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BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY
TOWN HALL, BOMBAY.

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PAPERS

RELATING TO

MILITARY OPERATIONS

108658

AFFGHANISTAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament, by Command of Her Majesty,
1843.

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PAPERS

RELATING TO

MILITARY OPERATIONS

IN

AFFGHANISTAN.

No. 1.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee of the East India Company.

Honorable Sirs, *Fort William, December* 22, No. 109, 1841.

IT may be of advantage to your Honorable Committee, that we endeavour to draw out a succinct narrative of the disastrous events which have lately occurred at Cabool, and in other parts of Affghanistan, with some examination of the causes which have led to these events, and an exposition of the views with which, in the present state of our information, we are disposed to regard them.

2. We are unfortunately able but most imperfectly to perform this task; we have before us but few authentic documents; the latest date of the dispatches received from Sir William Macnaghten is only of 26th October; and all else that we know is collected from two or three dispatches written, upon this side of the passes, by Sir Robert Sale, from fragments of private coprespondence, and from the rumours which have reached Candahar and Peshawur; but we believe that the facts in our possession, such as we shall give them to your Honorable Committee, may be relied upon.

3. The force at, and near, Cabool, consisted, at the beginning of October, of Her Majesty's 13th and 44th Regiments of Foot, the 5th, 35th, 37th, and 54th Regiments Bengal Native Infantry, the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry, a company of Foot, and a troop of Horse Artillery, besides minor details, in addition to two regiments of the disciplined infantry of the Shah's contingent, the headquarters of one of the corps of Hindoostanee Cavalry belonging to that contingent, a mountain train of Artillery attached to the same force under Captain Backhouse, of the Bengal Army, and a number of the Shah's guns under the charge of Lieutenant Warburton, with some strength, of the extent of which we are not accurately informed, of Affghan horse, partly under British command. And of this force it was intended that Her Majesty's 13th, and the 35th and 37th Native Infantry, with a company of Artillery, some Sappers, &c., should proceed in the autumn to the provinces; two Native regiments, and, if it should be found necessary, one European regiment, the 9th, being held in readiness for their relief. One of the Shah's Hindoostanee regiments, the 6th, was stationed at Chareekar, about 130 miles to the north of Cabool, and the remainder of the force was divided between the Bala Hissar, which overlooks the town, and in which the Shah resides, and the Cantonment, which is a strong post about three miles to its north. The aspect of things at the capital, even to the very end of October, appears to have been altogether pacific. Many of our officers resided, some with their families, in the town. The Commissariat establishments were partly placed within its walls; our officers are said to have walked and rode in all directions without apprehension or interruption; and, though it was notorious that the Priesthood and the Chiefs of Clans, with a large portion of the military retainers immediately dependent upon them, regarded with extreme dislike the

state of things introduced under our influence, no idea was entertained of an universal discontent, or of the hazard of a general and formidable outbreak. Indeed, for many weeks previously, almost every communication, public and private, had represented the country as improving, and the difficulties of our Affghan relations as in a fair train for permanent satisfactory settlement.

4. An expedition against a predatory tribe at Zao, in the direction of Ghuznee, had been undertaken at the end of September. It had terminated successfully, and without bloodshed, in the submission of the tribe. Our troops were on their return to Cabool, and the 20th of October had been named by Sir William Macnaghten as the day on which he should put Sir Alexander Burnes in charge of his office, and set out on his journey to Bombay.

5. By a private leeter from Sir W. Macnaghten, dated 6th of October, we learnt that some discontent had exhibited itself on the part of several of the chiefs of the tribes of the Eastern Ghilzies, who command the passes leading from Gundamuck, to within twelve or thirteen miles of Cabool. These passes are of a very difficult character, but a good understanding had been maintained with the chiefs from our entrance into the country, up to that time. The ground of this discontent was a reduction in the amount of the grain allowances granted to the chiefs, the portion of the allowances remaining, being regarded as more valuable to them than their receipts in the time of Dost Mohamed Khan, in consequence of the high prices at present prevailing. It appears that, on this reduction being made, the chiefs left Cabool, and an insurrection took place in the passes, that the dawks were robbed, and that all regular communications were stopped. These disturbances were lightly treated; an Affghan chief, of supposed loyalty and influence, was sent forward to deal with the malcontents; and it was hoped that peace would be restored, rather by negotiation than by force of arms. Towards the 12th, it had been determined that the passes should be forced. Her Majesty's 13th, the 35th Native Infantry, and, subsequently, the 37th Native Infantry, a squadron of the 5th Bengal Cavalry, and some other horse, with a portion of artillery, were allotted to this service, and placed under the command of Brigadier Sale; and Captain Macgregor, the Political Agent at Jellalabad, was attached to it. The Khoord Cabool Pass, as may be seen by the official dispatches, was gallantly forced on the 12th, though with a loss to the British troops employed, of from thirty to forty men. A night attack was the next day repelled by the 35th Native Infantry, and the enemy's position at Tezeen was subsequently attacked on the 22nd with success. Captain Macgregor unguarded, with Captain Paton, visited the camp of the insurgents. He was kindly received by the chiefs, and he believed that he had made a satisfactory arrangement with them; but, though for some days afterwards the professions of the chiefs were invariably those of peace and of friendship, the attacks from the hills upon the detachment in its advance were unceasing, and it will be seen, by Sir Robert Sale's reports, with what difficulties, and with how severe a loss of men and baggage, he made good his advance on the 31st of October, to the station of Gundamuck, where was Captain Burn with a strong detachment of mountaineer Jezzailchees, chiefly of the Afredee or Khyber tribes.

6. Sir William Macnaghten's official report, the latest we have received from him upon any subject, under date the 26th of October, gives his view of the origin and progress of this quarrel with the Eastern Ghilzies. A copy of that report is appended to this dispatch.

7. Sir Robert Sale had found it desirable only to take on with him the 13th and 35th, with artillery, cavalry and details, from Khoord Cabool; and the 37th Native Infantry was ordered, in the first instance, to remain in position, with a view mainly to keep open the communication, and was, subsequently, on the outbreaak of the insurrection in the city, called back to Cabool; a movement it was only able to effect with a loss of baggage and some men, (five killed and fifteen wounded.)

8. At Gundamuck. Sir Robert Sale was in a position of some difficulty; his camel-men were deserting him; his ammunition was in great part expended; he was overhung by the enemy in the hills, and the post was not a strong one, whilst it was distant from any support which could be afforded to him from Peshawur. He had received a summons to return to Cabool, to which he felt himself obliged to represent, in answer, that, without means of carriage, that with the enemy in force upon every point of his passage, and ill-provided as he was with ammunition, the absolute destruction of his Brigade would be the certain

result of the attempt. He determined, therefore, on the advice of a council of war, upon retiring upon Jellalabad, and of making a strong intrenchment at that place. Upon the 6th of November he destroyed a fort of one of the insurgent chiefs, of whose flight in revolt from Cabool he had received intimation, and, upon the 11th, he marched to Jellalabad, leaving Gundamuck in charge of Captain Burn, with his detachment of Jezzailchees and a corps of Jan-Baz horse. These troops became rapidly disordered. The Jan-Baz horse, and a large number of the Afreedee Jezzailchees, went over to the enemy, or deserted to their homes. With such of the Jezzailchees as adhered to him, Captain Burn retired also to Jellalabad, leaving, however, two guns and much baggage behind him.

9. Brigadier Sale found himself at Jellalabad, surrounded and attacked by all the armed population of the country. He had at first but six days' provision; his men were harassed, and the defences of the place were exceedingly weak. The latest letters from him are of November 27th; he had attacked and dispersed the enemy, and collected supplies for thirty days. Ammunition had been sent from Peshawur; but it is uncertain whether it had reached him. All the later reports, however, from this post are in a tone of laudable and increasing confidence. The enemy, after their first defeat, had not again ventured to assail it; and we may look, we trust, with certainty, to the security of this portion of our troops.

10. Captain Ferris, an officer commanding one of the Shah's irregular Affghan regiments, had been posted at Besh-Boolak, between the Khyber Pass and Jellalabad, with a detachment of his corps. When the country became disorganized in consequence of our troops falling back to Jellalabad, his camp was attacked by numbers of the surrounding tribes, but his men, chiefly Eusofzye Patans, from the country subject to the Sikhs, fought bravely, and he was able to cut his way through the enemy, and to make good his retreat, though compelled to abandon about 38,000 rupees of public treasure, and all private property.

11. Mr. Mackeson, a gentleman not in the regular service, had charge of the fort of Ali Musjid in the Khyber Pass, with 150 men, also of the Eusofyze tribe; and the Khyberees, when the infection of alarm and disorder reached them, shewed an inclination to disturb the peace of the Pass. The chiefs disavowed all participation with the tribes in this feeling, but the fort was nevertheless attacked, and the enemy nearly crowned the heights, but the Eusofzyes were faithful, and the assailants were repulsed; and in the end, by the interference of General Avitabile and Captain Mackeson, the insurgents departed, and the fort has been replenished. The known march of large Sikh and British reinforcements towards Peshawur, and the interest of the chiefs in keeping on terms with us, for the sake of their considerable pecuniary allowances, may, possibly, lead the Khyberees not to declare against us.

12. We know not with accuracy what indications of trouble preceded the tragical events which took place on the 2nd of November at Cabool. In the letter from Captain Mackeson, at Peshawur, of the 11th of October, forwarded to your Honorable Committee with our dispatch of the 20th ultimo, mention is made of six leading Dooranee Chiefs having incurred the King's displeasure with reference to discontents, openly and disrespectfully evinced by them, in consequence of reductions in the allowances, to which the narrowness of the King's finances, led him, under Sir William Macnaghten's advice, to have recourse. We have received no official report regarding that occurrence, but your Honorable Committee are aware from the papers which we have at different times forwarded to you, that a reduction of the retainers of the military khans, and the formation of bodies of horse, paid directly by the Crown, had been among the objects of policy which have appeared most important for giving strength and stability to the King's Government. Your Honorable Committee are sensible also that it has been a necessary and prominent object of our care to bring the Shah's disbursements, as nearly as possible, within the limit of his income. In pursuance of these objects, the six chiefs referred to appear to have been subject to some retrenchment, and opposition at one time seems to have been attempted in an indirect manner, to the organization of the bodies of horse to be paid by the State. The Shah himself, who has made over for the most part the duty of administration to his minister, Mahomed Oosman Khan, an individual possessing the entire confidence and approbation of Sir William Macnaghten, may be believed to have thrown the responsibility of these distasteful measures mainly on that officer, with whom the Envoy and Minister was, doubtless, in general

estimation, identified; and we find accordingly that, in the popular rumours which have prevailed, at least the dissatisfaction of the Shah with the state of things existing at Cabool has been very readily taken for granted. We attach to this dispatch, such notices as the Governor-General has found in the private or demi-official letters addressed to him, on the resistance and disgrace of the six chiefs alluded to. These notices become of importance, since we find, from a comparison of Captain Mackeson's dispatch before cited, with the names which have subsequently been most bruited as those of the leaders of the insurrection, that several of these six chiefs have taken the leading part in exciting the troubles which we have now to lament. Meer Ufzul Khan Urzbegee is the chief on whose flight from Cabool, and rebellion, Brigadier Sale proceeded to occupy his fort as above described; and others of the chiefs, such as Abdoola Khan Atchikzye, Secunder Khan, and Abdool Salam Khan, are those most generally mentioned, in reports which have reached us alike from Candahar and Peshawur, as the heads of the disturbance.

13. On the 1st November, we learn that Meer Ufzul Khan Urzbegee left the city and set up the standard of revolt, but we must suppose that there was no keen apprehension of serious danger. On the next day, however, our countrymen were attacked on every side. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Burnes, with his brother Lieutenant Burnes, and Lieutenant Broadfoot, of the Bengal European Regiment, were surprized and murdered in the city. Lieutenant Sturt, of the Engineers, received, it is said, in the presence of the Shah, but under circumstances of which we have no information, five wounds. Captain Trevor and his family, but narrowly escaped. The houses of the British residents were burnt or pillaged. The Commissariat stores and treasure in the city were lost, and the enemy obtained possession of a fort in the immediate vicinity of the cantonment. We subjoin to this narrative a précis of intelligence addressed by Lady to Sir Robert Sale, by which your Committee will learn that there was a succession of engagements from the 2nd to 8th November, by which, though our troops invariably behaved well, and obtained advantage, but little impression was made upon the enemy. We further know that a successful sally was made on the 13th, and that the stock of provisions, which on the 8th was estimated as only sufficient for five, was, on the 14th, equal to ten days' consumption; and the tone in a note from Sir William Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor, at Jellalabad, of the 18th, was certainly not one of any immediate apprehension. Negotiations were still apparently open between Sir William Macnaghten and some of the chiefs, but, as far as is stated, with no satisfactory prospect. Copies of all papers which have reached us on the progress and aspect of events at Cabool, since the insurrection commenced, accompany this dispatch. We must necessarily regard the position of our force at that city with great anxiety. It was divided; its means of supply were narrow and precarious; the whole surrounding country was opposed to it; and the season was approaching at which the passes of the hills would be closed by the snow. On the other hand, there are bravery and discipline; the interval between the Bala Hissar and the Cantonments is open, and a junction could easily be made; and the town may be forced to afford supplies; whilst the falling of the snows may have the effect of forcing, at least, a partial dispersion of the enemy. We must painfully await the result, for it seems to be physically impossible, that troops could, before the spring, approach Cabool for rescue.

14. Simultaneously with the events which we have related as having occurred at Cabool, the Kohistan broke into insurrection, and two officers, Captain Maule and Lieutenant Wheeler, attached to the irregular regiment of Kohistanees, were murdered, and the Goorkha regiment of the Shah's service, posted at Chareekar in that country was attacked, and all of its officers were wounded, of whom Captain Codrington has since died. We have since heard that this corps has been overpowered and destroyed, and that Major Pottinger, the Political Agent at Chareekar, and one officer, Lieutenant Haughton, have made their way to the camp at Cabool.

15. Beyond these sad details we have to report the surprize, and almost entire destruction, by a large party of Ghilzies at Sydabad, between Ghuznee and Cabool, of Captain Woodburn, of the Shah's service, and a detachment of 138 invalids, proceeding from Ghuznee towards Cabool; and we know that the disturbances had extended to between seventy and eighty miles south of Ghuznee, and that the country was disordered in that quarter up to the 17th or 18th of November.

16. Our latest direct accounts from Candahar are of the 19th, but there is a letter from Major Leech, at Kelat-i-Ghilzie, of the 20th, which must have been forwarded from Candahar on the 22nd or 23rd of November. At that time all was quiet in that neighbourhood, yet it must be apprehended that eventually disturbances of a similar nature may also take place there; but the country is less unfavourable to action. General Nott's force is strong, and we must hope that he will lose no time in calling in every detachment which is not securely posted. The three regiments, the 16th, 22nd, and 43rd Bengal Native Infantry, that had been on the point of returning to India by the Bolan Pass and Shikarpore, with a troop of Horse Artillery and Cavalry, were, upon a requisition from Major-General Elphinstone, dated 3rd November, the day after the insurrection at Cabool, directed to march from Candahar towards Ghuznee and Cabool, and we learn that they actually marched on the 16th. We are told that the seasons will not be opposed at any time of the year to such a march as far as Ghuznee; but the ground between Ghuznee and Cabool rises 2000 feet, and the road will, it is to be feared, not be passable until late in the spring. We have intelligence of the advance of the brigade, without difficulty, half-way to Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and we shall watch, with anxious interest, its further progress. We have, further, a post at Quetta, which has been reinforced by Major Outram, and which, it is possible, may be harassed by the Kakur Affghans, though Major Outram apprehends no serious attack from that tribe; and he is confident that the late arrangements with Nusseer Khan are so satisfactory to the Brahoe and Belooch chiefs and people, that he has nothing to fear from them. He is strong, too, in Upper and Lower Sinde, and has wisely determined upon not parting with a single soldier until any excitement which may be caused by the events of Cabool shall have subsided.

17. We have thus stated, in as accurate an outline as the means at our command will permit, the afflicting events by which our position in Affghanistan has been so suddenly and seriously endangered. We have marked the obstinacy with which, notwithstanding the apparent accommodation of the Eastern Ghilzie chiefs with Captain Macgregor about the 22nd of November, the tribes under them, stated not to be numerous or powerful, though in possession of a very difficult country, contested every portion of the advance of the British troops eastward, at a time when these tribes stood alone openly committed to insurrection. We cannot doubt that the comparative success of the Ghilzie mountaineers in their defiles, the report of which must have reached Cabool with much exaggeration, had an important effect in giving encouragement to the disaffected in that city. And we think it may be assumed as certain, that the discontent of the Dooranee chiefs at Shah Shooja's court, with the arrangements of the King's Government, which partially affected their pecuniary interests, and threatened to destroy their political influence, has been the direct operative cause of the formidable rebellion by which our authority has been shaken. This discontent found ready material for the excitement of hostility and disorder, in the national and religious feeling of the Affghan tribes, whom our presence, and the measures pursued under our influence, have failed to conciliate. The population, with the exception of the labouring cultivators, who probably regard our ascendancy with satisfaction, but whose good will is of little value in such a crisis, is armed, and accustomed to turbulenae and violence; and time has not admitted of any effectual repression of these habits, or of giving stability to the new order of things.

18. We have applied ourselves immediately to concerting such measures, and issuing such instructions, as the exigency of the case seemed to require and admit; and we forward with this communication copies of our several dispatches to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to the Government of Bombay, to Sir Wm. Macnaghten, Mr. Clerk, and our principal political functionaries. It will be seen that we have laid it down as a rule of our conduct that we would do all in our power to rescue our detachments wherever they may be encompassed by danger; but that, if the position of command and influence, which we have held at the capital of Affghanistan, should once be absolutely and entirely lost, we would make no more sacrifices of the very serious and extensive nature which could alone be effectual, except under positive instructions from England, for the re-establishment of our supremacy throughout the country. If matters should, by force or negotiation, be restored at Cabool, we shall have time for deliberation; and, if they should be but rarely maintained in their present state of precarious difficulty, we must await the approach of spring before we can act with vigour or

advantage. We have particularly, however, felt it our duty distinctly at this distance to give instructions applicable to all contingencies, and therefore to contemplate the most unfavourable issue to the struggle which our troops are maintaining at Cabool; and, in this case, upon the anticipation of which we cannot conceal from ourselves the hazard of extending dangers, and of the insurrection assuming in other quarters also the same national and united character, we have authorized General Nott and Major Rawlinson, with such caution and deliberation, in their military and political proceedings, as may serve to avoid discredit, and to promise safety, so to shape their course as best to promote the end of the eventual relinquishment of our direct control in the several Affghan provinces, and to provide for the concentration of all forces and detachments as may be most conducive to the security of the troops. On our side, we would immediately collect a strong force at Peshawur, with the view of its acting in aid of Sir Robert Sale at Jellalabad, and making a demonstration of strength on that frontier; and the troops as here enumerated are already on their march, viz., 60th, 64th, 30th, and 53rd Regiments Native Infantry, with details of Cavalry, and a company of European Foot Artillery. Two other regiments, one of them Her Majesty's 9th Foot, are held also in readiness to march, in the event of Mr. Clerk and the Commander-in-Chief so determining; and a Sikh detachment, consisting of four battalions of Infantry, 2000 Horse, and Artillery, has been directed by the Lahore Durbar to act in co-operation with it. We hope that this force will be sufficient to keep in awe the tribes of the Khyber Pass, or, if necessary, to force that defile, and give support to General Sale, and ultimately, should circumstances admit of such course, to form a base from whence communications may be opened with Cabool. We have requested the Government of Bombay, and Major Outram, to detain, for the present, all the troops which are present in Upper Sinde, and in any event to look to his having a force of not less than two effective brigades, at Sukkur, and Shikarpore. We feel it to be absolutely necessary that we thus hold a strong front upon the line of the Indus. And this front it is our intention and determination, subject to the orders of yonr Honorable Committee, firmly to maintain; and we have endeavoured to do this, without in any degree relaxing from that care which is due to the protection of our frontiers, and to the preservation of tranquillity in the territories of India, and in those of our dependent allies. Even if six regiments should be sent to Peshawur, the state of our northern cantonments will be such as to enable his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to collect, at a very short notice, for the field, besides an ample force of Artillery, an army of not less than twelve or fourteen regiments of Infantry, and nine or ten of Cavalry, of which at least three of the former, and two of the latter, would be Europeans. For details of the orders which we have given, and of the discretion which we have requested his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in communicating with Mr. Clerk, to exercise, we would refer your Honorable Committee to the copies of our several dispatches, the purport and effect of which will, we trust, meet with your approbation, particularly in the part of them which relates to the using the occasion, in order to establish more intimately our union with the Sikh Government.

19. It is possible that we shall, at the earnest request of the Court at Catmandhoo, made after a compliance with all of Mr. Hodgson's demands, and the strongest professions of friendly intentions, withdraw the force which had been stationed immediately on the Nepalese frontier, at Mullye and Segowlee; but, in this case, we shall keep more than the customary complement of troops at the stations of Benares and Dinapore, and shall be able, in the event of the Nepalese Court relapsing into unfriendly movements, to bring a strong force into the field. We most confidently believe, however, that there will be no necessity for the assemblage of such a force, either towards Nepal, or in the north-west provinces. The professions of the Rajah of Nepal are yet fresh, and he is in no state of preparation; while the interests of the British Government and the Sikh Durbar, in all that regards the state of affairs in Affghanistan, are substantially the same, and the Durbar appears to be acting cordially in concert with us upon that conviction. But we are aware that the occurrence of serious disaster to the British arms in any quarter, will give rise, if not to injurious attempts, at least to something of excitement, and to evil report, and we would appear strong and prepared on every side.

20. In concluding this dispatch, we would observe, that your Honorable Committee are aware, that three regiments on the Indian establishment are now

detached, and are likely for some considerable period to continue so, with the expedition in China, and that one of the regiments in Bengal, Her Majesty's 3rd Foot, has nearly completed its term of Indian service. Under these circumstances, we should think it prudent that the Government in England should, at the earliest convenient period, send out two fresh regiments to Bengal, affording a reinforcement which would enable your authorities here to maintain the exhibition of unquestionably commanding strength in every part of the empire. It will be remarked that, for the present, an European regiment has been withdrawn from Nagpore, a post which ought not to be so weakened, excepting in emergency, and to which an European corps should be returned at the earliest possible time.

21. Your Honorable Committee will find, among the inclosures of this dispatch, a correspondence respecting the temporary detention of the Ameer, Dost Mahomed Khan, on his route to Loodiana. We learn from Captain Nicolson, that the Ameer has submitted to this detention without making any serious difficulty. He is now at Kurnaul, and it is Captain Nicolson's opinion that he has no desire or intention of abandoning the protection he is under, within our frontier.

22. In one of the later reports from Captain Mackeson, it is mentioned that letters had been received by the chiefs of the Afreedee tribes, from the Nawabs Zeman Khan and Jubbar Khan, brothers of the Ameer, stating that they were active in the insurrection, and that they awaited the arrival of his son, Mahomed Akbar Khan, who was then expected to place himself at its head. This is the only notice, which has reached us, of the family of the Ameer being connected with the disturbances.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND,
W. W. BIRD,
WM. CASEMENT,
H. T. PRINSEP.

P.S.—Since this dispatch was prepared, advices have been received from Major Outram, at Dadur, to the 29th, with intelligence from Candahar to the 23rd November; at those dates, all is said to have been perfectly quiet at Candahar; and Major Outram writes, in his usual tone of confidence and ease, respecting the country under his control.

We have accounts from Peshawur to the 6th, and from Jellalabad to the 3rd December, representing the entire success of the troops at the latter post to the 1st instant; and mentioning that native reports represent an improving state of things at Cabool; it being said that supplies are brought into camp at night for sale.

No. 2.

Sir W. H. Macnaghten, Bart., Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Shooja, to T. H. Maddock, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir, *Cabool, October 26*, 1841.

I HAVE now the honor to report the circumstances attending the recent rebellion of certain of the Eastern Ghilzie Chiefs.

2. The first intimation I received of this rebellion was about three weeks ago, to the effect that the chiefs had suddenly left Cabool; and, the day after, I learnt that they had stopped a caravan on the high road, and had taken the property and its owners to the hills, at a distance from the road.

3. I immediately waited upon His Majesty, and prevailed upon him to send the Governor, Humza Khan, with a message to the rebels, inviting them to return to their allegiance, and promising redress of any real grievance they might have sustained. This mission failed of success, because Humza Khan was the chief instigator of the rebellion.

4. Two reasons have been assigned for this rebellion. First, the reduction of the allowances of the Ghilzie Chiefs; and, secondly, the engagement that was

required of them to be responsible for robberies by the Eastern Ghilzies, wherever committed.

5. On the first point I may observe that the necessities of His Majesty, and the frequent prohibitions I had received against further reliance on the resources of the British Government, appeared to admit of no alternative. I was assured that the chiefs had admitted the justice of, and cheerfully acquiesced in, the reduction; moreover, that, after the reduction was effected, the chiefs would, in consequence of the enhanced value of grain, receive larger allowances than they did in the time of Dost Mahomed.

6. On the second point, I am compelled to state that the grievance of the chiefs was well founded. Their liabilities should have been only co-extensive with their respective jurisdictions. Unfortunately they never represented their grievance to me. They have been prohibited from visiting me by the before-named Governor, on the part of the Shah, (Humza Khan), a worthless man, alike inimical to us and to His Majesty. The good result of the recent rebellion, is the disgrace and imprisonment of this man. His father was killed in the Shah's service; and His Majesty, an amiable weakness, was unwilling to acknowledge the demerits of the son, of which, however, he is now fully sensible.

7. One of the chief rebels, Mahomed Shah Khan, has very large possessions in the district of Lughman. I therefore urged the Minister to send out a relative of his own with 300 Huzarbash Horse to that neighbourhood. This was done without the delay of an hour, and the designs of the rebels were for the time frustrated. They attacked the party, *en route*, but did comparatively little damage; and the conspirators found it necessary to separate, and each to look after his individual interests, before the plot was matured.

8. There are four thanas, or posts, guarded by Ghilzies, between Cabool and Gundamuk. The first belongs to a chief named Khoda Buksh, a relative, by marriage, of the ex-Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan. The second to Sher Mahomed Khan, the third to Allahzar Khan, and the fourth to Gool Mahomed Khan. The second named of these (who has by far the greatest influence) was gained over to our cause at an early period, and the third was always staunch in his allegiance. Khoda Buksh and Gool Mahomed went into open rebellion, and with them was joined Mahomed Shah Khan already mentioned, a Ghilzie Chief, possessing extensive property in Lughman, and a relative also, by marriage, of the ex-Ameer.

9. The conduct of Gool Mahomed was the most inexcusable of all. On the Shah's arrival in this country, that individual was in a state of destitution, and was placed in power and affluence by His Majesty. He has been indefatigable in his endeavours to stir up the surrounding tribes to rebellion, but I have much gratification in adding that he has in no one instance succeeded, a fact which speaks well for His Majesty's Government. Gool Mahomed Khan was immediately deposed, and his place supplied by Burkut Khan, a chief of great influence and respectability.

10. On the separation of the rebels, Mahomed Shah Khan retreated to Lughman. Khoda Buksh Khan, with not more than 100 followers, proceeded to occupy the Khoord Cabool Pass; and Gool Mahomed Khan went into his own country to raise the tribes. Lughman was already occupied by the Huzarbash horse, and I had no apprehension from that quarter. I had the greatest confidence in the new chief appointed by His Majesty to supersede Gool Mahomed, and the first thing to be done was to dislodge Khoda Buksh and his party of rebels from the strong defile which they had occupied. The manner in which this service was performed, has doubtless been reported to Government by Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., and it only remains for me to add, that the prowess displayed by the British troops on this occasion was the admiration of all the Affghans, and there were not a few on our side who witnessed it.

11. Captain Macgregor having in the mean time returned from the Zoormut expedition, I caused him to communicate with the rebels, and he promised, in His Majesty's name, and my own, to inquire into, and redress, all their grievances. Messengers with conciliatory proposals were also sent, but to no purpose. Whilst professing the greatost desire to return to their allegiance, the party of Khoda Buksh and Gool Mahomed, which latter had joined the former after his expulsion from the pass, made a night attack on the position of the 35th regiment of Native Infantry at Khoord Cabool, the particulars of which also have no doubt been communicated to Government.

12. On this occasion a party of His Majesty's own Affghan Horse were present in our camp; and rumours, I understand, are rife that this party (consisting of about 80 persons) were guilty of treachery, and actually fired upon our troops. The particulars of the case have not yet reached me, but it shall be duly inquired into, and His Majesty will, I feel assured, make a signal example of any one who may be proved to have thus offended. But if this party of Affghans suffered themselves to be surprised by a night attack, or even if, in the confusion of the moment, they fired shots in the direction of our own camp, it would be uncharitable in any one familiar with the Affghan character, to form from such premises the conclusion that they were guilty of deliberate treachery. But I merely wish his Lordship in Council to suspend his judgment on this transaction, for I well know the predisposition that exists in certain quarters to condemn, without hesitation and without reason, every Affghan institution, and that even the irreproachable character of His Majesty has not secured him from the attacks of malevolence and calumny.

13. After the night attack, the 35th N. I. were joined by Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, the 37th Regiment N. I., with a suitable proportion of artillery and cavalry, and the rebels were in the meantime joined at Tezeen by Mahomed Shah Khan, Azeez Khan, and a party from Tugno. Captain Macgregor estimates their united numbers at about 700 men.

14. Our troops moved upon Tazeen on the 22nd instant, and I need not detail the operations which there took place, as they will have been reported to his Lordship in Council by the General commanding in Affghanistan.

15. I have now received information from Captain Macgregor to the effect, that our differences with the chiefs have been amicably arranged. The particulars have not reached me; but when Captain Macgregor submits a statement of his negociations, a copy of it shall be forwarded without loss of time for the information of Government. From what little I know of the terms conceded to the rebels, they would seem to me to be too favorable; but I have the fullest reliance on Captain Macgregor's discretion. The chiefs have furnished hostages, and have consented to the appointment of Burkut Khan, by which means their confederacy has been dissolved.

16. I have been thus particular in detailing the circumstances of this rebellion, from my conviction, that the most false and exaggerated reports regarding it will be circulated by a class of persons whom I have already described to his Lordship in Council, and whose sole pursuit is the dissemination of groundless and alarming reports, through the medium of the public prints.

17. The inconvenience to which we have been subjected, by the interruption of our communications, has been very great, but it only shows how easily annoyance may be inflicted, by means which would otherwise be contemptible, on a government, which has so long a line of mountainous country to defend, and whose chiefs have been so accustomed to a life of lawless turbulence, that they do not hesitate to array themselves in opposition to authority upon the slightest provocation, and without a hope of ultimate success.

18. We have learned, by the experience of this rebellion, one important fact, which is, that our regular European and Hindostanee troops fight against Affghans, in their native hills, to a great disadvantage. The superior agility of the latter enables them to evade pursuit, and their fuzils, or long guns, carry with deadly precision to a distance, where our muskets are harmless. There is now no enemy to oppose us in the open plain, and should we hereafter be forced into hostilities, the desultory mountain warfare will doubtless be that with which we shall have to contend. Should his Lordship in Council therefore resolve on increasing His Majesty's force, with a view of recalling the regular regiments from this country, I would suggest that, instead of organizing any more Hindostanee troops, three infantry corps should be raised from the Eusufzyes, Suhaks, Undurees, Kohistanees, Khyberries, and the inhabitants of other mountainous regions, to undergo a moderate degree of discipline, and to be armed with the jezzail of the country. By a judicious admixture of different tribes, by attention to their prejudices, and by regular pay, I should have little fear of their fidelity. In the meantime, endeavours will be made to impart as great a degree of efficiency as possible to His Majesty's Jezzailchees, who are a very useful body of men. In the above opinion I am supported by the authority of Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes, C.B., and of Brigadier Anquetil.

19. It is my intention to forward a copy of this letter, for the information of the Honorable the Secret Committee, through the Government of Bombay.

I have, &c.,
W. H. MACNAGHTEN,
Envoy and Minister.

No. 3.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Fort William, November* 22, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch, dated 1st instant, recommending, for the reasons stated by the Accountant North-West Provinces, that the dispatch of the second convoy to Affghanistan, be changed from the 10th January to 10th February next, and to inform you that the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council has sanctioned this arrangement.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 4.

Major-General Sir Robert Sale to Captain Grant.

Sir, *Camp, Bootkhak, October*, 12, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to state to you, for the information of Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., that the task of forcing the pass of Khoord Cabool, and defeating the rebels posted within it, has, this morning, been accomplished.

After fully weighing the whole of the information brought to me at various periods in the course of yesterday, I came to the conclusion that the main body of the insurgents was posted behind a breastwork near the middle of the pass, and that they would defend it, as well as the almost inaccessible heights on either flank of it.

My plan of attack was therefore arranged as follows. I determined to employ 200 Jezzailchees, under the well known Sirdar Jan Fishan Khan, to create a diversion by assaulting, in flank and rear, the precipitous ridge which forms the southern side of the Durra, whilst the troops under my command entered its gorge, and attacked the enemy in front. The force left camp at 6 A.M. The advanced guard consisted of the two guns of Foot Artillery, under Lieutenant Dawes, two companies of the 13th Light Infantry, under Captain Fenwick and Lieutenant George King, the flank companies of the 35th Native Infantry under Captain Younghusband, and a detachment of pioneers under Captain Broadfoot, the whole being in charge of Captain Seaton, 35th Regiment of Native Infantry. The remainder of the 13th and 35th formed our main body. As we approached the insurgents' position, we found that the reports of our spies had been substantially correct, but that the enemy were withdrawing from behind their breastwork in the valley, and occupying the rocky ridges of the mountains on either side. They opened upon us a well-directed fire, and, at the very commencement of the affair, I received a wound from a ball, above the ancle, which ultimately compelled me to leave the field. Whilst I remained on it, however, I directed two companies of the 13th, and one of the 35th, to ascend the precipices on either hand in face of the enemy, and I must, in justice to them, mention the gallantry, activity, and perseverance with which this duty was performed, and the enemy driven by our skirmishers from point to point of eminences almost perpendicular. When compelled to retire, I resigned the command into the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie, C.B., and have the pleasure to forward his report, detailing the further progress and completion of the affair.

I beg to add that, whilst I remained at the head of the force, the conduct of both officers and men afforded me the highest satisfaction, and I am greatly pleased with the spirited and judicious manner in which Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie brought the matter to a close.

The exertions of my Brigade-Major, Captain Wade, and of Captain Have-

lock, and Lieutenant Airey, of Major-General Elphinstone's personal staff, who attached themselves to me as volunteers on this service, demand my amplest acknowledgments. The last-mentioned of these officers had a horse shot under him. I beg to forward the casualty return of the 13th; that of the Artillery, Sappers, and 35th Native Infantry shall follow.

A Memorandum of the ammunition expended, is also annexed. I am thankful for the promised reinforcement of two guns; and if the 37th Regiment Native Infantry can also be promply sent out, it will relieve the troops from part of a very harassing outpost duty, in an exposed plain, in the vicinity of mountains.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

P.S.—I ought not to have forgotten to mention, that Captain Bellew, Assistant Quartermaster-General, who had previously, under General Elphinstone's instructions, reconnoitred the passes occupied by the enemy, accompanied me during my march from Cabool, and ably aided me, until the moment of my being wounded, upon which he continued to render valuable assistance to Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie. To Brevet-Captain Trevor, 3rd Light Cavalry, politically employed on this occasion, I was indebted for the information obtained at Bootkhak; upon it my plan of attack was based, and it proved correct in every particular; and he was personally active and conspicuous throughout the engagement.

No. 5.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Dennie to Major-General Sir R. H. Sale.

Sir, *Camp, Bootkhak, October* 12, 1841.

I BEG, on my return to camp, to report the detail of the progress and completion of the affair with the rebels, in the Khoord Cabool Pass, begun in so spirited a manner under your personal command this morning.

On receiving over charge of the troops, in consequence of your wound compelling you to leave the valley, I pursued your plan of operations, by pressing the enemy as much as the nature of the ground would admit, on both flanks, and rapidly moving on the main column and guns, with the intention of dislodging them from their breastworks, if still occupied, but this the insurgents had evacuated, though they ventured to dispute the possession of the precipitous heights, and to direct a well-aimed fire against our main force. Disconcerted, however, by the bold manner in which they were met by our skirmishers, as they scaled the mountain sides, and by the steady progress of the advance, they gradually abandoned their first position, and retired to the highest ridges and pinnacles of the Durra.

I had resolved, from the first, not to allow any lateral opposition to divert me from the main purpose of clearing the valley, and a little after 7 A.M., I had the satisfaction of reaching the southern gorge of the pass, and establishing there the 35th Native Infantry, and the guns, in an excellent post, constituted by the walls of a strong and capacious, though deserted, fort. By this time our skirmishers had everywhere got possession of the heights, and the Affghan force under Jan Fishan Khan, had also crowned the mountains, and displayed their banners on its summit.

You are aware, that it was part of your original plan, that the 13th Light Infantry should return to their encampment at Bootkhak. As the column marched back, the enemy again showed themselves on several points of the defile, and opened a fire, and some loss was sustained in repelling these attacks, and in withdrawing our flanking parties.

The troops finally arrived at Bootkhak about 2 P.M., a good deal harassed by the exertions of the morning. You will see by the returns, that the casualties have not been few, which arose from the great advantage afforded by the ground to an enemy trained to mountain warfare.

Permit me to add the expression of my admiration of the fearless manner in which the men of the 13th, chiefly young soldiers, ascended heights nearly perpendicular, under the sharp fire of the insurgents. The Sepoys of the 35th

rivalled and equalled them in steadiness, activity, and intrepidity. I am happy to say, that no loss whatever of the baggage of the Native Infantry was sustained in traversing this valley of plunderers.

I have not yet received the casualty return of the 35th Regiment Native Infantry, but have reason to believe that it is in amount about equal to that of the 13th, and am informed that they have one officer, Captain Younghusband, severely wounded.

I have, &c.,
W. H. DENNIE.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the Force under the command of Major-General Sir R. H. Sale, in forcing the Pass of Khoord Cabool, on the 12th October, 1841.

2nd Company 6th Battalion Artillery—1 private, 3 horses wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—2 privates killed; 2 subalterns, 2 serjeants, 16 privates, wounded.

35th Regiment N.I.—2 privates killed; 1 captain, 1 naick, 8 sepoys, wounded.

Sappers and Miners—2 privates killed; 2 privates wounded.

Total—6 privates killed; 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 2 serjeants, 1 corporal, 27 privates, 3 horses, wounded.

Grand Total—6 killed: 33 wounded, and 3 horses wounded.

Names of Officers Wounded.

General Staff.—Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., commanding, severely; Captain Wade, Major of Brigade, slightly.

13th Light Infantry.—Lieutenant Mein, severely; Ensign Oakes, slightly.

35th Regiment Native Infantry.—Captain Younghusband, severely.

H. WADE, *Major of Brigade.*

No. 6.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Grant.

Camp in the Valley near Tezeen,
Sir, *October* 23, 1841.

I BEG to acquaint you for the information of Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., that the force united under my command, consisting of the 1st Brigade of Infantry, No. 6 Light Field Battery, the Mountain Train, the Corps of Sappers and Miners, a Squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry, and a Rissalah of the Shah's 2nd Cavalry, marched from Khoord Cabool towards Tezeen yesterday morning. Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, 35th, commanded the advanced guard, Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie, 13th, the main column, and Captain Oldfield, 5th Light Cavalry, the rear guard, in each of which troops of the several arms were appointed according to the best of my judgment. The force felt its way cautiously through the defiles of the Huft Kotul, occupying with skirmishers the hills on either flank, and leaving parties for the protection of our baggage and rear on selected points. Nothing was seen of the enemy until the advance and main body had halted in the Valley of Tezeen. From this low ground another vale stretches out towards the south-east, and on the sides and summits of the mountains which enclose the latter, were posted in every quarter bodies of the insurgents, whilst another portion of their force, consisting of foot, led on by Sirdars on horseback, and their mounted followers, showed a determination to dispute with us the possession of a conical hill, which partly closes the entrance of the branching valley, and barred our approach to Mohamed Ufzal's fort, a large work backed by gardens, which the rebels still garrisoned. From this eminence the advanced guard under Colonel Monteath drove them by a combined attack, and I then directed the 13th Light Infantry and a portion of Captain Abbott's battery to advance under Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie, and assault the fort itself. The insurgents, however, abandoned it after directing from it a feeble fire.

I immediately determined to establish in it a depôt for my sick and wounded,

and to take it as a point of support for ulterior operations and an appui to my camp, to be fixed under its walls, but as the enemy continued to occupy in force a nearly circular range of heights, and even boldly to skirmish in a lower part of the valley, it became necessary to drive them from such segments of the mountain as would, if remaining in their hands, have given them the power to command our position, and fire upon the troops with advantage at night. This led to a succession of skirmishes, which were maintained with great coolness and spirit by several companies of the 13th and one of the 35th, aided by the guns of Captain Abbott's battery and the Mountain Train, and supported by the cavalry. The combat was prolonged until after dusk, and the ammunition of one of the companies of the 13th having been expended, it was compelled temporarily to retire, and a very promising officer, Lieutenant Edward King, was killed at its head. A supply of cartridges and a reinforcement were promptly sent up, and the affair ended by the rebels being pushed off every part of the steep mountains which we designed to retain. The returns will show that our loss has been slight, and I have no doubt that the enemy suffered severely from the fire of our skirmishers and the shot of our batteries. The force bivouacked in position without an attempt being made upon our line. Morning showed us the heights everywhere deserted by the rebels, and if a negotiation, which they have opened in very humble terms, should not end in their entire submission, I purpose to attack their principal fort to-morrow.

I regret to have to add, though every precaution was adopted for the security of our line of communication, a large interval was created between our main body and rear guard, by the circumstance of the latter having to await at Khoord Cabool the arrival of carriage from the capital for part of the public baggage. A light armed enemy, well acquainted with the country, did not fail to take advantage of this, and I fear that some ammunition and valuable stores have fallen into their hands. I beg to forward the report of Captain Oldfield, detailing every occurrence whilst he commanded the rear-guard, also the returns of killed and wounded and of ammunition expended.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the Force under the command of Major-General Sir R. H. Sale, in the attack on the enemy's position in the valley of Tezeen, on the 22nd October, 1841.

2nd Company 6th Battalion Artillery.—1 serjeant, 1 horse wounded.

Squadron, 5th Light Cavalry.—1 horse killed; 1 private, wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.—1 lieutenant, 3 privates, killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 corporal, 7 privates, wounded.

Sappers and Miners.—1 private killed; 1 lieutenant, 5 privates, 1 mule, wounded.

Mountain Train.—2 privates, wounded.

Total.—1 lieutenant, 4 privates, 1 horse, killed; 2 lieutenants, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 15 privates, 1 horse, 1 mule, wounded.

Names of Officers Killed and Wounded

Killed.—Lieutenant Edward King, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.

Wounded.—Lieutenant Frere, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, slightly; Lieutenant Orr, Sappers and Miners, severely.

H. WADE, *Major of Brigade.*

No. 7.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Grant.

Sir, *Camp, Jugduluk, October* 28, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you, for the information of Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., that the force under my command reached this place to-day; last night passed over without the slightest insult to our out-posts at Kuttah Sung, but during the morning's march we descried small parties at a distance on

both flanks, especially near the outlet of the Puree Durree, which afterwards united in a combined attack on our rear-guard. Our loss has been small, and the enemy was everywhere baffled and held in check by the fire from our guns and skirmishers. Owing, however, to the jaded state of our camels, it became necessary to destroy a good deal of camp equipage to prevent its falling into the rebels' hands.

The daily repetition of these attacks has given rise to suspicions of the sincerity of the chiefs, in the mind of the Political Assistant, in which I am compelled to participate, though I shall be happy to find that their submission at Tezeen was made in good faith, and that these petty hostilities are the acts of men not under their control.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 8.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Grant.

Sir, *Camp, Gundamuck, October* 30, 1841.

YESTERDAY the force under my command was again engaged with the insurgents of these mountains, and the affair was the sharpest which we have had since penetrating the pass of Khoord Cabool. I experienced little molestation in my camp at Jugduluk, but observed, towards sunset and by moonlight, evident indications of the enemy, which had attacked our rear-guard earlier in the day, being in the act of moving off over the hills, with a view of concentrating between my force and Sookhab. Major-General Elphinstone is acquainted with the localities, and will not have forgotten that the only entrance to the valley at Jugduluk, from the eastward, is by a long and winding kotul, overlooked and commanded by a lofty range of mountains, partially clothed with bushes and dwarf trees. Of these really terrific eminences the rebels had, as I had anticipated, taken possession, in more considerable numbers than we have been opposed to since leaving Tezeen. Holding all the salient points of the hills, and secured by breastworks, they showed a determination to dispute with the utmost obstinacy the progress of our flanking parties, and to endeavour to prevent the debouche of our advance and main column. To enable us to effect this I had to detach companies from every corps in the force to the right and left, which, aided by the artillery, won their way inch by inch up the lofty heights. Much, however, remained to be done, and the fire of the mountaineers from several of the tallest summits was unabated, and success was everywhere doubtful, when a single company of the 13th, under Captain Wilkinson, was directed to advance up the defile itself. It pressed forward at a rapid pace, supported by all the reserves which remained available, and to the surprise of the whole force, found that the enemy had neglected to guard the main outlet. This van-guard, therefore, its supports, and the guns, were quickly established on the narrow table-land, from which they had it in their power to take the whole of the defences of the rebels in reverse. Our troops commanded the route to Sookhab, and the enemy seemed to decline all further opposition. The march was resumed; but as the cumbrous train of baggage filed over the mountain, the insurgents, again appearing from beyond the most distant ridges, renewed the contest with increased numbers, and the most savage fury. Our rear-guard made the best dispositions for defence and rescue; but the suddenness of the onset caused some confusion, during which, notwithstanding the efforts of the troops, some baggage and camp-equipage fell into the hands of their opponents. Captain Wyndham, of the 35th, was killed at this crisis of the affair; and several brave men of all the corps fell or were wounded. Soon, however, by the praiseworthy exertions and cool and soldierlike order and example of Captains Backhouse and Broadfoot, of the Shah's service, and Fenwick, of the 13th, confidence was restored, the aspect of the affair changed, and the rear-guard extricated from the defile. It continued in the best order to retreat, and to repel the enemy, who had followed it up to the point at which the loftier hills wear away. Our casualties of yesterday and the day before amount to 130; amonst whom are one officer killed and four wounded. This loss will not be considered heavy by those who have seen the

heights from which the rebels were driven, and are acquainted with the habits and character of the mountaineers to whom we were opposed. I have to-day marched to this place without any interruption worthy of mention.

From the details of this dispatch the Major-General Commanding in Affghanistan will be enabled to draw his own inferences as to the actual state of our relations with the refractory Chiefs who were admitted at Tezeen into a treaty of reconciliation with the Government against which they had rebelled. But it belongs more peculiarly to my vocation in the field, now that there is a prospect of brief repose in the vicinity of this cantonment, to report with much satisfaction the cheerfulness, steadiness and perseverance with which the troops have performed every duty required of them: since leaving Cabool they have been kept constantly on the alert by attacks by night and day; from the time of their arrival at Tezeen they have invariably bivouacked, and the safety of our positions has only been secured by unremitting labour, and throwing up intrenchments, and very severe outpost duty; whilst each succeeding morning has brought its affair, with a bold and active enemy, eminently skilful in the species of warfare to which their attempts have been confined, and armed with jezails, which have enabled them to annoy us at a range at which they could only be reached by our artillery. Though compelled by the effects of my late wound to witness these conflicts from a doolie, I must bear my unequivocal testimony to the gallantry of officers and men, on every occasion of contact with the enemy, and especially in scaling the tremendous heights above Jugduluk. I inclose a casualty return.

I beg to express my sense of the highly able assistance which I have received in all our attacks and skirmishes, and throughout the operations, from Lieut.-Colonels Dennie and Monteath, C.B. I have been much pleased with the address and able management of Captain Abbott, of the Artillery, who has twice commanded the advanced guard; and the exertions of Captain Wade, my Brigade-Major, and of Captain Havelock, Persian Interpreter to General Elphinstone (temporarily attached to me), in conveying my orders from point to point, and aiding in the dispositions, deserve my warmest commendations.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing of the Force under the command of Major-General Sir Robert H. Sale, on the advance to, and storming of, the Pass of Jugduluk, on the 28th and 29th of October, 1841.

2nd Company 6th Battalion Artillery.—1 private killed; 5 privates, 2 horses, wounded.

5th Regiment Light Cavalry Squadron.—2 horses killed; 1 private, 2 horses, wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.—4 privates killed; 3 lieutenants, 30 privates wounded.

35th Regiment Native Infantry.—1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 soobadars, 1 jemadar, 1 corporal, 12 privates, killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 jemadar, 4 serjeants, 1 corporal, 25 privates wounded.

Sappers and Miners.—1 serjeant, 6 privates, killed; 1 soobadar, 1 jemadar, 4 serjeants, 1 corporal, 13 privates wounded.

2nd Regiment Shah Shoojah's Cavalry.—1 horse wounded.

Total.—1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 soobadars, 1 jemadar, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 23 privates, 2 horses, killed; 4 lieutenants, 1 soobadar, 2 jemadars, 8 serjeants, 2 corporals, 74 privates, 5 horses, wounded.

Names of Officers killed and wounded.

Killed.—Captain Wyndham, 35th Regiment Native Infantry.

Wounded.—Lieutenant Jennings, 13th Light Infantry, severely; Lieutenant Holcombe, 13th Light Infantry, severely; Lieutenant Rattray, 13th Light Infantry, severely; Lieutenant Combe, 35th Native Infantry, severely.

No. 9.

Captain Paton to Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar.

Sir, *Cabool, November* 3, 1841.

I HAVE the honor, by direction of Major-General Elphinstone, commanding in Affghanistan, to request you will immediately direct the whole of the troops under orders to return to Hindoostan from Candahar, to move upon Cabool, instead of Shikarpore, except any that shall have got beyond the Kojjuck Pass, and that you will instruct the officer who may command to use the utmost practicable expedition; you are requested to attach a troop of His Majesty the Shah's Horse Artillery to the above force, and likewise half the 1st Regiment of Cavalry.

I have, &c.,
J. PATON,
Assistant Quartermaster-General.

No. 10.

Captain Mackeson, Political Agent at Peshawur, to Captain Lawrence, Assistant-Governor-General's Agent, Ferozepore.

Sir, *Peshawur, November* 9, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to inclose a copy of a letter, this instant received, from Captain Burn, dated Gundamuck, 5th November, and with reference to its contents, have to request that you will communicate with the military authorities at Ferozepore, and urge on them the necessity of hastening, by every means in their power, the dispatch of the brigade, warned for the Cabool relief.

I doubt the correctness of the report Captain Burn has received, of our troops being shut up in the Bala Hissar, and yet there must be some cause for the absence of all letters from the Envoy; under any circumstances, the state of the country, owing to the rebellion among the eastern Ghilzies, is such as to make it highly desirable that the brigade destined for Affghanistan should arrive here as expeditiously as possible, consistent with a due regard to preserving its efficiency for work when it does arrive.

I have, &c.,
F. MACKESON.

No. 11.

Major-General Sir Robert Sale to Captain Mackeson.

Sir, *Camp Futteabad, November* 11, 1841.

IN the course of my operations against the eastern Ghilzies, undertaken in pursuance of instructions from Major-General Elphinstone, I reached Gundamuck on the 30th ultimo, and whilst there, was made aware of the critical position in which the force of Cabool is placed, by the occupation of the city and of the heights around it by bodies of insurgents, who have captured, it is said, one magazine, and seem to have it in their power, now at the approach of winter, to cut off every supply from the troops in the Bala Hissar and intrenched cantonment. I was unable as they and I had desired to march to their relief, partly in consequence of the desertion, in great numbers, of the owners of our hired carriage with their animals, and partly from our want of ammunition, half of our supply having been expended in our numerous affairs with the enemy, Jellalabad being at the same time menaced on the side of Lughman. I have determined to secure that important point by falling back upon it, and I hope to reach it to-morrow. The Commissariat Officer will probably communicate with you on the subject of any wants he may have in that department; and I have now urgently to request the favor of your exerting your influence with the Sikh authorities at Peshawur, to

obtain for me, without delay, 200,000 rounds of musket ammunition, or if that amount be not in readiness in their arsenal made up into cartridges, the material complete for the same.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE,
Commanding Field Force.

No. 12.

Captain J. Paton, Assistant Quarter-Master General, to Major-General Sir R. Sale.

Sir, *Cabool, November* 9, 1841.

I HAVE the honor, by direction of Major-General Elphinstone, commanding in Affghanistan, to acquaint you that the condition of the force here is at present unfortunately such as to compel him to request you will march the troops under your command to its assistance immediately on receipt of this, at all risks, and with the utmost possible expedition.

I have, &c.,
J. PATON.

No. 13.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Paton.

Sir, *Jellalabad, November* 15, 1841.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, requiring the force under my command to move again upon Cabool. In reply I beg to represent that the whole of my camp equipage has been destroyed; that the wounded and sick have increased to upwards of 300, that there is no longer a single depôt of provisions on the route; and that the carriage of the force is not sufficient to bring on one day's rations with it. I have at the same time positive information that the whole country is in arms, and ready to oppose us in the defiles between this city and Cabool, whilst my ammunition is insufficient for more than two such contests, as I should assuredly have to sustain for six days at least. With my present means I could not force the passes of either Jugdulluk or Khoord Cabool, and even if the *débris* of my brigade did reach Cabool, I am given to understand that I should find the troops now garrisoning it without the means of subsistence. Under these circumstances, a regard for the honor and interests of our Government compels me to adhere to my plan already formed of putting this place into a state of defence, and holding it if possible, until the Cabool force falls back upon me, or succours arrive from Peshawur or India.

Yesterday this city was invested by the enemy, amounting at the least to the lowest calculation to five thousand men, which had kept up a heavy fire on the defective walls for upwards of twenty-four hours, by which we suffered much. I directed Lieut.-Colonel Monteath, at the head of 700 bayonets, and the cavalry to sally forthwith and make a general attack. The enemy were totally routed at every point; but I must of course expect successive investments, and to have to make unremitting efforts for our defence.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 14.

Major-General Sir R. Sale, commanding Field Force, to Major Craigie, Acting Adjutant-General.

Sir, *Jellalabad, November* 13, 1841.

BE pleased to acquaint the Commander-in-Chief, that whilst the force at Cabool is by the last account surrounded by enemies, we are now closely invested

here by the hostile Ooloos from every side. Two regiments, and the corps of Sappers, do not more than suffice to man these extensive walls, and great efforts are demanded of us. We need succours in every way; troops, treasure, provisions, and ammunition now, and a siege train to enable us to retrieve things by active operations, on the conclusion of the winter. In an affair with the rebels yesterday, our cavalry made a gallant charge, and the enemy left 150 dead on the field.

I have, &c.,
ROBERT SALE.

No. 15.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major Craigie.

Head Quarters, Jellalabad,
November 18, 1841.

Sir,

THE troops under my command reached this city on the 12th instant.

My line of march on the 11th was no otherwise interrupted than by the attacks of bodies of plunderers on the baggage, who received signal punishment from our precautionary parties.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie commanded the rear guard; he retired slowly before the enemy, repelling him by skirmishes and cannon as long as the ground continued abrupt and rugged, but on approaching the plains, he commenced to manœuvre with the view of drawing them into an action on the level. Their boldness favoured his stratagem, and foreseeing this result, I had dispatched the Rissalah of Shah's horse to reinforce him. At length the desired moment arrived, and the Lieutenant-Colonel directed Captain Oldfield, of the 5th Cavalry, and Lieutenant Mayne, of the Shah's 2nd, to make a combined charge against the Ooloose; this was executed with great rapidity and resolution, and in very compact order, and in a few minutes upwards of 100 Affghan matchlock men were sabred and shot, and the rest driven in irremediable confusion to the heights. It was ascertained on the spot, that the Ooloose had left in the course of the whole affair 150 dead on the field, and the proportion of their wounded must have been heavy. After this salutary lesson, their efforts to annoy our columns on their route up to the walls of this place were cautious and feeble. The defences of Jellalabad consist of a mud *enceinte*, of upwards of 2000 yards, of weak curtains, and round towers, which have a narrow rampart, but insufficient parapet. On the northern face the profile is less bold than elsewhere, and there was excellent cover for an enemy within pistol shot. On the evening of the 12th, our infantry occupied the gates, and the ill-constructed citadel, whilst the artillery and cavalry were dispersed in the enclosures adjacent to the residences of the King, and Envoy and Minister, without the walls.

On the morning of the 13th, more regular occupation was taken of the place. Troops were posted on the whole of its bastions, the two infantry corps were established in the citadel, the artillery in an open space in front of it, and the cavalry in the Shah's garden. About 250 of the Khyberees had remained steady to their allegiance; the Jezzailchees were emulating the regular battalions in zeal and courage, and unremitting efforts were made by plying our intrenching tools and the substitution of camel saddles for sandbags, to put the town into a state of decent defence; in the meantime a great force had assembled under the walls to the southward and westward, whilst other masses came down from the direction of Lughman, crossed the river, and invested us closely to the northward, detaching parties to set fire to the cantonment, raised at so great an expense in 1840. It had been in part burnt down the night before, and was now involved in a general conflagration; the enemy, masked by trees and old buildings, kept up an incessant fire of musquetry against the walls at a very short range for upwards of twenty-four hours, by which our men sustained some loss behind their growing defences, and as it was desirable to diminish the consumption of provisions within the city, I adopted the measure, first, of telling the women and children to withdraw, next, of excluding all strangers and suspicious persons, and finally, of getting rid, as far as it was practicable, of the whole male population, excepting the shopkeepers whose stay was valuable to us.

On the morning of Sunday the 14th, I determined to attempt to dislodge the enemy from a part of their position. I placed for this purpose a force consisting of 300 men of the 13th, 300 of the 35th, 100 sappers, three guns of Captain Abbott's battery, the whole of the cavalry, and 200 Khyberees, at the disposal of Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, C.B., and directed him to sally from the town, and assail that part of the enemy's line from which I was most desirous of expelling them. I beg to forward the report of the very gallant affair which followed, and which I had the satisfaction of witnessing from the walls. This spirited attack upon not fewer than 5000 men, has wholly broken up the enemy's investment, and we have from that hour scarcely seen an armed Affghan in our neighbourhood; we have availed ourselves of this pause to put the walls into a state of defence, which will, I trust, enable us to defy the efforts of any Asiatic force unaided by siege artillery, and are using every exertion to store our magazines with grain from the adjacent villages. I inclose reports from Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie and Captain Oldfield, and casualty returns from the 11th to the 14th instant, inclusive.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 16.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie to Captain Wade, Major of Brigade.

Sir, *Jellalabad, November* 14, 1841.

AS commanding the rear guard on the 12th instant, I have the honor to report for the Major-General's information, that previously to the troops leaving their bivouac a sharp fire was opened upon the loading baggage from the hills on our right, which afterwards was taken up along our rear. The piquets at either point kept the enemy for some time in check, but as his numbers and confidence increased, I deemed it advisable to reinforce them; Captain Oldfield with his troop also pushed those who had descended into the plain, back to the highest covered by our skirmishers (under Lieutenant Wade 13th, and Ensign Norton 35th) extended across the valley, and crowning the hills; the baggage safely debouched through the gorge in which the village is situated, and in about an hour afterwards I gradually retired in the same order. On clearing its narrow outlet at the other extremity, the enemy again pressed upon us and were very numerous, completely enveloping our flanks and rear. As the country, however, soon opened in our front, and as the troops were perfectly steady and could be fully relied upon, and as I was desirous to disengage them from the broken and close ground, and the fire of the village and that of a large fort, I continued to retire and permitted the confident pursuit of the Ooloose until I had drawn them to the point which I had fixed upon in my mind. Here whilst the squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry, under Captain Oldfield, was drawn up in line, I was joined by a Rissalah of Anderson's horse under Lieutenant Mayne, sent back by the Major-General, who had witnessed the heavy firing, and judged that the ground was favourable to the movements of cavalry. I now directed a combined charge, which was instantaneous and overpowering: bringing their right shoulders forward, they swept the plain and bore down all opposition; not fewer than one hundred fell under their sabres, and the wounded were in proportion. The cavalry was ably supported by Captain Broadfoot with his detachment of sappers, who carried all before them to the right, and cleared the hills which had been covered by our assailants. The route was now general and complete. After the halt, necessary for the recall of the cavalry and reforming my party, I resumed my march, which, for at least ten miles, was not interrupted by a shot. On the road then becoming difficult and contracted, a body of the enemy, encouraged by some Jan-Bazes, who had deserted at Gundamuk, again made their appearance, but they preserved a distance at which their fire was harmless. On extricating the column from this ground, I once more awaited their approach, but, instructed by the recent lesson, they could not be induced to cross the ravines, and from thence, until we marched into Jellalabad, we saw no more of an enemy.

Though the conduct of every officer and soldier in this affair was excellent,

I must be permitted particularly to remark the gallant manner in which Captain Oldfield led the charge of cavalry, in which he was emulated by Lieutenant Mayne at the head of his Rissalah, and Lieutenant Plowden in command of a troop of the 5th Cavalry; Captain Broadfoot's support of them was most soldier-like and intrepid. The services of Captain Backhouse in command of the artillery were very valuable to me, and I have to thank Captain Seaton, 35th, senior officer of the infantry, for his able assistance.

I have, &c.,
W. H. DENNIE.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the force under the command of Major-General Sir Robert Sale, from the 11th to the 14th of November, 1841.

Squadron 5th Light Cavalry.—1 camp follower, 1 horse, killed; 5 privates, 1 syce, 7 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Rissalah 2nd Regiment Cavalry, S. S. F.—7 sepoys, 11 horses, killed; 1 duffadar, 10 privates, 4 horses, wounded.

Sappers and Miners.—1 naick, 1 sepoy, killed; 1 serjeant, wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.—11 privates, wounded.

35th Regiment Native Infantry.—1 sepoy killed; 6 privates, 2 camp followers, wounded.

Detachment Jezzailchee Regiment.—1 havildar, 2 naicks, 19 sepoys, 1 camp follower, killed; 1 captain, 1 jemadar, 12 sepoys, wounded; 1 havildar, 8 sepoys, missing.

Total.—1 havildar, 3 naicks, 28 sepoys, 2 camp followers, 12 horses killed; 1 captain, 1 jemadar, 3 staff serjeants, 1 duffadar, 44 privates, 1 syce, 2 camp followers, 11 horses, wounded; 1 havildar, 8 sepoys, 1 horse, missing.

Grand Total.—33 men, 12 horses, killed; 53 men, 11 horses, wounded; 9 sepoys, 1 horse, missing.

Names of Officers wounded.

Jezzailchee Regiment.—Captain Gerrard, 2nd in command.

H. WADE, *Captain, Major of Brigade.*

No. 17.

Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath to Captain Wade.

Sir, *Jellalabad, November* 14, 1841.

HAVING been entrusted with the command of the troops named in the margin*, by Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., for the purpose of making a sortie to dislodge the enemy from the several positions of investment taken up by them around Jellalabad, I have now the honor of addressing you to report, for the Major-General's information, the arrangements made by me towards the fulfilment of his views.

Having made a reconnoissance of the enemy's posts, as well as the sharp fire upon the ramparts would admit, I determined, as a preliminary measure, to carry the walled garden immediately in front of the southern gate, the walled enclosure and mosque to the south-west of that gate, from whence the flank of the sallying column could be assailed in its advance, and the garden immediately in front of the Cabool gate.

The first of these posts was taken by a party of one hundred men of the Khyber corps, under Lieutenant Hillersden; the second, by a party of fifty men, of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, under Lieutenant Cox; and the third, by a similar party of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, under Captain Fenwick.

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* 300 Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; 300, 35th Regiment; 100 Sappers and Miners; 200 Khyber corps; 3 guns, Abbott's Battalion; 1 Squadron 5th Light Infantry; 1 Rissalah Anderson's Horse; a duffadar and 12 men, Skinner's Horse.

Having seen the troops established in these three posts, a sortie was immediately made with the remainder of the force from the southern gate, for the purpose of storming the heights in front of that face of the town on which the enemy had collected in masses, and which seemed to be considered the head quarters, from their standard having been planted there, but on the approach of the column of infantry and guns, they immediately fled from them with the utmost precipitancy.

Captain Oldfield, commanding the cavalry stationed in the Shah Bhag, at the south-east angle of the town, had received my instructions that as soon as he saw the infantry debouche upon the plain he was to move forward as expeditiously as possible, gain the rear of the heights, there form line out of reach of the enemy's fire, and remain prepared to charge them upon their being driven down by the infantry.

In order that he might not be impeded by fire behind the walls during his advance, a party of one hundred of the Khyber corps, under Captain Bruce, was placed under his command, to enable him to dislodge any small parties of the enemy so posted. Circumstances, however, occurred which completely prevented Captain Oldfield from acting in the manner prescribed by me, and which, in the end, proved of no consequence whatsoever. A report of the occurrences which took place in that officer's quarter is herewith inclosed.

Having occupied the heights from which the enemy had fled, by one hundred men of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and the same number of the 35th Regiment, and placed the cavalry with one nine-pounder gun under Captain Backhouse, commanding the Mountain Train (but who was present as a volunteer), on the plain at a short distance in the front to watch the movements of the enemy, who, both horse and foot, had again collected on a distant height, I moved the rest of the troops and guns round to the right, for the purpose of driving the remainder of the enemy from the western and northern faces of the town, and, on a well-directed fire being opened by Lieutenant Dawes from the guns on one of their positions, they broke in every quarter, and fled with the greatest consternation, when I am given to understand the Jezzailchees stationed on the northern face, sallied in a very gallant manner, and cut up a number of them.

On seeing the hopeless state of affairs in every direction, the chiefs, with about three hundred of the Jan-Baz who had deserted our cause at Gundamuk, descended from the height on which they had in the first instance rallied, and made off in the direction of Cabool; but having come within range of Captain Backhouse's gun, that officer had the opportunity afforded him of firing some admirably directed round shot amongst them, which seemed to create an instant feeling to remove themselves as speedily, and as far from our vicinity as possible.

Having now detailed the operations of the day, it is a most gratifying reflection to think how much has been gained at so trifling a loss to ourselves, and so considerable a one to the enemy, 5,000 of whom must have been present on the occasion.

As after sallying from the town, I had the opportunity of witnessing the conduct of the cavalry, I have no hesitation in saying they acquitted themselves entirely to my satisfaction. My thanks are therefore justly due to them, and to that gallant and meritorious officer, Captain Oldfield, for the able manner in which he extricated himself from a very critical situation, in the first instance, and for the brilliant manner in which he afterwards led his men to the charge, placing himself in that situation that he was attacked by two Affghan horsemen at the same moment, against whom he had to defend himself until they were sabred by two of his men.

Lieutenant Mayne, commanding the Rissalah of Anderson's Horse, than whom I know not a more gallant and zealous officer, has also well deserved my thanks for his conspicuous conduct, and that of Lieutenant Plowden, 5th Light Cavalry, has been mentioned to me by his commanding officer, Captain Oldfield, in terms of the highest commendation.

In regard to the remainder of the troops, viz., the Artillery, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 35th Regiment, Sappers and Miners, Shah Shooja's force, and detachment Khyber corps, under Lieutenant Hillersden, nothing could exceed the gallant spirit manifested by them; and I have to return my thanks to Captain Havelock, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, who volunteered to

accompany me as staff, for the very ready and zealous assistance he was always prepared to render me; to Captain Backhouse, who volunteered to take charge of a nine-pounder, left with the Cavalry; Lieutanant Dawes, commanding the Artillery with the detachment; to Captain Fenwick, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, who took the walled inclosure and mosque; Lietenant Cox, who took possession of the garden in front of the Cabool gates, and Lieutenant Hillersden, who took possession of the walled garden in front of the southern gate.

Herewith I beg to inclose a return of the killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,

T. MONTEATH.

No. 18.

Captain Oldfield to Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, November* 14, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to report that, in obedience to orders, I formed the cavalry at mid-day of 14th instant, consisting of 1st Squadron 5th Cavalry, and part of 3rd Squadron of Shah's 2nd Cavalry, under the fort wall of this town and facing to the east ready for sally.

As the Khyberees would not act in our front, I was compelled to give up the line of march pointed out, particularly after the occupation by the enemy of the mission grounds and house. The fire on us was very heavy from our front and right; to check this, I ordered Lieutenant Plowden to the front with the skirmishers, and sounded the charge; this frightened the enemy, who soon disappeared from the points above-mentioned. Lieutenant Plowden led the skirmishers gallantly, and rendered me most essential service.

As I advanced, I directed Lieutenant Mayne to clear the ground from left to right, and join me at South Mission Gate: here we were again exposed to a heavy fire, but a charge drove the enemy away, and we soon were in the midst of their Foot, whom we cut up right and left.

The enemy's horse being in force on my right towards the southern gate of the town, I halted to form my troops; the Janbaz fancying they had an easy prey actually charged me, and two of their number were killed in my ranks; this was their last effort. I dashed at and drove them to the hills, then withdrew out of shot covered by skirmishers, and formed in parade order ready for work, but the enemy had had enough.

I deem it but justice to mention, that the moment I advanced the Khyberees supported me.

The whole of the troops under my command behaved most gallantly, and I received the greatest assistance from Lieutenants Mayne and Plowden, and Subadar Sheik Mykhan of the 2nd Troop, 5th Light Cavalry.

I have, &c.,

C. OLDFIELD.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, in the sally made on the enemy's position, on the 14th November, 1841.

Artillery, Abbott's Battery—None killed or wounded. 1st Squadron 5th Light Cavalry—1 naick, 1 rank and file, 1 horse wounded.

Rissalah Anderson's Horse, 4 horses killed; 1 naick, 3 rank and file, 10 horses, wounded.

Detachment of Skinner's Horse—None killed or wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—3 rank and file, wounded.

35th Regiment Native Infantry—None killed or wounded.

Sappers and Miners, S. S. F.—None killed or wounded.

Detachment Khyberees—None killed or wounded.

Total—4 horses, killed; 2 naiks, 7 rank and file, 11 horses, wounded.

T. MONTEATH, *Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding the sallying party.*

No. 19.

Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor.

Sir, *Cabool, November* 18, 1841.

I HAVE received your letters of the 13th instant. The cossid gave us an account of your action of the 14th instant, which, if he speaks truth, must have been a very successful one; we are in statu quo. Our chief want is supplies. I perceive now, that you could not well have joined us. I hope you have written to Mackeson, asking aid from the Sikhs under the treaty. If there is any difficulty about the Sikhs getting through the pass, Mackeson should offer a bribe to the Khybers, of a lac of rupees or more, to insure their safe passage. These are not times to stick at trifles. The Gorkha regiment has been annihilated, but Pottinger and Haughton are here; the latter has lost his hand. I believe I told you that Paton lost his arm in the action we had near cantonments the other day. It is raining here, and the water is very cold, but I am not sure that this is not as bad for the enemy as for ourselves. I do not hear anything from Ghuzni or Candahar; but I should not wonder if they are in the same mess as ourselves: we must look for supplies chiefly from Peshawur. Write to Mackeson continually; tell him to urge Government to send as many troops into this country, and as speedily as possible. John Conolly is in the "Bala Hissar" with his Majesty, who, as you may imagine, is in sad taking about all this "fussad." I am making no progress in my negotiations with the rebels.

Your's, &c.,
W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

No. 20.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major Craigie.

Sir, *Jellalabad, November* 24, 1841.

THE communication being on all sides interrupted, I am compelled to write in the most condensed form. Lest previous letters should have been intercepted, I would ask of you now to acquaint the Commander-in-Chief that the substance of our intelligence from Cabool is, that a sudden and sanguinary insurrection broke out there on the 2nd of November. Armed bodies attacked simultaneously the houses of all the British residents in the city. Sir A. Burnes, his brother, and Lieut. Broadfoot, were murdered. Brigadier Anquetil, Captains Johnson and Troup, were fortunately at the moment in the cantonment. Captain Skinner has been secreted; Captain Mackenzie, S. S. F., cut his way through the assailants (wounded). The insurgents proceeded to establish themselves on the hills around the city; and, making an unexpected attack on our commissariat magazine, carried and plundered it. There was a simultaneous rising in the Kohistan: the Shah's Goorkha battalion, and his regiment of Kohistanees, were both defeated, and every officer put to the sword, excepting Major Pottinger and Lieutenant Haughton: the latter has lost one hand. Our troops at Cabool maintained themselves on the two points of the Bala Hissar and the entrenched cantonment. They repelled several attacks on the latter, and made a brilliant sally on the 5th. Actions were fought with varied success up to the 10th, on which day the British attacked, and carried with great slaughter, several forts, and obtained very considerable supplies of provisions. The enemy assailed the cantonment on the 13th, but were repulsed with great loss, and two guns, which had been captured from the Wuzeer, were retaken. Since that time it would appear that there has been no engagement, but the investment continues, and the numbers of the enemy daily increase. All tribes are united against the Shah. The insurgents have proclaimed Mahomed Zeman Khan Barukzye, King; Jubber Khan, Wuzeer; and Abdoollah Khan Alchukzye, the assassin of Sir A. Burnes, Surdar-i-Surdaran. The earlier part of these events and transactions become known to me on the night of the 10th instant, at Gundamuck; and I was urged by General Elphinstone to advance to the succour of

the capital, if I could place my sick and wounded in security. This was impossible; my ammunition also was insufficient for the operation; we had no supplies; and our carriage cattle were daily diminishing in number. I determined, therefore, to retire on Jellalabad. On the 11th the Jan-Bazees went over to the enemy, and they have since been followed by the Khyberee corps. I reached this place on the 12th, after a successful rear-guard affair, in which my cavalry charged, and the enemy left 150 dead on the field. Five thousand men invested this place on the 13th; on the 14th I ordered a sally and general attack with part of my garrison. The enemy were totally routed, and I have since scarcely seen an armed Affghan around us, though a force is known to have assembled within a few miles. Incessant labor has put this place into a respectable state of defence. Eleven guns and five mortars are mounted on the works, which have now a widened rampart and growing parapet of three feet. Meanwhile the Khyber is in a state of insurrection. Ali Musjid has been besieged; Captain Ferris' corps at Pesh Boluk was attacked, and it is believed that he only escaped with his people by concluding a convention with the assailants and retiring to Peshawur. We have, however, no certain information regarding him. I forward copy of General Elphinstone's last communication, written in French, in consequence of its being known that the enemy have employed two young men, instructed in English in Delhi or Loodianah, to read our intercepted dispatches. I am happy to perceive that the General approves of my measures. Captain Macgregor and I have written to Captain Mackeson to send up through the Khyber to us, ammunition, treasure, and provisions, and to call upon the Sikh Government to aid us, according to treaty, with 5,000 troops. I can, in every event, I trust, maintain myself here for thirty days, and await reinforcement from India; and I should hope that Major-General Elphinstone will be enabled to retain possession of all he holds at Cabool. His Excellency will not fail to perceive from the above detail that, all measures of reinforcement and succour ought, at this crisis, to be prompt and energetic.

I have, &c.

R. SALE.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Elphinstone to the Address of Sir R. Sale.

Mon cher Sale, *Cabool, November 18, 1841.*

J'AI reçu votre lettre du 15mo. Je pense que vous avez très bien fait is vous envoi des renforts de la place de Peshawur, et que vous vous trouvez dans la situation de nous aider, ne manquez pas de le faire; nous sommes dans un peril extrême.

No. 21.

Captain Lawrence, Assistant Agent to the Governor-General, Ferozepore, to Colonel Wild, commanding at Ferozepore.

Sir, *November* 14, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to request, with reference to the dispatch from Lieutenant Mackeson, which I showed you this morning, that the troops, now under orders for Cabool, should start with the least possible delay.

I would also suggest that the 60th Regiment, now in orders for Sukkur, and any other infantry regiment you may think proper, as well as the 10th Cavalry, should be held in immediate readiness for a move towards Affghanistan, as soon as instructions can arrive from Mr. Clerk, Agent Governor-General, which will be the 19th instant, so that they could, without any difficulty, overtake the Kafila at the Ravee.

I would further offer my opinion that the commanding officer should not be hampered with any extra stores by the charge of ladies; but have under his care simply the treasure and such magazine stores as are deemed absolutely necessary for supplying the immediate wants of our troops in Affghanistan.

Perhaps you will agree with me that the better plan will be only to warn the officers of the corps above alluded to, that they may be required to move, it being desirable to give as little room as possible for reports. In this view, I

should not have suggested the ladies remaining behind, if their going now did not involve a certain degree of risk to themselves, and that they and their establishments must be in the way, should the troops be called on for any rapid movements.

A copy of Lieutenant Mackeson's letter shall be forwarded to you immediately.

I have, &c.,
H. M. LAWRENCE.

P. S. Arrangements now in progress at the Ghaut will be completed by the 17th instant, and will enable me to cross the whole Kafila in one day.

No. 22.

Captain Mackeson to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Peshawur, November* 15, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to forward for your information a letter received this afternoon from Major-General Sale commanding field force, dated Futteabad, 11th November.

Several days before the receipt of this letter I had dispatched powder, &c. to Captain Macgregor sufficient for 100,000 rounds, but I am not positive that it has reached him, nor can I be that the quantity I shall now send will reach Jellalabad.

It appears that on General Sale's brigade leaving Gundamuck that post was again left to be guarded by Captain Burn's corps of Afreedees, Captain Dowson's Janbaz, and 200 of Captain Ferris' Jezailchees. The whole of the Janbaz and one-third of Captain Burn's corps of Afreedees deserted and went over to the enemy, and the remainder refused to remain at Gundamuck. Captain Burn was consequently obliged also to retire with the remainder, and joined General Sale's column at Futteabad. He was unable to bring away with him from Gundamuck two of the Shah's guns, that had been left there for his protection, and it is not mentioned whether the guns were spiked on leaving them behind.

There can be no doubt, that if the troops at Cabool do not succeed shortly in making the townspeople sue for terms, the tribes in Nungrahar, as well as those towards Cabool, will combine against us; and the force that moves from Ferozepore should consist of two brigades, with one, if not two regiments of Europeans; the brigades should follow each other as quickly as possible.

I have written to General Avitabile (in French, in order to avoid making use of a Persian writer,) and for the information of Koonwur Purtab Sing, who is with Rajah Golab Sing, and the Sikh troops in Hazara, an outline of the state of affairs at Cabool. I have told them, that though I am in no alarm for the safety of our troops, either at Cabool or Jellalabad, still so long as they are confined to one spot, the present rise among the Affghan race will extend every day; and as the Affghans about here have long ago declared that the Sikhs only hold Peshawur through the power of the British Government, it became me, as a wellwisher to the two Governments, to draw his attention to the small number of troops now at Peshawur, and to recommend the reinforcing them without delay.

I shall not think of asking for Sikh troops excepting in the last extremity, but the movement of a large force from Hazara to Peshawur, accompanied as they may perhaps be by the Koonwur himself, cannot fail to have a good effect.

I have, &c.,
F. MACKESON,
Political Agent.

No. 23.

Mr. Clerk to Colonel Rich, commanding at Loodiana.

Sir, *November* 16, 1841.

AN express having been received from the Political Agent at Peshawur, requiring the dispatch of the brigade warned for the Cabool relief to be hastened by every means, in consequence of an alarming insurrection at, or near Cabool, I have the honor to request that you will accordingly dispatch, with the utmost expedition, the 53rd regiment Native Infantry, which had been already warned to proceed to Peshawur.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 24.

Mr. Clerk to the Officer commanding at Ferozepore.

Sir, *November* 16, 1841.

AN express having been received from the Political Agent at Peshawur, requiring the dispatch of the brigade warned for the Cabool relief to be hastened by every means, in consequence of an alarming insurrection at or near Cabool, I have the honor to request that you will dispatch at the same time with the 64th, which is preparing to march on the 20th instant, or as soon after as possible, the 60th Regiment, which had been warned to proceed to Affghanistan, via Sinde.

I have requested the officer in command at Loodiana to hasten the departure of the 53rd Native Infantry, which is already warned to proceed to Cabool.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 25.

Mr. Clerk to General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief.

Sir, *Camp Mynpooree, November* 17, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to annex a copy of the demi-official letter which I received yesterday from the Assistant Agent to the Governor General at Ferozepore, with a copy of Captain Mackeson's express of the 9th instant, of which I yesterday transmitted a copy to your Excellency; also a copy of another letter from Captain Lawrence to my address, dated the 14th instant, forwarding a copy of his letter of the same date, to Colonel Wild.

2. Your Excellency will have observed that I have limited the requisitions which I have presumed to make upon the commanding officers at Loodiana and Ferozepore, to the three infantry regiments which were already preparing to march to Affghanistan. I consider that this is what Captain Mackeson means in his urgent request for the dispatch of "the brigade warned for the Cabool relief." I therefore have not followed up the intimation made by Captain Lawrence to the commanding officer at Ferozepore, regarding artillery and cavalry, by requesting that a detachment of either should move forward. That intimation, however, will enable Colonel Wild now to make preparations that will facilitate the execution of the orders he may receive, should your Excellency see fit to direct that artillery or regular cavalry should accompany the 60th or the 53rd Regiments.

3. I trust that your Excellency will approve of my having recommended to Colonel Wild, not only that no women should accompany the 64th Regiment, but that the eight lacks of rupees which were to have been escorted by the

regiment to Jellalabad, should await the departure of the other regiments about to follow, in order that nothing may retard the arrival at Peshawur of the first regiment moving up.

4. I had failed in procuring boats to carry the 60th Regiment down to Sukkur. Those in which the company of artillery embarked last month for Sukkur, have not returned. The remaining boats are not sufficient, and if they were so, they are so greatly in demand at this season for the trade, that the hire, which Government would have to pay, would be most exorbitant.

5. A party of fifty horse, appointed at my request by the Lahore Government, together with a respectable Sikh officer, who has before given satisfaction on similar occasions, has arrived at the Ferozepore ferry, to attend upon the 64th Regiment to Peshawur.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 26.

Mr. Maddock, Secretary to the Government of India, to Mr. Clerk, Agent to the Governor-General.

Sir, *Fort-William, November* 29, 1841.

THE Right Honorable the Governor General in Council has directed me to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatches, dated respectively the 16th and 17th instant, enclosing copies of correspondence regarding the dispatch of troops towards Affghanistan, and in reply to inform you that his Lordship in Council approves of your proceedings therein reported.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 27.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Loodiana, November* 21, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to transmit a letter just received from Captain Mackeson to your address, dated the 14th instant, with its inclosure from Captain Macgregor.

The 64th regiment, N. I., crossed the Sutlej on the 17th, the 60th yesterday, and the 53rd marched hence on the 19th instant, to cross the Sutlej at Ferozepore also.

Colonel Wild has dispatched a large supply of ammunition, which will be pushed forward under a cavalry escort.

I have also called upon the Lahore Government to direct General Avitabile to supply ammunition on Captain Mackeson's requisition, and I have informed Captain Mackeson of my having done so.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK,
Governor-General's Agent.

No. 28.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Earl of Auckland.

My dear Lord, *East of Mynpooree, November* 26, 1841.

ALTHOUGH Mr. Clerk will have transmitted, by express, all he can collect, regarding Sir Robert Sale and our troops at Cabool, I hasten to dispatch

copies of three letters just received by express from Captain Lawrence at Ferozepore.

They are anything but agreeable, I am sorry to say.

What I have immediately done, your Lordship will be anxious to know, and I hope you will approve.

If the Light Infantry Battalion, according to Captain Lawrence's suggestion, has been sent on with the 53rd, I have desired Major-General Boyd to order the most efficient native corps at Kurnaul to Ferozepore.

Though much against such employment of the Light Battalion, it may be quite necessary to have four corps to force the Khyber, if rebellion should extend to that formidable pass.

Her Majesty's 9th Regiment to continue its march to Ferozepore; there to await events and orders, and to be ready, if your Lordship permits it, to relieve the 13th.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wild has been ordered to push on another lac of musket ammunition.

The Commissary of Ordnance at Delhi to send three or four lacs of the same to Ferozepore.

Also 100 rounds a gun for Abbott's guns, and the Mountain Train.

There is no want of money at Ferozepore, and no doubt Mr. Clerk will supply what Sir Robert requires, with his usual address and skill.

Provisions may, perhaps, be sent by Captain Mackeson if the Khyberees are faithful; but such demands can only be met upon or near the spot.

I hope the letter from Sir W. Macnaghten, alluded to by Captain Lawrence, may reach your Lordship safely, and be more cheering.

I shall not detain the express to say more.

Believe me, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 29.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Loodiana, November* 22, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to transmit copies of three letters received from Captain Mackeson at the same time by express No. 1, dated the 15th instant, inclosing copy of a letter from Major-General Sale, commanding field force, dated Futteabad the 11th instant, and Nos. 2 and 3, dated the 16th, inclosing two demi-official notes from Captain Macgregor, one of which refers to a letter received by him from Sir William Macnaghten of the 6th instant, which Captain Macgregor has inadvertently omitted to forward to Captain Mackeson.

2. As reported in my letter of this date, dispatched by the regular dawk, the 64th regiment Native Infantry, with 8 lacs of rupees and 100,000 rounds of ammunition for Captain Macgregor, crossed the Sutlej on the 18th instant, the 60th Native Infantry on the 20th, and the 53rd, which marched from Loodiana on the 19th instant, will cross at Ferozepore, on the 23rd or 24th instant.

3. With regard to moving up another brigade with at least one European regiment, I have requested the Major-General commanding this division to prepare and dispatch such a brigade if he can. But I doubt whether Her Majesty's 3rd Foot is in a fit state to march, on account of the great sickness that has lately prevailed in that regiment; and as the European regiment has so lately returned from Affghanistan, it will probably be deemed advisable to send Her Majesty's 9th Foot from Meerut. I shall therefore forward a copy of this letter to Sir Robert Arbuthnot as well as to Major-General Boyd, in order that they may be prepared for whatever selection may be made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, whose camp is now approaching Agra, and to whom a copy of Captain Mackeson's letter of the 15th instant, with a copy of Major-General Sale's letter of the 11th instant, has been transmitted by express.

4. I have called upon Maha Rajah Shere Sing to cause the immediate march of his son Koonwur Purtab Sing on Peshawur with five thousand of their best troops from the neighbouring district of Chuch Hazara, and to direct the

Koonwur to be prepared to assist Captain Mackeson to the utmost in sending up ammunition under escorts approved by that officer to our posts at Ali Musjid and Jellalabad, and to co-operate in any manner that Captain Mackeson may require.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE CLERK.

P.S. I inclose a copy of a letter from General Sale to Major Craigie, dated the 13th instant, of which a copy has reached me by express, while the original has gone down to the head-quarters of the army by express.

No. 30.

Mr. Clerk to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *November* 22, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to transmit to your Excellency copies of three letters received from Captain Mackeson, under date the 15th and 16th instant, forwarding dispatches from Major-General Sale, dated the 11th and 13th, the former in original to Captain Mackeson, the latter a copy of a letter addressed to the officiating Adjutant-General of the Army, together with copies of my letter of this date to the Secretary to the Government of India, to Major-General Boyd, commanding the Sirhind division, to Major-General Sir R. Arbuthnot, commanding the Meerut division, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, commanding at Ferozepore.

2. I have prepared the Lahore Government to expect the immediate march of another brigade across the Punjaub, and to collect boats for the passage of all the rivers.

3. The Sikh troops, which I have called upon the Lahore Government to dispatch to Peshawur under the command of the Maha Raja's son, are at present engaged in the field in the Hazara country, and can soon reach Peshawur.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 31.

Mr. Clerk to Major-General Sir R. Arbuthnot, commanding the Meerut Division.

Sir, *Meerut, November* 22, 1841.

THE intelligence which I do myself the honor to forward to you, rendering it necessary to move up another strong brigade to the relief of our troops in Affghanistan as expeditiously as possible, I would beg to recommend, in consideration of the severe sickness prevailing in the regiments of Europeans at Kurnaul, that Her Majesty's 9th Foot should march to Kurnaul, where, at all events, it will be required to strengthen this frontier, should his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to whom Major-General Sale's dispatches have been forwarded by express to Agra, select any other regiment to accompany the brigade.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 32.

Mr. Clerk to Major-General Boyd, commanding the Sirhind Division.

Sir, *Kurnaul, November* 22, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to transmit a copy of a letter which I have this day addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, commanding at Ferozepore.

The intelligence from Jellalabad and Peshawur which I inclose, renders it necessary to move up another strong brigade to the relief of our troops in Affghanistan as expeditiously as possible, and as I believe you have not a regiment of Europeans in condition to march on account of the late severe sickness prevailing at Kurnaul, I have recommended Major-General Sir R. Arbuthnot to dispatch Her Majesty's 9th Foot to Kurnaul, where, at all events, it will be required to strengthen this frontier, should his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to whom Major-General Sale's dispatches have been forwarded by express to Agra, select any other regiment of Europeans to accompany the brigade.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 33.

Mr. Clerk to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, commanding at Ferozepore.

Sir, *November* 22, 1841

THE Political Agent at Peshawur having transmitted intelligence of Major-General Sale's being hemmed in at Jellalabad, and called for another brigade, I have the honor to apprize you that I have requested Major-General Boyd, commanding this division, to prepare the brigade required.

I presume, from the intimation which Major-General Boyd informs me he has previously made to you, that the 30th regiment is prepared to proceed from Ferozepore, and I would therefore recommend its marching with the 53rd, or following that regiment as soon as possible.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 34.

Mr. Clerk to Captain Mackeson.

Sir, *November* 22, 1841.

IN consequence of my receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, the 64th Regiment, Native Infantry, crossed the Sutlej on the 18th instant, the 60th Regiment, Native Infantry, on the 20th, and the 53rd marched from Loodiana on the 19th instant, and will also cross the Sutlej at Ferozepore about the 26th instant; all in progress to Peshawur.

2. Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, Commanding at Ferozepore, has directed Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, commanding the 64th Regiment, to proceed with all practicable expedition consistent with the efficiency of his men.

3. Lieutenant-Colonel Wild has also dispatched one hundred thousand musket cartridges, in forty-two loads, with twenty-one good spare camels, and has requested Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley to send them on by long marches, under an escort of irregular horse.

4. A remittance of eight lacs of rupees to the Paymaster of the Army in Affghanistan, has been forwarded by the 64th Regiment.

5. The following statement shows the strength of this regiment, and the amount of the stores, &c., escorted by it :—

Sikh Motimud, Commandant Ghyare Sing; British ditto, Mohamud Hoosain.	
64th Regiment, Native Infantry	1048
3rd Local Horse	100
Sappers	137
Goolundazees	164
Syces and followers	855
Horses	247
Camel Loads of Ordnance Stores	166
Ditto Commissariat	137
Ditto Baggage, &c.	540
Ditto 8 lacs of Treasure	100
Officers	36

6. I have apprised the Commanding Officers of the 53rd, 60th, and 64th Regiments, of your recommendation that they should order the "Posteens," or warm cloaks, which you believe are allowed by Government to be prepared for their men against their arrival at Peshawur, in anticipation of their proceeding to Cabool during this winter.

7. The Sikh Government has been requested by me to direct General Avitabile to supply ammunition on your requisition.

8. Native Agents, on the part of the British Government, are in attendance on the regiments, as well as Sikh Agents appointed by the Durbar, with an escort of Sikh Horse. The Sikh officers and escort should receive suitable presents from you on their dismissal at Peshawur, if their conduct is well spoken of by the commanding officers of the regiments, and you will be so good as to ascertain and report to me whether our Native Agents in attendance have given satisfaction.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 35.

Mr. Clerk to Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, commanding 64th Regiment Native Infantry, Camp in the Punjaub.

Sir, *November* 23, 1841.

I WOULD beg leave to recommend that 100,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition which you have for the troops in Affghanistan should be pushed on, in the manner you think most expeditious through the Punjaub, some servants of the Sikh officer with you accompanying it; and I have suggested to Captain Mackeson to send down an escort of Sikh Horse from Peshawur to take it on to that place, in order to relieve the party you may send on with it.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 36.

Sir Jasper Nicolls to Lord Auckland.

My dear Lord, *Mynpooree, November* 27, 1841.

I WOULD not detain Mr. Clerk's express dispatch of the 22nd to Mr. Maddock even for half an hour, deeming it of the utmost importance that the intelligence should reach your Lordship without any delay.

This early and earnest call for a second brigade I was not prepared for, as your Lordship will be fully aware from the difficulty I expressed regarding a native regiment for Kurnaul or Ferozepore.

However this demand will be thus met:—

64th	60th	1st division
53rd	30th	2nd ditto.
H. M. 9th	26th	3rd ditto.

Or a regiment from Loodiana.

To this last I have attached half the light field battery, (that is, two 9-pounders and a howitzer) now at Ferozepore, and a rissallah of the 3rd Irregular Horse.

If Ali Musjid should be in the hands of an enemy the guns will be required.

The four first regiments will be well commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, until Major-General M'Caskill joins: I shall endeavour to instil energy into him by showing that all his military prospects and hopes will, in a great degree, depend on his management of the forces.

It is possible that I may receive your Lordship's commands upon the subject of this important charge.

The vacancies occasioned on our frontier will be partly supplied as follows:

The 2nd Light Infantry Battalion I shall have at Loodiana.

A regiment was ordered yesterday from Kurnaul to Ferozepore. The 33rd Native Infantry has been ordered to-day from Meerut to Ferozepore.

The 72nd will, instead of being stationed at Agra, proceed to Meerut or one of the northern stations.

Also to meet this very heavy call upon the frontier, I have taken upon me to order the 6th Native Infantry from Cawnpore to Kurnaul.

The 57th from Lucknow to replace it, and one of the Oude Infantry corps to Lucknow.

Your Lordship will remember that the 6th was intended for Saugor, but I hope the two regiments now there may be sufficient.

The 9th regiment has also been ordered from Benares to Delhi.

When the 51st reaches Benares there will be as usual three regiments.

I have written to Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland requesting him, if he safely can, to spare me a regiment from Nusseerabad, and if so, to direct Brigadier Kennedy to order its march to Kurnaul. The route to Ferozepore may be objectionable at this season.

I hope these measures will be approved.

The Sikhs seem to conform to our wishes in a friendly spirit; had there been any appearance of a contrary tendency I should have moved straight upon Delhi and abandoned my visit to Agra.

Believe me, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 37.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *November* 23, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to transmit, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, copy of letters addressed by me to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to Major-General Sir R. Arbuthnot, to Major-General Boyd, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild.

2. The agent of the Lahore Durbar having inquired whether Raja Goolaub Sing should proceed to Peshawur along with the troops which I have called upon the Lahore Government to dispatch to Peshawur, I have recommended that the Maha Raja's son should proceed in command, accompanied by other chiefs, and that Rajah Goolaub Sing should remain in the Hazara country, but prepared to move in any direction, with a reserve, if called upon by me or by Captain Mackeson.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 38.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, December* 2, 1841.

YOUR Excellency will have received full details of the important events which appear to have placed our troops in Cabool and Jellalabad, in a position of considerable difficulty. We have now to inform your Excellency, that the only measure which we deem it practicable and prudent to adopt at present, for the support of these troops, is to concentrate an effective brigade at or near Peshawur, by which a good front can be shown towards the northern portion of Affghanistan, and a point of union and strength provided in case of emergency. This brigade may have the effect of controlling an extended outbreak of the insurgents on the Peshawur frontier; and in the event of its being able to advance to Jellalabad, and to hold that post and the line of country dependent upon it, the officer commanding the collected force will have a discretion to make that forward movement, being careful however to maintain the integrity of his communications with Peshawur. Your Excellency will be pleased to give instructions to the officer commanding to that effect. But he will not consider himself authorised, except upon the receipt of further directions of a contrary tenor, to endeavour to make his way to Cabool, unless he should see that the movement could certainly be effected with little hazard, or unless in view to an object of pressing and vital importance to the safety of the troops at that place. We apprehend that the severity of the winter would, under any circumstances, render such an advance impossible until the month of April, and that the obstacles to it arising from the want of means of carriage and of supply, which could be depended upon, would, in the actual state of things in Affghanistan, be exceedingly serious, were the season even more favourable for the attempt.

2. We observe that three regiments of Native Infantry have been hastened on towards Peshawur; and we are highly sensible of the zeal with which these reinforcements have been expedited. We believe that some proportion of irregular horse has accompanied these corps, but we should be glad, if your Excellency should think it proper to make the brigade complete, with a due proportion of cavalry and artillery.

3. We think it undesirable immediately to detach Her Majesty's 9th Foot to Peshawur; but circumstances may induce us to alter this opinion, and we will be prepared to adopt any arrangement respecting this regiment, which your Excellency may wish your nearer means of forming a judgment have thought to be advisable.

4. Generally we would solicit your Excellency to exercise your discretion in regard to the details of these arrangements, and to give orders without reference to us, bearing always in mind that our present object is only to establish a point of support and demonstration at Peshawur, and not to require the forcing at all hazards of the passes to Cabool.

5. We will issue instructions to the Political Agent at Peshawur, as to the course to be followed by British officers and troops, in the event of serious collision arising between the Sikh forces in the Peshawur territory, and the Affghan inhabitants of that country. And your Excellency will direct the officer commanding the brigade, to attend to the wishes which, in conformity with these instructions, the Political Agent may express to him on that subject.

6. While these arrangements were made in advance at Peshawur, it will be necessary that a strong force of not less than from 10,000 to 12,000 men should be held ready to be concentrated between the Sutlej and the Jumna; and we believe that, with a few additions, and without weakening the means of controlling places of importance, such as the city of Delhi and the Province of Rohilcund, the troops already assembled or directed towards that quarter, will be sufficient for the purpose. We would suggest to your Excellency that Her Majesty's 31st Foot should be moved upwards from Agra to Meerut or Kurnaul, as we are in communication with the Resident at Nagpore, upon his releasing the 39th Foot to take the place of that or of any other corps which your Excellency may deem preferable for such service. We have ordered the 46th and 17th Regiments in progress to Barrackpore, to be halted at Benares, so as to enable your Excellency, should you think it necessary, to arrange for withdrawing two

more native corps from Benares, or other more convenient station, to Upper India.

7. In our calculations on this subject, we have not reckoned upon drawing any corps from Rajpootana; but your Excellency will consult Colonel Sutherland as to his means of aiding you in emergency from that quarter. Your Excellency may doubtless regard both the Hurriana Light Infantry and the Jeypore Contingent at Shaka-Wattee, as available for any service which you may desire.

8. We shall address the Government of Bombay, requesting them so to modify the plans which Major Outram may have announced to them for the arrangements to be made for the next year in Upper Sinde and Cutchee, as to allow of the assemblage at Sukkur and Shikarpore, of two effective brigades, so that along the whole line of the Sutlej and Indus, our position may be one of imposing strength.

9. We shall keep your Excellency constantly informed of any further arrangements which it may seem advisable to make in connection with the subject of this letter.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 39.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Fort William, December* 2, 1841.

I AM directed to transmit for your information, a copy of a letter this day addressed by the Governor-General in Council, to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. It will be desirable that this dispatch shall be communicated without delay to the Political Agent at Peshawur; and it is hoped that that officer will find the means of furnishing Sir William Macnaghten with a copy of it, or of communicating to him the substance of it in a secret and confidential manner.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 40.

Mr. Maddock to Major Outram, Political Agent in Sinde and Beloochistan.

Sir, *Fort William, December* 2, 1841.

I AM directed to transmit, for your information, the inclosed extract* from a letter this day, addressed by the Governor-General in Council to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and to request that you will give effect to the plans of Government, by detaining in Upper Sinde such portions of the troops which you had designed to relieve, as you may consider sufficient for the end in view.

I am, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India.

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* See paragraph 8 in No. 38.

No. 41.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, December* 3, 1841.

SINCE addressing your Excellency yesterday we have received an express from Mr. Clerk, of the 24th ultimo, containing information of the events at Cabool to the 9th, and at Jellalabad to the 15th ultimo.

2. These accounts exhibit a most unfavourable state of affairs at Cabool, but they do not lead us to alter the views and intentions which were stated in our yesterday's dispatch. Your Excellency will, therefore, expedite the movement of whatever may be required to complete one brigade, efficiently provided with all necessaries of equipment and supply, in the direction of Peshawur, to be stationed there, with orders of the tenor which we yesterday fully explained, so as to give succour to our troops in the event of their retiring. We do not now desire to send a second brigade in advance, for we do not conceive it to be called for, for the objects of support and assistance which we contemplate; and we think it inexpedient to detach any greater number of troops than may be absolutely indispensable from our own provinces.

3. It would be vain to speculate upon the issue of the contest at Cabool; but in the extreme event of the military possession of that city, and the surrounding territory, having been entirely lost, it is not our intention to direct new and extensive operations for the re-establishment of our supremacy throughout Affghanistan.

4. We can scarcely contemplate in such case that there will be any circumstances or political objects of sufficient weight to induce us to desire to retain possession of the remainder of that country, and, unless such shall be obvious as arising from the course of events, we should wish our military and political officers so to shape their proceedings as will best promote the end of retiring with the least possible discredit. Of course it will be desirable that this retirement shall be deliberate, and the result of arrangements that will leave some political influence in the country: but it is impossible to shut our eyes to the probability that the first impulse of the population in the southern districts, upon hearing of our having suffered disaster at Cabool, will be to rise and surround our different positions, cutting off the communication. In this case the commanding officers will be instructed to make it their first aim to fall back on the nearest support, and so to save their troops from the risk of being isolated, it being, of course, a paramount consideration to provide for the safety of the different detachments as far as possible. Major-General Nott, or the officer commanding at Candahar, will be directed, in the event of the loss of Cabool, to take the force at Ghuznee under his orders, and to provide Colonel Palmer with suitable instructions. With regard to the regiment at Ghuznee, we shall instruct Mr. Clerk to arrange with the Sikh Government for giving every aid in its power, should the retirement of that corps to Dhera Ismael Khan, or other point on the frontier, be determined upon. We shall cause a copy of this paragraph to be conveyed to Major Rawlinson, Major-General Nott, and Lieut.-Colonel Palmer, both through Major Outram in Upper Scinde, and Captain Mackeson in Peshawur.

5. We doubt not that your Excellency will have felt it desirable to superintend personally the execution of such measures on our frontier as the exigency of events may have rendered necessary, and will, therefore, have proceeded to establish your head-quarters at one of the advanced stations.

6. It is of high importance at this juncture that we should act in a clear and cordial plan of co-operation with the Government of Lahore, and a dispatch has been this day in consequence addressed to Mr. Clerk, of which we enclose a copy for your Excellency's information.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND,
W. W. BIRD,
W. CASEMENT,
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 42.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Fort William, December* 3, 1841

IN continuation of my dispatch of yesterday's date, I am directed to acknowledge your dispatch by express of the 23rd ultimo, and to send to you, for information and guidance, the accompanying copy of a further letter, which has been this day addressed by the Governor-General in Council to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. Your language to the Lahore Durbar, in the unfavourable crisis which must be anticipated as possible in Affghanistan, will be to the purport, that the Government will take time to consider the eventual policy which it may be most proper to adopt in relation to that country; that in the meanwhile it is proposed only to push on such troops towards Peshawur as may give support to any of our detachments falling back towards that place, and as may be sufficient to act, in emergency, in aid of the Sikh authority within that territory. The possible employment of such troops in advance towards Jellalabad, as referred to in the dispatch to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of yesterday's date, may be explained by you to the Durbar if occasion should seem to call for it.

3. It is the intention of the Governor-General in Council, with a general view to the repression of any possible disturbance of tranquillity, to hold a strong force, ready to be concentrated in our northern frontier; but your language to the Sikh Government will be that of uniform and cordial friendship, so as to remove any suspicion which might be entertained from a knowledge that reinforcements were assembling in that quarter; and the Durbar will doubtless feel that, in a collision with the Affghan tribes and people, their interests are identical with ours, and they will be prepared to join heartily with us in measures, the effect of which must contribute to the security of their own Affghan districts.

4. You will instruct Captain Mackeson, in conformity with the intimation in the dispatch of yesterday to the Commander-in-Chief, to call upon the officer commanding the brigade proceeding to Peshawur to assist, in any exigency, the Sikh authorities in defending their power within that territory.

5. The object of the British Government will be to maintain its union with the Lahore Durbar in unimpaired and increasing intimacy, to give all legitimate support to the Sikh Government, and to use our influence for reconciling the differences by which it may be embarrassed, with a fair and friendly regard to the interests of all parties in it. The mode of giving effect to this object, alike by timely cordiality or judicious reserve, is left with confidence to your discretion; and if you should see good to visit Lahore for the promotion of our interests at this period, you will be at liberty to do so.

6. Your attention will be particularly given to the intimation for your guidance in paragraph 4 of the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, and you will make the necessary communication to Captain Mackeson, or any Sikh authority on whom you may depend, desiring him to make every effort to forward a letter to Colonel Palmer at Ghuznee.

I have &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 43.

Mr. Maddock to Major Outram.

Sir, *Fort William, December* 3, 1841.

INFORMATION of the important and unfavourable events which have occurred at Cabool will have reached you, and some communication has already been made to you on the views of the Governor-General in Council upon that subject. Such further orders as may be called for will, from time to time, be sent to you, but in the meanwhile I am desired to forward to you copy of a dispatch addressed on this date to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, consequent on

the receipt of intelligence from Cabool to the 9th, and from Jellalabad to the 15th ultimo, and to call your immediate and particular attention to the intimation in regard to the possible withdrawal of our forces from Affghanistan contained in paragraph 4. You will forward a copy of that paragraph without delay to Major Rawlinson and Major-General Nott, and you will request Major-General Nott to give such directions as he may see necessary, to the officers in command of detached posts with whom he can communicate.

2. You will, on your part, give every aid in the means of support, transport, and supply, to General Nott's force, that may be in your power, in the event of their being required from you.

3. Until further orders, all troops assembling or present in Upper Sinde and Cutchee will be held there in united strength. On the ultimate distribution of these troops, and on the affairs of Beloochistan, you will be addressed separately hereafter; but your tone will, of course, be one of continued friendship and intimacy with the governments of the Khan of Kelat and of the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sinde.

I have &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 44.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, December* 5, 1841.

THE letter of Major Craigie to the Military Secretary, detailing the orders given by your Excellency for the movement of regiments, has been communicated by the Military to the Secret and Political Department, and we may assure your Excellency of our entire concurrence in the movement, as proposed, of the 9th, 57th, 6th, 33rd, and 72nd Regiments; and we entirely approve of the manner in which it is proposed that the two brigades shall be composed, provided it is determined that a second brigade shall march across the Punjab. We would but repeat our doubt, with our present imperfect knowledge of the events which may have happened beyond Peshawur, whether the movement of so large a force is immediately necessary, but we will not press this doubt against what will be the result of a careful consideration of all circumstances by your Excellency and Mr. Clerk, with a full knowledge of the views of policy, as at present entertained by the Government. We have no doubt upon the expediency of having the brigade in readiness, and it is probable that before its march can take place from Ferozepore, accounts will have been received leading to a clear decision upon the propriety of its advance. That decision we will readily leave to your Excellency, who, after communication with Mr. Clerk, will best be able to judge of the arrangements requisite for the two objects which we regard as alike of paramount importance, namely, those of giving every practicable support to our troops across the Indus, and of maintaining the exhibition of clear and concentrated strength within our own provinces.

2. If the second brigade should be sent, we would request your Excellency to select for the command of the whole force thus collected, an officer of distinguished ability and known experience. The attention of Major-General Lumley has latterly been much directed to the events which have been passing in and beyond the North-West Frontier, and we would suggest his name to your Excellency for first consideration.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 45.

Mr. Maddock to Sir W. H. Macnaghten, Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk.

Sir, *Fort William, December* 5, 1841.

THE latest accounts which have reached Government from Cabool, give information of the state of affairs at that place up to the 9th ultimo, and notwithstanding the difficulties with which the British forces were then surrounded, the Governor-General in Council entertains sanguine hopes that, aided by the zeal and gallantry of the troops, you will have been enabled to suppress the insurrection, or at all events, to have secured a supply of provisions for the army, whereby it may be secure in its positions for the winter.

2. So serious appear to be the difficulties which are to be encountered at Cabool, amid a hostile population, by a force cut off for several months from support by the impassable state of the roads in the winter season, that the Governor General in Council has felt compelled to take into his contemplation the possible occurrence of still more serious disaster to our troops there, and to provide even for the contingency of our political influence in that quarter being for a time entirely subverted; and the first duty of Government in issuing instructions suitable to such an event having been discharged, I am now directed to assure you that the Governor-General in Council will remain anxiously mindful of your position, and that every measure will be adopted, as the tenor of the information received may show to be necessary, of which the season will admit, and which may be otherwise practicable, for affording relief to yourself and to the troops by whom you are accompanied.

3. A strong and complete brigade has been ordered from India, and is now in progress to Peshawur, where it will be directed to act immediately in aid of Sir Robert Sale, who was by the last accounts posted at Jellalabad; and in the event of further operations being necessary in that quarter, his Lordship in Council has it in contemplation to relieve the 13th Light Infantry and 35th Native Infantry by two fresh regiments; and the movements of these or other corps, which may be dispatched towards Peshawur, will depend upon the events which may have occurred at Cabool, and upon the directions which you and General Elphinstone may think proper to issue. Copies of the instructions which have been issued by the Governor-General in Council to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, will be communicated confidentially, through Mr. Clerk, to Captain Mackeson, and you will be informed of their purport through him as opportunity may require and admit; but in every event you may depend on the desire and determination of the Governor-General in Council to afford all possible succour to your position, and you will have complete and timely information of the political views of his Lordship in Council, under any change of circumstances which may arise.

4. Major-General Nott will, of course, have been anxious to give you every assistance in his power from the troops at Candahar, and it would be a source of much satisfaction to the Government to know that he has felt himself able to detach with a reasonable prospect of safety at a season in which, ordinarily, many difficulties may be expected, any effective portion of those troops towards Cabool.

5. The remarks or directions of Government must now be limited to the points which have here been noticed. We have only for the present to trust to an overruling Providence, and to the energy and perseverance of our gallant troops, for the maintenance of the power and safety of our arms.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK,

Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 46.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Fort William, December* 5, 1841.

IN continuation of my letter of the 3rd instant I am directed to forward, for your information and guidance, the inclosed copies of letters this day addressed to the Commander-in-Chief and Sir William Macnaghten, and to draw your particular attention to the third paragraph of the latter document.

2. The original dispatch for Sir William Macnaghten accompanies, and you are requested to take such means of forwarding it as you may consider best calculated to ensure its safe delivery.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 47.

Captain Mackeson to Sir W. H. Macnaghten.

Sir, *Futteghur, November* 20, 1841.

THE country between Peshawur and Gundamuck continued quiet up to the time of Captain Burn's Afreedees and Lieutenant Dowson's Janbaz abandoning the cantonment there. When the Gundamuck cantonment had been burnt the whole country rose at once, and our posts were attacked on all sides. Captain Ferris's cantonment was attacked on the night of the 13th. He repulsed the assailants, and then withdrew into the cantonment fort. He had a garrison of 250 men, Eusufzyes, and one gun; but, running short of ammunition, he was compelled to abandon the fort on the 16th, and cutting his way through the surrounding Ooloos at night, with the loss of fifteen men, he reached Salpura in safety, and is now on his way to Peshawur. Captain Ferris had recalled the posts at Landi Khana and Haft Chah, in Khyber, to his assistance, and their leaving the pass was the signal for disturbance there. A Kafila was plundered by the Shinwaris, and the huts of the Sepoys at Landi Khana, and some bhoosa set fire to. The Zukha Khail tribe of Gharri Lala Beg came and plundered the bazaar below Ali Musjid, and attacked the fort. The Afreedees of Captain Burn's corps, who had fled from Gundamuck, reached Tira, and spread the report that all the Europeans at Cabool had been murdered and cut up. Hundreds after hundreds came down to Khyber from Tira, bent on rapine and plunder; and from the 16th to the 19th Ali Musjid was invested, and the garrison, consisting of Mr. Mackeson, and 150 Eusufzyes, badly armed, were opposed to 1000 or 2000 Afreedees. At the commencement a burj of the fort was blown up by the explosion of some gunpowder, and about sixteen men of the garrison killed and wounded, with two Munshis. On the evening of the 18th the Afreedees had succeeded in cutting off from the garrison all access to the water, and had taken possession of Mr. Mackeson's house, built on the platform of the hill, nearly as high as the fort, and kept a galling fire from it on the fort. They also made two or three assaults on the gate, or door-way of the fort, but were repulsed, leaving about thirty dead on the ground. Mr. Mackeson and the men with him did their duty well, and though the Maliks frequently offered him and his men safe-conduct to Peshawur, and they had little hope of succour, they remained staunch. From the commencement of the attack I was in communication with the Afreedee Maliks, who disclaimed all participation in it, but said they were unable to control the Ooloos, who had risen up as one man; and now that men had been killed on both sides it would be very difficult to put matters right. I threatened them with the army of the Sikhs at Peshawur, and on the 19th went out with General Avitabile to Jamrud, with 300 or 400 horsemen and the Ooloos of Peshawur. I also dispatched Abul Rahim Khan Malizai, with 1500 rupees, to the Maliks, to enable them to dismiss the Tira Ooloos, and withdraw them from near the fort. This the Maliks succeeded in doing on the afternoon of the 19th. The water of the garrison was released, and the men

who had possession of Mr. Mackeson's house withdrawn to below the hill. The Afreedees also asked permission to carry off their dead, which was granted. On the morning of the 20th, as most of the supplies of the garrison had been plundered with the bazaar, I sent fifty bullocks, laden with supplies, to the Maliks, and told them if they sent them to the fort I would believe in their profession of friendship. They sent the supplies, and have re-established their chokis on the road, and the fort has most fortunately been as yet preserved to us. I am now sending in supplies to it, and as soon as the crowd has had time to disperse shall increase the garrison to 600 men.

The Afreedee Maliks are to restore the property the tribes have plundered, and have sworn to serve us as they have hitherto done, and to keep the road open so long as a Feringee remains alive at Cabool. They may keep their promise of serving us, unless any fresh disaster occur to our troops at Cabool before succour can arrive. The tribes talk of Shah Haidur, the King of Islam, and war with the Kafirs. The Maliks care nothing either for Shah Shooja, or Shah Zeman, or his son, or Islam. They are waiting to see if we are equal to the present contest. As long as they think we are they will continue our friends, and prefer us even to a King of Islam, because they know that no one can pay them so highly as we do. Should our troops at Cabool be overpowered we cannot expect to hold the pass one day. The Afreedees have reports that the garrison at Ghuznee has been cut off to a man; that Candahar and Beloochistan are up in arms. The whole country has risen against as, and is looking towards Cabool,—we have no friends. Turebaz Khan, of Lalpura, a chief of our own creation, is an exception; for to what place could Captain Ferris, with his family and handful of soldiers, have directed his steps, had he not felt confident of the reception he would meet with from Turebaz Khan?

It is the general opinion among Affghans, that if our troops should be overpowered at Cabool, we shall see Shah Shooja a second time crowned as King of the Affghans and of Islam.

Captain Ferris was compelled to leave all his baggage behind at the fort at Pesh Bolak; and I regret to say, 38,000 rupees of Government money which he had under his charge, belonging to the Peshawur treasury. The whole investment of a Parsee merchant, some eighteen camel-loads, has also fallen into the hands of the Ooloos.

I have, &c.,
F. MACKESON,
Political Agent.

No. 48.

Captain Mackeson to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Jallighur, November* 21, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to inclose for your information, and that of the Secretary to the Government of India, the copy of a letter addressed by me to the Envoy and Minister on the 20th instant.

This morning, by a letter from Jellalabad, I learn that an engagement took place between our troops and the rebels at Cabool on the 11th instant, in which our troops were completely victorious, and recaptured from the enemy the two guns taken in the city. A prospect appeared of their being able to gain over the Ghilzies, and thus break the confederacy against us. The troops at Jellalabad, after defeating the Ooloos on the 15th instant, had placed the city in a state of defence, got in supplies from the country, and were quite safe. They expected another attack on the 20th (yesterday), but were quite confident as to the result.

The Afredees are still hovering around Ali Musjid, and the Maliks apparently unable to keep them off, or probably unwilling. Until they are dispersed I cannot send more ammunition or provisions through the pass. The 100 maunds of powder and lead I first sent have, I hope, reached Jellalabad.

The whole country appears to have arisen, but we have no certain intelligence from Candahar, Ghuznee, or Beloochistan. We shall require a large force to put things to rights again. A large army should be stationed at Cabool, another at Peshawur, another at Candahar, and our troops should not again be

dispersed in small detachments, as hitherto, but wherever a disturbance arises bear with all force on one point, and make a severe example of any exciters of rebellion.

I have, &c.,
F. MACKESON,
Political Agent.

No. 49.

Captain Ferris, Commanding Jezailchee Corps, to Captain Lawrence.

Sir, *Peshawur, November* 22, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of Sir William H. Macnaghten, Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, that on the night of the 13th instant, about 10 P.M., an attack was made on my post by a party, consisting of six horsemen and about 120 foot, which were driven back after some sharp firing by the outlying picquet; our only casualty was one troop horse of the 5th Cavalry, shot through the neck*.

On the morning of the 14th instant I deemed it expedient to move into the fort, and was occupied during the greater part of the day in filling up a very large breach in the curtain in the north side of the fort, and making banquettes and loop-holes for the men to fire through, in which I was most ably assisted by my Adjutant, Lieutenant Lukin. At about 3 in the afternoon the enemy came down in great force from the direction of the Goolar Forts, and made an attempt to enter the cantonment. I immediately ordered out a sallying party of a detachment of 5th Cavalry, consisting of one havildar, one naick, and troopers, supported by one company of Jezailchees, and succeeded in driving the enemy back to their forts. This movement was executed entirely to my satisfaction; and I have great pleasure in recording the gallant behaviour of the small detachment of cavalry, as well as the steadiness of the company who supported them. The casualties were, one trooper killed, three Jezailchees wounded, and three horses wounded. Towards evening the fort was completely surrounded, and during the night the enemy succeeded in occupying the officers' bungalows and the lines, and kept up a heavy fire; the firing on our side continued throughout the night, and a number of the enemy were killed. On the morning of the 15th instant the Goolar people were joined by the Shinwaries of Deh Surroah Sungoo Khail, Beshbilgees, and a numerous body of Koochies, amounting to upwards of 5000 men. The firing from the fort continued the whole of the day and throughout the night. I this day got the 6-pounder in position on one of the centre bastions, and fired several rounds of grape and round shots, by which a number of the enemy were destroyed, and their advance on that side of the fort checked.

On the morning of the 16th the enemy increased in numbers, and towards evening large bodies of men were seen coming from the direction of Jellalabad to join them. Having no prospect of relief from any quarter, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Lukin having reported to me that the ammunition was only sufficient for the day, I attempted to treat with the insurgent chief, but failed, with the exception of one Meer Affghan, who withdrew with a portion of the Shinwaries; towards evening, our defenceless position having become known to our men, from the failure of ammunition, they became disheartened, and many made preparations for throwing themselves over the walls, five of whom did so, and were fortunately cut up by the enemy, which evidently deterred many others from following their examples. Prior to this, I had endeavoured to open a communication with Captain Mackeson and Captain Macgregor, as well as with Turibaz Khan, Kalid Khan, and other chiefs of influence, who I thought might have rendered me assistance, and had also sent off orders for two companies of Shahzada's Levies,

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* Strength of the party in Fort. Captain Ferris, commanding Jezailchee corps; Dr. Ritchie; Lieutenant and Adjutant Lukin; Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant-General; Dr. Stiven, Superintending Surgeon; Lieutenant Harington, 5th Light Cavalry; 1 Native Adjutant; 4 Jemadars; 4 Naib ditto; 12 Havildars; 17 Naicks; 249 Sepoys; (including sick), 1 Havildar, 5 Cavalry, 1 Naick, 20 Troopers.

stationed at the posts of Haftchah* and Lundikhana, to reinforce my post, but from the state the country was in I conclude my cossids never could have reached their destinations. The enemy had now been in possession of the officers' bungalows, Adjutant's office, men's lines, and hospital, (which closely adjoin the fort) for two days, and as the strength of my detachment would not admit of my sending out parties to dislodge them, they had succeeded in throwing up loop-holed defences on the roofs of the houses, so as partly to command the north and west walls.

At this crisis I called a meeting of the European and Native officers, (Lieutenant Harrington, 5th Cavalry, was unable to attend, being seriously ill from a severe bilious attack and too weak to leave his bed,) and laid before them the desperate state we were in, and it was resolved that at dusk we should make an attempt to cut our way through the enemy, leaving the treasure and all public and private property behind us. We had no means of conveyance, and our passage from the gateway through the lines being strongly occupied by the enemy, it being a point of honour amongst the Affghans to sacrifice everything for the safety of their zunanas, the few spare horses, the property of the officers, were given up for this purpose. Accordingly at dusk, the time the enemy's fire usually slackened, I formed my men in columns, the women in the centre, the rear protected by the detachment of 5th Light Cavalry, the defences that we had built at the gate were thrown down and the gate opened; the men then moved forward, and on our arriving at the ditch of the cantonment the enemy opened a heavy fire on us, by which three troopers and two horses were killed, one trooper wounded, and fourteen Jezailchees killed or missing, my horse wounded, twenty Jezailchees wounded; the camp followers also suffered severely. On reaching the plain I detached a company to the rear to check any advance that might be made by the enemy, this they effectually did, and with the exception of being fired on by one fort we were not molested until we arrived at the pass which turns Hazar No, when a party of forty men attacked our rear, but were beaten off by the rear-guard. No further interruption occurred, and we reached Girdia about three on the morning of the 17th instant, where we met the Mohmund Chief Turibaz Khan. Although our loss has been severe, I attribute the safety of the party to the eagerness which the enemy evinced to enter and plunder the fort in our rear. At day-break we marched for Lalpura under the escort of Turibaz Khan. Arrangements were here made by the Chief, to whom a promise of 3000 rupees was given by me if he would assist the detachment in reaching Peshawur, as he assured me it was unsafe our remaining at Lalpura in consequence of his tribe being in a most unsettled state; accordingly in the afternoon of the 18th instant we left under charge of his nephew Hyder Khan and 200 Mohmands, who conveyed us in safety through the Tatara Pass (as the Khyber was closed) and reached Peshawur on the morning of the 21st instant.

I have every reason to suppose, that the quantity of treasure (about 38,000 rupees,) known to be in the fort, together with a large and valuable investment belonging to a Parsee merchant, stores for Sir William Macnaghten, Bart. and Major Pottinger, and that of the other officers, acted as a considerable incentive to the exertions of the enemy, and tended to swell their numbers.

In conclusion, I beg leave to bring to the notice of the Envoy the valuable assistance I received, on every occasion, from my Adjutant, Lieutenant Lukin, throughout this affair, as also from Mr. Assistant Surgeon Ritchie: their exertions were beyond all praise. Captain Ponsonby, Assistant-Adjutant General, and Dr. Stiven, Superintending Surgeon, both rendered me great assistance. I regret that Lieutenant Harrington's health was such, that he was unable to leave his bed. To Alli Wardir, my native Adjutant, the native officers and men, all did their duty most nobly on this most trying occasion, and are deserving of every confidence.

I have, &c.,
JOS. FERRIS.

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* Captain Ferris's orders reached, and the withdrawal of these companies brought the Afreedees down upon Ali Musjid.

F. MACKESON.

No. 50.

Captain Ferris to Captain Mackeson.

Sir, *Peshawur, November* 23, 1841.

INCLOSED I have the honor to forward you my dispatch to the address of Captain Lawrence, Military Secretary, which, after perusal, I shall feel obliged if you can possibly forward it by cossid to Jellalabad.

Having made a promise of 3000 rupees to Taribaz Khan, for his safe-escort across the hills to Peshawur, I have the honor to request this sum may be disbursed from your treasury, pending the sanction of Government. In addition to this sum, Company's rupees 240 was paid by me as subsistence-money to the Mohmund escort.

I have, &c.,
J. FERRIS.

No. 51.

Captain Mackeson to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Futteghur, November* 26, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to forward, for the information of Government, a copy of a report received from Captain Ferris, Commanding Jazailchee Corps, on the 23rd instant.

Simultaneously with this report I received letters from Turibaz Khan, Chief of the Mohmunds, informing me that Saadut Khan, Ex-Chief of the Mohmunds, was advancing on Lalpura, with 1000 men, to attack him. It occurred to me that a sum of money might at this crisis be of great service to Turibaz Khan. I therefore did not hesitate to advance to him the 3000 rupees, promised to him by the officers who accompanied Captain Ferris's detachment to Peshawur, on the guarantee of those officers, pending the sanction of Government.

By letter from Jellalabad of the 21st instant, and from Cabool of the 14th instant, it would appear that our troops at both these places continue to be in a most critical position. It is, however, confidently reported at Peshawur that either on the 16th, the day of Eed, or one day afterwards, our troops at Cabool obtained a decided victory over the rebels; that many of their leaders had fled, leaving their families behind at Cabool, and that many had come in to Sir William Macnaghten, and that our troops had possession of the city of Cabool.

We are still without positive information as to the movers of this rebellion. The persons first pointed out in the letters from Cabool were Abdulla Khan Achakzai, Moolla Monim, and Sikandar Khan Ghilzais. These persons were no friends to the Sullogaishut Mir Afzul, who fled from Cabool. Mir Ahmed and one or two others were people in the confidence of Shah Shooja. Firmans, bearing the signature of Shah Zaman, are said to be circulating in Bajore, Koonar, Kashgar, Baneer, Suat, and the Eusofzai territory, calling on the tribes to rise and join the sons of Shah Zaman at Jellalabad. These may be forgeries, circulated by some needy Affghan, who lives upon his wits. From the tenor of the last native Akhbars at Peshawur, the Barukzais, Nawab Mahomed Zaman Khan, and Nawab Jubbar Khan, are pointed at as the great encouragers of disturbance at present. From whatever beginning it arose the insurrection has been general throughout the country; the population have not stopped to inquire in favour of whom they were rising,—it was sufficient that the object in view was to rid themselves of the Kafir yoke,—to expel the Feringees from Affghanistan.

Should our troops hold their own at Cabool until succour reach them, matters may be with little difficulty restored to their former footing; and should any misfortune occur to them, either from a scarcity of provisions or other cause, it will require an overwhelming force to retrieve our lost ground. Such is the excitement among Affghans, that those who have reputation for discernment venture to pronounce that the fate of the British Empire in India depends on the

issue of the contest at Cabool. It is profitless to speculate on events on which our information is so defective; but if it should appear that the Sullozais have been the instigators of this insurrection, and the keeping a large army in Affghanistan be too great a drain on the resources of India, to be continued as a permanent measure, much might be done, after force has had its effect in subduing opposition, by putting forward again Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, and merely leaving with him a representative of the British Government, as a pledge of our support when it might be needed.

I inclose a copy of two Persian Akhbars, which will show the nature of the rumours prevailing at Peshawur.

I have, &c.,
F. MACKESON,
Political Agent.

P.S.—Since writing the above intelligence has reached me of Saadut Khan having attacked Lalpura, and having been defeated by Taribaz Khan.

No. 52.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *November* 27, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to inform you that the 30th and 60th Regiments Native Infantry, with convoy as below, crossed the Sutlej this day, in progress to Peshawur:—

Colonel Wild, 30th Regiment, in command; Commandant Cheyt Sing Sikh Motummud; Sheikh Sadut-oolla, British Do.

30th Regiment Native Infantry	1,008
53rd Ditto Ditto	1,045
Total Soldiers	2,053
Officers	49
Followers	860
Baggage Camels	599
Commissariat ditto	650
Ordnance Stores ditto	71
Horses and Ponies	150

The Ordnance stores are the annual indents of the 5th Light Cavalry, Her Majesty's 44th Regiment, 5th and 54th Native Infantry.

The 60th Regiment crossed on 20th instant—mustered 1044 men and 14 officers.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE CLERK.
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 53.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *November* 27, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy, with an English translation, of a letter from Maha Raja Shere Sing, in reply to my letter to His Highness, of the 19th ultimo, a copy of a translation of which accompanied my letter to your address, of the 20th ultimo, relative to the withdrawal of Vizeer Zorawur Sing to Ladakh.

2. Raee Kishen Chund waited upon me this morning, and read to me a perwannah addressed to him from the Maha Raja, directing him to state to me that his Highness, hearing of the rebellion of the tribes around Cabool and Jellalabad, had dispatched Raee Keisree Sing with four battalions, 2000 horse, and six guns, with a good deal of ammunition; and that Keisree Sing has been directed

to proceed by forced marches, and to perform whatever Captain Mackeson and General Avitabile, may, after consultation, require him to undertake.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 54.

Mr. Clerk to Major-General Boyd, commanding the Sirhind Division, Kurnaul.

Sir, *November* 27, 1841.

THOUGH I have not yet heard that any artillery is ordered up to this frontier, I would beg leave to recommend, in anticipation of the speedy arrival of reinforcements so necessary on the Sutlej, that some artillery should move forward from hence.

2. I shall transmit a copy of this letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, in case he may think proper to halt one of the regiments under his command, until the arrival of such artillery as you consider can best be spared from Loodiana or Ferozepore ; but the latter is, I believe, for want of horses, incapable of moving, and this leaves an insufficiency for the due protection of this border, during an unsettled state of parties at Lahore.

3. Though Captain Mackeson made no application for artillery, I called upon the Sikh Government to send some guns to Peshawur ; and I am apprised that six have been dispatched from the nearest Sikh force to be placed at the disposal of that officer.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 55.

Mr. Clerk to Captain Mackeson.

Sir, *November* 27, 1841.

THE Lahore Durbar apprizes me that it has sent off ammunition direct to Peshawur, besides warning Koonwur Purtaub Singh, and Rajah Goolaub Singh, in the Huzara county, to comply with your requisitions.

2. If money will secure it, you will, at any price, convey to General Sale's force, through means of the tribes, with whom you may think it best to negotiate its safe delivery, what ever ammunition you obtain either from General Avitabile, or from Colonel Tulloch's advance party.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 56.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, commanding the Convoy, to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Buna Maltarjan, November* 27, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd instant, recommending the immediate dispatch to Peshawur of the ammunition under my charge. In reply, I beg to inform you that Lieutenant Liptrot, of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, will proceed to-morrow morning towards Peshawur, in charge of those stores, which he will deliver over to the escort that may be dispatched by Captain Mackeson, Assistant Political Agent, to receive charge of them.

Lieutenant Liptrot will then proceed with his Rissalah, by easy stages, to Peshawur.

I have, &c.,
J. TULLOCH.

No. 57.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Camp, Pärehwalla, December* 3, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to report the arrival, at this place, in progress to Affghanistan, of the detachment under my command, as noted below. It may be proper to add that we were detained by heavy rain, at Noee Wallah, on the 1st instant.

4th Company 6th Battalion, Artillery.
5th Company Sappers and Miners.
60th Regiment Native Infantry.
64th ditto ditto.

I have, &c.
J. TULLOCH.

No. 58.

Mr. Clerk to Major-General Boyd.

Sir, *Loodiana, December* 2, 1841.

HAVING had the honor to receive from the Acting Adjutant-General of the Army, a statement of the reinforcements which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has ordered to be put in motion for the purpose of forcing the Khyber, I beg leave to state to you, that I would not now wish that the 3rd troop, 2nd brigade, Horse Artillery, should move from the British frontier, on my requisition; though I do not propose, in consequence of this information, to request Lieutenant-Colonel Rich to recal the order for the intended march hence of that troop to-morrow, in progress to Ferozepore.

I have, &c.
G. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 59.

Captain Mackeson to Mr. Maddock.

Sir; *Futtehghur, November* 28, 1841.

OUR last letters from Cabool date on the 14th instant, and from Jellalabad the 21st instant. Since then we have a rumour very prevalent at Peshawur, that our troops at Cabool gained a complete victory over the rebels on the 16th or 17th. Another rumour also prevails, that the Kohulies had managed to conduct water so as to flood the cantonments near the Bagh-i-shab, and that the scarcity of grain at Cabool was such, that not only our troops, but the people of the city also, were likely to suffer from it during the cold season. At Jellalabad also grain is very dear and scarce. Our troops at Cabool and Jellalabad are said to be in no danger from the attacks of the hostile Ooloos, who now cease to come near them in very large bodies; but their position must still be considered as imminently critical with reference to the want of provisions and the roads continuing interrupted. Neither have we any intelligence from Candahar beyond a rumour, that the rising has been as general there as in this part of the country.

2. The Peshawur territory will supply provisions; but without a large force to keep open our communications, these provisions cannot reach Cabool or Jellalabad. The brigade of native troops now on its way from Ferozepore and Loodiana, incumbered as it is with 8 lacs of treasure and commissariat stores, can do little. The Khyber Pass has been closed for the last 10 days. Ali Musjid, which will be of vital importance to us in forcing the pass, still remains in our possessionand we shall endeavour to keep it, till our troops arrive, at all hazards; but the insurrection has been so general, that the Afreedee tribes are not to be controlled by the Maliks, and we can place no dependence on them.

When the brigade arrives at Peshawur, I purpose to leave most of the treasure at Peshawur ; and such stores and ammunition as are necessary to the troops at Jellalabad can be sent by the Sittaree Road, while the brigade will take only its own baggage, and march through the Khyber to Jellalabad. One regiment of Native Infantry and Captain Ferris' Jezailchee corps might suffice to garrison Jellalabad, whilst three Native regiments and one regiment of Europeans proceed to the relief of the troops at Cabool. This will, however, only be a partial relief. We shall require a larger body of troops to restore matters to their former state, and the more troops are necessary because the army must be mainly supplied with provisions from this side of Khyber, and our communications must be kept open at all risk.

3. The necessity of sending up an overpowering force must be obvious when it is remembered that the whole population, with exception to the Tajik cultivators, has risen against us. At the approach of our troops they will all withdraw their families from the villages in the plains, and if we have a small force we shall have to fight our way against the whole armed people, but if our strength is put forth in full vigour, the people of the country, seeing the hopelessness of resistance, will by degrees renew their intercourse with us, and return to their villages.

4. To keep up our communications through Candahar, a large force will be necessary, but the same force will enable us to obtain a command of the pass which it will not be in the power of the Afreedees again to disturb. Towers require to be built at regular intervals from the eastern entrance of the pass to Ali Musjid, and a strong mud fort must be constructed at the top of the Laudi Khana Pass near Lohargi, where we have sunk wells. The present system of paying the Afreedees has been found not to answer at the time of need, neither have hostages been found of use to us. The sons and brothers of the Maliks of the Gakhakeeil and Sepai tribe were with me, and the Gakhakheil tribe were the first to attack Ali Musjid. The son of the Mahomed chief Saadat Khan was with me, and his father led a force against Salpura. When we have posts built in the pass that can be held, we may, to a limited extent, pay the tribes and take hostages from them with more success.

5. It is fair to observe that the Afreedee Maliks have not hitherto willingly acted against us. The first disturbance in the Khyber was caused by Captain Ferris' withdrawal of the posts at Lundi Khana and Haftchab. The Ooloos proceeded to invest Ali Musjid and had cut off the water, and but for the active interference of the Maliks on my remonstrances and threats, might soon have got possession of the fort. The Afreedees who fled from Gundamuck spread reports in Tira that all the Feringees had been murdered at Cabool; the Ooloos of Tira rose as one man and came into the pass. It has been with much difficulty that the Maliks have succeeded in dispersing this multitude. The Maliks wish to preserve their allowances, but the tribes are decidedly hostile to us. Their Moollas are preaching against us, and the popular feeling is too strong for the Maliks to oppose or restrain. The Maliks are now looking anxiously towards Cabool; should our troops be successful there the pass will be again open, but so long as the issue of events remains doubtful we cannot trust the Afreedees. The system, therefore, of paying the Maliks is found not to answer. Meanwhile I have made temporary arrangements with the Moolla Goris for opening the Tatara road, and I have no doubt of our being able to use the Ali Khana road which is practicable for artillery, should the Khyber continue closed. I also expect that the opening of the Tatara Road will have much effect on the Afreedees.

6. Major-General Sale has sent urgent requisitions on me for ammunition, supplies, and treasure. All these can be supplied from Peshawur, but there is risk of their falling into the hands of the enemy. I have applied to General Avitabile for 200 Affghan horsemen, whose families are at Peshawur; and with the assistance of these, and that I can raise myself, and the horsemen of the Mahomed chief Turibaz Khan at Lalpura, and 400 Eusofzyes, I hope to be able to forward ammunition to Jellalabad, if not by Khyber by the Tatara road.

7. Some days after receiving intelligence of the critical position of our troops at Cabool and Jellalabad, I called on the Sikh authorities here to furnish me with 6000 men to march on Jellelabad, being certain that they had them not to furnish. General Avitabile replied to the effect that there were few troops at Peshawur, and that he required them all for the protection of the Peshawur territory.

I have, &c.

F. MACKESON, *Political Agent.*

No. 60.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *December* 4, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to transmit a letter to your address from Captain Mackeson, which that officer has enclosed to me for my inspection. It has just reached me, and I forward it hence by express.

2. I have pointed out to Rao Gobind Jus, for communication to the Sikh Durbar, the inability manifested by General Avitabile to comply immediately with Captain Mackeson's requisition, for a force of 6000 men to penetrate to Jellalabad. Although I shall avail myself of this circumstance, in a letter which I propose to-day to address to the Maharaja, indicating again the necessity for every exertion on the part of the Durbar, for a powerful co-operation with the British troops proceeding to Peshawur, and for prompt attention to Captain Mackeson's applications for escorts, supplies, and ammunition, I do not consider it to be necessary at present, in addressing the Maharaja, to advert more particularly to the consequences, respecting the Treaty, of General Avitabile's being unprovided with the force called for by Captain Mackeson. The discussion of this subject now can answer no good purpose, because, since the long disregard of the terms of the Article respecting it, by the parties concerned, both Affghans and Sikhs, it cannot present to the British Government any difficulties in adjustment hereafter.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 61.

Mr. Clerk to Captain Alexander, commanding 3rd troop 2nd brigade of Horse Artillery.

Sir, *December* 4, 1841.

HAVING heard that it is possible the guns which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has directed to move across the frontier may not be ready to move so immediately as the passage across the Sutlej of your troop, now in progress to Ferozepore, may be effected, I deem it to be advisable, adverting to the emergency of the occasion, to recommend that you, nevertheless, proceed on, in anticipation of the sanction of his Excellency to your doing so by orders of the Major-General commanding the division, issued at my request, provided that you can do so without crippling the means of marching requisite for the artillery which his Excellency has directed to be put in motion from the frontier, and which should follow as expeditiously as possible.

I have &c.,
G. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 62.

Mr. Clerk to General Sir J. Nicolls.

Sir, *December* 7, 1841.

I DO myself the honor to inform your Excellency that in consequence of my receiving your Excellency's letter of the 2nd instant, prohibiting the advance of Horse Artillery as a reinforcement to proceed to Affghanistan, I have apprised Captain Alexander, commanding the 3rd troop, 2nd brigade, now on its way to Ferozepore, and Major Huish, commanding that station, that they are to consider the request made by me for the advance of that troop to be withdrawn.

2. In reply to the question contained in the 8th paragraph of your Excellency's letter under acknowledgment, I beg leave to state to your Excellency that I have

offered no suggestions to the officer commanding the 60th and 64th, or to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, either respecting the progress of those two regiments beyond Peshawur by themselves, or when they may be joined by the 30th and 53rd.

I have &c.,
G. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 63.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, December* 15, 1841.

UPON reconsidering the latest intelligence which we have received, extending (though comprising no detailed particulars of facts) to the 18th of November from Cabool and to the 23rd of November from Jellalabad, and on a review of the large extent of available means which will be very shortly collected for the support of tranquillity within our own provinces, it has appeared to us likely, that on the discretion which we requested your Excellency to exercise, in our dispatch of the 5th instant, you will have determined to send on Her Majesty's 9th Foot and a fifth native regiment to Peshawur, and to place Major-General Lumley in command of the force assembled on that frontier. We beg to intimate to your Excellency, that if you should have come to that decision, it is one of which we would cordially approve.

2. The objects of the force collected towards Peshawur would, as before stated to your Excellency, be mainly those of demonstration and strength upon that part of the Affghan frontier; but for these objects it may, as it seems to us on our present information, be advisable to employ two effective brigades under an officer of the high reputation and ability possessed by Major-General Lumley.

3. Should your Excellency have resolved to give effect to this arrangement, we would commit to Major-General Lumley the political as well as military direction of proceedings within the tracts wherein he will have to act. The Political Agents, Captain Macgregor and Captain Mackeson, will place themselves in subordination to him, and will be guided by his orders.

4. Your Excellency will cause a copy of this intimation to be sent to those officers by Mr. Clerk, if Major-General Lumley should proceed on this duty.

5. We shall hereafter communicate any detailed instructions which it may seem desirable to send, to Major-General Lumley, if so employed, but he will, in the first instance, be guided by the spirit of the dispatches addressed to your Excellency on the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th instant. The safety of the troops under Sir Robert Sale will, of course, be the nearest and most prominent object of his care; and he will hold himself in such force towards the Ghilzie or other Passes leading in advance of Jellalabad to Cabool, (which will be closed for the winter) as circumstances will admit.

6. If there should be no longer a question of giving a support to the position of our troops at Cabool, and the supply of a force in, or in advance of the Jellalabad Valley should be difficult and precarious, it will be for Major-General Lumley to decide whether it will be expedient to remain in that forward position, in dependence on the receipt of provisions and materiel from the Peshawur territory, to the roads communicating with it in his rear. We should regard this as a matter to be regulated entirely by his military discretion, and on his knowledge of the present political ends which are contemplated by the Government.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND,
W. W. BIRD,
WM. CASEMENT,
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 64.

Mr. Maddock to the Residents at Hyderabad, Lucknow, Indore, Gwalior, Nagpore, Nepal, Mysore, and Commissioner or Agent to the Governor-General, in Rajpootana.

Sir, *Fort William, December* 16, 1841.

IN the present state of affairs at Cabool and at other points in Affghanistan, you may feel it to be of importance that you should be acquainted with the probable measures and intentions of the Government, and I am accordingly directed to inform you that the immediate objects of the Governor-General in Council are to give every practicable support to our troops across the Indus, and at the same time to maintain the exhibition of clear and concentrated strength within our own dominions. Measures have been already taken for the advance of troops in the direction of Peshawur and Jellalabad, and for gathering our forces in powerful and collected bodies along the line of the Sutlege and Indus down to the sea, and, beyond this, the public authorities will, of course, be aware of the necessity of maintaining for a time a system of more than usual vigor and vigilance throughout India.

2. It has been very satisfactory that throughout the course of the late campaigns we have been able to rely, and that we may now yet more confidently rely upon the concert and co-operation of the Government of Lahore. The union of the British and Sikh Governments promises, under present circumstances, to become yet more close than before, and the sincerity and notoriety of that union will afford a most powerful guarantee for the tranquillity of India.

3. It remains only that within our Indian territories and those of our dependent allies, we be watchful over every movement of mischief, that we keep our forces in readiness for action, and be forward to repress decisively the least advances towards disorder. After a brief interval, when it is seen that our hand is prompt and powerful as heretofore, any tendency to agitation, which may possibly, in certain situations, be the first effect of our present difficulties in Affghanistan, may be expected to subside.

4. In the event of further reverses in that country, your language will, of course, still be one of calmness and confidence, such as is suited to the stability and vast variety of our resources, and whatever may be the future policy of the Government towards Affghanistan, you may rest assured that it is and will continue to be the firm resolution of his Lordship in Council, to maintain unimpaired the military strength of the Government in the territories subject to your political control, as well as in all other quarters of the empire.

5. The Governor-General in Council has judged it right to communicate to you thus much of the present objects and policy of Government, and if any important change should take place which it would be necessary for you to know, the same will be communicated for your information and for the guidance of your conduct in the duties entrusted to your charge.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 65.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major Craigie.

Sir, *Jellalabad, December* 1, 1841.

I HAVE to request that you will acquaint the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy continue to occupy a position amongst hills, at the distance of about three miles from this place. I have reason to believe that their present numbers do not exceed 2,000, and they have not ventured on any serious movement since the 14th ultimo. Daily, however, they push forward parties in advance, which direct a desultory fire of musquetry upon the bastions and curtains to the north-westward. From Cabool our direct latest intelligence is the letter of the 18th ultimo, from Major-General Elphinstone (copy of which was transmitted with mine of the 24th ultimo). A spy, however, who visited the enemy's camp,

reports to us that they there describe the situation of the Feringees at the capital as similar to our own in Jellalabad, meaning that they are invested, subject to petty attacks, and anxiously awaiting reinforcements and supplies. We shall, indeed, be well pleased to hear that their position is not more unfavorable than our own. Captain Mackeson writes us, that he has continued to throw provisions into Ali Musjid, and expects to be able to add a reinforcement of Eusofzyes. He likewise informs us, that one regiment of Native Infantry was to leave Ferozepore on the 19th ultimo, and another on the 20th, and a third to march from Loodianah on the 21st. We trust, if provisions can be obtained, that both the force at Cabool, and we at Jellalabad, may be enabled, by God's blessing, to maintain ourselves until the arrival of these troops, should they be here early in January, but I must beg of you to make known explicitly to his Excellency, my opinion that the crisis in Affghanistan demands much larger reinforcements than this, and that European Infantry and Dragoons ought to form a part of it. I consider also the present artillery, in the eastern part of the country, viz., two batteries, to be insufficient; I would recommend that a third be added without delay, which ought to consist of 9-pounders. I would also remind you that the whole of the camp equipage of the force now under my command, with the exception of the hospital tents, and one single Sepoy pall of the 35th Regiment, has been destroyed, having been left in charge of the irregulars at Gundamuck, whose defection has been already reported. If also it be the intention of Government to subjugate the provinces now in a state of universal revolt, it is to be remarked, that there are, in this immediate vicinity, besides the strong place of Lughman, other forts which cannot be breached without the aid of siege artillery, or reduced without a complete engineer establishment, guided by the most skilful officers.

I take this opportunity to annex a return of my force.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 66.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major Craigie.

Sir, *Jellalabad, December* 2, 1841.

I HAVE to request the favor of your informing the Commander-in-Chief, that the enemy who had for some days annoyed my garrison, by sending forward parties to open a desultory fire on our soldiers labouring on the works, appeared in force yesterday morning, closely environed the northern and western faces, and partially surrounded the whole place. A desire, under present circumstances, to reserve our ammunition, would, perhaps, have induced me to tolerate this audacity somewhat longer; but as these continued attacks had at length the effect of compelling our people to suspend their exertions to complete the parapets, and as the reports of our spies indicated an intention on the part of the rebels to establish mines under the scarp of our defences, (a species of operation in which some Khails of this country are exceedingly skilful) I determined to remove them by a sally to a more convenient distance. I therefore formed a column within the Cabool gate, consisting of 300 of the 13th, 300 of the 35th, a detachment of Sappers and Jezailchees, two guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery, and the whole of the cavalry. I placed this force under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie, purposing to superintend the operation myself from the ramparts.

On the gate being thrown open, the column advanced at a rapid pace, and then, according to my previous instructions, the sappers diverging to the left, swept the whole space in front of the walls in that direction, and moved towards the rocky mounds on the right of the main road from Cabool. The security of the other flank was in like manner provided for, by a company of the 35th being extended facing towards the river, whilst the cavalry had been ordered to follow the track of the main column, then forming and wheeling to their left to intercept all fugitives on the plain in that quarter. These movements were made in uninterrupted succession, and with great spirit, and an animating cheer burst from our soldiers the moment they found themselves beyond the walls. The

enemy poured their fire upon Colonel Dennie's column as soon as it debouched, but dismayed by the unchecked speed of its advance, broke, and deserting the ruined forts in their rear, fled across the plain obliquely towards the river. They were promptly and hotly pursued up to its bank by the Jezailchees and the skirmishers of the 13th; and Captain Abbott pushing his guns at the gallop up to a point which commanded the stream, formed battery, and completed the *deroute*. His practice here was excellent, and the enemy suffered visibly and severely from his round shot and shrapnell. Many of them fell under his fire and that of the infantry and irregulars, and many rushing into the river, and missing the ford in their consternation, got into deep water, and were swept away and drowned. The cavalry also successfully sought an opportunity of charging on the level, and once more found ample employment for their sabres. The sappers too, surprised, by a sudden onset, a mass of the Ooloos, which was moving on apparently with the intention of operating against the southern front of the walls, and dispersed them with slaughter. The enemy now were in panic flight on every side, and the reserves having been steadily reformed, the work of demolishing the walls of old forts which had afforded cover to petty assailants, was commenced.

The effect of this sudden and unexpected blow has been electrical. The insurgents have not only fled from the near holds of the Zilne Urbol and two others, in which the Ghiljee chiefs Uzeez Khan and Gool Mahomed and Golam Jon, son of the revolted Urz Bezie, had taken up their quarters, but retired from the whole line of the Char Bhag forts, and only rallied at Umr Khail, at the cautious distance of twelve miles from our ramparts. The latest information is to the effect, that the rebel commander has demanded a strong reinforcement of horse from Cabool as an indispensable condition of his making any further attempts against us. Our loss has been trifling beyond calculation or hope.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

No. 67.

Captain Mackeson to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Futtyghur, December* 2, 1841.

ON receipt of copy of Sir W. H. Macnaghten's letter to the address of Captain Macgregor, dated Cabool, 18th November, 1841, (a copy of which has been forwarded to you) in which I am desired "to ask for aid from the Sikhs under the treaty, and to urge Government to send as many troops into this country, and as speedily as possible," I lost no time in again calling on General Avitabile to send five or six thousand men to Jellalabad. General Avitabile consulted with the commanding officers of the four Mussulman Auxiliary Battalions now at Peshawur. These officers made objections to ordering their men to march. The principal were, 1st, That the four Battalions could not parade more than 2,200 fighting men fit for service; that this small body could not make its way to Jellalabad. That on reaching Lalpura it would be surrounded by overpowering numbers of the Ooloos. 2ndly, That there were no troops at Peshawur, either for the protection of Peshawur in their absence, or to march to their support, and that their supplies would be cut off. 3rdly, That when they last marched with our troops towards Cabool, after passing Khyber, their own Government took no measures to provide for them, although Konwur Kharall Sing, and Nao Nehal Sing were then at Peshawur with 40,000 men, and that when they applied to Colonel Wade to be supplied from the Company's godowns, they were told that they must look to their own Government to provide for them; what hope, therefore, could they now have that they would be supported, when there were no troops at Peshawur? Further, that one of the Nujib Battalions had been completely annihilated in the Khyber Pass, and no measures taken, either by the Sikh or British Government, to save them. Finally, that the promises of extra pay made to them had never been fulfilled, and that, although the semblance of discipline was still kept up in the Sikh Army, it was well known that the Sepoys no longer obeyed, or had any fear of their officers, and they feared that these battalions, if ordered to march to Jellalabad, would break out into

open mutiny, an event which might encourage the Affghan tribes round Peshawur to imitate the example of the tribes at Cabul. I had offered General Avitabile to pay the troops a gratuity of two months' pay, or 20,000 rupees, if they would march towards Jellalabad 4000 strong, and this had been made known to the Commandants.

I have no fresh intelligence from Cabool. Mulla Najaib, the pensioner of the British Government, returned to Peshawur from Cabool a few days ago. He was in Cabool up to the action of the 14th, and there had been no action since; but friends of his, who had left Cabool eight days later than he had, told him that the Caboolees were meditating another attack on the cantonment troops, and were waiting the arrival of those Kohistanies who had hitherto been held in check, and occupied with the Goorkha corps. Mulla Najaib states, that there had been four great actions, in all of which our troops had been successful, and he expressed great admiration of our mode of fighting; he compared the sallies of our troops with their artillery to the thunder flash, rapid, and carrying destruction wherever it alighted.

I desired Mulla Najaib to draw out an account of what he had seen and heard, which I will send you on some future occasion. I learn from him, that on the first outbreak, the Shah sent his own battalion, under Mr. Campbell and Nizamood Dowlah, to seize the rebels in the city; but after a great struggle, and much loss, they failed. His Majesty also entreated our troops, who had been marched to the Bala Hissar, to go in support of his own; but they pleaded that their orders were to remain in the Bala Hissar, and near his person. Captain Skinner was seized by the rebels in the shop of a seller of wood, where he had been concealed some days. He is now made to read any letters of ours that fall into their hands; there is also a son of Cazi Mulla Hussan, educated at Loodiana, who is in the city of Cabool, who reads these letters.

A detachment of 300 men coming up to Cabool from Ghuznee, is said to have been annihilated by the Warduk tribe. Another detachment of Affghan Dooranee Horse of similar strength to the above, bringing up the Zamin Dawar prisoners from Candahar towards Cabool, had been overpowered on the other side of Ghuznee in an engagement with the tribes. An European officer commanded; but he reached Ghuznee with a few horsemen in safety. The troops at Ghuznee are said to have put to death two of the principal Affghans in the city there. No disaster is mentioned by Mulla Najaib, as having occurred to the garrison there, and there is reason to hope that our troops will weather the storm much better at Candahar than at Cabool.

I have, &c.,
F. MACKESON,
Political Agent.

No. 68.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *December* 10, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to transmit a copy of a letter to my address from Captain Mackeson, dated the 2nd instant.

2. It is fortunate, I think, that circumstances prevented the execution of Captain Mackeson's intention of dispatching 4000 Sikh troops, unsupported, towards Jellalabad. In the best days of the Sikh army they would have been worsted in that undertaking before they had accomplished one march, and at such a time as this, affording the Khyberrees a means of triumph is peculiarly to be deprecated.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 69.

Captain Mackeson to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Peshawur, December* 4, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to forward, for the information of Government, Persian letters, as per margin*, which may convey some idea of the spirit and motives that actuate the movers of the present insurrection at Cabool, and throughout Affghanistan. The papers may be depended upon as authentic.

2. Our open enemies are now the Barukzais, that is, the Dooranee and Kazilbash Khawanni, and the Kohistanis and Ghilzais have chosen Mahomed Zuman Khan, as temporary ruler: Nawab Jabar Khan is his Minister, Shawish-ooden Khan Sardar, and Aminoolla Loghari Naib. Shah Shooja, who is now, of necessity, and to all appearance on our side, is in the Balla Hissar, with Mahomed Oosman his Vizier, and Syed Mohamed Khan Paghmam. It is fortunate for us that the Barukzais head the rebellion, as we are thereby sure of the Shah. His Majesty, from what I can gather from respectable natives arriving from Cabool, had not altogether escaped the imputation of favouring the rebels in the outset. After the murder of Sir Alexander Burnes, when the rebels were committing further excesses in the city, His Majesty first sent his own troops to quell the disturbance there, with Mahomed Shariff Khan, his father-in-law, at their head. Mahomed Shariff Khan had a parley with the leaders of the insurgents, Abdoolla Khan and others, and remonstrated with them on their rising against the English, to whom His Majesty was so much indebted, and who were moreover their guests. The rebel leaders declared their determination to exterminate or expel the whole of the race of Kafirs from Affghanistan. On which Mahomed Shariff Khan is represented to have suggested to them the necessity of their choosing for themselves a head. Intimation had reached the Envoy and Minister of this overture having been made by Mahomed Shariff Khan, on the part of the King, but His Majesty was not aware that he stood otherwise than fair with our people. The conference between Mahomed Shariff Khan and the rebels was broken off by a cannon shot discharged from our guns in the Bala Hissar, which fell among the rebels, and killed several of them. They then turned upon the Shah's troops, and drove them back to the Bala Hissar. Sir William Macnaghten, in telling me to urge Government to send as many troops into this country, and as speedily as possible, is probably aware that hereafter we must stand on our strength, and act in our own name.

3. The leaders among the Ghilzai Khograni and Shinwari rebels, Aziz Khan, Gul Mahomed Khan, and others, in writing to the Afreedees, and exciting them against us, after pointing out that the wealth of a future world is much better than the wealth of this, and the only lasting wealth, guarantee to them, in the name of the future King of Islam, whoever he may be, the same allowances that they now receive from us. From this it would appear, that Nawab Mahomed Zuman Khan, though temporarily elected Chief, is not the King the rebels have in contemplation.

4. The Ghilzies, and other rebels in Ningrahar, after representing our force at Jellalabad as only 2000 strong, ask the Afreedees to send men to their assistance. The receipt of their letter no doubt has tended greatly to keep the Afreedees on our side. They do not fail to perceive that the cause must be weak, if all the tribes in Ningrahar and the Ghilzies to boot, cannot manage 2000 men without their assistance. Aziz Khan is represented as delaying, and Barkat Khan as on our side, and the levies of the Oolloos are supported by forced exactions from the ryots of the Government share of the produce of the land. The leaders, fearing to take the responsibility of collecting the revenue on themselves, have put up one Khairvullah, a person of no note, to make these exac-

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* No. 1. From the Cabool Khawanur to the Afreedee chiefs.

No. 2. From the leaders among the Ghilzie, Lughman, Khogani, and Shinwari rebels to the Shinwaris of Khyber.

No. 3. From Fouz Mahomed Khan, nephew of Nizam Odoulah to Aboul Rahim Malikzar, the officer of Shah Shooja with Captain Mackeson at Peshawur.

No. 4. From Abdool Kumeem to his father Abdool Rahim Khan Maligar, the Shah's officer with Captain Mackeson at Peshawur.

tions. Thus have the rebels in Ningrahar made themselves contemptible even in the eyes of their countrymen. I apprehend no danger to our troops at Jellalabad from such adversaries. A brigade of our troops, when once past the Khyber, will suffice to restore tranquillity in the Ningrahar valley.

5. Yesterday evening I received, from the Afreedee Maliks, a letter communicating the final determination of their Jirgha. They begged me to send any supplies I might wish to send to Ali Musjid, and also to send supplies of grain through the pass; but as our troops had not yet arrived in force, they hoped I would save their purda by sending some troops, in the first instance, by the Tatara road, so that they might be excused in the eyes of their Mussulman countrymen, for having given us a road when all other tribes were against us. The Maliks will do much to preserve their allowances; but they will not be able to control their tribes if the latter think they are able to stop our troops. I should, however, have no hesitation in advancing through the pass with the four native battalions now on their way here; and the effect of our troops arriving at Jellalabad would be so beneficial to our interests at Cabool, that I think no delay should occur in pushing them on, provided this can be done without risk. The Maliks of Khyber say, that when our troops arrive, they will write to the Ghilzies and other tribes in Ningrahar, to say that they alone are not able to oppose us, and to request, if they wish to close the road, that they will themselves come and do it.

I have, &c.,
F. MACKESON,
Political Agent.

No. 70.

Mr. Clerk to Captain Mackeson.

Sir, *December* 12, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, a copy of which, with its inclosures, will be forwarded to Government.

2. I concur in opinion with you that no delay should occur in pushing on to Jellalabad the four Regiments of Native Infantry now on their march to Peshawur, provided, as you observe, that this can be done without any risk. Jellalabad must stand greatly in need of ammunition and money, and the effect on affairs at Cabool, of the arrival of reinforcements at Jellalabad, will, in all probability, be very favourable. But you will doubtless consider that the first reinforcement proceeding to Jellalabad will have charge of large quantities of supplies and stores. Therefore, this risk on one hand, and the utility of waiting for the second brigade on the other, must be judged by, and depend upon, your knowledge of the intentions, and means of co-operation or resistance of the tribes upon the road under your charge.

3. I am informed by Maharaja Shere Sing that Rao Kesree Sing has been dispatched from Lahore by dawk, to take charge of some troops that are marching upon Peshawur to co-operate with the British troops. You will be so good as to let me know when he arrives, and to keep me informed of the assistance of any kind afforded by General Avitabile, as well as by Rau Kesree Sing.

4. Captain Lawrence has been directed by me to join you by forced marches, and you can devolve on him any local duties, connected with the Sikhs, arising out of these disturbances, for which at present you may not be able to find time.

I have, &c.,
G. R. CLERK,
Agent to the Governor-General.

No. 71.

Captain Mackeson to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Peshawur, December* 7, 1841

I HAVE the honor to forward for your information, a copy of a letter received from Captain Mc Gregor, dated Jellalabad, 30th ultimo, and 1st instant. I also forward a letter from Major-General Sale, to the address of the Acting Adjutant-General of the army, a duplicate copy of which shall be forwarded to-morrow to guard any miscarriage. You will observe, that both these officers strongly urge the necessity of sending more European troops into this country, and particularly mention European cavalry, as necessary to enable us to re-establish that reputation for superiority in arms, which is the main prop of our power.

I have, &c.,
F. MACKESON,
Political Agent.

No. 72.

Major Craigie to Brigadier F. Wild.

Sir, *Camp, Secundra, December* 11, 1841.

I HAVE the honor, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to inform you, that the Governor-General in Council has been pleased to confer on you the rank of a Brigadier of the Second Class, whilst in command of the troops proceeding to the Affghan frontier.

You will, therefore, take the advanced portion of that force, consisting of the 60th and 64th regiments, under your orders.

As you may not have any statement of the troops, supplies, and stores, proceeding under Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch's protection, I am desired to insert the information.

Sikh Motimud Commandant, Ghyan Sing; British Commandant, Mohamed Hosain.

Fighting men.	60th Regiment, Native Infantry	900
	64th do. do.	1048
	3rd Local Horse	100
	Sappers	137
	Golundauze	164
	Syces and followers	855
	Horses	247
	Camel loads of Ordnance Stores	166
	Do. Commissariat	137
	Do. Baggage, &c.	540
	Do. Eight lacs of treasure	100
	Officers	36

You are well aware that Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and the 26th Native Infantry, are preparing to cross the Punjaub; but as you may be called upon to act before the arrival of Major-General Mc Caskill, I am desired by his Excellency to convey to you the following instructions, prepared under the orders of the Governor-General in Council.

1. Your brigade will be concentrated at or near Peshawur, to establish a point of union and support in case of emergency.

2. It will assist in putting down, if not completely, by its presence, controlling and checking any disposition which the insurgents of Khyber and the vicinity may evince to extend their depredations to the eastward of the pass.

3. You will consider yourself authorized to aid the force of our ally, the ruler of the Punjaub; in such case, retaining in your own hands, however, the command of any portion of your troops so employed; and not diverging much from the line between Peshawur and Ali-Musjid.

4. The situation of Major-General Sir Robert Sale will be fully made known to you by Captain Mackeson; it is not so bad as was at first supposed, but still it has not a certain supply of provisions; money is scarce, and the stock of ammunition decreases.

If you feel confident of your ability to advance with three corps to Jellalabad, and to maintain the integrity of your communication with Peshawur, (aided by the 4th), you are authorized to make that forward movement.

5. You are to be guided by your own judgment in this; the Commander-in-Chief being so favorably impressed with an opinion that you merit a high degree of confidence, that he does not invest Major-General Sir Robert Sale with any power to order you onwards.

Obtain the fullest intelligence from Captain Mackeson; weigh the advantages and difficulties; study the nature of the enemy and of the pass; ascertain the number and positions of your opponents, and then decide for yourself.

6. You have not at present any guns; but you have artillerymen, sappers and miners, and officers of both corps. His Excellency is not aware of any difficulty likely to prevent your being accommodated by the Sikh Governor, General Avitabile, with four or six pieces, and you will solicit such aid, when necessary, through Captain Mackeson.

7. As your object will be to restore our communications, and to replenish the magazine, treasury, and commissariat at Jellalabad, you should be as lightly equipped yourselves as climate will allow; but escort as large a convoy as you safely can. Ammunition first, then money; thirdly, supplies of food, preferring the least bulky.

8. It is too early yet to furnish you with any ulterior instructions; of course, when arrived at Jellalabad, you fall under the command of Major-General Sir Robert Sale, to whom the necessary communications will be made.

9. Should collision arise between the Sikh forces in the Peshawur territory, and the Affghan inhabitants of that country, you will attend to the wishes of the Political Agent on that subject.

10. If further misfortune should attend our troops at Cabool and Jellalabad, you are not to consider such events as being sufficient reasons for remaining fixed at or near Peshawur; on the contrary, you should then resolutely attack and firmly occupy several points in the Khyber Pass, to secure their retreat with credit.

This, however, is only mentioned as a contingency.

11. Keep up a correspondence with Sir Robert Sale, for which, it is hoped Captain Macgregor and Captain Mackeson will always be able to find means.

12. Small detachments, or weak posts, are to be avoided.

13. Captain Mackeson is aware of two passes by which the Khyber can be turned; the Commander-in-Chief would have you be cautious in having two lines of operation, unless they are so near that the firing may be mutually heard, and paths of communication be available. The adoption of either of these new lines must be a subject on which to exercise your judgment.

14. Mr. Clerk prepared last year, a paper of hints to officers passing through the Punjab; no doubt you have been furnished with a copy.

In conclusion, his Excellency directs me to ask for an acknowledgment of this dispatch, and for a report of your proceedings, at least every second day, whilst you are acting independently.

Concerning Sikh affairs and Sikh troops, you will communicate freely with Mr. Clerk and Captain Mackeson.

I have, &c.,
P. CRAIGIE.

No. 73.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

Camp, two marches north of Agra,
December 12, 1841.

My Lord,

I HAVE been honored by the receipt of a dispatch from your Lordship in Council, dated 2nd inst., containing instructions for my guidance in certain points, and your Lordship's views and wishes upon others, arising out of the late unlooked-for events in Affghanistan.

2. It gives me much pleasure to think, that your Lordship's directions, touching the concentration of an effective brigade, have been anticipated. The leading Regiments (60th and 64th) will reach Peshawur on or about the 26th instant, and the second division, under Brigadier Wild, in eight days after. This brigade, and the details of corps proceeding with it, somewhat exceeds 4,500 men.

3. I have the honor to transmit a copy of the instructions which were yesterday forwarded to Brigadier Wild. Your Lordship in Council will observe that I have carefully followed the orders contained in the dispatch of the 2nd inst.; adding such suggestions and cautions as his position, and the state of affairs at Jellalabad, on the 27th ult., seemed to require.

4. I trust that your Lordship in Council will approve of my desiring the Brigadier to act on his own decision, and consequent responsibility; and I have particularly freed him from orders from Major-General Sir Robert Sale. Brigadier Wild will weigh the advantages more calmly than Sir Robert can be expected to do.

5. A sketch of the Khyber Pass is now preparing by Lieutenant-Colonel Garden, for the Brigadier's use, and will be dispatched to-day.

6. No advance from Jellalabad to Cabool will be authorized, or even encouraged, by me, unless under the circumstances alluded to in the dispatch now acknowledged.

7. Referring to the 6th article of my instructions, I trust that your Lordship in Council will think that there is little probability of any want of artillery for the use of this brigade. Respecting cavalry, I beg to say, that I did not consider it prudent to send the 10th Light Cavalry, wholly or in part; we can ill spare that Regiment, and if the Sikhs were unfaithful to us, a single corps of cavalry could do but little. In the Khyber Pass they would very greatly increase the line of march, and require at every yard the protection of infantry.

8. Her Majesty's 9th Foot will not be at Ferozepore until the 28th instant, and I think that I shall, before the 25th, clearly see whether that corps and the 26th Native Infantry should be ordered forward, or not. Their presence at Ferozepore will probably have a very good effect, but I shall not send them unless I firmly believe that what it may be necessary to do cannot be done without their aid.

9. Your Lordship will have observed that two 9-pounders and a 24-pounder howitzer are preparing to cross the Sutlej with the 9th Foot.

10. I am much flattered by the confidence reposed in me by Government, and shall not lose sight of the caution contained in the 4th paragraph, relative to the passes leading to Cabool.

11. Being in daily communication with Mr. Clerk, who had on the 5th instant no apprehension of any want of cordiality, or good faith, on the part of the Sikh ruler, or nation, I have not yet warned the regiments which I should collect to form an army of observation. To this I have been led as well by a desire to avoid giving alarm, as by considerations of expense. The corps which are advancing towards the frontier shall, however, be ordered to retain their establishments.

12. Retaining Ferozepore and Loodiana as my outposts, I should collect 8000 men at or near Munsoorpore, midway between them and Kurnaul.

13. Should Government desire to have these troops drawn together at once, or even placed on their field establishment, I beg your Lordship in Council to signify your pleasure to that effect.

14. I have not availed myself of the permission to move Her Majesty's 31s

Foot to Meerut or Kurnaul, for the reasons given in paragraph 11, but I shall do so at once, if the 9th Foot should cross the Sutlej.

15. Her Majesty's 39th Regiment will be a most important and valuable reserve; it may not, however, be wanting, and I hope it will not be.

16. Your Lordship will observe that I have already called upwards the 73rd and 15th Regiments, replacing them by means of the 17th and 46th Regiments, which have been halted on their march to Barrackpore.

17. I have already had the honor to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland at once yielded to my request that a regiment might be spared from Nusseerabad, and the 55th is now on its march to Kurnaul.

I have sent a copy of the instructions to Mr. Clerk.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 74.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, December* 20, 1841.

YOUR dispatch of the 12th instant, in reply to our communication of the 2nd instant, has been received and carefully considered, and we return your Excellency thanks for the prompt and able manner in which you have proceeded to carry into effect the wishes of the Government.

2. We entirely approve the tenor of the instructions which have been addressed by your Excellency's orders to Brigadier Wild.

3. We only feel disposed to regret that your Excellency was only able to attach so very small a number of cavalry to the first division of the brigade. For though the advance of cavalry through the Khyber Pass might be difficult, or dangerous, circumstances might occur on the march and on this side of the pass, in which the presence of this arm would be highly useful.

4. It occurs to the Governor-General in Council, to suggest to your Excellency that it might be very proper to authorize Brigadier Wild to employ, in connection with his operations for the security of the Khyber Pass, a sufficient number of Jezzailchees of the Eusofzye or other tribe, upon whom it may seem likely that dependence could be placed.

5. Experience appears to show that the use of weapons, such as are wielded by this class of the Affghan soldiery, would be of great value in aid of the ordinary arms of our troops in all operations in mountain defiles. Brigadier Wild, in communication with Captain Mackeson would, it may be hoped, be able to make a selection of some trust-worthy men of this description, and would be able to judge what number of them he could hope to employ with benefit, under the near control either of his own force, or of British officers who might be qualified to command them. Perhaps, after a little time, some of our own Sepahees might be trained to the efficient use of this weapon.

6. On the subject of pushing on the last division of the force ordered for Peshawur, including Her Majesty's 9th Foot, with two 9-pounders and a 24-pound howitzer, or detaining it on the Sutlege, we would leave it entirely to your Excellency, with the information which will have reached you before the end of this month, to decide on the course to be pursued regarding it.

7. We repose with perfect confidence on your judgment to decide upon the necessity of immediately drawing together the force alluded to in the 12th and 13th paragraphs of your dispatch. This must mainly depend upon the state of affairs in the Punjab, of which your Excellency will receive the fullest and earliest information, and on which you are fully empowered to act, to the extent of placing the whole of the available force in the North-Western Provinces in readiness to be concentrated or to be moved on any direction where their services may be required.

8. It has occurred to us that it may be expedient to alter the destination of Her Majesty's 39th Regiment from Cawnpore to Agra, in case of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment being removed from the latter station, and in that case your Excellency is requested to issue instructions to the officer in command of the 39th, which may reach him while passing through the Saugor district, where

the roads to Agra and Cawnpore diverge, and in that case instructions will also be required by the Resident at Gwalior, and other political authorities, for the collection of supplies on the road that passes through some of the Boondulah States, the Gwalior territory, and that of Dhalpore. An intimation to this effect will be sent from hence to the Agents in Bundelcund, and the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, and the Resident at Gwalior, so that they may be prepared to meet any requisition consequent on the change in the route of Her Majesty's 39th Regiment.

9. We have resolved that the recruits raised for the service of Shah Shooja by Captain Taylor, shall not be sent on to the frontier, but shall remain for the present at Cawnpore, and we have accordingly thought it proper to place that officer with his levy at the disposal of your Excellency.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 75.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Camp, Muttra, December* 13, 1841.

I HAD the honor of replying yesterday to the dispatch of your Lordship in Council, dated 2nd instant; on the morning of the 10th your express of the 3rd instant was received, written after the lamented turn of affairs at Cabool had been officially made known to your Lordship by Mr. Clerk.

2. The injunction, now repeated, not to detach a second brigade, shall be ever borne carefully in view; although by a subsequent dispatch your Lordship has been pleased to permit me to consult my own judgment "after a careful consideration of all circumstances by Mr. Clerk and myself, with a full knowledge of the views of policy, as at present entertained by the Government."

3. I shall, with great reluctance, order the advance of these two last regiments, (Her Majesty's 9th and 26th Native Infantry) but very strong doubts are entertained here whether the four Native Infantry corps can protect a considerable convoy through the Khyber Pass.

4. I beg to record my full and hearty concurrence in the resolution expressed by your Lordship in Council in the 3rd paragraph of your dispatch of the 3rd instant, and of the instructions conveyed in that which follows, by which I shall, on all occasions, be guided.

5. Your Lordship will observe, by the date hereof, that I have already made three marches towards Delhi, where I expect to arrive on the 21st.

6. I have to thank your Lordship for the copy of the dispatch to Mr. Clerk of the 3rd instant, by which his future communications with the Government of Lahore are to be guided.

7. Referring to the concluding part of the 1st paragraph of your Lordship's dispatch of the 5th instant, I beg to say that I have not received any information which requires me to hasten the concentration alluded to, concerning which my views were explained in the 11th, 12th, and 13th paragraphs of my letter of yesterday.

8. I very much regret that the state of Major-General Lumley's health entirely forbids the hope of his being able to undertake the command of the troops advancing to Peshawur. If, therefore, the force is raised to six regiments, I shall order Major-General Sir Edmund Williams to join my camp by dawk, and push him forward, as soon as I shall have furnished him with instructions, and armed him with all the information and advice which the known state of affairs at his departure may seem to require.

I have &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 76.

The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, *Fort William, January* 9, No. 2, 1842.

WE have the honor to submit to your Committee by the opportunity now afforded by the dispatch of the India steamer direct to Suez (in addition to the ordinary news letters up to this date) the subjoined general précis of late intelligence regarding the north-west frontier of British India, since our dispatches of dates noted in the margin.

2. But we must solicit your Committee to remember that the documents from which this dispatch is prepared, are generally of a private or demi-official character, for we have not received from the other side of Jellalabad any formal record to submit to your Committee.

CABOOL.

3. Lieutenant Conolly, in a private letter from the Bala Hissar, dated 27th November, describes the action of the 23rd of November in the following words:—"The enemy rushed on in front and flank. The men became flurried, and came down the hill in a disorderly manner. The Cavalry charged home on the column, and, had they not been checked by a party of Anderson's Horse, there is no telling where the mischief may have ended. Our loss was great,—Oliver, 5th Bengal Native Infantry, Mackintosh, 5th Native Infantry, and Laing, 27th Bengal Native Infantry, killed. Poor Walker has since died of his wounds. Many more officers were wounded.

"Mahomed Akbar Khan has arrived. The enemy's force in Horse and Foot 10,000 or 15,000. The Envoy tried to negotiate. The enemy demanded the person of the King, and the immediate withdrawal of ourselves. This, of course, was not listened to. They assembled yesterday on the hills, near Cantonments, but a snow-storm came on, and drove them off. Abdoolhah* is wounded, Meer Musjide dead. The cry, *Ul Koofar Islam*†, increases.

4. Sir William Macnaghten, without date, (but supposed to be the 8th,) writes to Captain Macgregor, commenting upon the acts and wishes of the military, and proceeds to state that they had but three days' provisions for the troops, and nothing for the cattle,—that their communications had been successfully intercepted,—that his Majesty was in the Bala Hissar, with Lieutenant Conolly, —that the Chief of Lughman was almost the only Chief with the Shah,—and that they were anxiously looking for reinforcements from Candahar. He refers in this letter to the possibility of a capitulation, which, however, he would endeavour to put off to the last moment.

5. On the 7th of December Lieutenant Conolly, writing to Captain Macgregor, mentions that for many days previously the Cabool force was not annoyed by the enemy,—that the latter tried negociation, requiring from the King that he should separate himself from us, and from the Envoy the person of His Majesty, whilst the Envoy attempted other terms, which proved abortive,—that for the three or four days previous to that on which he wrote, the rebels had tried all their force on the cantonments, with five guns at a long range, and their countless hosts of rabble, that they had gained great confidence by our inertness, having made approaches to within half-musket shot of the works, and mined and taken possession of a fort which was evacuated by our troops, and from which they commanded the cantonment in some way,—that their numbers had decreased considerably, but their activity and courage had increased,—that they burnt the bridge within musket-range of the gate, and had occupied the forts and villages in the neighbourhood, thereby cutting off all supplies. Lieutenant Conolly adds that the King was very staunch, though deserted by all his followers; and gives the following list of Officers who have been killed:—

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* The assassin of Sir Alexander Burnes, the chief of the Kohistanis.

† *I. e.* Against the Infidels.

Her Majesty's 44th Regiment.—Colonel Mackerell; Captains Robinson, Mc Creagh, Swayne; Lieutenants Raban, Mc Kay.

5th Regiment Native Infantry.—Colonel Oliver; Captain Mackintosh.

37th Regiment Native Infantry—Captain Westmacott; Lieutenant Gordon.

4th Irregular Horse.—Captain Walker.

Officers' Names who have been Killed, and were omitted in the foregoing List.

Salisbury, Maule, Wheeler, Woodburn, killed near Ghuznee.

Shah's 4th.—Captain Codrington; Lieutenant W. Broadfoot; Sir A. Burnes, C. Burnes, Dr. Grant.

Officers who have been Wounded.

Majors Swayne, Thain, Pottinger; Captains Walsh, Paton.

Artillery Captains, Eyre, Wall, Haughton.

6. In the annexed extracts of a journal, by Lady Sale, from the 19th of November to the 8th of December, your Honourable Committee will find many details of events at Cabool; and to this, in the absence of more formal papers, we would invite the special notice of your Honourable Committee.

7. Captain Mackeson reports to Mr. Clerk that a Persian letter was received on the 22nd December, by the Shah's officer with Captain Mackeson, from Khadad Khan Afreedee. In this letter it is stated that a letter had been received by some Moollah at Intaba, by the hands of his own cossid, from a certain Dooranee at Cabool, the contents of which went to show that negociations were going on for the withdrawal of our troops, with their arms, and artillery, and property; for the grant of hostages from among the British for the safe return of Dost Mahomed and his family to Affghanistan; and arrangements amongst the Chiefs themselves for the sovereignty, the viziership, and the command of the army.

JELLALABAD.

8. Captain Macgregor writes, on the 5th December, that of supplies they had sufficient for two months' consumption; but ammunition was still a desideratum. They were, however, at the time of writing, tolerably off. The Ghilzie chiefs were still in the neighbourhood, with a few followers only. It was then reported that they contemplated trying their luck again in a contest with our troops.

9. Captain Macgregor again writes that they cannot move without abandoning their sick and wounded; that since their action on the 1st of December, with the Ghilzie and Shinwarree force, the Ghilzie chiefs had retired to Ummar Kheil, twelve miles distant from Jellalabad, where they remained with 300 of 400 followers; and it was said they were again attempting to collect followers.

10. Sir Robert Sale mentions that his force at Jellalabad had eleven guns and five mortars mounted on the works, and that incessant labour had put the place into a very respectable state of defence.

11. On the 11th December Captain Macgregor reports that he was not afraid of treachery within the walls; that he had turned out of the town all suspicious persons, leaving only tradesmen and artificers,—having at the same time established a market outside the walls, to which the villagers brought atta, sheep, fowls, grain, &c.

12. On the 10th Sir R. Sale writes that the chiefs were still at Ummar Kheil, and were said to be disturbed by dissensions among themselves, and between them and the rebel chiefs at Cabool.

13. On the 20th and 21st December Captain Mackeson despatched, by the two routes of Tattarra and Aktara, 50,000 rupees, to the troops at Jellalabad, with the escort before mentioned.

KHYBER PASS.

14. On the 10th December Captain Mackeson writes that there appeared to be no doubt that Mahomed Akbar Khan had arrived at Cabool, and that he had

sent letters of an inflammatory nature to the Afreedee tribes, calling on them to close the Khyber Pass; also to the tribes of Ningrahar, calling on them to unite and attack the force at Jellalabad.

15. In his letter of the 11th of December Captain Mackeson further reports, that Mahomed Akbar Khan had sent letters of the above kind to all the chiefs and tribes from Cabool to Peshawur. Captain Mackeson added, "Our enemies are contemptible in everything but their numbers." Every tribe turns out its 10,000 or 12,000 men. The latest accounts from Peshawur state that the intelligence of negociations for our withdrawal from Cabool had caused much excitement among the Khyberees.

16. In his letter of December 20th, Captain Mackeson states that the British dawks between Jellalabad and Peshawur continued to run without interruption, and regularly by the Tattarra road, and crossing the river at Lalpura. The grain which Captain Mackeson sent to Lalpura*, both by the Tattarra and Akhbara roads, reached in safety. The transmission of money for the troops at Jellalabad had been unavoidably delayed for some days, but 50,000 rupees started on the 20th December, by the Tattarra road. Captain Mackeson had appointed his escort of horsemen, increased in number for the service to 100 men, and 100 Affghan Horse of Peshawur, newly raised, in concert with the horsemen of Toorabaz Khan, to convey the treasure from Lalpura to Jellalabad, whilst from Peshawur to Lalpura, through the Tattarra Pass, there would be a detachment of Captain Ferris's Jezzailchees, 120 strong, under a Native officer, and 300 Eusofzyes, newly raised, to accompany and protect it. These men will remain at Lalpura for some time, both to strengthen Toorabaz Khan and to take charge of the supplies now in the fort at Lalpura; and of such other supplies as Captain Mackeson might send hereafter.

17. The Maliks were holding a council of their tribes as to whether they should be hostile or friendly; but it was rumoured that they contemplated a renewed attack on Ali Musjid.

18. Captain Mackeson writes, under date the 20th December, that Dr. Ritchie, whom he had sent to Rajah Goolaub Sing, and to Koonwur Pertab Sing, to remonstrate against their having removed boats from the Attok, had succeeded in getting the Koonwur to release them. Captain Mackeson adds, that the Mussulman Auxiliary Troops at Peshawur had openly refused to leave their cantonments, and had placed their own sentries over their guns, from a fear of their being taken from them. Gratuities had been offered them, but without effect, and they decline going even as far as Jumrood. General Avitabile had been told that while Shere Sing had written to him to order the troops to move, and to move with them himself, the Maharajah had written a separate perwannah to the Commandants, desiring them not to move, but Captain Mackeson gave no credence to this charge of duplicity, though there appeared to him to be much wavering and indecision in the councils of the Durbar. The troops at first ordered to move on Peshawur, had been ordered to halt on the road, but only till all our troops should have passed.

19. The accompanying Lahore akbar was forwarded by Mr. Clerk in a letter dated 27th December. From this dispatch it appears the Durbar is making exertions to co-operate with the British troops at Peshawur, but that its power to do so promptly is considerably diminished by disaffection in a portion of the army, which has latterly been inclining to the cause of the Sundhunwalla chiefs, and by Rajah Goolaub Sing having been debarred from going to Peshawur.

20. This latter impediment Mr. Clerk has thought it proper at this juncture to do his best to remove, as he is the only chief who retains due authority over the Sikh troops, is a good and courageous General, and is the brother of the active Premier.

21. Captain Mackeson reports, on the 22nd December, that the Sikhs still refuse to move from their cantonments, and that he had again remonstrated with

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* The post of the friendly chief Toorabaz Khan

Rajah Goolaub Sing, and urged the necesssity of his going to Peshawur with the Koonwur and his troops.

22. These papers contain addresses from Mr. Clerk to Maharajah Shere Sing and the Khurutah of the Governor-General to his Highness on the co-operation which his Highness's obligation by Treaty require him to afford at this period, and an acknowledgment for the orders already issued by the Durbar.

GHUZNEE.

23. The 27th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, under Lieut.-Colonel Palmer, is quartered at Ghuznee, but we have no intelligence of the exact position of the garrison in regard to supplies, or whether it has been attacked or not.

KELAT-I-GHILZIE.

24. We have reason to believe this post contains a garrison of 1000 men, two 18-pounders, some 9 or 6-pounders, and six months' supplies.

CANDAHAR.

25. We learn from private communications of 11th December, 1841, that Lieutenant-Colonel Mc Laren's Brigade returned to Candahar on the 10th December, after an unsuccessful attempt to advance on Cabool. Emissaries from Cabool were trying to incite the Candahar provinces to rise. By the latest accounts, the people it appears had removed their women, goods, and chattels from the town, in anticipation of troubled times. The old Ghilzie rebel Gooroo, had issued orders to strip every traveller on the road from head to foot, and no one had yet escaped his vigilance. In a few days five of our regiments were to be quartered in the town; a park of artillery had been in position in the town for some days past. It was expected that the force which had been detached to Zamindawur and to Girishk, would also have returned about the 15th, and General Nott would then have under his command six regiments of Native Infantry, one European regiment (40th), and four regiments of the Shah's contingent, with artillery and some cavalry; but from this force, the greater part of which will have been concentrated at Candahar, must be deducted the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie.

26. From these your Honorable Committee will perceive, that with reference to the disturbed state of affairs in Affghanistan, Major Outram has assembled all the available troops in Sinde in his neighbourhood, to be in readiness to ascend the pass if necessary, and to deter the hill tribes from entering into any combination to disturb the peace of the country. Major Outram stated that, should the arrangements recommended by him be carried into effect, a strong brigade (one troop horse artillery, a wing or whole regiment of regular cavalry, Her Majesty's 41st Foot, two regiments Native Infantry) from the troops now in Sinde, will be available for the service above the pass (in addition to the Bombay troops already there), and he hopes that it will be fully equipped by the 15th March next.

27. It was intended by the Assistant Political Agent at Quetta to remit three lacs of rupees to the Treasury of the Political Agent at Candahar, but owing to the disturbed state of the country, and the money not being immediately required, that intention was deferred for the present, and the troops which were to have escorted the treasure were halted at Quetta.

28. The correspondence submitted by Major Outram, with his letter of the 15th December, will show your Honourable Committee the steps which were to be adopted to avert any risk to Quetta, should the object of the flight of the ex-Naib of that place be to bring a body of the Affghan insurgents to that quarter, with a view to incite the Kaker tribes to rebellion, but the Political Agent was of opinion that it was more likely the Naib had no other object in flight than saving himself, on seeing that a Brahooee Naib was about to be appointed in his place, and naturally surmising that, as an object of suspicion, from his near relationship with one of the rebel leaders, he was likely to be

arrested. Your Honourable Committee will perceive that Major Outram had considered the post of Quetta sufficiently strong to protect itself before; but that officer thought that, by the greater appearance of strength which increasing it to the utmost force that can be accommodated will give, the efforts of the Affghan insurgents to invite the Kakers to unite in an attack on the place were less likely to be successful.

29. The force, therefore, at Quetta would be two strong Regiments of Native Infantry (minus three companies at Kella Abdulla), and two 9-pounders of the Bombay European Artillery, and two 9-pounders of the Bolan Rangers, of Major Sotheby's Company of Bengal European Artillerymen, with ample provisions, and tenable ground. Owing to this arrangement, Major Outram was under no anxiety whatever, were the rebels to come in their utmost strength against that post, which might be their policy, with a view to preventing succour to Candahar, by exciting disturbances in this country.

30. Colonel Stacy and the Khan were at Sebee, where they were to be joined by the uncle of the Murree Chief, their assurances to whom would, Major Outram hoped, remove the personal fears which the chief himself entertained; and once thoroughly assured of our good faith towards him, Major Outram was satisfied that he would not join any combination against us, which indeed he (Major Outram) was not apprehensive of being formed in this country, even although the protracted struggle in Affghanistan was so calculated to encourage disaffection.

31. In the letter of the 17th December your Honourable Committee will be informed of the measures proposed by the Political Agent to the Government of Bombay for the reinforcement of our troops in Affghanistan, at the opening of the season, which he has been induced to do by the increasing spirit of insurrection displayed throughout Affghanistan. These arrangements have had the concurrence of Brigadier England, commanding the Sinde force.

DOST MAHOMED KHAN AND FAMILY.

32. From these papers your Honourable Committee will perceive that Dost Mahomed Khan is at present at Seharunpore, and that Mr. Clerk has had an interview with the ex-chief in order frankly to state to him the inconvenience which would attend his residence at the present moment at Loodiana, and the urgent reasons that require his temporary detention at Seharunpore. The ex-chief, after some discussion, and an expression of unwillingness to be longer separated from his family, has submitted to this detention, and will remain for the present under the care of Lieutenant Nicolson at Seharanpore; his son, Hyder Khan has been allowed to visit Loodiana and his family.

33. You will perceive that, owing to the ill health of Major-General Lumley, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has selected Major-General Pollock to command the troops assembled, and assembling, at Peshawur; and that we have approved the selection. Under date the 27th of December, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief forwarded to us a copy of his instructions to Brigadier Wild, and stated that his object in them was to encourage the Brigadier to advance with supplies, treasure, and ammunition, to Jellalabad, if the state of affairs there, and in the Khyber Pass, seemed to promise that it might be done without any great risk. In those instructions his Excellency mentions that (in addition to the 30th, 53rd, 60th, and 64th Regiments) Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and the 26th Bengal Native Infantry, and the 10th Bengal Light Cavalry, and half No. 5 Light Field Battery, had been ordered to march towards Peshawur, without any unnecessary delay; and adds, that the infantry of the force was to be divided into two brigades, the first brigade consisting of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, the 26th and 53rd Bengal Native Infantry, under Major-General Mc Caskill; the second, of the 30th, 60th, and 64th, under Brigadier Wild. His Excellency desired that, if Sikh troops co-operated, the two forces should by no means be mixed.

34. The letter of the Commander-in-Chief, dated 28th of December, contains his opinion on the subject of Sir R. Sale's requisition for a train of heavy artillery, and Captain Mackeson and Captain Macgregor's wishes for very large forces to be sent towards Affghanistan through the Punjab and Khyber Pass, and strongly points out the difficulties which would oppose themselves to the collection of such reinforcements, as well as to the supply of provisions, and of means of

carriage, for the numerous armaments which those officers would require; and, in the same manner, upon some of Major Outram's requisitions, the Bombay Government has requested instructions, and has stated the inconvenience with which a compliance with them might be attended. We share in the opinions which are held by both these authorities, and would refer you to our dispatches addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on December 2nd, 3rd, and 5th, for an explanation of the course of policy, and of the first military measures which, in the present uncertain and most anxious state of affairs, we would wish our officers to pursue. But we may state to you, that the force lately ordered to cross the Punjab will not amount to less than 8000 men; and that Major-General Sale, by his last returns, had 2600 men under his command; and that Major Outram will have been strengthened by the substitution of two strong and fresh regiments for two which had been long upon service.

35. Our last accounts state that the bridge on the Attok was to have been completed on December 21. Lieutenant Liptrot's detachment of Irregular Horse, which had preceded the first brigade with magazine stores, reached Peshawar on December 13.

36. From the accompanying resolution, dated January 6, your Honorable Committee will learn that in the present circumstances of great military difficulty, and in the absence of all means of receiving orders from Sir W Macnaghten, the constituted representative of Government in that country, we would throw upon each military commander a more than usual discretion in whatever may regard military movements, or the safety of the troops, or the defence or abandonment of the positions occupied by our forces.

37. The Generals commanding divisions, will not hesitate to give the weight that is due to the advice of the Political Officers, who will also put them in possession of their instructions and all their intelligence; and in the absence of any competent political superior, they will consider themselves under the direction of the Military Commandants, and will address to them all those communications which would formerly have been addressed to the Envoy and Minister. The commanding officers to whom these observations may be fully applicable, are Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar, and Major-General Pollock, proceeding to take the command on the Sikh frontier, towards Jellalabad. We have named Sir R. Shakespeare to be Secretary to Major-General Pollock.

38. The above Resolution will not extend, in the case of Captain Mackeson, Political Agent at Peshawur, to any matters of a military or political nature, having relation to the Government of Lahore. In all matters involving the interest of that Government, Captain Mackeson will be exclusively under the authority of Mr. Clerk, the Agent of the Governor-General on the North-West frontier.

39. The Political Agent in Sinde and Beloochistan is already in direct communication with the Government of India. It is not proposed to make any change in that respect, nor to place Major Outram under the control of the officer commanding the forces of Sinde. With that officer he will maintain a close and confidential communication of the orders that he has received from Government, and of the intelligence that reaches him, and in regard to all military operations whatever Brigadier England will act upon his own discretion, with the same independent power as that conferred on the two officers named above.

40. We confine ourselves, on the present occasion, to a brief outline of such information as is most likely to be of interest. The general scope of our present policy will have been apparent to your Honorable Committee, from our dispatches (already communicated to you) of 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 15th December, to the Military and Political Authorities on the North-West frontier, and in the Punjab, Affghanistan, and Beloochistan. We shall remain prepared and vigilant in India, and have especially enjoined firmness, circumspection, and prudence in the employment of all the forces at their disposal, on the several officers charged with the executive direction of affairs on and beyond the Indus.

41. In the same packet we have enclosed the news letters from the 20th ultimo, and to those documents we will beg leave to refer your Honorable Committee for further intelligence in respect to political events in this quarter.

42. We have requested the Honorable Company's Agents at Suez and

Alexandria to take such steps as they may consider most expedient for the speedy transit of this packet through Egypt, and for its early arrival in England.

We have, &c.
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
WM. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 77.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *December* 11, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to transmit a copy of a requisition which, in consequence of the dispatch of the British artillery being delayed, I have deemed it advisable to make upon the officer commanding at Ferozepore.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK.

No. 78.

Mr. Clerk to Major Huish, commanding at Ferozepore.

Sir, *December* 11, 1841.

AS it is possible that the artillery of the Sikhs may be made use of in the advance of the British reinforcements from Peshawur, I have the honor to request that if your means admit of it, without crippling the British artillery under orders to proceed with Her Majesty's 9th Foot, you will be so good as to provide a set of drag ropes for six 9-pounders, with spare rope and the usual quantity of small stores, and to consign them on camels lightly laden, to the care of Captain Lawrence, Assistant Agent Governor-General.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK.

No. 79.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Tulloch to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Camp, Jhelum, December* 9, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to report the arrival at this place in progress to Affghanistan, of the detachment under my command*, and to add that I purpose marching to Rhotas to morrow-morning.

I have, &c.,
J. TULLOCH.

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* 4th Company, 6th Battalion, Artillery ; 5th Company Sappers and Miners; 60th Regiment Native Infantry ; 64th Ditto, Ditto.

No. 80.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

Sirs, *Delhi, December* 20, 1841.

REFERRING to the 11th, 12th, and 13th paragraphs of my dispatch of the 12th instant, to the address of your Lordship in Council, respecting the assembly of a body of troops on this frontier, I have now the honor to transcribe the paragraph of a letter dated 16th instant, received from Mr. Clerk, on that subject.

"I shall not fail immediately to apprize your Excellency, should it appear that the actual assemblage of a large force on this frontier is necessary, or that it would be desirable that the regiments intended for such concentration should entertain their field establishments. It does not seem to me that at present either one or the other of these measures is necessary to the quiet of the north-western provinces, provided the Goorkhas are not encroaching upon us. Even should worse disasters befall our arms in the west than Affghan prowess can inflict, and the whole of the reinforcement now in orders have left this frontier, I conceive that the north-western provinces would still continue to be securely held, if our cantonments could only be replenished to the same extent as before, but not otherwise."

2. Relying on this opinion, fully borne out by all present appearances, and the latest information, I have not taken any measures to collect troops.

3. The 6th and 55th Regiments will reach Kurnaul about the 8th of January, and the 9th arrive at Delhi about the 27th. The 15th and 73rd will soon be moving in this direction also. These five corps will replace the five proceeding across the Punjab.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 81.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, January* 3, 1842.

IN reply to your dispatch of the 20th ultimo, we have only to express our entire approval of your Excellency having, on the opinion given to you by Mr, Clerk, borne out, as it was, by all present appearances, and the latest information, refrained from adopting any measures for the assemblage of troops in the north-west provinces.

We have, &c.
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 82.

Major-General Sir Robert Sale to Major Craigie.

Sir, *Jellalabad, December* 10, 1841.

THE enemy have not ventured on even a demonstration towards Jellalabad since the 1st instant.

The hostile chiefs are still at Umr Khail, twelve miles distant, but are said to have few followers, and to be distracted with dissensions among themselves, and between them and the rebel leaders at Cabool. We have received some further account of the affair of the 23rd ultimo, in the environs of that capital. Our ultimate success on that day does not seem doubtful, but our troops met with a check in the first onset, and a gun fell into the hands of the enemy.

Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver, 5th Native Infantry; Captain Mackintosh, of the same corps; and Lieutenant Lang, 27th, were killed: and Captain Walker, Irregular Horse, died of his wounds. On the part of the insurgents, Meer Musjeedee, the most influential chief of the Kohistanees, fell; and Abdoollah Khan Achikzie, the assassin of Sir A. Burnes, was wounded.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 83.

Major Craigie to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Delhi, December* 24, 1841.

I HAVE the honor, by direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, copies of dispatches of the 24th ultimo and 10th instant, from Major-General Sir Robert Sale, K.C.B., commanding the force at Jellalabad.

I have also been requested to report, that the troops detailed in the margin* have been ordered to cross the Punjab towards Peshawur, remaining only two days at Ferozepore after the arrival of Her Majesty's 9th Regiment.

Major-General Boyd, commanding the Sirhind division, has been desired to send forward the 1st Light Cavalry from Kurnaul, to replace the 10th Regiment at Ferozepore.

I have likewise been instructed to add, that Major-General Pollock, C.B., has been ordered to proceed by dawk to Ferozepore, to assume command of the troops moving to Peshawur.

I have, &c.,
P. CRAIGIE.

No. 84.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Delhi, December* 24, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt, this morning, of your Lordship's dispatch of the 15th instant by express.

2. My receipt last night of an express from Mr. Clerk, dated 21st instant, with thirteen inclosures, all of which have been of course communicated by him to Government, removed all remaining doubt as to the propriety of directing Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and the 26th Native Infantry to follow the brigade under Brigadier Wild, which they will accordingly do, early next month.

3. The repeated calls for cavalry, and your Lordship's opinion given in the 2nd paragraph of your dispatch of the 2nd instant, have induced me to order the 10th Cavalry to march with Major-General Mc Caskill which will, I hope, be approved under the circumstances stated by Mr. Clerk, and quoted in my dispatch to your Lordship in Council, on the 20th instant.

4. In addition to the two 9-pounder guns and 24-pounder howitzer, ordered to move with the Major-General, I beg to apprize your Lordship that five other pieces, indented for by Captain Abbott, will accompany this convoy.

5. In obedience to your Lordship's wishes that Major-General Lumley should be placed in command of the force assembling at Peshawur, I requested his attendance at my tent, and placed the dispatch, now acknowledged, in his hands. The General is still very weak, though improved in health; he is willing to proceed, but requested that his medical adviser should be consulted as to his ability to undertake such a service.

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* 10th Regiment of Light Cavalry; 3 guns of 5th Light Field Battery; Her Majesty's 9th Foot; 26th Regiment Native Infantry; Light Company 6th Native Infantry; 2nd Rissallah, 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

Assistant Surgeon Tunner decidedly assured me that his state of health would by no means admit of the required exertion and exposure.

6. In this dilemma, I have ordered Major-General Pollock to proceed by dawk to Ferozepore, and there assume the charge, that is, the military command.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 85.

Mr. Maddock to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, January* 3, 1842.

WE have received your Excellency's dispatch of the 24th ultimo, and deeply as we regret that the state of Major-General Lumley's health should have deprived the Government of his services in the important post which we had proposed that he should hold, we are satisfied with the judiciousness of the selection which your Excellency has made for his successor in the person of Major-General Pollock. That officer will be vested with the same Political authority beyond the Indus, which we had designed to confer on Major-General Lumley, and he should be instructed to place himself in direct and confidential communication with Mr Clerk, as the chief Political authority charged with the control of British interests on our north-west frontier, and in the territories of Lahore.

2. Captain Mackeson and the other subordinate Political Authorities in the eastern provinces of Affghanistan, will be apprised of the Major-General's appointment to these duties, and directed to seek their instructions from him from the date of his crossiug the Indus, and to keep him fully informed of the state of affairs in that quarter, during his march across the Punjaub.

3. We have resolved to appoint Lieutenant Sir Richmond Shakespear, to hold the office of secretary to Major-General Pollock, and we trust that the talents of this officer, by which his late services in Central Asia have been distinguished, will prove of much advantage to the Major-General in the field of operations now open to him.

We have, &c., AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 86.

Major Craigie to Brigadier Wild.

Sir, *Delhi, December* 26, 1841.

ON the 11th instant I had the honor to convey to you in a dispatch, No. 2360, the general instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, for your guidance in the important command to which you have been nominated, and I am now required to express the apprehension of his Excellency, that the communication may have miscarried or been delayed in transit, otherwise the receipt of so interesting a paper would at once have been acknowledged; a duplicate of the dispatch has accordingly been prepared, and will be transmitted with the present letter.

I have been instructed to take the present opportunity to apprize you, that Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and the 26th Native Infantry, with the 10th Regiment of Light Cavalry, and half of No. 5 Light Field Battery, have been ordered to march towards Peshawur without any unnecessary delay.

Major-General Pollock, C.B., has been selected for the chief command of the forces, and Captain Ponsonby, now at Peshawur, will be attached to the Major-General, as his Assistant Adjutant-General; you will therefore require that officer to await at Peshawur, Major-General Pollock's arrival.

The infantry of the force will be divided into two brigades. The first

brigade, consisting of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and 26th and 53rd regiments of Native Infantry, will be commanded by Major-General Mc Caskill. The second brigade will be composed of the 30th, 60th, and 64th regiments, and will be under your orders, with Captain Loftie as your brigade Major.

This distribution of the troops into brigades is not, however, to interfere with your command of the four battalions and details at present in advance, and you will consider the instructions you have received as fully applicable to the present state of affairs, as when they were first prepared.

The Commander-in-Chief has again carefully considered these instructions, and he does not observe that he can improve them.

If you are confident that you can pass through the Khyber Pass with your four corps, it is, his Excellency observes, certainly of importance to show the Affghan nation how speedily (distance considered) we can repair our misfortunes; but you are not unnecessarily to run any very great risk.

You will let the convoy for Jellalabad be as large as considerations of security will warrant, bearing in mind that ammunition is a primary consideration, then treasure, and then food.

Ali Musjid ought to be occupied with three companies of Native Infantry, well provisioned, and with a good store of ammunition; its defences must also be repaired. The remainder of the corps furnishing the garrison, should be posted further in the pass, in some defensible and commanding position; at this season it is hoped that no unhealthiness prevails to prevent this arrangement.

With the four corps of infantry, Captain Ferris's corps of Jezailchees should advance.

If either of the northern passes is attempted, the Commander-in-Chief desires that the operation may be undertaken by the Sikh troops, keeping the Khyber to our own Native Infantry, and by no means mixing the two forces.

With two established posts in the Khyber, the Commander-in-Chief anticipates no serious difficulty in the advance of the infantry and cavalry under Major-General Pollock.

I have, &c.,
P. CRAIGIE.

No. 87.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General in Council.

My Lord, *Delhi, December 27, 1841.*

REFERRING to the 3rd and 4th paragraphs of my letter of the 12th instant, and to instructions sent on the preceding day to Brigadier Wild, I have now the honor to submit a copy of a dispatch addressed yesterday to that officer, which I trust your Lordship in Council will approve.

2. My object is to encourage Brigadier Wild to advance with supplies, treasure, and ammunition, to Jellalabad, if the state of affairs there and in the Khyber Pass seems to promise that it may be done without any great risk. It must have a good effect, even at Cabool, if we can thus promptly replace what we have lost and expended.

3. Regarding the posts to be established in the pass, I can have no doubt as to the firm occupation of Ali Musjid. Military considerations point out Lundikhana as the suitable position on the opposite, or western side of the highest portion of the pass; but Brigadier Wild shall be ordered to weigh most carefully all the difficulties and risks by which a detachment placed there may be surrounded before he plans it.

4. If the tribes in the vicinity are resolved to oppose our passage, the four Native regiments will await the arrival of the third division, but if a junction with Major-General Sir Robert Sale can now be effected, it should not be postponed till February.

5. I am making arrangements for replacing the tents of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and for supplying the Native troops at Jellalabad with the tents now on their way for corps at Cabool, which can be replaced by the February convoy.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 88.

Major-General Sir Robert Sale to Major Craigie.

Sir, *Jellalabad, December* 13, 1841.

BEING doubtful whether the previous cossids have reached Peshawur, and a dawk having been now established along the margin of the Cabool River, by which three small packets have come safely to this place, I think it advisable to recapitulate, for his Excellency's information, part of the contents of mine of the 10th instant.

Since their defeat on the 1st, the enemy have not ventured on even a demonstration towards Jellalabad. We have received some further accounts of the affair in the environs of Cabool, on the 23rd ultimo. It does not appear doubtful that the ultimate success of the British on that day was decisive; but the troops experienced a check at the first onset, and a gun was captured by the enemy; the loss was heavy on both sides.

On ours, Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver, and Captain Mackintosh, 5th Regiment Native Infantry, and Lieutenant Laing, 27th, were killed; and Captain Walker, 4th Regiment Irregular Cavalry, has died of his wounds. On the part of the insurgents, Meer Musjeedee, the most influential chief in the Kohistan, Abdoolla Khan Achickzye,—the assassin of Sir A. Burnes, and many other men of note and distinction among them, have fallen. Our spies report, that another action was fought at the village of Wuzeerabad, near Cabool, on the 4th instant, which terminated most favourably to us; but no communication has reached us on this subject from the Balla Hissar, or the cantonment.

As regards the situation and prospects of the troops at Jellalabad, I must again ask of you to remind his Excellency, that the whole of our camp equipage was destroyed at Gundamuck, and must be supplied again, to enable us to take the field.

Our soldiers are on half rations, and we have provisions at the full rate for six weeks. The troops are healthy, as the accompanying state will show, although they labour six hours daily on the fortifications, and there are not three full reliefs for the guards on the walls. Treasure is urgently required, officers and men being from two to three months in arrears; and our Commissariat's arrangements cramped for want of the means of disbursements. I have mentioned, that I have no official details of the affairs at Cabool; but from all that I can glean of their nature, I conclude that the expenditure of ordnance ammunition, has been very great, and that a large supply, especially of grape and Shrapnell, ought to accompany the reinforcements.

Captain Mackeson informs us, under date the 10th instant, that a rissalah, in charge of ammunition, was to cross the Attock on that day, and that the 1st brigade of infantry has passed the Jhelum. Whilst on the subject of reinforcement, I would beg to reiterate my recommendatiom, that a siege train of heavy ordnance be sent here, without which many of the forts of the refractory chiefs cannot be reduced, and that Engineer Officers, capable of conducting the attack of a place, accompany it. At present there is one only at Cabool, who is permanently attached to Shah Shooja.

The regiments of infantry of my brigade urgently require clothing, if not relieved this season. I am given to understand, that a part of that of the 13th was lost some time since, in boats on the Ganges, and the 35th has now in wear its coats of 1838. Both need watch coats.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 89.

General Sir J. Nicolls to the Governor-General in Council.

Camp, one march north of Delhi,
December 28, 1841.

My Lord,

THE accompanying dispatch, dated 13th inst., from Major-General Sir Robert Sale, has already been submitted to your Lordship in Council, through the military department; butas Sir Robert has repeated his suggestion that "a siege train of heavy ordnance be sent forward," without which, "many of the forts of the refractory chiefs cannot be reduced," I think it necessary to bring this subject to your Lordship's notice.

2. Before we could send this train by Jellalabad, and collect, with extreme difficulty and some risk, the troops which should accompany it, we shall know how Sir William Macnaghten and General Elphinstone have been able to repel or disperse the insurgents. If an amnesty should be granted, we cannot require this great armament. If the rebels are obliged to relinquish their undertaking, and to return home in despair, are we to arouse them again by following them into their valleys and fastnesses?

3. It may be most just and expedient to punish two or three of the greatest traitors, by levelling their strongholds; but war against tribes seems so closely to resemble a resolution to subdue the country again, at whatever cost, that I cannot sanction even preparation for such an object, without your Lordship in Council's express orders.

4. Intimately connected with these repeated suggestions that a heavy train should be sent on, are Captain Macgregor and Captain Mackeson's recommendations, (equally frequent and more urgent,) that 10,000 or 12,000 troops, including three or more European regiments should be sent viâ the Punjab into Affghanistan.

5. When the corps march next week, the numbers already moving on Peshawur will exceed 7000 men; and beyond this great reinforcement, I shall most unwillingly spare a man from the Sirhind or Meerut Divisions, except for the February convoy.

6. In reply to Mr. Secretary Maddock's dispatch of the 18th instant, I have the honor to state, that the 3rd Native Infantry has been ordered to proceed to Saugor, in order to enable the General Officer commanding there, to relieve the Madras troops at Jabulpore and Husinjabad. A regiment will be sent from Benares to Mirzapore, to enable the 3rd to move without any avoidable delay

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 90.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir J. Nicolls.

Sir,

Fort William, January 6, 1842.

WE have received your dispatch, dated the 28th ultimo, and have to express our entire concurrence in the resolution of your Excellency, not to comply with that part of Major-General Sale's requisition, which relates to sending a siege train of heavy ordnance to Affghanistan, as this resolution is in perfect accordance with the views of Government, explained to your Excellency in our letter of the 2nd ultimo, as is also the opinion expressed in the 5th paragraph of your letter against sending further reinforcements to Peshawur, beyond the force exceeding 7000 men, already *en route* to Affghanistan.

2. We entirely approve of the arrangement reported in the last paragraph.

3. We take this opportunity of furnishing your Excellency with a copy of a resolution which has been this day passed, for vesting the Commanding Officers of divisions of the Army employed in Affghanistan, with political authority, independent of the Political Agents and Assistants under the Envoy and Minister, and pointing out the manner in which their correspondence with Government is to be

carried on; and we propose, in the course of a few days, to address your Excellency again on the extent to which we desire you to act, without the delay of reference to us, in issuing your own instructions to those officers for the direction of their movements beyond our frontier, and that of Sinde and the Punjaub.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 91.

Resolution by the Government of India.

Fort William, January 6, 1842.

IN the conduct of military operations at the present crisis in Affghanistan and the adjoining countries, it appears to the Governor-General in Council to be of all things most essential to attend to the expedience, the safety, and the necessity of military movements with reference to military considerations in the first place. These will doubtless always be affected more or less by political circumstances, but they should be under the control of such circumstances no further than commanding officers, responsible for their own military arrangements, and for the honor and success of the troops committed to their charge, may see fitting. His Lordship in Council has come to this resolution in no mistrust of our political officers in that quarter. He is conscious that they are, for the most part, possessed of much talent and information, that they are ever actuated by unbounded zeal in the service of the state, and that they have the means of procuring the best intelligence for the guidance of the military commandants, but in the present circumstances of great military difficulty, and in the absence of all means of receiving orders from Sir W. Macnaghten, the constituted representative of Government in that country, his Lordship in Council would throw upon each military commandant a more than usual discretion in whatever may regard military movements, or the safety of the troops, or the defence or abandonment of the positions occupied by our forces.

2. The Generals commanding divisions will not hesitate to give the weight that is due to the advice of the political officers, who will also put them in possession of their instructions, and all their intelligence, and in the absence of any competent political superior they will consider themselves under the direction of the military commandants, and will address to them all those communications which would have been formerly addressed to the Envoy and Minister.

3. The commanding officers to whom these observations may be fully applicable are, Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar, and Major-General Pollock, proceeding to take the command on the Sikh frontier, towards Jellalabad.

4. To these officers instructions will be issued to the above effect, and copies of the resolution will be communicated to the political officers at Peshawur, Jellalabad, and Candahar, with the request of Government, that they will, with their wonted zeal and devotion, render the functions of their respective offices conducive in the fullest manner to the information of the military commanding officers with whom they are to be associated, and to the success of all military operations decided on by the military authorities.

5. The above resolution will not extend in the case of Captain Mackeson, Political Agent at Peshawur, to any matters of a military or political nature having relation to the government of Lahore. In all matters involving the interests of that Government Captain Mackeson will be exclusively under the authority of Mr. Clerk, the Agent of the Governor-General on the North-West Frontier.

6. The Political Agent in Sinde and Beloochistan is already in direct communication with the Government of India. It is not proposed to make any change in that respect, nor to place Major Outram under the control of the officer commanding the forces in Sinde. With that officer he will maintain a close and confidential communication of the orders that he has received from Government, and of the intelligence that reaches him; and in regard to all military

operations whatever, Brigadier England will act upon his own discretion, with the same independent power as that conferred on the two officers named above.

7. Major-Generals Nott and Pollock, and Brigadier England, will address the Government of India, in the Secret and Political Department, direct, on all matters of a military and political nature connected with their present commands, and will either forward their dispatches under flying seals to the address of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, or will furnish his Excellency with copies of their dispatches to the Government, according to the circumstances of position of his Excellency's camp, which may render one course or the other most convenient.

8. Copies of this resolution will be communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, the Agent Governor-General on the North-West Frontier, and the Political Agent in Sinde and Beloochistan, and extracts, as per margin,* to the other officers named herein, and a separate letter will be hereafter addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the subject of his Excellency's authority to issue direct orders for the guidance of military operations beyond the Sinde and British frontiers.

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 92.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, *Fort William, January* 22, No. 9, 1842.

WITH reference to our dispatch in this department, under date the 9th instant, per India steamer, submitting a précis of our latest information regarding the state of affairs in Affghanistan, we have now to communicate, with the deepest regret, the melancholy intelligence, such as it has yet reached us, of the treacherous murder of the Envoy and Minister, Sir William Macnaghten, at a conference to which he was invited, in furtherance of negotiations for the withdrawal of our troops.

2. We pass over the reports of a somewhat improved state of affairs at Cabool, which had reached us at different dates, previously to the receipt of this intelligence. From our dispatch of the 9th instant, your Honorable Committee will be aware of the unsatisfactory accounts which had reached us from Cabool to the 9th of December. From that date to the 25th, we have no letter from any of the British officers, either of the Cabool mission or force; but it appears certain that about the 13th or 15th of December, Sir William Macnaghten judged it necessary to make overtures to the Affghan chiefs in arms against us, on the basis of our evacuation of the positions which we held at the capital. While these overtures were under discussion, supplies were obtained in the cantonment, which gave rise to the more favourable reports that your Honorable Committee will find in letters of different dates from Jellalabad and Peshawur. Mahomed Akhbar Khan, son of Dost Mahomed Khan, who had escaped from confinement at Bokhara, and was proceeding to Cabool, to deliver himself up to the Envoy and Minister, found the insurrection in full violence on his arrival, and immediately took a prominent part in it. He appears to have been the channel through which Sir William Macnaghten's negotiations for withdrawal were carried on, and was believed in the country to be disposed in some measure to aid our interests. What the motives were, which induced him to take the life of Sir William Macnaghten, by an act which seems to have been one of the most gross and barbarous perfidy, we do not yet know with accuracy, but the fact of the murder is placed beyond doubt, by the brief note of Major Pottinger of December 25th, and by the concurrent tenor of all the reports which have reached Jellalabad. The letter from Cabool of the son of the Governor of lalabad to his father of the latter place, of which your Honorable Committee

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* Paragraph 1, 2, 3, and 7, General Nott.
„ 1, 2, 5, and 7, General Pollock
„ 6 and 7, to Brigadier England.
Parag. 1 to 5 to Political Agent, Peshawur.
„ 1 to 4, Ditto Jellalabad.
„ 1 to 4, Ditto Candahar.

will find a translation appended to Mr. Clerk's dispatch of the 12th instant, gives all the detail of which we are in possession up to this time, respecting this deplorable event.

3. We await further and more accurate reports before we decide on the measures which it may be becoming to pursue in consequence of this bloody outrage; and we must also very anxiously await these reports, that we may learn the fate of the troops which appear to have been reduced to a state of most imminent peril at Cabool. We need not assure your Honorable Committee that, on the first occasion of which circumstances will admit, we will cause the strictest inquiry to be made in regard to the military proceedings of which we are now compelled to anticipate that the result will be so calamitous.

4. It has been our first duty to determine whether further reinforcements ought to be forwarded to strengthen our position on the Affghan frontier, and your Honorable Committe will observe that we have immediately instructed his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to prepare another efficient brigade with cavalry and artillery for an advance to Peshawur, that we have authorized, under the sanction given by the Honorable Court, the raising of another regiment of regular cavalry, and that we have taken measures for adding to the efficiency of the force of artillery in the north-western provinces.

5. It may be satisfactory to your Honorable Committee to be informed that after the march of this further brigade, if it should be ordered to move beyond the Indus, we shall still have an army of fifteen thousand men, (after providing for the security of all stations and cantonments) available for concentration and service on our north-western frontier.

6. We proceed to notice shortly such other papers connected with this subject as may appear to be of prominent interest.

PUNJAB AND PESHAWUR.

7. The correspondence here referred to, regards the co-operation of the troops of the Lahore Government. Captain Mackeson writes on the 25th ultimo, that they still showed symptoms of insubordination.

8. In his letter marginally referred to, Captain Mackeson strongly recommended the employment of a body of 700 Patan horsemen, who had last year accompanied our troops through the Khyber Pass. These men seemed willing to serve us, and their example, he observed, might have the effect of shaming the Sikh troops into a proper sense of their duty. He represented, however, that they complained of the non-fulfilment of some promise of extra pay which they alleged to have been made to them on the occasion of their former employment in the Khyber. Mr. Clerk has, as will be seen, authorized Captain Mackeson to fulfil, in so far as the British and Affghan Governments are concerned, any promise of extra pay that may have actually been made to the Sikh troops whilst serving beyond the Khyber last year.

9. We have approved of Mr. Clerk's proceedings on this occasion, and called on Sir C. M. Wade for an explanation of the grounds of the claim to extra batta, while employed in the Khyber, which has been advanced by the Patans.

KHYBER.

10. According to our latest information, this pass continued open. Captain Mackeson mentions having paid the Maliks of Khyber 4000 rupees, on the condition of their dispersing their tribes from Ali Musjid, and keeping the pass quiet, and he also mentions that the Afreedee Maliks had been holding "Jirgha" (council) for several days, and that the result of their deliberations, (previously, however, to the receipt of the latest tidings from Cabool,) had been to keep the pass open, not to molest our convoys or dawks, and to punish the parties who had stopped the dawk some days previously.

11. In a letter dated 3rd instant, Captain Mackeson mentions, that Toorabaz Khan, the friendly Momund chief, through whom our communications with Jellalabad had latterly been carried on, apprehended another attack from his rival Saadut Khan, and that he had assisted him with funds for the preservation of his position.

JELLALABAD.

12. Captain Mc Gregor writes to Captain Mackeson on the 27th ultimo, that they were all continuing to do well at Jellalabad. He has acknowledged the receipt of 25,000 out of the 50,000 rupees sent to him by Captain Mackeson through the agency of Toorabaz Khan, and expected that the balance then at Lalpoora would be sent on as soon as Toorabaz Khan heard of the safe arrival of the first consignment.

REINFORCEMENTS.

13. With advertence to paragraph 33 of our letter No. 2, we beg to transmit, as a number of the packet, the accompanying copy of the Commander-in-Chief's further instructions to Brigadier Wild, authorizing him to entertain a body of Jezailchees for service in the Khyber.

14. The documents here referred to, regard the deputation of Captain Lawrence to act in conjunction with Brigadier Wild and Captain Mackeson in Peshawur, and the orders issued by the Lahore Durbar to its officers in Peshawur, to co-operate with our troops. In these will be found stated the dates on which the 30th, 53rd, 60th, and 64th Regiments of Native Infanty reached Peshawur.

15, On the 3rd January, Captain Mackeson reported that the four corps of Native Infantry were then encamped within one march of Ali Musjid. He said they had four guns made over to us by the Sikh authorities in camp, and he was in hopes that 700 Patan horsemen in the service of the Sikhs would be ready to accompany them next day.

16. Orders, it appeared, continued to reach General Avitabile for the advance into Khyber of the Mussulman auxiliaries, in support of our troops; but it was supposed that they would not be able, owing to the want of pay, and the defectiveness of the arrangements for obtaining supplies, to advance beyond Ali Musjid. Mehtele Singh, with four Sikh battalions, was reported to have arrived at Attock, and Keishree Singh, with troops from Lahore, at Vazeerabad, on his way to Peshawur.

17. On the 8th instant Mr. Clerk reported that the brigade under Major-General Mc Caskill, K.C.H., composed as below, crossed the Sutlej, on the 4th idem, at Ferozepore, in progress to Affghanistan :—

	Officers.	Soldiers.	Syces and Grass Cutters.	Followers.	Horses.	Tattoos.	Camels.	Hackerries.
Her Majesty's 9th Foot	35	834	50	500	50	50	470	..
Detachment, recruits of Her Majesty's 44th Foot	10	235	..	276	30	..	200	..
10th Regiment Light Cavalry ..	16	493	587	800	580	160	300	1
Detachment, 3rd Irregular Cavalry ..	1	200	200	150	297	100	40	2
26th Regiment Native Infantry ..	19	1,011	..	570	30	30	420	..
Detachment, 60th Native Infantry ..	11	146	24	88	11	30	80	..
Commissariat Stores	..	..	..	1,100	..	..	2,000	..
Ordnance Stores	..	..	..	100	..	..	116	2
Detachment, 2nd Company 2nd Battalion, Artillery	1	115	4	30	3	..	22	..
Total	91	3,034	865	3,614	953	370	3,648	5

18. In our communication to the Commander-in-Chief, consequent on the receipt of Mr. Clerk's dispatch of the 12th instant, your Honourable Committee will see that we have recommended his Excellency to summon Mr. Clerk to his head-quarters, for the convenience of immediate reference to him on the existing exigency of affairs, as we consider that gentleman's opinions on the disposition and probable proceedings of the Sikh Durbar to be entitled to the greatest weight.

CANDAHAR.

19. We have received no authentic intelligence from Candahar since the date of our last report of the 9th instant, per "India" steamer. Owing to the reports of a hostile feeling against us having arisen on the part of some of the tribes, between Candahar and Killah Abdoollah, it had been deemed prudent, by our authorities at Quetta, to withdraw our detachment from that post; this detachment accordingly reached Quetta on the 21st ultimo, with loss of only five stragglers, and the private property of the officers, which had been voluntarily left behind them, for the purpose of saving ammunition and public stores. Reports were current of an intended attack upon Quetta, but that place, with a reinforcement of 100 men of Her Majesty's 41st Foot, and a wing of a regiment of Native Infantry, was believed to be quite safe against any force the insurgents could bring against it. It was subsequently stated that the intention to attack Quetta had been for the time abandoned by the rebels, and the leader of the force, destined for that purpose, recalled to Cabool. Major Outram appeared to place confidence in the fidelity of the Murrees and Kakurs to their late engagements, and thought that they had refused to listen to the seditious overtures of of the traitor Naib of Shawl.

20. Up to the date of our latest information tranquillity prevailed in Sinde and Beloochistan, and though Major Outram appeared to omit no measure of precaution, he did not seem to apprehend any disturbance within the sphere of his jurisdiction; but your Honourable Committee will be in possession of later intelligence from this quarter, direct through Bombay, than any that we can furnish from hence.

DOST MAHOMED KHAN.

21. On the receipt of authentic intelligence of Mahomed Akbar Khan's having assassinated Sir William Macnaghten, Mr. Clerk directed Captain Nicolson to make Dost Mahomed a close prisoner, preventing all communication with him or his retinue by Affghans or Hindoostanees, except with his, Captain Nicolson's, permission. Further, giving him authority to increase the guard over the Ex-Ameer's camp.

22. We have approved of Mr. Clerk's proceedings, and intimated an opinion that similar precautions should be taken to ensure the safe custody of all members of the Ameer's family now in Hindoostan; but that no severity of treatment should be practised, beyond what may be required for such custody, and if the Ameer should particularly desire to have one or two members of his family brought from Loodiana, to reside with him, the indulgence, under the precautions indispensable to prevent escape, may be granted to him.

POLITICAL.

23. In his letter to Mr. Clerk, dated 25th December, Captain Mackeson entered into some speculation respecting the course of policy to be pursued with reference to the present posture of our affairs to the westward of the Indus, and the possibility of our hold on the city of Cabool itself being for the present entirely lost. The only portion of his suggestions which we have noticed, is that which relates to our endeavouring to obtain the cession of Peshawur from the Lahore Government. Your Honorable Committee will perceive, from our instructions to Mr. Clerk, which formed Inclosure No. 8 of our Letter No. 2, that Captain Mackeson has been strictly enjoined to avoid any agitation of this subject, the prosecution of which is wholly foreign from our views alike of justice and expediency.

24. For other particulars, in connection with the subjects adverted to in

this letter, we would beg to refer your Honorable Committee to the news letters by this mail.

25. The Lahore intelligence papers your Honorable Committee will receive to a later date, direct through Mr. Clerk.

26. We have but to add with reference to our intimation in our dispatch of 22nd December, 1841, respecting the sending some reinforcements of European regiments to India, that it is of urgent importance, with reference to the season for marching and military operations, that such reinforcement should reach this country at least by the middle of October next. We think it right to notice this circumstance, although we are sensible that considerations of this nature will be fully weighed by your Honorable Committee.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 93.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *January* 2, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to transmit copies of three letters to my address from Captain Mackeson, dated the 25th and 26th ultimo, forwarding copies of letters addressed to him by Captain Macgregor, on the 20th and 22nd ultimo.

2. Captain Mackeson appears to think that much good may result from the presence of a second brigade and artillery, in addition to the reinforcements which have already reached Peshawur. It is needless to say that I fully concur in that opinion, for it was my conviction from the first, of the advantages to be derived from our appearing, as early as possible after the insurrection, in considerable strength at Peshawur, for the relief of Jellalabad, if not of Cabool, that induced me to request the Major-General commanding this division to expedite the departure of a troop of horse artillery and a second brigade of infantry.

3. Of the events on which Captain Mackeson speculates in his official letter to me of the 25th ultimo, that of a capitulation seems by the last account received from Cabool, the most likely to occur. Should this take place, it is to be hoped that, as Captain Mackeson anticipates, the British Government may be absolved from the disadvantageous and humilitating consequences of such a capitulation by the Affghans violating its terms.

I have, &c.
G. CLERK.

No. 94.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicholls.

Sir, *Fort William, January* 10, 1842.

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch of the 27th ultimo, we have only to express our entire approbation of the instructions addressed to Brigadier Wild, and our concurrence with your Excellency in the great political benefit which may be expected from an early passage of our troops through the Khyber Pass, and the reinforcement of Jellalabad.

2. Captain Mackeson, and the other local officers who have been employed in the pass, will be able to afford to Brigadier Wild the fullest and most correct information of the advantages, or otherwise, of the different posts which it may be resolved to occupy.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 95.

Major Craigie to Brigadier Wild.

Sir, *Camp, Burki-Chokie, December* 30, 1841.

I AM directed by the Commander-in-Chief to request that you will consider whether, for the advance through the Khyber Pass, or for the subsequent security of it, it may be advantageous to employ a body of Jezailchees, of the Eusofzye, or other tribe, which may be depended upon.

If so, you are authorized to entertain a body of 300 of those men for these services, consulting Captain Mackeson as to the conditions of service, suitable method of treatment, and rates of pay.

It is considered by Government that the weapon wielded by the Affghan soldiery would be of great value, in aid of the ordinary arms of our troops, in all operations in mountain defiles.

If Captain Ferris has been entertaining men for his corps, and can afford such a detachment, or join you himself, it seems to his Excellency desirable that either should be done. Should you, however, raise men independently of his corps, you must carefully select an officer or two to superintend and command them.

I have, &c.
P. CRAIGIE.

No. 96.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Paniput, January* 1, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the dispatch addressed to me by your Lordship in Council, on the 20th ultimo, and to express the great satisfaction which I have felt on receiving your Lordship's approval of the instructions issued to Brigadier Wild on the 11th December.

2. Respecting cavalry, I trust that the three rissalahs attending the two first detachments will be sufficient for an early passage of the Khyber Pass. If delay be necessary, the 10th Cavalry will have joined.

3. I have the honour to inclose a copy of a letter addressed to Brigadier Wilde, on the 30th ultimo, regarding the employment of a body of Jezailchees, which I hope will meet with your Lordship's approbation.

4. I beg to report that, in conformity with the suggestion contained in the 8th paragraph of your Lordship's dispatch, I have directed Her Majesty's 39th Regiment to march, *vid* Gwalior, to Agra.

5. Captain Taylor's levy has been ordered to remain at Cawnpore till further orders.

I have, &c.
J. NICOLLS.

No. 97.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, January* 17, 1842.

WE entirely approve of the measures reported to have been adopted in your Excellency's letter of the 1st instant, and of the instructions issued to Brigadier Wild, authorizing him to entertain a body of Jezailchees.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND,
W. W. BIRD,
W. CASEMENT,
H. S. PRINSEP.

No. 98.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Jellalabad, December* 26, 1841.

IN consequence of Brevet-Captain Gerrard having been severely wounded here on the 14th ultimo, I have only to-day received from him a report of the part borne by his detachment in the transactions attending the destruction of the fort of the Urz Begee, in the fastnesses of the Mamoo Khail, and the subsequent retreat of the irregulars from Gundamuck. I have now the honor to forward that communication, together with a similar one from Captain Burn, commanding the Khyberee Rangers. I beg to add, that I feel greatly indebted to Captain Gerrard and the troops under his command for their conduct on that occasion, and the manner in which the demolition of the castle of the refractory chief was effected, and the men of Shah Sooja's corps of Sappers and Miners were afterwards withdrawn, appears to me to afford evidence of no ordinary skill, perseverance, and resolution on the part of Lieutenant Cunningham, in charge of the last-mentioned party.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 99.

Captain Gerrard to Captain Wade.

Sir, *Jellalabad, December* 26, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to state, for the information of the Major-General commanding, that, on the morning of the 11th ultimo, I was joined by a detachment of the Sappers and Miners, Shah Shooja's force, and of the 2nd Cavalry, Shah Shooja's force, under the command of Lieutenant Cunningham, with official instructions to destroy the bastions of the Fort of Mamoo Khail. The parties of the Sappers were immediately set to work, and everything was progressing well and quietly, when about ten o'clock I was informed that two houses (one in the larger and one in the smaller fort) were on fire. Flames and smoke filled the place, and the powder and working parties were withdrawn with considerable difficulty. Whilst we were engaged in this a smart firing was heard in our rear, and I was made aware by a party (which I had posted for the purpose) that the enemy were coming down upon us. The assembly was immediately sounded; No. 1 company was thrown to the rear in skirmishing order; No. 2, amongst the trees on the bank of the ravine; and No. 3, left in parties of a naik and five, along the walls and bastions, with a strong party at the gateway, to enable us to enter should our skirmishers be beaten back. Lieutenant Cunningham now made an opening in the wall of the vineyard, and set parties to work to drive horizontal shafts from the outside into the centre of the bastions, whilst I joined the skirmishers, and kept down the fire of my men as much as possible: I remained with this party for some time, and on returning to the gateway was informed by Lieutenant Cunningham that, from the nature of the materials, it was a work of great difficulty to mine from the outside, but that as the wind appeared to blow steadily from the westward, he was of opinion that the flames and smoke must have abated sufficiently to enable him to recommence his work from the inside, in the windward bastions. This, he informed me, would completely destroy the strength of the fort on that side. I again returned to my skirmishers, and, to my surprise, found them between two and three miles from the fort. I inquired the reason, and was told that a company of the Khyber corps was advancing along the opposite bank of the ravine, and that my men had moved forward to cover them. The Khyberees opened a fire upon the enemy, drove a few men behind a small fort, and took possession of it. They had not been in it five minutes when a party of about 150 men rushed down upon them, and drove them in disorder to my side of the ravine. Just as this occurred I received a message from Lieutenant Cunningham, to say that the mines were ready, and that Lieutenant Dowson had come down to our assistance with a party of Jan-Baz. I retired quietly and steadily upon the fort, and gave

directions to Hyder Ali Khan (the native commandant) that the instant the skirmishers came under the fire of the men on the walls they were to close up by the right of the fort, and form in front of the gate. The other company retired by the left, and were halted, to keep back the enemy till arrangements were made to move on Gundamuck. It is with great regret I have now to state, that my men could not get space to form up, on account of the Khyberees becoming completely intermixed with the detachment. The Khyberees at once commenced walking hurriedly, and in confusion, towards Gundamuck. The mines exploded without accident, and ruined the two bastions to their foundations. It was here that I first met Lieutenant Dowson, who reported to me that he had brought 150 Jan-Baz to my aid, and that 50 of them had been posted to secure our retreat through the village. The fire at this time having become exceedingly heavy, the Khyberies fairly broke and ran, throwing all into confusion in their progress. The utmost exertions of Lieutenant Dowson and Cunningham, of Hyder Ali Khan, and myself, to get a party to face the enemy, were altogether ineffectual. The confusion increased every moment, and all our endeavours to carry off the magazine, and bring off the dead and wounded, were fruitless; order could not be restored till having got clear of the village (from which I need not say the Jan Baz had long before moved away); and the steps of cultivation, I called upon the party of the 2nd Cavalry to charge the enemy. The rissalah immediately halted, and faced about, whilst the Jezailchees and Sappers at once rallied, and formed up in good order to their support. At this juncture not a single man of the Khyberees or Jan-Baz was to be seen. The cavalry charged home with me in the most gallant manner, and killed a few of the enemy, the remainder taking themselves to the village and ravines. From the moment that we moved out of the fort the firing upon us had been incessant, and almost entirely from invisible enemies; but this sudden and unexpected attack put a stop to the pursuit, and we were allowed to join Captain Burn without another assault being made upon us. The rest of the events of this day have been reported to the Major-General by Captain Burn.

To Lieutenants Dowson and Cunningham my best thanks are due, for their great exertions on this occasion. I also beg to bring to the notice of the Major-General the exemplary conduct of Hyder Ali Khan, the native commandant of the Jezailchees, and of Jawahis Sing, the Rissaldar of the 2nd Cavalry, Shah Shooja's force. To Lieutenant Cunningham, and his small party of Sappers, the highest praise is due for the effectual manner in which the fort was dismantled under such trying circumstances, and amidst so many obstacles; and to the men of the Jezailchies, for the gallant manner in which they sustained the attacks of the enemy for so many hours.

I have, &c.
J. G. GERRARD.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the Detachment of Shah Shooja's Force, under the command of Captain Gerrard, Shah Shooja's Force.

Jellalabad, December 26, 1841.

	2nd Cavalry, Shah Shooja's Force.				Sappers and Miners.			Jezailchees.						Khyberries.		
	Duffadars.	Sawars.	Total.	Horses.	Naiques.	Privates.	Total.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Naiques.	Privates.	Khalassies.	Total.	Naiques.	Privates.	Total.
Killed . .	..	7	7	11	1	..	1	..	1	1	17	1	20	..	10	10
Wounded .	1	10	11	4	..	1	1	1	3	..	11	..	15	..	9	9

TOTAL { Killed:—1 Havildar, 2 Naiques, 34 Privates, 1 Khalassie, and 11 Horses.
Wounded:—1 Jemadar, 1 Duffadar, 3 Havildars, 36 Privates, and 4 Horses.

JOHN GRANT GERRARD, *Captain.*

No. 100.

Captain Burn to Captain Wade.

Sir, *Jellalabad, November* 13, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., commanding, the circumstances under which I was compelled to abandon the post of Gundamuck, on the afternoon of the 11th instant.

The Major-General is aware that the force left under my command consisted of the 3rd Regiment of Jan-Baz, the Khyber Rangers, and two 6-pounders, manned by the Shah's artillery men (Hindoostanees). This force was to be reinforced by a party of 200 of the Jezailchee Regiment, under Captain Gerrard, after the destruction of Meer Ufzul Khan's fort in Mamoo Kheil.

Previous to the march of the troops under Sir R. Sale from Gundamuck, on the forenoon of the 11th, doubts were entertained of the fidelity of the men of the Jan-Baz Regiment, and those of the Khyber Rangers were not altogether without suspicion. These doubts were very soon verified by the desertions of the whole of the Jan-Baz and a very large portion of the Khyber Rangers. The desertion of the former was, I think, precipitated, and fortunately so, by my ordering a party of them, under Lieutenant Dowson, to Captain Gerrard's assistance in Mamoo Khail, he having been hotly attacked by the Kohgeenees in the neighbourhood of Meer Ufzul Khan's Fort; so soon as the forces under the Major-General moved from Gundamuck, and while the destruction of the fort was still in progress. The Jan-Baz made a show of accompanying Lieutenant Dowson to Mamoo Kheil, but only to desert him, which they did to a man, and followed those who had remained with me towards Tootur, which lies on one of the roads leading to Cabool.

I detached with the Jan-Baz one company of the Khyber Rangers, with orders to push on and join Captain Gerrard in Mamoo Kheil, and sent a second company half-way to Mamoo Khail, to act as a support. This second company returned without orders about 4 P.M., and shortly afterwards deserted, having plundered a portion of the baggage which was left in my charge on the march of the brigade from Gundamuck. The remainder of the men of the Khyber Rangers were extremely anxious to move off, and I perceived the hopelessness of any attempt to control them, and that our only chance of escape was in following where they led; we accordingly moved off with the guns, keeping as many of the men of the Khyber Rangers with them as possible, and as our progress was slow, the guns being drawn by bullocks, time was allowed for Captain Gerrard's party to join us, which they did about a mile off the cantonments.

Captain Gerrard's little band, consisting of a small party of the Shah's Sappers and Miners, a few of Captain Anderson's Horse, and the Jezailchees, formed our rear-guard, and to them we owe our safe escape from Gundamuck. We retreated without molestation, excepting in coming through the pass on the north side of the Neemla Valley, where a few shots were fired at us; but, notwithstanding the absence of all opposition on the part of the enemy, I regret to report that I was forced to abandon both my guns. The wheels of one of them got locked amongst large stones in the first nullah we had to cross after leaving Gundamuck, and there I had to spike and abandon it. The second we brought as far as the bridge to the the east of Gundamuck, but it, too, we were forced to abandon. The remainder of our march to Futtehabad, where we joined the Major-General, was unattended with any circumstances deserving of notice. Of the Khyber Rangers not more than 250 marched into Futtehabad with us, the remainder having taken the road to Kaja with the Jemadar who deserted.

I shall leave it to Captain Gerrard to detail his own operations in Mamoo Khail, and shall only remark that the manner in which he brought off his small detachment, ably assisted by Lieutenant Cunningham, of the Sappers and Miners, is deserving of the Major-General's highest praise. The conduct of their men, while under my eyes, was exemplary in the extreme, not a murmur escaped them, but each did his duty cheerfully. The Hindoostan portion of the detachment, the Major-General is aware, was under arms from daylight in the morning till twelve at night, when we reached Futtehabad, and, during a considerable part of that period, were warmly engaged with the enemy.

Captain Gerrard's loss, he will himself report; that of the company I detached to his assistance I am unable to state correctly, a number of the men having been reported missing on its return; but the Jemadar commanding informs me he lost ten killed and nine wounded, four of the latter he brought back with him, the rest were unable to get away.

I have, &c.,
H. W. BURN.

No. 101.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to the Officer Commanding at Peshawur.

Sir, *Jellalabad, December* 26, 1841.

I BEG to forward to you copy of a communication from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, date Mynporee, 27th ultimo, and have to direct therefore, that as soon as four native regiments shall be united at Peshawur, they may be moved forward to Jellalabad without a moment's delay. I have to request that you will for this purpose put yourself immediately in communication with Captain Mackeson, Political Agent, and avail yourself of his counsel, information, and aid, in organizing the means of this movement.

Should an officer senior to yourself be proceeding with the two regiments, which are to be expected to arrive at Peshawur after your own, you will be pleased to hand this over to him on his joining you, and in the mean time to send him a copy of it, and make him acquainted with the nature and state of the preparation for his immediate advance.

I have made known to the Political Agent by this day's dawk, the circumstance of these instructions having been sent to you, and I desire you distinctly to understand, that I regard it as a matter of the utmost moment, as respects British interests in Affghanistan, that four native regiments should make their appearance, with the least possible delay, under the walls of this place.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE

P.S.—You will be pleased to acknowledge the receipt of this communication by return of dawk, and at the same time inform me what steps you are taking.

No. 102.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major Craigie.

Sir, *Jellalabad, December* 26, 1841.

I HAVE the honor, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to acknowledge the receipt, this day, of your letters of the 27th and 28th ultimo, and have immediately dispatched instructions to the senior officer commanding the British troops at Peshawur, to lose no time in joining me here (as soon as the first four regiments of Native Infantry are united), in communication with the Political Agent, as the presence of any reinforcements here will enable me to keep the neighbouring tribes quiet, and will, I hope, act as a powerful diversion in favor of our interests at Cabool.

I regret that I cannot furnish his Excellency with any authentic accounts of our situation at the capital, since my letter of the 19th instant, to his address. Native reports all indicate that some cessation of hostilities has taken place, but the exact nature of it is doubtful; no two accounts agreeing.

I have experienced no interruption since the 1st instant, and our fortifications are advancing rapidly. The hostile chiefs, I am informed, with their followers, are in the neighbourhood of Bala Bagh.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 103.

Brigadier Wild to Major Craigie.

Sir. *Camp, Peshawur, December* 27, 1841.

I HAVE the honor, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to apprize you with my having joined here, this morning, the advanced portion of the troops under my command.

The first thing I found it necessary to do on arrival, was to shift the encampment, for which purpose I went, accompanied by General Avitabile, and Captain Mackeson, to select a spot on the west side of the town, in the direction of the Khyber Pass.

The last intelligence from Cabool, formed on native reports, is so uncertain and contradictory that nothing can be made out of it. Some allude to a capitulation; others to a decisive victory on our part obtained on the 13th instant.

Some of the field pieces expected to have been obtained from General Avitabile, as a loan to us, on the part of the Lahore Government, proceed to-morrow under Sikh troops to Jamrood, their last frontier post towards Ali Musjid; but it seems very doubtful whether we shall be able to obtain the use of them; such is yet the insubordinate state of the Sikh troops, that although the officers will order their delivery, it is by no means certain, whether the men will comply, and the officers dare not enforce their orders. At the same time it is Captain Mackeson's opinion, that although the Khyber Pass might be gone through in safety, one corps to keep open the communication in the rear, if the Afreedees and Simonees were inclined to hostilities, would be inadequate; whilst it would not be safe, after having gone through the Pass, and arrived on the plain in the neighbourhood of Lalpoora, to proceed onwards without guns to Jellalabad. Captain Mackeson is now in treaty with certain of the chiefs, and entertains hopes of obtaining hostages from them, their answer is shortly expected; and in the mean time the rear detachment will also have arrived here, viz., on the 31st instant.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 104.

Brigadier Wild to the Brigade-Major of Major-General Sale's Force.

Sir, *Peshawur, December* 27, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to state, for the information of Sir R. Sale, that I joined here to-day the advanced detachment of the troops under my command, consisting of two regiments of Native Infantry, a company of artillery, (without guns,) a company of Sappers and Miners, and a troop of Irregular Cavalry.

The rear detachment consisting of two regiments of Native Infantry, which I left on the 21st, will arrive here on the 31st instant. The Political Agent here has not yet succeeded in obtaining in a way that can be relied on, the assistance of field pieces, which were expected to be lent by the Lahore Government, and without which he considers no attempt to proceed beyond Lalpoora ought to be made.

May I request to be favored with Sir R. Sale's orders and sentiments, grounded, as they no doubt will be, on the best intelligence received from Cabool, which seems so uncertain, and in many instances contradictory, that one does not know what to make of it. The difficulty of communicating with Jellalabad, will plead my excuse for sending a letter of this size and shape.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 105.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Peshawur, December* 29, 1841.

I BEG to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that since the letter which I had the honor to address to you the day before yesterday, on which I arrived here, no news of any importance has been received, and I regret to say, that no further progress has yet been made in obtaining guns from General Avitabile, who, on the most pressing remonstrance made to him by Captain Mackeson to-day, said he could not give them up without an express permission from the Lahore Government, having but nine pieces altogether, and that if he were required to keep a communication in our rear hereafter, he would be obliged to plead his inability to do so, for want of guns that had been lent us. He, however, agreed at last to refer the case to Raja Golab Sing, at Hazara, by letter to-day; and Captain Mackeson has addressed another letter to the Raja to the same effect; but it will take four days ere an answer be obtained.

Grain and some treasure have been sent on by Captain Mackeson to Lalpore, which they reached in safety; but its friendly chief appears to be under some apprehension for the safety of his charge, and to be destitute of means to forward on the treasure to Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

No. 106.

Brigade-Major Wade to the Officer Commanding at Peshawur.

Sir, *Jellalabad, December* 29, 1841.

I AM directed by Major-General Sir Robert Sale to furnish you with the accompanying copy of a letter this day addressed to Captain Mackeson, Political Agent at Peshawur, for your information.

I am further requested to add, that it is the Major-General's wish that the Irregular Cavalry, and the other detachments from India, should accompany the advance of the four regiments Native Infantry to this place.

I have, &c.,
H. WADE.

No. 107.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to the Political Agent at Peshawur.

Sir, *Jellalabad, December* 29, 1841.

I HAVE already made known to you my desire that as soon as four regiments Native Infantry are united at Peshawur, they should advance without delay upon this place. I have now to mention that if it should happen that the corps are unprovided with sufficient artillery, I should feel obliged if you would use your utmost influence with the Sikh Authorities to obtain from them a complete battery of at least six pieces, with a full proportion of ammunition, to accompany them here. These guns can be sent back to Peshawur with the first British troops that return to our provinces. I have sent instructions to the senior officer, to the effect that any detachment of Irregular Cavalry which may have come up should also march with the Infantry.

As you possess an intimate knowledge of the whole line of the Khyber Pass, I rely upon your zeal and intelligence to give the most detailed and accurate information on the subject to the officer who may proceed in command of the troops, especially as to the points at which he may expect attack from the Ooloos, and the means of guarding against it.

We trust you will be able to send us treasure by this opportunity, and shall be happy to be supplied with attah to the utmost extent to which you can procure it up to the time when the troops march, as we have not been able to store our magazine in a manner adequate to the wants of a place and garrison of such magnitude.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 108.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Peshawur, December* 30, 1841.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the rear detachment of the force under my command reached Peshawur to-day, where I propose to allow it a few days' halt before its long march, but as in consequence of intelligence received last night from Ali Musjid, Captain Mackeson is desirous that some part of the force should occupy a position in advance of the city, I have directed the first convoy to move on to Kowulsur, to-morrow morning, a distance of about seven miles.

Last night, too, I was informed by General Avitabile that a mutinous spirit had shown itself among his artillery men, in consequence of his artillery officers having closely examined a couple of guns that were about to be ceded to us, with a view to put them in an efficient state of repair for the march, and that the Sikh artillery men positively refused to let them be removed. It is still hoped, however, that after this force shall have proceeded on to Jamrood, the Sikhs may be persuaded to allow the two field pieces to follow and be made over to us.

I cannot express how much I lament that no artillery of our own should have been allowed to accompany, or at least to follow me, and to find ourselves reduced to sue, perhaps in vain, for the assistance of two paltry field pieces. Had a troop of horse artillery been present, this force would have been in an efficient state for an immediate advance, whilst now it may not take place without imminent hazard. If I wait for the arrival of artillery from the rear, an irreparable loss of time may take place, and in the mean time the ardour of the troops, which are now in high and excellent spirits, may also cool down.

Captain Mackeson received a letter yesterday from Captain Mc Gregor, at Jellalabad, telling him that all was quiet there, that they had not had any later accounts from the Envoy at Cabool than the 9th instant, but that native intelligence had been received of a peace having been concluded between Sir William Macnaghten and the Affghan tribes, and that provisions again found their way into cantonments.

Captain Macgregor also gave the pleasing information that 25,000 rupees, being one half of the treasure sent by Captain Mackeson through the Tatara Pass to Lalpoora along with grain, has reached him; and that he hoped the chief of that place, when he should hear of the safe arrival of the first invoice, would also find means to forward the remainder.

The negotiations with the Afreedee chiefs appear to proceed in a slow and doubtful manner, and the Sikh troops promise by no means a cordial co-operation as far as my information goes.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

P.S. I am sorry to add that a heavy and lasting rain appears to have set in.

No. 109.

Major-General Lumley to Brigadier Wild.

Sir, *Kurnaul, January* 11, 1842.

I AM directed by the Commander-in-Chief to acknowledge your letters of the 27th, 29th, and 31st December.

His Excellency is happy to learn that the troops have arrived in good order and good spirits at Peshawur.

He is very sorry to find that our Sikh allies have demurred so long in providing four or six pieces of artillery for your use: his intelligence of the 2nd January, received through Mr. Clerk, leads him to hope that, the perwanneh from Lahore and the orders of Rajah Golab Sing having arrived, the difficulties will be removed. Should this not be the case, you are carefully to act on the fifth article of your instructions.

The Commander-in-Chief considers Jellalabad to be in a state of security, and also that affairs at Cabool are much improved, by a supply of provisions having been obtained. There is no very pressing urgency for an advance attended with heavy risk; for the practicability of relieving Cabool for two months and a half, is more than doubted.

His Excellency scarcely thinks it necessary to warn you of the propriety of keeping our troops separate from the Sikhs, which, as they are not inclined to advance, may not be difficult. The warning, however, may be useful; for, when troops show an insubordinate spirit, they are inclined to involve the loyal and well-disposed in a participation of their crime.

The good feeling of the native regiments under your orders is not the least doubted; but the Sikhs may be inclined to taunt or upbraid them, and to provoke dissensions.

The third division crossed into the Punjab on the 4th instant.

I have, &c.,
J. R. LUMLEY.

No. 110.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Sir R. Sale.

Sir, *Peshawur, January* 2, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 26th ultimo, on my way to the Political Agent, Captain Mackeson's, about an hour ago, half past one P.M., and beg to assure you that nothing coincides more with my anxious desires than to comply with your wish that I should move on towards Jellalabad without delay; but this under the terms of the instructions, sent to me by the Adjutant-General of the Army, under date the 11th ultimo, which he informs me have also been communicated to you, I do not find it safe to undertake, without the presence of some artillery, in the present excited state of the Afreedi and Shinwari tribes.

No one can lament more sincerely than I do that the troop of horse artillery that was to have followed closely the rear detachment of the force under my command, should have been detained at Ferozepore, when almost in the act of crossing the Sutlej. Had it been present, I should have felt myself in an efficient state to advance, the moment Captain Mackeson's negociations, which are still in progress with certain Afreedi chiefs, should have been concluded.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief adverted to an expectation entertained that General Avitabile, on the part of the Lahore Government, would be able to lend our Government four or six field-pieces: he has only nine altogether, and it appears that the insubordinate Sikh soldiery (artillery), are much inclined to prevent the removal of their guns, and that the only hope of our getting possession of two or perhaps four very indifferent field-pieces, is that they may follow us after our removal to Kalsar, which is half way between this place and Jumrood, and where the whole brigade will be encamped to-morrow.

You are no doubt aware that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has

invested me with discretionary power to advance or not, according to circumstances.

The 10th Regiment of Light Cavalry, Her Majesty's 9th Regiment of Foot, and the 26th Regiment of Native Infantry, together with a camel battery and some other guns, as also some troops of Irregular Cavalry, were, it is understood, to have crossed the Sutlej on the 1st instant, but no certain accounts on the subject have yet been received.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

No. 111.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to the Officer Commanding at Peshawur.

Sir, *Jellalabad, January* 3, 1842.

I HAVE to direct that you will, on receipt of this, hasten on as much as possible your march on this place, circumstances urgently requiring the immediate presence here of the four Native regiments, and the other troops under your command.

This is sent by cossid; and you will be pleased to acknowledge the receipt of it without delay.

I desire you distinctly to understand that it is of vital importance to our interests in this country that you should appear under these walls immediately.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 112.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Peshawur, January* 3, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the whole of the troops under my command will, in the course of the day, be encamped at Kowulsur, about seven miles in advance of the town, towards the Khyber Pass.

Captain Mackeson, the Political Agent, expects to hold a conference with some Afreedee Chiefs near Jumrood, to-day, when it will be ascertained how far it may be safe to attempt an advance, for which Major-General Sale appears extremely anxious, though he recommends that it should not be ventured on, without six field-pieces and some cavalry.

I hope four field-pieces are now in the course of being delivered over to Captain Mackeson, in consequence of a favorable answer having last night been received to the reference which, in a former letter I had the honor to mention, had been made to Rajah Golab Sing.

Yesterday, also, native accounts were transmitted by Captain Mc Gregor, Political Agent, at Jellalabad, to which some credence appears to be given, (in the absence of all official communication from the Envoy himself), that Shah Shooja had been playing a double part with his friends and our Government, and had been the secret instigator of much of the misfortunes that had befallen our arms at Cabool; but that a change had taken place, that the Barukzai Chiefs, headed by Mahomed Akbar Khan, had concluded a peace with the Envoy; that provisions were freely imported into his cantonment, to which all the British troops had retired from the Bala Hissar; that the Barukzai and other chiefs had offered Shah Shooja a lac of rupeess, if he would retire to any place most agreeable to himself, to which, however, he returned a decided negative, and said that he would assert his right to the crown to the last. It is impossible to say what part of this intelligence is true or not, but there is little doubt that a favorable turn to our interests at Cabool has taken place.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

No. 113.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, January 6, 1842.*

MY camp being at the distance of eight or nine miles from the Political Agent's residence, I had no definite information to communicate yesterday, which will, I trust, serve as my apology for not having done myself the honor of addressing you then, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Captain Mackeson succeeded in obtaining, on the 3rd instant, four field-pieces with a complement of horses, from General Avitabile, though not without a disposition to interrupt their progress by the Sikh soldiery, who were seen collecting and consulting together as the guns went past their cantonment; but it so happened that the 30th and 53rd Regiments came up at that time, on their way to this camp, from the ground they left at Peshawur, so the artillery fell in a-head of the column, and no hindrance was offered.

On the following day, the guns being tested, the limber of one of them gave way, so as to be required to be renewed. The repairs are now in progress, and will be completed in two or three days.

The hired Rewaree camels have given the greatest possible annoyance since the troops arrived here; the Sarwans declaring that neither threats or money would induce them to proceed onwards to Jellalabâd, though Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, the Deputy-Commissary-General, had intimated to me, and to the commanding officer of every regiment in this brigade, that he had concluded an agreement with some person at Ferozepore to secure us the further services of these camels on to Jellalabad, on the payment in advance here of twelve rupees for each; but it now appears, after a reference on the subject, that the agreement was concluded by a person unauthorized by the real owners to do so, and without their concurrence.

Captain Mackeson, however, left me under the impression (this evening) that by great concessions, and promising a liberal indemnification for the cattle that perishes, he may yet prevail on them to proceed; but I never witnessed a more determined and perverse defiance than these camel owners have shown on this occasion.

Notwithstanding every precaution taken by means of guards sent out with the camels when they go to graze, and keeping watch over them in camp, some hundreds have contrived to abscond, a great proportion of which have been recovered.

An estimate was made of the number of camels that will be required for progress of the brigade through the Khyber Pass, for treasure, for ammunition, camp equipage, private baggage (reduced to the lowest scale, as one small tent is made to serve for the accommodation of three or four officers, who have also been limited to the fewest servants possible), and for the carriage of one month's provisions on a road, where, in some parts, nothing in the world can be procured for either man or beast but what is carried along hence. The estimate amounted to upwards of 3000 camels; and supposing that half a month's supplies would be sufficient, the number would still amount to about 2200, and must be reduced.

In the meantime Captain Mackeson exerts himself to form a depôt of grain at Lalpoora, by the Tattara Pass, conveyed thither on mules, ponies, and donkies; but in small quantities at the time, so as to reduce the quantum that would have to be escorted by the troops from this place.

To-day the Afreedee Chiefs were to have held a meeting to consult together on the terms that have been offered them. Their reply will probably be received the day after to-morrow, and contribute materially to the decision I shall come to regarding an advance upon Jellalabad, a consummation which I consider most desirable; though, with the insufficient means at my disposal, if anything like an opposition of numerous bodies on different points is to take place, the sacrifice of lives may be enormous; but if once attempted, I consider it must be carried into effect, and that to recede ever so little is not to be thought of in the face of so ruthless a foe. The immense string of camels, where only one can go a-breast, allowing about five yards to each, and which will extend to nearly nine miles, is of itself a very serious impediment.

The above intelligence * having reached Jellalabad and Peshawur in comparatively so short a time, it is possible the Khyberees may not yet have become acquainted with it. Nevertheless, it can scarce be expected but that when once fully aware of the state of affairs, the fear of provoking the resentment of the Caboolees and their adherents will make them break off any treaty they may have contracted with us, in spite of the forbearance-money they receive for not molesting us, and which the dependents at all times scarcely consider to be binding on themselves, whatever their chiefs may do.

The road between our camp and Peshawur is not safe, from the Afreedees' attacks upon defenceless people. Three camp-followers were found murder don the road two days ago, who had not time to reach camp before dusk.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

No. 114.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Sir R. Sale.

Camp, Kowulsur, half-way to Jumrood,
Sir, *January* 7, 1842.

I HAD the honor to address a letter for your information to your Brigade-Major on the 27th ultimo, the day on which I reached Peshawur.

On the 1st instant I acknowledged the receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo, and explained at the same time my reasons for not complying with your wish of proceeding to Jellalabad forthwith. Four guns have since been obtained from General Avitabile; but one of them on being tested with an extra charge, smashed its limber, which is now in course of being replaced. Another great difficulty under which we labour is the obstreperous conduct of our hired camel men, a large proportion of which seem not inclined to yield to the influence of either threats or money, and without supplies it is almost impossible to proceed, where man and beast depend on the food that accompanies the force for their subsistence.

In the third place, Captain Mackeson has offered terms to certain Afreedee chiefs for facilitating the passage through the Khyber Pass, to which the expected reply has not been received, and which so much affects the comparative security of our advance, as to deserve serious attention, for there is no doubt that if the brigade should meet the opposition of numerous bodies in many points, during its progress, a heavy sacrifice of life must ensue, for the attempt once made must be persevered in to its fulfilment. In the fourth instance, there is such an evident want of zealous co-operation on the part of the Sikh chiefs and soldiery, if not of their Government, though I suspect the feeling originates there, that I consider no reliance can be placed on them, for keeping open the communication in our rear, after we have once gone on.

I have now the honor of acknowledging the receipt to-day of your note of the 3rd instant, again calling on me to hasten my advance, though at the same time it would appear that within the walls of Jellalabad you consider yourself safe, and it therefore remains for me to weigh maturely, how far, with the inadequate means at my disposal, having no cavalry, except one troop of irregular horse, I would promote or hurt the interests of the service, if after pushing on I were to join you in a crippled state. But if you thought of retiring with your force upon Peshawur, I would not hesitate instantly to advance, and take up positions in the Khyber Pass at any cost, to assist in facilitating your retreat.

I beg at the same time to assure you, that I will not cease to watch for the first seasonable opportunity to advance with the force at my disposal, with a view to instantly avail myself of it.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

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* The foregoing paragraph has reference to the reported murder of the Envoy.

No. 115.

Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone, to Captain Macgregor.

Sir, *Cabool, December* 29, 1841.

IT having been found necessary to conclude an agreement founded on that of the late Sir William Macnaghten, for the evacuation of Affghanistan by the troops, we have the honor to request that you will intimate to the officer commanding at Jellalabad, our wish that the troops now at that place should return to India, commencing their march immediately after the receipt of this letter, leaving all guns, the property of Dost Mahomed Khan, with the new Governor. As also such stores and baggage as there may not be the means of carrying away, and the provisions in store for our use, on arriving at Jellalabad.

Abdool Zhufoor Khan, who is the bearer of this letter, will render you all the assistance in his power. He has been appointed Governor of Jellalabad on the part of the existing Government.

We have, &c,
ELDRED POTTINGER.
W. K. ELPHINSTONE.

No. 116.

Major-General Sir R. Sale and Captain Macgregor, to Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone.

Sirs, *Jellalabad, January* 9, 1842.

WE have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, which you therein state was to be delivered to us by Abdool Zhufoor Khan, appointed Governor of this place by the existing powers at Cabool. That communication was not handed to us by him, but by a messenger of his; and though dated 29th December, 1841, has only this moment reached us. We have, at the same time, positive information that Mahomed Akbar Khan has sent a proclamation to all the chiefs in the neighbourhood, urging them to raise their followers, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying the force now at Jellalabad. Under these circumstances, we have deemed it our duty to await a further communication from you, which we desire may point out the security which is to be given for our safe march to Peshawur.

We have, &c.,
R. SALE.
G. H. MACGREGOR.

No. 117.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, January* 7, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt, to-day, of your letter of the 26th ultimo, and to state in reply that I did acknowledge the receipt of the original instructions which you sent me, from Masurkyala, on the 20th ultimo.

I shall, as desired, have his Excellency's orders conveyed to Captain Ponsonby, now residing at Peshawur, to await there the arrival of Major-General Pollock.

My former letters will have informed his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that I consider an advance through the Khyber Pass, with the means at my disposal, having no other cavalry but a troop of Irregular Cavalry, with some indifferent artillery, as somewhat hazardous, and likely to cost many lives; but that I shall run the risk of it, if occasion requires it.

From the various information I have obtained, an advance through the Khyber Pass ought not to be attempted, except under favourable circumstances,

with a less force than 6000 men, with six guns, besides cavalry, the want of which may be felt immediately after emerging from the western extremity of the Pass, beyond Lundee Khana, on approaching Dakka; and that it would require a whole corps at Ali Musjid to maintain the command of water, which must be brought to the fort from some distance, and to assist in keeping open the communication, if the Afreedees were determined on opposing us; and that it would require two corps more, with some guns, to be posted near Gurhee Lala Beg, Luagee, and Lundee Khana, to maintain the communication open above, and to be sufficiently strong to resist the attacks of the Khyberees.

With reference to Captain Ferris's Jezailchee corps, I understand from him that when he left Pesh Bolak he had one wing on duty at Jellalabad, which is still there; about 150 men are at Lalpoora, to which place they escorted grain and treasure by the Tatara Pass, and the remainder, consisting, I believe, of about 40, is the only part of his corps that could accompany the brigade.

The Sikhs show such extreme lukewarmness, not to say reluctance, in the co-operation they are required to afford, that it is much to be apprehended their assistance in the field, or in keeping open the communication in the Khyber Pass, is in no way to be depended on.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

No. 118

Brigadier Wild to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, January* 8, 1842.

I WAS honored yesterday afternoon with your Excellency's letter of the 27th ultimo, regarding the advance, through the Khyber Pass, of the brigade under my command, and I have never felt so deeply impressed as on the occasion of its perusal, with the difference there is between simply obeying orders and acting on my own responsibility, in a case affecting the lives of thousands, and perhaps the vital interests of the state, though I trust, with the Almighty's help, I shall not be found wanting in firmness and perseverance, when the time for acting may arrive.

In replying yesterday to the Deputy Adjutant-General's official letter of the 26th December, I stated, that from the information I had obtained from various quarters, the general impression was, that an advance through the Khyber Pass, except under favorable circumstances, ought not to be attempted with a less force than 6000 men, six guns, and some cavalry, and mine is wanting of that strength by a complement of one-third. The brigade under the orders of Major-General Mc Caskill will not probably reach Peshawur before the 8th or 10th of February, and will not be within reach to support mine, in the event of my advancing now. Should any disaster befal me that brigade would then be placed in a predicament worse even than what mine now stands in.

What the views of Government, as to our retaining possession of Jellalabad, may be, after our troops evacuate Cabool, which, by a letter received from Captain Pottinger, appears to have been decided upon there, I, of course, know not; but if no immediate danger threatens the force of Sir Robert Sale at Jellalabad, and he can maintain himself there in safety, until Major-General Mc Caskill's brigade arrive here, our united brigades advancing together would be able to afford Major-General Sir Robert Sale certain and effectual relief, and be prepared also to join his force in carrying on offensive operations, if required; whereas, if each brigade in succession were to reach Jellalabad in a crippled state, from having been unable singly to overpower the resistance opposed to its progress, both may arrive there so weakened as to reduce the whole to a state of inefficiency.

The Sikh soldiery, too, is in such a disorganized and insubordinate state that no confidence can be placed in any show of assistance on the part of the Lahore Government. The men, as well as their chiefs, are decidedly averse to contribute in any way to the success of our arms. General Avitabile, who paid me a visit this evening, on his return from Jumrood, related the two following instances of insubordination, which occurred to-day. He ordered two battalions, which it was intended should co-operate with us, to move out to Jumrood, from their lines

at Peshawur,—they flatly refused, and gave him to understand that they intended to return to Lahore. In the next place, he also ordered three guns to be taken to Jumrood; but as these were in progress the same Sikh soldiers seized on one of them, as they passed in front of their lines, and let only the other two proceed. No reliance whatever can therefore be placed on their keeping the communication open in our rear, in the event of our advancing, and there is still less chance that they will move onwards with us, even so far as Ali Musjid.

Your Excellency alludes to the firm occupation of Ali Musjid, and Major Craigie, in the abovementioned official letter, says, that "it ought to be occupied by three companies of Native Infantry, well provisioned, and with a good store of ammunition." Captain Ferris, who was left to garrison that fort, when first taken, and Captain Mackeson also, have assured me, that in case the Afreedees were decidedly hostile, nothing short of one complete regiment could maintain itself there, as the command of water, which had to be brought to the fort from a considerable distance, could not be secured without a strong garrison. Should I find this to be really the case, it would reduce my strength for ulterior progress very much.

Lundee Khana, near the upper or western extremity of the Khyber Pass, to which your Excellency also calls my attention, as a suitable position to be occupied, has been represented to me as the most contracted and formidable part of the whole Khyber Pass, and that it will be difficult to find in its neighbourhood a position that is not commanded by some near adjoining hill.

There is another position, which has likewise been pointed out to me, between Ali Musjid and Lundee Khana, in the vicinity of Ghurree Lalla Beg, and Luagee, as one that ought to be occupied, to keep the communication open, but these posts would require to be of such strength, to guard against attack, that there would not be any troops left to advance with after getting through the pass, whilst the greatest difficulty would be to supply them with provisions, as it would, except in the most urgent case, be impossible for us to advance immediately, for want of cattle. We had been informed by the Commissariat, that the camels we brought with us from Ferozepore had been bound down by an agreement to proceed with us to Jellalabad, on payment of twelve rupees each in advance, a very high rate of hire. Our stores, ammunition, commissariat supplies, were all loaded on them, but to the great annoyance of the Political Agent, myself, and all concerned, the camel owners denied being a party in the agreement; they could not be forced, and neither threats, nor the most liberal offers of remuneration, could induce above one-fourth of them to move on a step beyond this; nay, these even repent, and are not to be depended upon.

Captain Mackeson is now trying to supply the place of camels, for the carriage of grain, &c., with bullocks and ponies, for there is no Commissariat officer either with me or at Peshawur, to arrange these matters.

I am told that on emerging from the pass beyond Lundee Khana, and thence on to Jellalabad, we are likely to feel the want of cavalry for the protection of the cattle.

The troops, I am happy to say, are healthy, though they felt fatigued after their long march, on arriving here, for when they came to the crossing of a river, the day that would otherwise have been a halt for them, was a harder working-day than any other, to unload and load the ferry boats with Commissariat stores, ammunition, baggage, &c. I shall, however, be obliged to leave behind me here thirty or forty sick, most of them men who were brought before the Invaliding Committee last year, but were not passed, because it was thought two or three years' work might still be got out of them.

General Avitabile has repeatedly expatiated on the danger of proceeding through the Khyber Pass with so small a force as the one under my command, and entreated me not to act rashly in the attempt. Major-General Sir Robert Sale, on the other hand, is rather peremptory in his desire that I should hasten on to Jellalabad, but I conceive he could not have been aware of the instructions I received by your Excellency's orders, nor of the hazardous nature of the attempt. I, however, wrote to him yesterday, that if he thought of retiring upon Peshawur, I would not then hesitate to advance, to take up position, at any cost, in the Khyber Pass, to facilitate his retreat.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

No. 119.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, January* 9, 1842.

I HAVE not yet received your letter, No. 2482, of the 30th ultimo, but Captain Mackeson has communicated to me the copy of it which was sent to Mr. Clerk.

I had the honour of informing you in my last, of the present distribution of Captain Ferris's corps of Jezailchees, which would make known to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, how very few men belonging to it remain with him, and out of that number I find that there are about fifteen who have not yet recovered from the effects of their wounds, leaving in fact only twenty-five men fit for duty. Those that were detached as an escort with grain and treasure to Lalpoora, as mentioned by me in a former letter, amounting to about 170, have been recalled; their number is supposed to be considerably reduced since. Captain Ferris has promised me a statement of his corps when that detachment arrives. He has had many desertions of late, both among the men who were detached hence and those at Jellalabad, which he partly attributes to want of pay, they being four months' in arrears, and those who have gone have taken their jezails or rifles with them, which is a serious loss. Captain Ferris has been trying to recruit trustworthy men here, to fill up the vacancies in his corps, without success; he does not think the men to be had could be depended upon, or safely trusted with a jezail or ammunition for it; but there is another description of people to be had here, matchlockmen, named Arbabs, on whom some little dependance can be placed. Captain Mackeson has already entertained about three or four of them; they may prove useful, and as Captain Ferris with his adjutant Lieutenant Lukin, are both in camp, and understand the language and manners of those people well, I do not think that the Arbabs could be placed under a better superintendence than that of those two officers.

With reference to the arming of our troops for operation in monntain defiles with the weapon of the Affghan "soldiery," I will consult Captain Mackeson as to how and in what manner they may be obtained.

Captain Pottinger has written to Captain Magcregor, Political Agent at Jellalabad, a short note dated Cabool 25th ultimo, confirming the melancholy intelligence of Sir William Macnaghten's murder, by Mahomed Akbar Khan, and saying that a treaty had been entered into with the Affghan chiefs, for the immediate evacuation of Cabool by the British troops, to retire upon Peshawur; but he adds, as he was closing his letter, an attack was made upon our cantonments. In consequenee of the death and imprisonment of all his seniors in the political department, Captain Pottinger was left at the head of affairs. Subsequent native reports received at Jellalabad say, that after Sir William Macnaghten's murder, provisions still continued to be carried to cantonments by the country people, and that it was again quiet. Nevertheless Captain Macgregor is most anxious that the force under my command should arrive at Jellalabad, taking it for granted, as it were, that it will do so in perfect safety, and be ready for any emergency, without considering that, as soon as we have entered the pass a door closes as it were upon our rear, there being no other force close at hand to support our advance, or to take advantage thereof for its own benefit; so that if my brigade should have the misfortune to meet with a disaster, Major-General Mc Caskill's brigade would then stand in a worse predicament even than mine does now, so that the chances are that both brigades would reach Jellalabad in a crippled state one after the other; for the co-operation of our Sikh allies is by no means to be depended upon. Their troops are in a thorough state of insubordination, they obey only when and as much as they please. Two battalions flatly refused to move out of their lines when ordered, two days ago, by General Avitabile, to proceed to Jumrood with a view eventually to co-operate with us, and intimated that it was their intention to return to Lahore; they also laid hold on one out of three guns that were proceeding to Jumrood by the general's orders, and conveyed it back to their own lines. Under such circumstances it is evident that we neither can depend on their active co-operation in the field, nor on maintainiug the communication open for us in the rear.

The security into which the whole brigade has been lulled by the official announcement that a contract had been entered into by which all the Rewarree camels, those in the employ of the Commissariat, for the conveyance of ammunition, stores, &c., as well as those hired by individuals, were to continue their services until the force should reach Jellalabad, on the further payment, in advance, of 12 rupees each, has been sadly disappointed by the most decided and obstinate refusal of the camel owners in camp to abide by the agreement, or to acknowledge the competency of those who are alleged to have contracted it in their names, to do so. The consequence has been, that we have literally been left without carriage of any kind to proceed with, besides the few Company's camels that carry the Sepoys' camp equipage. Neither liberal promises nor threats could prevail on the camel owners to come to any terms, and after giving the greatest possible annoyance, Captain Mackeson, as a last expedient, offered to purchase them, but only about 300 were secured on those terms yesterday. The conviction that the agreement must hold good prevented both the Political Agent on the part of Government, and individuals on their private accounts, to make any arrangement to supply the want of carriage for the further progress of the troops towards Jellalabad after reaching Peshawur, so that an immediate advance, except in a case of extreme urgency and leaving almost every necessary article behind us, could not take place; though I hope with the active measures now on foot, this impediment will be removed in two or three days.

Captain Mackeson has not yet received a satisfactory answer from the Afreedee chiefs, to whom terms for allowing us to pass through the Khyber Pass have been offered. They plead divisions among themselves as the cause which renders it impossible for them to give a reply for some days.

The broken limber of the gun (by firing it off the other day) has been substantially repaired.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

No. 120.

Brigadier Wild to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, January* 10, 1842.

SINCE writing the accompanying letter, which was too late for dispatch yesterday, I find I have been misinformed with respect to the Arbabs, stated to to have been entertained by Captain Mackeson. He says he could entertain that number; but he does not at this present moment, as they are all Mussulmans, whose feelings against Europeans are much excited, think they could much be trusted.

I was anxious ere dispatching this letter, to rectify a misstatement that might have given rise to a wrong impression.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

No. 121.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to the Officer Commanding at Peshawur.

Sir, *Jellalabad, January* 9, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, which has only this moment reached me. Captain Mackeson will be able to communicate to you the substance of the important intelligence sent to Captain Macgregor, from Cabool, under date 29th ultimo; with reference to which it is my opinion that you ought to lose no time in advancing on this place, which will enable us either to hold it against any enemy, or in every event to retire in perfectly good order across the Khyber.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

P.S.—A letter from Captain Mackeson, of the 3rd instant, mentions that he has obtained four field-pieces from General Avitabile, which will be sufficient, I think, for your operations.

No. 122.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Brigadier Wild.

Sir, *Jellalabad, January* 10, 1842.

I HAD the honor, late yesterday evening, to receive yours of the 2nd instant. The Postmaster at Peshawur will be best able to explain the delay in the transmission of both this and yours of the 27th ultimo, as well as of that of a private communication of the 16th December, from General Sir J. Nicolls, K.C.B., which also came to hand on the same day, and gave me the first intimation of the circumstance of a separate command being vested in you, which will not merge in mine until you reach Jellalabad.

I have to thank you for the co-operation which you have shown every disposition to afford me, and once more to beg to be permitted to press upon your attention the paramount importance, as respects British interests in Affghanistan at this moment, of your appearing with the least practicable delay under the walls of Jellalabad. I shall esteem it a favour to be informed of your progress by every available opportunity.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 123.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Brigadier Wild.

Sir, *Jellalabad, January* 11, 1842.

YOUR letter of the 7th instant I have this moment received, and in reply I can only again repeat that I consider the appearance of your brigade under the walls of Jellalabad would have the effect of restoring confidence at this crisis, and tranquillizing the country on this side of Gundamuck, besides affording the only hope of extricating from a situation perilous in the extreme, our troops at Cabool.

I am of opinion that your deficiency in cavalry could not be materially felt in such a route as that of the passes of the Khyber. The circumstance of your delay beyond the time when your approach was expected has already produced the effect of inducing all the surrounding chiefs, who had hitherto been faithful, to manifest decided indications of an intention to desert our cause. It has also greatly depressed the spirits of our native soldiers in this garrison, who are anxiously looking for reinforcements, and are four months in arrears of pay, whilst we have not within these walls a single rupee; and our ammunition is not sufficient to enable us to fight our way from Jellalabad.

Having been entrusted with a separate command, you are of course the best judge of your own operations, and alone responsible for them, but I must repeat that I consider that the fate and prospects of the British force at Cabool and this place chiefly depend on a speedy support of us.

Should any untoward circumstance occur that would compel me to retire on Peshawur, it would be, after this, impossible to communicate with you, so as to enable you to assist us in our retreat, as your present delay will probably close the route even for single cossids.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 124.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Jellalabad, January* 12, 1842.

IN order that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief may be in full possession of the exact state of affairs, I have the honor to forward copies of the whole of the correspondence between Brigadier Wild and myself, and have the honor to request you will submit them, together with this letter, to his Excellency for perusal.

You will perceive that I had opened this correspondence before I was made aware that Brigadier Wild's command was intended to be separate and independent of mine, up to the time of his arrival here.

With reference to the whole of those letters, but especially the last, I have only to remark, that if the Brigadier could have marched from Jumrood, even so late as the 7th instant, I cannot doubt that his advance would have kept all the Affghan sirdars around us, who have hitherto been friendly, still true to our interests, and it is probable that the Ghilzye sirdars from Lughman would have separated themselves from the confederacy. The very contrary effect has been produced by the indefinite delay which he unfortunately announces to me. The confidence in us of even the governor of this place and his adherents without, is evidently shaken. They doubt whether we shall ever be reinforced, and seemed prepared to leave us, and in case of the force at Cabool coming down in confusion to seek shelter within these walls, it is quite certain that the armed population would rise to a man to intercept them and us. Again, if the Brigadier had been able promptly to move on, he would have met with no opposition, excepting in the Khyber Pass, between Jumrood and Dakka, for we had positive information that the people from the latter place to Jellalabad had made arrangements to carry off their families and leave the road clear for the column; but when once the impulse of resistance is given to the armed peasantry, the Brigadier will only be able to appear here, after contesting every inch of both mountains and plains from Jumrood to this spot.

I regret this delay, which has produced a great depression of spirits amongst the soldiers of this garrison, and beg of you to understand, that I pass no judgment on the movements of Brigadier Wild, for which he is alone responsible.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 125.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, January* 12, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I learnt from Captain Mackeson, who has this moment called upon me, that Captain Macgregor, the Political agent at Jellalabad, had received a letter from Captain Pottinger, dated Cabool, the 28th ultimo, written in French; that makes no mention of any engagement having, as supposed, taken place on the 25th ultimo, but he states that the strength of the cantonment

had been considerably weakened by the late Sir William Macnaghten's surrender of some adjoining forts, that the troops had been desired to retire upon Jellalabad as soon as carriage for the sick and wounded should be sent, (which was expected in the course of the day,) by the Bungiah Pass, but that they would not consent to proceed by that route; that Captain Pottinger also warns Captain Macgregor not to obey an order sent to him by the late Envoy to surrender Jellalabad, and to retire upon Peshawur, unless it should be reiterated by himself.

Under such circumstances, it may be imperatively required to run the risk of forcing our way through the Khyber Pass, and to advance to the relief of the force at Jellalabad. No friendly forbearance on the part of the Afredee tribes can any longer be reckoned upon, and it becomes matter of most serious consideration how to proceed. The best plan, in my opinion, is to make our way through it as speedily as practicable before their vigilance be excited, so as to preclude, as well as frustrate, any serious resistance.

The proposed mode of proceeding, subject to such modification as circumstances at the moment may require, is to ascertain in the first instance, whether there is any hope of co-operation on the part of the Sikh troops, so as to get a couple of their corps to accompany the brigade to Ali Musjid, and to leave them there with a view to maintain the communication open to a certain extent by their occupation of that post. In which case, I would take up a new position with the brigade in the morning of the day, when it was intended to move about six miles in advance of the present camp, close to the entrance of the pass at Jumrood, and after the men shall have taken their meals comfortably during the day, I would order them in the evening to get under arms at as short a notice, and with as little noise as possible, and proceed at once to Ali Musjid, a distance of eight miles, in the dark, leaving, with a few exceptions of the most indispensable articles, all the tents and baggage behind them, and if successful so far, to push on forthwith to the end of the pass to Lalpoora, where it will be necessary to wait a day or two for the arrival of the camp equipage, which could be forwarded thither by the Tatara Pass, as the want of it would be much felt at this inclement season of the year, when much rain may be expected.

Part of the treasure, in the event of such a move, will have to be left behind, but I shall endeavour to take all the ammunition with me. Independent of the want of sufficient carriage, it will be impossible to take supplies of provision in any large quantity in a movement requiring celerity and secresy, and which if delayed too long, may no longer be practicable. Nevertheless, Captain Mackeson, who entirely concurs in the above measure, still holds a communication open with the Maliks, or Afreedee chiefs, and seems anxious to avoid any collison with them, until their definitive answer to the terms offered shall have been received.

Very few camels, and the strongest only, can be taken; their liability to fall and to obstruct a passage, and the slowness of their progress over stony roads, might defeat our object. For the same reason, Captain Mackeson will endeavour to secure the loan of some elephants from General Avitabile to carry the guns through the pass, lest the restiveness of the horses, or some other untoward obstacle, should cause some breakage, and delay in consequence.

If only Major-General McCaskill's brigade were near at hand, I should feel a confidence as to the maintenance of an open communication in the rear, which ten thousand Sikh troops could never inspire.

The disasters at Cabool are well known at Peshawur, with considerable exaggeration, and have much increased the insolence of its inhabitants towards us.

I have, &c.

C. F. WILD.

No. 126.

Major-General Sir Robert Sale to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Jellalabad, January* 13, 1842.

I BEG to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that Assistant-Surgeon Brydon, a few hours since, arrived at this place wounded, and has reported that, on the faith of a Treaty, our troops left Cabool on or about the 6th instant.

They were treacherously attacked on the road by overwhelming numbers, and from the nature of his recital there is reason to expect that he is the only one of the fugitives that we shall ever see alive.

Relying on his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's promise to relieve us as soon as possible, I have resolved on the most determined defence of this place; but if his Excellency will understand that the parapets are not cannon-proof, and that as the Cabool force has abandoned all their guns, we may expect to be besieged immediately by the Affghans, aided by a considerable artillery, I feel that this short statement is the strongest appeal I can make for succour.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 127.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, January* 14, 1842.

MY Brigade Major is laid up with a fever since yesterday, and secresy being required in all our proceedings, I have scarce time left to take the necessary copies myself, but will not delay the transmission of the inclosed dispatches for submission to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The situation of the troops at Jellalabad is becoming daily more critical, and with it the danger of our advance increases. Captain Mackeson has been engaged to-day in a conference with the Sikh commandants of corps, to endeavor to secure their co-operation. I have just received an express from him saying, that nothing had been concluded; that another would be held at Jumrood to-morrow, at which I shall assist, to endeavour to obtain their co-operation, as far at least as the occupation of Ali Musjid is concerned.

We are still unprovided with the necessary carriage for an advance, and our store of ammunition is already sufficiently scanty not to leave any behind, when an interrupted communication is to be apprehended.

The guns, too, which we got here are miserable things; in firing them the day before yesterday to ascertain their range, the limbers of two again gave way, and the powder that was obtained with them is of so inferior a quality, the shot so far from round, that little precision can be expected.

I shall have the honor of addressing you again to-morrow.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

No. 128.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, January* 15, 1842.

I HAVE scarce time left to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that information received from Ali Musjid renders it imperative that relief should be immediately sent thither, for which purpose I shall detach to-night at 9 P.M. the 53rd and 64th regiments, as lightly equipped as possible.

The meeting at Jumrood was rendered unnecessary to day, by a consent and promise on the part of the Sikh commandants last night, to co-operate with us and to occupy Ali Musjid. Some of them it is hoped will be induced to proceed to-night together with the above regiments.

The Afreedees have thrown off all reserve.

I beg also to inclose a letter from Major-General Sir R. Sale, in reply to one formerly written to him by me, when I considered the advance might without danger to his safety be deferred. As soon as I hear of the successful result of the detachment sent to Ali Musjid, I shall adopt measures for following up the advance, as the detachment is just now obliged to proceed without provisions, except what the men will carry in their knapsacks. I shall have to supply their wants as soon as possible.

Report from Jellalabad says, that Mahomed Akbar Khan has fallen by the hand of another rival chief, but this has not yet been confirmed.

Letters have been received up to the 4th instant from Major Pottinger; I have no time for copying them, or this letter, now. Six officers had been taken as hostages; the troops were put off from day to day for their return. Intimation has been sent to General Sale to consider the order for evacuating Jellalabad cancelled.

The remainder of the money sent to Lalpoora, 25,000 rupees, had reached Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

No. 129.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *January* 8, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that the brigade under the command of Major-General Mc Caskill, K.C.H., as per the subjoined statement, crossed the Sutlej on the 4th instant, at Ferozepore, on progress to Peshawur.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK.

	Officers.	Soldiers.	Syces and Grass Cutters.	Followers.	Horses.	Tattoos.	Camels.	Hackeries.
Her Majesty's 9th Foot	35	834	50	500	50	50	470	..
Detachment of recruits, Her Majesty's 44th Regiment	10	235	..	276	30	..	200	..
10th Regiment Light Cavalry ..	16	493	587	800	580	160	300	1
Detachment, 2nd Company 2nd Battalion, Artillery	1	115	4	30	3	..	22	2
Detachment, 3rd Irregular Cavalry ..	1	200	200	150	297	100	40	..
36th Regiment Native Infantry ..	17	1,011	..	570	30	30	420	..
Detachment, 60th Regiment Native Infantry	11	146	24	88	11	30	80	..
Commissariat Stores	..	..	..	1,100	..	..	2,000	..
Ordnance Stores	..	..	..	100	..	..	116	2
Total	91	3,034	865	3,614	953	370	3,648	5

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No. 130.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *January* 12, 1842, 1 A.M.

WITH the deepest regret I transmit to you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, a confirmation of the rumor which I this day forwarded by the regular post, of the murder of Sir William Macnaghten.

2. I have received only two of three Persian papers to which Captain Mackeson refers, and I send them as they reached me, to save time in the translation of them.

3. The Sikhs have furnished some guns to Brigadier Wild's force, and some more were expected with Mohtab Sing's Brigade; which I this morning heard from Captain Lawrence, at Peshawur, would arrive there on the 5th instant. I have called upon the Durbar to make every exertion to provide more cavalry than the 700 Patans which Captain Mackeson has reported to be in readiness.

4. Being uncertain whether more troops are soon to move forward from this frontier, I shall detain ten out of twenty-four lacs of rupees arrived here this morning in progress to Ferozepore, and I shall remit these ten lacs to Peshawur, without loss of time, through the Soucars. Four lacs were sent with the brigade which crossed the Sutlej on the 4th instant, and eight lacs with Brigadier Wild's force.

5. I have apprized Major Outram of these tidings by express, and have suggested to him the great importance of applying every possible means for the maintenance and the strengthening of our positions in and above the passes on that side.

I have, &c.
GEORGE CLERK.

No. 131.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, January* 21, 1842.

WE have had under our consideration Mr. Clerk's despatch of the 12th instant, inclosing the reports which had then reached him of the melancholy events which have occurred at Cabool up to the 25th ultimo, and although, in the the uncertainty which still hangs over the fate of our troops at that place, and the subsequent progress of events in Affghanistan, and in our ignorance whether the passage of the Khyber has been effected by the force under Brigadier Wild, we are precluded from coming to any immediate decision on our future plans of operation beyond the Sikh frontier, it seems to us highly expedient that another brigade should forthwith be formed, and held in readiness to move across the Punjab; and we would wish that, if possible, this brigade shall have, as a part of it, one European regiment, a troop of horse artillery, and as large a body of cavalry as your Excellency can spare for this service; and, in order to facilitate your Excellency's disposition for providing this additional reinforcement to the troops in Affghanistan, we propose to direct the march of the troop of horse artillery at Dum Dum to the north-west provinces, and would not object to your availing yourself of the services of two squadrons of one of the dragoon regiments in the Upper Provinces; and in case of your Excellency attaching one of Her Majesty's regiments of foot to the brigade, we will authorize your Excellency, if you deem the measure expedient, to move the Honorable Company's 2nd European Regiment from Ghazepore to Meerut. The arrangement for replacing this regiment, if moved, will be hereafter considered by us.

2. We may further state, that your Excellency will be immediately authorized, in the military department, to raise a corps of light cavalry, to replace the late 2nd regiment of that branch of the service.

3. Your Excellency will probably be near to the frontier when this despatch reaches you, and we would recommend that you summon Mr. Clerk to your head-

quarters, for the convenience of immediate reference to him on the existing exigency of affairs.

4. Mr. Clerk's opinions on the disposition and probable proceedings of the Sikh Durbar are entitled to the greatest weight.

We have, &c.
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 132.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, *Fort William, February* 19, No. 16, 1842.

IN continuing the narrative of events in Affghanistan since the date of our latest dispatch on that subject of the 22nd of last month, we have to deplore the occurrence of heavy calamity to the British arms, and at the same time to lament the great obscurity which still hangs over many of the most important circumstances connected with the causes and course of the disasters which have been suffered.

2. In our despatch of the 22nd ultimo, we stated, that the last date of our intelligence, then received from Cabool, was the 25th of December, when Major Pottinger reported the murder of Sir William Macnaghten, and the continuance of negotiation for the retirement of our troops from that place.

3. From the papers now sent, your Honorable Committee will learn, that on the 28th of December Major Pottinger wrote to Captain Macgregor at Jellalabad, stating the arrangement with the leaders at Cabool to be still incomplete. That on the 29th of December, Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone wrote officially to Captain Macgregor* and Major-General Sir Robert Sale, directing them, in pursuance of stipulations made at Cabool, to retire from Jelalabad to Peshawur,—that on the 4th of January letters were received at Jellalabad from the cantonment at Cabool, announcing, that a march towards the former place was immediately intended, and that on the 6th of January the troops actually marched, devoid, as far as we learn, of all provision for food, for shelter, or for safety; and that thus exposed to the attacks of enemies in the mountain defiles, and in the worst severity of a winter season, they became, after two or three marches, dispirited and disorganized, and were, as a military body, ultimately wholly destroyed or dispersed.

4. We do not know the strength in effective men that marched from Cabool on this melancholy retreat, but the force there must have been greatly reduced by the casualties of a protracted contest; and we should believe that the retiring body could scarcely have exceeded 4000 men fit for service, and placed at much disadvantage by the loss of many officers killed or wounded.

5. The details of which we are in possession regarding this disastrous march, will be learned by your Honorable Committee, from the private letters of Captain Macgregor at Jellalabad, of the 13th January, and subsequent dates, and from a private letter from Capt. G. St. P. Lawrence, late Military Secretary to Sir William Macnaghten, to his brother, written from a fort in the Lughman country, near to Jellalabad, where he, with other British officers and some ladies, were prisoners, under the care of Mahomed Akbar Khan, the son of Dost Mahomed Khan, whose prominent participation in the struggle was stated in our dispatch of the 22nd ultimo; but your Honorable Committee will remember that these details proceeding from single parties, cannot in any degree be regarded as furnishing us with an authentic and complete narrative of events, and are not to be referred to as being of authority, beyond the testimony given to events happening under the immediate observation of the writers.

6. We learn from the letter of Captain Lawrence, that Major-General Elphinstone, who commanded the Cabool force, was also a prisoner in the same fort at Lughman; but we have no communication from Major-General Elphinstone of any kind, nor have we received any since the disturbance at Cabool first commenced.

7. In a letter from Jellalabad, of the 25th of January, Captain Macgregor refers to the receipt of two long letters from Major Pottinger, likewise a prisoner at Lughman, copies of which Captain Macgregor intended to send on to Peshawur on the next day; but these communications have not yet reached us, and we fear that the transit of letters between Jellalabad and Peshawur may have become interrupted.

8. We would point the attention of your Committee to a statement in the private letter of Captain Lawrence, which gives the first clear intimation of a division of the force at Cabool, that must most dangerously have impaired its strength. It appears, that immediately after the insurrection broke out, nearly two corps of infantry, with a troop of Horse Artillery, were thrown into the Bala Hissar, where the King resided, and which we understand to be a position that could not have been successfully assailed by an enemy unprovided with an efficient force in guns. The extensive works of the cantonments were thus left with only three regiments of infantry to guard them, and to be directed against an enemy without, and almost the only effective portion of the field artillery which was at that time at Cabool, was diverted from the service on which it could apparently have been most usefully employed.

9. We do not wish to prejudge proceedings of which we know so little, but it is at the same time right to mark such facts in the correspondence before us, as seem to be of obvious importance.

10. Your Honorable Committee will remember that the battery of Foot Artillery with horses, under the command of Captain Abbott, had left Cabool before the insurrection, and formed a portion of Sir Robert Sale's force proceeding to Jellalabad.

11. For the artillery that remained at Cabool, there were abundant supplies of ammunition of all kinds calculated for a year's use. It is to the absence of any sufficient force, in the different arms, held available for action beyond the line of our defensive works, and to the early loss of the unprotected Commissariat stores, that we must attribute, in a great measure, the ultimate triumph of the enemy.

12. The letter from Lieutenant Conolly, at Cabool, of the 17th of January, sent with Captain Macgregor's letter from Jellalabad, of the 24th January, gives the latest intelligence of the state of affairs at the capital after the departure of our troops. It will be perceived that Shah Shooja had been accepted as King by the chiefs of the insurgents generally, and that Mahomed Zemaun Khan Barukzye, a brother of Dost Mahomed Khan, who had been placed as leader of the insurrection, had resigned the name at least of the authority to which he had been raised, and been appointed to the post of Chief Minister under the Shah. There are conflicting parties of Barukzye and other Dooranee Chiefs at Cabool, and it is not probable that this compromise or union of interests, supported as it would seem to have been by an expenditure of money on the part of the Shah, can be of long continuance.

13. In a letter from Shah Shooja to Captain Macgregor, sent with a letter from the latter officer, of the 22nd January, your Honorable Committee will find a statement by the Shah with respect to his own position and views. It will be seen that he asks for pecuniary aid to enable him to maintain his authority.

14. From the 13th to the 25th of January, which is our last date from Jellalabad, no attack has been made on that post, which is stated to have been then supplied with two months' provisions for the troops, though only with one month's forage for the cattle. The spirit and fortitude with which the position at Jellalabad has been held and strengthened, for a period of two months, under circumstances of pressing difficulty and discouragement, have entitled our officers and troops there, under the command of Major-General Sir Robert Sale, and aided by the able and determined political management of Captain Macgregor, Assistant to the Cabool Mission, to our highest admiration.

15. Mahomed Akbar Khan had no strong force with him near to Jellalabad, and it is not known whether any effective means and materiel will be sent to him from Cabool; but we must regard the position of the gallant garrison of Jellalabad with very deep anxiety. It appeared to be the plan of Mahomed Akbar Khan to proceed to the Khyber defiles in order to prevent the approach of succour to Jellalabad by troops moving from Peshawur.

16. The efforts at first made by the detachment of British troops, consist-

ing of four regiments of Naive Infantry, with some details of Irregular Horse, and a Native company of Foot Artillery, using four inefficient guns, obtained from General Avitabile, at Peshawur, to advance through the Khyber Pass for the relief of Jellalabad, or to hold the pass in strength so as to cover the retirement of the Jellalabad garrison to Peshawur, have unhappily ended in failure.

The dispatches in the Political and Military Departments, connected with this subject, are sent as inclosures to this letter; and we will refer your Honorable Committee to them for all details. Two papers of remarks, by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in regard to no guns having been sent from Ferozepore, with either of the two detachments in wihch these regiments marched, are also amongst the inclosures, and will engage the particular attention of your Honorable Committee. We certainly see much reason to regret that some guns were not attached both to the second detachment of these regiments, and to the brigade which subsequently marched with Major-General Pollock; with this last brigade three 9-pounders were indeed sent, but we cannot feel confident that they will prove sufficient for the service required from them. We shall communicate a copy of this paragraph to his Excellency.

17. At the same time we think it right to add, that the instructions given by his Excellency to Brigadier Wild, commanding the four regiments of Native Infantry, in regard to the circumstances under which he was to venture into the Khyber Pass, previously to the arrival of Major-General Pollock, with the strong reinforcement accompanying him, appear to us to have been in all respects suitable and judicious. These instructions were forwarded to your Honorable Committee, with our dispatches of the 22nd ultimo.

18. Major-General Pollock, with a fresh brigade, will have reached Peshawur in the first week of this month, and we expect daily to hear from him respecting his first views and intentions.

19. Meanwhile we have to lament that the post of Ali Musjid has been for the present necessarily abandoned to the Khyberees, and that the difficulties of the garrison of Jellalabad have been much increased by the retirement of the friendly Mamund Chief Turabaz Khan, from Lalpoora, the other line of communication between Jellalabad and Peshawur, in consequence of apprehensions arising from the approach of Mohamed Akbar Khan.

20. There are circumstances represented in a letter from Captain Mackeson, of the 27th January, regarding the absence of proper precautions for taking on with the two regiments, which penetrated to Ali Musjid, the supplies of grain prepared for their support there, which will be made a subject of separate and full inquiry in the military department. Most injurious consequences may arise from the retreat, which was unavoidable, when from their supplies not having arrived with the detachment, and from the subsequent failure of the two remaining corps to force their way to Ali Musjid with a convoy, the means of subsistence at that post no longer remained.

21. Our instructions for the guidance of Major-General Pollock and Sir Robert Sale have been adapted by us from time to time to the exigencies of circumstances, as these have gradually been disclosed. We entirely approve, the answer of Sir Robert Sale and Captain Macgregor to the injunction sent to them from Cabool, for a retirement from Jellalabad, which answer was to the effect, that they must first learn what security could be given to them for the safety of that movement, for we felt that the chiefs with whom the engagements were formed at Cabool were in no condition to stipulate for a state of things, or for the protection of our troops in other parts of the country. We have regarded the proceedings generally of Major-General Elphinstone, as far as we are aware of them, with the keenest disappointment and displeasure, and we have requested the Commander-in-Chief to institute, when circumstances may admit of it, a full military inquiry into the Major-General's conduct, and desired that the authority of the Major-General over the troops serving in or near Affghanistan should wholly cease.

22. The successive instructions which we have issued for the guidance of Major-General Pollock will be found in our letters of December 15, Janury 31, and February 10th and 16th.

23. The original direction to Major-General Pollock was, that the safety of the force under Sir Robert Sale should be the prominent object of his care, and that, otherwise, the situation of the force under his command was mainly that of a strong demonstration on the Peshawur frontier; it resting in his military

discretion to determine whether he could with safety hold the advanced post of Jellalabad, in dependence on a secure command of the Khyber, and other passes, between Jellalabad and Peshawur. We should have been glad, had it appeared likely to be in Major-General Pollock's power to maintain the post of Jellalabad for some period, as giving advantages in any communication with the adverse chiefs in Affghanistan, or in any ulterior movement, or course of policy that might be thought proper by the Government here or in England. But on the 31st January, we expressly informed Major-General Pollock, that Jellalabad was not a place which we desired to retain at all hazards, and that after securing Sir Robert Sale's brigade there, and giving every practicable relief to parties from Cabool, we would wish him, rather than run extreme risks at Jellalabad, to arrange for withdrawal from it, and the assemblage of all his force at or near Peshawur.

24. Since we have heard of the misfortunes in the Khyber Pass, and have become convinced that with the difficulties at present opposed to us, and in the actual state of our preparations, we could not expect, at least in this year, to maintain a position in the Jellalabad districts for any effective purpose, we have made our directions in regard to withdrawal from Jellalabad clear and positive, and we shall rejoice to learn that Major-General Pollock will have anticipated these more express orders by confining his efforts to the same object.

25. We have attentively considered the question of remaining in force at or near Peshawur during the present year, and upon strengthening the division under Major-General Pollock, by the other complete brigade, which your Honorable Committee has before learned had been warned to march from Ferozepore, and we have given the full instructions, which will be found in our letters to the Commander-in-Chief and Mr. Clerk, of the 10th instant, upon these subjects.

26. While there may be a hope of contributing to the safety of the Jellalabad garrison, the advance of the fresh brigade will of course be most desirable and necessary, for the purpose also of supporting the division under Major-General Pollock, whether it remain for the year at Peshawur, or other place, in the Lahore territory, or be drawn back gradually to the British frontier. The advance of the brigade is likely to be of much advantage; but there are questions of much delicacy and difficulty connected with the condition of the Sikh Government, and with the temper and feeling of the most powerful of the Sikh chiefs, and of the body of the Sikh soldiery, which may make the retention of a British force for a long period at any advanced point of the Sikh dominions, far from politic and safe. We have in our instructions to Mr. Clerk dwelt upon these considerations, and given to him a large discretion in respect to the position and movement of our forces in the Punjab. We trust that your Honorable Committee will be satisfied, that upon a matter of this nature, the proper determination of which depends so entirely upon local circumstances, we have adopted the best course in giving extensive powers to Mr. Clerk, who is an officer deserving of our high confidence. We have, it will be observed, given a general discretion to Mr. Clerk to act in unforeseen emergencies, as he may think best for the national interest and honor on the general principles, which have uniformly been prescribed to him in regard to our relations with the Sikh Government, and we have intimated to him that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the Commanders of the British forces within the Punjab, will be prepared to give attention to his wishes, as far as they may feel themselves able to do so, consistently with military considerations, and with the arrangements judged necessary by his Excellency for the protection of our own provinces.

27. We have been careful in our letters to the Commander-in-Chief, to advert to all those points, which have appeared indispensable for the due support and equipment, in all respects, of a British force, while employed within the Punjab.

28. The dispatch from Mr. Clerk, of the 15th ultimo, conveyed some general observations on the condition of the Sikh Government and troops, with reference to the altered and unsettled aspect of affairs in Affghanistan, and we stated to Mr. Clerk in reply, our continued desire to give strength to the existing administration in the Punjab. We have been happy to perceive, from the tenor of different communications from Mr. Clerk, which have extended to the 8th instant, that he appears to rest with some confidence upon the stability of that Government, and the prevention of any general disorder in the country or army,

as a consequence of the more intimate intercourse, which has now been established between the Durbar and Mr. Clerk, as the agent and representative of the British Government.

29. On the 31st of January, upon receiving the intelligence of the disasters which had happened to our troops in the retreat from Cabool, we thought it proper to issue a brief notification, which we caused also to be officially communicated to the several Political Residents and Agents, expressed in very general terms with regard to the intentions of the Government; but also, in a tone of confidence and firmness, such as is suitable to the power and resources of the British Empire in India, and was calculated to allay any impressions of apprehension or mistrust, which might possibly be crated by so great a calamity as that which has now been sustained by a portion of the British Army. We are happy to state that we have no information, which could lead us to suppose that impressions of this kind have been any where diffused.

30. In our dispatch of the 22nd ultimo, we communicated the grounds upon which it appeared that Sir William Macnaghten had been murdered by Mahomed Akbar Khan. With a letter from Mr. Clerk, of 20th January, your Honorable Committee will find the translation of a letter, purporting to be from Mahomed Akbar to a chief near Jellalabad, named Meer Alfyed Khan, which, if it can be assumed as genuine, as there appeared at first to be no reason to doubt that it was, would show that Mahomed Akbar openly avowed and gloried in the horrible outrage. In the letter, however, from Mr. Clerk, of the 6th instant, and that of Captain Lawrence to his brother, which has been before referred to in this dispatch, there seem to be grounds for at least suspending an opinion upon this point. The entire uncertainty which at present attends the most important circumstances connected with the conduct and purposes of the principal actors in the scenes which have passed, and are passing at Cabool, precludes us for the present from forming any clear view, or giving any defined instructions in regard to communications with any of those parties. We can, for the moment, do little else than await and watch the development of events and factions; we hope to receive shortly the two letters from Major Pottinger, of which the arrival at Jellalabad has been announced to us. We may, however, state that it is not our intention, on such information as we yet have, to authorize any advances of money to Shah Shooja, for we could have no confidence that such advances would not be employed by the individuals who, in his name, exercise real authority at Cabool, in hostilities against ourselves.

31. We have to mention that bills upon our treasuries, drawn by Major Pottinger from Cabool, on the 28th of December, the day on which he appears to have made his final arrangement with the hostile chiefs, have been presented, some with, and others without letters of advice, to an amount of about 15 lacs of rupees. The authorities in the North-Western Provinces, after giving assurances to the shroffs who hold the bills, that their claims connected with them shall receive a full and just consideration, have referred the question of paying the bills to the Supreme Government. We have stated that such payment must be deferred until a distinct and satisfactory explanation shall be received from Major Pottinger of the circumstances under which they were drawn, and Mr. Clerk has been instructed to endeavour to obtain such explanation without delay.

32. We need not assure your Honorable Committee that the painful situation of the officers, families, and European and Native soldiers, who are prisoners in Affghanistan, engages our most anxious thought, and that any measures which we can adopt with fair and honourable prospect of advantage for their comfort or release, will be eagerly adopted by us.

33. With respect to the other posts in Affghanistan, it will be seen, that in the letter from Lieutenant Conolly of the 17th of January, it is stated that the garrison of Ghuznee still maintained possession of the citadel, though the town was in the occupation of the enemy.

34. From Kelat-i-Ghilzye we have no direct tidings, but it is believed that no disaster can have happened to that strongly fortified post.

35. The latest date of a private letter from Candahar is of the 9th of January, when Major Rawlinson reported that the Prince Sufder-Jung, a son of Shah Shooja, who had at one time been Governor of that province, and who had been dispossessed in favor of the Shahsada Timor, had fled from the city, and joined the camp of the insurgents at a place some thirty or forty miles distant.

36. Collision appeared then, to Major Rawlinson, to be unavoidable, and from letters received from Lieutenant Hammersley, the Political Assistant at Quetta, it would appear probable that some engagement had actually occurred, in which the insurgents had been defeated, but the communication between Candahar and Quetta has, for some time, been effectually closed, and we are without any authentic information of events, of which, however, we trust that you may be apprized to a later period, through Bombay.

37. Major-General Nott had under his orders, and concentrated in strength at Candahar, a force of about 8,700 men, with at least eighteen pieces of artillery. This force is believed to be well supplied, and defective only in having but a small body of trust-worthy cavalry, and very scanty means of carriage for any distant movement.

38. Your Honorable Committee is already aware that upon first hearing of the serious difficulties which threatened our troops at Cabool, we sent instructions to Major Rawlinson and General Nott at Candahar, preparing them, in the event of extreme disaster at Cabool, for the ultimate result of a withdrawal from Affghanistan, with the least possible amount of discredit: but so also, as to make the union and safety of our troops a paramount object of attention. These instructions, we know, reached Candahar towards the end of December. Upon learning the order given by Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone, for the evacuation of Jellalabad, and assuming that similar orders would also have been issued in regard to Candahar, we stated to the Commander-in-Chief, that we did not doubt that Major-General Nott would have rejected the authority of these orders, and we requested his Excellency to instruct the Major-General to act for himself, independently of such orders, upon his own distinct military responsibility.

39. We desired, also, that his Excellency would communicate to Major-General Nott, that it was of the highest importance, that he should maintain his position at Candahar, in concentrated strength, until he should receive the further instructions of the Government. This last intimation was made in the same view as that with which we have before said that we looked to the retention, if possible, of the post of Jellalabad, and it was dispatched to the Commander-in-Chief on the 28th of January.

But having on the 31st of January received information in regard to the actual state of affairs at Candahar, we addressed Major Outram, instructing him to communicate with Major-General Nott, and to arrange in concert with Brigadier England, and if the condition of the tracts under his immediate charge should admit of it, for having the disposable part of the troops under the orders of that officer moved above the Bolan Pass as early as possible, in order that if Major-General Nott should decide upon withdrawing from Candahar, the troops in question might be marched forwards to the foot of the Kojuck Pass on the Quetta side, so as to facilitate and support such withdrawal. We have since, on the 10th instant, issued the instructions to Major-General Nott, which your Honorable Committee will find in our Secretary's letter to him of that date. He has there been distinctly informed that it is our desire that he should act solely so as may best, in his judgment, secure the paramount object of the safety of his troops, and may uphold at the same time, the honor of the British arms. The Major-General will, of course, make to the utmost, every effort in order to relieve also the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye and that likewise of Ghuznee, should it be in any manner within the compass of his means to give succour to the last named post.

40. We learn that the post of Quetta has also been threatened with attack, but Major Outram writes with confidence of its strength and of the preparations made there, and we have not heard that any enemy has actually approached.

41. Tranquillity has not been interrupted in Beloochistan, or Sinde, and your Honorable Committee is separately addressed upon details connected with those countries.

42. The Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, and his family, have been placed under a strict surveillance and restraint at Saharunpore and Loodiana. On the 31st ultimo we authorized and directed Mr. Clerk, unless he should be confident that the Ameer and his family could be kept in perfectly secure custody at those places, to take measures for sending him and his male relatives to the fortress of Allahabad.

43. If this removal should be carried into effect, it will be acompanied with every reasonable indulgence, consistent with safety, and a letter has been

addressed by the Governor-General to the Ameer, to be delivered to him if necessary, in which the motives of his removal are stated to him with courtesy and kindness.

44. On our relations with Nepal and Ava, and on the question of the military and financial arrangements which it may be proper at present to adopt, your Honorable Committee have been addressed in separate letters.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 133.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Earl of Auckland.

My dear Lord, *Kurnaul, January* 10, 1842.

YOU will receive through the Secretary in the Military Department a letter (or copy) from Brigadier Wild, deeply lamenting his want of artillery; he says, "I cannot express how much I lament that no artillery of our own should have been allowed to accompany, or at least to follow me, and to find ourselves reduced to sue, perhaps in vain, for the assistance of two paltry field pieces," &c.

Your Lordship will expect to hear from me, why horse artillery, or at least some guns, did not accompany the 2nd division.

Sir Robert Sale writes to Captain Mackeson, 20th November, "We have a sufficient artillery," sixteen pieces.

Mr. Clerk writes, 29th November, that a regiment should be halted to escort artillery across the Punjab, "but the Ferozepore artillery is, I believe, incapable of moving for want of horses," adding, "and this leaves an insufficiency for the due protection of this border, during an unsettled state of parties at Lahore."

Though Captain Mackeson made no application for artillery, I called upon the Sikh Government to send, &c. &c., and I am apprized that six guns have been dispatched, &c.

On the 4th December a troop was ordered on, but Mr. Clerk, having received a copy of the Acting Adjutant-General's report, 27th November, to Government, makes his requisition for that troop of horse artillery, as I had ordered three guns to be prepared; and in reply to his letter I informed Mr. Clerk, 8th December, that I thought "the troop would be destroyed in efficiency and little valued beyond the Indus, and finally, we have not one man to spare."

The little value arose from Major-General Elphinstone writing very disparagingly both of the 5th Cavalry and Captain Nicolls' troop, which two corps your Lordship may remember, he and the Envoy proposed to return to India, but we declined to sanction it.

My disinclination to part with a troop of horse artillery arose from Mr. Clerk's own reference to the state of affairs in the Punjab, for if we have a contest there we must be strong in artillery and cavalry.

On the 11th December Mr. Clerk requires drag-ropes for six 9-pounders (the borrowed pieces) to be sent to Peshawur with small stores, doubting the efficiency of their equipment.

Mr. Clerk, 13th December, says, "I have little doubt that General Avitabile will, if they are required, be enabled to provide a few pieces of artillery to accompany Colonel Wild's brigade from Peshawur."

This day I am informed by Mr. Clerk's dispatch of the 8th instant, that Rajah Golab Sing's sanction had arrived (2nd instant) to four guns being given.

All would be well, as Captain Lawrence is on the spot to select good ones, and put their equipment in order, if the Sikh army had any subordination or the smallest good will to us; but I am afraid they are lamentably deficient in both. As to their actual co-operation, I have not the smallest dependance upon it.

From this undisguised dislike to us, I am exceedingly glad that I did not send another troop of horse artillery beyond the Indus. Sir Robert Sale is perfectly safe till Major-General Pollock arrives, and then there will be nearly 8,000 men of all arms to force the pass, if Brigadier Wild does not think it justifiable to proceed.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 134.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Kurnaul, January* 13, 1842.

WITH reference to the deplorable intelligence conveyed to your Lordship in Council in Mr. Clerk's express of yesterday, announcing the assassination of Sir William Macnaghten, I have the honor to report that I have this day ordered Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, and 16th Lancers, Major-Crawford's troop of Horse Artillery, and the 9th Light Cavalry, to entertain their field establishments.

2. It is not my intention to move forward any of these corps at present, unless Mr. Clerk considers it to be politically expedient, or important; they should, however, be kept in readiness for any call, and so many regiments have been equipped here and at Meerut, that camels and followers are becoming less abundant than usual.

3. As already reported, I have directed the corps recently moved in this quarter to retain their field establishments.

4. I have ordered Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell to join my camp by dawk, in order to have a cavalry officer of rank at hand in case of my being compelled to assemble a force in this quarter, a precaution which I trust your Lordship will approve.

5. At Mr. Clerk's request 100 men of the Buffs, and 4 officers, proceed to Saharunpore to-morrow morning, to secure Dost Mahomed Khan and his followers as close prisoners. To this detachment I have added a rissalah of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 135.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, January* 27, 1842.

IN reply to your letter of the 13th instant, we have to express our approval of the measures therein reported by your Excellency, and with respect to the additional precautions which it has been found expedient to adopt for the security of Dost Mahomed Khan, and his family and attendants. We annex the copy of a letter which we have this day directed to be written to Mr. Clerk.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 136.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Fort William, January* 26, 1842.

YOUR dispatch of the 15th instant has been laid before the Governor-General in Council, and I am directed to inform you that his Lordship in Council entirely approves the measures which you have adopted, and intend to adopt, for a more intimate intercourse with the existing Government of Lahore, and for giving support generally to the Sikh authority within the territories subject to that state. The policy upon which these measures are founded is that upon which his Lordship in Council would wish you steadily to act, and which has, indeed, already been expressly prescribed to you by the instructions contained in the 6th paragraph of my letter to your address of the 3rd ultimo.

2. In respect to the military position to be held by us, under existing circumstances, towards Peshawur, and on our north-western frontier, I am desired to forward, for your information, the copy of a dispatch this day addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 137.

The Governor-General in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, January* 26, 1842.

YOUR Excellency will probably have received from Mr. Clerk a copy of his dispatch of the 15th instant, No. 6, but that it may be certainly in your Excellency's possession, we herewith append a copy of it, and of the reply which we have caused to be sent to it, of this day's date.

2. Your Excellency will be aware, from our former communications, that we have been very sensible of the necessity of giving strength, in the existing crisis, to the Sikh administration generally, and particularly as regards the support of its authority on the Peshawur frontier, by the assemblage of a strong British force in that direction. With this view we have sanctioned the advance of the efficient division, of at least 7000 men, under Major-General Pollock; and, in continuation of our dispatch of the 21st instant, we would now further request your Excellency to be prepared for a direction for immediately expediting the march of the third complete brigade, referred to in that dispatch, as a reinforcement to the troops of General Pollock's division.

3. We believe that, after the march of this third brigade, there will remain a force of at least 15,000 men available for concentration in the north-western provinces, with a view to the maintenance of the internal tranquillity of our own territory; and we consider this force, supported by the troops assigned to the several cantonments, to be undoubtedly adequate to its purpose; although we do not think that it would be prudent in any greater degree to weaken the military strength which will remain at your Excellency's immediate disposal.

4. Your Excellency will of course issue to Major-General Pollock such instructions and advice as you may deem to be called for, for the object of giving to the large force which will be under his command the most effective and advantageous direction. We need only observe, that the primary importance of keeping our men together in masses, in the most favourable positions, ought never to be lost sight of.

5. We anticipate that the Sikh Government will cordially concur in measures which will add in the greatest degree to the stability of their dominion in their western territories; but your Excellency will of course take all your measures, in the execution of the policy now prescribed, in communication with Mr. Clerk.

6. Your Excellency has been informed of the several measures which we have thought to be in the first instance expedient for increasing the military means available in Upper India.

7. We have now also to state to your Excellency that we have strongly recommended to the Home Authorities that (three regiments of Her Majesty's Foót, on the Indian Establishment, being engaged with the China Expedition) the same number of corps should be sent to this country from Europe; two of these corps being supplied to Bengal, and the other to the Bombay Presidency,—the military means of the Bombay Government having been diminished to a greater degree than it would be expedient to admit for a length of time.

8. If other arrangements of military reinforcement should occur to us as being desirable, we shall duly address your Excellency in regard to them. In the meantime we would remark, that if your Excellency should think it of advantage to raise three more corps of recruits, at the stations of Meerut, Kurnaul, and Agra, similar to that which has been raised by Captain Taylor for the Shah's service, and has now been fixed at Cawnpore, we would request you at once to give effect to that opinion. These corps, each commanded by three officers to be selected by your Excellency, might within a few months be rendered quite efficient for station purposes and the support of internal order, and they would set free regular corps for more general service. We would invite, also, the opinion of your Excellency upon the expediency of raising the complement of the three Goorkha corps, and the Hurriana local battalion, to the present full complement of the regular regiments of Infantry.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 138.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, January* 28, 1842.

WE have received an express dispatch from Mr. Clerk of the 18th instant, with copies of the letter of Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone, to the address of Captain Macgregor of the 29th of December, and of the reply of that officer, and of Major-General Sale, of the 9th instant.

2. We request that your Excellency will instruct Major-General Pollock to inform Major-General Sale and Captain Macgregor that we highly approve the judgment and spirit shewn in their reply to the directions conveyed to them from Cabool; and it is our anxious hope that the fort of Jellalabad may have been maintained until it could be effectively succoured by the forces proceeding from India. We do not doubt that Major-General Nott will have rejected the authority of any directions which may have been sent to him by Major-General Elphinstone of a like tenor to those sent to Jellalabad; and we would request your Excellency expressly to instruct him to act for himself, independently of such directions, upon his own distinct military responsibility. Your Excellency will communicate to Major-General Nott that it is of the highest importance that he should maintain his position at Candahar, in concentrated strength, until he shall receive the further orders of the Government.

3. We have not received, since the commencement of the insurrection at Cabool, any dispatch, either in the political or military department, from the British authorities at that place, and on our present information we are disposed to view the conduct of Major-General Elphinstone, in command of the force there, with the most severe displeasure and indignation. Your Excellency will, of course, cause a full military inquiry to be made into all the circumstances connected with the direction and conduct of our troops at Cabool, at the earliest period at which such an inquiry may be practicable. In the mean time we think it right to direct that Major-General Elphinstone shall not retain the command of the troops to the west of the Indus, but that the command of the force at and beyond Peshawur shall remain with Major-General Pollock. It is our direction also that the local command at Jellalabad should be vested in Major-General Sale, subject only to the direction of Major-General Pollock, and that the authority of Major-General Elphinstone should at once wholly cease.

4. We have to desire your Excellency to consider the resolution to send on another complete brigade as a reinforcement to the Peshawur frontier as definitively adopted, and to request that you will hasten all the arrangements for the march of that brigade, with such amount of treasure and equipments as may be indispensable to the maintenance and comfort of the troops in that quarter. Your Excellency will give the orders which you may think the most suitable, in respect to the return to India of any portion of the force which has served for the longest period in Affghanistan.

5. We shall communicate to your Excellency without an instant's delay, the views which we may be led to form, when more complete information of the melancholy events which have happened in Affghanistan and of the actual condition of affairs shall be before us.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 139.

Notification by the Government of India.

Fort William, January 31, 1842.

INTELLIGENCE having been received which leaves no room to doubt that, after the British force, at Cabool, had maintained its position against overpowering numbers of insurgents for more than six weeks, the officer commanding had judged it necessary, in consequence of a failure of provisions, to agree to a convention of the enemy, and to retire, in reliance on the faith of that convention, towards Jellalabad, when the troops, exposed to the worst rigours of cold and privation in the mountain defiles, and harassed by treacherous attacks, suffered extreme disaster,—the Governor-General in Council deems it proper to notify, that the most active measures have been adopted, and will be stedfastly prosecuted, for expediting powerful reinforcements to the Affghan frontier, and for assisting such operations as may be required in that quarter for the maintenance of the honor and interests of the British Government.

The ample military means at the disposal of the British Government will be strenuously applied to these objects, so as at once to support external operations, and to ensure efficient protection to its subjects and allies.

A faithless enemy, stained by the foul crime of assassination, has, through a failure of supplies, followed by consummate treachery, been able to overcome a body of British troops, in a country removed, by distance and difficulties of season, from the possibility of succour. But the Governor-General in Council, while he most deeply laments the loss of the brave officers and men, regards this partial reverse, only as a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigor of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valor of the British Indian army.

By order of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 140.

Mr. Maddock to Major Outram.

Sir, *Fort William, January* 31, 1842.

IN consequence of demi-official information received from you, under date the 14th instant, respecting the condition of things in the Candahar province, I am desired by the Governor-General in Council to request that you will, in communication with Brigadier England, and, if the condition of the tracts under your immediate charge will admit of it, arrange for having the disposable part of the troops under the orders of that officer moved above the Bolan Pass as early as practicable, in order that, in communication with Major-

General Nott, if that officer should decide on withdrawing from Candahar, the troops in question may be marched forward to the foot of the Kojuck Pass on the Quetta side, so as to support and facilitate General Nott's movement.

2. You will send intimation to Major-General Nott of your receipt of this letter, and of the arrangements that may be made in consequence of it, so as to insure every possible certainty that the intimation will reach him.

3. All troops falling back to Quetta can, it is believed, be maintained at that place and Mustoong; and it is desired that they should be posted at these places, or other convenient points near, until the return of the favorable season for descending to the plains, or the receipt of further orders. But the exact positions of the troops on this side of the Kojuck Pass, must be determined by the General Officer commanding, according to practicability of supply, and other local considerations.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 141.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, January* 31, 1842.

WE received yesterday Mr. Clerk's dispatch of the 22nd instant, with the afflicting report, brought by Dr. Brydon, of the march of the British force from Cabool towards Jellalabad, and of its fatal consequences.

2. We have only at this moment, in addition to our former communications, to refer your Excellency to the notifications in the Secret and Military Departments, copies of which will be forwarded to you with this dispatch, and to state to you the following opinion, in conformity with which we would desire that Major-General Pollock should be instructed by your Excellency.

3. Major-General Pollock will have under his command, upon reaching Peshawur, a force of about 7,500 men, in addition to the brigade, under Sir Robert Sale, which, independently of Affghan auxiliaries, may amount to a further force of about 2000—and the brigade of which the advance has been directed, by our later dispatches, to proceed to Peshawur, but which cannot be expected to arrive there before the 16th or 28th of March, will add, at least, 3,000 more troops to General Pollock's force, thus raising it to an army of above 12,000 men.

4. This force, when assembled in concentrated strength and with due equipments and provisions, will be adequate to subdue all opposition to the movements which it may be directed to undertake, but we would wish your Excellency particularly to enjoin Major-General Pollock to be careful that the force is weakened as little as possible by separation and detachments.

5. Major-General Pollock will have a specially delicate decision to form, when he is in advance before the arrival of the last brigade; beyond which brigade he should be made aware that he cannot look for additional reinforcements during this season.

6. In the instructions of the 15th ultimo, it was stated that the object of the division, as at first moved forward under Major-General Pollock's command, was mainly that of demonstration and strength on the Peshawur frontier, and that it would rest in his military discretion to determine whether he could with safety hold Jellalabad, in advance, in dependence on a secure command of the Khyber and other passes between Jellalabad and Peshawur.

7. If Major-General Pollock, arriving with only General Mc Caskill's brigade, can safely maintain the position of Jellalabad, with due regard to the security of the communications through the Khyber Pass, he will, until otherwise ordered, continue to do so—and it will be highly desirable that he should find an opportunity of asserting our military superiority in the open country in the Jellalabad neighbourhood. But Jellalabad is not a place which the Governor-General in Council desires to be kept at all hazards, and after succour shall have been given to Sir R. Sale's brigade there, and relief shall have been

giver [illegible] parti arriving from Cabool, the Governor-General in Council would wish Major-General Pollock, rather than run extreme risks in that position, to arrange [illegible] trawal from it, and the assemblage of all his force at or near Peshawur.

8. When [illegible]ntually the last brigade may reach Peshawur, Major-General Pollock will [illegible] have received further directions for his conduct, but, in the mean while, [illegible]her the bulk of his troops be at Jellalabad, or elsewhere, he will attend [illegible] to the direction given to him of holding them, to the utmost practicable [illegible], assembled together, and in the most favorable positions, not, of course, [illegible] from such detached or advanced operations near or beyond Jellalabad, [illegible] state of the country may render obviously expedient and advantageous.

9. Your Excellency will, of course, cause an abundant depôt of ammunition and [illegible] necessary equipments to be formed at Peshawur, and Major-General Pollock will understand that he is authorized to incur such reasonable expense as [illegible] may think necessary for sheltering the men of his force, and particularly the European portion of them, as the season advances. Wherever they may [illegible], the British troops should be kept distinct from other forces, or any [illegible] of collision with the subjects of a friendly power, in the most convenient and healthy site procurable—but upon this last point your Excellency will be fully addressed hereafter, as events may appear to require.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 142.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to Major-General Elphinstone.

Sir,

January 21, 1842.

[illegible] of the 29th ultimo, written jointly by yourself and Major Pottinger, Captain M'Gregor, leaves me no reason to doubt that you have long [illegible] Jellalabad, and are contemplating a further retreat to India, if [illegible] should have been forced upon you, as is too probable, by the [illegible].

[illegible]-General Sir R. Sale is very strongly inclined to think that he and his force [illegible] be bound by your Cabool agreement; of this, however, when you [illegible] Jellalabad he will have no power or right to judge, far less to act [illegible].

[illegible] communication with Cabool has been so full of hazard, I have not [illegible] to write to you on such a subject in terms which might have influenced your [illegible], but it is proper that I should make known to you the views of the [illegible]ernor-General in Council, in anticipation of events, which have now [illegible].

[illegible] intention and wishes therein expressed have never been altered or [illegible], and you will therefore be pleased to consider it your duty to conform to [illegible].

[illegible] addition to camp equipage in store, for parts of your force, at Peshawur, I [illegible] that tents for 1,000 European and 2,000 native infantry or [illegible] may be despatched to that place to meet you.

[illegible] officers may probably ask for a few tents; if so, receipts must be [illegible] taken.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 143.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

Camp, two marches north of Jarnaul,
January 22, 1842.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honor to lay before your Lordship in Coun a copy of a letter addressed by me yesterday to Major-General Elphinstone, the retreat of the Cabool force upon Jellalabad can be no longer doubtful.

2. After that force has been refreshed at the latter station b few days' halt, I should hope that, collected, the two brigades will be able t force their way to the entrance of the Khyber, near Dacca; where, if not befo Brigadier Wild's helping hand will be held out to them.

3. At a late hour yesterday, an express from that officer, of the h instant, announced his intention of detaching two native regiments to the ef of Ali Musjid that night, and to follow with the other two corps, wit supplies. A copy of the Brigadier's dispatch I have the honor to inclose for th information of your Lordship in Council.

4. At the same time I received a dispatch from Mr. Clerk, t mitting Mr. Reid's, of 15th January, to Mr. Clerk; Captain Lawrence's of 15th January, to Mr. Clerk, with intelligence from Cabool to the 4t instant; contents of a letter, Mahomed Akbar Khan to Meer Afzul Khan Captain Mackeson, 14th January, to Mr. Clerk; Captain Mackeson, 12th J ary, to Mr. Clerk.

5. I have felt it necessary to reply immediately to that part of Mr Clerk's letter, and Captain Mackeson's, of the 14th, in which they ask for reinf ments of artillery and native infantry. These I have declined to send, for the owing reasons, which I trust will be approved.

The force in Affghanistan, and proceeding thither, stands thus :—

	Guns.	Artillery & Sappers.	Cavalry.	European Inf.	Native Inf.
With General Elphinstone	6	144	464	531	2770
With Sir R. Sale	15	559	279	777	1119
With Brigadier Wild	4	247	101	0	3979
With General Pollock ..	3	176	693	887	191
	28	1126	1537	2195	059

Total of all ranks, 13,008, (and 5 guns, with their ammunition, with or-General Pollock's Division from Delhi Magazine,) when 909 men have en deducted from the Cabool force to cover casualties, and sick and wounde en left behind.

These numbers ought, I think, to be able to extricate themselves, af he most critical movement, that from Cabool to Jellalabad, has been effected.

6. Were native infantry now ordered from Ferozepore, they might ss the river on the 29th, and be at Peshawur on the 5th of March, moving wit a halt.

7. If Major-General Elphinstone left Cabool on the 5th of January, he probably, at Jellalabad on the 15th, and united with Sir R. Sale; after h there eight or ten days, they could force their way to the Khyber, if not th the Pass, by the 1st of February.

8. Brigadier Wild was to enter the Khyber, with two corps, on the of the 15th, and to be followed by the other two soon after.

9. Major-General Pollock was at Shabul on the 15th instant, an wi at Peshawur, without halting, on the 10th of February.

10. Under these circumstances I do not think that any force, now se ward, could be of any use in supporting our troops during their retreat. It most unlooked-for, and probably most disastrous, if our corps should n effected their passage through the Khyber before the 5th of March Clerk has never hinted that the Sikh troops would venture to molest us a circumstance does not, therefore, enter into my calculation.,

I have, &c.

J. NICC

No. 144.

General Sr Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

Camp, two marches north of Kurnaul,
January 23, 1842.

My Lord,

I HAVE he honor to inform your Lordship in Council that Mr. Clerk arrived here (Thanesur) yesterday evening.

We have had a long conversation upon the affairs of Affghanistan, including the statement of Assistant-Surgeon Brydon; and Mr. Clerk has, by various and repeated arguments, endeavored to convince me of the necessity for detaching another reinforcement to Peshawur, in order to support Jellalabad.

My instructions and my opinion (expressed in my letter of yesterday) being widely different, I have demurred giving my consent to the proposal; but as your Lordship was not aware, on the date of your last orders of 6th of January, of the murder of Sir William Macnaghten, and the probable fate of our troops, I have ordered the 6th and 55th Regiments of Native Infantry from Kurnaul to Ferozepore, which will enable me to detach two corps to Peshawur, should your Lordship in Council's views and orders have been altered or modified by that event, and your resolution be made known to me.

Being fully aware of the confidence enjoyed by Mr. Clerk, I have taken this preparatory step; but, when he advised the addition of some portion of Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, I felt myself unable to give him any hope of such a recommendation being attended to.

We may expect your Lordship's orders, upon the reports contained in dispatches of the 12th instant, on the 2nd or 3rd of February, that is, before these regiments can reach Ferozepore.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 145.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Fort William, February 2, 1842.

Sir,

WE have received your Excellency's letter of the 23rd of January, and have to request your Excellency, in reply, to our dispatches of the 20th, 26th, 28th, and 31st idem, by the instructions in which we would request you strictly to be guided.

2. We regard it as absolutely essential to the maintenance of our interests at this crisis, that a commanding force, of all arms, should be concentrated at or near Peshawur, in order to curb the violence of excitement which may be expected in that quarter, and to protect the Sikh territory from aggression.

3. It is particularly important that this force should be effective in cavalry and light artillery, and we are disposed strongly to adhere to our recommendation that two squadrons of European Dragoons should be employed on the service.

4. We have taken measures for summoning up Her Majesty's 50th Regiment to this Presidency from Moulmein, unless imperative reasons of defence should require its detention at that place. And we contemplate additional measures for the increase of our military strength, of which your Excellency will be separately informed.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 146.

Resolution by the Governor-General of India in Council.

[illegible] 1842.

THE Right Honorable the Governor-General in C[illegible] olved that it is expedient to add a tenth company to ever[illegible] Native Infantry of the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.

Ordered, that a communication to this effect be ma[illegible] nments of Madras and Bombay, and that a copy of this res[illegible] to the military departments of the Government of India for the [illegible] of necessary orders to give effect thereto in this Presidency.

No. 147.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

Camp, three mar[illegible] from Cabool,
January 1842.

My Lord,

I HAD yesterday the honor to report that, at Mr [illegible]'s earnest request, I had ordered two more native regiments from Kur[illegible] pore, to give further support to our troops at Jellalabad.

After I had dispatched my letter to your Lordship [illegible] received the note, of which I transmit a copy herewith, from t[illegible] -General, and I had a second discussion with Mr. Clerk on the su[illegible] ng our ground at Jellalabad against any Affghan power or forc[illegible] retrieving our position at Cabool, by advancing upon it, at the [illegible] simultaneously, from Candahar and Jellalabad. Having thus regai[illegible] n, and the influence which such proof of power must give, not on[illegible] istan, but amongst all the neighbouring States, we should th[illegible] with dignity, and undiminished honor.

Admitting the undeniable force of this argument, I [illegible] clined to doubt that we have, at present, either army, or fund[illegible] renew this contest. Money may, perhaps, be obtainable, but s[illegible], without leaving India bare.

Shortly before I left Calcutta, there were, at least [illegible] in our pay in Affghanistan and Sinde, including Shah Shooja's troop[illegible] nt the rabble attached to his person.

How insufficient that number has been to awe the ba[illegible] rous, at first disunited, tribes of Affghanistan and Sinde, our numerous [illegible] late reverses, and our heavy losses fully prove. I admit that a blind[illegible] ce in persons around the late Envoy,—a total want of forethought a[illegible] t on his part,—unaccountable indecision, at first, followed by cessio[illegible] day by day, rendered our force more helpless,—inactivity, perhaps o[illegible] occasions,—have led to these reverses, but we must not overlook [illegible] ts of climate, the difficulty of communication, the distance from our [illegible], and the fanatical zeal of our opponents.

No doubt your Lordship can cause our army to fore[illegible] way to Cabool, if you think our name and predominance in Indi[illegible] otherwise be supported; but our means are utterly insufficient to [illegible] dominion over that country. If this be granted, the questions for [illegible]'s decision are, whether we shall retake Cabool, to assert [illegible] power; and whether, if we subsequently retire, our subjects [illegible] will not attribute our withdrawal, even then, to conscious [illegible] hold the country.

Reading your Lordship's instructions literally, [illegible] of 3rd December and 6th January, I have not countenanced a[illegible] n for a renewal of the contest. I thought the return of our t[illegible] ments of cavalry and infantry, a troop and four companies of artille[illegible] ne irregular cavalry, together with the vast reduction of expen[illegible] would

[illegible] follow the return of this large army, would place the Government [illegible] position of strength that it might summarily chastise any neighbouring [illegible] even two, who might dare to act upon a mistaken view of our [illegible]

[illegible] opinions are of no great value, but encouraged and supported as I have [illegible] your Lordship in Council, I think the time is come at which I should express them at some length.

Having done so, I beg to report to your Lordship in Council, that I have ordered [illegible] Majesty's 3rd Dragoons to move to Ferozepore, at which point they will [illegible] have arrived when I may hope to be honored by your Lordship's [illegible] as to their advance.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

P.S.—I have just received your Lordship's letter in Council of the 10th

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No. 148.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.

Fort William, February 10, 1842.

ENCLOSED are extracts from a letter to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the 28th ult., and copy of a letter to Major Outram, of the 31st ult., in reference to the intimation of the instructions of the Governor-General in Council for your guidance, conveyed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief, of the 3rd December last, in anticipation of the event, which has unhappily occurred, of the military possession of Cabool and the surrounding territory having, for the present, been entirely lost by the British authorities and troops. Intelligence of the receipt at Candahar, towards the end of December, of these paragraphs of the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd of that month, has reached the Government through a demi-official letter from Major Rawlinson.

The Governor-General in Council feels that events will, in every probability, have determined your course of proceeding long before the present letter, or any communication founded upon the letters of the 28th and 31st ult., can be in your possession. But he thinks it now right not to omit the chance of hereby informing you that it is his desire that you should, without reference to the contents of the extract of the despatch of the 28th ult., act solely so as may seem best, in your judgment, secure the paramount object of the safety of the troops placed under your orders, and may uphold, at the same time, the honour of the British arms.

Should you, with that object, resolve upon falling back from Candahar towards Quetta, you will, to the utmost, make every effort that may be in your power in order also to relieve and bring off with you the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghilzee, and that likewise of Ghuznee, if it should be within the compass of your means to give any succour to that post; and you will be aware that boldness, and celerity in attacking any enemy, will be the best means of obviating danger to retiring troops.

Brigadier England and Major Outram will apprize you of the means of co-operation with you which they may be able to arrange, under the orders of the latter, upon the Quetta side of the Kojuck Pass.

This letter will be sent through Major Outram, who will be desired to use [illegible] possible means to ensure its reaching you.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 149.

Mr. Maddock to General Sir Jasper Nicolls

Sir, *Fort William, Febru*ry 10, 1842.

I AM directed by the Governor-General in Council to tran[illegible]it, for your Excellency's information, the inclosed copy of instructions this da[illegible]addressed to Major-General Nott.

I have, &c.,
T. H. [illegible]ADDOCK.

No. 150.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper [illegible]icolls.

Sir, *Fort William, Februa*[illegible]10, 1842.

THE intelligence received since the transmission to you of our [illegible]spatch of the 31st ultimo, has convinced us that, excepting under some very [illegible]nforeseen change, no sufficient advantage would be derived from an attempt to [illegible]tain possession of Jellalabad for any prolonged period during the present seas[illegible].

2. The fate of the gallant garrison at that place will probably [illegible]ve been determined before the intimation of our opinion to the above effect [illegible]n reach Major-General Pollock. But we would request your Excellency w[illegible]t delay to inform the Major-General, that the main inducement for the ma[illegible]ance of a post at Jellalabad, namely, that of being a point of support to [illegible]y of our troops escaping from Cabool, having now, it must be feared, unhap[illegible]y passed away, it is the object of the Government that he should, unless any [illegible]foreseen contingency should give a decidedly favourable turn to affairs, confine [illegible]imself to measures for withdrawing the Jellalabad garrison in safety to Pesh[illegible]ur, and there, for the present, holding together all the troops under his o[illegible]s, in a secure position, removed from collision with the Sikh forces or subject o[illegible].

3. Your Excellency has been made aware privately, that, in conse[illegible]nce of the circumstances which had occurred at Peshawur, we had been led [illegible]. [illegible]le to hesitate on the march to that place of the further complete brig[illegible]h from Ferozepore, the movement of which was directed by our dispatch of [illegible]28th ultimo.

4. We have now, upon mature deliberation, resolved that the b[illegible]ctle in question shall be moved onward, in any of the three following cases:— [illegible]e t[illegible].

First—If there should appear to your Excellency any rational g[illegible]in[illegible] of hope whatever, that this brigade can be of use towards extricating Si[illegible]d [illegible]bert Sale's garrison from Jellalabad. [illegible]sh[illegible].

Second—If your Excellency should be aware that the troops unde[illegible]3. [illegible]or-General Pollock's orders have suffered in action, or if the tenor of h[illegible]rd re-spondence with your Excellency shall have shown the advantage of h[illegible]er, [illegible]ng joined by the brigade, with a view to the due support and efficiency of th[illegible]zie[illegible]ce, already at Peshawur, regarded merely as an advanced British divisi[illegible]ns a distant frontier, where it is important that such a division should be of i[illegible]ar[illegible]ng strength, whether for the purpose of remaining in the locality, or [illegible]ger[illegible]ng from it. [illegible]4[illegible].

Third—If Mr. Clerk should apply for the march of the brigade, or [illegible]ppe[illegible]y part of it, under the instructions of which a copy accompanies this d[illegible]31h, with regard to the maintenance and promotion of our interests in connex[illegible]ith the Sikh Government and territory. [illegible]re[illegible].

5. We would particularly request your Excellency to appoint an o[illegible] of character and efficiency to the command of the brigade; and we beg [illegible]the remaining half of the battery of guns, of which one half only was sent [illegible]ith Major-General Pollock, may be attached to the brigade, in addition to t[illegible]p of horse artillery already ordered. Experience has shown the extreme[illegible]t-ance of giving an efficient artillery, and an ample supply of ammuniti[illegible]ll arms and of general equipments, to every force ordered on such a servic[illegible].

6. We are not unmindful of arrangements for the greater efficiency of the artillery in the Upper Provinces, and may have occasion again to address your Excellency separately on that subject.

7. An experienced engineer officer, with a supply of field intrenching tools, should also accompany the brigade, or rapidly follow it—a detachment of sappers and miners being already in advance; and a qualified officer of the commissariat department ought also to be attached to Major-General Pollock's division.

8. Your Excellency will give the necessary intimation, in furtherance of this dispatch and of the instructions to Mr. Clerk, to Major-General Pollock; and will desire the Major-General and the officer commanding the new brigade, if advanced, to conform, as far as they may think consistent with military considerations of safety, to Mr. Clerk's wishes in respect to their movements.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 151.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Fort William, February* 10, 1842.

I AM directed to forward to you the annexed copy of a dispatch to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and to state that, as the Government now looks to a withdrawal from Jellalabad; and as the resolution has been formed, unless events take some unexpected turn, which would obviously require or encourage a forward move, not to attempt the prosecution of operations in advance of the Khyber Pass, during the present season, the Governor-General in Council would wish you to announce that resolution frankly to the Lahore Durbar, and to invite it to enter on an immediate consideration of the arrangements by which it may best provide for the security of its western territories.

2. As regards many considerations affecting the interests of the British Government, it would be highly desirable that, when Jellalabad shall no longer be held by us, our detachments, which have been moved forward in support to meet the present emergency, should be brought gradually back to their cantonment, in order that any ulterior operations that may be determined upon for another advance beyond the Indus, by whatever route (and that towards the Khyber and Jellalabad is probably not the one to which preference would be given), may be undertaken after full preparation, with a complete equipment, and a fresh and well-organized strength.

3. The Governor-General in Council had, however, intended that, as a support to the Sikh authority on its western frontier during the excitement which must be regarded as impending, an imposing British force should be kept at and near Peshawur for this year.

4. Such an arrangement would have entailed great sacrifices on the British Government, and have involved much hazard to the health and well-being of its troops, but the Governor-General in Council was prepared to make a very considerable exertion in aid of the tranquillity and safety of this part of the Sikh dominions.

5. The course of events at Peshawur has, however, appeared to show that the Sikh authorities there are either not disposed, or have it not in their power, to render any effective and cordial co-operation to a British force. And it is impossible that the British Government can allow its troops to be compromised by being retained in a distant position such as Peshawur, separated by several large and difficult rivers, and by a territory liable to confusion, from its support and resources; and in a country which it does not control and govern; where serious troubles may arise, and where the good-will and steadiness of the forces and Sikh Durbar (however that Durbar may be, in itself, well disposed) are not to be depended upon.

6. It will be proper, therefore, that the Sikh Durbar should make its own arrangements for the protection of its country. And his Lordship in Council

would recommend that Rajah Golab Sing should be allowed to assume the government and direction of affairs at Peshawur, by the aid of his own force, or in any other manner which the Durbar may think most expedient and effective.

7. It is even not improbable that the Durbar and the Rajahs may prefer such a course of proceeding to one which might lead to jealousies and dissensions between the British and Sikh troops, placed or acting near each other, and which might involve the Durbar, through unfortunate and uncontrollable accidents, in a serious responsibility to the British Government. The measures of the Sikh authorities for the preservation of their power at Peshawur might also be such as that the British Government, while it could not prevent, could not desire even to seem to sanction or permit them.

8. If, when you receive these instructions, you shall be aware that the Sikh troops now at Peshawur have really, notwithstanding their first inertness or mutinous desertion, afforded hearty and effective aid to the British force; or in case of direct overtures from the Durbar for the maintenance of our position on that frontier, the tone of your observations will, of course, be modified. But you will still say that the collection of British troops in strength on the Sutlej, and a cordial understanding from that point with the Sikh administration at Lahore, are thought to be the most simple and sure means by which the alliance between the British and Sikh Governments can be made advantageous to both parties. And this concentration of troops will obviously be the best mode by which to obtain a ready reserve for the support of our interests, if required, along the lower line of the Indus.

9. Our being in strength, in advance between Lahore and the Affghan frontier, might doubtless be a very important aid to the continuance of tranquillity at the capital; but, on the other hand, the presence of a large British detachment resting inactively in the centre of the Sikh dominions might give rise to extreme distrust, whilst a division of our forces, and the possible interruption of communication, might greatly weaken our means of acting with vigour and effect for the common interests of the two Governments, in the event of any general commotion.

10. Placing a high confidence in your discretion and ability, and in your intimate knowledge of the condition of affairs and parties within the Sikh State, the Governor-General in Council would wish you, bearing the considerations which have been stated carefully in mind, to regulate, as you think best, without any further delays of reference, which would at this season be highly inexpedient, the time and manner of recalling the troops leisurely from Peshawur, and empowers you, if you think it desirable, to call for the advance (independently of the two first cases or contingencies referred to in the letter to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief) of the brigade under orders at Ferozepore, with the artillery now directed, for the purpose of a temporary approach to, or junction with, the troops already at Peshawur, so as to give support to those troops, to facilitate their march homewards (if such a measure should finally be decided upon), to ensure the more certain maintenance of order along their route in the Punjab, and to promote, generally, as far as practicable by this means, the common interests of the two States.

11. The political effect of an immediate forward movement, though only for a temporary object, would probably be beneficial.

12. The extreme disadvantage of any hazardous exposure of single detachments of our troops will be most carefully regarded by you.

13. All questions of a merely military nature, with regard to the convenience and safety of the troops, will, of course, be determined exclusively by the orders of Major-General Pollock, with whom you will be in constant and free communication.

14. You will remember that the earlier the date at which our troops can be brought back to their cantonments, if to return to the left bank of the Sutlej, the more desirable it will be for the preservation of their health and efficiency. It is not necessary to impress on you the most anxious attention to the health of the troops, whose movements are thus confided to your judgment.

15. You will communicate to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the date of any probable return of troops to the provinces, that his Excellency may direct the necessary arrangements for their reception.

16. If, at the same time, it should be your deliberate opinion that important and vital interests of the British Government in India, and the well-being

the British and Sikh States, urgently require that the measure of withdrawing our troops from Peshawur, or at least further eastward than some point on the left bank of the Indus, or a few marches from it, as at Rawil Pindee, should be suspended, his Lordship in Council authorizes you to postpone such withdrawal pending a report to Government, in which you will explain fully the grounds of that opinion, and the manner in which you think it possible that the political and military difficulties of national feeling, aversion, and disorganization of the Sikh troops, excited and uncertain temper of the population, isolated and remote position, and the hazard of disorders at the capital, and in the whole line of communication between the position of the force and the Sutlej, can, without the most serious imprudence, be encountered. You will, in that case, obtain also, and submit, a full report from Major-General Pollock of his sentiments on this question; and the final orders of the Government, in reply, may be in your possession about the 1st of April next. You will also immediately communicate these reports to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that his Excellency may state his views on them to the Government.

17. You will bear in mind the inexpediency of accustoming the Durbar to lean upon our presence at or near Peshawur, as a means of propping up its power, and saving its own means and exertions in that quarter.

18. You have been authorized to establish the most friendly understanding with the existing Sikh Government. Should it at any time desire to arrange any new and definite terms for its own support, through a remodelling of its relations with the British Government, you will readily receive and report such overtures, avoiding, until further instructions, any express promises or stipulations. The Governor-General in Council does not wish to be forward in altering, in any manner, the independent character of the Sikh Administration.

19. Emergencies may arise in regard to the affairs of the Sikh State, and to the position of the British troops moving within its territory, which it is impossible to foresee and to provide for by previous instruction. In such emergencies, if it should be clear to you that they do not admit of the delay of a reference to the Government, the Governor-General in Council empowers you to act as you may judge best for the national interest and honor, on the general principles which have now and heretofore been prescribed to you; and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the Commanders of the British forces within the Punjab, will be prepared to give attention to your wishes as far as they may feel themselves able to do so consistently with military considerations, and with the arrangements judged necessary by his Excellency for the protection of our own provinces.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 152.

Major-General Lumley to Mr. Maddock.

Head-Quarters, Camp, Rajpoorah,
Sir, *January* 28, 1842.

I HAVE the honor, by direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, copy of a dispatch from Brigadier C. F. Wild, commanding the troops at Peshawur, commenced on the 16th and closed on the 17th instant, reporting the occupation of the fort of Ali Musjid by a portion of the force under his orders, together with the copy of a letter to the Brigadier's address, from Captain Mackeson, dated the 16th instant, at 8 P.M.

Copies of the letters adverted to by Brigadier Wild, and detailed below*, from Jellalabad and Cabool, have already been forwarded for the information of the Government.

I have, &c.,
J. R. LUMLEY.

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* From Captain Macgregor to Captain Mackeson, dated Jellalabad, the 11th, inclosing a letter from Captain George Lawrence, of the 4th January; extract of letters from Lady Sale and Lieutenant Sturt; and one letter from Captain Macgregor to Captain Mackeson, dated Jellalabad, 13th January.

No. 153.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, near Jumrood, January* 16, 1842.

I AM happy to have it in my power to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the plan I adopted to prevent the fort of Ali Musjid falling into the hands of the Afreedees has perfectly succeeded. Every attempt at resistance that might have been expected in the day-time was prevented by the unlooked-for advance of the 53rd and 64th Regiments Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, and the guidance of Captain Mackeson, at night, unencumbered as they were by baggage of any kind Only three shots were fired at them, which did no harm, and they arrived at Ali Musjid as the day dawned.

This unexpected call on our assistance has somewhat interfered with the proposed movement through the Khyber Pass with the whole brigade; but it is as well, perhaps, that, under the existing deficiency of carriage, and the very inadequate means at our disposal for conveying stores, baggage, ammunition, treasure, and provisions, the attempt should not have been made; for it was with the greatest difficulty that I removed, as a preparatory step, the camp from Kowulsur to this place to-day, leaving nearly one-third of the property behind, under a guard.

I was interrupted whilst writing what precedes, about 10 P.M. last night (17th January), by an alert in our camp, occasioned by several shots fired into it by some Afreedees, which brought on a general firing of the chain of the picquet sentries. Several other shots were fired into camp at later hours afterwards.

At 3 A.M. I got the note from Captain Mackeson, regarding the successful movement, mentioned at the beginning of this letter, on Ali Musjid. It was expected that the intelligence of that event would, when it reached the ears of the Afreedee tribes, render them more tractable; but it has not: and I am apprehensive that, encumbered with all the cattle conveying the effects of the regiments that have preceded me, as well as those left with me, I shall meet with a resistance and loss that will contrast sadly with the good fortune of the former. The cattle here mentioned is scanty beyond measure for the exigency of the men and officers, but tells, in addition to camels and bullocks conveying treasure, ammunition, stores, &c., for the public service, in a pass where they can only pass one by one, and where the fall of a single animal may create serious delay and confusion.

In the midst of all my difficulties there is none which distresses me more, and causes more trouble and importunate references to me, than the commissariat department, at every instant of the day; occasioned by the insufficiency of cattle, and the prospect that one-half of what may accompany us will probably die from sheer starvation, as food for animals, in advancing through the Khyber Pass, must be carried along, as well as for man. On no occasion that has ever come under my observation would it have been so desirable to have an experienced and efficient commissariat officer with a force, as at Peshawur; and there is no European responsible person,—none but a parcel of Gomashtis, each bent on his own interested purposes, without any controlling authority. I have endeavoured to remedy this difficulty, by appointing, some days ago, temporarily, Ensign Montgomery; but, after trying to do everything in his power, he requested permission to resign; and I have appointed, subject to confirmation, Captain Gwatkin, of the 60th Regiment, who offered his services, and who appears to possess the requisite qualifications for the situation, but without experience in the department, or information, other than what is to be obtained from the Gomashtis themselves, whom he is to control, and who are very unwilling to be so.

I also beg leave to inclose copies of the melancholy disasters of the Cabool force, numbered 1 and 2; the former received yesterday and the latter to-day: and of which I took a hasty copy in General Avitabile's tent this afternoon, where Captain Lawrence privately showed me the original.

Captain Mackeson's dispatch is numbered 3. I trust his Excellency will kindly excuse the somewhat blotted appearance of this letter, my small tent being a perfect pigeon-house of people entering and leaving it, each with some subject of reference of his own.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 154.

Major-General Lumley to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Patarree, January* 30, 1842.

I HAVE the honor, by direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to annex, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, copy of a letter from the Deputy Commissary-General, dated the 25th instant, and its inclosures, detailing the nature of the agreement into which the owners of hired camels were supposed to have entered previous to their departure from Ferozepore, with the columns commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch and Brigadier Wild, which his Lordship in Council will have learned from the inclosure transmitted with my dispatch, No. 39, of the 17th instant, they have failed to fulfil.

I have, &c.
J. R. LUMLEY.

No. 155.

Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, Deputy Commissary-General, to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *January* 25, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 135, and annexation, on the subject of the refusal of the owners of hired camels, who left this place with troops for Affghanistan, to proceed with the detachment from Peshawur to Jellalabad.

2. In reply, I beg to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that it has hitherto been most difficult to induce the owners of hired camels to engage to go even as far as Peshawur, but I have, by promises, encouragement, and obtaining a liberal remuneration from Government for them, succeeded in procuring their services to Peshawur.

3. From that place it has been customary for the carriage to be provided by Captain Mackeson, Political Agent on the spot, or by the chief Commissariat Officer in Affghanistan; but owing to the unfortunate state of affairs at Cabool, which only became known here after Brigadier Wild's detachment left, it was impossible to hope for any arrangements being effected by the Commissariat Department in Affghanistan, and barely probable that any could be made by the Political Agent at Peshawur.

4. Under these circumstances, I by much persuasion, and allowing high remuneration, induced some of the Shokedars, and influential people of that class, who were present at this station, to enter into an agreement, that the camels of Brigadier Wild's detachment would proceed on to Jellalabad instead of to Peshawur, as the owners had at first agreed to do.

5. It appears now, that the whole of the Shokedars (except one), on arriving at Peshawur, declined to ratify the engagement thus entered into, and this untoward circumstance I attribute to two causes: first, to the state of the country beyond Peshawur; and second, that the cattle employed with the 60th and 64th Regiments were harassed so much on the route to Peshawur by long marches, that the owners of them became alarmed, and dissatisfied; otherwise, I have not the least doubt but the people would have fulfilled the engagement to go on to Jellalabad. People have been dispatched to induce the dissatisfied Shokedars to go forward, and I have every hope that they have been successful

6. I beg to inclose a copy of a communication from Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, commanding Detachment, relative to the necessity he had for issuing an order for Government bhoosa being given to the hired camels of the force, consequent on the cattle not having had time to graze, and during the forced marches which were made, the men had not time to cook their food, and several of the female camels cast their young. Yet, in conclusion, I have the honor to state, for his Excellency's information, that I have but little doubt that the hired camels which have left this, subsequently to the departure of Brigadier Wild's troops, will proceed to Jellalabad.

I have, &c.
J. PARSONS

No. 156.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch to the Deputy-Commissary General.

Sir, *December* 21, 1841.

HAVING been obliged to increase the length of my marches towards Peshawur, and the nature of the roads preventing our marching except in daylight, great numbers of camels attached to the force have necessarily been up too late in the evening to allow of the owners grazing them sufficiently; under these circumstances, on the 18th instant, after several long marches, I took upon myself to order the Commissariat Gomashta to advance ten rupees for bhoosa to the camels in the rear, which had the effect of satisfying their owners, who had several times complained that their cattle would be injured if they remained without food in that way.

I have, &c.,
J. TULLOCH.

No. 157.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Jumrood, January* 23, 1842.

FOR the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, I have the honor to state, that late last night Captain Lawrence entered my tent, and communicated to me the notes of which I inclose copies, the original, from Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, not having reached me.

The urgency of the request for assistance demanded immediate attention, and I accordingly ordered the two serviceable guns that remain to us, with all the efficient men of all arms in camp, except the guards and picquets left for its protection, to be held in readiness to proceed to the Shadee Bhagiar mouth of the pass, so as to arrive there by the first dawn of day, and by that means take the Afreedees by surprise, at a breastwork of thorns and stones which they had thrown across the pass. My wound preventing me from going myself, Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch took the command of the party, and I directed the 30th Regiment to lead.

The operation was successfully performed, the breastwork was gained and destroyed, and the troops appear on this occasion to have behaved with great steadiness and alacrity. For the details I beg to refer his Excellency to the accompanying letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, who commanded the party, and to the returns of killed and wounded, which I so much the more deeply lament, that the object for which the demonstration was made was not effected, in consequence of the many messengers sent to Ali Musjid to apprise Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley and Captain Mackeson, that their request for co-operation would be attended to, not reaching that place in time, though promised a reward of fifty rupees if it did, whilst they were afraid of hazarding a retreat, under the doubt of co-operation on our side.

A Sikh regiment was prevailed upon to combine in the demonstration made to-day, by entering another mouth of the pass at Jabaghee, and had also one Jemadar killed and two men wounded.

Whilst writing this, another letter is received from Captain Mackeson, at Ali Musjid, stating that the garrison, it was determined, would march out at 4 A.M. to-morrow, and urging me and the Sikh regiment to make a similar demonstration, and attack at both mouths of the pass. I confess, that after the effort made to-day proving to no purpose, I felt extreme reluctance in repeating the same to-morrow, but yielded to the claims of humanity, and extreme urgency of the occasion. I have accordingly ordered the same party to proceed to-morrow to the Shadee Bhagiar mouth of the pass, and General Avitabile has also ordered the same Sikh regiment that went to the Jabaghee mouth of it yesterday, to return thither,

I trust his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will make allowances in the situation of extreme difficulty in which I am placed; the inefficiency of my

means, destitution of carriage, apprehension of every public servant (not being a soldier) and camp follower to go on, being surrounded by a population that murders every individual who moves insufficiently protected to any distance from camp; if the measures I have attempted to carry into effect did not meet with that success which would, I conscientiously believe, have attended them, had adequate means been at my disposal, as to carriage and artillery, when I first reached Peshawur, and the Afreedees were still wavering in their acceptance of the proffered terms for their forbearance, to push on to Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

P.S. I inclose a note, in original, the last received from Captain Mackeson.

No. 158.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch to the Officiating Brigade-Major.

Sir, *Camp, Jumrood, January* 23, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report to you, for the information of Brigadier Wild, commanding the force, that agreeably to his instructions I proceeded with the 30th and 60th Native Infantry Regiments, the detail of Artillery, with two guns, a few Sappers and Miners, and the rissalah of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, at 4 A.M. to-day, for the purpose of assisting the return of the two regiments from Ali Musjid, through the Khyber Pass.

The entrance of the nullah leading to the pass was reached soon after day-break, and a passage effected to the barricade pointed out by Captain Lawrence, which, though only formed by brambles, was, by its size and construction, likely to be a serious obstacle to troops (in retreat particularly); the whole of this was destroyed by fire during the stay of the troops in its vicinity, and some adjacent breastworks levelled.

The infantry, with exception of about 100 men, were entirely employed in crowning the heights on either side of the entrance, up to, and beyond the position taken up by the reserve body mentioned above, and in securing a breast-work in front of, and commanding the barricade before mentioned, which duty was performed in the most efficient manner, and greatly to the credit of all concerned.

One gun, and the detachment of Sappers and Miners, and Irregular Horse, were kept with the reserve of the column, and the gun was occasionally useful in dispersing small parties of the enemy, who appeared occasionally pressing towards the flanking parties; the other gun was left in a position near the entrance of the nullah, for covering our return. The troops remained, from before sunrise till past 10, A.M., in possession of the works before mentioned; the whole behaved with remarkable steadiness, and after retaining them in position till further delay seemed useless for the object in view, no sounds proceeding from the front indicating any advance of troops from that quarter, and the enemy collected in some numbers, from our demonstration, which appeared likely to render hazardous our retreat, with the few men held in reserve, I deemed it prudent to call gradually in the flanking parties from either side, and returned to camp a little before noon.

Regretting, as all must do, that the object of our advance has been rendered null, by circumstances having apparently prevented the arrival of those for whose assistance it was intended, I have the honor to conclude by inclosing a return of killed and wounded, with the force, and shall be happy to afford any further explanation that the Brigadier may require, on points which the hurry of my present writing, in the wish to give, as early as possible, an account of the day's proceedings, may have left obscure.

I have, &c.,
J. TULLOCH.

Return of Killed and Wounded of the Force employed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Tulloch, at the entrance on the Khyber Pass on the 23rd of January, 1842.

Camp, Jumrood, January 24, 1842.

	Killed.	Wounded.						
	Sepoys.	Lieutenant and Brevet Captain.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Sepoys.	Sowars.	Horse.
Detachment 3rd Irregular Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
30th Regiment Native Infantry	2	..	1	..	..	..	9	..
60th Regiment Native Infantry	..	1	1	1	1	2	..	..
TOTAL	2	1	2	1	1	2	10	1
GRAND TOTAL	2	18						

C. F. WILD, *Brigadier.*

No. 159.

Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley to Brigadier Wild.

Sir, *Ali Musjid, January* 22, 1842, 2 P.M.

HAVING determined to fall back upon Futtehghur (alias Jumrood) to-morrow morning, I have to request that you will move up with your whole available force to form a junction with ours, inside of the pass of Shadee Bhagiar, as I am determined to give the Afreedees battle, if they oppose us, and the ground admit of our doing so with a chance of success. Your cavalry should be well to the front, as I am told the ground will admit of their acting. I propose to get away from this quietly before day-break. Your force should enter the mouth of the pass a little after daylight, and the Sikhs should move into the Jabaghee mouth of the pass at day-break. The safety of this detachment will depend on your prompt and determined demonstration, at both mouths of the pass, being executed as above pointed out.

I have to request that you will send several replies to this communication, so that they may reach us before we move down.

I have, &c.,
J. MOSELEY.

No. 160.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Jumrood, January* 24, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that, with the assistance afforded them, and the help of God, the two regiments that were at Ali Musjid have returned thence in comparative safety, about 1, P.M., to this camp, having had to fight and cover their retreat the whole way. The official returns have not yet been sent to me, and there will not be time for it to-day, the dawk being about to close, but I fear the statement will exhibit a severe loss. Captains Wilson, of the 64th, and Lock, of the 5th Regiment, doing duty with the 60th, have been killed, and four or

five officers of the 53rd, 60th, and 64th, have been wounded, whose names I have not yet all ascertained.

Being myself weak, and unable to quit my tent, my Brigade-Major incapacitated, by the wound he received, to afford me any assistance, and Brevet-Captain Ewart, whom I requested to act for Captain Loftie, temporarily, having in the present emergency his time taken up as Adjutant of his regiment, will, I trust, be a sufficient excuse for this hasty letter.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

No. 161.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Jumrood, January* 25, 1842.

I HAD the honor, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to report to you yesterday, and in a very hasty manner, the dawk being about to close, the retreat from Ali Musjid, of the two regiments sent thither on the 15th instant, at the particular instance of Captain Mackeson, who accompanied the detachment, to prevent that important post falling into the possession of the Khyberees.

This movement being effected in the dark, by troops unincumbered by baggage or tents of any kind, and unexpected by the Khyberees, was successful beyond expectation. Unfortunately, however, out of 300 bullocks loaded with provisions, that left camp with the detachment, only sixty and odd reached that place, so that the men had soon to apprehend that want of food would be superadded to their destitution of baggage and camp equipage. These it was my intention to have conveyed to them with the remainder of the brigade, supported by the Sikh troops, and to have advanced, leaving the latter to occupy Ali Musjid, and maintain the communications open in the rear, according to their engagement, and to have then proceeded forward with my whole force towards Jellalabad, in compliance with the pressing appeal of Major-General Sir Robert Sale and Captain Macgregor, consequent on the disasters of Cabool, for the contingency alluded to in one of the paragraphs of the instructions sent me by his Excellency's orders, seemed to have arrived. These instructions, I no longer possess: as reported in my letter to your address of the instant, they, and all other valuable papers, public and private, sketches, &c., that I had, fell, with a horse-load of my baggage, into the hands of the Khyberees, on the 19th instant; and I thought it my duty, contrary to my own opinion, to attend to the call of the Political Agent, of running the risk to push on, and carry relief to the Jellalabad force, or to facilitate its retreat, the time for it having now arrived.

General Avitabile having informed Captain Lawrence, the Assistant Political Agent, and myself, on the 17th instant, that four Sikh battalions, with the artillery attached to them, had agreed to co-operate and advance with me, and as no time was to be lost, I appointed the following day to commence the march.

I have already reported to you, in my letter of the 17th and 20th instant, how grievously I was disappointed by the almost treacherous abandonment of our cause by the soldiery of the Sikh battalion, at the critical moment when their co-operation was expected, within a few hours of that which had been ordered for commencing the march through the Khyber Pass. I have also informed you of the further difficulty experienced at the very moment when the march was to have begun, owing to the absence of a number of camels, and the abandoning of Sirwans, who dreaded to go on, and of the new arrangements which these untoward events necessitated, which protracted the departure of the troops till after sunrise, and also of the destitute situation of the regiments at Ali Musjid, which induced me, though forsaken by our faithless Sikh allies, and destitute of their support, nevertheless to make the attempt of carrying them relief and joining them, with a view to an immediate further advance.

However, the opposition we experienced far exceeded any thing I had anticipated, and with long strings of cattle to protect, extending together with the troops to a distance exceeding two miles, it became impossible to detach sufficient flanking and skirmishing parties to dislodge the enemy,

scattered in parties on every ridge and knoll, behind stone breastworks, pouring down a destructive fire upon us. In this emergency, our advanced gun broke down at the second shot discharged, whilst one of the elephants that carried another gun, on being hit by a ball, turned round and threw the column into confusion, as did also some camels carrying treasure, and several horses. The Khyberees observing this, gained confidence, and redoubled their fire, by which I was wounded, as I was calling on our men to follow me and advance. No longer able, from the nature of my wound, to exert my voice, and becoming soon after faint from loss of blood, I was taken to the rear, when a retreat commenced before we had well entered the pass. Of several loads of treasure that were thrown, one was lost, the broken-down gun was forsaken and spiked, and baggage of various kinds thrown by animals running away, was lost. In other respects, the retreat was covered, and Lieutenant Liptrott, with a party of his horse, dashing in among some Afreedees that had already descended to plunder, cut up several.

The troops returned to Jumrood, after experiencing a heavy loss in killed and wounded, as stated in the returns I transmitted on the 20th instant; and worse than all, every hope of carrying relief to the garrison at Ali Musjid was lost. It now only remained for me to see how, in the precarious situation in which it was placed, I should be able to assist in facilitating its retreat, and the co-operation on the 23rd and 24th instant accordingly took place, as I have already had the honor to report.

Having, on the above recapitulation, endeavoured to connect the events from the period of detaching the 53rd and 64th Regiments to secure the possession of Ali Musjid, until that of their abandoning it, I have now the melancholy task before me, to relate the occurrences of the latter day, for the minor details of which I beg to refer his Excellency to the reports of Lieutenant-Colonels Tulloch and Moseley, and to the heavy list of killed and wounded, which no less overwhelms me with grief now, than all the foregoing events had preyed upon my mind with distressing anxiety, the only soothing reflection being, that if the force detached had been less, or if the retreat had been delayed for a few days longer, the loss, heavy as it is, would have been considerably greater, as the Khyberees were daily increasing in numbers all along the pass.

Captain Mackeson informed me, that before the rear of the detachment had quitted Ali Musjid, it was attacked, and had both to fight its way down, and cover its retreat all the way; the 64th Regiment being in the rear, performed that duty with great steadiness, and deserved every praise for their good conduct, which I am particularly desirous to bring to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's notice, after the report I was obliged to make some time since on the spirit of insubordination which had shown itself among them. The two regiments joined the party sent from camp to their assistance, at a later hour in the day than had been expected, and passed on with their sick and baggage, leaving their further retreat to be covered by the other; and it appears, the heaviest loss which the latter sustained, occurred on this occasion. When the flanking parties descended from the heights that had been occupied by them to rejoin the column, the Khyberees reascended them with all the celerity which habit and constant practice has rendered so natural to them, and opened a destructive fire upon the retiring skirmishers. The retreat, however, was effected in good order; but when the whole had retired, a body of the enemy collected and formed on a rising ground in extended order, equal to the front of a regiment 1000 or 1200 strong, and fired a couple of volleys.

The loss of two good officers, Captain Wilson and Captain Lock, I deeply lament.

I shall commence to fall back to-morrow morning upon Kowulsur, where the brigade was formerly encamped, to be further removed from the Sikh troops, with the advantage of having forage for our cattle, and being near Peshawur for supplies, besides not running the risk we do here of having the water cut off from the hills. But from the insufficiency of cattle to carry our camp equipage, &c., only one half of the brigade will be able to move at a time, and the remainder will avail itself of its services on the following day. I hope, when an efficient Commissariat officer arrives with General Pollock, he may be able to do something to remedy this evil.

I beg to represent, that disproportionate to our eventual wants as the quantity of ammunition we brought with us originally was, it has been greatly reduced

by these three last engagements, and that it would be most desirable to have a store to indent upon nearer at hand than Delhi, or even Ferozepore.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

P.S.—26th January.

I regret to say, I can only transmit the return of killed and wounded, of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley's detachment. His report will follow to-morrow.

No. 162.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch to Captain Ewart.

Sir, *Camp, Jumrood, January* 25, 1842.

AGREEABLY to instructions from Brigadier Wild, commanding, I proceeded with the corps and detachments mentioned in my report of yesterday, to the entrance of the Shadee Ghurree Pass, for the purpose of meeting and assisting the 53rd and 64th Regiments Native Infantry.

The column arrived at the appointed time (daybreak); but previous to entering the nullah, I dispatched Acting-Captain Ross, 30th Regiment, and Brevet-Captain Geils, 60th Regiment, with four companies from each regiment, the former to crown the heights on the right, the latter on the left of the nullah. The right hills in the line of ascent, taken (at the suggestion of some friendly mountaineers,) proved too abrupt, and were not crowned so far in advance as could have been wished; but the position taken by the companies had the effect of preventing the ascent of a number of the enemy who were in a village, commanded by these companies. The hills to the left were completely in our possession in about an hour, reserves, &c., in order.

These arrangements being made, the column advanced; and on reaching the barricade, found it again blocked up with brushwood, but only one layer, (on the morning of the 23rd there were several,) which was beaten flatly down, and covered by large stones, sufficient to prevent a body of men passing until it was burnt away, which could not be effected so quickly as desirable, being wet; drag ropes were laid on, and the barricade removed. The stockade on the hill in front being again occupied, these positions were held until information was received that the regiments were near, when another party was thrown forward to the right of the stockade, and fresh supports sent to the assistance of the party posted on the left hills, which ultimately proved of the greatest assistance, by enabling them to retire with comparative impunity, only one man of them having fallen.

Previous to the arrival of the two corps at this head of my column, I had detached Captain Payne, 30th, to draw off one or more of the companies from the right hills, to form a good reserve for our retreating upon. When the two regiments were sufficiently retired, with their sick and wounded, baggage, &c., in safety, the companies upon the right of the stockaded hill reformed at the barricade, and then proceeded to retire in extended order, keeping a brisk fire to the mouth of the pass, covered by the guns, which were placed in position with the reserve on the rising ground in our rear.

To my knowledge, the whole of the troops employed on this occasion, exerted themselves to the attainment of the object in view, with the greatest gallantry; the loss, it appears, fell heaviest on the covering party of the 60th to the left, where the Khyberees were collected in great numbers. I have also to regret the loss of Brevet-Captain Lock, 5th Native Infantry, doing duty with the 60th, who was killed on the heights to the right, where his company was detached from the reserve, consequent on those first detached for this point having failed, from the cause before mentioned, to reach it.

I request you will inform the Brigadier commanding, that I feel greatly indebted to yourself and Brevet-Captain Geils, 60th, for the very efficient aid rendered me by both during the retirement of the column.

I have the honour to annex a statement of killed and wounded on the occasion.

I have, &c.,

J. TULLOCH.

Return of Killed and Wounded of the Force employed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Tulloch, at the Entrance of the Khyber Pass, on the 24th of January, 1842.

Camp, Jumrood, January 25, 1842.

	Killed.			Wounded.							
	Brevet Captain.	Naick.	Sepoy.	Lieutenant.	Ensign.	Sub r.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Sepoys.	Privates.	Sowars.
Detachment 3rd Irregular Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
4th Company 60th Battalion Artillery..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..
30th Regiment Native Infantry.....	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	6	..	..
60th Regiment Native Infantry.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	5	45	..	..
TOTAL.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	51	2	1
GRAND TOTAL.....	3			67							

List of Officers killed and wounded.

Killed:—Brevet-Captain Lock, 5th Native Infantry, doing duty with 60th Regiment.
Wounded slightly:—Lieutenant Phillips, 60th.
Ditto severely:—Ensign Halhed, 54th Native Infantry, doing duty with 60th.

R. S. EWART, *Brevet-Captain.* J. TULLOCH, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*
F. C. WILD, *Brigadier.*

Return of Killed and Wounded of the Detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Moseley, on the return from Ali Musjid, on the 24th of January, 1842.

Camp, Jumrood, January 25, 1842.

	Killed.					Wounded.					
	Captain.	Subadars.	Havildar.	Naicks.	Sepoys.	Ensigns.	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Sepoys.
53rd Regiment Native Infantry.....	..	2	..	1	7	1	2	..	5	3	19
64th Ditto Ditto.....	1	..	1	1	19	1	1	2	9	7	98
TOTAL.....	1	2	1	2	26	2	3	2	14	10	117
GRAND TOTAL.....	32					148					

List of European Officers killed and wounded.

Killed:—Captain A. Wilson, 64th Native Infantry.
Wounded:—Ensign Baron Von Meyern, 53rd Native Infantry, severely.
Ditto:—Ensign Rattray, 64th Native Infantry, severely.

R. S. EWART, *Brevet-Captain.* G. W. MOSELEY, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*
F. C. WILD, *Brigadier.*

No. 163.

Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, January* 28, 1842.

IN continuation of my letter of the 25th instant, with a postscript of the 26th, I have the honor to inclose Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley's report of the occurrences which took place since the evening he was detached in command of the 53rd and 64th Regiments Native Infantry, to occupy Ali Musjid, until adverse circumstances compelled him to abandon that post on the morning of the 24th instant.

I suffer in mind more than I can express, that the urgent call for relief of the Jellalabad force, and the intervening necessity of securing Ali Musjid, has induced me to yield, against the dictates of my better judgment, (as previously reported by me for his Excellency's information,) to take a step that has had such a fatal result; but when I resolved to yield to necessity, I was assured that I could depend on the co-operation of a part of the Sikh troops, after their arrears had been paid up to them by cash, which the Political Agent advanced to General Avitabile, who came out to Jumrood on purpose to disburse it. I thought also, that the guns, after having been tried and repaired, would not, in time of need, fail and prove worthless; and however sensible of the danger of the undertaking, I considered I might, at a risk, succeed in getting, with a sufficient part of my force, through the pass to carry help to Jellalabad, or else facilitate Sir Robert Sale's retreat, agreeable to the tenor of a paragraph of my instructions, which enjoined me to run that risk in the event of such a contingency. But insufficiency of carriage, faithless allies, and worthless guns, together with inexperienced troops in hill warfare, and who have seen no service for upwards of twenty years, every circumstance seemed to combine to frustrate my attempt; and I trust his Excellency will, in judging of my conduct, allow me the benefit of these considerations.

I have, &c.,
C. F. WILD.

No. 164.

Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley to Captain Ewart.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, January* 26, 1842.

IN obedience to instructions communicated in your letter, bearing date the 15th instant, placing me in command of the 53rd and 64th Regiments Native Infantry for secret service, I began my march at 10 P. M. of the same day, in progress to Ali Musjid, and reached that place with little opposition at eight o'clock next morning.

As we approached Ali Musjid, the enemy appeared in considerable numbers to the front, and on either flank, and here a few of our men were wounded.

Detachments were immediately sent off to dislodge the enemy from the heights, a duty which was effected in good style, and without further casualty on our side.

I now proceeded with the main column round the base of the isolated hill on which the fortress stands, in order to make myself acquainted with its localities.

Ali Musjid consists of two small forts, which are connected by a weak and dilapidated wall. The low oblong rock on which it stands is commanded by two hills of considerable eminence, of which one is to its south, the other to its west.

These positions I found to be occupied by small parties of the Jezailchee garrison, but I lost no time in detaching for their more secure retention, a complete company under an European officer, to each of them. I at the same time strengthened, with the assistance of the sappers and miners, the breastworks that had already been erected on them.

On the morning of the 17th, the enemy appeared in strength on all sides of the fort, and apparently designed to cut off our water, and to drive us from the two heights.

To frustrate the first of these designs, a party was sent down to the side of the stream which supplied the garrison*, and assisted by some Jezailchees of the original garrison, whose large rifles carry twice as far as our muskets, it succeeded in maintaining a safe communication between the water and the fort.

Meantime the companies on the southern and the western points were actively engaged in repelling the attacks of the enemy, who (without themselves incurring much exposure) fired on our men from a distance, and with a precision of aim which neither the weapon, nor the skill of our sepoys, could equal.

In these affairs many of Captain Mackeson's Jezailchees behaved admirably, and using, as they did, with equal aptitude, the same weapons employed by the enemy, their services were of much assistance to us on the present, and on all similar occasions.

I regret to say that Ensign Swinton, of the 53rd Regiment, was on that day (the 17th) severely wounded, while heading his men in charging a party of the enemy from the immediate neighbourhood of the southern height, where this is united with a ridge of table-land.

Other casualties also occurred on that day, as will be seen by the inclosed letters from Major Hoggan, commanding the 53rd Regiment, and the late Captain Wilson, commanding the 64th Regiment.

From this date the enemy, attracted (no doubt) to the mouth of the Pass by Brigadier Wild's demonstration in that quarter, gradually diminished in force, and we were for some days almost wholly unmolested, and were busily employed in completing the defences of the fort, but on the morning of the 23rd, they again appeared in considerable numbers, and we were again engaged all day in checking them.

The continued occupation of the fortress would, however, have been a work of no difficulty, and we might have defied the efforts of any number of such an enemy as were opposed to us, had we been adequately supplied with provisions; but through some mismanagement, only eighty bullock-loads of grain had been brought up by the rear-guard from Jumrood, on the night of the 15th, whereas I had been led to expect, that three hundred would have accompanied me.

On the morning of the 23rd, finding the remnant of our stores to be only five maunds of atta for the subsistence of 2500 men; men who had already been five or six days on half rations, and who had been exposed for eight days without bedding, and without tents, to an inclement climate, and who were daily thronging into hospital, I reluctantly obeyed an inevitable necessity, and arranged for evacuating the post and cutting my way to Jumrood.

The importance of retaining possession of the post of Ali Musjid was, however, so strongly impressed upon me by Captain Mackeson, the Political Agent, that when about this time my detachment staff, Brevet-Captain Thomas, gallantly came forward and volunteered to hold it (with only four or five days' scanty provision) with 150 of the original Jezailchee garrison, I felt it my duty not to oppose the proposition, dangerous as the experiment doubtless would have been, and on the night of the 23rd, arrangements were completed by the Political Agent for making over the command of the higher and smaller of the two forts to Captain Thomas.

But on the morning of the 24th, Captain Mackeson represented to me that his Jezailchees had changed their minds, and had resolved not to remain, after the departure of the two regiments under my command.

The evacuation of the fortress had now become inevitable, and the collective force marched on the morning of the 24th, about day-break.

Our return was accomplished in the face of a wary and active foe, whose numbers always considerable, were invariably found to be greatest above the narrower and more difficult defiles.

Among the precipitous heights that skirt the Shadee Buguar and Kafir Jungee Passes, they were especially numerous, and here, in spite of our best exertions in crowning the heights, and checking their attacks on the rear-guard, they directed against us from beneath the shelter of their steep and scarcely perceptible "sungahs," a galling fire, which inflicted on us a heavy loss in killed and wounded.

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* This water-guard was afterwards relieved daily.

It was here that that able and gallant officer, Captain Alexander Wilson, fell at the head of the 64th Regiment.

About this time, finding that the cattle, from having been almost starved during the preceding six days, were too feeble to carry their burdens, I sent orders to Lieutenant Corsar, the officer commanding the rear-guard, to relinquish all such cattle as had a tendency to delay his movements, and to come up and join the main body. This he accordingly did, and after four hours' hard fighting we succeeded in reaching Jumrood.

I have deeply to deplore the numerous casualties that have befallen the detachment under my command, although it is some satisfaction to know, that the loss on the part of the enemy was likewise considerable.

Inclosed is a copy of my order on the occasion, in which are enumerated the names of those officers who particularly attracted my attention during the engagement. I also inclose a list of killed and wounded.

Finally, I cannot abstain from an expression of my regret, that I should have been unaccompanied by either cavalry or guns; a detachment of the former arm would have been most useful in cutting up the enemy between Ali Musjid and the Kafir Jungee Pass, where the baggage was chiefly plundered, and where the ground was good for cavalry to act upon.

I have, &c.

G. W. MOSELEY.

No. 165.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Camp, Sirhind, January* 31, 18

AT a late hour yesterday, I had the honor to receive the dispatch of your Lordship in Council, of the 21st instant.

2. To enable me to form, and hold in readiness, another brigade to move across the Punjab, I ordered Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, by express, to move to Kurnaul, where further orders will await the corps. There will be little delay, as their marching establishment was retained.

3. When the 3rd Dragoons and 31st arrive at Ferozepore, I shall have ample means of forming such a force as your orders, now acknowledged, prescribe; leaving at that station as many troops as present circumstances seem to require, viz.:—

Artillery—A troop, a company and a half, the field-battery of the former drawn by camels.

Cavalry—Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, 1st Light Cavalry.

Infantry—Her Majesty's 31st Foot, 6th, 19th, 33rd, 55th Regiments of Native Infantry, 1st Light Infantry Battalion, 244 recruits of Her Majesty's 13th and 44th Regiments.

4. From these corps I shall be able to select the most serviceable, but as your Lordship does not order their advance, I presume that I am expected to exercise my judgment as to the necessity of increasing the force at Peshawur, either in view to the security of Sir Robert Sale's force, or of the Sikh territory, west of the Indus.

5. We yesterday received accounts of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley's retreat from Ali Musjid with the 53rd and 64th Regiments, in which some loss was sustained; but the official report has not been received. Of course the difficulty of forcing the Khyber Pass, especially with such a convoy as could supply Jellalabad for a month, is greatly increased.

6. Major-General Pollock will, I believe, reach Attock about the 2nd of February, and will, I trust, be in possession of intelligence, by which beneficially and safely to guide his ulterior proceedings.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 166.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *February* 1, 1842.

IN order to keep Major-General Pollock informed of your Lordship's views and orders, I have transmitted to him an extract from the official letter from Government of the 21st ultimo.

2. I have added thereto the following paragraph, which I trust your Lordship will approve:—

"You may deem it perfectly certain that Government will not do more than detach this brigade, and this in view to support Major-General Sale, either at Jellalabad for a few weeks, or to aid his retreat; very probably also to strengthen the Sikhs at Peshawur for some time. It is not intended to collect a force for the reconquest of Cabool.

"You will convey the preceding paragraph, if you safely can, to the Major-General."

3. I am not at all anxious to weaken the Nepaul frontier, by calling up the 2nd European Regiment. On the contrary, as soon as the 31st Foot was directed to march to Kurnaul, I ordered Her Majesty's 3rd Foot to be moved by an easy march, two halts in each week, *via* Delhi, to Cawnpore, there to incorporate a large body of recruits, and to benefit by change of air and scene, which they still require.

4. By this arrangement the barracks at Kurnaul and Meerut will accommodate the infantry which it may be practicable to withdraw in March and April from the westward. The Buffs would probably have suffered much had they marched so late in the season.

5. Your Lordship's orders for raising a corps of light cavalry shall be followed up, without the least delay, when received.

6. Mr. Clerk has been with us since his return from Saharunpore.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 167.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, February* 12, 1842.

IN reply to your Excellency's dispatch of the 1st instant, we beg to apprise your Excellency that, considering it most expedient that the complement of European regiments in the north-western provinces shall be fully kept up, we have judged it necessary to issue orders, through the Military Department, for the immediate march of the 2nd European Regiment from Gazeepore to Meerut, or such other station as your Excellency may direct in those provinces. Your Excellency is aware that the return of Her Majesty's 50th Regiment, from Moulmein, may shortly be expected, and that while we gather from the reports of the Resident at Nepaul no prospect of hostility on the part of the Goorkhas, the approaching season when malaria prevails in the Terai may remove all apprehension of any immediate danger from that quarter.

2. We are of opinion that temporary barracks should be constructed without delay, under your Excellency's orders, at Loodianah, Ferozepore, or some other situation near the Sutlej, for the accommodation of European troops, unless your Excellency should, from the communications of Mr. Clerk, see reason to believe that Major-General Pollock's force will not fall back this season on our own frontier, under the instructions which we issued on the 10th instant.

We have, &c.
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 168.

Mr. Maddock to the Military Board.

Gentlemen, *Fort William, February* 14, 1842.

THE Governor-General in Council having received information that guns intended for the Cabool magazine were placed under convoy of the brigade which marched from the Sutledge towards Peshawur, on the 4th ultimo, and sent forward without any supply of ammunition, desires me to request from your Board, at the earliest possible date, full details and explanation on the subject.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 169.

The Military Board to the Governor-General of India in Council.

Ordnance Department,

My Lord, *Fort William, February* 15, 1842.

WE do ourselves the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Maddock's letter of the 14th instant, and in reply, to mention that the guns, therein alluded to, formed part of a consignment of ordnance stores sent by order of Government, as conveyed in Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart's letter of the 31st of March, 1841, from the Delhi magazine to that of Cabool, to complete the proportion of stores assigned to the Cabool magazine.

2. It will be evident to your Lordship that such consignments are necessarily made up of unconnected fragments, which would, on reaching the destination, be most valuable; but while separate from the depôt of which they are intended to form a part, must, from the very nature of the consignment, be useless for immediate service.

3. Military authorities would, in fact, be more warranted in expecting that a fleet of store-boats proceeding from the Presidency to Allahabad, should at once be convertible into a serviceable siege equipment, than in expecting that guns or carriages, proceeding under convoy from Ferozepore to Cabool, should at once be available for field service.

4. Under such circumstances, the stores referred to might, doubtless, be turned to good account by a little previous arrangement; and, in this particular instance, we are fully satisfied that the Commissary of Ordnance at Delhi or at Ferozepore would, if so ordered, have very speedily arranged for the dispatch of any necessary quantity of ammunition; but we trust that your Lordship in Council will perceive that instructions to this effect could not have emanated from us, ignorant, as we necessarily were, of there being any intention of so employing them.

5. We may, moreover, state that, although the guns above referred to were necessarily incomplete as regards limbers, ammunition-waggons, and stores of every description, there were, at the time of their quitting Ferozepore, four spare 9-pounders and two spare 6-pounder guns completely equipped in every respect, and available for immediate service in the depôt at that station.

No. 170.

Captain Mackeson to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Futtyghur, January* 27, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report to you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, the events that have occurred on this frontier since the arrival here of the force under Brigadier Wild's command.

2. Had this force been sent up in an efficient state as to ammunition and carriage, and with cavalry and artillery, it might, at the time of its arrival here, have advanced through the Khyber Pass to the support of Major-General Sale's force at Jellalabad. The Afreedee tribes had not, up to that time, heard of our troops having evacuated Cabool; and they would have allowed Brigadier Wild's force to pass through Khyber unmolested for a sum of money; neither had they, at the time organized any opposition, for they had no hope of seeing any leader from the existing Government of Cabool appear in the plains of Ningrahar, and such was the eagerness of our Sepoys to meet the enemy at that time, that we could have forced our way through, if necessary, with little loss. Unfortunately, days and weeks elapsed in making arrangements for our carriage, and in obtaining from the Sikhs the loan of artillery, whose inefficiency has been a main cause of our subsequent disasters, while the delay at Peshawur, as it threw our Sepoys into close intercourse with the mutinous and disaffected Sikh troops, destroyed their confidence in themselves, and imbued them for a time with a spirit of insubordination.

3. I need not here advert to General Sale's frequent and pressing requisitions on Brigadier Wild to appear with his force under the walls of Jellalabad. It was Brigadier Wild's earnest wish to comply with these requisitions, provided he could make the movement with a chance of success; but without cavalry and artillery, and without co-operation from the Sikh troops to keep open the Khyber Pass, the movement could not well be attempted Every endeavor was made on my part to induce the Sikh authorities to co-operate, and at length, on the 13th instant, General Avitabile and the other Sikh officers here pledged themselves to support our troops, and charged themselves with guarding Ali Musjid, and the road from Peshawur to it, while our troops should advance with some guns and Patan horse of the Sikh Government as far as Jellalabad. All that was wanting for the completing of this arrangement was a lac and 40,000 rupees to pay the Sikh battalions; and, under the pressing exigencies of the occasion, I incurred the responsibility of advancing that sum as a loan to the Sikh from the British Government. Meanwhile, the delay that occurred in effecting the above arrangements made it more difficult to come to any terms with the Afreedee tribes. They had heard of Mahomed Akbar's defiance of us in his brutal and treacherous murder of the Envoy and Minister, and they had also heard that our troops at Cabool had ceased to struggle with the enemy, and were preparing to evacuate their quarters on the faith of treaties. They also knew, at the same time, that Mahomed Akbar had no intention of keeping these treaties, as he had written to them and to the tribes in Ningrahar to exterminate all the Feringees in their quarter and to let none escape or pass up or down through Khyber. The Maliks of the Afreedees put me off with promises, while the tribes daily made desultory attacks on our garrison at Ali Musjid. On the 12th the Maliks promised me a final answer in three days, and on the 15th they sent me their reply: it was decisive, "that they would not barter their religion for gold, nor incur the odium and contempt of their brother Mussulmans, by allowing our troops to pass"—that I was at liberty to act as I pleased. In a letter to Mr. Mackeson (who held the fort of Ali Musjid with a Mussulman garrison of 150 men, chiefly Eusofzyes), dated 10th instant, they had warned him to look to his own safety. From that date to the 15th, Ali Musjid was subject to frequent attacks from the tribes during the day, but they left the post unmolested at night. On the 15th instant it was attacked by about 1,500 men, and Mr. Mackeson wrote to me that the interior of the fort being commanded from the surrounding hills, and the fire kept up on him all day being very galling, he

did not expect, in the disaffected state of the garrison, to be able to hold his post twelve hours longer. I had also information that the tribes intended to attack Ali Musjid with all their force on the following day, and also to barricade and guard the road to Ali Musjid in several places.

4. The objects which Brigadier Wild and myself had proposed to effect with his force were, first, to move on to the support of General Sale, provided the Sikhs could be induced to co-operate so far as to keep the road open from Peshawur to Ali Musjid, and assist the garrison of irregulars in keeping that post. We were also prepared at any time that General Sale should require it of us, in order to cover his retreat, to advance, lightly equipped, into the pass, and occupy in it the two strong positions of Ali Musjid and Lundikhana. A third movement which we were aware might be demanded of us was, an advance of part of the force to Ali Musjid, should it be hotly attacked, to prevent that important post falling into the hands of the enemy. Once in strong possession of Ali Musjid, we were available either for General Sale's retreat, or for General Pollock's advance to his support, while any objection to dividing the force was in a great measure obviated, owing to the short distance—eight miles—from our camp in front of Jumrood to Ali Musjid, which admitted of musketry firing being heard from either detachment.

5. On the 15th, as I have before stated, Ali Musjid was fiercely attacked, and the post in danger. On that day also I had received the final answer of the Afreedees; and on the same day, the Sikh auxiliary force, who were encamped at Jumrood, were to be paid to enable them to advance with us on the following morning. I left Peshawur at four, P. M., and our camp at Kowalsar in the evening, and went to Futti Ghur to call on General Avitabile, and ask him to send one corps of the Sikh auxiliaries in rear of the two regiments who, it had been determined, should advance to Ali Musjid immediately, under cover of the night. The Sikh commanders were sent for, and the movement was proposed to them, but they pleaded that their pay had not yet been entirely distributed, and that their men would willingly march on the following morning. From what I saw of the disposition of these officers, I had little hope of receiving any aid from the Sikh troops; it was, however, necessary to secure the post of Ali Musjid, and we started with the two regiments, prepared, in case the Sikhs should not advance with the remainder of our force, to hold the post with the two regiments until General Pollock's arrival. Five hundred and odd bullocks, laden with atta, ghee, &c., had been sent on to Futti Ghur a day previously, and while our troops were advancing at night from Kowalsar to Futti Ghur, I had these bullocks laden and drawn up by the road-side. After this I separated 350 bullocks to accompany the column, and allowed the rest to return to their former standing-places. When the column arrived at Futti Ghur, it was halted for some time to wait for ammunition. During this interval I reported to the commanding-officer, Colonel Moseley, that the provision bullocks were all collected on the left of the column, and begged he would give orders for their being taken charge of by the officers commanding the rear guard or some other. He gave the order to some mounted officer standing by to convey. After another interval of some minutes, and seeing that no arrangement had yet been made for placing the bullocks anywhere in the column, I again drew Colonel Moseley's attention to the subject, telling him that the guarding of the bullocks was of vital importance to us. He again issued some orders about their being placed between the column and rear guard, and I went myself to the rear of the column to ask for the rear guard, but could find none. I believe that, up to that time, it had not been formed. The head of the column was now advancing; I passed up to the front, and on my way, seeing the bullocks still standing together apart from the column, I applied to the nearest officer, Captain Leadbeater, and begged he would see that they were taken care of, as their coming with us was of vital importance. As far as I recollect, he ordered a naik and four to see the bullocks put between the column and the rear guard. I went on to the front. The head of the column had arrived opposite the post of Shina Khan Afredee, and it was most important that we should pass this point without observation, but the column was halted there waiting for the rear. I then once more asked Colonel Moseley if he had satisfied himself that the bullocks had been put in charge in their proper place. To the best of my recollection he sent Captain Thomas

back, or it was another mounted officer, to ascertain that they were coming on. I remained at the head of the advanced guard after this till day dawned on us below Ali Musjid, as the utmost caution was required to prevent any confusion in case of a rush or surprise in front.

6. My information had led me to believe that our movement at night would be a complete surprise, and it was so. Our march to Ali Musjid was effected without loss, either of men or baggage, or useless expenditure of ammunition; but instead of 350 bullocks, laden with supplies, which, with those in the garrison, would have enabled us to hold out a month, the officer in command of the rear guard brought up with him to Ali Musjid between fifty and sixty bullocks only. This unfortunate oversight entirely defeated our plans. We were but little molested at Ali Musjid; we remained there eight days on half rations until our supplies were quite exhausted; we had not more than for one day at quarter rations when we left the post.

7. The Sikh regiments, who were to have co-operated and accompanied the remainder of Brigadier Wild's force, mutinied on the night of the 16th. Brigadier Wild made an attempt to join us with the remainder of the force without the Sikhs, but met with a reverse in the attempt, owing, in a great measure, to the breaking down of the Sikh guns at the outset. On the day he marched, we were under arms at Ali Musjid, prepared to move to his support; but we had not received positive information that he intended coming, and therefore feared to risk uselessly the expenditure of ammunition. The wind was excessively high and contrary, and prevented firing being heard. On the 23rd we were again under arms, ready to join him and bring up supplies: but the positive information that he had moved to make a demonstration did not reach us till late in the day. We heard firing, but did not consider that we should be justified in moving and wasting our ammunition on an uncertainty, and when the firing was heard, it was too late for us to have reached the ground in time to form a junction with him. On the 25th, after trying in vain to get supplies in by a by-road from Lalpoora and Tatara, we came to the determination of cutting our way out of the pass. We left Ali Musjid at day-break, and our rear and front were both attacked before we got clear of the fort, and some loss there occurred. Our whole loss, including sick men cut up, has been about 40 killed, 130 wounded, during our stay and our retreat. We were met by Colonel Tulloch's force at the mouth of the pass. I tried every means to induce the garrison of irregulars to continue to hold the post for five days, for which period there were provisions for them and an ample supply of water, but they refused. Captain Burt volunteered to remain with a party of regulars, no Sepoys would volunteer. Captain Thomas volunteered to remain with the irregular garrison, as did Mr. Mackeson, but the men would not remain. The loss of Ali Musjid will most likely bring with it the loss of the post at Lalpoora, and the ejection of Turabaz Khan from the chiefship of that place. It has also considerably increased the difficulty of forcing the Khyber Pass. A party of Dooranee horsemen belonging to Akbar Khan, who were said to be at Peshbulak, on hearing of our having evacuated Ali Musjid, came and encamped below it. It would not appear that the fort itself has been occupied, and the Afredees are debating among themselves whether or not to destroy it.

I have, &c.,
F. MACKESON.

No. 171.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, February 15, 1842.*

WE have received, from Mr. Clerk and Mr. Melville, two express dispatches, of the 4th and 6th instant, and the letter from Captain Mackeson at Peshawur, dated the 27th ultimo.

2. We reserve any particular remarks or instructions on the communications made by Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk and Mahomed Akbar Khan, through Captain Macgregor and Major Pottinger respectively, till we shall have

received the two letters from Major Pottinger, referred to in the postscript to Captain Macgregor's letter of the 25th ultimo. But, in the mean while, we lose no time, in continuation of our last dispatch of the same purport, in desiring your Excellency expressly to instruct Major-General Pollock to direct all his efforts and measures to the withdrawal of Sir Robert Sale's force from Jellalabad to Peshawur, with the least possible delay, the Major-General having a full discretion, if he finds it proper, in aid of his own military proceedings, to make such arrangements with the Khyberees, or other tribes, as may seem most likely to facilitate the easy attainment of that object.

3. We think that the rapid advance of the complete efficient brigade ordered from Ferozepore, according to our recent instructions, will be highly conducive to the support of Major-General Pollock in his measures for recalling Sir Robert Sale's force, or generally for holding a strong position while in front of the enemy on the Affghan frontier; and we take it for granted that your Excellency will have placed that brigade in march, immediately on the receipt of our last letter, under date the 10th instant.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP

No. 172.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Loodiana, February 6, 1842.*

THERE is a passage in Captain Mackeson's report to Mr. Maddock, dated 27th January, on which I feel it necessary to make some comments. It is the following:—

"Had this force been sent up in an efficient state with ammunition and carriage, and with cavalry and artillery, it might at the time of its arrival here have advanced through the Khyber Pass to the support of Major-General Sale's force at Jellalabad."

Now, my dear Lord, the reasons why the four first regiments went so provided as this officer describes, are these:—Captain Mackeson to Captain Lawrence, 9th November.

"I request you will urge on the military authorities at Ferozepore the necessity of hastening by every means in their power the dispatch of the brigade named for the Cabool relief."

Idem. "It is highly desirable that the brigade destined for Affghanistan should arrive here as expeditiously as possible."

In consequence, on the 16th November, Mr. Clerk ordered the 64th and 60th Native Infantry to cross as soon as the latter was ready, and they did pass into the Punjab on the 18th and 20th November, that is, in 9 and 11 days after Captain Mackeson's requisition. He also ordered the 53rd from this place to Ferozepore.

There is no mention of ammunition, carriage, cavalry, or artillery. The essence of the demand was, "Send hither Native Infantry most quickly," and it was very promptly attended to. I claim no credit here, for I received Mr. Clerk's notification of the demand when two marches south of Futtyghur on the 22nd November, that is, two days after the last corps had crossed the Sutlej.

Acting upon the foregoing, Captain Lawrence, on the 14th, recommends Lieutenant-Colonel Wild to hold the 10th Cavalry in immediate readiness to move with the two infantry regiments, pending instructions from Mr. Clerk, who thus wrote to me on the 17th: "Your Excellency will have observed that I have limited the requisition which I have presumed to make upon the commanding officers at Lahore and Ferozepore, to the three infantry regiments which were preparing to march to Affghanistan. I consider that this is what Captain Mackeson means in his urgent request for the dispatch of the brigade

named for the Cabool relief. I therefore have not followed up the intimation made by Captain Lawrence to the commanding officer at Ferozepore regarding artillery and cavalry, by requesting that a detachment of either should move forward." Mr. Clerk wished these regiments to move lightly, and directed eight lacs of rupees to be left, "that nothing may retard the arrival at Peshawur of the first Regiment moving up."

Mr. Clerk, in the same letter, 17th November, leaves the decision regarding cavalry and artillery to me; all which I received at Futtyghur on the 24th November; and a reference to reports and dates shows, that the 30th and 53rd, under Brigadier Wild's command, crossed over on the 26th, (known to me 3rd December,) my timely interference was therefore impossible.

Captain Lawrence writes, 14th November, to Colonel Wild: "The commanding officer should not be hampered with any extra stores, or by the charge of ladies, but have under his care simply the treasure, and such magazine stores as are deemed absolutely necessary, for supplying the immediate wants of our troops in Affghanistan."

On the same day Captain Lawrence tells Mr. Clerk, "If four guns can be made effective, they also shall be ready." This alludes to the field-battery guns, of which three are now with Major-General Pollock.

Before the 30th and 53rd had left Ferozepore, the outbreak of the 2nd November was known to Mr. Clerk, who, on the 22nd, requested Major-General Boyd to prepare another brigade, of which he requested Sir R. Arbuthnot to send the 9th Foot to form a part.

It is an extraordinary coincidence that, on the same day, the 22nd November, I ordered the 9th to be moved to Kurnaul, and eventually to Ferozepore, in order to relieve the 13th Light Infantry, and I informed your Lordship on the 20th, of my intention, thus: "I propose that Her Majesty's 9th should proceed with the second convoy."

Captain Mackeson to Mr. Clerk, 16th November. "P.S.—Unless troops arrive quickly from Ferozepore, the most disastrous consequences must follow."

I should first have quoted Captain Mackeson's letter of the 15th, to Mr. Clerk:—

"The force that moves from Ferozepore should consist of two brigades, with one, if not two, regiments of Europeans, and the brigades should follow each other as quickly as possible."

Here, again, Captain Mackeson's requisition is confined to troops. Sir R. Sale, it is true, on the 13th November, received at the same time, asks for a siege-train, but it was "to enable them to retrieve things by active operations at the conclusion of the winter."

When Captain Mackeson penned his paragraph now replied to, he seems to me to have forgotten that there is no magazine at Ferozepore; and, when he expected every one to forward his views instantly, that the seat of Government is 1180 miles from Ferozepore. I was then 456 miles from that place. Major-General Boyd was 203 miles distant. The Delhi magazine 281 ditto.

Mr. Clerk was the only authority on the spot; and he evinced great decision, increased by promptitude.

To return to the artillery question, Mr. Clerk, on the 27th November, the day after the 30th and 53rd crossed the Sutlej, referred this subject to Major-General Boyd, stating, at the same time, "I believe the Ferozepore artillery (the field-battery) is, for want of horses, incapable of moving." This involved the troublesome discussion of horses and bullocks; and General Boyd therefore ordered a troop of horse artillery to be prepared.

I received these notifications on the 1st December and subsequent days; and, considering that the dispatch of horse artillery with infantry, was only to obtain horse draft, I directed the substitution of three guns of the field-battery. The great utility of artillery in the pass we have yet to learn, and as an artillery officer, General Pollock will, probably, attach their full weig to that arm. To me it seems, that a gun unlimbered and fired two or three times at an enemy perched on the side of an adjoining mountain, within musket range, would run a great chance of being dismounted or overturned, or its carriage much shaken, by its own recoil, and that, whilst thus delayed, two or

three men and a horse or two would be struck, thus adding to the delay of the column under fire.

As to cavalry, they can make no return at all, except upon open spaces.

The only mode of clearing the Khyber Pass appears to be by having bodies of well-armed, active, and daring troops acting as light infantry, on either hand, under whose protection the main body may pass. It was thus that Sir R. Sale effected the passage of the Khoord Cabool, the Huft Kothul, the Sutterbund, the Puri-durra, and the Jugdulluck Passes; and, though artillery accompanied his advance-guard, he lays no great stress upon their services*, except that they were useful in reaching the Jezailchees, whose arms carried so much further than our muskets; and upon the last occasion they took the enemy's breast-works and defences in reverse.

I shall not weary your Lordship with further remarks; the hurried manner in which Captain Mackeson made his requisitions has been the chief cause that the supplies and stores of all kinds were not more ample. There was no time given even to consider what might make the reinforcement more complete, far less to draw the ammunition and stores from Delhi.

Your Lordship will remember that it was for many days doubted by Government whether the 2nd Brigade (Her Majesty's 8th and the 26th Native Infantry) should be sent forward or not; and that its advance was only ordered when Akbar Khan's having joined the rebels, and the action of the 23rd November at Cabool, were reported.

I beg that your Lordship will be pleased to permit this letter to be attached to Captain Mackeson's report of the 27th ultimo.

I shall address Major-General Pollock upon the subject of the bullock loads of supplies left behind upon the advance of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley's detachment.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 173.

Brigadier England, commanding in Sinde, to Mr. Maddock.

Head-Quarters, Sinde Force,
Sir, *Camp, near Dadur, January* 29, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge your letter of the 6th instant inclosing an extract from a resolution of the Government of India in the Secret Department of the same date, and I beg to assure the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council that I shall pay implicit attention to the paragraphs which relate to the conduct of military proceedings in Upper Sinde.

2. As the shortest means of explaining our military position here, I beg to inclose a statement which will show the present distribution of the force in this part of the country, and I do not see, in the uncertainty which prevails of the point at which insurrection may first show itself, that it can be improved, for our numbers will not now admit of a large appui any where, at the same time it will be seen that the force can be easily collected, in any direction which may suddenly demand its display. Our magazines at this place, and at Sukkur, are plentiful, and I am happy to say that there is an abundance of provision at Quetta, even sufficient to supply the troops at Candahar, if they were, by any emergency, forced to retire in this direction.

3. I have no doubt but that Major Outram, Political Agent for this country, will have informed Lord Auckland of the strong reasons we have to suppose that there has been an action with the insurgents near Candahar, and that the loss sustained by the enemy on that occasion has probably prevented their meditated descent upon Quetta, and I beg you will assure his Lordship that my knowledge of the constant communications made by Major Outram from hence has alone prevented my troubling his Lordship or the Government with

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* Sale's artillery was drawn by yabhoos, which are greatly preferred to our horses for services there.

reports, which would probably contain mere repetitions of the information conveyed by the Political Department. Regarding Quetta, however, every military defensive precaution has been adopted, and, although the cantonment is unconnected, and unfortunately placed, its locality offering no good position, I cannot but contemplate that the best results will follow any efforts which the enemy may make in that quarter.

4. As soon as the 12th and 15th Regiments Bombay Native Infantry reach Upper Sinde, I propose to occupy Bagh and to strengthen Shikarpore, and if matters rendered such a step expedient, and that, with a due consideration for the safety of our rear, prudence would sanction it, I should not hesitate to ascend the Bolan Pass with a reinforcement, even now if also such a step was dictated by the state of affairs generally; at this moment, however, I do not view such a movement as essential or beneficial, for although the authorities at Candahar evidently regard some diversion from hence as highly desirable, yet it must not be forgotten that we have a large extent of doubtful country to watch, leaving a very small body disposable to march out of it. This season, I may remark, appears to be one of unusual severity.

5. I request to draw the early attention of the Right Honorable the Governor-General to the expediency which will exist of a total change in the distribution of the troops in the middle of March, owing to the alteration of the climate of this country at that period, when all the European troops should be placed above the passes if the Government adopts a forward movement, or in the other case fall back to the line of the Indus. Timely preparations for either of these movements should be made accordingly, and it is not necessary that I should explain the variety of arrangements belonging to such operations in a denuded country such as this, or the advantage in point of economy of my obtaining the earliest practicable decision thereupon.

6. In the first-named instance I would propose to place all the European and all other troops which could at that season be safely extracted from Cutchee and Upper Sinde in the country adjacent to Quetta, but if we fall back it will be expedient to send the Europeans to Curachee for the hot season, and to concentrate the remainder of the force at Shikarpore and Sukkur. In the event, however, of a strong emergency existing for the detention of the European troops at Sukkur during summer, it might be practicable to obtain some cover for them at that place. Lord Auckland will have perceived from the medical statistical reports transmitted by me from hence, that with pre-arrangement of this kind there is no reason to conclude that Sukkur would be more fatal to European troops than Quetta has proved to be.

7. It is, however, quite unnecessary that I should at present say more on a question, the decision of which can but be determined by the course of passing events and the political arrangements consequent on such events, and I will merely take the liberty, in conclusion, of again assuring Lord Auckland that in every matter confided to my discretion relating to the care and management of the troops under my command, and in the execution of any of the commands of Government, I shall employ my best ability and judgment, and act in due communication with the Political Agent with whom I am associated in this country.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

Distribution of the Sinde Field Force.

Stations.	No. of Battalions.	No. of Guns.	Corps.
Sukkur	2	Three 6-pounders, Golundauz.	1st Grenadiers; 12th Native Infantry (not arrived).
Shikarpore		Two 6-pounders, Horse Artillery.	8th Native Infantry, and the 15th Native Infantry (when it arrives); one squadron 3rd Light Cavalry.
Bagh	..	.. ..	Intended to be occupied by a wing.
Sebee	1	One 6-pounder, Golundauz.	21st Regiment Native Infantry.
Dadur	1½	Two 6-pounders, Golandauz; four guns, Horse Artillery,	One troop 3rd Light Cavalry; four companies Her Majesty's 41st Regiment; 6th Regiment Native Infantry.
Quettá	2	Two 9-pounders, European Foot Artillery.	One company Her Majesty's 41st Regiment; 20th Regiment Native Infantry; 25th Regiment Native Infantry; and a company of European Artillery of the Bengal Army halted there when en route to Candahar.
En route to join this Force	1½	Camel battery, six 9-pounders.	Four companies Her Majesty's 41st, and the 15th Regiment Native Infantry.

NOTE.—630 irregular cavalry, divided into parties at each station, and a company of Madras Sappers, are stationed at Sebee and elsewhere.

R. ENGLAND.

No. 174.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, *Fort William, March* 22, No. 25, 1842.

ALTHOUGH the events that have occurred in Affghanistan since the date of our last dispatch on this subject have been less important, and have not been marked by circumstances of great and heavy calamity, such as we had then the melancholy duty of reporting, we consider that it may be convenient if we refer briefly to the intelligence which we have received from that quarter, the detailed particulars of which may be gathered from the inclosures of this dispatch, before we proceed to explain our present views as to the policy to be pursued in that country, and the measures which have been adopted to give them effect.

2. The latest accounts which we have received from Cabool are contained in a letter of Lieutenant J. P. Conolly, dated the 24th January, addressed to Mr. Clerk, in which that officer states, that although Shah Shooja had found himself compelled to appear hostile to the British Government, and to talk of equipping an army to oppose us at the Khyber Pass, he secretly assured Lieutenant Conolly of his friendly feeling towards us. The King had been acknowledged by Nawab Zeman Khan, and the rebel chiefs, on the payment of two lacs of rupees to the Nawab, and Ameenoollah Khan, of whom the former had been appointed Vizier and the latter his deputy. Great praise is given in this letter to the conduct and good intentions towards the British Government of Zeman Khan, who is said not to have shared in the treachery of the other chiefs. Great excitement is said still to prevail at Cabool, where the feeling against us continued very strong; and it is added, all will unite to oppose our re-entering the country, unless our force is so large as to preclude the hope of successful opposition.

3. We have no accounts direct from Ghuznee, but it is believed, alike at Candahar, and at Jellalabad, and Peshawur, that the garrison under Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer still holds the citadel, which is well provisioned, and that the town is in the hands of the Affghans.

4. The accounts from Jellalabad extend down to the 24th ultimo. Up to that time the place had been threatened by Mahomed Akbar Khan, but he had not been able to collect a sufficient force to attempt a serious attack. His endeavours to raise the neighbouring chiefs and tribes against us had not been attended with any marked success, and he had failed in inducing the Khyber Maliks to espouse his cause, or to allow him to occupy Ali Musjid in the pass. Mahomed Akbar Khan was, at the same time, anxious to impress upon the officers who are his prisoners at Buddeabad, as well as those at Jellalabad, that he is well disposed to them, and when the army expected from Cabool to operate against that place shall arrive in the neighbourhood he will assist them. The accounts received from Buddeabad continue to speak of the prisoners there being well treated; and they have been allowed to receive from Jellalabad such supplies of clothes and other necessaries as their friends could send to them. Captain Macgregor has, however, received another letter from Shah Shooja, denouncing Mahomed Akbar, and warning that officer against him; and, whatever may be the professions of that leader, his acts serve to show that he is actuated by a determined spirit of hostility; modified only, perhaps, by considerations connected with the position of his own family in Hindostan.

5. Major-General Sir R. Sale had, through the unwearied exertions of the troops and camp followers, succeeded in strengthening the fortifications to a degree that made him feel secure, as long as his supplies and ammunition lasted, against any attack that could be made against him, unsupported by siege artillery, but though he had provision for the troops enough to enable him to hold out for six weeks or two months, he was very scantily supplied with provender for his cattle, and had no money to purchase any description of supplies. This was on the 14th ultimo. On the 19th Sir Robert Sale reported also the deficiency of his means of carriage for bringing off the troops, stores, and ammunition, if he should be compelled to evacuate Jellalabad, and attempt a retreat through the Khyber. On the same day he reports the occurrence of a severe shock of an earthquake, from which some of the bastions of the place had been greatly injured, and the parapet walls had been in many places thrown down. From a letter of Captain Macgregor, dated two days afterwards, it appears that the damage caused by the earthquake was not so serious as had been at first supposed, and that it would be soon repaired.

6. Sir Robert Sale and Captain Macgregor continued to press upon Major-General Pollock the expediency of advancing to their relief, and have been informed by that officer that, although he is reluctant to attempt an advance through the Khyber till he shall be joined by the reinforcements which are on their way to him from India, if, after a full consideration of the objections which he has explained to making such a move, Sir Robert Sale feels compelled to call upon him to advance, he will feel it his duty to comply with their requisition.

7. The Maliks of the Afreedees, and other Khyber tribes, being dissatisfied with the terms offered to them by Mahomed Akbar Khan, have been negotiating with General Pollock through Captain Mackeson, and hopes are entertained that they may yet be prevailed upon to allow us the undisturbed passage of the Khyber.

8. The troops of Brigadier Wild's Brigade have suffered severely from sickness, there being at one time upwards of 1800 men in hospital. The disease, however, was not of a dangerous type, and, by the last accounts, the number of sick had diminished to 868.

9. The insurgents in the neighbourhood of Candahar, under Atta Mahomed and Prince Sufter Jung, having approached to within eight miles of that place, Major-General Nott determined to attack them, and went out for this purpose, with the greater part of his disposable force, on the morning of the 12th January. The enemy had taken up a strong position, with a morass on their front, which made the approach of our troops difficult, and enabled the enemy, who gave way almost as soon as our guns could approach near enough to open upon them, to effect their retreat with comparatively trifling loss, and our force in cavalry was too small to enable the General to act with great effect on their line of retreat. The Janbaz, and other cavalry of Shah Shooja, had previously deserted in great numbers, which is one cause of the General's weakness in this arm. General

Nott had subsequently resolved to march out again to attack the enemy, but the severity of the weather had, up to the last accounts from Candahar, rendered such a measure impracticable. The General and the Political Agent anticipated a deficiency of funds in the Treasury in the month of March, and were considering the practicability of treasure being brought up by an escort from Quetta.

10. The force at Kelat-i-Ghilzye has hitherto remained unmolested, and is considered strong and secure.

11. The attempts of Mohummud Sadik to raise a force in Pesheen for his contemplated attack on Quetta have proved abortive, and that position has been reinforced, and remains strong.

12. Brigadier England, commanding the troops in Sinde, had, before the receipt of our instructions of the 31st January to that effect, made preparations for moving above the passes a portion of the force under his command. He proposes to form a brigade, composed of the troops noted in the margin*, and expected to be able to commence his march about the 20th of this month.

13. The young Khan of Kelat and his chiefs remain firm in their allegiance, and none of the tribes of Cutchee, and near the Bolan Pass, have yet shewn symptoms of hostility consequent on the intelligence of our disasters at Cabool, and the combination of chiefs against us in the Candahar provinces. But Major Outram does not appear satisfied of the fidelity of the Ameers of Sinde, and apprehensions have been felt of some serious exhibitions of a hostile spirit in that country. Brigadier England will, however, leave a strong force in Upper Sinde when he moves above the Bolan Pass, and the post of Kurachee has lately been reinforced by Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment of Foot; and whatever may be the disposition of the Ameers, the force assembled at the two extremities of their territory is sufficient to overawe them, and to subdue any partial attempts that may be made to cause embarrassment.

14. We now proceed to state the measures which have been adopted in consequence of our instructions of the 10th ultimo, which we communicated to your Honorable Committee, in our dispatch of the 19th ultimo.

15. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, on the receipt of our letter of the 10th ultimo, determined to dispatch, in two divisions, the troops noted in the margin†, for the reinforcement of Major-General Pollock. The first of these divisions was to commence its march immediately, but its progress was much impeded by the swollen state of the Ravee, and it cannot be expected to reach Peshawur before the first or second week in April; and the second division did not cross the Sutlej till the 8th instant.

16. On the 24th ultimo, we thought it proper to issue a letter of instructions to Major-General Pollock, in order to put that officer in possession of our views in certain contingencies which might occur. With respect to the application which had been made to Captain Macgregor by Shah Shooja for pecuniary aid, we thought that none should be afforded, while we have no assurance that such aid would not be employed in hostilities against ourselves, while our subjects are detained as captives in his country, and we declared our opinion, that since the Shah, however he might have been influenced to the measure, had accepted a position as head of the Government at Cabool, with the direct support of those principally concerned in the attacks on our force, the strict obligations of our treaty with him must be considered to have ceased.

17. Though doubts might still exist whether Mahomed Akbar Khan is guilty of the crime and treachery laid to his charge, we discouraged all thoughts of negociating with him, unless through some indirect channel, for the release of the British captives in his hands. We recommended to Major-General Pollock the greatest caution in avoiding any positive plan or course of policy which had not already received our sanction; and we informed him that we should consider it prudent, except for very special reasons, to disclose in any manner our probable eventual purposes with regard to Affghanistan.

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* Her Majesty's 41st Foot; Troop of Horse Artillery, 6 Guns; Company of European Foot Artillery; 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry; and 2 Regiments Bombay Native Infantry, with about 22 lacs of rupees for Candahar.

† 1st Division: Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons; 3rd Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery; 1st Light Cavalry; 33rd Native Infantry; a Rissalah 3rd Irregular Cavalry. 2nd Division: Her Majesty's 31st Foot; 6th Native Infantry; Recruits of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; 3 Field Battery Guns; 3 Rissalahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

18. Major-General Pollock was told that we should look to him for as clear an exposition as possible of past facts, as they affected the conduct and character of all parties in Affghanistan. We cautioned him as to his mode of proceeding to secure the release of the prisoners, and instructed him, that if their liberation in exchange for Dost Mahomed Khan and his family should be brought forward, he might hold out very distant hopes of the possibility of such event, though he himself must regard it as a measure of important state policy, to be deliberately determined by Government, upon considerations affecting only the general well-being and advantage of the empire.

19. We explained to the Major-General, that the present object of his proceedings, next to securing the safe withdrawal of the force from Jellalabad, will be that of watching events, and collecting the most accurate information of the state of parties for report to us. For every matter relative to the Lahore Government and its officers, we assured General Pollock that he might always rely on the judicious advice of Mr. Clerk. We enjoined him to repress all disposition to encourage among the Sikhs a violent tone of national and religious animosity against the Affghans, and lead the former to look to making conquests from the latter. We directed the Major-General's particular attention to the condition of the garrison of Ghuznee, and told him that we could not relinquish the hope, that on the return of spring, efforts may be made for its support or relief from Candahar; but that we would not, on that account, desist from urging the Sikhs to assist us by a demonstration on the side of the Juleree Pass, for communication with Colonel Palmer, and if ultimately necessary, his retirement by that route.

20. We have recently judged it expedient to enter again upon an exposition of our views regarding the line of policy which it may be proper for us to pursue in relation to Affghanistan. To our dispatch of the 15th instant on this subject, addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, we would solicit the particular attention of your Honorable Committee. It contains our deliberate sentiments on the present position of affairs in that country, and the course we should pursue towards the retrieval of our late military disgrace, and our final withdrawal of our army from Affghanistan. It points out the conditions on which we can sanction the continuance during the coming season of Major-General Pollock's force in the valley of Jellalabad, after he shall have penetrated by force or by negociation the Khyber Pass. It discourages the expectation that Major-General Nott's force, though reinforced by that of Brigadier England, will, in consequence of the inefficiency of its field equipments, be able to effect much more than the relief of the posts of Kelat-i-Ghilzye and of Ghuznee, and the security of its own retirement to the Indus. To this letter is annexed a statement showing the strength and distribution of the British forces beyond the Indus and the Sutlej.

21. Major Rawlinson has suggested the expediency of a plan for retaining our influence in Affghanistan even after our army is withdrawn from the country, which consists in the separation of the Cabool and Candahar divisions of Shah Shooja's dominions, and annexing the latter division to the possessions of Shah Kamran of Herât, but we have entirely discouraged this proposition; and, indeed, we have no certain information that the Shah Kamran has emancipated himself from the thraldom in which he was lately held by his minister, Yar Mahomed, a decided enemy of the British Government.

22. We have judged it expedient and necessary to confer on Major-General Nott, or other senior officer serving with our armies in those countries, the command of all the troops in Lower Affghanistan and Sinde, and the control of the Political officers employed in those countries, and we have authorised him to take all such steps as he shall deem necessary for the perfect equipment of his army.

23. Mr. Clerk has announced his arrival at Amritsir, whither he proceeded to confer with Maharajah Shere Sing, on the state of the relations between the two countries, and the disposition and power of the Maharajah to afford us useful military co-operation, and Mr. Clerk's report, when received, will probably enable us to decide on the maintenance of any force in the neighbourhood of Peshawur during the ensuing season, in case Major-General Pollock determines on not occupying the valley of Jellalabad.

24. Dost Mahomed Khan has been removed from Saharunpore to Deyra Doon, where he is securely guarded

25. By the inclosure No. 82 of this dispatch, your Committee will perceive that Mr. Clerk now entertains little doubt of the treachery and hostility of Shah Shocja, and thinks, that in consequence there are grounds for considering the policy of the release of Dost Mahomed, with our countenance to his recovery of his former power in Affghanistan.

26. Having received information that the guns intended for the Cabool magazine, which had been placed under convoy of the brigade which marched from Ferozepore towards Peshawur on the 4th of January last, were sent on without ammunition, we called on the Military Board to submit an early and full explanation on this subject.

27. In reply the Board stated, that the guns in question were sent in obedience to orders of the 31st March, 1841, to supply deficiencies in the Cabool magazine, and that consequently, they could not have expected to be immediately available for field service, unless orders had been given to make them so, and such orders the Board remarked, could not have emanated from them, ignorant as they necessarily were of there being any intention of so employing the guns in question. The Board further remarked, that although the guns referred to were necessarily incomplete, there were at the time of their quitting Ferozepore, four spare 9-pounders, and two spare 6-pounder guns completely equipped in every respect, and available for immediate service in the depôt at that station.

28. We caused a copy of the above correspondence with the Military Board to be communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, for his Excellency's information, with reference to the observations contained in the 16th paragraph of our letter to your Honorable Committee of the 19th ultimo (No. 16), a copy of this paragraph having been communicated to his Excellency.

We have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

POSTSCRIPT.

Since the conclusion of this letter, we have received a dispatch from Major-General Pollock, dated 6th instant, copies of which, and its inclosures, we transmit for your Committee's information.

The Major-General is looking anxiously for the arrival of the first division of the reinforcement on its way from India, considering the presence of Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, which forms part of that division, calculated to inspire confidence into the Sepoys. The negotiations with the Khyberees were in progress, but Major-General Pollock did not anticipate from them any beneficial results.

Among the inclosures of the Major-General's letters, are a copy and translation of a letter from Shah Shooja to the Governor-General, which we shall notice more fully hereafter, and copies of two letters from Major-General Sir Robert Sale, dated Jellalabad, March 1st, from which it will be seen that the desultory attacks of the force under Mahomed Akbar had been harmless to the garrison, that forage was still with difficulty procurable beyond the walls, and that there were only thirty-five days' rations of meat for the European portion of the garrison, that the force under Mahomed Akbar was computed at 1500 horse, and 500 foot, and that they had suffered some loss from the fire of our guns.

Among the inclosures of the Major-General's dispatch, will be found letters from Captain Macgregor, at Jellalabad, and Lieutenant J. Conolly, at Cabool. The former officer advises Lieutenant Conolly to keep aloof from all party politics at Cabool, and to recommend to Colonel Palmer to hold his post at Ghuznee as long as it is possible to do so. From Lieutenant Conolly's letter it would appear, that dissension prevails among the chiefs at Cabool, and that the Shah was forming a party against the Barukzye faction, and had among his own partisans the chief conspirators in the late insurrection. It was generally asserted and believed at Cabool, that the Shah instigated the insurrection; and Lieutenant Conolly observes,—"I have never been able to prove the accusation, though I cannot but think that His Majesty was directly or indirectly the cause of the revolution." Accounts from Ghuznee are alluded to, from which it would appear that Colonel Palmer is besieged in the citadel.

We have this day received letters from the Commander-in-Chief, and from Mr. Clerk, copies of which are inclosed.

The Commander-in-Chief's letter, of the 9th instant, gives cover to a copy of one addressed to his Excellency by Major-General Pollock, and dated the 3rd instant, in which that officer alludes to circumstances of a painful nature, regarding the aversion evinced by some of the Native troops to going beyond the Khyber, that may have an influence in determining the course which he will pursue. Major-General Pollock's intention of waiting for his reinforcements before attempting a forward movement, unless pressed by Sir Robert Sale to do so, remained unaltered.

Mr. Clerk writes from Amritsir, on the 6th instant, that he had held a conference with the Maharajah, regarding the mode of co-operation of the Sikh and British forces assembled near Peshawur. The Durbar urges the necessity of slow and cautious proceeding, and that General Pollock should wait the arrival of his reinforcements, in which case the force under Golaub Sing will certainly co-operate, and orders to this effect have been addressed to Golaub Sing. Mr. Clerk had not thought it expedient yet to communicate to the Durbar the determination of the British Government to evacuate Affghanistan.

No. 175.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Loodiana, February* 5, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt yesterday evening of the express dispatch of the 26th ultimo from your Lordship in Council, and the inclosures therein mentioned.

2. I shall be fully prepared, when Her Majesty's 31st Regiment reaches Ferozepore, to detach a brigade of three corps of infantry, a troop of artillery, and such cavalry as your Lordship may direct, before the end of this month.

3. Your Lordship having warned me of the imprudence of weakening our force too much in this quarter, I have directed that Her Majesty's 3rd Foot shall proceed to Meerut, instead of Cawnpore, to be joined at the former by the recruits. I am confident that this will contribute much to the restoration of fine corps.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 176.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Loodiana, February* 8, 1842.

ON the night of the 6th instant I had the honor to receive your Lordship's dispatch of the 28th ultimo, directing me to inform Major-General Pollock and Nott, that they were not to receive any orders in future from Major-General Elphinstone, even if he should be released from his present confinement.

2. The communication to Major-General Nott was sent in triplicate, in this paper, to Major Outram, and it contained the concluding part of the second paragraph for his guidance.

3. Two days since I directed the Adjutant-General to transmit for the information of your Lordship in Council a return of the force at Candahar on the 15th of December, which will be very nearly its present strength.

4. At Mr. Clerk's request I propose to send the Peshawur reinforcement in two divisions, the first of which may, I think, cross over on the 19th or 20th instant.

5. The senior officers will conduct them very well to Peshawur, I have no doubt, and when a junction may be effected, Colonel Dennie, of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, will fall into the command of a brigade, which he so well deserves.

6. I have ordered Captain Codrington, of the Quarter-master-General's department, to proceed with the troops collecting at Ferozepore.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No 177.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Loodiana, February* 8, 1842.

REFERRING to the last passage of your Lordship in Council's letter of the 26th ultimo, I beg to state that I think the raising the complement of the three Ghoorka corps, and the Hurriana local battalion, to the present full complement of the regular regiments of infantry, is strongly to be recommended, the former in view to their assistance in the plains, but more especially to prepare us for the possible consequences of the late conflict between the Sikhs and Chinese upon our northern frontier.

I have directed the three levies authorized by the same dispatch to be raised, trusting, however, to your Lordship's indulgence to remove them to stations nearer to Oude, if the ranks should not fill speedily.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 178

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Loodiana, February* 10, 1842.

THE reports dated 25th and 28th of January from Brigadier Wild, were transmitted to Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, Secretary to Government, by the Adjutant-General, on the 7th instant, for submission to your Lordship in Council.

Supposing that copies have been made for the Political Department, and with reference to them, I beg to inform your Lordship that I have directed Major-General Pollock to assemble a Court composed of three field officers, if circumstances will conveniently permit, to ascertain and report to what causes the deviation from the plan of advance (by which 350 bullocks laden with supplies were to accompany the column) may be set down, and upon whom the blame should be laid. I hope this inquiry may not interrupt the harmony which should prevail, and have warned Major-General Pollock accordingly.

Brigadier Wild has not availed himself of the freedom from control with which I invested him, but considering the urgent orders at first, and appeals afterwards transmitted by Sir Robert Sale, and the opinions and advice of the Political Authorities at Peshawur, I am not disposed to censure an attempt to reinforce and retain Ali Musjid in view to an early advance upon Jellalabad.

I am now apprehensive that that part of my instructions which recommended the establishment of two posts within the pass, and the employment of one native regiment for that purpose, is wholly impracticable; and further that Sikh co-operation for that object will not be afforded.

I regret exceedingly the loss of officers and heavy loss of men experienced in these nine days; cattle, ammunition, and baggage have also been abandoned most untowardly, for the thirst for plunder on the part of the Khyberees will inevitably increase from such successes.

Major-General Pollock was passing his guns over at Attock on the 3rd instant, and proposed to precede the brigade, as soon as it had passed the corps encamped near the road, under the command of Rajah Golab Singh.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 179.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Loodiana, February* 12, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt, this morning, of dispatch No. 227, of the 2nd instant, referring to your Lordship's former orders, and repeating them.

2. My letters of the 31st January, 5th and 8th instant, will have fully assured your Lordship in Council of the arrangemements now in progress to comply with these orders.

3. Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons will arrive at Ferozepore on the 17th instant.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 180.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, February* 24, 1842.

WE transmit herewith, for your Excellency's information, a copy of the instructions this day addressed to Major-General Pollock; and as we may have to retain for an indefinite period a large force in the Punjab, we rely upon your Excellency's exercising a close and constant vigilance, and issuing such injunctions to all the subordinate authorities on whom your measures may depend, that this force wants for nothing, whether in the strength of its artillery, and the munitions of war, or in what regards the efficient direction of all its parts, or its health, its comfort, its shelter, and its supplies.

2. We avail ourselves of this opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letters of the 31st January, 5th February, 8th (two), 10th, 11th, and 12th February. These do not generally require any present notice from us; but with respect to the succession of Colonel Dennie to the command of a brigade, we would express our satisfaction at his promotion, as we have a high opinion of him as an able officer; but as circumstances may for some time preclude him from assuming this command, we would suggest to your Excellency the expediency of a provisional arrangement, by the nomination of an officer who may be deserving of confidence, for the purpose.

We have, &c.,
AUCKLAND.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 181.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Fort William, February* 24, 1842.

THE great uncertainty which must attend all speculations formed at a distance from the scene of action on the probable course of events, military and political, with which you will have to deal, precludes the possibility of Government providing, by previous precise instructions, for many contingencies which may arise in your intercourse with parties within Affghanistan. The consideration of many important points may well be deferred till they come before Government with such illustration and suggestions as you, and the political officers acting in concert and under you, may see reason to submit. There are others on which it would be satisfactory to you to be in possession of the general sentiments of Government as to the principles on which it would act, even though it may not be easy to lay down very precise rules for your guidance; and it is to

provide you with such general instructions that I am now directed to address you.

2. The Governor-General in Council has for some days, in order that he might be enabled to prepare these instructions with greater certainty, awaited the receipt of the two despatches from Major Pottinger, the transmission of which was announced in Captain Macgregor's letter of the 24th of January, but these papers have not been received, and his Lordship in Council does not deem it proper to admit of further delay in communicating his views to you.

3. You will of course have been put in possession of the correspondence which has passed between Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, and Captain Macgregor, and which was communicated to Government by Captain Mackeson in his letter to my address of the 27th ultimo. Captain Macgregor has promised to reply to the Shah's application for pecuniary aid as soon as he may have received the orders of Government on the subject.

4. On this point you will instruct Captain Macgregor to reply to the application, that the British Government, while it is yet disposed to wish well to the Shah personally, can afford no pecuniary aid to him, when there is no assurance that such aid would not be employed in hostilities against ourselves, and when our subjects are detained as captives in his country.

5. As to the past and present conduct of Shah Shooja, and as to our future relations with him, the Governor-General in Council is not in possession of sufficient facts to enable him now to decide, though he holds it to be clear, that having accepted a position as head of the Government at Cabool, with the direct support and assistance of the parties principally concerned in the attacks on the British force, the strict obligations of the treaty by which the British Government was connected with the Shah, must be considered to have ceased.

6. It appears probable that overtures may also be made to you by Mahomed Akbar Khan, in which case you will bear in mind that this person is the reputed murderer of Sir William Macnaghten, and a prominent member of the league against the British ascendency. Doubts have indeed been raised of the fact of Mahomed Akbar having assassinated the Envoy, and till his Lordship in Council can learn more of the facts of the case, he can form no final judgment on that head.

7. But whatever doubts may exist on that point, it is believed that there can be none of Mahomed Khan's having pursued a course of continued treachery, and the prosecution of measures which had for their object the destruction of our troops and the captivity of our officers, whose lives have probably only been saved in order to afford him an advantage in his future negotiations with us: and the whole of his conduct is thought to have been such as to discourage you by all means from entering into any negotiation with him if it can be avoided.

8. Respecting the past conduct both of Shah Shooja and Mahomed Akbar Khan, and the objects and proceedings of all parties principally concerned in the late transactions, you will turn your immediate attention to the necessity of obtaining a clear view of facts, not more for your own immediate guidance than for the information of Government. You may be compelled by circumstances to act on some points on your own judgment, without waiting for instructions. In such case you will be careful not to commit your Government to any positive course or plan of policy, on which its sentiments have not been communicated to you.

9. You are aware that the Governor-General in Council does not contemplate any great effort in the present season for the re-occupation of Affghanistan. It is for you to consider how far it may be prudent to allow a resolution to this effect to become more generally known. It may be of importance, with a view to the objects which we should seek to attain, that our policy in this respect should be kept most secret. On the other hand, the knowledge that we do not propose to return as principals to Affghanistan, might disarm some of the opposition which would otherwise be made to those objects. His Lordship in Council would lean to the opinion that it may not be prudent at present to disclose in any manner our probable eventual purposes; but this is a matter for the exercise of your judgment.

10. You will consider it one of the first objects of your solicitude to procure the release of British officers and soldiers, and their families and private servants and followers, who are held in captivity, and their delivery to you or to

other British officers, at Peshawur, or other certain place of safety. The means of effecting this object must be left a good deal to your own discretion; your efforts will be cordially seconded by Mr. Clerk, and all other British functionaries, and your success may probably be best secured rather by reserve and delay than by apparent eagerness and ready expenditure, as any such eagerness would be likely to increase the difficulty, by encouraging extravagance in the demands of those who hold these unfortunate persons in confinement.

11. Mr. Clerk will be instructed to state to you without delay, his view as to the most proper and prudent means for pursuing this end, and you are authorised at once to give effect to the recommendations which he may offer to you, if they should meet with your concurrence. It appears to his Lordship in Council that arrangements for the purpose would most expediently be made, not through your direct official agency, but through private channels, such as Hindoo bankers and merchants, and other classes among the Affghans; and that all consideration for the release of any parties should be given only after these parties had been brought in security to British posts at Peshawur, or elsewhere on this side of the mountains.

12. His Lordship in Council is aware of the likelihood of private agency and pecuniary means being applied directly or indirectly to this end for the release of particular individuals. Mr. Clerk and yourself, and the officers subordinate to you, will do well to watch such proceedings with care, so as to further them with judgment, and without augmenting the difficulty of procuring a general release of the prisoners, by the natural anxiety of parties to obtain the enlargement of their own friends by expending very large sums for that purpose.

13. The release of the widow of the late Envoy will be an object of prominent care and interest, though his Lordship in Council must look rather to the ultimate possibility of some general arrangement, than to any partial release of individuals; and with respect to the rescue of the prisoners generally, the discouragement to negotiation with Mahomed Akbar Khan might be so far modified as to admit of some competent officer treating with him, or with an agent on his part, for their delivery, if this can be effected without stipulation for the surrender of Dost Mahomed Khan; for that, you must be aware, is a proposition which you could not entertain as a part of a scheme for the exchange of persons held in detention, though if the state of things should appear to justify and require it, you would be authorised to speak of his release as an event which, under various contingencies of circumstances, might not be altogether impossible. Such a measure must be regarded as one of important state policy, and to be deliberately determined by the Government upon considerations affecting only the general well-being and advantage of the empire.

14. On the whole, you will understand that the great present object of your proceedings in Peshawur, is, beyond the safe withdrawal of the force at Jellalabad, that of watching events, of keeping up such communications as may be admissible with the several parties who may acquire power in the northern portion of Affghanistan, of committing yourself permanently with none of these parties, but also of declaring positively against none of them, while you are collecting the most accurate information of their relative strength and purposes for report to the Government, and pursuing the measures which you may find in your power, for procuring the safe return of our troops and people detained beyond the Khyber Pass.

15. In your intercourse with Rajah Golab Sing, and other Sikh officers at Peshawur, you should on all occasions observe a tone as conciliatory as possible, giving to them the consideration due to their rank and independent authority; but you will not require or rely upon the aid of the Sikhs, excepting on occasions when you may deem them perfectly trust-worthy, and for purposes towards the accomplishment of which you may consider such aid essential. On this head, as on all points connected with parties and proceedings within the Lahore dominions, you may always rely on the judicious advice of Mr. Clerk.

16. You will be particularly cautious to avoid, and yet more to repress in others, any indication which may lead to the adoption of a violent tone of national and religious animosity against the Affghans, such as in some of the correspondence of Captain Mackeson, his Lordship in Council has seen with much regret to have been very injudiciously adopted; and with reference to allusions which have been made to the transfer of Jellalabad to the Sikhs, I am desired to inform you that the British Government could not be parties, actively

co-operating in that measure. Such a scheme would be of doubtful expediency, even if we withdraw our own force from Peshawur, and his Lordship in Council apprehends that none of the Sikh leaders would be found in any haste to adopt it. Should we withdraw from Peshawur, his Lordship in Council would not, however, interfere in any way to prevent the Sikh Government from following the course which it might think the best for itself in the maintenance, or the extension, of its boundaries in that quarter.

17. The Governor-General in Council continues to regard with very great anxiety the position of the British garrison of Ghuznee. He will not relinquish the hope that on the opening of the season efforts may possibly be made from Candahar, either for the support of Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer and his troops in the maintenance of their post, or facilitate their retirement in that direction. But unless there should be an early dissolution of the confederacy of the hostile chiefs, this does not appear probable, and you should on your side omit no exertion to open a communication with Colonel Palmer. In this respect the Sikh Government and officers might afford us the greatest assistance, by the conveyance of our letters through the Gahree Pass, and even by demonstrations, and the advance of a body of their own troops to support the retreat of Colonel Palmer, if he is enabled to hold out till the return of Spring, and resolves to attempt retiring by that route. Mr. Clerk will not have failed to take advantage of the return of some of the Lohanee merchants from Hindoostan, to open through them a communication with Colonel Palmer.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 182.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Peshawur, February* 11, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward a letter from Captain Ferris, commanding the corps of Jezailchees, to the address of Captain Mackeson, also one from the latter officer to my address. The fidelity of the men of this corps has been severely tried, and their devotion to the British interests, under very peculiar and trying circumstances, has been fully proved. I therefore trust that Government will sanction the measure which I have authorized, of granting a donation equivalent to one month's pay, and which has been strongly recommended by Captains Mackeson and Ferris.

I hope to derive good service from these men in going through the Khyber Pass; their arms are on an equality with those of the enemy, while the musket is less sure in its aim, and does not carry so far. As there are now only 187 men, I have authorized Captain Ferris to entertain men who can be depended upon by the Native Commandant, to complete the corps to 300 men. This is, of course, only a temporary arrangement, and has reference solely to the prospect of an advance through the Khyber Pass. I shall, therefore, be glad, with reference thereto, to be favoured with the intentions of Government towards this corps.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 183.

Captain Mackeson to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Peshawur, February* 9, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to submit for your consideration a letter to my address, of this date, from Captain Ferris, relative to the disposal of the detachment of Jezailchees remaining under his command.

I had the honor of stating to you in conversation, a few days ago, th meritorious manner in which the detachments of Jezailchees, whether with our troops at Cabool, or with our troops at Jellalabad, or when escorting Captain

Ferris and his party from Peshbulak into Peshawur, had conducted themselves and I expressed my opinion, with reference to them, that it would be for the interest of Government to reward these men for their past services, in order to attach them to the service, and induce others of the same class to serve us. Captain Ferris's request that all arrears due to the detachment with him should be immediately paid up, and a month's gratuity be further allowed to each grade, appears to me reasonable. There is no doubt, also, that a body of 300 Jezailchees would be of great use to our force in passing through Khyber.

An order from you would be necessary to enable me to advance to Captain Ferris the sums due for arrears to his men, and the gratuity, on his furnishing abstracts and receipts.

I have, &c.,
F. MACKESON.

No. 184.

Captain Ferris to Captain Mackeson.

Sir, *February* 9, 1842.

AS you are acquainted with the services in which different detachments of the Regiment of Jezailchees, under my command, have lately been engaged, and can speak as to the manner in which these detachments have done their duty, I shall esteem it a favor if you will take the wishes of Major-General Pollock, C.B., with regard to the future disposal of the detachment that now remains under my command.

2. This detachment consists of 1 Native Commandant, 1 Native Captain, 6 Jemadars, 6 Naib Jemadars, 22 Havildars, 15 Naicks, 5 Buglers, 5 Bheestees, 5 Ferashes, and 187 Sepoys. I have jezails for 280 men, including those you have made up, and which have not yet been issued to the regiment. I propose, with General Pollock's sanction, to increase the detachment to 300 strong, with a view of making use of their service in advancing through Khyber.

3. I would also suggest, with reference to the services performed by the detachment at present with me, that all arrears due to them should be at once paid up, and, further, that, in order to show that their fidelity and services are appreciated by our Government, and to encourage a continuance of the same devotion to our service in this class of men, that a gratuity of one month's pay should be allowed to each grade.

4. Lieutenant Lukin, my former Adjutant, having tendered his resignation, and Captain Gerrard, my second in command, being absent at Jellalabad, it will be necessary, in the event of the detachment being increased, that an officer should be appointed under me.

5. The men will require to be distinguished by some dress, and I would suggest that a brown-coloured shirt of cotton, and a skull-cap, should be supplied at the expense of Government, the cost of which would probably be about 2*s.* 8*d.* per man.

6. I shall also require powder and lead, to make up ammunition, together with native pouches, and about 4000 flints.

I have, &c.,
J. FERRIS.

No. 185.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Peshawur, February* 12, 1842.

I HOPED by this date to have been able to report, for the information of Government, my intention of moving forward immediately, but unforeseen circumstances have occurred, and which are likely to delay any active operations, though I hope not long.

I left General Mc Caskill's brigade three marches on the other side of the At ock, in the expectation of reaching Peshawur the following day, but on my

arrival at the Indus, I found the Sikh troops encamped on the left bank under Rajah Golab Sing, accompanied by the prince, and the road on the right bank was occupied by the four Nujeeb battalions, who had so shamefully retired on the occasion of Brigadier Wild's advance. I was thus compelled to remain at Attock until the Sikh troops moved away, which was effected after many urgent messages from Captain Lawrence, who had joined the Sikh camp with the view of hastening their advance to Peshawur. As the British troops arrived on the day the Sikh troops marched, I remained with the former to hasten them across the Indus. We unfortunately had very heavy rain, but I crossed the whole and marched to Akora on the 4th. The next morning (the 5th) I again left the camp, and proceeded to Peshawur with Captain Lawrence, who returned again to the Sikh camp on the 6th. The day after my arrival, I was much concerned to hear from Brigadier Wild that the number of sick in his brigade amounted to about 1000 men. I proceeded the next morning to camp, visited all the hospitals, to endeavour to ascertain from the surgeons the probable cause: several were suggested, such as the snow water, the attah, the inclemency of the weather, and the effects of the late exposure at Ali Musjid. I attribute it chiefly to the weather at this season, which is cold, with constant rain. I have ordered a special medical committee to assemble and report on the subject, for I regret to say that the number of cases now amounts to more than 1800; the disease, dysentery and diarrhœa. It is, however, satisfactory to know that no case has been fatal, and that almost the whole of them are slight, and I have little doubt of the complaint disappearing almost entirely when the weather becomes less severe. In the meantime I have requested of Captain Mackeson to endeavour to procure for all the men the worsted gloves and stockings which I understand from Captain Ponsonby were granted to the other troops arriving here. I consider it the more desirable that these articles should be given to the men, as the late affairs in which they have been engaged, have, from some mismanagement or want of proper arrangement after Brigadier Wild was wounded, proved severe and trying. I shall visit their hospitals frequently, and by adding in any way to their comforts, show that I feel an interest in them. There has been some unpleasant feeling among them, which I hope has entirely subsided.

The Sikh troops, under Rajah Golab Sing, have not yet arrived, and I fear from the very unnecessary delay which has been made since I first met them at Attock, that I can expect little, indeed no aid, from them; it is unfortunate that it should be so, but it is better that I should expect no aid rather than depend upon receiving it and afterwards be disappointed. The number of troops which I have now fit for duty, exclusive of cavalry, is scarcely equal to the strength of Brigadier Wild's brigade before I arrived. I could not therefore hope to advance and keep open my communication with Peshawur. This is quite evident from the circumstance of the communication being entirely cut off between Ali Musjid and Peshawur, while two regiments held possession of the former place, and the other two regiments were at the mouth of the pass. If, as I am led to expect from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, another brigade, including the 31st Queen's, and the 3rd Dragoons, is now on its march to join me, I shall have no difficulty in advancing, for I fully expect that the sickness which now exists will cease as the weather becomes milder. I have every reason to believe that with a force of about 10,000 men (which they would be if the expected brigade joins in time), I should be able to reach Jellalabad almost without opposition. The chiefs of Lalpoora and Ghoosta are willing to and desirous of aiding us, if we advance with a force sufficient to command respect, and the same may perhaps be said of the Sikhs; but unless the force is formidable, and we are able to make our way and keep open the communication, the tribes between this and Jellalabad will not only not aid us, but will feel compelled to act offensively, to save themselves from the vengeance of the Cabool authorities whenever we may withdraw from the country. The chief of Ghoosta has written a letter, a translation of which I inclose; he has hitherto been friendly, and will no doubt continue so while we are in force. The late Lalpoora chief is still here, and feels fully confident of being able to regain his authority whenever we advance in sufficient numbers. In the event of Sir R. Sale requiring aid before any reinforcement joins me, I should not hesitate to make every exertion to join him; but as we are in communication, I do not expect any sudden or unexpected call from him: he is, by the last accounts, well supplied for a month. Ali Musjid is still in possession of the enemy. I

have made particular inquiry about it, and as I find it is commanded by two hills, I anticipate no difficulty in retaking it, which I propose doing whenever I advance.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 186.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Fort William, March* 1, 1842.

YOUR dispatch of the 12th ultimo, dated from Peshawur, has this day been received and submitted, together with its inclosures, to the Governor-General in Council.

2. Your statement of the extent of sickness prevailing in Brigadier Wild's camp, has been perused with deep regret by his Lordship in Council. His Lordship trusts, however, that the disease is owing to the causes to which you chiefly attribute it, and entirely approves of the judicious measures adopted by you of directing a special medical committee to report upon the subject, and indulges the hope you have intimated, that the prevalent complaint will disappear when the weather becomes less severe.

3. Your conduct is likewise entirely approved, in requesting Captain Mackeson to procure for the men worsted gloves and stockings. I am directed to express the most anxious desire, on the part of his Lordship in Council, that every measure should at all times be taken for securing the efficiency and comfort of the troops, whose gallantry and perseverance, under much difficulty, have caused their admiration, and command their confidence; and this you will not fail to make known to them.

4. I am directed to impress upon you the necessity of acting with concentrated forces, and of avoiding the risk of failure from attempting any important operation with inadequate means. The Governor-General in Council is happy to perceive that you propose to act on this principle, and that you rely on the effect of an advance with overpowering forces, as likely to diminish, very greatly, the opposition which might otherwise be offered to your progress; and his Lordship in Council looks forward to the junction of the reinforcements now on their way to join you, as placing you in a posture of strength which would insure the success of your operations.

5. You will be aware of the great importance of leaving no effort untried to keep open your communication with Major-General Sir R. Sale, by which that officer may become aware of your intentions and movements.

6. I am directed to add, that nothing in this dispatch is intended to vary the tenor of your former instructions, as far as relates to the ulterior objects of your advance.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 187.

Major-General Pollock to Lieut.-Colonel Luard, Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief.

Sir, *Peshawur, February* 13, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 5th instant, containing copies of two paragraphs of a dispatch from the Governor-General in Council.

I have already informed his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief how desirable it is that I should be reinforced, before I attempt the passage of the Khyber: with the additional troops mentioned in your letter, I should expect little or no opposition: if, therefore, I can wait for their arrival, I certainly will do so, but it is of the very utmost importance that there should not be a day's delay, as the Norooz will be in less than forty days, and that is the time at which troops may be expected to collect. There is also another important considera-

tion with regard to Sir R. Sale's force, which is, that they are without money. I have spoken to Captain Mackeson just now on this subject, and he (most zealous in the cause) will endeavour to effect a remittance, though the chances are much against its success.

If Sir R. Sale can hold out till I reach him with the reinforcement, I shall not move till it arrives; but if, on the other hand, his supplies fail him, and he is compelled to retreat, I shall consider that I act in conformity to the wishes of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and of the Government in moving forward to afford him all the aid in my power. I hope this latter course may not be necessary, for in that case we shall be strongly opposed.

I mention these particulars, in order that his Excellency may know how I understand the instructions I have received: also that he may be fully aware of the urgent necessity of pushing on the troops now in progress without a day's delay.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 188.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Peshawur, February* 16, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward herewith copy of a letter received by Captain Mackeson, from Captain Macgregor, dated 7th instant, from which it will appear that at Jellalabad they had three months' supply of atta, and bhoosa for about one month. Since the receipt of Captain Macgregor's letter I have seen a letter from Captain Cunningham, at Jellalabad, dated 11th instant, who says they have four months' atta. Captain Macgregor's information is, perhaps, the most correct of the two. He (the latter) speaks with confidence of their being able to defend themselves against the whole of the Affghan force—so long as their ammunition and food lasts. Captain Cunningham's letter mentions that the ammunition amounts to 200 rounds per man, which is more than we at present have with this force. We are now endeavouring to send money to Captain Macgregor, and I have reason to believe that, through Captain Mackeson's exertions, the scheme will succeed. If so, Captain Macgregor will be able to purchase food for the cattle, and thus render it unnecessary for me to advance until reinforced.

I wrote yesterday again to Sir Robert Sale, to say that, in the event of his considering my immediate advance imperatively called for to aid him, I will do so, though I know that every foot of ground will be contested; but that, if he can hold out with safety till the reinforcements in progress arrive, I will wait for them. I have already, in my letter dated 12th instant, informed you that the sick and wounded amount to 1800, reducing thereby my numbers much below what was contemplated by Government, when, in their dispatch, dated 31st ultimo, to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, they allude to my advancing with the force now here.

The unfortunate affairs at Ali Musjid, where four regiments were employed, show the impracticability of keeping open the pass with a small force, even for the short distance of eight or ten miles. Were I to advance now, with the force I have disposable, I conclude I should be able to force the pass, and reach Sir Robert Sale; but I require 271,542 rounds, to complete the force here to 200 rounds per man. As I advanced, the communication with my rear would be entirely closed. I should also be advancing with a very limited quantity of ammunition for small arms, which Sir Robert Sale would be in want of.

That I could force my way to Sir Robert Sale with the force I at present have available I have no doubt, though it must be attended with loss, and a considerable expenditure of ammunition, which I can ill afford; for I shall not be able to complete the force here to 200 rounds per man until the arrival of Captain Todd's detachment, which may be expected on or about the 2nd proximo. I cannot say when the next brigade may arrive, but whenever they do, if I shall have advanced, and they follow, they will in like manner have to force the pass, thus causing a double loss and a double expenditure of ammunition; indeed, with

only three regiments of Infantry, they would find it difficult to make their way. It therefore appears to me that, unless called upon by Sir Robert Sale, I shall act up to the spirit of the Government instructions, and those of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in not dividing the force. When the whole force is assembled, and I reach Jellalabad, I cannot doubt that, should an opportunity offer, our military superiority would enable me to meet any number of the enemy; but, unless I am enabled, through negociation, or by means of the Sikh troops, to keep open the Khyber Pass, after I have advanced, my position at Jellalabad would not be judicious.

I do not anticipate such a dilemma, for some negociations are already going on with the Auruckzye tribe, who have on our behalf already attacked the Afreedees, and taken some of their strongholds. I cannot at present say how the feuds between the two tribes may terminate; but it holds out a prospect that before very long the passage of the Khyber may be open to us.

The Rajah Golaub Sing, accompanied by the Prince, reached Peshawur the day before yesterday. I expected to have had an interview with the Rajah yesterday, also to-day; but it has rained incessantly, and no hour could be fixed.

I have, &c.

G. POLLOCK.

No. 189.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Peshawur, February* 18, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to inclose a letter from Captain Mackeson to my address, forwarding a translation of a letter from his Majesty Shah Shooja to Captain Macgregor.

2. It may be necessary at some future time to prove the innocence, or otherwise, of the Shah, and with reference to Captain Mackeson's letter I would observe, that the fact of Major Pottinger still considering (after the murder of Sir William Macnaghten) that the Bala Hissar was open to our troops, is strongly in favor of the Shah's innocence.

3. I have also the honor to inclose a translation of a letter from the Maliks of the Afreedees; their object in sending this letter is to endeavour to ascertain our ultimate intentions. In answer to it, I propose sending a copy of the notification made by the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, when the disastrous fate of the Cabool troops was received.

4. If the Afreedees, or indeed any other tribe, suppose that we go to Jellalabad only to relieve the force there, or to strike one blow and retire, they will lose no time in closing an alliance with Mahomed Akbar Khan, whose vengeance they would know must fall on them immediately we gave up all connexion with the country.

5. The more I reflect on the means at my disposal, and on the natural difficulties of the ground, the more I am convinced of the necessity of entering into arrangements with some of the tribes occupying the Khyber Pass. Even with posts of my own troops, I could not consider my communication through the Pass as secure, unless some such arrangement is made; without it I might find myself at or in advance of Jellalabad, entirely dependent on the country round me, for money, ammunition, and supplies.

6. A negotiation is now on foot with the Aurukzyes, and I earnestly hope that it will end in a satisfactory understanding between us and the tribes, who have the greatest influence in the Khyber.

I have, &c.

G. POLLOCK.

No. 190.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Peshawur, February* 18, 1842.

WITH reference to my letter dated 11th instant, on the subject of the corps of Jezailchees under the command of Captain Ferris, I have considered it desirable to authorize Captain Ferris to recruit till his corps is 400 strong. Had I been aware that his Excellency the Commander-in Chief had already authorized Brigadier Wild to recruit for this corps, I should in my former letter have proposed 400 as the strength of the corps, and I trust the Government will sanction this additional increase, as I hope to derive great assistance from them in passing through the Khyber.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK

No. 191.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Fort William, March* 7, 1842.

I AM directed by the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 18th ultimo, reporting that you had authorized Captain Ferris to recruit his Jezailchee corps to the strength of 400 men, and in reply to inform you that your proceedings on this occasion have been approved by his Lordship in Council.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 192.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Peshawur, February* 21, 1842.

THE letters from Captain Macgregor advocate my advance, but I have already stated to Government my reasons for deeming such a measure unadvisable at the present moment, and I do not see sufficient cause to make me change that opinion from the arguments brought forward by Captain Macgregor in the second of the inclosed letters.

There is no one chief at Cabool or near Jellalabad, who appears to possess supreme power, and all parties are at variance. A well-organized advance from Cabool is therefore very unlikely, and I consider that the declaration of Mahomed Akbar Khan's intention of attacking Jellalabad is made merely to keep the eyes of the tribes fixed on him.

He requires some such declaration to prevent his sinking into insignificance, and is (to use Captain Macgregor's words) "without influence, means, or character to assemble a force strong enough" to attack us.

2. My ammunition is, I have already stated, deficient, and the supply which is *en route*, cannot arrive here until the 2nd proximo; an advance without it would be hazardous in the extreme, and, in the mean time, I shall have answers from Captain Macgregor to letters which I have sent to him, in which I clearly explain the causes of my detention.

My sick are daily decreasing; to-day the number is 1289, and this is a very important point.

The Afreedees have made overtures, and the negotiation with them and the Aurukzyes promises to end in a satisfactory adjustment, which I have stated to be in my opinion necessary, even if I now had all my reinforcements and supplies, and ammunition.

For these reasons I have decided to halt until my ammunition arrives, unless the safety of Jellalabad calls for my advance.

3. From General Sir R. Sale's memorandum I have made an abstract of the present state of his force on the 14th of February, and entered it here.

	Effective.	Sick.
Cavalry	241	21
Artillery	171	11
Sappers	304	45
European Infantry	719	30
Native Infantry	838	48
Total	2,273	155

	Days.
Provisions for European soldiers	70
Half rations for natives and sepahis	70
Barley for cavalry and artillery	25*
Forage for all animals	30

It will be observed in this officer's letter, that he says he could not add to the resources detailed, "even if he had money:" this is a most unfortunate circumstance. I have within the last three days sent them in coin 3,000 rupees (three thousand.)

I earnestly hope that this sum will enable them to lay in forage for their cattle, for Captain Macgregor, who must be better able to judge, does not confirm Sir R. Sale's assertion, and urges us to send money.

4. If after the arrival of the detachment of the 33rd Native Infantry with my ammunition, (about the 2nd proximo,) the letters from Captain Macgregor and Sir R. Sale should still urge me to advance as imperative for their safety, I shall not be able to refuse compliance, though I see plainly the many strong objections to my doing so under other circumstances, until I have all my reinforcements.

These objections are to me so numerous and important, that nothing but the fear of losing the fort and garrison of Jellalabad could induce me to overcome them.

5. I had a long interview with Rajah Golab Sing yesterday; nothing was decided; the particulars shall be forwarded to you to-morrow.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 193.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Peshawur, February* 23, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward an abstract of a conversation which took place with Rajah Golab Sing on the 20th instant, and which is by no means satisfactory. I confess I have no expectation of any assistance from the Sikh troops.

The number of sick, which at one time amounted in Brigadier Wild's force to 1800, is now I am happy to say reduced to 1289. The weather lately has become more moderate, and the men are recovering fast.

I herewith transmit also copy of a letter from Captain Macgregor, dated 16th instant; also translation of a French letter from Major-General Sir R. Sale of the same date.

I regret to state Captain Tibbs, with the 400,000 rounds of ammunition, has made four halts on account of rain. I did hope that I might have been able to advance with the brigade lately ordered, but from Sir R. Sale's last letter, and the several delays that have taken place in the advance of the brigade, I now consider it almost hopeless, though it would have a most beneficial effect.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

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* Sir Robert Sale reports that he is short of ammunition and lead.

No. 194.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Peshawur, February* 24, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to inclose a copy and translation of a letter from Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., dated Jellalabad, February 19. The original of this letter is also forwarded, as there are some words in it which it is impossible to decipher with certainty.

I have also the honor to forward copy of a letter from Captain Macgregor, of the same date. The cossids who brought these letters assert that the damage done to the town and fortifications of Jellalabad was trifling as compared to that in Mahomed Akbar's camp at Chanbagh and in all the district of Ningrahar, and I therefore hope that the enemy will be employed in repairing his own losses, and thereby prevented from taking advantage of ours.

2. In all my late letters to your address I have dwelt on the numerous and strong objections which exist to my advancing without my reinforcements; but it is impossible for me to withstand these repeated calls for assistance from Jellalabad, and should they now be continued, I must advance so soon as I can make arrangements, after I have received my ammunition from the detachment of the 33rd Native Infantry, whose arrival here may be now considered as nearly certain on either the 3rd or 4th proximo.

3. The negotiation with the Afreedees and Aurakzyes is still in progress, and there is a hope that by it I may be able to secure a safe passage through the Khyber; but should it fail, or should it be unnecessarily delayed by the tribes, I must advance and force a passage to the relief of the Jellalabad garrison: in which case it is absolutely necessary for me to curtail the baggage which usually accompanies an Indian army, and I shall therefore be compelled to deprive officers and men of many comforts, which under other circumstances might be considered necessaries; and should our communication be closed with the brigades in the rear, my force will have to look forward for an indefinite period to more than usual privations.

4. I have therefore deemed it advisable to address them in Orders on this occasion, and I have preferred appealing to the troops to make the sacrifice themselves, to issuing an order fixing the amount of carriage for each officer and each regiment.

5. With reference to the postscript to Major-General Sir R. Sale's letter, I have informed him that, in the event of Government allowing an interpreter, it will afford me pleasure if Captain Havelock is nominated.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 195.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Peshawur, February* 24, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to inclose copies of letters from Captain Macgregor, of date the 21st instant.

I am much pleased to find him write in such good spirits, and to hear that the money (3000 rupees, three thousand) has reached him, and also that the damaged one to the works by the earthquake has been so speedily repaired.

Captain Macgregor, in the letters now forwarded, admits that he has food for his cattle for one month, that is, up to the 21st of March. By sending money to him, I hope he may be enabled to lay in supplies for a longer period for his animals. Sir R. Sale's letter on this occasion has not yet been received by me, but in his former letters he has reported that he has supplies for seventy days for his men.

The negotiation with the tribes in the pass is still in progress, and Captain Macgregor reports favourably regarding it; but it is as well to be prepared to act without expecting good faith or assistance from the Afreedees.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 196.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Camp, 3 marches west of Loodiana, Feb.* 20, 1842.

I HAD the honor to receive your Lordship in Council's dispatch of the 10th instant, this morning.

2. I am of opinion that the first and second cases require that the force shall advance forthwith to Peshawur. A reference to Major-General Pollock's reports, transmitted by the Adjutant-General to the Secretary in the Military Department, will show how heavily the native corps which proceeded with Brigadier Wild are suffering.

3. Orders were dispatched at eleven A.M. by camel dawk, previously laid, to detach immediately (to-morrow evening, if possible) Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, the 3rd troop 2nd brigade Horse Artillery, 1st Light Cavalry, 33rd Native Infantry, a rissalah of 3rd Irregular Cavalry, six lacs of musket ammunition, and ordnance and musket powder.

Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons has been desired to send a large proportion of other stores, and if the service requires it, two companies of the 6th Native Native Infantry are to be added.

4. This will leave Her Majesty's 31st Foot; 6th Native Infantry recruits; Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; three field battery guns; three rissalahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry; for the second division, the departure of which will immediately follow the arrival of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, perhaps on the 8th of March.

5. I have again departed from my own plan of reinforcement, by adding the 3rd Dragoons, instead of two squadrons, at the instance of Mr. Clerk, who thinks the effect on the Sikhs will be very beneficial. As to their being much employed in relieving Jellalabad, which is the main object of this second exertion, I do not expect it, neither does Mr. Clerk; and I dread the effects of the excessive heat of April and May upon them.

6. The orders and suggestions in the 5th, 7th, and 8th paragraphs have been in several respects anticipated, and in all will be duly attended to.

7. I have the honor to transmit a report, dated Feb. 13, received this morning from Major-General Pollock. His intention to assist Sir Robert Sale, if a retreat from Jellalabad be resolved upon, even before the arrival of the troops, now preparing, has been approved of. I have, however, a strong hope that Jellalabad may and will be held till they are prepared to enter the pass in full force for its relief.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 197.

Major-General Nott to the Officer Commanding at Quetta and in Sinde.

Sir, *Candahar, February* 14, 1842.

IN the event of troops moving towards Candahar I beg you will have the goodness to bear in mind that we have no medicine here; it is also very desirable that you should send as much musket ammunition as you can spare, as there is very little at Candahar. I know not what troops there may be in Sinde, but I am very much in want of cavalry. As I have not received letters from Calcutta since the 3rd of December, I am without instructions from Government, and know not their intentions regarding this country, whether reinforcements are to be sent here from Sinde or not. Prince Sufter Jung, Atta Mahomed, and the

chiefs, have assembled an army, and are in position about thirty miles south-west of this city. I should have moved against them four days ago, but heavy rains have completely inundated the country; however, I hope to attack them in a few days. To-day, we have a heavy fall of snow. No late news from Ghuznee or Cabool.

I have, &c.,
W. NOTT.

No. 198.

Brigadier England to Major Outram.

Head-Quarters, Sinde Field Force,
Sir, *Dadur, February* 18, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you that, under the circumstances of the determination of the Government to maintain Candahar, and with a view to give support to that important measure, I propose, at the earliest practicable period in next month, to move the head-quarters of this force up the Bolan Pass to Quetta, with the following detachment of the troops now in the low country:—

One troop horse artillery, two squadrons 3rd Light Cavalry, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, 6th Regiment Native Infantry, 150 Poona horse.

This movement will render the experiment of keeping European troops at Sukkur during the hot weather almost wholly inexpedient.

2. The corps left for the protection of the line of communication to the Indus, and of our several magazines on that line and depôt at Sukkur will in such case be as follows:—

European company of artillery, camel battery, one company of Golundauze artillery, one squadron of 3rd Light Cavalry, (not yet arrived,) four and a half battalions of Native Infantry, the whole of the Sinde horse, and part of the Poona horse.

3. This portion of the Sinde field force I propose to station thus:—

At Sukkur—Two battalions, two guns; 170 rank and file of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment.
Shikarpore—One squadron 3rd Light Cavalry; one battalion, two guns.
Janeedehra—Two companies.
Chuttin—Two companies.
Bagh—Two companies.
Sebee—Three companies, one gun.
Dadur—Three companies, two guns.
With detachments of Irregular Horse at each post.

4. Thus the force which will be assembled at Quetta very early, I trust, in April, will consist of two squadrons, four battalions, and fourteen guns; and leaving a sufficient body of troops to protect that place, amounting, in fact, to almost its present garrison, I am of opinion that the following detachment may be at once most advantageously employed in opening the communication with Candahar, or in effecting such other operation in aid of that post as circumstances at the moment may suggest:—

One troop horse artillery, two squadrons 3rd Light Cavalry, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, one battalion Native Infantry, a small battalion of light companies drawn from the corps nearest to Quetta, as per margin*, and about 150 Poona horse. The total probable strength of this moveable column being 2500 men.

5. You are probably aware that, independent of the expediency of forcing the communication with Candahar, the troops at that place are much in want of carriage, treasure, medicines, and other stores; also that several officers, as well as a company of Bengal artillery, destined for Candahar, have been for some time prevented from reaching it, owing to the interruption of the road by the

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* Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, 6th Native Infantry, 8th ditto, 20th ditto, 21st ditto, and 25th ditto.

insurgents. The movement, however, which I contemplate, will at once remedy these evils, and thus place the corps of Major-General Nott in increased efficiency.

6. I shall be very glad to hear that you see no political objection, or risk to the peace of the country between this and the Indus, by the arrangement of the troops which I have set forth for your information, and, indeed, that you concur with me in the propriety of my making this diversion in favor of any operations to the northward.

7. You are aware of the numerous arrangements which are essential to even the smallest military operations in this country, and I need offer no other reason for desiring that the measures I have now detailed should be considered as finally decided upon thus early.

I have, &c.,
R. ENGLAND.

No. 199.

Brigadier England to Mr. Maddock.

Head-Quarters, Camp, near Dadur,
Sir, *February* 20, 1842.

I BEG to acquaint you that, after leaving sufficient troops on the line of communication between this and the Indus, and providing, as amply as our means will admit, for the tranquillity of Sukkur and Shikarpore, and after leaving a garrison at Quetta of two battalions, I propose, in accordance with the instructions of the Government of India, which I have yesterday received through Major Outram, and which are dated the 31st ultimo, to push forward to the southern extremity of the Kojuck Pass, and open a communication with Candahar, or support any movement made by the force now occupying that city.

2. I had anticipated this measure on hearing that Major-General Nott had been directed to hold his post, and on also finding, by the chance transmission of a dispatch from Major Rawlinson, dated the 1st instant, that, although he had not then received these directions, there was no intention on the part of the garrison to evacuate that place, notwithstanding they had been called upon to do so by virtue of a treaty entered into with the enemy at Cabool.

3. I beg that you will acquaint his Lordship the Governor-General in Council, that I am the more desirous to force the road to Candahar, because I am aware that the troops now there are in want of stores, treasure, and various supplies which I intend to convey thither if practicable; but as it is impossible, owing to the season, that cattle could survive the march in any numbers through the Bolan Pass, and be effective for further movement, till the end of next month, I shall have an opportunity of being made acquainted with any further wishes which the Government may have to express for my guidance. I presume that, whatever ultimate arrangements may be decided on, there cannot be a doubt of the political advantage of making as powerful a demonstration as possible in the direction in question.

4. The moveable force to be pushed beyond Quetta, after the various deductions which are above referred to, will consist of one troop horse artillery, two squadrons 3rd Bombay Cavalry, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, one battalion Native Infantry, the flank companies of the battalions left at Quetta, and about 100 Poona horse.

5. I take this occasion to submit our extreme deficiency in cavalry, for this or any other operation, and to suggest that such deficiency should, if possible, be still supplied, because some accession of that arm would appear to be equally wanted by Major-General Nott, in the event of his retiring, as by me, in the protection of the large convoy of about 2,500 camels with which I advance.

6. I am aware that the Political Agent of Sinde and Beloochistan has represented this defect to the Supreme Government, and I am merely desirous of adding my testimony as to the triumphant effect which would be produced to the southward of Candahar, by the presence of even two squadrons of European cavalry. If their arrival at Sukkur could be accomplished by the middle of

March, it would be quite practicable that they reached this place before any intensity of heat; and they would overtake me at Quetta, where commissariat arrangements may oblige me to halt a few days.

7. I shall transmit this dispatch under a flying seal to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

I have, &c.,
R. ENGLAND.

No. 200.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, March* 15, 1842.

IT appears to us that it would be convenient at this period to lay fully before your Excellency the deliberate views we entertain with respect to the measures now to be pursued in Affghanistan; and we, therefore, transmit to your Excellency this letter, in continuation of those already addressed to your Excellency upon this subject.

2. The insurrection which has existed in parts of Affghanistan almost from the time of our obtaining possession of Cabool; which, in the summer of last year, led to more than one serious conflict with considerable bodies of men in the vicinity of Candahar; and, extending itself in October to the vicinity of Cabool, impeded the march of Major-General Sir Robert Sale's brigade to Jellalabad; still more the revolution, rather than insurrection, which commenced at Cabool on the 2nd of November, and which, after many disastrous and lamentable events, led to the ultimate destruction of a numerous division of the British army, a calamity wholly without parallel in our history in India; all these circumstances, followed as they have been by the universal hostility of the whole people of Affghanistan, united at the present moment against us in a war which has assumed a religious, as well as national, character, compel us to adopt the conclusion, that the possession of Affghanistan, could we recover it, would be a source of weakness, rather than of strength, in resisting the invasion of any army from the West, and, therefore, that the ground upon which the policy of the advance of our troops to that country mainly rested, has altogether ceased to exist.

3. The information received with respect to the conduct of Shah Shooja during the late transactions, is necessarily imperfect, and, moreover, of a somewhat contradictory character. It is not probable that the insurrection against our troops should have originated with him. It is most probable, and it is almost proved, that he has adopted it, and, powerless in himself, is prepared to side with either party by which he may hope to be maintained upon his precarious throne.

4. Certainly, as we are at present informed, the conduct of Shah Shooja has not been such as to compel the British Government, in blind and solitary observance of the Tripartite Treaty, of which the ground has ceased to exist, to peril its armies, and, with its armies, its Indian Empire, in his support.

5. Whatever course we may hereafter take, must rest solely upon military considerations, and have, in the first instance, regard to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at Ghuznee, at Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and Candahar, to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary risk, and, finally, to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Affghans, which may make it appear to them, to our own subjects, and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities, and violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Affghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that the King we have set up, has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed.

6. But, while the facts before us justify the withdrawal of our troops from Affghanistan, and the refusal of all further assistance to Shah Shooja, they are yet not such as to make it consistent with our reputation, to give our

future support, as is suggested by Major Rawlinson, to Shah Kamran, and to make over Candahar to that nominal ruler of Herat, even were it consistent with prudence to engage in a new speculative enterprize beyond the Indus, which might render it necessary for us to retain, at an enormous cost, a large body of troops in the difficult country, between that river and Candahar, for the purpose of maintaining in the country so made over to him, a Sovereign personally incapable, and for many years unknown to its inhabitants, otherwise than by the fame of his degrading vices.

7. We are of opinion that it would be erroneous to suppose that a forward position in Upper Affghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Sikhs, or that a forward position above the passes of Lower Affghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Beloochees, and the Sindians, by the appearance of confidence and of strength. That which will really, and will alone control the Sikhs, the Beloochees, and the Sindians, and all the other nations beyond and within the Indus, is the knowledge that we possess an army, perfect in its equipment, possessed of all the means of movement, and so secure in its communications with the country from which its supplies and its reinforcements are drawn, as to be able at any time to act with vigour and effect against any enemy.

8. In war, reputation is strength; but reputation is lost by the rash exposure of the most gallant troops under circumstances which render defeat more probable than victory; and a succession of reverses will dishearten any soldiers, and, most of all, those whose courage and devotion have been mainly the result of their confidence that they were always led to certain success. We would, therefore, strongly impress upon the commanders of the forces employed in Affghanistan and Sinde the importance of incurring no unnecessary risk, and of bringing their troops into action under circumstances which may afford full scope to the superiority they derive from their discipline. At the same time, we are aware that no great object can be accomplished without incurring some risk; and we should consider that the object of striking a decisive blow at the Affghans, more especially if such blow could be struck in combination with measures for the relief of Ghuznee,—a blow which might re-establish our military character beyond the Indus, and leave a deep impression of our power, and of the vigor with which it would be applied to punish an atrocious enemy,—would be one for which risk might be justifiably incurred, all due and possible precaution being taken to diminish such necessary risk, and to secure decisive success.

9. The Commanders of the forces in Upper and Lower Affghanistan will, in all the operations they may design, bear in mind these general views and opinions of the Government of India. They will, in the first instance, endeavour to relieve all the garrisons in Affghanistan, which are now surrounded by the enemy. The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military character of the army, and deeply interesting the feelings of their country; but to make a rash attempt to effect such relief, in any case, without a reasonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose preservation is equally dear to the Government they serve. To effect the release of the prisoners taken at Cabool, is an object likewise deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honor. That object can, probably, only be accomplished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be in, or may come into, our possession; and, with reference to this object, and to that of the relief of Ghuznee, it may possibly become a question, in the event of Major-General Pollock's effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward position near Jellalabad, or even advance to Cabool.

10. We are fully sensible of the advantages which would be derived from the re-occupation of Cabool, the scene of our great disaster and of so much crime, even for a week, of the means which it might afford of recovering the prisoners, of the gratification which it would give to the army, and of the effect which it would have upon our enemies. Our withdrawal might then be made to rest upon an official declaration of the grounds upon which we retired as solemn as that which accompanied our advance; and we should retire as a conquering, not as a defeated, Power; but we cannot sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-General Pollock,

unless that General should be satisfied that he can,—without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the pass, which, obtained only by purchase, must, under all circumstances, be precarious, and without depending upon the fidelity of the Sikh chiefs, or upon the power of those chiefs to restrain their troops, upon neither of which can any reliance be safely placed,—feel assured that he can, by his own strength, overawe and overcome all who dispute the pass, and keep up at all times his communication with Peshawur and the Indus; and we would caution Major-General Pollock, and all the officers commanding the troops in the field, not to place reliance upon, or to be biassed by, the representations of native chiefs who may have been expelled from their country, in consequence of their adherence to us, and who will naturally be ready to lead us into any danger by operations which may have the possible effect of restoring them to their former possessions.

11. We have been informed that Major-General Pollock does not consider himself strong enough to force, and to keep, the Khyber Pass, without the first reserve brigade, which was not known to have crossed the Ravee on the 2nd of this month, and which can hardly join him before the second week in April; and being informed likewise that Major-General Sir Robert Sale had, on the 21st of last month, only forage sufficient to last about thirty days, we cannot but expect that those officers will have endeavoured to effect their junction before the arrival of the first reserve brigade, and that they will, when that junction shall have been effected, occupy a secure position near the Khyber.

12. In such a position they will, under all circumstances, be better enabled to assist any operations of Major-General Nott on the side of Ghuznee, by the moral effect of their concentrated strength, than they would be in a more advanced position of extreme hazard to the troops under their command.

13. We look, further, to the effect which the concentration of a large force under your Excellency's command upon the Sutlej would have upon the policy of the Sikhs, and of all Indian States, exhibiting the British Government in an attitude of imposing strength, and giving confidence to its army and to its subjects.

14. The operations of the large force under Major-General Nott and Brigadier England,—a force numerous enough to overcome all resistance whenever it might march, if its numbers comprised a due proportion of cavalry, and if it possessed the perfect equipment and ample means of movement, without which numbers of the bravest and best disciplined men have not the character of an army,—are necessarily so crippled by the want of cavalry and of animals of burden and draught, that we cannot safely rely upon those officers being able to effect any object beyond that of withdrawing the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and securing their own retreat at the proper season, and their communications, in the mean time, with the Indus.

15. We cannot review all the circumstances of the present crisis without being deeply impressed with a sense of the danger arising from the dissemination of troops in an enemy's country, having difficult communication, and of the further danger of leaving any force intended for operations in the field, and at any time liable to be called into action, so composed in the several arms of infantry, cavalry and artillery, and so supplied with ammunition, provisions, and the means of movement, as to be in fact incapable of executing with promptitude and effect, and even of attempting, without peril to itself, any important operations with which it may be entrusted.

16. We subjoin, for the convenience of reference, a memorandum, showing the position and strength of the several corps of the army beyond the Indus, and moving towards that river at the latest period up to which we have information.

17. We have, by this post, transmitted a copy of this letter to Major-Generals Pollock and Nott, for their information and guidance. Copies will also be forwarded to the Lieutenant-Governor and Mr. Clerk; and the dispatch to Major-General Nott will pass under a flying seal through the hands of Major Outram and Brigadier England.

ELLENBOROUGH.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 201.

Memorandum of the Troops employed beyond the Sutlej and in Sinde, according to the latest information in the possession of Government.

FROM the Commander-in-Chief's letter of the 2nd instant, to Mr. Maddock, it appears that at that date no information had reached his Excellency of the first division* of the reserve brigade having crossed the Ravee, and it appears, from his Excellency's letter of the 20th ultimo, that he expected the second reserve brigade†, consisting of the troops detailed in the margin, would cross the Sutlej on, or about, the 8th instant.

The first of these brigades can hardly, therefore, be expected to reach Peshawur before the first or second week in April; and the second brigade, which will be yet more impeded by the heat, not before the end of that month.

On the 27th ultimo, the date of the last report from Major-General Pollock, that officer was at, or near, Peshawur, with three brigades, according to the following statement:—

Her Majesty's 9th Foot.	3rd comp. 2nd batt. Foot Artillery.
26th Regiment of Native Infantry.	4th comp. 6th batt. ditto.
30th Ditto.	10th Regiment of Light Cavalry.
53rd Ditto.	Detachment 3rd Irregular Cavalry.
60th Ditto.	5th comp. Sappers and Miners.
64th Ditto.	

Of the two brigades which were originally commanded by Brigadier Wild, 868 were sick in hospital; more than 1800 had been in hospital ten days before, of whom 236 were wounded; but the sick are said to be rapidly recovering.

At Peshawur was stationed Rajah Golab Sing; and, according to Mr. Clerk's letter of the 17th ultimo, the Rajah's force consisted of the troops and each corps of the strength detailed as follows:—

Khalsa Troops now at or about Peshawur.

Four battalions of General Metab Sing	2,700
Four battalions of Mahomedans and Nujeebs	3,000
One battalion Subja Sing's	800
One battalion under Kooldey Sing Goorkha	600
Sowars under Dewan Mote Ram, in the Eusofzyes	2,000
Miscellaneous Rissalahs	110
One regiment Sowars, under Geean Sing, Commander	500
Two brigades, Bamgall, &c., under General Avitabile	1,300
Jageerdar Sowars	500
Sirdar Nehal Sing of Allowata, contingent with two guns under Hyder Ali Khan	500
Under the personal command of Rajah Golab Sing, the best and chosen troops, with bhower or long-barrelled muskets	3,000
Koonwur Pertab Sing's escort	500
General Avitabile's escort	500
Eight Pieces of Guns.	
Charyarees under Race Kisnee Sing	1,500
Nursing regiment under ditto	800
Hill Peasantry under ditto	200
Four battalions and one regiment under General Court	5,000
Twelve Guns under ditto.	
Two battalions under John Homer	1,000
125 Tumborucks and some miscellaneous Sowars.	

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* Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, 3rd troop 2nd brigade Horse Artillery, 1st Light Cavalry, 33rd Regiment of Native Infantry, and a Rissalah 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

† Her Majesty's 31st Foot, recruits of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 6th Regiment of Native Infantry, three field-battery guns, and three Rissalahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

At Jellalabad, on the 21st ultimo, the force detained there, under the command of Major-General Sir Robert Sale, amounted, of all arms, as per margin*, to 2,273 effective troops, and 155 sick. The Major-General has provisions for the Europeans, and half rations for the native troops, for seventy days; but he was ill supplied with grain and forage for his cattle, not having a stock that would last more than twenty-five or thirty days; and he was apprehensive that, even if he had money to purchase fodder, he would be unable to procure any. He has since received a small remittance of cash—3,000 rupees; and 1,500 more had been dispatched to him.

Major-General Pollock appeared to entertain a hope that the Khyberee tribes would be induced to open the pass, if he consented to pay them for their neutrality.

The force under Major-General Nott, at Candahar, consisted, by the last accounts, of the following troops:—

General Staff - - -	7
All other Staff - -	76
Regimental Officers - -	83
Native Officers . - -	168
All other ranks—fighting men -	8,390
	8,724

1,425 Horses, 265 Camels, 148 Bullocks.

The Major-General's force is strong in infantry and artillery, but is deficient in cavalry; and has not carriage equal to the wants of his force.

Brigadier England's force, above and below the passes, consisted, on the 27th January, of the detachments of the strength noted as follows:—

	No. of Battns.	No. of Guns.	Corps.
Sukkur -	2	three 6-pounders (Golundauze)	1st Grenadiers. 12th Native Infantry. (not arrived.)
Shikarpore-	1	two 6-pounders Horse Artillery.	8th Native Infantry and 15th Native Infantry. (when it arrives.) 1 Squadron 3rd Light Cavalry.
Bagh - - - - - - - -			Intended to be occupied by a wing.
Sebee - -	1	one 6-pounder (Golundauze.)	21st Native Infantry.
Dadur -	1½	two 6-pounders (Golundauze) Horse Artillery.	1 Troop 3rd Light Cavalry. 4 Comp. Her Majesty's 41st Regiment. 6th Regiment Native Infantry.
Quetta - -	2	two 9-pounders European] Foot Artillery.	1 Comp. Her Majesty's 41st Regiment. 20th Regiment Native Infantry. 25th ditto ditto. And a Company of European Artillery of the Bengal Army.
En route to join this force	1½	six 9-pounders.	4 Comps. Her Majesty's 41st Reg. And 15th Native Infantry.

N.B. 630 irregular cavalry divided into parties at each station, and a company of Madras Sappers and Miners are stationed at Sebee and elsewhere.

	Effective.	Sick.
* One squadron 5th Bengal Cavalry	241 ...	21
Artillery	171 ...	11
Sappers and Miners	304 ...	45
Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry	719 ...	30
35th Regiment Native Infantry	838 ...	48
	2,273	155

The Brigadier proposes to move up above the passes about the 15th, or 20th, of March, the troops noted in the margin*, for the purpose of opening the communication with Candahar, and reinforcing Major-General Nott, or covering his retreat, if that officer should resolve on retiring southward. Some difficulty appears to exist in providing carriage for the troops, and the convoy about to proceed, under Brigadier England, above the passes. The exact quantity of carriage required, and of that deficient, has not been stated. The Brigadier speaks of having 2,500 camels and escort, and as we see that considerable purchases of camels have been made for this force in the States of Rajpootana, we may hope that no serious distress on this account will be experienced. The brigade under Brigadier England will take up treasure, about 22 lacs, with medicines and other necessary stores for the force at Candahar.

The last returns of the force at Kurachee exhibit the following number of troops:—

EUROPEANS.		NATIVES.		
Artillery - - - -	94	Left wing—15th Reg. - -		493
13th Light Infantry - -	20	,, 23rd ditto	434	
41st Foot - - - -	194	Absent on command -	190	
40th ditto - - - -	40			244
	343	Recruits, 1st Gren. Regt.		150
				887
				343
				1,230

The force will subsequently have been augmented by the arrival of Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment from Bombay.

And on the advance of Brigadier England through the Bolan Pass, the following will be the disposition which he proposes to make of the troops remaining in the plains of Upper and lower Sinde:—

For the protection of the line of communication, the several magazines and depôts at Sukkur:

One company of European Artillery—Camel Battery.
One ditto Golundauze Artillery.
One squadron, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.
Four and a half battalions of Native Infantry.
The whole of the Sinde horse and part of the Poona horse.
At Sukkur†—Two battalions, two guns; 170 rank and file of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment.
Shikarpore—One squadron 3rd Light Cavalry; one battalion, two guns.
Janeedehra—Two companies.
Chuttin—Two companies.
Bagh—Two companies.
Sebee—Two companies.
Dadur—Two companies.
Detachment of Irregular Horse at each post.

No. 202.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Camp, Loodiana, March* 4, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to transmit a copy of a letter received to-day from Major-General Pollock, dated 27th ultimo. This letter was in acknowledgment

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* One troop of Horse Artillery, two squadrons 3rd Bombay Cavalry, Her Majesty's 41ts Regiment, one battalion of Native Infantry. The flank companies of the battalions left at Quetta, and about 100 Poona horse.

† Mountain Train of Artillery expected from Bombay.

of one addressed to the Major-General, in which I conveyed to him the two first paragraphs of your Lordship in Council's letter of the 10th of February to my address.

The dispatch of the 15th of February, conveying your Lordship's orders of that date, was forwarded to Peshawur in duplicate, on the 25th and 27th, and will remove all the Major-General's doubts.

I am not at all inclined to believe that any arrangements made with the Khyberees will give us permanent security for communication with any troops advanced to Jellalabad, although the prospect and arguments of some of the chiefs appear to tempt the Major-General to venture into Ningrahar for the ensuing summer.

The concluding paragraph of the Major-General's letter contains matter for grave reflection, but, from the tenor of several of your Lordship's late dispatches, the subject has already received your serious attention.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 203.

Major-General Pollock to Lieut.-Colonel Luard.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, February 27, 1842.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 20th instant, by order of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, conveying his approval of my intentions relative to the relief of Sir R. Sale's party. I regret that the copies of my letters to the address of his Excellency and to Mr. Maddock, up to the 13th instant inclusive, have, I fear, been buried in the ruins occasioned by the earthquake. The roof of the room which was for the time my office fell in a few seconds after I left it; I can, therefore, only guess at the intentions I expressed to his Excellency.

On the occasion of the earthquake, which took place on the 19th instant, considerable damage was supposed to have been done to the walls of the fortifications of Jellalabad, and Sir R. Sale thought it probable an attack would be made by Mahomed Akbar; such, however, has not been the case; and instead of the extensive injury which was at first reported, his Excellency will observe that, in Captain Macgregor's letter, dated 21st instant, which I forwarded express, it was expected that in a couple of days the defences would again be strong, and that "the parapet was rising like magic." He had received 3,000 rupees which I had sent him, and which I presume will enable him to purchase food for his cattle. I shall send him more to-day, if Captain Mackeson (who is indefatigable in aiding me) can complete the arrangements; and I fervently hope that the gallant garrison will be enabled to hold out in safety till my reinforcements arrive. On this point I have not lately been sanguine, from their want of money, and being uncertain as to the movements of the 3rd Brigade.

In all my communications with Sir R. Sale and Captain Macgregor, although I have advocated the expediency of waiting for the 3rd Brigade, I have explicitly stated to both, that if in the interim they should consider my advance absolutely necessary, I would at once obey the call.

I have already, I believe more than once, expressed my opinion on the bad policy of moving my force through the Pass in two columns, so long as the Pass is closed to us, thereby entailing a double loss of life, and a double expenditure of ammunition.

I have carefully perused and deeply considered the two paragraphs forwarded by the Governor-General in Council to his Excellency, and which you were directed to transcribe. One part adverts to "a decided turn" admitting of a deviation from the avowed purpose for which this force was mainly formed, viz., "the withdrawing of the Jellalabad garrison in safety to Peshawur;" and his Excellency's orders are that I should carefully and implicitly obey these instructions.

While holding the responsible and confidential situation which it has pleased the Government to confer on me, I consider that I should ill fullfil my trust if I did not respectfully offer my opinion on any points when I may have objec-

tions to propose to the course pointed out for me to pursue; I therefore beg to submit the following observations:—

Uninformed as I am of the ultimate intentions of Government relating to Affghanistan, I may perhaps offer opinions which, as regards their views, may be unimportant; but I apprehend that at the date at which the resolutions of Government were made, it was not known that I have a fair prospect of opening the Pass to our troops; that the Ex-Chief of Lalpoora is not only with us, but has been the means of conveying the money to Captain Macgregor; the Kama Chief, until the fall of Ali Musjid, aided Captain Macgregor, and would no doubt return to our interest on my advancing in force.

The Goshta Chief has proved himself friendly, by having secreted the horsemen who took money to Captain Macgregor a whole night at Goshta. These I consider very favourable circumstances for our advance, and I submit them for the consideration of Government.

It is the opinion of Toorabaz Khan and Suyeed Ayaudeen, that our force, if sufficiently strong to command the resources of the country in Ningrahar, will not be straightened for supplies for twelve months, supposing the Pass to be closed upon us; and Captain Mackeson confirms this opinion, and the Syeed and Toorabaz Khan guarantee on their part to provide the supplies.

The troops remaining at Peshawur would suffer severely in the unhealthy months, whereas at Gundamuck, or on the plain of Ashphan, the climate is favorable to European constitutions, and would admit of Jellalabad being frequently relieved. Such a position would, I conceive, be justifiable only if the Khyber Pass be open; in which case the resources of the Punjab and of Peshawur would also be open to me. I should be too strong to apprehend risk from any attack of the enemy; on the contrary, it would be desirable if I could meet them on a plain, and give them another instance of our superiority. My advanced position would further enable me, I hope, to effect the liberation of the prisoners now with the enemy. If, however, I found that any unforeseen obstacles rendered it necessary for me to retire on Peshawur, I should not hesitate to do so.

If I were to advance with the intention of merely withdrawing the garrison of Jellalabad, my success in advancing must chiefly depend on concealing my intentions; for although (if I succeed in any negotiation to open the Pass) every precaution will be taken by me to secure a safe retreat, I must expect that every man will rise to molest our return, as they would be left to the mercy of the Affghan rulers; and I must confess, I sincerely believe that our return here, unless I have first an opportunity of inflicting some signal punishment on the enemy, would have a very bad effect both far and near.

Our connexion with the Sikh Government is professedly friendly, and the chiefs are, as far as I have observed, courteous, and perhaps well disposed towards us; but the bearing of the soldiery, one and all, is insolent, and they scruple not to express their wish that we may meet with reverses. They are a disorganized rabble, but dangerous as neighbours. Our officers require escorts between camp and Peshawur, and our sepoys or camp-followers dare not move beyond the pickets after dark.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 204.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, February* 28, 1842.

IT is with regret I report that two officers were yesterday severely wounded in an attack on some of the hill tribes, who came down to carry off camels a few miles from camp. It was reported to me that about sixty-six men were carrying off the camels to the hills, and I ordered out a troop of cavalry to recover them. Major Anderson, of the 64th Native Infantry, having reported the circumstance, and knowing the direction, offered to conduct the party. It appeared

that, before the troopers reached the spot, the villagers in the vicinity had driven off the party, and secured the camels, which was not known to the, Major who advanced to the foot of the hills and skirted them for some distance; some of the enemy were overtaken, who defended themselves well; four of them were killed, and those from the hills fired on our party. I beg to inclose a list of killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No.	Rank and Names.	Killed.	Wounded.	Remarks.
	CORNET			
1	T. E. Vibart	..	1	5th Light Cavalry, doing duty, severely.
	TROOPERS.			
1	Ramzaun Khan	1	..	
2	Chundun Sing	..	1	Severely.
3	Buldeo Sing	..	1	Slightly.
4	Usman Khan	..	1	
5	Mankun Khan	..	1	
	ENSIGN			
1	T. M. B. Fraser Tytler, 37th Native Infantry, doing duty with 26th Native Infantry..	..	1	Severely.

No. 205.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, March* 19, 1842.

HAVING taken into consideration the expediency of placing the command of all the troops in Lower Affghanistan and Sinde, in the hands of one officer, with a view to their being directed with uniformity of plan to the accomplishment of the objects detailed in our letter to your Excellency of 15th instant, we have determined to place all those troops under the command of Major-General Nott, and in the event of casualty, under that of Brigadier England, or the officer next to Major-General Nott in rank who may be there employed.

2. We have likewise decided upon entrusting to Major-General Nott, and to such his successor, entire control over the several Political Agents there employed.

3. Major-General Nott, or such his successor, will take such measures and give such orders as he may think fit for equipping the whole force under his command in the most efficient manner, so that it may be capable of executing every movement and enterprise which can be required from an army in the field.

4. Major-General Nott will rely upon our constant support, and upon our placing the most favorable interpretation upon all the measures he may deem it necessary to adopt in the execution of our orders.

We have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.
W. W. BIRD.
W. CASEMENT.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 206.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Camp, Loodiana, March* 5, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant, from Amritsir, transmitting two demi-official letters from Major Outram, dated 17th and 19th ultimo.

2. As Major Outram has fully explained his opinion, and made known his wants to the Governor-General, through his Lordship's private secretary, and as you have duly supported them, by transmitting a copy of your letter above-mentioned, I cannot venture to anticipate his Lordship's orders upon the requisitions therein made.

3. The 9th Light Cavalry is now moving from Kurnaul to Ferozepore, and there are three Native Infantry regiments at the latter station. All these, Major Outram would desire to have, and in addition the 16th Lancers, and Irregular Cavalry.

4. Whence Major Outram has drawn grounds for his opinion that an advance against Cabool is intended by Government, I know not. The dispatch of the 15th of February, is of a decidedly opposite character, as to Major-General Pollock's force—and, I think, Mr. Maddock's instructions to Major-General Nott, of the 10th of February, rather look to the rescue or relief of Kelat-i-Ghilzie and of Ghuznee, than to any advance upon Cabool.

5. You may very well remember that the authorities at Candahar, Quetta, and Sukkur, similarly anticipated and partly prepared for an advance upon Herat last year, which Government entirely disapproved, and which cost the Bombay Government an exertion from which it has never yet recovered.

6. I agree with Major Outram, when he says, "We have to pause for a season before commencing our advance against Cabool." Undoubtedly, it would require the greatest part of 1842 to re-equip General Nott's force, which had but 265 camels, and 148 bullocks, on the 1st of December, for 9,000 men, without followers, at Candahar.

7. What the Government may resolve to do in the present state of affairs beyond the Indus, especially in Candahar, we have yet to learn. The orders of the Governor-General in Council to Major Outram, of the 31st of January, on which the advance of Brigadier England to the Kojuck Pass is founded, make no mention of any movement being intended beyond the southern side of that Pass.

8. If you feel certain that Government will authorize an advance upon Cabool from Candahar this year, I think Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons should be sent to the southward, to join in the enterprise; but on this as on all other points, it is our duty to await the authority and orders of the Governor-General in Council.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 207.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Loodiana, March* 6, 1842.

HAVING received intimation from Mr. Clerk, your Lordship's Agent on this frontier, that he had transmitted a copy of his dispatch to me, dated the 3rd instant, to the Secretary to Government, I have the honor to submit, for the information of your Lordship in Council, a copy of my letter of yesterday, in reply thereto.

2. Brigadier England states in his letter to Mr. Maddock, of the 29th of January, that the troops should be above the Bolan Pass in March; no troops could, therefore, arrive in time to join him; but if your Lordship chooses to send either the 19th, 1st Light Infantry Battalion, or 55th, to reinforce Sinde, your instructions, through Major-General Fast, will reach Ferozepore

nearly as soon, perhaps, as boats can be collected. I have put the 55th last, because it has not a field officer present.

3. Major Delafosse's troop of Artillery will march from Loodiana to-morrow evening, if possible, and will easily join Her Majesty's 31st and the second division ere it can cross the river.

4. The 9th Cavalry will reach Ferozepore about the 20th instant.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 203.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, March* 3, 1842.

IT is to me most painful that notwithstanding all my hopes about the state of the men, I am sorry to say there have been several desertions of late, and there is a feeling among many of the Hindoos of four Regiments of Brigadier Wild's force, which is most lamentable.

A number of the unfortunate creatures from Cabool have come down here, and have exaggerated their sufferings, stating among other things, that, although they were Brahmins, food was thrust down their throats by Mussulmans, and they were spit upon. Some men have also shown mutilated hands and feet, having been frost-bitten ; these things are said to have operated to cause a backwardness.

I sent for Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, who admitted that there was a bad feeling, which he had just heard of; he seemed to say that the men would not hesitate to go to Jellalabad to the relief of Sir R. Sale, but that they had a dread of proceeding to Cabool. I went to each of the other commanding officers, viz., of the 30th, 53rd, and 64th, and instructed them to endeavor to find out what the real state of the case was. Each of these latter officers seemed to consider his own regiment free from any taint, but I had reason to think otherwise, and I further believe that the causes I have mentioned were brought forward by the men to screen them from a suspicion of fear, which, in my opinion, was the real cause.

The affairs which have already taken place in this quarter, and in which those corps are concerned, were so disastrous, that they have, in my opinion, produced the feeling which now unhappily exists. In consequence of what I have stated, his Excellency and Government will suppose that I am doubly anxious to open the Khyber Pass, which those regiments evidently dread.

The vicinity of the Sikh troops is perplexing, for they would not only delight in the feeling I have mentioned, but have, I am told, endeavored to encourage it. I have, therefore, been obliged to prevent them coming into our camp.

I feel, at such a crisis, the want of more European troops, for their presence would give confidence to the native soldiers.

Captain Napleton and other officers of the 60th have been doing their utmost to bring their men to a proper feeling, and expect a successful result; the 53rd are equally implicated, but I have just heard, from both Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch and Major Hoggan, that considerable reaction has taken place, and they hope to report all right before to-morrow evening.

I cannot help remarking here, that this is the second instance of misconduct o the part o fthe 60th since they have arrived here, from which I feel inclined to believe their internal economy is not such as it should be. I inspected them a few days ago, in marching order, and have never seen a finer-looking regiment. At Cawnpore I recollect them in excellent order.

Were I differently situated I might attempt coercive measures, but surrounded as I am by the Sikhs, and within hearing of the Pass, I think such a measure should on all acounts be avoided ; it might risk the safety of the force, which I consider of the utmost importance. The feeling to which I have alluded was reported to me the day before yesterday by Lieutenant Verner, who very properly considered it right that I should immediately be informed, and I should have reported the circumstance yesterday, but that I had strong hopes from the measures I took, that I should be able to suppress it, and was unwilling to give

unnecessary alarm, although my anxiety as to the result has been greater than I can express.

I shall address you daily on this subject by express, until I feel confident that all are willing to go on; they all profess their willingness to die in action in the plains, but they dread Cabool when approached through these passes.

I have sent express to Lieutenant-Colonel White, to hasten his advance as much as possible, as the presence of his force is urgently required: at the same time I have told him that he must not overwork his cattle. I am sorry to say that Captain Tibbs has not arrived yet, and I fear he will not till the 8th instant.

I have not received any direct accounts from Jellalabad for the last three or four days, but the ex-Chief of Lalpoora received a letter from Lalpoora to-day, mentioning that all was well at Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 204.

Major-General Lumley to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Loodiana, March* 9, 1842.

I HAVE the honor, by direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India in Council, copy of a dispatch from Major-General G. Pollock, C.B. commanding the troops at Peshawur, dated the 3rd instant, reporting the existence of an unsoldier-like feeling in some of the native corps of his force.

I have, &c.,
J. R. LUMLEY.

No. 205.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Loodiana, March* 9, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to submit to your Lordship, in Council, a copy of a letter, this day received from Major-General Pollock, in the first paragraph of which he acknowledges his receipt of the orders conveyed to me in your Lordship's dispatch of the 15th of February, regarding the withdrawal of Sir R. Sale's force to Peshawur, with the least possible delay.

2. The Adjutant-General will transmit by this post, a copy of the dispatch to his address alluded to by the Major-General, in paragraph 4.

3. On the 4th instant, I had the honor to transmit, for your Lordship's information, a copy of Major-General Pollock's letter, of the 27th ultimo, now mentioned in the third paragraph.

4. Yesterday I received, and forwarded to Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, a report of Brigadier White's brigade having reached Dhinga, on the 5th instant. The great detention upon the Ravee will interfere much with the Major-General's calculations; but I am confident that time will not be thrown away by the Brigadier.

5. The orders which the Major-General was so desirous to receive, touching the prisoners at Cabool and elsewhere, will be in his hands to-morrow or next day. The copy of Mr. Secretary Maddock's dispatch, of the 24th of February, to the Major-General, was received by me three days ago.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 206.

Major-General Pollock to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Camp, near Peshawur, March* 3, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 25th ultimo, inclosing a copy of a dispatch from the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, of date the 15th ultimo.

My letters since my arrival here will have informed you of the measures which I have taken to effect the relief of the Jellalabad garrison, and the causes which have detained me here; also of the steps which have been taken with a view to bring about a negotiation with the Khyberees; this negotiation is still in progress, and I trust there is reason to hope that, by it, my advance through the Khyber will be unopposed.

3. In my letter of the 27th ultimo, to the address of Colonel J. Luard, Military Secretary, I have enumerated certain favorable circumstances which I have submitted for the consideration of Government, as justifying my maintaining a position near Jellalabad, but I have subsequently heard, with the deepest sorrow, of circumstances which would I apprehend render such a proceeding objectionable, if not attended with risk. I however hope that I may not have difficulty in persuading the Native regiments to enter the Khyber, if I advance merely for the purpose of withdrawing Sir R. Sale's force.

4. I have this day forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army, a detail of the painful circumstances above alluded to; they have caused me the greatest grief, and it is very distressing to me to be obliged to report conduct so disgraceful to the regiments concerned.

5. My communications with Jellalabad have been closed for the last three days, and should this continue I shall feel myself compelled to advance to Sir R. Sale's relief as soon as possible; on the other hand, should I receive letters from him by which I find that he can hold his post so long, I shall of course halt here until the arrival of the 1st Brigade of my reinforcements, viz., about the 22nd instant.

6. I have written to-day "express," to expedite the march of Colonel White's brigade.

7. Supposing the negotiation to which I have already alluded is completed, I shall not have difficulty in reaching Jellalabad; but the first march which I make with Sir R. Sale's force towards Peshawur, will convince the Affghan nation that the British Government no longer intend to keep a permanent footing in that country, and this belief will have the effect of closing the Khyber Pass in my rear: but we shall advance with the least possible baggage, and I do not feel any doubt as to our being able to force our passage and to crush any force which may be brought against us.

8. The above is the only plan which it is in my power to effect for the relief of the garrison of Jellalabad, as late events have too plainly proved that a negotiation for its retreat could not be depended on for a moment.

9. I attach the greatest importance to its being generally believed that we advance towards Cabool, and not only on Jellalabad.

10. The Government have not yet given any powers, that I am aware of, to negotiate concerning the many British subjects who are now prisoners at Cabool: on my arrival at Jellalabad I shall do all that will be in my power to obtain their release, but I am anxious that minute instructions may be sent on this point.

I have, &c.
G. POLLOCK.

No. 207.

The Quarter-Master General of the Army to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Loodiana, March* 9, 1842

I HAVE the honor, by desire of the Commander-in-Chief, to report, for the information of Government, that his Excellency has this day ordered the

3rd Light Infantry battalion to march from Meerut to Kurnaul, and the 6th Irregular Cavalry from Barilly to Umballa, where they are to be respectively stationed for the present.

I have, &c.,
W. GARDEN.

No. 208.

Major-General Lumley to Mr. Maddock,

Sir, *Camp, Doarke-ke-Serai, March* 10, 1842.

I HAVE the honor, by direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to annex, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, copy of a dispatch from Major-General G. Pollock, C.B., dated the 4th instant, on the state of feeling in some of the corps under his command, with copies of letters from the officers commanding the 53rd and 64th Regiments, on the same subject.

I have, &c.,
J. R. LUMLEY.

No. 209.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, March* 4, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward a letter this day received from Major Hoggan, Commanding the 53rd Regiment of Native Infantry. I have understood that there are certain men in the regiments who have encouraged the feeling which has prevailed, and whose discharge from the service would be desirable; I shall hereafter forward their names. If I had had the power to discharge them I would have done so, but although they may have returned to a sense of duty on the present occasion, some of them are considered spokesmen. The treaty with the Aurukzyes for a free passage of the pass, will, I hope, be concluded in five or six days, when I hope to move forward. My force is too small to divide, otherwise I would leave a regiment at Ali Musjid. If I can make any arrangement for our passage through on our return I will do so, but such a thing is highly improbable. I have not yet received a satisfactory report from Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, commanding 60th Regiment.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 210.

Major Hoggan to Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Sir,

I HAVE the honor to state, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., Commanding, that all those Hindoo Sepoys of the 53rd Regiment Native Infantry, who had a few days ago allowed themselves, in an unguarded moment, to evince feelings so immediately opposed to those of soldiers, have now unanimously expressed their contrition, and have given the most satisfactory assurances, through their respective commanding officers, that I shall never again have occasion to be displeased with them, and that they will strive in future to deserve the favorable opinion of the Major-General.

I have, &c.,
I. HOGGAN

No. 211.

Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, March* 2, 1842.

HAVING instituted an inquiry into the feeling at present existing in the 64th Regiment Native Infantry, under my command, I have the satisfaction to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., Commanding, that the order to advance, whenever received, will be obeyed with the greatest cheerfulness by both officers and men of the Regiment.

In proof of what I have before stated, not many days ago, several of the men of the 7th company came to the captain of that company, requesting that, in the event of an advance movement, and they happened to be killed, that the proceeds of their several estates might be sent to the individuals there mentioned.

I have, &c.,
C. W. MOSELEY.

No. 212.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, March* 6, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to transmit herewith an original letter from His Majesty Shah Shooja to the Governor-General; also a free translation thereof. I also inclose copies of letters from Sir R. Sale, Captain Macgregor, and Captain J. Conolly. The former bring down accounts from Jellalabad to the 1st instant. It is satisfactory to know that on the 1st the grass-cutters still continued to bring in forage.

Mr. Clerk, in a late letter, mentions that the dragoons may be here on the 16th, though I almost fear I cannot expect them before the 20th. I consider it of the utmost importance that they and the Horse Artillery should accompany me: their presence will give confidence, I hope, to the Sepoys. The feeling among them, which has lately been smothered, has not, I fear, been wholly extinguished. The example of some may stimulate others to advance, but nothing is so likely to do it as the presence of more European troops. The presence of the Cavalry when I clear the Pass is very desirable, to meet those now with Mahomed Akbar on more equal terms. Negociations continue with the Aurukzyes, but I cannot say that I am very sanguine that our difficulties will be lessened by their exertions.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 213.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Jellalabad, February* 27, 1842.

SINCE the 21st we have been unable to obtain grass for our horses, excepting by supporting our foraging parties in force, and risking an engagement; and have once sacrificed our forage in part rather than compromise our troops and camp followers. All hope of our retaining the uninterrupted command of this supply has been nearly precluded for the present by the events of yesterday.

Mahomed Akbar moved his camp, in the course of the morning, from Umr Khail to a line of forts within two thousand yards of us, formerly occupied by the Ghilzie chiefs, Uzeez Khan and Gool Mahomed Khan.

About half-past 10, A.M., he invested this place to the southward and westward, showing a force of about fifteen hundred horse and not fewer than five hundred Ooloose and other foot. The latter availed themselves of all the old

walls yet left standing, and every inequality of ground within eight hundred yards, and partially occupied the rocky mounds so often referred to in my dispatches. They thus sustained a continued fire of jezails for about seven hou rs holding their horse in reserve on the hills. The height of our restored parapets secured us from a single casualty on our side; and though I prohibited any general fire of musketry from the walls, the enemy lost men from the round shot, shells, and spherical case of our batteries, and the practice of a few selected marksmen with rifles and wall pieces.

I wish you, however, to make Major-General Pollock fully aware that our serious difficulties on the score of forage are hourly increasing.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

No. 214.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, *Benares, April* 20, No. 1, 1842.

IN a despatch from Major-General Pollock, dated the 19th ultimo, and received in Calcutta on the 2nd instant, arrived a copy of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, Commandant at Ghuznee, to the officer commanding at Jellalabad, dated March 1st, 1842, in which that officer reports that he had entered into terms to evacuate the citadel and fort of Ghuznee, in six days.

Your Honorable Committee will perceive from the Gazette, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer's report was published, that it appeared necessary to the Government to submit that officer's conduct, in so surrendering the citadel of Ghuznee, to the judgment of a Court-Martial.

It appeared at the same time to the Government, to be right formally to declare, that the conduct of Major-General Elphinstone should be submitted to the judgment of a Court-Martial, and to announce the intention of the Government to institute, at the earliest possible period, a full inquiry into the conduct of the political functionaries at Cabool.

I have the honor to inclose a copy of a letter which on the same date was addressed to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on this subject.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 215.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, March* 19, 1842

I HAVE the honor to transmit herewith, copies of letters from Sir Robert R. Sale, dated 11th instant, Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, dated 1st instant, and from Captain Mc Gregor, dated 12th instant. From the latter it will appear that they are not urgent for my arrival till the 6th or 7th proximo, under the belief that the reinforcements will reach me.

Brigadier White has, I am glad to say, answered to my several "expresses," by coming on with the cavalry and horse artillery; and by a letter received to-day, I hope he will reach my camp by the 28th. I fear the negotiations about the Khyber are not likely to terminate favourably; I should therefore be glad to have another infantry regiment; but the unaccountable delay which has taken place, makes it, I fear, hopeless.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 216.

Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer to the Officer Commanding at Jellalabad.

Sir, *Ghuznee, March* 1, 1842

IT is with much concern I acquaint you that, from want of water, and by an overpowering force under cover, and within fifty yards of us in the city, I have been compelled to enter into terms to evacuate the citadel and fort, within six days. The garrison is to occupy the north-east corner of the town. The garrison is exhausted by fatigue and constant duty, and the men have suffered greatly from cold, the thermometer having been 14 degrees below zero. The terms are, honorable treatment and safety whilst here and on the march to Cabool, solemnly sworn to by the chiefs. In capitulating, I have only acted up to the orders of Major Pottinger and General Elphinstone, who directed me, in an official letter, to evacuate the citadel and city on the arrival of Rohilla Khan, son of Ameenoolah Khan, Sirdar of Logur. This chief arrived, and promised to escort us in safety to Cabool. Ameer Shumsoodeen Khan, nephew of Dost Mahomed Khan, has also arrived as Governor of Ghuznee, and as Political Agent. I received instructions to march, immediately on his arrival, for Cabool, from the late Sir W. Macnaghten, Bart. Abandoned as this garrison has been, in the very centre of the enemy's country, cut off from all communication with any quarter, and without a sufficiency of water, even at this season, with two hundred men detached to hold an out-post, which is destitute of water, and must have fallen in forty-eight hours, nothing but capitulation remained. From the out-post falling into the hands of the enemy, they would command our only well, and, commanding the fort, the whole garrison would have been destroyed in a few days. The bearer has received only subsistence on the road, and is to receive a handsome reward on delivering this letter. We have upwards of 100 sick and wounded, and 137 casualties. The officers, including Captain Burnett, 54th, and Lieutenant Crawford, Shah Shooja's force, are all well.

I have, &c.,
T. PALMER.

P.S.—There is great reason to fear for our safety, as there are thousands of Ghazees in the city, whom the chiefs cannot disperse. The snow is still deep. No tidings from the southward, but report says the troops hold the city of Candahar, and are daily fighting.

No. 217.

Notification by order of the Governor-General of India in Council.

Fort William, April 4, 1842.

THE following copy of a dispatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, Commanding at Ghuznee, to the address of the Officer Commanding at Jellalabad, dated the 1st March, 1842, is published for general information by order of the Governor-General in Council.

The Governor-General in Council has directed that the Commander-in-chief will submit the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, in surrendering the citadel of Ghuznee, to the judgment of a Court-martial, at the earliest period which such court can be duly assembled.

The Governor-General in Council has already (on the 28th of January last) directed that a full military inquiry shall be made into all the circumstances connected with the direction and conduct of the troops at Cabool, at the earliest period at which such an inquiry may be practicable.

The Governor-General in Council has now directed that the conduct of Major-General Elphinstone in Affghanistan, shall be submitted to the judgment of a Court-Martial, at the earliest period at which such court can be duly assembled.

The Governor-General in Council will further direct that a full inquiry shall likewise be made into the conduct of all the political functionaries employed at

Cabool, at the earliest possible period after he shall be in possession of certain material documents, of which he has already ordered the immediate transmission to Government.

By order of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council.

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 218.

Mr. Maddock to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, April* 4, 1842.

THE Governor-General in Council has had under consideration, the letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, dated Ghuznee, the 1st March, 1842, addressed to the Officer commanding at Jellalabad, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer reports his having entered into terms of capitulation of the citadel of Ghuznee.

2. The Governor-General directs that your Excellency will submit the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, in so surrendering the citadel of Ghuznee, to the judgment of a Court-Martial at the earliest period at which such court can be duly assembled.

3. The Governor-General in Council has, already (on the 28th of January last) directed that your Excellency will cause a full military inquiry to be made into the circumstances connected with the direction and conduct of the troops at Cabool, at the earliest period at which such an inquiry may be practicable.

4. The Governor-General in Council now directs that your Excellency will submit the conduct of Major-General Elphinstone, in Affghanistan, to the judgment of a Court-Martial at the earliest period at which such court can be duly assembled.

5. The Governor-General in Council will on his part cause a full inquiry to be made into the conduct of all the political functionaries employed at Cabool, at the earliest possible period after he shall be in possession of certain material documents, of which he has already ordered the immediate transmission to Government.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 219.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, *Benares, April* 21, No. 3, 1842.

I HAVE already addressed a letter, from this place, to the Honorable the Court of Directors, to announce my departure from the Presidency to the North-West Provinces, and my progress to this station, *en route* to Allahabad, where I shall for a time fix my head-quarters.

2. The impediments to correspondence attendant on a journey by dawk, more particularly at this season of the year, will preclude me from entering into a full and complete detail of all the important proceedings of the Government, during the last month, in the Secret and Political Department; but I will endeavour, during my short stay at this place, to arrange for the information of your Honorable Committee, a précis of the most interesting events which have occurred, and have been reported to me, since the date of the last dispatches from the Governor-General in Council, transmitted to the Home Authorities by the last mail.

3. Confining myself chiefly in this dispatch to the correspondence relative to the progress of events in Affghanistan, I have to refer your Honorable Committee to the inclosures of this dispatch.

4. From these you will learn that the garrison of Jellalabad, under the command of Major-General Sir R. Sale, has continued to uphold the honor and reputation of the British arms, by maintaining its position against a large

besieging force of the enemy, headed by Mahomed Akbar Khan, under great privations from a scarcity of provisions for the men, and forage for the cattle, with a degree of spirit and devotion that has gained for the officers and men composing Sir R. Sale's small force, the sympathy and admiration of their countrymen in India, and has entitled them to the gratitude and applause of the Indian Government.

5. Your Honorable Committee is aware that the fortifications of Jellalabad, raised principally by the zeal and assiduity of the garrison, had sustained considerable injury by the violent earthquake which occurred in that vicinity on the 19th February. The damages were speedily repaired by the unwearied exertions of the garrison, and the troops have since continued to maintain their post with little loss, availing themselves of every opportunity to make sorties against the besiegers, which have been invariably attended with success to our arms, and with discomfiture and serious loss to the enemy. Major-General Sir R. Sale, without ever hazarding the safety of his garrison and post, has, on many of these occasions, inflicted severe injury on the besieging army, and has, by the promptness and vigour of his sallies, secured for himself the forage grounds of the immediate neighbourhood, and, on a late occasion, in an affair of great brilliancy, succeeded in capturing a large flock of sheep, led out to pasture within 800 yards of the walls, in the face of Mahomed Akbar's army. And it should be recorded to the credit of this gallant band, that its spirit and energy have not relaxed even after the repeated disappointment of its expectations of early relief, and under the discouraging circumstances of the failure of Brigadier Wild's attempt to force the Khyber Pass, and of the whole of the troops, both European and native, being straightened for provisions, with a deficiency of ammunition, and apparently dependent entirely on their own resources alone.

6. I feel it to be a pleasing duty to dwell on the gallant and loyal services of the small force under Sir R. Sale, placed in circumstances of so much difficulty and peril, with an active and inveterate enemy in their front and the Khyber Pass closed upon them in their rear, and I have now the satisfaction of informing you, that their enduring and persevering resistance to the enemy has probably ere this been brought to a happy close by the flight of Mahomed Akbar, and the appearance of Major-General Pollock's army in the plains of Jellalabad.

7. Your Honorable Committee is aware that the Major-General, on his arrival in the camp before Peshawur, found the four infantry regiments under Brigadier Wild, dispirited from their recent failure before Ali Musjid, enfeebled by an epidemic which had thrown a large portion of the force into hospital, and looking forward to another advance into the Khyber with so much horror, that even the arrival of Her Majesty's 9th Regiment of Foot failed to inspire the native troops with their usual confidence, and it thence became an object with the Major-General to defer his advance for the relief of Jellalabad till he should be joined by that portion of the reinforcing troops which was still in the rear. This consisted of one troop of Horse Artillery, Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, the 1st Regiment Light Cavalry, and Her Majesty's 31st Foot, besides details. The communication between Jellalabad and Peshawur was, at this time, very irregular; but Major-General Pollock succeeded, with some difficulty in informing Sir Robert Sale of the state of affairs in his camp, and the clear expediency of his waiting, if possible, for the junction of the whole of his force, before he attempted a movement, adding, however, that whenever Sir R. Sale should feel himself reduced to such straits that he had no prospect of holding out longer unless relieved, the attempt should at all hazards be made.

8. The scarcity of provisions at Jellalabad, particularly of meat for the European soldiers, and the great difficulty of longer feeding the cattle, convinced Major-General Pollock that he could not prudently defer his advance till he should be joined by Her Majesty's 31st Foot, which was not expected to cross the Indus before the middle of the present month, and he had consequently resolved to wait only for the arrival of the cavalry and guns, which were expected to join him by the end of March. After the arrival of these troops, however, further delay became unavoidable, in consequence, first, of heavy rain, and, secondly, of the arrangements necessary to be made with Rajah Golab Sing, and the other generals of the Sikh army, of co-operation, as to the particular service which they were to perform in forcing the passes, and the force could not therefore commence its march till the 5th instant.

9. Major-General Pollock's dispatch, a copy of which forms the inclosure No. 17, will fully inform your Committee of the successful commencement of this operation; and the Notification which I have published on the occasion will show how highly I appreciate the services of Her Majesty's and the Honorable Company's troops, and the zealous co-operation afforded by the Sikh army. After the favourable commencement of the advance on Jellalabad, I trust that we need not anticipate any further opposition which cannot be easily overcome in the only remaining strong points of the defile, a short distance from Dakka, where we are likely to meet with opposition. And I hope, before the dispatch of this letter, to have it in my power to congratulate your Committee on the safe arrival of the army before Jellalabad.

10. Your Committee will gather from Major-General Pollock's previous dispatches, and his correspondence with Captain Mackeson, that negotiations had for some time been in progress with Maliks of the Khyber tribes for a free passage through the defile. I am not clearly informed of the precise point at which these negotiations had arrived at the date of Major-General Pollock's advance; but it appears generally, that the Maliks had evinced a willingness to treat, but could not entirely overcome the bigotry of the tribes, or depend on their forbearance and submission to the terms to which the chiefs would have themselves agreed. Opposition, though feeble, was made to our advance, and a portion of the money promised to the Maliks had been actually paid to them. Mahomed Akbar Khan appears to have sent a portion of his own force as far as Ali Musjid, to co-operate in the opposition to our advance; but his troops retired from the position which they had taken up, on the night of the 5th instant, and the fort of Ali Musjid was found evacuated, and was immediately occupied by a British detachment.

11. I have said that the Sikh army co-operated efficiently with Major-General Pollock's force, in the storming of the approaches to Ali Musjid, and when the disorganized state of that army, and the compulsion placed on Rajah Golab Sing, in ordering him on this service, with the most trustworthy of the whole Sikh army, when his own interests called loudly for his presence in another and distant quarter of the Sikh dominions, are fairly considered, your Honorable Committee will regard these services as a very strong proof of the fidelity of the Lahore Durbar, and of its steady friendship to the British Government; and I am anxious to mark, in the strongest manner, the sense which I entertain of the steady attachment to our interests which has been on this occasion displayed by the Government of Maharajah Shere Sing.

12. I have referred, in a separate letter, to the lamentable convention entered into on the 1st ultimo, by Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, commanding the fortress of Ghuznee, by which that officer stipulated to evacuate the citadel in six days, on an engagement, on the part of the hostile troops, to convey the garrison in safety to Peshawar. No authentic accounts have been received from Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer since the date of his letter announcing this convention; but, from the concurrence of native reports received through different channels, there remains little doubt of the evacuation having actually taken place, and of the garrison having fallen victims to the fury of fanatic Ghazees, who were numerous in the town.

13. Party dissension appears, from the letters of Lieutenant Conolly, to have been carried to such a height at Cabool, as effectually to have prevented the chiefs from combining in any efforts often threatened, to equip a force for the reduction of Jellalabad; and Mahomed Akbar has in consequence been left to prosecute with little or no aid from the capital the siege of that place.

14. The British prisoners at Cabool appear to owe their safety to the friendly protection of Nawab Zeman Khan, to whom Shah Shooja is represented as hostile, and from whom he has frequently demanded the delivery of the prisoners.

15. A constant correspondence has been maintained between Shah Shooja and Captain Macgregor at Jellalabad, in which the former labours to prove his uninterrupted devotion to British interests, and to induce this Government to grant him pecuniary aid. He has also addressed letters to me, and to my Agent on the north-west frontier, in which he offers an explanation of the origin of the insurrection at Cabool in November last; and represents the manner in which, if his advice had been taken, it might have been suppressed, and the safety of our troops might at all events have been secured. I have not thought it proper to notice these letters, and I wait for fuller particulars of all the incidents

which preceded and followed the tragedy at Cabool, before I can venture to form a judgment of the degree of culpability attaching to the several actors in those lamentable transactions. I have not yet received the statements of Major Pottinger, which are known to have reached Captain Macgregor in the month of January last; but I may expect these documents, or other means of ascertaining facts now doubtful, from Major-General Pollock, soon after his arrival at Jellalabad.

16. The post of Kelat-i-Ghilzye appears to have continued unmolested since the date of the last report to your Committee. But the army under Atta Mahomed has been kept together, notwithstanding his defeat by Major-General Nott; and assumed an attitude which gave that General hopes, more than once, of being able to bring it to action. For some time the state of the weather prevented his undertaking operations in the field, but at length he marched out of Candahar, about the 7th ultimo, with the greater part of the force to attack the enemy; and when he had been led in the pursuit to a distance of nearly thirty miles from Candahar, a strong detachment from the enemy's army, passing his flank, made a sudden and rapid movement on Candahar, and, arriving before the city, commenced a desperate assault, in which they succeeded in obtaining possession of one of the gates, but were ultimately, after a severe struggle, repulsed with heavy loss. This occurred on the 11th ultimo, and I have not heard of any subsequent engagements in that quarter.

17. In consequence of the scarcity of funds in the treasure chest at Candahar, and the difficulty thence arising of negotiating bills on Shikarpore and other places, but at heavy loss, and in consequence also of a deficiency in some essential articles of medicine for the use of the hospitals, much anxiety had been expressed by the authorities at Candahar for the early transmission of an escort from Upper Sinde through Quetta in charge of supplies of cash and medicines. Major-General England, commanding in Upper Sinde, had been preparing to advance with a complete brigade to Shawl, in support of Major-General Nott, whether with a view to cover his retreat, if he decided on retrograding, or to keep up the communication with him if he resolved to maintain himself at Candahar. The Major-General did not expect to be able to commence his march from the valley of the Indus before the latter end of March, and he was averse to move his troops forward in detachments, but intended to carry up through the Bolan Pass a complete brigade, and to convoy to Candahar or to the Kojuck Pass, about twenty lacs of treasure, besides various supplies of medicines and stores. At the pressing instance of the Political Agent, Major Outram, backed by the requisition of Major-General Nott, Major-General England at length consented to commence his advance with the troops detailed in the margin*, leaving the remainder of the troops to follow when their commissariat and other arrangements should be completed.

He accordingly commenced his march on the 7th ultimo, and arrived at Quetta without difficulty on the 16th ultimo.

18. The state of affairs at Candahar, as then known at Quetta, was not such as to have made an immediate effort to push on a portion of the treasure and supplies indispensably necessary; and Major-General Nott had declared his intention not to detach a party from his force to meet and relieve the escort on the road between Quetta and Candahar, and there was accordingly no obvious object of importance to induce Major-General England to advance beyond Quetta, before he was strengthened by the arrival of his reinforcements from Sinde.

19. He, however, moved out from Quetta on the 26th ultimo, and met with slight opposition till his approach to Hykulzye, where he found Mahomed Sadik's force strongly posted in a position difficult of approach, on the defences of which much previous labour has been spent. The General's dispatch of the 1st instant from Quetta, will give your Honorable Committee all the details of the failure of his attempt to force the enemy's position; the subsequent abandonment of the effort, and his retreat, without further loss or serious molestation from the enemy, to the post of Quetta. Some excitement is said to have

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* Four guns Horse Artillery; wing of Her Majesty's 41st Foot; troop of 3rd Light Cavalry; wing of 6th Native Infantry; a detachment of 100 Poona Horse.

prevailed among the tribes about the Bolan Pass, and the feeling in parts of Cutchee and Sinde appears to be hostile; but no actual disturbances of any serious nature have taken place, and the Brahoees and all under the influence of the Khan of Kelat maintain an attitude of friendship and confident reliance on the British power.

20. Mr. Clerk, the Agent to the Governor-General on the north-western frontier, has been for some time at the Court of Maharajah Shere Sing, employed in discussions with the Maharajah, and his minister Rajah Dhyan Sing, on the arrangements for the co-operation of the Sikh army with the British forces under the command of Major-General Pollock, and on the general state of Sikh affairs. His advice and exhortations have met with ready attention from the Durbar, his intercourse with which appears to have been very satisfactory.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have received, through Major-General Pollock, Major-General Sir Robert Sale's report of the brilliant result of an attack which he directed against the camp of Mahomed Akbar Khan, on the morning of the 7th inst. Nearly the whole of the troops composing the garrison of Jellalabad shared in this bold and gallant exploit, and your Committee will not fail justly to appreciate the last and memorable proof of the zeal, gallantry, and devotion with which Major-General Sir Robert Sale, and the brave troops under his command, have, under every privation and difficulty, maintained their post, and displayed in repeated conflicts, the undaunted spirit of British soldiers, in attacking, or repelling the attacks of an enemy infinitely superior to them in numbers.

No. 220.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, March* 23, 1842.

WE have received your Excellency's letter of the 6th instant, on the subject of Major Outram's requisition for a native regiment to be sent down the Sutlej from Ferozepore, as a reinforcement to the troops in Sinde; and we have had under our consideration the letters from Major Outram of 25th of February, and from Mr. Clerk of 3rd and 8th of March, relative to the necessity of reinforcements for Sinde; but we feel disposed to concur in the opinion your Excellency has expressed with reference to that requisition. It appears that Brigadier England intended to commence his movement through the Bolan Pass about the 20th instant, that is, before any troops could have reached Sukkur from Ferozepore, if your Excellency had thought fit to comply with the requisition; and further, that Brigadier England had arranged that three battalions with four guns should remain at Sukkur and Shikarpore on his advance, a force which seemed to us amply sufficient to protect those points, according to the view we have been accustomed to take of the valor and discipline of our native regiments, and of the spirit and ability of the officers by whom they have been commanded.

We were satisfied that, if the requisition had seemed to your Excellency to be one with which it was fit to comply, your Excellency would have so informed us, and would have placed the regiments in march. It was evidently impossible for us to give any useful instruction upon the subject, to your Excellency, as we only received the letter on the 16th and 17th instant, a few days before the intended advance of Brigadier England from Dadur, which the detachment of a regiment from Ferozepore was said to be necessary to protect.

We have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.
W. CASEMENT.
W. W. BIRD.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 221.

The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, March* 30, 1842.

THE correspondence relative to the requisition of Major Outram for a corps of Native Infantry to be sent down from Ferozepore to Sinde, and the actual dispatch of the 19th Regiment by Brigadier Webber, has been this day under the consideration of Government.

2. We had already, in our letter of the 23rd instant, left it to the decision of your Excellency whether this requisition should be complied with or not. We were disposed to consider the measure unnecessary, as the requisition of Major Outram appeared to have originated in an unfounded apprehension of an impending insurrection in Sinde, and as the amount of force, which Brigadier England proposed to leave for the protection of the country below the Bolan Pass, seemed to us to be fully adequate to that end. We were, besides, convinced that the corps required could not be put in motion in time to produce the effect desired.

3. From the correspondence before us, we are unable to ascertain on what grounds, or by what authority, Brigadier Webber has taken upon himself to order the 19th Regiment to Sinde, but the entire responsibility of the measure would appear to rest with that officer. He had not, as far as we can gather from the correspondence, received any instructions from your Excellency to that effect; and the only intimation we have of the measure originating in any communication from Mr. Clerk is to be found in his letter to your Excellency of the 8th instant, in the last paragraph of which he says, "I have taken the liberty to prepare Lieutenant-Colonel Eckford, commanding at Ferozepore, for the receipt of your Excellency's orders for the immediate dispatch of a regiment, in compliance with Major Outram's requisition."

4. But here we see no authority to justify the officer commanding at Ferozepore in detaching the 19th Regiment to Sukkur, without the express sanction of the head of the Army; and we shall not be satisfied that Brigadier Webber has not acted precipitately and improperly, till we receive such an explanation of his conduct as your Excellency will no doubt have called for.

5. As far as we are at present informed, we cannot but regret the dispatch of the 19th Regiment Native Infantry from Ferozepore to Sinde, and that the more particularly, as we fear that the season will be too far advanced for its return, even if its recall at this moment should not on political grounds, be expedient.

We have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.
W. CASEMENT.
W. W. BIRD.
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 222.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Peshawur, March* 7, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward copy of letter received this morning from Jellalabad, of date the 22nd ultimo.

I yesterday forwarded one from that place, of date the 1st instant, and it is therefore unnecessary to make any remarks upon the present inclosure.

I regret to say, that during yesterday twenty-two men of the 53rd Regiment Native Infantry have deserted.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have received a report that one havildar and nineteen sepoys of the 60th Regiment Native Infantry, have also deserted.

No. 223.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Jellalabad, February* 22, 1842.

OUR troops having laboured incessantly in the works since the great earthquake, the circumstances of which I have communicated to Major-General Pollock, C. B. the extent to which our men have rebuilt the parapets, repaired the principal breach, cleared out the ditch, and restored the defences of the towers, really excites my surprise and admiration. We have had a succession of shocks by night and day since the terrific phenomenon of the morning of the 19th instant, but they have done no damage. Yesterday about half-past 10, A. M., a force of not fewer than 300 of the enemy's horse made a sudden attack upon our foraging party; it was commanded by Jemadar Deena Sing, of the 5th Light Cavalry, who had forty-eight troopers of the two corps under his orders. His videttes were well posted, and, with most praiseworthy coolness, he called in his grass-cutters, gradually withdrew his detached men, and formed up to receive the charge of the advancing Affghans. His bold attitude kept them in check, until he was reinforced by sixty Sowars of Shah Shooja's cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne. A few round shots were directed at the horse from the ramparts, and, on the appearance of the Shah's troops, the enemy, though very well mounted and so superior in numbers, went off over the hill, and returned to their camp at Ameer Khail without further attempt; they cut down, indeed, some, and carried off others, of our unfortunate grass-cutters, who had wandered too far to be able to retire under the protection of the Jemadar's party, but the demonstration appeared to me not very creditable to their enterprize or resolution. The supply of 3,000 rupees by Toorabaz Khan's people has been very acceptable.

This morning the enemy's skirmishers again attacked our foragers on the hills to the southward of the place. These foragers were escorted by Lieut. Mayne, of Shah Shooja's cavalry, with ninety Sowars; at the very commencement of the affair, I sent him positive orders to retire within the fort, and not to risk an engagement; he was falling back very slowly, securing his grass-cutters, when large bodies of the enemy were seen stealing in loose order across the plain from Ameer Khail.

When united, they formed a body of not fewer than 1,000 men. Lieutenant Mayne was now so pressed in his retreat, that, determining not to be taken in flank, he fronted, charged the Affghan skirmishers and the head of their column, and drove them back towards the hills on which they had originally appeared. Their overpowering numbers again compelled him to retire, and the skirmish which I had desired entirely to avoid, now continued on the plain. Perceiving the numerical superiority of the enemy, I sent out to Lieutenant Mayne's assistance, first, bodies of infantry and sappers under Colonel Dennie, to occupy the rocky mounds and old walls on his flank, and then the whole of our cavalry, and two 9-pounders under Captains Abbott and Oldfield. The enemy's horse were pressing on, but upon Captain Oldfield's advancing against them, hastily and in confusion refused the combat, and retired to the distant heights. Our guns did some mischief amongst them, and the whole force retired within the walls with the regularity of a day of exercise. Our loss has been trifling, which the underneath return will show.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

RETURN of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Foraging Party under the Command of Lieutenant Mayen, February 21 and 22, 1842.

	KILLED.				WOUNDED.					MISSING.	
	Troopers.	Grass Cutters.	Horses.	Total.	Havildars.	Troopers.	Grass Cutters.	Horses.	Total.		
5th Light Cavalry.	2	2	1	5	....	1	3	4	9	1	Lieut. May; horse severely wounded.
2nd Reg. S. S. Cy.	....	....	....	....	....	1	....	4	5	....	
Total....	2	2	1	5	1	2	3	8	14	1	

H. WADE.

No. 224.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Peshawur, March* 11, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 24th ultimo, containing the instructions of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council for my guidance.

I had, previous to their receipt, addressed Captain Macgregor on the subject of the prisoners, asking whether any overtures had been proposed or demanded. I have again addressed him, but I suspect no letters I now send to him are likely to reach him.

You will have seen Sir R. Sale's letter, as also Captain Macgregor's, dated the 1st. In the former it is stated that there were rations for the Europeans for thirty-five days, or until the 4th of April, and the fort was again strong.

The unfortunate panic among the Hindoo Sepoys, already reported, has, in a measure, been overcome, but they still dread an advance to Cabool by this road. I hope I may calculate on their advance to Jellalabad; but I am most anxious to add the dragoons and the horse artillery to my present force; their presence will give additional confidence to my own troops, and operate favourably on the hill tribes in the pass, and enable me to drive Mahomed Akbar Khan before me.

I herewith inclose a report from Captain Mackeson of the progress of our negotiations with the Aurukzyes, and, on this point, I confess I am most anxious; it may in the abstract be considered the more glorious course to force the pass when joined by the horse artillery and the cavalry; but it becomes me to consider all I have to do. The object of my advance is to relieve Sir R. Sale and bring him back. The means at my disposal for the conveyance of the sick and wounded is necessarily limited. If I am unfortunately compelled to force the pass, I must carry on my sick and wounded. At Jellalabad I must receive the sick and wounded of Sir R. Sale's force, and our return will, in all probability, very greatly increase the number. My object, therefore, is, if possible, to reach Jellalabad without wounded men. It would give encouragement to those who still dread the pass, and sure I am that we shall have no easy passage on our return. For these reasons I have halted here. I have written express to Lieutenant-Colonel White to leave his detachment with the dragoons and horse artillery (if the infantry impede him), and to advance by forced marches. If he should arrive about the 25th, I can wait till then. I hope to hear from him to-day or to-morrow: his detention at the Ravee was most unfortunate, for he would otherwise certainly arrive in time. I have to-day addressed Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, and have requested him to communicate his views and wishes. I have called his attention to the Guhree Pass, and have told him to let me know if I can in any way aid him. The latest news from Jellalabad is conveyed in a native letter of doubtful authority; by it, there appear to have been engagements both on Thursday and Friday last week, and on last Tuesday, the 8th instant. Our force is described as holding its own

against Mahomed Akbar, who is said to have completely invested the place, but to have been unsuccessful in all the attacks which he has made. Suspicions are thrown out in this letter, of Mahomed Akbar and the Shah Shooja acting in concert.

Syud Azooddeen was sent by me with 5,000 rupees in gold, and 10,000 in silver, to Jellalabad; he writes, that he was attacked on the road and pursued to his village of Misr Chenee, in which he is shut up; the village is fourteen coss from Jellalabad, but I fear that there is little chance of this money arriving.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 225.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Fort William, March* 30, 1842.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch, dated 11th instant, submitting a report of Captain Mackeson on his negotiations with the Khyberees, acknowledging the receipt of the instructions of the 24th ultimo, and adverting to the state of your force, and your views respecting an advance; and in reply, to observe, that as you must now be in possession of the views and wishes of Government with respect to the movements of the force under your command, the Governor-General in Council does not think it necessary to give you any further instructions in reply to this communication.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 226.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Kowulsur, March* 13, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to transmit herewith copies of letters as follow:—One from Sir R. Sale to me, one from Captain Macgregor to me, and one from me to Captain Macgregor. My letter was written with rice water, otherwise I could not have ventured to inform him of the state of the Sepoys.

The delay of the 3rd Brigade has caused me much anxiety, but I know the cavalry and artillery are now hastening on.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 227.

Major-General Pollock to Captain Macgregor.

My dear Macgregor, *Camp, Peshawur, March* 12, 1842.

I WILL write you a very short note with reference to yours and Sale's of the 8th.

It must, no doubt, appear to you and Sale most extraordinary that, with the force I have here, I do not at once move on; God knows it has been my anxious wish to do so, but I have been helpless. I came on a-head to Peshawur to arrange for an advance, but was saluted with a report of 1900 sick, and a bad feeling among the Sepoys. I visited the hospitals, and endeavoured to encourage by talking to them; but they had *no heart*.

I hoped that when the time came they would go.

On the 1st instant the feeling on the part of the Sepoys broke out, and I had the mortification of knowing that the Hindoos, of four out o five native corps, refused to advance. I immediately took measures to sift the evil, and gradually a re-action has taken place in the belief that I will wait for the reinforcements;

this has caused me the utmost anxiety on your account; your situation is never out of my thoughts; but having told you what I have, you and Sale will at once see that necessity has kept me here.

I have sent five expresses to hurry on the 1st Division of the next Brigade: it consists of 3rd Dragoons, a troop of Horse Artillery, 1st Light Cavalry, the 33rd Native Infantry, and two companies of 6th Native Infantry, all fresh and without *taint*. I verily believe if I were to attempt to move on *now* without the reinforcement, that the four regiments implicated would, as far as the Hindoos are concerned, stand fast.

Pray, therefore, tell me without the least reserve the latest day you can hold out. If I could, I would tell you the day when I expect the reinforcements, but I cannot. I may, however, I believe with safety, say, that they will arrive by the end of this month.

The case, therefore, now stands thus:—whether I am to *attempt*, with my present materials, to advance, and risk the appearance of disaffection or cowardice, which, in such a case, could not again be got over, or wait the arrival of a reinforcement, which will make all sure—this is the real state of the case; if I attempted now, I might risk you altogether; but if you can hold out, the reinforcements would make your relief as certain as any earthly thing can be.

Our only object in going to Jellalabad is to release you and bring you back with us to this; but it is necessary that this should be kept a profound secret.

Believe me, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 228.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Kowalsur, March* 15, 1842.

YESTERDAY I did myself the honor to forward copies of letters from Captain Mackeson and Captain Conolly, but I did not like to delay these very interesting letters for any remarks from me.

The fall of Ghuznee is a dreadful blow to our interests, and will much encourage Mahomed Akbar's troops in their attack on Jellalabad. The only hope I entertain for Ghuznee consists in the circumstance of Major Outram having written to Colonel Palmer, on the 24th ultimo, urging and encouraging him to hold his post. This letter was dispatched from Dadur on the 24th, and the bearer promised to convey it to Ghuznee in ten days, in which case it might reach Colonel Palmer before he had concluded his negotiation with the Affghans.

The sad example of Cabool has proved to us the utter inutility of forming treaties with Affghans on such occasions. Should Colonel Palmer have unhappily been induced to trust to the good faith of his opponents, I fear that he and his party will be annihilated. From what I have heard of the late occurrences at Cabool, and from the information which I have obtained of the state of Affghanistan generally, I should say that, apart from the natural treachery of the Affghan character, the country is now so divided by the different contending parties, and the spirit of fanaticism is so strong, that none of the chiefs have the power, even supposing them to have the inclination, to give our troops the protection for which Colonel Palmer has negotiated.

Captain Mackeson has complied with Captain Conolly's request, by giving out that all bills will be dishonoured bearing the signature of the Envoy and Minister, Major Pottinger, or Captain Conolly. Captain Conolly, by crying down the credit of the bills held by the chiefs for twelve lacs of rupees, has done the Government most essential service, as the want of money at Cabool will I trust put it out of the power of any party there to despatch troops to Jellalabad.

I cannot help thinking that Captain Conolly must have been misinformed regarding the letter which he states was written by Rajah Golab Sing. I have already stated, in former letters, that I do not give the Rajah credit for cordially assisting us, but I think him too cautious to commit himself by an expression such as "that the Sikhs would join against us."

I have written to Captain Conolly to say, that the Newab's kindness to the British subjects should be brought to the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, and that I felt certain that such service would not be forgotten.

With reference to the eighth paragraph of Captain Mackeson's letter, I regret that I cannot spare the services of an officer to remain at the Attock; but we have there a Ressaldar and 20 irregular horse, and I have given directions to the Ressaldar to be on the watch regarding the bridge.

Captain Lawrence, with the zeal which has so frequently induced him to undergo many hardships and annoyances, when he thinks he can be of service, has volunteered to ride over to the Attock a day or two before the arrival of Brigadier White's force, and see that every assistance is given in crossing the troops over the river.

Syud Azoodeen, whose departure for Jellalabad with money was reported in my letter to your address dated the 11th instant, has returned. He reports that finding it impossible to reach Jellalabad himself, he sent three Sowars with the gold (amounting to 12,000 Rs.) which two of the Sowars carried into the fort, although closely pursued by the enemy, while the third returned to the Syud with the intelligence.

The Syud's return here with the silver (3000 Rs.) is a sufficient proof of his having acted honestly himself on this occasion; and he assures me that there is not the slightest doubt of the truth of the Sowar's report. He states that Mahomed Akbar Khan has 12,000 of the Ooloos collected round Jellalabad, to whom he is enabled to give the daily half seer of attah customary on such occasions, by having secured three lacs of rupees from the property plundered from our officers near Khoord Cabool.

This account of the force surrounding Jellalabad makes me the more desirous to advance; and therefore anxious for the speedy arrival of the dragoons and horse artillery.

In my letter to your address of the 13th inst., I have stated, "I know the cavalry and horse artillery are advancing." This was written in consequence of my having previously directed Brigadier White to leave the treasure, &c. with the infantry, and to move on with the cavalry and horse artillery; but I regret exceedingly that, by order, Brigadier White has been prohibited from adopting this course; and I much dread the detention which will ensue at each river from crossing so many camels and troops at one time, may greatly endanger Sir R. Sale's safety.

The feeling amongst the Sepoys of four of the native regiments here against an advance has been frequently reported by me. Of late we have had no desertions: I attribute this to a report which has been generally credited in camp, of 20 deserters having been murdered before they reached the Attock; but I anticipate more desertions, and much bad feeling, if I attempt to advance before the arrival of more Europeans and reinforcements, *i. e.* the dragoons and horse artillery.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 229.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

MyLord, *Simla, March* 28, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to transmit, for the information of your Lordship in Council, a copy of a report made by the Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, of the marches lately made by the column under the orders of Brigadier White.

2. Your Lordship will be happy to observe that the Horse Artillery and Cavalry would probably arrive at Peshawur the 27th instant, and in a state of efficiency.

3. Your Lordship in Council will not fail to observe, that the difficulties of passing through the Punjab in haste, are even more considerable and formidable than they are described to be in the 5th paragraph of Mr. Maddock's instructions to Mr. Clerk, of the 10th ultimo.

4. With the certain conviction that, under adverse circumstances, a corps at Peshawur might be as completely compromised as a force at Jellalabad, I had intended to address your Lordship on that point. I hold it now to be unnecessary to do so, as, in the 7th paragraph of your Lordship's dispatch of the 15th instant, I find a similar opinion recorded, which, by your order, has been sent to all the political authorities beyond the Indus, and to your Lordship's agent on this frontier.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

P. S. The prohibition alluded to in the 2nd paragraph of the inclosure, was given by me, to prevent Brigadier White from sending his regiments separately, as he was disposed to do, and which, in our own provinces, it would have been very judicious to have done.

No. 230.

Captain Codrington, Assistant Quartermaster-General, to Lieutenant-Colonel Garden.

Mala, near Pucka Serai,
Sir, *March* 19, 1842.

IN continuation of my report of the 7th instant, I have the honor to inform you that the head-quarters of the force under Brigadier White arrived at Porewala on the 8th, by the same stages as were made by the 1st Cavalry, and on the 9th crossed to the left bank of the Chenab, a distance of seventeen miles. The 3rd Dragoons crossed the river by the ferry on the same day: the continued rise of the river making it impossible to pass even camels by the ford, which I had examined. The Horse Artillery, 33rd Native Infantry, treasure, and stores, followed on the 10th, when no less than thirty-five boats had been collected, and on the 11th moved on with the 3rd Dragoons to Porewala, 7½ miles.

2. The 1st Cavalry had continued its march to Porewala on the 9th, and to Dhenga on the 10th, but in consequence of an order from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief prohibiting the separation of the force, the regiment was directed to halt at Dhenga on the 11th, to enable the head-quarter of the force to overtake it; and on the 12th the whole moved to Koree, eighteen miles from Porewala, and six from Dhenga. The stage on the following day was to Malloo, thirteen and a quarter miles, which, being within six miles of the ferry opposite Jhylum, it was hoped that the 1st Cavalry might get across the river on the same day; no more than eight boats, however, had been collected, and there being a strong adverse wind and current which drove back almost every boat that attempted to cross, very little progress could be made.

3. On the 14th, the remainder of the force encamped on the bank of the river, and in the course of the day, the wind having subsided, the passage of the 1st Cavalry was nearly completed. As the river appeared to be falling, the offer of a reward of 100 rupees induced the boatmen to try some difficult fords, about six miles higher up the river, between the villages of Maydapoor on the left bank, and Kiree on the right. Here there are five distinct streams, separated from each other by considerable tracts of highly cultivated land, containing several villages. The depth of these fords was found to be about four feet; the breadth varying from 150 to 600 yards; the current very rapid, and the bottom composed of large pebbles, in which no marks could be fixed to shew the direction. I reported them practicable only for unladen camels and horses, and on the 15th, five troops of the 3rd Dragoons in watering order, and many hundred camels, passed through them; many men and horses, and some of the camels, were carried into deep water by the strength of the current, but the villagers, provided with inflated goat-skins, rescued them all, with the exception of one of the Syces, who was unfortunately drowned, and a camel.

4. On the 16th, the guns, and all the mounted troops reached the right bank of the river, and, in compliance with an order from Major-General Pollock, pushed on as rapidly as possible, leaving the stores and treasure on the left

bank of the Jhylum to follow under escort of the 33rd Native Infantry, and rissalah of Irregular Cavalry.

5. The stages made by the 3rd Dragoons, 1st Cavalry, and Horse Artillery from the right bank of the Jhylum, are as follows:—

On the 17th, Oudenana 2¼ miles.
,, 18th, Tumuk, 17½ ,,
,, 19th, Mala, 15 ,,
(near Pucka Serai.)

6. The only heavy and difficult road between Oudenana and Tumuk, made it a severe march for the Horse Artillery, which did not reach camp till four in the afternoon, and the guns had to be dragged up the steep, rocky ascent near Tumuk, by a fatigue party from the 3rd Dragoons. It is to be feared that the artillery horses will suffer much more than the cavalry; but, nevertheless, if no unforeseen impediment occurs, the whole may be expected to reach Peshawur on the 27th instant, in a perfectly efficient state.

I have, &c.,
R. CODRINGTON.

No. 231.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Simla, March* 28, 1842.

I HAVE long since had the honor to receive Mr. Maddock's letter of the 28th ultimo, transmitting, by your Lordship's orders, a letter from the Military Board, (not the correspondence in full,) on the unequipped state of certain guns sent from Ferozepore to Peshawur, under charge of Major-General Mc Caskill.

2. The Board's explanation is very correct. The guns were ordered as part of a Cabool indent, and even their dispatch was a matter between the Delhi magazine and the Deputy Commissary of Ordnance in Affghanistan. When I knew that they were under Major-General Mc Caskill's charge, I desired General Pollock to use them, of course, and the annexed statement of ammunition will show that they were not so unprovided as was supposed.

3. As to 6-pounder ammunition, it is the commonest class in use. No doubt General Avitabile could have supplied the two guns of that calibre with 200 or 300 rounds each, with great ease; and I do not yet know that he was unable or unwilling to grant the supply.

4. The Military Board is not so very correct in apprizing your Lordship that there are six spare guns in the fort at Ferozepore. I wish I could say that they were in any depôt; they are not now under shelter, but exposed to the atmosphere, and, until the fort is nearly rebuilt, they cannot be fired with safety.

5. Any part of this battery might have been sent forward with the four Native Infantry regiments: but it was not so ordered. In the excessive haste with which the requisitions were made, all such equipment was forgotten.

6. I presume that the two papers of remarks alluded to in the dispatch of the 19th February last to the Secret Committee, were extracted from my explanatory letters to Lord Auckland, dated 10th January, and 6th February.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

List of Ammunition for Mountain Train under command of Captain Backhouse, which proceeded with Major-General Mc Caskill.

Cartridges fitted for 3-pounders . .	330
Cartridges fitted for 4⅖ howitzer . .	330
Shells, common, for do. . .	111
Spherical case for (fitted and fixed) . .	350
Canister for 3-pounders . . .	60
Canister for 4⅖ howitzer . . .	39
Round shot for 3-pounders . . .	240

No. 232.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Simla, March* 30, 1842.

I HAD the honor to receive, upon the 26th instant, the dispatch addressed to me on the 15th by your Lordship in Council, copies of which have been transmitted to the General Officers Commanding in Upper and Lower Affghanistan, and to the Political Officers, for their information and guidance.

2. I should have confined myself to a mere acknowledgment of this dispatch, but that I am anxious to point out to your Lordship in Council, the embarrassment which Major-General Pollock may feel, when called upon to decide upon the measures to be taken after he reaches Jellalabad. By the orders of Government, dated 15th February, the Major-General was "to direct all his efforts and measures to the withdrawal of Sir R. Sale's force from Jellalabad to Peshawur, with the least possible delay."

In accordance with the late instructions (fifth paragraph), the Major-General will feel called upon to strike "some signal and decisive blow upon the Affghans" in view "to the re-establishment of our military reputation." And, by the ninth paragraph, he will understand that he is at liberty to choose the place and time at which such effort is to be made, even to an advance upon Cabool.

3. Whilst Major-General Pollock is hesitating between these two orders, he will, no doubt, receive from Mr. Clerk, your Lordship's Agent on this frontier, a copy of Major Outram's letter to Mr. Clerk, dated Dadur, March 13, 1842. Of this Mr. Clerk has transmitted to me an abstract which contains the following passages:

"Deprecates in the strongest manner the withdrawal of the Jellalabad Garrison, and does not conceive a mode more injurious to our interest in Affghanistan, or one more likely to endanger our position there, and in India, could be devised by our bitterest enemy."

"Trusts, that as discretionary power is invested with him (Mr. Clerk), he will see the expediency of holding Jellalabad, even should we be compelled to defer the invasion of the country till another," &c. Of Mr. Clerk's power to control Major-General Pollock, when 500 miles distant from him, I was not aware.

4. It is not desirable that I should add to the Major-General's difficulties, by attempting to define his course, but your Lordship would possibly have been surprised if I had overlooked them.

5. If Major-General Pollock could have carried up stores of all descriptions, and spare cattle for Sir R. Sale's force, I should have thought it practicable for these united bodies of troops to have moved next month up on Cabool, to have left some marks of our power and displeasure there, and to have retired by Candahar, carrying away the garrisons of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, Giriskh, and the 27th Native Infantry. The want of cattle and of followers is not, I fear, to be overcome.

6. Should your Lordship in Council be pleased to adopt the opinions of Major Outram and Mr. Clerk, and to hold Candahar and Jellalabad as defensive positions for this year, I earnestly recommend that a large augmentation of the Bombay and Bengal Armies may be previously authorized to enable them to effect in 1843 whatever your Lordship may please to order.

7. It is my duty to solicit your Lordship's attention, however, to the danger of having an insulated force at Jellalabad, cut off from Hindoostan by the formidable Khyber Pass, and by the Powers of the Punjab.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 233.

The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Taldanga, April* 12, 1842.

I RECEIVED here this morning, your Excellency's letter to me in Council, dated Simla, the 30th of March.

2. In reply thereto, I have the honor to observe, that the instructions contained in the letter from me in Council, dated the 15th of March, to which your Excellency refers, necessarily supersede the previous instructions of the 15th February, wherein those instructions may be deemed to conflict.

3. On what authority Major Outram, in the letter from him to Mr. Clerk, dated the 13th of March, to which your Excellency adverts, intimates "that a discretionary power is vested in Mr. Clerk of holding Jellalabad," I am altogether ignorant. I have not concurred in giving any such discretionary power to that political agent; nor am I aware that any such power was ever entrusted to him.

4. Your Excellency has been already informed, that authority over all political agents in Lower Affghanistan and Sinde, has by my letters in Council dated the 19th of March, been given to the Major-General commanding at Candahar, and to his successor in command.

5. I am so far on my way to Allahabad, where I trust I shall arrive on the 21st. I shall there have the means of more easy communication with your Excellency, and I look forward with anxiety to the time when we may be together, being convinced that our being together, or very near each other, will obviate many evils.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 234.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Peshawur, March* 28, 1842.

SIR ROBERT SALE has not, I believe, provision sufficient to last until I could reach him if I wait for the 31st Foot, and as he appears most anxious that he should be reinforced without delay, I shall move forward as soon after the arrival of the dragoons and horse artillery as practicable. Negotiations still continue with the Maliks, on which I hope to report to-morrow or the next day. I may, however, say the appearances are more favourable than they have yet been. If we succeed, it will give encouragement to the Sepoys, and the taking of Ali Musjid will, I hope, fully restore confidence. It is, perhaps, premature to speculate on our position at Jellalabad, when I shall have joined Sir R. Sale; but I consider it advisable to the possibility of my being in a commanding situation at Jellalabad with the Khyber Pass open.

If closed, the position would not be judicious.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 235.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Kowlusur, March* 29, 1842.

I BEG to report that the troop of horse artillery, the 3rd Dragoons, and 1st Light Cavalry, reached Peshawur this morning: they will move on to this camp to-morrow morning, and I hope to be able to move forward on the following day. I will keep you regularly informed of my movements when in advance.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 236.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Tope Chonee, April* 12, 1842.

THE Governor-General being on his way to Allalabad by dawk, has not at present the best opportunities of replying regularly to your dispatches, but with respect to those which have been submitted to him from you, of dates between the 23rd and 29th ultimo, his Lordship has desired me to convey to you the following instructions.

2. You are authorized to advance to Newab Zumaun Khan, who is described by Lieutenant Conolly, as having evinced great kindness to the British prisoners at Cabool, and as having expended much money on account of their protection and sustenance, such sums as, under the circumstances, you may deem fitting.

3. Your authorizing the payment of the small bills for 3000 and 4000 rupees, respectively, drawn by Lieutenant Conolly at Cabool, and your leaving unpaid for the present that officer's bill for 21,000 rupees, are appoved by the Governor-General.

4. The Governor-General expects to arrive to-morrow at the staging Bungalow from which this letter is dated, and to be at Benares on the 19th, and at Allahabad on the 21st instant.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 237.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jumrood, March* 31, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward copies and translations of the following letters:—

From Colonel Palmer to the English gentlemen at Cabool.

From Lieutenant Conolly to Major-General Sir R. Sale and Captain Macgregor.

From Major-General Sir R. Sale and Captain Macgregor to me.

I have also the honor to send a copy of Captain Lawrence's letter to Captain Mackeson, forwarding the above-mentioned papers; there can be no doubt of their being genuine, as Lieutenant Conolly's letter to Captain Macgregor (a copy of which was forwarded by me to you on the 28th instant) was written in rice-water on the back of his Persian letter.

I shall, of course, in the event of the conditions for which Colonel Palmer stipulated, being fulfilled, cash the bond for 40,000 rupees.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 238.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Jumrood, April* 2, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, of date 15th ultimo, with accompanying documents, viz., copy of instruction by his Lordship in Council to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and a memorandum of the troops employed beyond the Sutlej and in Sinde.

2. I arrived here on the 31st ultimo, in the expectation of moving into the Pass the following morning, but the desertion of camels, and very heavy rain, have alone been sufficient to prevent my moving. I have also been much disappointed by the delay of the Rajah Golab Sing in not sooner having moved up his troops. The force which is to act in concert with me, has not yet all arrived at the ground, from whence it will enter the Jubhagi entrance of the Pass, to

meet us at Ali Musjid. Although I have never expected any very active operations from them, I feel that the circumstance of our moving at the same time and for the same object, will have a good moral effect on all parties.

3. I shall, to-morrow morning, advance to the Pass, and hope to reach Ali Musjid during the day; but the heavy rain which has just fallen will so much increase the weight of the carriage, that I may be compelled to halt at the first stream of water which is about one mile and a half on this side.

4. The result of the negotiations with the Afredees is contained in the copy of a letter (which I will this day send express to your address) from Captain Mackeson, whose patience and exertions on this occasion have been incessant. As I cannot place much confidence in any treaties entered into with any of the tribes, I shall go prepared for resistance, and I hope to report favourably of the morrow's march. The Sikhs have engaged to hold Ali Musjid for one month, after which period I shall have no means of keeping open a free communication with Peshawur, but through the forbearance of the tribes in the Khyber, which cannot be depended on. I therefore fully expect that, if I remain beyond the period which the Sikhs engaged to hold Ali Musjid, I shall be opposed the whole distance, and even by those who now profess to act with me.

5. I shall endeavour to report daily until I clear the Pass; but as the Sikhs hold it only as far as Ali Musjid, it may not be in my power after leaving that post. I don't think (and my opinion is formed on the statement of Captain Mackeson, who has eight times passed through), that the whole of the Pass, from the entrance near this spot, to Dakka, a distance of twenty-six miles, could be kept open with a less force than 8000 men.

6. I consider it my duty to place on record, that the present system of supplying hired camels is most ruinous as regards efficiency, and that no force beyond the Indus ought to be dependent for carriage upon the owners of camels. As an example, I would draw your attention to the following particulars connected with the carriage of the force now here. The cattle are hired for the journey from Ferozepore to Jellalabad, and the owners receive an advance of twenty rupees for each camel. Desertions even before we reached Peshawur were numerous; and on several occasions I have been obliged to send spare camels to bring on stores, &c. The three companies of Native Infantry which last arrived here have no camels; they brought their loads to Peshawur, and deserted; two of these companies, under Captain Tebbs, brought 600,000 rounds of musket ammunition; but the whole of the Surwans, with these camels, having deserted, I have the greatest difficulty in moving the men, and can only take a portion of the ammunition. The evil is a very serious one. I am unable to point out any remedy but that of employing only purchased camels, and Surwans whose houses are in our provinces. The greater number of Surwans who have been sent with this force, are natives of the Punjab, and have therefore greater facilities in deserting; indeed, it is hardly possible to prevent their doing so.

7. I trust that I may consider the feeling of the native troops averse to an advance, has, in a considerable degree, subsided; and I earnestly hope, that by carrying the first position with promptness and spirit, I shall be able to give them confidence in themselves.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 239.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jumrood, April* 2, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward copy of a letter from Captain Mackeson, detailing the progress of a negotiation which has been for some days going on with the Afreedees.

2. I have also the honor to inclose copies of letters from Captain Macgregor and Major-General Sir R. Sale, C. B., of the 29th and 30th ultimo. The very favourable report of affairs at Jellalabad, makes me think it less urgent for me to advance immediately, and has induced me to accede to the wishes of the Sikhs, who have begged of me to delay another day, in consequence of the

heavy rain which has this day fallen. I have decided on halting here to-morrow and on the next day moving into the Khyber. I have been desirous that the move of the Sikhs should be simultaneous with ours, as the knowledge of our moving at the same time, and for the same object, will operate greatly in favor of the cause in all quarters.

I have given the Rajah Golab Sing distinctly to understand that I cannot delay a day longer.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 240.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Jumrood, April* 3, 1842.

I HAVE heard this moment that the 33rd Regiment cannot possibly join my camp from Peshawur, before 9 A.M., and that the state of their cattle is such as to preclude the possibility of their accompanying us to Ali Musjid to-morrow. I have therefore been compelled to halt another day.

I regret exceedingly that I have to report more desertions from the regiments which were formerly under Brigadier Wild, with the exception of the 60th Regiment Native Infantry.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 241.

Notification by the Governor-General of India.

Head-Quarters, Benares, April 19, 1842.

THE Governor-General has much satisfaction in communicating to the Army the following dispatch from Major-General Pollock, C. B., announcing the successful advance of the troops, under the Major-General's command, into the Khyber Pass, and the evacuation by the enemy of the fort of Ali Musjid.

The Governor-General has been much gratified by the uniform testimony borne by all the officers engaged, to the zeal, the gallantry, and the perseverance of all the troops of Her Majesty, and of the Government of India, which had the good fortune to have this opportunity of distinguishing themselves before the Affghan enemy; and his Lordship doubts not that the continued exercise of these, the accustomed military qualities of the Indian Army, will produce their accustomed results, in the achievement of new honour, and of new victories.

The Governor-General deems it to be due to the troops of the Maharajah Shere Sing, to express his entire satisfaction with their conduct, as reported to him, and to inform the Army, that the loss sustained by the Sikhs in the assault of the Pass which was forced by them, is understood to have been equal to that sustained by the troops of Her Majesty and of the Government of India.

The Governor-General has instructed his agent at the Court of the Maharajah, to offer his congratulations to his Highness on this occasion so honorable to the Sikh name.

By order of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India.
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 242.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Sulla Chunee, near Ali Musjid, April* 16, 1842.

IT is with feelings of much gratification I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, the

following detail of operations undertaken and carried into effect against the Afreedees.

2. Yesterday morning, at half-past three, the troops were under arms, the camp struck, and, according to arrangements previously made, the treasure, ammunition and baggage placed on the road leading from Jumrood towards the entrance of the Khyber Pass. The enemy had for some days appeared in great numbers at the mouth of the pass, which they had fortified with a strong breast-work of stones and bushes. The hills on the right and left were rocky and precipitous, presenting great natural obstacles to the ascent of troops. To gain the summit of these heights, defended as they were by a numerous body of the enemy, was an undertaking of considerable difficulty.

3. The columns destined to accomplish this most important object, moved off simultaneously with the main column intended to assault the entrance, but were compelled to make a considerable detour to the right and left, to enable them to commence the ascent.

4. The right column consisted of the troops detailed in the margin*, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and Major Anderson, 64th Regiment Native Infantry.

5. The left column †, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley and Major Huish, commenced the ascent, led by Captain Ferris' regiment of Jezailchees. Both columns, after considerable opposition, which they overcame in a most gallant style, succeeded in routing the enemy, and gaining possession of the crest of the hills on either side. While the flanking columns were in progress on the heights, I ordered Captain Alexander, in command of the Artillery, to place the guns in position, and to throw shrapnell among the enemy when opportunity offered, which assisted much in their discomfiture. As Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, from the opposition he had met with, and the extremely difficult nature of the ground, was some time in reaching the summit of the hill on the right, I detached a party ‡ under the command of Brigadier Wild, to assault it in front; it was however so extremely steep near the top, that, notwithstanding the undaunted gallantry of the officers and men, they were unable to gain a footing on the summit, and I regret to say, the enemy were enabled to throw stones with fatal effect upon some of the leading Grenadiers of the 9th Foot. Finding the heights in our possession, I now advanced the main column to the mouth of the pass, and commenced destroying the barrier which the enemy had evacuated on perceiving their position was turned; a portion of the right and left columns being left to keep the heights, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, and Major Anderson, respectively. Major Huish and Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor continued their advance to crown the hills in front and on each side, which were covered with the enemy, who appeared determined to contest every inch of ground, but nothing could resist the gallantry of our troops, who carried everything before them. A position of considerable strength above the bridge now remained to be carried, and again the Jezailchees were conspicuous in forcing the enemy to relinquish their strongholds. Crowning parties having taken possession of their heights, all opposition on the part of the enemy may be said to have ceased, as no large body of them has since come in sight. The nature of the arrangements made for the protection of the baggage, will be best understood when I state that not a single baggage animal has fallen into the hands of the enemy.

6. It now remains for me to perform the pleasing duty of stating how much I feel indebted to the officers and men comprising the force under my command, for their zeal, devotion, and unflinching valour, in performance of the very arduous duty which they have so nobly executed.

7. From Major-General Mc Caskill, K. H., commanding the infantry division, and who was on this occasion commanding the rear guard, I have received every assistance; as likewise from Brigadier Wild:—to Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, K. H., my warmest acknowledgments are due for the spirit, coolness and judgment with which he discharged the duties entrusted to him.

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* Four companies of Her Majesty's 9th Foot; four companies of Her Majesty's 26th Native Infantry; four companies of Her Majesty's 64th Native Infantry.

† Four companies of Her Majesty's 9th foot; four companies of Her Majesty's 26th Native Infantry; four companies of Her Majesty's 64th Native Infantry; 400 Jezailchees.

‡ Gr. Her Majesty's 9th Foot; six companies of the 53rd Native Infantry.

Where officers and men, European and Native, have all so gallantly performed their duty, it is difficult to select the names of particular individuals, but I cannot omit the names of those who so admirably led the troops to storm the heights, viz.: Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, 64th Native Infantry, Major Huish, 26th Native Infantry, Major Anderson, 64th Native Infantry, and Captain Ferris, commanding the Jezailchees, whose conduct excited the delight and admiration of all who beheld them; indeed I consider much of the success of the day to be attributed to their gallantry, skill and perseverance in this most difficult description of warfare. I have also to express my satisfaction with the manner in which the artillery was served, by Captain Alexander commanding; the precision with which shrapnell was thrown, caused considerable loss to the enemy. To Captain Ponsonby, my Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Codrington, Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Captain Macadam, Deputy-Judge-Advocate-General, and to Lieutenant Pollock, A.D.C., I am much indebted for communicating my orders at different times during the day.

8. I cannot conclude this dispatch without requesting that you will bring to the particular notice of the Governor-General in Council, the very great assistance I have received from Captains Mackeson and Lawrence; Captain Mackeson's knowledge of the localities was invaluable to me by enabling him to point out those heights which required to be crowned. Both these officers came on to the ground which I now occupy. Captain Lawrence returned to Peshawur yesterday, and Captain Mackeson proceeds with the force. Captain Sir Richmond Shakespear volunteered his services to accompany Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, as his aide-de-camp, and took command of the men lately composing the garrison of Ali Musjid; his exertions throughout the day were most conspicuous and unceasing.

9. I must here observe that, from the character of the operations, and the very great numbers of the enemy, estimated at about 10,000, I found the force under my command numerically deficient, and in consequence the troops suffered severely from excessive fatigue.

10. There were some of the enemy's horse in the vicinity of Ali Musjid, but I regret they did not wait for Brigadier White, and his brigade, to make an example of them.

I have, &c.
G. POLLOCK.

P. S.—I herewith forward reports from officers commanding detached parties, but have not yet received the return of casualties, which shall be sent to-morrow. I am happy to say, our loss has been much below what could possibly have been expected.

No. 243.

Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Ali Musjid, April 6*, 1842.

I HAVE to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., commanding the force in Affghanistan, that, agreeably to his instructions, the columns intrusted to my command (as detailed in the margin*) for the capture of the heights on the right entrance to the Khyber Pass, were formed at daybreak on the 5th instant, in three divisions of four companies each, protected on the right flank by a squadron of H. M. 3rd Light Dragoons under Lieutenant Unett, and, in this order, with skirmishers and supports in front, advanced, driving a considerable body of the enemy up the hills, which were scaled and crowned in spite of a determined opposition. This effected, the troops moved to their left to clear the redoubts commanding the entrance to the pass, which were abandoned on our approach, the enemy suffering severely in their retreat. Major Anderson, as directed, remained on the heights with his column, reinforced by

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*Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor's right advance column, two companies of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, four companies of the 26th Native Infantry; Major Anderson's rear right flank column; ½ company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot; four and a half companies of the 64th Native Infantry, 100 Jezailchees (Mackeson's).

one company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and two companies of the 26th Native Infantry, under Captain Gahan, of the latter corps, whilst I descended, with the remainder, to carry into effect the ulterior plan of operations of the Major-General in clearing off the enemy from their positions on the right of the road to Ali Musjid, which was finally accomplished, though obstinate resistance was offered on several points, especially over the bridge, where the enemy had concentrated in force.

Having been reinforced by one company of the 33rd Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Watson, I directed Captain Lushington, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, to move with that company, and the light company of the 9th Foot, to the right, to take the enemy's position in reverse, whilst I attacked in front. This had the desired effect of forcing their immediate retreat, and clearing the bridge. No further opposition was offered by the enemy, who retreated on Ali Musjid, whilst I pushed on, and occupied the tower and hill to the left, within about a mile of that place.

It afforded me the greatest gratification to witness the gallant and persevering conduct of all the troops under my command, engaged, during the day, in a series of operations, requiring great energy and patient endurance of fatigue; and I beg to mention the able assistance and support rendered me by Major Anderson, 64th Native Infantry (second in command), Captain Gahan, 26th Native Infantry, commanding a division, Captain Lushington, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, commanding the companies of that regiment, Captain Sir Richmond Shakespear, who volunteered his services in charge of the Jezailchees, as well as the conduct and praiseworthy zeal of all the officers and men engaged.

It is with regret I have to report the death of Lieutenant Cumming, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, a very promising officer, who was killed on the heights above the Pass, whilst in command of No. 6 company.

Returns of the killed and wounded will be sent as soon as the companies with the rear column come up.

I have, &c.,
A. B. TAYLOR.

No. 244.

Major George Huish to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Ali Musjid, April 6, 1842.*

HAVING been honored with the command of the party, as per margin,* intended for the capture of the hills on the left of the Khyber Pass, I have the honor to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., commanding the troops west of the Indus, that the party was formed for that purpose at daybreak on the 5th instant, and advanced to the attack in skirmishing order. The height on the left was speedily carried, in the most gallant and determined manner, the summit of which having been attained, the smaller hill, at the entrance of the pass, was cleared by the fire of my party.

This being effected, agreeably to the instructions of the Major-General, the post was made over to Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, commanding the rear crowning column; and the troops, with the exception of two companies of the 26th Native Infantry, descended, for the purpose of continuing to scale and clear the heights on the left of the road leading to Ali Musjid.

At several points very considerable opposition was made by the enemy; especially at one of the hills in advance of the smaller hill before alluded to, and at the heights commanding the bridge, where the enemy were in great force, but they were driven from their posts in the most spirited style, and with considerable loss while retreating.

Having occupied the last height adjacent to the intended encamping ground, I took position thereon with my party, occupying it during the night, until relieved this morning by a party of the 33rd Native Infantry, under Major Hewitt.

It gives me great pleasure to be able to report that this duty, though of the

* Two companies of Her Majesty's 9th Foot; four ditto 26th Native Infantry; 53 Ferris' Jezailchees.

most fatiguing description, scaling heights the whole day, under the hot sun, and in the face of an enemy, was cheerfully performed by all the troops, (European and Native, the Sepoys vying with their European comrades), whose perseverance and good spirit could not be surpassed, and were most gratifying to me: and here I cannot omit to make mention of the Jezailchees, under that able officer, Captain Ferris, who afforded me most material aid, as also the ready assistance of Captain Tritton, second in command, and the zeal and gallantry of every officer and man engaged.

I do myself the honor to inclose a return of the killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE HUISH.

No. 245.

Major-General McCaskill to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Ali Musjid, April* 6, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., commanding the forces, that, agreeably to his orders, I marched yesterday morning from Jumrood, in command of the rear-guard of the column for the attack of the Khyber Pass, composed of the troops detailed in the margin*.

The complete success of the attacks made by the force in advance, rendered unnecessary any active operations on my part. At nightfall, I took the necessary precautions for security, and the troops bivouacked at a spot about two miles within the pass, without any molestation from the enemy.

The rear-guard arrived in camp 2 P. M. this day, no part of the baggage having been plundered, nor any loss sustained.

I have reason to be highly satisfied with the exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, second in command, of Captain Smith, Officiating Deputy Assistant-General, and of every officer placed under my orders, in performance of the duties assigned to them.

I have, &c.
JOHN McCASKILL.

No. 246.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Ghurree Lalla Beg, April* 8, 1842.

IN continuation of my dispatch of the 6th instant, I have now the honor to inclose a return of casualties which took place on the 5th and 6th; those of the latter date occurred in taking possession of Ali Musjid. I am happy to say, the amount of our loss is trifling, considering the very great opposition we experienced from the enemy.

In my last communication I inadvertently omitted to mention the name of Lieutenant John Becher, Acting Field Engineer, and have to request you to bring to the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, the very essential services rendered by that officer in clearing the Pass of the impediments constructed by the enemy, which he did with a degree of celerity, notwithstanding their strength and difficulty of removal, that elicited my warmest satisfaction.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

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* Two guns Horse Artillery; 3 guns Foot Artillery; 2 squadrons of Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons; 10th Light Cavalry; 2 rissalahs Irregular Cavalry; 1 company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot; 1 company 6th Native Infantry; 3 companies 60th Native Infantry.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Troops under the command of Major-General Pollock, C.B., on the 5th April, in forcing the Khyber Pass.

Staff.—1 wounded.

Her Majesty's 9th Foot.—1 European commissioned officer, 1 colour serjeant, 6 privates, killed; 1 European commissioned officer, 1 drummer, 31 privates wounded; total killed and wounded, 41.

26th Regiment Native Infantry.—2 sepoys killed; 1 fife major, 2 havildars, 17 sepoys wounded; 1 bugler missing; total killed, wounded, and missing, 23.

30th Regiment Native Infantry.—2 sepoys killed; 1 havildar, 12 sepoys wounded; 1 sepoy missing; total killed, wounded, and missing, 16.

33rd Regiment Native Infantry.—1 sepoy wounded; 1 sepoy missing; total wounded and missing, 2.

53rd Regiment Native Infantry.—1 sepoy killed; 1 sepoy wounded; 3 sepoys missing; total killed, wounded, and missing, 2.

64th Regiment Native Infantry.—1 European commissioned officer; 3 havildars, 4 sepoys wounded; 1 sepoy missing; total wounded and missing, 9.

Jezailchee Regiment.—1 sepoy killed; 2 jemadars, 4 havildars, 2 naicks, 18 sepoys wounded; 10 sepoys missing; total killed, wounded, and missing, 37.

Total.—1 European commissioned officer, 1 colour serjeant, 12 sepoys and privates, killed; 1 staff, 2 European commissioned officers, 1 fife major, 2 jemadars, 10 havildars, 2 naicks, 1 drummer, 85 sepoys and privates, wounded; 1 bugler, 16 sepoys and privates, missing.

Grand total of killed, wounded and missing, 135.

G. PONSONBY.

Name of Officer killed.

Lieutenant Cumming, Her Majesty's 9th Foot.

Names of Officers wounded.

Staff.—Brigadier Wild, slightly.
Captain Ogle, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, slightly.
Lieut. Mulcaster, 64th Native Infantry, severely.

No. 247.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 21, 1842.

AS I am doubtful if the originals, of which the inclosed are copies, ever reached you, I am induced to forward the copies, and take this opportunity of stating, that on the 5th April the 30th Regiment ascended the height at the entrance of the Pass, and reached the summit, under Brigadier Wild. I was obliged to advance before the party did reach the summit, and was not aware that they had done so, till informed of it two or three days ago by Brigadier Wild.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 248.

Notification by the Governor-General of India.

Benares, April 21, 1842.

THE Governor-General feels assured that every subject of the British Government will peruse with the deepest interest and satisfaction the report he now communicates, of the entire defeat of the Affghan troops under Mahomed Akbar Khan by the garrison of Jellalabad.

That illustrious garrison, which, by its constancy in enduring privation, and by its valour in action, has already obtained for itself the sympathy and respect of every true soldier, has now, sallying forth from its walls, under the command of its gallant leader, Major-General Sir Robert Sale, thoroughly beaten in open field an enemy of more than three times its numbers, taken the standards of their

boasted cavalry, destroyed their camp, and recaptured four guns, which, under circumstances which can never again occur, had during the last winter fallen into their hands.

The Governor-General cordially congratulates the Army upon the return of victory to its ranks.

He is convinced that there, as in all former times, it will be found, while, as at Jellalabad, the European and Native troops mutually supporting each other, and evincing equal discipline and valour, are led into action by officers in whom they justly confide.

The Governor-General directs that the substance of this Notification, and of Major-General Sir Robert Sale's report, be carefully made known to all the troops, and that a salute of twenty-one guns be fired at every principal station of the Army.

By order, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 249.

Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Jellalabad, April 7, 1842.*

INFORMATION was, on the evening of the 5th instant, brought into this place, in the most positive and circumstantial terms, by spies from the enemy's camp, to the effect that the force under Major-General Pollock, C.B., had met with reverses in the Khyber, and retraced its steps towards Peshawur; and about ten o'clock A.M. on the 6th, a feu-de-joie and salute of artillery were fired by Mahomed Akbar, which were said to be in honor of the same event. It was on the same day, and through similar channels, announced to me, that the Affghans were sending additional reinforcements to aid in defending their frontier passes. Although I could not wholly depend on these statements, which were improbable in themselves, and accompanied by counter reports, of a new revolution at Cabool, which was assigned by some as the cause of the rejoicing; and of the defeat of the Ghazees in Khyber; and by an account of the intended, and even actual, retreat of the Sirdar into Lughman,—I adopted, on a full consideration of various circumstances and rumours, the resolution of anticipating the last mentioned event, if it had not come to pass, by a general attack on the Affghan camp, in the hope of relieving this place from blockade, and facilitating General Pollock's advance to our succour. I accordingly gave directions to form three columns of infantry, the central consisting of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry (mustering 500 bayonets), under Colonel Dennie, C.B.; the left, of the 35th Native Infantry (also 500 strong), under Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, C.B.; and the right, composed of one company of the 13th Light Infantry, and one of the 35th regiment Native Infantry, and the detachment of Sappers under the command of Lieutenant Orr (the severity of Captain Broadfoot's wound still rendering him non-effective), amounting to 360 men, commanded by Captain Havelock, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; these were to be supported by the fire of the guns of No. 6, field-battery under Captain Abbott, to which Captain Backhouse, Shah Shooja's artillery, was also attached, and by the whole of my small cavalry force under Captain Oldfield and Lieutenant Mayne.

The troops issued from the Cabool and Peshawur gates at daylight this morning. So far from the Sirdar having made any dispositions to avoid the encounter, his whole force, (not falling short in all of 6,000 men,) was formed in order of battle, for the defence of his camp; its right resting on a fort, and its left on the Cabool river; and even the ruined works within eight hundred yards of the place, recently repaired, were filled with Ghilzye marksmen, evidently prepared for a stout resistance. The attack was led by the skirmishers and column under Captain Havelock, which drove the enemy in the most satisfactory manner from the extreme left of his advanced line of works, which it pierced at once, and proceeded to advance into the plain; whilst the central column directed its efforts against a square fort, upon the same base, the defence of which was obstinately maintained. With the deepest regret, I have to record that, whilst nobly leading his regiment to the assault, Colonel Dennie, C.B., of Her Majesty's

13th Light Infantry, received a shot through his body, which shortly after proved fatal. The rear of the work having been finally gained by passing to its left, I gave orders for a combined attack upon the enemy's camp. It was in every way brilliant and successful. The artillery advanced at the gallop, and directed a heavy fire upon the Affghan centre, whilst two of the columns of infantry penetrated his line near the same point, and the third forced back his left from its support on the river, into the stream of which some of his horse and foot were driven. The Affghans made repeated attempts to check our advance, by a smart fire of musquetry, by throwing forward heavy bodies of horse, which twice threatened in force the detachments of foot under Captain Havelock, and by opening on us three guns screened by a garden wall, and said to have been served under the personal superintendence of the Sirdar—but, in a short time, they were dislodged from every point of their positions,—their cannon taken, and their camp involved in a general conflagration. The battle was over, and the enemy in full retreat in the direction of Lughman by about seven, A. M. We have made ourselves masters of two cavalry standards, recaptured four guns, lost by the Cabool army and Gundamuck forces, the restoration of which to our Government is matter of much honest exultation among our troops; seized and destroyed a great quantity of matériel and ordnance stores, and burnt the whole of the enemy's tents. In short the defeat of Mahomed Akbar, in open field, by the troops whom he had boasted of blockading, has been complete and signal.

The fall of an officer so distinguished as Colonel Dennie will be felt as a public calamity; lamenting it on every account, I must yet share with his country, his regiment, and his friends, in the consolation afforded by the reflection, that he was killed whilst most gallantly performing his duty. I have to express my entire satisfaction with the conduct, in this action, of Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, C. B., commanding one of the two infantry columns under my own eye, and of Captain Wilkinson, 13th Light Infantry, on whom the charge of the other devolved on the death of his Lieutenant-Colonel; of Captain Oldfield and Lieutenant Mayne, who led the cavalry, and of Captains Abbott and Backhouse, and Lieutenant Dawes, Artillery.

The able and judicious manner in which Captain Havelock moved the force under his command, which acted on a line sufficiently distant to render the manœuvres independent of my immediate control, demands my particular and separate commendation.

My acknowledgments are also especially due to my Brigade-Major, Captain Hamlet Wade, whose exertions were on this day, as they have ever been, most meritorious; to Major Frazer of the Light Cavalry, who acted as my Aide-de-Camp; and to Captain Mainwaring, Commissariat Officer with the Force, who was present and active in the field. Captain Macgregor, Political Agent, handsomely offered his services with No. 6 light field-battery, and was most useful in serving the guns.

I inclose returns of killed and wounded, and of ordnance and stores captured.

Lieutenant and Adjutant Wood, Her Majesty's 13th light infantry, made a dash at one of the enemy, and in cutting him down, his charger was so severely injured as to have been since destroyed. Captain Havelock reports in the most favorable manner the gallant conduct, throughout the day, of Lieutenant Cox; Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and he was the first, of the party which captured them, to seize two of the enemy's cannon.

It will be seen from the preceding details, that the force employed in this successful enterprise amounted to about 1800 men of all arms. The safety of the place was entrusted, during the action, to the ordinary guards of its gates, and one provisional battalion of followers of every description, armed with pikes and other weapons, who manned the curtains, and made a respectable show of defence, as they have done on all occasions of attack on the walls. Captain Pattison, 13th Light Infantry, was left in command of this diminished garrison;—a sally was made from the Cabool gate by Lieutenant Wade, of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, towards the conclusion of the engagement, into the fort before which Colonel Dennie had fallen, when it was observed that the enemy were abandoning it; all that it contained was set on fire, and some of its defenders were bayoneted.

The enemy's loss during the day must have been severe, the field of battle

was strewed with the bodies of men and horses, and the richness of the trappings of some of the cattle seemed to attest that persons of rank had fallen.

Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath has mentioned to me, in high terms, the gallant behaviour of Captain Seaton, of the 35th Regiment Native Infantry, when in command of the skirmishers of that corps, and the fact of his having been the captor of a howitzer from the enemy.

I have, &c.,
R. SALE.

P. S. We have information to the fact, that the following Chiefs were present and took part in the action, viz.:—

Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan, in person.
Ameer Khan, Chief of Bajore.

Ghilzye Chiefs.
- Nuzeez Khan,
- Gool Mahomed Khan,
- Mahomed Shah Khan,
- Burnkut Khan,
- Azad Khan,
- Thukoor Khan,

Mohmund Chiefs.
- Syud Oosman.
- Oonerah Khan,

Syud Mahomed, Son of the King of Konar.
Syud Hoskyim, Ex-King of Kooner.
Mecah Hyder, Chief of Koorat.
Mahomed Yan Khan, Chief of Sungar Serai.
Abdool Guffoor Khan, Barukzye.
Abdool Guffoor Khan, Nephew of Abdoolah Khan, Chief of the Atchukzyes.
Meer Abdool Ruhman, Chief of Kama.
Khalid Khan, Chief of Goshta.
Meer Ufzul Khan, Chief of Gundaghur.

RETURN of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Force under the Command of Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., Jellalabad, April 7, 1842.

No. 6 Light Field Battery—1 native officer, 2 havildars, 1 naick, 2 sepoys, 1 naib, 4 drivers, wounded.

Mountain Train—1 havildar, 2 sepoys, wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—1 officer, 8 privates, killed; 1 officer, 2 corporals, 29 privates, wounded.

35th Native Infantry—2 sepoys killed; 1 officer, 1 native officer, 1 havildar, 2 naicks, 11 sepoys, wounded.

Sappers and Miners—2 havildars, 1 naick, 1 bugler, 5 sepoys, wounded.

1 Tindal and 1 bearer, 35 native infantry, wounded.

5 Horses wounded.

Total—1 officer, 10 privates and sepoys, killed; 2 officers, 2 native officers, 6 serjeants and havildars, 6 corporals and naicks, 1 bugler, 49 privates and sepoys, 1 naib, 4 drivers, wounded.

Names of Officers.

Killed.

Colonel Dennie, C. B., Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.

Wounded.

Captain Moorhouse, 35th Native Infantry, severely.

Lieutenant Jennings, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, slightly.

Assistant-Surgeon Barnes, M.D., Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, slightly.

HAMLET WADE.

RETURN of Ordnance captured by the Forces under Major-General Sir R. Sale, April 7, 1842.

1 six-pounder, 1 twelve-pounder howitzer, that belonged to 1st brigade Horse Artillery, 1 howitzer, that belonged to the Mountain Train, 1 six-pounder dismantled, that was left at Gundamuck by the Khyber corps.

An inconsiderable quantity of ammunition was found with this ordnance, also some half wrought matériel.

A. ABBOTT.

No. 250.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Ghuree Lala Beg, April 8, 1842.*

I HAVE the honor to forward copies of two letters received yesterday from Jellalabad, of the 4th instant. The very satisfactory account which they contain of the state of their supplies, removes the anxiety which I have so long entertained regarding that garrison.

My report of the operations of the 5th instant has already been forwarded to you. On the 6th I was detained south of Ali Musjid, by finding that the Sikh Government had not completed its arrangements for guarding the road from Ali Musjid to Peshawur. On that morning I sent the regiment of Jezailchees to take possession of the fort of Ali Musjid, which was effected. On the 7th I marched to this place, and met with very trifling opposition; but owing to the narrowness of the road, the whole of the baggage of this force did not arrive here until 1 P. M. to-day.

The men and cattle are much fatigued, and Captain Mackeson has urged me to halt here to-morrow, in order to complete the arrangements for guarding the road from this to Dakka, which there appears to be a prospect of affecting by an amicable arrangement with the tribes.

At Ali Musjid I propose leaving a garrison of six companies of Native Infantry, until the arrival of the 6th Native Infantry, and Her Majesty's 31st, when I shall direct the former corps to occupy that post. The Sikhs have moved up their troops close to the fort.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have decided on moving the force to-morrow morning a short distance in advance.

Camp, Lundi Khana, April 9, 1842.

The arrangements for opening the road not having been completed, it was not deemed advisable to send the above yesterday; and to-day letters have been received from Jellalabad, of date the 7th instant. I lose no time in forwarding copies of these highly interesting documents.

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 251.

Major Rawlinson to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, March 6, 1842.*

I HAD the honor to receive yesterday at this place copy of your letter to my address, under date December 24th, 1841. In explanation of my apparent neglect in not communicating direct with Calcutta on the affairs of Candahar, I have the honor to observe that, up to the 12th of November, I had no reason to believe the communication between Cabool and Jellalabad to be otherwise than partially interrupted; that, subsequent to this date, I had the honor to forward to you direct duplicates of all despatches of importance; that during the

month of November, I also regularly corresponded demi-officially with Major Outram, with a view to the information of that officer, and the transmission of all intelligence of importance to Calcutta; that from the commencement of December, until the southern road became finally closed, I likewise addressed letters repeatedly to the Private Secretary to the Right Honorable the Governor-General, as the least intrusive way of communicating with Government, and that since that period, December 17th, debarred from the possibility of transmitting any bulky papers, and obliged to depend on the secret conveyance of foot messengers, I have still exerted myself to the utmost to keep Government duly informed of all affairs of consequence at this place through Lieutenant Hammersley, in political charge at Quetta, and through Major Outram, Political Agent in Sinde and Beloochistan. The difficulty of communicating still continues, and I have thus no alternative but to adhere for a time to my demi-official correspondence with Major Outram; but immediately that any safe channel is opened for the transmission of our dawks, I shall avail myself of it, to forward to Government duplicates of all my official letters, and to send a copy of the detailed political diary which I have kept since the commencement of our difficulties at Candahar in the end of last December. In the meantime, I have the honor to submit, in as concise and portable a form as possible, an abstract of all matters of consequence that have occurred at this place since the breaking out of the Cabool insurrection in the beginning of November.

At that period affairs wore a more tranquil and promising appearance in the Candahar province than I had ever witnessed since my assumption of the charge of the agency. Akram Khan, the leader of the Dehrawat rebellion, captured by Lieutenant Conolly, had been executed at this place by His Majesty's orders. Eight of the most influential of his colleagues in rebellion had been sent by me, according to the orders of the Envoy, under charge of Lieutenant Crawford, to Cabool, that officer having my written instructions to destroy his prisoners in the event of an attempt at rescue. The Hazareh and Belooch tribes had been effectually conciliated; the Dooranees of the Northern and Western districts had been humbled and overawed.

On the 7th of November, Colonel McLaren's Brigade marched for India; and, upon the same evening, we heard of the disaster which had befallen Captain Woodburn and his detachment, between Ghuznee and Cabool. I immediately applied to Major-General Nott to halt the Brigade. Upon the 14th letters from the Envoy and Major-General Elphinstone arrived, announcing the Cabool insurrection, and calling on General Nott to reinforce the capital with the Brigade under orders for India. Colonel McLaren accordingly returned to Candahar, and strengthened with a troop of Horse Artillery, started for Cabool upon the 17th. In the meantime, Captain Hart's corps of Janubaz had been called in from Tireen, agreeably to the Envoy's wishes, and followed in the rear of Colonel McLaren's Brigade, en route to Cabool. Two of the Shah's corps that had been left in Neesh and Dehrawat, after the return of the regular troops, were likewise summoned to Candahar, and nothing remained out but the 1st corps of Jaunbaz, the 1st Shah's regiment, and two guns in Zamin Dawur.

Having experienced much embarrassment from the presence of two Princes in this province during the summer and autumn, who regarded each other with the greatest jealousy, I judged the present to be a favourable opportunity for deputing Sufter Jung to Cabool, thus leaving Prince Timour in the immediate exercise of supreme authority in the Candahar Government. Prince Sufter Jung accordingly returned from Zamin Dawur, and prepared to accompany the Jaunbaz to Cabool; but, previous to the departure of the corps, I had reason to suspect the fidelity of the Affghan Horse; and having come to an explanation with the Prince upon the subject, he signified to me that he would prefer remaining at Candahar during the winter, without employment, to running the risk of being disgraced by any treacherous conduct on the part of the Horse to which he was attached. About the same time we learnt that Lieutenant Crawford had been attacked near Ghuznee, and had allowed the Dooranee prisoners under his charge to escape; and this intelligence was followed by an account of the Ghilzyes' attack upon Guddoo Khan, on his return from Ghuznee, in which that gallant Affghan officer, whose services to us throughout had been of such extreme value, was overpowered by numbers and slain, with 17 of his best men, losing at the same time 45 horses, and all the arms and baggage of the Rissalah.

The Province of Candahar itself, however, still continued tranquil; and it was not until we learnt, upon the 3rd of December, that Colonel McLaren had been forced by the inclemency of the weather to give up his advance on Cabool, that we were led to anticipate disturbances in this Government. General Nott then judged it advisable to concentrate all his troops at Candahar, and accordingly ordered in the regiment and guns from Zamin Dawur. I wished to keep the Jaunbaz at Giriskh, as the best chance of obliging them to adhere to us, from their enmity to the surrounding tribes, but my letters miscarried, and, unfortunately, the Affghan Horse returned to Candahar with the infantry. Colonel McLaren reached Candahar upon the 8th of December, and the Zamin Dawur detachment came in the following day. Lieutenant Hammersley was at this time about to dispatch treasure to Candahar from Quetta, but judging that the temptation of securing this booty would induce the tribes about the Kojuck to rise, I suggested its detention till a more favorable opportunity offered. It is fortunate that this detention occurred, or the treasure would certainly have been sacrificed; for intelligence having reached the Candahar frontier of the dispatch of Mahomed Atta Khan from Cabool to excite the rebellion in this province, the tribes to the south-east, who are particularly under the influence of that chief, assembled and came down upon the Quetta road, with the hope of plundering the convoy. Disappointed of their booty they returned to their homes; but an impetus had been given to insurrection by their movement, which led to many further evils. Lieutenant Bosanquet, on the 17th of December, reported to me that all was quiet in the neighbourhood of Killa Abdoolla; but on the following day he received orders from Quetta to evacuate his post, and this abandonment taking place immediately after the émeute north of the Kojuck, was construed into an admission of weakness, and was the signal for the Atchukzye tribe to rise, cutting off at once our communication with the south. I had no resource in this emergency but to send Saloo Khan, the Atchukzye Chief, with the Candahar Jaunbaz, to reoccupy Killa Abdoolla, taking the precaution at the same time to withdraw the European Superintendent of the corps. The men on approaching the Kojuck were infected with the rebellion of the Atchukzye tribe, and the greater part of them deserted. Saloo Khan, however, remained firm, and has from that time to the present steadily adhered to our interests, and has exerted himself to the utmost in our service, thus justifying, in the most satisfactory manner, the selection I had made of him for the important post of Sirdar of Jaunbaz, and proving, moreover, that I employed the best means at my disposal for preserving the communication with India.

I must now note a few particulars regarding affairs in the city of Candahar. When I became aware of the names of the leaders who headed the Cabool insurrection, and found that they were principally Dooranee noblemen of rank, I could not but be suspicious of the chiefs of Candahar, who are all of the same tribe. I temporized with them, however, during the whole month of November, keeping them in good humour, and leading them to believe that the Cabool rebellion was nothing more than a partial and temporary disturbance. When Colonel McLaren's retirement, however, became known, and Mahomed Atta Khan also approached the Candahar frontier as the champion of Islam, it was no longer possible to treat the Dooranee chiefs with the sort of half confidence that I had hitherto shown them. I had but three courses open to me: 1st, arresting the chiefs and expelling their followers from the city; 2nd, obliging them to leave the city, which was equivalent to throwing them into the arms of Mahomed Atta Khan; and 3rd, affecting to trust them with the execution and direction of a popular movement in favor of His Majesty the Shah, and against Mahomed Atta Khan, who approached Candahar as the representative of the Baruckzye Sirdars,—the acknowledged enemies of the Dooranee power; either of the two former courses appeared to me calculated to increase and precipitate our difficulties, whilst the latter secured a comparative safety to the city, and, in the event of the restoration of order at Cabool, to which I confidently looked forward, promised to relieve the Candahar province altogether of the troubles or the expenses of war. After the most mature deliberation, I accordingly adopted the latter course, persuaded his Royal Highness Prince Timour to depute his eldest son with the Dooranee chiefs, and advanced on account of the local Government the sum of one lac of rupees to Meerza Ahmed, the revenue manager, to maintain the Dooranee troops in the field. I also obtained a *Futwa* from the priesthood of Candahar, declaring the Cabool conspirators, and their adherents, rebels and traitors,

and deserving of punishment in this world and the next. The Dooranees quitted Candahar in the middle of December, delayed for a considerable time the advance of Atta Khan, prevented to the utmost of their power the spread of religious fanaticism among the tribes, and acted in apparent good faith until their accounts from Cabool impressed them with a conviction that His Majesty the Shah had ranged himself in the ranks of our enemies. I am induced, therefore, to hope that Government will not consider me to have acted inconsiderately or prejudicially to our interests in the game which I have played with the Dooranees. The expenditure of the lac of rupees answered the temporizing purpose at which it was chiefly aimed, and the funds have been exhausted long ere this when we are about to be brought into collision with the Dooranees. To return, however, to the occurrences of the month of December. After the deputation of Prince Sekunder with the Dooranee chiefs, my attention was chiefly directed to the disposition of the Jaunbaz. A part of them accompanied the prince, the remainder I judged it best to endeavour to station upon the Helmund, as well with a view to the protection of the fort of Giriskh, as to place them in a situation where they would be cut off from communication with Cabool, and surrounded with their blood enemies. They were to have started for Giriskh accordingly upon the 27th of December; but, on the previous night, supposing from a mere accident that their intention to desert had been discovered, they broke into open mutiny, murdered Lieutenant Golding, wounded Lieutenant Patterson so severely that he now lies in danger of his life, and took the field, hoping to raise the country. It is worthy of remark, that they did not attempt to join the Dooranee camp, proving thereby that the chiefs were then understood to be friendly to us. Captain Leeson's cavalry, and a party of the Parsewan Jaunbaz, who remained firm under Lieutenant Wilson, although in the same camp with the mutineers, were immediately detached in pursuit, and coming up with the Jaunbaz in the afternoon, at a village about twelve miles distant from Candahar, they attacked and dispersed them, killing the ringleader of the mutiny, and inflicting a severe loss on the whole body. It had been my wish, with General Nott's concurrence, to send out two of the guns belonging to the local Government, for the better protection of the fortress of Girishk. No escort, however, could be now spared, and I had no better means therefore of providing for the safety of that important post than by authorizing Bulwunt Sing, the Hindostanee Killadar, to increase his garrison to 400 men; and by obtaining from his Royal Highness Prince Timour the nomination to the Government of the Helmund of a Baruckzye chief, the son of the famous Vizier Futteh Khan, who is possessed of an extensive influence in the tribe, and who is equally at enmity with the members of his own family, and with the other Dooranee chiefs who put his father to death.

An important occurrence took place on the 29th of December, two days subsequent to the Jaunbaz mutiny. Prince Sufter Jung, jealous of his brother, and disgusted at his own removal from authority, was won over by the persuasions of a dissolute and intriguing chief, the son of Shah Pussund, Khan of Laush, to fly from the city, and place himself at the head of the insurgents whom Mahomed Atta Khan was assembling on our eastern frontier. As the prince was subjected to no restraint, it was impossible to have provided against this flight. As soon, however, as he took the field, the rebel cause rapidly gained strength. The Jaunbaz, who had fled from Candahar and from Saloo Khan, collected round the standard of Mahomed Atta Khan, and the Sirdar fixed his head-quarters at Dehla, distant about forty miles from the city. General Nott was deterred by the unfavourable state of the season from attacking the rebels at that place; and our inactivity being considered a proof of weakness, Mahomed Atta, with about 3000 horse and foot, proceeded leisurely down the valley of the Arghundab to the vicinity of the town of Candahar; and having been joined by a considerable number of people from the surrounding villages, upon the 12th of January he took post on the river, distant five miles west of the city. General Nott attacked the enemy in this position, and dispersed them after a brief skirmish. The Dooranees, up to this time, had avoided committing themselves in any open hostility with us, though, I believe, that the Cabool advices, describing the increasing difficulties of our position, and affording a prospect of the Shah's being able, subsequently to our departure, to supersede the authority of the Baruckzyes, had rendered them ripe for declaring against us. Be this, however, as it may, when the Dooranees found that we were engaged with Mahomed Atta, their camp broke up tumultuously, and the entire force marched apparently to the support

of their countrymen. They did not arrive in our vicinity, however, till the evening, when Mahomed Atta's followers were scattered in flight and disorder, and they then prudently retired to a sufficient distance to escape the risk of being exposed to any immediate collision with us. From this time the Dooranee camp became the nucleus for rebellion. Sufter Jung, Mahomed Atta Khan, and the other fugitives from the field of the 12th, sought the protection of the Dooranees, and were honorably received. Prince Sekunder had been carried away by the Dooranee chiefs; but we succeeded in releasing him from their hands, and bringing him back into the city before Sufter Jung arrived in their camp. During all this period I had kept up an uninterrupted correspondence with Sufter Jung, with Meerza Ahmed, and with the Dooranees. The prince, I believe, regretted the step he had taken, and would have returned to Candahar before the affair of the 12th, had I considered myself authorized to guarantee to him a definite reward for so doing; but, besides the inexpediency of thus putting a premium upon rebellion, it was altogether out of my power to promise him what he required, namely, the future Government of Candahar. That I have been deceived with regard to Meerza Ahmed I candidly admit, as he is a man of first-rate talent for an Affghan, and must, I supposed, appreciate the difference between the power of his countrymen and that of the British Government. I judged that from motives of self-interest he would adhere cordially to our cause. He appears, however, from the breaking out of the Cabool insurrection, to have guessed that the contest would terminate in our compulsory abandonment of the country; and, thus while he honestly played for a season the temporizing game that I enjoined upon him, he still took care so to strengthen his position with his own party, that, in the event of our adversity, he might keep the lead in the Affghan cause which had been entrusted to him whilst acting under our own auspices. I was so sensible of the danger of this man as an enemy, that long after I had evidence of his duplicity, I affected to trust him, in the hope of his reclamation, and I might possibly, to the present day, have retained some hold upon him, had I not been necessitated, in order to carry on the business of local administration and to consolidate some party in the state as a counterpoise to the weight of the Dooranees, to bring his rival, Meerza Wulee Mahomed into power, as revenue manager of Candahar. This arrangement took place, with his Royal Highness Prince Timour's approval, upon the 18th of January; and since that time, Meerza Ahmed has been actively employed as minister to Sufter Jung, in directing the councils of the Dooranees, and concerting measures to place them out of the danger of a surprise, and yet sufficiently near to have an appearance of menacing Candahar; and in this camp they remained from the 20th of January to the last day of February. Meerza Ahmed alone could have so long preserved union among the discordant elements of which this camp was composed; he alone could have managed, by the most careful revenue arrangements, to have supported the concourse which was assembled round the standard of Sufter Jung; he alone, perhaps, could have prevented the Dooranees from risking an action in which they were certain to have been defeated—his measures throughout have been most skilful and well sustained. The chiefs were, in the first place, sent to recruit in the different districts where their influence chiefly prevailed; revenue was raised in the usual forms, for the support of the troops, in anticipation of the coming harvest, the ryots receiving an acquittance from Meerza Ahmed, in case the management should continue in his hands, and being assured that, if our power prevailed, we were too just to subject the cultivators to a double exaction. Statements of the Shah's connivance in the Cabool revolution were industriously circulated; incessant attempts were made to tamper with our Hindostanee troops (not altogether without success), and letters were designedly thrown into our hands to render us suspicious of such few chiefs as adhered to us, whilst the most stringent measures were adopted to deter the villagers around the city from bringing supplies into Candahar. Such was the line of policy pursued by Meerza Ahmed from the 20th of January to the 20th of February. In this interim General Nott had laid in five months' supplies for the troops; he had repaired the fortifications to a certain extent; and, intending on the 12th of February to march out and attack the enemy, he had concurred with me in the advisability of disarming the population preparatory to the movement of our troops. Severe weather, however, rendered a march impracticable at the time he meditated; and before it became sufficiently mild to enable him to take the field, the tactics of the enemy had undergone a total alteration, in consequence of advices from Cabool.

It may be as well here to notice our receipt of intelligence from Cabool and Calcutta; the Government letter of the 3rd of December, reached us on the 28th idem; and on the 30th of January we heard of the assassination of the Envoy and the intended evacuation of Cabool. On the 1st of February I addressed General Nott on the subject of the Government letter of the 3rd of December, stating that although the contingency contemplated by Government appeared to have arrived, yet it was attended with circumstances which could not have been contemplated, and which seemed to render it advisable that we should await further instructions. In this view General Nott cordially concurred. Upon the 21st of February a letter signed by Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone reached us, of the same tenor as that addressed by those officers to the authorities at Jellalabad, and in submitting the document to General Nott, I distinctly stated my opinion that the Cabool convention was in no way binding on us at Candahar. In this view also, General Nott fully coincided, expressing his resolve to enter into negotiations with no one pending the receipt of definitive instructions from Calcutta. Two days subsequently, the resolutions of Government of the 6th of January reached Candahar, and from that date I have conducted my political duties in cordial communication with, but still in direct subordination to, Major-General Nott's authority.

The Cabool messenger who brought us Major-General Elphinstone's letter of the 25th of December, left the capital as late as the 22nd of January, and was the bearer of a number of important documents from His Majesty the Shah, and from the Cabool leaders of the Dooranee Chiefs of Candahar. His Majesty's acceptance of the crown subsequent to our evacuation of Cabool was most gratifying to the Candahar insurgents, and was generally interpreted by them into a tacit approval of the progress and result of the revolution. They were not, however, I understand, perfectly satisfied on this score, and dispatched another messenger to Cabool, requiring the direct orders of His Majesty to attack us. In the mean time, the Dooranee Chiefs addressed a formal letter to me, of which I have sent duplicate copies through Major Outram, calling on us to evacuate Candahar in peace, lest we should experience the same fate as our countrymen at Cabool; and remarking further, that the coalition of the Shah with the insurgent party at Cabool had deprived us of any further pretext for maintaining our troops in the country. In reply to this letter, I wrote, with Major-General Nott's approval, that we still remained at Candahar in support of the Shah's authority, believing His Majesty to desire our presence, and that we had, moreover, an ample force at our disposal for the defence of our position.

Upon the 27th of February we received the Government letter of the 28th of January, and General Nott then drew up a proclamation stating more explicitly the identity of our interests with those of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk and our determination to treat as enemies to His Majesty all those assembled in arms under Prince Sufter Jung. I obtained his Royal Highness Prince Timour's consent to this proclamation, and copies of it have been generally distributed through the country. Having further received on the 4th instant a copy of the Government Notification of January 31st, a translation of this has also been prepared, and all possible publicity has been given to the document. General Nott, also, in support of the determination which we have thus evinced to hold Candahar, has now made all his arrangements to take the field, and during the last few days I have been employed under his directions in expelling the Affghan population from the town preparatory to the movement. This extreme measure has been forced upon us by the paramount consideration of safety. There were, at least, 6,000 Affghans within the walls, who, in the present state of affairs, could not but be considered inimical to us, who had been generally, moreover, in active communication with the Dooranee camp, and to control whom, such a garrison was necessary for the protection of the city as threatened to cripple our movements in the field. Under such circumstances, expulsion was indispensable, and although we have, no doubt, by the measure, increased the national exasperation against us, still we have secured a position in which we may resolutely and confidently meet it. A distinction has been made in this clearing of the town, which it would have been as well to have avoided, had there been a prospect of accommodation with our Affghan enemies, but which has been forced upon us by circumstances, and from which, if the war (as is not improbable) should assume a character of inveteracy, we shall

certainly derive beneficial results. The Sheeahs of Candahar have always been at enmity with the Dooranees, and in the disturbances which have from time to time occurred in this province, they have evinced a general disposition to side with us. This feeling has been latterly still more directly manifested, and we have, in return, shown our confidence in them by permitting them to retain occupation of their dwellings. They must consider themselves for the future fully committed in our quarrel, and will, I think, be found of great value, if our contest with the Affghans proceeds to extremities.

I have now to detail the movements of the Dooranees since the 20th ultimo, when they received their advice from Cabool, announcing the Shah's restoration to power. Active measures of annoyance were at once adopted, a demonstration of force being considered likely to induce us more readily to an evacuation of the country. Large detachments of horse were thrown out from the Dooranee camp to the vicinity of the city, with a view of plundering our camels, cutting off stragglers, and preventing us from foraging. On the 21st, one of our foraging parties sustained a severe loss from the enemy's horse, 150 camp followers having been cut up, and nearly 300 camels carried off. On the 25th again, the Dooranee horse, nearly 2000 in number, came down upon another party, but the escort of three regiments which had been sent for the protection of the camels, was too strong for the enemy to attack, and nothing occurred beyond a little skirmishing. On the 27th, a third party went out to the eastward to procure forage, and returned unmolested; and on the 2nd, a fourth detachment of two regiments and four guns proceeded in the same direction, and brought in bhoosa, without falling in with any of the enemy's horse. This brigade, however, remained out during one night, and a report having in consequence arisen that it had marched for Kelat-i-Ghilzye to withdraw the garrison of that place, large bodies of the Dooranee horse proceeded up the Turmuk valley to harass the force. Discovering their mistake, they have since returned, and have encamped for several nights a few miles to the south of the city, and yesterday they cut up some of our camp-followers close under the walls of the city. During this interval, the Dooranee head-quarters have been moved to the left bank of the Arghundab river, and the numbers and spirits of the party have been daily on the increase. It has been the object of the Dooranees to show themselves at all points, and to keep us in a state of perpetual alarm. They have destroyed the villages of those chiefs who were supposed to be friendly to us, have greatly impeded the conveyance of supplies to the city, and have even threatened the cantonments. The numbers of horse and foot at present in arms amount, I believe, to about 4000 of the former, and 5000 of the latter. It is said that they will, if possible, decline an engagement, and content themselves with harassing General Nott's force, which is known to be sadly deficient in cavalry, but they are aware that an irregular army, like their own, becomes altogether unmanageable when pressed upon by an active foe, and if the danger therefore of dissolution becomes imminent, it is thought that they may try their fortune in a battle. Should an action of this sort occur, I may confidently predict that tranquillity will for a time be restored to Candahar. The Cabool Jaunbaz who are with the enemy will fly to the northward; the different chiefs will take refuge among the tribes in the remote districts; and some of those who consider themselves the least committed, may possibly be induced to come in.

The future prospects of Candahar will almost entirely depend upon the real feelings of the Shah, and the decision of the British Government with respect to him. Should we remain in the country as his supporters, we need not anticipate any very formidable opposition. Should Shah Shooja on the other hand be regarded as our enemy, I submit, with deference, that in regard to local feelings, His Majesty Shah Kamran will prove the most eligible rival to supplant him. Under any other arrangements, the war will become one of great inveteracy, and we can only expect to restore order by an overwhelming force, which shall suffice to crush altogether the power of the Dooranees. If we decide upon a measure of this sort, the attachment to us of the Sheeah population will be a most valuable auxiliary, and the Hazareh mountaineers, who are of the same faith, will gladly co-operate with us in the work of complete coercion.

I now do myself the honor to report various other measures, to which I have been compelled to give effect during the long period that has elapsed since an opportunity offered for reference to superior authority. I am still without any instructions on the subject of Herat, but I retain Sirdar Sultan Mahomed

Khan at Candahar, as a pledge for the sincerity of his brother, and as a means for arranging any relations that we may possibly desire to enter into with Shah Kamran, in the event of His Majesty's succeeding in the contest which he has precipitated with Yar Mahomed Khan, and which, after a continuance of two months, now promises to terminate in His Majesty's favor. Sirdar Sultan Mahomed Khan has been of the utmost service at Candahar in exerting his powerful influence with the Alekozye tribe, to detach it from the Dooranee confederacy, and, assisted with money which I have advanced to him for the purpose, he has so far succeeded, that the Alekozye chief in the Dooranee camp, one of the first nobles of Candahar, has been arrested and threatened with death by Prince Sufter Jung, for the lukewarmness his tribe has displayed in the Dooranee cause, and for being suspected of a personal attachment to us. Sirdar Sultan Mahomed Khan has been in the receipt of his allowance of 2000 rupees per mensem, recommended in my dispatch of the 20th of November, since his arrival here, and acting on demi-official permission granted by the Envoy some months back, I have also advanced the sum of 10,000 rupees to Sirdar Deen Mahomed Khan, in consideration of his brother's services.

At the commencement of the Candahar disturbances, fearing that the outlaw Attar Khan would attempt to return through the Tymmunee country, to the Helmund, I made another disbursement (sanctioned by the Envoy on a former occasion), of 10,000 rupees to Ibrahim Khan, Sirdar of the Tymmunees, to induce him to close the passes against our enemy. This disbursement has brought us into very friendly relations with the Tymmunees, and an agent of the Sirdar still continues to reside in Candahar. Deputations from the chiefs of Seistan, and from the Beloochees and Brahees of Gurmsel, who arrived at Candahar before the Cabool revolution broke out, have been obliged to remain here ever since at the Government's expense. The latter chiefs have been very useful in holding the Dooranees of Gurmsel in check, and thus preventing them from sending any considerable reinforcements to Sufter Jung's camp. The Hazareh and Belooch tribes, who returned with Lieutenant Elliot from Tireen and Dehrawut, have also resided in Candahar during the winter, and their entertainment here has pledged the tribes over whom their influence extends, to support the Jaunbaz detachment, that, up to the present time, has held its ground in Tireen, and paralyzed the movements of the Dooranees in that quarter, where the influence of Mahomed Atta Khan is paramount, and the tribes are notoriously strong and turbulent.

The Persian refugee, Agha Khan, is still a guest at Candahar, and General Nott, in consideration of our deficiency of cavalry, has expressed a wish that this chief, who is possessed of much military experience, and whose attachment to our interests is certain, should be intrusted with the temporary direction of such Parseewan horse as have remained true to us since the disorganization of the Jaunbaz. Agha Khan has at present about 300 of these horse under his orders, and will accompany General Nott in his projected attack upon the enemy, Were we not threatened with a deficiency of funds for our necessary expenses, I should venture to recommend that the Parseewan horse were considerably increased, as well with a view of relieving our own cavalry of the harassing duty of patrolling, as to give further confidence to the Sheeah party, and to show that we can still command the services of a not unimportant class of the Candahar population.

I have also the honor to bring to the notice of Government, that, during the late disturbances, when the sources of local revenue have been closed against the Government which we support, I have been compelled to advance funds for the maintenance of Prince Timour, of Abbas Khan, Sirdar of Candahar, and other chiefs who are entitled to salaries from the crown, and remain attached to the court of His Royal Highness. I have taken upon myself also to grant compensation for the losses sustained by Gaddoo Khan's Rissalah in November; and it has further appeared to me on several occasions desirable to expend sums upon chiefs who have supplied us with valuable information, or who have laboured to preserve tranquillity among their respective tribes. The total sum which I have disbursed for contingent expenses of this nature, inclusive of the original advance to Meerza Ahmed Khan, reported in a former part of my letter, amounts during the five last months to two lacs eleven thousand and sixty six rupees, ten annas and eight pice; and I shall take the earliest opportunity of submitting a detailed explanation of the numerous

items included in this account. I presume that henceforward I must be guided in my political expenditure entirely by General Nott's view of expediency.

I have only further to report, that within the last fortnight the fortress of Girishk has been attacked by the Baruckzyes, but that Bulwunt Sing, the Hindoostanee Killadar, has repulsed the assailants, and is confident of holding his post whilst his ammunition and provisions last. We are altogether without intelligence from Ghuznee, but the post of Kelat-i-Ghilzye is safe, and General Nott has directed the officer commanding to make every preparation for the sustained defence of his position.

I have, &c.,
H. C. RAWLINSON.

P. S. General Nott has marched out of the town this morning with five and a half regiments of infantry, sixteen guns, and about 1000 horse. The Dooranees have advanced to meet him, leaving their heavy baggage in the rear, and it is not unlikely that, either to-day or to-morrow, an action will take place between our troops and the enemy. I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of His Royal Highness Prince Timour, throughout the whole of the trying circumstances in which he has been placed. He has witnessed our reverses at Cabool, he has been addressed by his father in a manner which leads him to believe His Majesty to be inimical to us; his brother has absconded from Candahar, to head the Dooranee rising, and he has been himself repeatedly solicited to make common cause with the insurgents, but he has continued firm to us to the present time, and I see no reason whatever to doubt his real attachment to our interests.

No. 252.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, March* 12, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, that during the month of February, considerable numbers of the rebel forces, under the command of Prince Sufter Jung and other Affghan chiefs, assembled in the vicinity of Candahar, plundering the villages, and by every possible means urging the inhabitants to join in an attack upon the British troops. In the beginning of the present month the enemy approached close to the city of Candahar; I made the necessary arrangements for the safety of the city, and leaving a garrison of about 2,600 men in it, I, on the 7th instant, moved with the remainder of my force against the enemy; they retired as I advanced, they were driven first across the Turmuck, and then across the Arghundab. They would not allow the infantry to come in contact with them. On the 9th I got near enough to open our guns upon them with great effect. They were soon broken and fled; my want of good cavalry saved them from being totally destroyed. They were dispersed in every direction. During a march of five days opposed to 12,000 of the enemy, who had upwards of 6,000 well mounted cavalry, not a camel was taken or a particle of baggage lost. The troops marched without tents, both officers and men, and the conduct of my artillery and infantry was excellent. I think this dispersion of the rebel force will have the best effect, as it will convince the inhabitants that the chiefs cannot face us in the field with any chance of success. I am now doing all in my power to conciliate the villagers, and to induce them to return to the cultivation of their lands, and to live in peace, under the assurance of protection. During my absence a strong detachment of the enemy made an attempt on the city, and succeeded in burning one of the gates, but they were repulsed with great loss by the gallantry of the troops in garrison, under the command of Major Lane, of the 2nd Regiment of Native Infantry, whose report shall be forwarded for the information of Government, by the first opportunity.

I have, &c.,
W. NOTT.

No. 253.

Brigadier England to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, near Quetta, March* 22, 1842.

I BEG to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, and in continuation of my letter of the 3rd, that I arrived at this place with the troops mentioned in the margin of that communication, on the 16th instant.

2. In advancing through the Bolan Pass, I succeeded in turning the most dangerous part of that defile, by detaching a flanking party to the right of the zig-zag, its extremity in this direction, but there was no appearance of any intention on the part of the people of that region to dispute our progress.

3. The weather below the Passes was soon found to be no criterion as to the temperature above, for the thermometer at 7 in the morning stands in this camp usually at 40°.

4. Nevertheless, the influence of our advance has occurred happily at a moment when the successes of the 9th and 10th at Candahar were producing similar effects in that quarter; and I cannot but consider, that owing to these combined causes, the insurrection is now but languidly sustained southward of that city.

5. I apprehend that the second division of troops, which I had allotted to follow me to this place, when withdrawn from Shikarpore and other stations, where their presence had been required by the political agent of Sinde and Beloochistan, will not arrive here for ten days from this date, for the disappointments in carriage set aside all accuracy of calculation in military movements in this country; and the uncertainty of the weather is still a serious impediment.

6. I have found little or no aid in camels prepared for me here, but I rely much on the political effect of our arrival, and that our presence will give the people some confidence in bringing to our camp these animals for sale; and as I am led to suppose that the resources of the whole Pisheen Valley will be better secured by a movement in that direction, its climate also being much milder than this, and the very fact of advancing being at all times important, our numbers as usual being much magnified, I propose to make one or two marches in the direction of Killa Abdoolah in a few days, and there await the reinforcement I expect from Dadur.

7. It will then become my duty to consider how I can best aid the garrison of Candahar, in conveying to it the treasure, musket-ammunition, &c. which I have brought thus far for that purpose, and of which it has been often stated to me that they are in need; and I shall not fail to do my utmost to give facility and effect to these desirable measures, though it is evident by Major-General Nott's communication to me of the 14th instant, and from various other letters from Major Rawlinson, that the possibility of their detaching a brigade to receive these supplies at the Kojuck, as I had suggested, is not contemplated; on the other hand, it is clear that I am expected to convey them the whole distance to Candahar.

8. By present circumstances I think it very probable that I may be enabled to accomplish the relief in question by the end of next month, without risk or injury to the tranquillity of Sinde or Beloochistan; but I am perfectly impressed with the prudential considerations attached to all parts of this question.

9. It is my intention to maintain a garrison of 1500 men at Quetta, and to improve in some measure the defences of that place.

10. I cannot, however, too much lament the paucity of troops with me, the slender means of carriage, and the especial deficiency, both here and at Candahar, of cavalry, for I should not doubt, if somewhat more formidably equipped in these respects, that our supremacy in these countries and to the northward, would be at once placed in a true and rapid progress of re-establishment.

I have, &c.
R. ENGLAND.

No. 254.

Brigadier England to Lieutenant-Colonel Powell.

Sir, *Camp, at Koochlach, March* 25, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that a body of the insurgent horse, amounting apparently to about 100, having shown themselves this morning on the hills near this camp and in the direction of Hyderzee, I caused them to be attacked by a detachment of Captain Leslie's troop of the horse brigade, supported by a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry.

The officers immediately engaged in this affair, in which Captain Christie, of the 3rd Bengal Cavalry, assisted, report that nothing could exceed the ardour and good conduct of their men.

The enemy left five dead bodies on the field, and we have had two men wounded and one horse killed ; two horses are missing.

I have, &c.,
R. ENGLAND.

No. 255.

Major-General England to Major-General Nott.

Sir, *Camp, near Quetta, April* 1, 1842.

I WISH to acquaint you that the insurgents are so strongly posted and stockaded in a defile which leads from the village of Hykulzye to the plains in this direction, that I am of opinion that it is not to be forced by less than a strong brigade; and such brigade should be equipped with mortars. I had no information whatever of this defensive arrangement on the part of the insurgents until I was stopped by it, with some loss of men, in my way to the village of Hykulzye, at which place I had intended to wait for my reinforcements, now in progress through the Bolan, and then to proceed to Killa Abdoolla with some treasure, &c., for the use of the force under your command. I shall again attempt this operation with a brigade lightly equipped, and without knapsacks, as soon as I hear from you that you are prepared to meet it on the northern side of the Kojuck, and that this aid of treasure is absolutely necessary to you; but it would in my opinion be most prejudicial to the safety of Quetta, if I remained longer from it than merely to perform this service. I beg to advise that the force you send to meet me at Killa Abdoola should be strong with mortars, if you can spare them, as I have none, for I am credibly informed that the Kojuck is stockaded. It is, however, possible I believe to turn it. I have had no intelligence from Candahar since the 19th.

I have, &c.,
R. ENGLAND.

No. 256.

Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, near Quetta, April* 2, 1842

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that having advanced from hence on the 26th ultimo, with the troops mentioned in the margin*, I arrived at the entrance of a defile which leads to the village of Hykulzye early on the 28th, at which place I had intended to await the remainder of the brigade now in progress to this place through the Bolan Pass.

* Four guns, Horse Brigade; 1 troop 3rd Light Cavalry; 5 companies Her Majesty's 41st Regiment; 6 companies Bombay Native Infantry; 50 Poona Horse.

2. From the total impossibility which now evidently prevails in obtaining any sort of information of the numbers and position of the enemy, and from the stern silence observed on such subjects by even those whose interest seems to depend on our success, I had no reason whatever to suppose that the people visible on these hills near Hykulzye were more than an assemblage of the scouts and marauders which are thus placed on all parts of this country wherever our troops traverse it; and the principal men of the village of Hyderzie, which is but six miles from the defile in question, and who received us on the preceding day with the greatest apparent cordiality, carefully kept from our knowledge though much questioned on the subject, that Mahomed Sadig, the insurgent chief south of Candahar, was strongly posted in the pass above-mentioned and contiguous heights, for the express purpose of opposing our progress.

3. It became evident as we approached, that there was some preparation made for resistance by the insurgents on the commanding ground which flanked our line of march at this point; and, after a rapid reconnoissance, I proceeded to attack the principal hill by four light companies, including that of Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, supporting the attack by the remainder of the wing of that corps, under cover of the four guns of Captain Leslie's Horse Artillery; the remainder of the troops being duly distributed for the protection of the baggage.

4. The enemy kept his strength concealed behind a succession of breastworks improved by a ditch and abattis, until our advance reached the crest of his exterior defence, when a crowded body suddenly sprung up, and made the contest so unequal, that it was immediately evident it could not be advantageously maintained.

5. The light companies fell back, therefore, on the small supporting column of Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, which, on the appearance of the enemy's cavalry, which now rushed out from behind the hills, formed square, and gallantly resisted the efforts which were made to penetrate and break it; the matchlock men of the enemy still keeping up a sharp and destructive fire from the heights.

6. To persevere in a second attack on the now developed strength of the enemy, with the small numbers I had disposable for such an operation, I deemed to be unwarrantable; and I therefore determined to move by my right to the ruined village of Bazar, three miles to north-north-east, in which direction the baggage was first ordered to proceed, and the troops followed across the plain in echellon of squares, the artillery protecting by alternate guns, and the whole covered by as good a display of cavalry as we had at command.

7. The steady manner in which this movement was made, prevented any close molestation from the enemy; neither did they make any attack on us during the night.

8. I here discovered that 400 men, principally cavalry, had joined the insurgents' forces, from Candahar, the day before my arrival, and that, with a view to resist us, Mahomed Sadig had collected also at this point, from Shoranent and Shawl, 500 men, and that Mirza, a Kakur chief, with 100 of that tribe, also formed part of his force; the rest of the enemy's strength was made up by the Achukzye horse, formerly in our service, by armed villagers of the neighbourhood, making an estimated total of at least 1500 or 2000 men. Many officers, however, consider it to have been much greater.

9. I moreover discovered that the defences within which the enemy fought, had been works of two months' preparation, and I have seldom seen better cavalry than those, which, for *the first time*, displayed themselves, when the light companies fell back on Her Majesty's 41st, at which moment several of the enemy were bayoneted in their attack on the square of that half battalion.

10. On the morning of the 29th, it was perceptible that the insurgents had been collecting further reinforcements of armed villagers during the night, and that arrangements were making by them on an increased scale to resist any renewed assault on our part; and it being evident that the object of my remaining in the Pisheen Valley was negatived, whilst its resources and communications were thus in the hands of an enemy much stronger than myself, and that the latter could not be dislodged from the important heights he occupied without incurring severe additional losses, I felt I should best serve the views and interests of Government by falling back to my position at this place until reinforced; and I am happy to say that this difficult operation has been accom-

plished, although encumbered with a train of 1500 baggage animals and camels, and four and a half lacs of treasure, and many wounded men, notwithstanding the constant presence of the enemy, without hurry, and without incurring the loss of any baggage or article of public property beyond such as might reasonable happen in any ordinary march in India.

11. In passing near some strong ground yesterday near Koochlach, a company of Her Majesty's 41st Regiment ascended a steep hill on our left, and killed sixteen of a party of the enemy, from whom our column was receiving some annoyance in its progress, many others being wounded.

12. Having now detailed the circumstances belonging to the military events in this vicinity for the last few days, I solicit the favour of bringing to the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, the good conduct of the troops generally, and the gallantry of Her Majesty's 41st in particular, under Major Browne. I had every reason to be also satisfied with the good practice of Captain Leslie's efficient battery; and Major Apthorp, of the 20th Bombay Native Infantry (severely wounded, and since dead), led the light companies to the attack in the best possible style.

13. I have received from Major Wyllie, Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Boyd, Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Captain Davidson, Deputy Commissary-General, and the rest of the officers of the staff, very valuable and zealous assistance.

14. I beg to inclose a return of killed and wounded, as well as a copy of a letter which has this day been addressed to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Stacy, of the 43rd Bengal Native Infantry, who has been a volunteer with this force during its recent operations, and I quite concur in the sentiments expressed in the 6th paragraph of the Lieutenant-Colonel's communication.

15. I further beg leave to submit, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, a copy of a letter which I have this day addressed to General Nott.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

Sinde Field Force.—Return of Casualties in Action with the Enemy, near Hykulzye, on the 28th March, 1842.

Head-Quarters, Camp near Koochlach, March 30, 1842.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment of Foot—1 captain, 2 serjeants, 1 corporal, 14 privates, killed; 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 50 privates, wounded.

Light Company 6th Regiment N.I.—1 sepoy, killed; 3 sepoys, wounded.

Light Company 20th Regiment N.I.—5 sepoys, killed; 1 major, 2 naicks, 7 sepoys, wounded.

Light Company 25th Regiment N.I.—1 naick, 2 sepoys, killed; 6 sepoys, wounded.

Total—1 captain, 2 serjeants, 2 corporals or naicks, 22 privates or sepoys, killed; 1 major, 1 serjeant, 3 corporals or naicks, 63 privates or sepoys wounded.

Grand Total—27 killed; 71 wounded.

Names of Officers Killed or Wounded.

Captain W. May, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, killed.

Major Apthorp, 20th Native Infantry, commanding Light Battalion, wounded, severely and dangerously; since dead.

Remarks.

Wounded—13 privates, dangerously; 1 serjeant, 3 corporals, 20 privates, severely; 33 privates slightly.

W. WYLLIE.

No. 257.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Stacy to Major-General England.

Quetta, March 31, 1842.

I HAVE said the affair of the 28th, however distressing, has not been unproductive of good; it has shewn us, besides other facts, that our intelligence is next to nothing, our information so imperfect, that the existence of the entrenched position, which it appears the enemy had been engaged on the last two months, was utterly unknown to us, nor should we, I believe, have learnt that similar works have been prepared in the Kojuck, but for an advance on Hykulzye. Let it be observed, that our ignorance of the existence of this entrenchment, and the time necessarily taken to prepare it, prove, no less, our want of common information beyond our piquets, than the astonishing unanimity which is leagued against us.

No. 258.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.) *Benares, April* 22, No. 4, 1842

I HAVE the honor to transmit to you copies of the several letters addressed by me from this city, to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the instructions I have deemed it right to send to Major-General Nott.

These several documents will place you fully in possession of the views I entertained at the period at which those letters were written.

Yesterday I received the dispatch containing the gratifying account of Sir Robert Sale's victory at Jellalabad, and other dispatches conveying the intelligence of Brigadier England's having regained his position at Quetta without further loss, and of his having been joined there by the remainder of his brigade.

These several events, although they improve our prospects to some extent, have in no respect altered my deliberate opinion, that it is expedient to withdraw the troops under Major-General Pollock, and those under Major-General Nott, at the earliest practicable period, into positions wherein they may have certain and easy communication with India.

That opinion is found upon a general view of our military, political, and financial situation, and is not liable to be lightly changed. I shall do all in my power, to make manifest the high estimation in which I hold the conduct of Major-General Sir Robert Sale and the garrison of Jellalabad. I transmit, herewith, a copy of the Notification I have prefixed to the Gazette, and I shall consider in what further manner I may confer honor upon that distinguished officer, and his gallant brothers in arms.

No. 259.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.

Sir, *Benares, April* 19, 1842.

I AM directed by the Governor-General to instruct you to take immediate measures for drawing off the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye. You will effectually destroy all such guns as you cannot conveniently bring away. You will destroy the fort likewise, unless, at the time at which the operation shall be effected, which is hereinbefore enjoined, Prince Timour, having remained faithful to British interests, shall possess a sufficient force to be reasonably expected to be able to maintain that fort, upon your giving it into his charge.

2. You will evacuate the city of Candahar, giving that too into the charge of Prince Timour under the circumstances above-mentioned; you will otherwise ruin its defences before you evacuate it.

3. You will then proceed to take up a position at Quetta, until the season may enable you to retire upon Sukkur.

4. The object of the above-directed measures is, to withdraw all our forces to Sukkur at the earliest period at which the season and other circumstances may permit you to take up a new position there. The manner of effecting this, now necessary, object is however left to your discretion.

5. You will understand that, in the event of Prince Timour having continued faithful, it is the desire of the Governor-General to afford him the means of preserving, by his own native troops, or any other troops in his pay, the city of Candahar, and the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzye; but no British guns must be left which you can carry away; and no British officer must remain in his service, retaining his commission in the British army.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 260.

The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

General, *Benares, April* 19, 1842.

THE fall of the citadel of Ghuznee had removed the principal object for which it was expedient to retain the force under Major-General Nott, in its advanced position at Candahar.

2. The severe check experienced by Brigadier England's small corps on the 28th ultimo,—an event disastrous as it was unexpected,—and of which we have not yet information to enable us to calculate all the results,—has a tendency so to cripple the before limited means of movement and of action which were possessed by Major-General Nott, as to render it expedient to take immediate measures for the ultimate safety of that officer's corps, by withdrawing it, at the earliest practicable period, from its advanced position, into nearer communication with India.

3. Under this impression, I have thought it right to transmit the inclosed instructions to Major-General Nott.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 261.

The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

General, *Benares, April* 19, 1842.

THE intelligence just received of the successful entrance of Major-General Pollock into the Khyber Pass, supported by a large body of Sikh troops, and the more recent accounts from Jellalabad, seem to justify the expectation that, by this day, the junction of Major-General Pollock with Major-General Sir Robert Sale will have been effected, and their combined force be in sufficient strength, either to retain possession of the country near Jellalabad during the hot season, or to return without material loss to the vicinity of Peshawur.

2. The retention of the combined force in the vicinity of Jellalabad, during the hot months, may be more conducive to the health of the troops than a retrograde march through the Khyber Pass, and might have some material influence upon any negotiation which might be instituted for an exchange of prisoners.

3. On the other hand, it is obvious that the position of Major-General Pollock's force at one end of a long and difficult pass, with an enemy in its front, and an ally, not to be entirely depended upon, in its rear, is not one in which, having regard to military considerations alone, a general would readily place himself.

4. It has been already intimated to your Excellency, in the letter from the Governor-General in Council of the 15th March, that, in the opinion of the Government, military considerations alone should hereafter direct the movements of the British armies in Affghanistan.

5. The only question, therefore, will be, in which position will Major-General Pollock's force remain during the hot months with most security to itself, and with the least pressure upon the health of the troops, its ultimate retirement within the Indus being a point determined upon, because the reasons for our first crossing the Indus have ceased to exist.

6. Your Excellency is so much nearer the scene of action in Upper Affghanistan than I am, or can soon be; and you are, moreover, otherwise so much more qualified to form a correct opinion upon this subject than I am, that I feel I do best by leaving it in your Excellency's hands, and by requesting you to issue any instructions beyond those he already has, which your Excellency may think necessary for the guidance of Major-General Pollock.

7. I have forwarded to the Major-General a copy of this letter.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 262.

The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

General, *Benares, April* 19, 1842.

IN my letters of this day's date, I have communicated to your Excellency the instructions I have deemed it right to send at once to Major-General Nott, and have requested your Excellency to send the further instructions which you may deem necessary to Major-General Pollock.

2. The object of the instructions which will thus be given to those officers is to bring their respective corps into easy and certain communication with India.

3. What ulterior destination may be given to those corps, when that of Major-General Nott, having drawn off the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, shall be concentrated ultimately in the vicinity of Sukkur, and that of Major-General Pollock, having drawn off the garrison of Jellalabad, shall be again on this side of the Khyber Pass, is a matter for the most serious consideration, and one upon which I am most anxious to have the opportunity of conferring personally with your Excellency, or with some officer in your confidence, whom you may depute to me for that purpose.

4. If new aggressive movements upon Affghanistan should be deemed to be necessary, it will be for our consideration, whether it may not be possible to select a new line of operations leading directly upon Ghuznee, which may enable us to concentrate our forces, and to hold them in more immediate and secure communication with India.

5. It will, however, likewise be for consideration, whether our troops, having been redeemed from the state of peril in which they have been placed in Affghanistan, and, it may still be hoped, not without the infliction of some severe blow upon the Affghan army, it would be justifiable again to push them for no other object than that of revenging our losses, and of re-establishing, in all its original brilliancy, our military character.

6. Whatever may be the course upon which we may ultimately decide, it will be my anxious desire to carry with us the Sikh Government: the cordial aid of that Government will still be required, should we determine upon the adoption of a new central line of operations; and its cordial concurrence will likewise be required to enable us to terminate with propriety and dignity the military measures in which we have been involved by the Tripartite Treaty.

7. With a view to secure the tranquillity of India, while so large a portion of our force is beyond the Indus, it appears to me that it would be advisable to form, at the earliest period, an army of reserve, of at least 15,000 men of all arms, perfectly equipped for immediate service, in such a position as may make

it at once an apparent support to the corps in advance, and an object of apprehension to all who may entertain designs of hostility against the British Government.

8. It is impossible to doubt that, upon the first intelligence of the disasters experienced in Cabool, the Home Authorities will have taken measures for largely reinforcing us with British troops.

9. I shall not fail to impress upon them the expediency of largely increasing the proportion which British troops have of late years borne to the total numbers of the army in India, and of adopting other measures for increasing the efficiency of the native portion of our force.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 263.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

Honourable Sirs, *Allahabad*, No. 10, *May* 17, 1842.

MAJOR-GENERAL POLLOCK prosecuted his march upon Jellalabad, without further opposition than that he had encountered in the Khyber Pass, and arrived there on the 16th ultimo.

On the 20th, the Major-General detached a force to meet Colonel Bolton's brigade, which had reached Peshawur on the 21st; and the two formed their junction, and marched together to Jellalabad, without encountering an enemy.

At Jellalabad, the united force was on half rations. Grain was coming in, and by the last accounts more rapidly; but the force had no sufficient means of movement, and seemed to be unable to procure any; otherwise, the discouragement was such amongst the enemy, and the confusion such, consequent upon the decease of Shah Shooja, that the march of the force upon Cabool, had it been equipped with the means of movement, and well supplied, would have been at the moment a march probably unopposed.

Apprehending that negotiations would be opened for the release of the prisoners now in the hands of the Affghans, I had, on the 25th of April, informed Major-General Pollock that the British Government would not ransom prisoners; but that if all our prisoners were surrendered, we would surrender all without any reservation; but that if a partial exchange only were agreed upon, Dost Mahomed could not be given up.

As soon as I had reason to believe that Shah Shooja was actually dead, I addressed a letter to Major-General Pollock, dated the 28th of April, informing him that, in the present divided state of Affghanistan, the British Government could not prudently recognize any successor to the throne, although it was desirous of seeing established in Affghanistan a national Government, approved by the people, with which it could maintain relations of amity. I likewise informed Major-General Pollock that he might negotiate for an exchange of prisoners, with a *de facto* Government.

Your Committee is already aware that, on the 19th ultimo, I requested the Commander-in-Chief to give any further instructions his Excellency might deem necessary to Major-General Pollock. In the first instance, his Excellency informed me, by a letter dated the 27th of April, that he had not ventured to give any such instructions. Upon the receipt of this letter, I addressed to Major-General Pollock, on the 4th of May, a letter wherein I informed him, that neither his advance through the Khyber, nor the victory of Sir Robert Sale, nor the death of Shah Shooja, had varied my views. On the contrary, those events appeared to render his retirement more easy than it would have been, had important political considerations appeared to require other and ulterior operations. I expressed an opinion that his deficient means of movement and provision would have already induced him to withdraw within the Khyber Pass. I reminded the Major-General that no great object could be accomplished by an army deficient in the means of movement and supply; and I added, that I could experience no higher gratification than that of hearing that, the health of his army having been preserved, it was in a secure position, having certain communication with India.

On the 29th of April, the Commander-in-Chief did address orders to Major-General Pollock, directing him to retire at once, and only allowing him, under certain and specified circumstances, to delay that movement.

Upon the receipt of this communication I, on the 6th of May, expressed my entire approval of it, but again cautioned the Major-General not to endanger the health of his troops, which I feared might be seriously affected by the march across the Punjab at this season, directed by the Commander-in-Chief.

Anticipating the possibility that Major-General Pollock might have advanced upon Cabool, after relieving Jellalabad, I have already, on the 28th of April, informed him that that event would in no respect vary the view I previously took of the policy to be pursued; and that I adhered to the opinion that the only safe course was that of withdrawing the army under his command, at the earliest practicable period, into positions within the Khyber Pass, where it might possess easy and certain communication with India.

I authorized the Major-General to place the Sikhs in possession of Jellalabad, if he should receive instructions to that effect from Mr. Clerk. I had understood that the Sikhs were desirous of possessing that place, with a view to the protection of the territories on the left bank of the Cabool river, which they coveted for themselves, and which, under present circumstances, I see no reason for withholding from them; on the contrary, I considered that if the Jummoo Rajahs could be induced to give up their schemes of conquests beyond the Himalaya, and be content to extend themselves in the territory on the left bank of the Cabool river, our interests would be promoted.

The unfortunate repulse of Major-General England in the Pesheen valley had not the fatal consequences I was led to anticipate, when the last overland mail was dispatched. He was enabled to retreat upon Quetta, on the 1st of April, without further loss; and he was soon after joined there by the remaining portion of his force, which effected its passage through the Bolan Pass without any difficulty. He had then 3,600 men at Quetta, and began to fortify his position.

I instructed Major-General Nott to withdraw the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and to retire to Quetta on his route to Sukkur, under the impression that Brigadier England's force might almost be considered as lost, and that the brigade advancing through the Bolan Pass would be seriously opposed: the more favourable state of things has not induced me to vary the order given for his retirement, which the season will not permit him to carry into effect before October.

Major-General Nott has directed Brigadier England to move on the Kojuck Pass with 2,500: and he was to send a brigade to meet him. I apprehend, that about the 10th of this month, Brigadier England's force of 2,500 men, together with the force sent to meet him, having passed the Kojuck, will have reached Candahar.

Major-General Nott will then have under his orders above the passes a force of more than 13,000 men. He will be enabled to feed that force; but not, I apprehend, to provide any considerable means of movement; and his communications across the Kojuck Pass, and through the Bolan Pass, will be uncertain. In fact, military communication there is none between Candahar and the foot of the pass, for that cannot be called military communication upon which an army can depend, which can only be opened from time to time by the movement of strong bodies of troops.

Under these circumstances, I adhere to the orders already given to Major-General Nott to withdraw the garrison from Kelat-i-Ghilzye and retire upon Sukkur.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 264.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.) *Allahabad*, No. 14, *May* 17, 1842.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 23rd ultimo, No. 3, I have now the honor of reporting such further particulars relative to the operations to the

westward of the Indus, and of affairs in Affghanistan generally, as are not contained in my separate despatch of this date, No. 10.

2. In my letter above referred to, I informed your Honorable Committee that Major-General Pollock's force had reached Dhaka, and that no further serious opposition to its advance to Jellalabad was apprehended. On the 10th of April, the Major-General reached Gurdee with part of his force, the narrowness of the pass, and the necessary care of the baggage, rendering it impracticable for the whole to move in one body. On his arrival at Gurdee he met with some slight opposition from Saadat Khan, the opponent of Toorabaz Khan, of Lalpoora, a chief who has stedfastly adhered to British interests, and rendered important service by conveying money to the garrison of Jellalabad at the time of its greatest exigency. The Major-General had made arrangements for attacking the fort, but Saadat Khan fled, without awaiting the attack, and Toorabaz Khan was re-established in his principality of Lalpoora, and the General prepared for moving forward next day towards Jellalabad.

3. On the 16th of April, Major-General Pollock reported his arrival at Jellalabad, and expressed his gratification at finding the garrison in so healthy a state, and observed that he had been much struck by the strength of the works which had been erected by the indefatigable exertions of the garrison.

4. I forward as a number in the packet, copy of a Notification which I caused to be published, on the receipt of Major-General Pollock's letter, announcing his arrival at Jellalabad. I have addressed a separate letter to the Honorable the Court of Directors, dated 30th ultimo, on the subject of the honorary rewards and distinctions proposed to be conferred on the officers and men who composed the garrison of Jellalabad, and were present under Sir Robert Sale, at the action of the 7th April.

5. I have authorized Major-General Pollock to entertain an office establishment, at an expense of 475 rupees per mensem.

6. Major-General Pollock, in his letter, dated 18th ultimo, forwarded a copy of Captain Mackeson's report of the negotiations which had for a considerable time been going on with the Maliks of the Khyber, and which appeared to have ceased the day before the pass was forced; but after this success, the Maliks again made their appearance, with friendly professions. The Major-General remarked on the little dependence to be placed on any agreement with the Khyber Maliks for keeping open the pass, as any reverse on our side, or even the whim or caprice of a chief, might close it in twenty-four hours, if we had no other security but their forbearance to rely upon.

7. The Sikhs at the time held the pass as far as Ali Musjid, which was occupied by irregulars in our service. According to the agreement made with Rajah Golab Sing, the Sikhs were to hold the pass as far as Ali Musjid, until the 5th of June; and the General adverted to the hazard of its falling into the hands of the enemy, if troops be not then sent to occupy it, and observed, that if that garrison were the only post in the pass to be occupied by our troops, they would be unwilling to remain, without frequent reliefs, in so isolated a position, surrounded by an enemy; but he considered its occupation by our own troops to be absolutely necessary, if we are to depend on it in the time of need, and pointed out the great importance of its possession to a retiring army.

8. Mr. Clerk's dispatch of the 27th ultimo contains copies of further correspondence, on the subject of retaining a garrison of British troops in Ali Musjid.

9. The Major-General brought to my notice the inefficiency of the arrangements for the movement of an army, occasioned by the existing mode of engaging camels, and the fact of no grass-cutters having been sent with Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons.

10. I have caused a reference to be made to the Commander-in-Chief, on the circumstance of Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons having been sent on foreign service without grass-cutters to procure forage for the horses; and I have directed Major-General Pollock to purchase such number of camels as he may deem necessary for the service of his army, and recommended that the drivers of such camels should be regularly enlisted into the service of Government, so that they might be retained in the performance of the duty they engage to execute by martial law; and, if he should deem it expedient to form a corps of camel drivers under European officers, I have authorised him so to do; and in short, to adopt any measure which might seem to him to be best calculated to

ensure, for the use of the army under his command, the services of a sufficient number of carriage-cattle.

11. From a subsequent communication, it appears that partial arrangements had been made for supplying the horses of the 3rd Dragoons with forage, but General Pollock expressed his anxiety to have grass-cutters from the provinces, as he would, in that case, be more at ease as to the efficiency of the 3rd Dragoons; who, when an advance should be made, would probably have to play a conspicuous part, though at that time he believed that there was not a soul to oppose them between Jellalabad and Cabool.

12. In his dispatch of the 29th, Major-General Pollock recommended several measures for supplying the requisite means of carriage for his army, in the event of his advancing on Cabool. But, as your Honorable Committee will perceive, his recommendations on this important subject had been anticipated by the full power with which I invested him in my dispatch of the 4th instant.

13. In his letter of the 24th ultimo, Major-General Pollock submitted a copy of a letter which he had addressed to Mr. Clerk, pointing out the injurious tendency of the Sikh troops advancing to Dhaka and then withdrawing at the expiration of two months; and in Mr. Clerk's dispatch of the 30th ultimo, will be found copy of the reply which he addressed to the Major-General on the subject.

14. I referred General Pollock to the letter addressed to him by Mr. Clerk, informing him that on the 23rd of April, he had cautioned Captain Lawrence against the advance of Sikh troops to Jellalabad, and that in communicating with the Sikh Government, he had provided that none should advance without the Major-General's permission.

15. I concluded therefore that Captain Lawrence being thus instructed and informed by Mr. Clerk, would, on General Pollock's representation, so arrange, that no movement in advance by the Sikhs would take place without his approval.

16. I at the same time caused it to be intimated to Major-General Pollock that I was apprehensive that it would be found productive of much embarrassment, if the army under his command, and that of the Sikhs, were in force upon the same road, and suggested that it might be desirable, in the event of any Sikh troops having advanced through the pass, to endeavour to induce the Sikh generals to cross the Cabool river, if fordable, and to take up their quarters altogether on the left bank.

17. I forward copies of Mr. Clerk's dispatches respecting the co-operation of the Sikhs, and the best means of keeping open the Khyber Pass.

18. On the 3rd instant I referred Mr. Clerk to the notification which I had prefixed to General Pollock's despatch, announcing the passage of the Khyber, published on the 19th ultimo, and which I conclude he had communicated to Maharajah Shere Sing, as containing my recognition of the good service performed by the Sikh troops in the Khyber, and intimating my intention of congratulating the Maharajah. This intimation was deemed sufficient to enable Mr. Clerk to communicate my sentiments to His Highness.

19. In the event of his not having done so, I desired that he would make that communication through the minister, Rajah Dhyan Sing, and be careful to inform him that I had publicly expressed my sense of the good service rendered by the Sikh troops, and of the military distinction acquired by them immediately on receipt of Major-General Pollock's despatch, conveying an account of the operations in the Khyber Pass.

20. Anticipating that the Sikh Government may prefer some claim to pecuniary compensation, in consequence of the charge incurred in sending troops to the support of Major-General Pollock's movement through the Khyber Pass, I have called on Mr. Clerk for a report on the pecuniary transactions, as they now stand, between the two States, with reference especially to the obligations of the 15th Article of the Tripartite Treaty; and I have stated my opinion, that all sums actually received by the British Government from the Ameers of Sinde, under the 16th Article of that treaty, on account of the Lahore State, could only be considered as being held in deposit for the Maharajah; and I desired to be informed how the account of receipts and payments under that head now stands.

21. It will be seen from the demi-official letters inclosed in Mr. Clerk's despatch of the 4th instant, that the prospect of obtaining grain at Jellalabad

had much improved. By the same, it appears that Colonel Bolton's detachment had, on the 28th April, met Colonel Monteath's Brigade at Lundikhana.

22. Your Honorable Committee will find copies of a correspondence which had passed between Shah Shooja and Captain Macgregor, on which it would be needless to offer any remark.

23. On the 13th April, General Pollock reported that a rumour obtained in that quarter, that Shah Shooja had been murdered. On the 15th idem, Mr. Clerk forwarded a translation of letters of intelligence, describing the particulars of that atrocity. From these accounts it appears that His Majesty was suspected of a favorable disposition towards the English; and having, when charged with it, fully avowed the fact, he was inveigled out of the Bala Hissar, when he was fired at by four Barukzyes, employed by a son of Mahomed Zeman Khan, who, finding the Shah still alive, went up to him, and dispatched him dead with a pistol.

24. Subsequent information has confirmed the report of the Shah's murder, and the elevation to the throne of Prince Futteh-Jung, who has opened a communication with Major-General Pollock, and professes a strong inclination to co-operate with our Government. For particulars of the state of parties and affairs at Cabool, I beg to refer your Honorable Committee to the letters from Mohun Lall to Captain Macgregor, inclosed in General Pollock's dispatch of the 30th ultimo.

25. Prince Timour, the eldest son of Shah Shooja, was in Candahar when his father the Shah was killed; but I am not informed whether he has taken measures consequent upon that event.

26. It will be seen from the letter to Major-General Pollock, reported in my separate letter of this date, No. 10, that I have instructed him not to commit his Government to the recognition of any of the competitors to the throne of Cabool.

27. On the 24th ultimo, Major-General Pollock forwarded authentic copies of the several letters addressed in December and January last, by Captain Lawrence and Major Pottinger to Captain Macgregor, with reference to the Treaty entered into at Cabool, for securing the retreat of the army, to that retreat, and to the subsequent disaster. I directed copies of these documents to be sent to the President in Council, with a request that they, as well as all other documents relating to the conduct of the military and political authorities at Cabool, during the last three months of 1841 and in January, 1842, might be placed in the hands of some perfectly impartial person, for the purpose of separating as far as possible, such documentary evidence as they contain, relating to the military officers, from such as relates to the political agents, and submitting a report, upon which may be founded any charges to be preferred against the former, before a court-martial, and against the latter, to a court of inquiry, in pursuance of the determination contained in the notification of the 4th April, which accompanied the dispatch announcing the surrender of Ghuznee.

28. Considering Mr. Cameron, the law commissioner, to be best qualified for this office, I have suggested that he be requested to undertake it, and the memorandum found among Major-General Elphinstone's papers inclosed in General Pollock's dispatch of the 30th ultimo, as well as all other documents bearing on the subject, will be sent to the Presidency for the purpose of being analyzed as above indicated.

29. The best means of effecting the liberation of the prisoners now in the hands of the Affghans, has occupied my anxious consideration, and I beg to refer you to the letter I caused to be addressed to General Pollock, on the 25th ultimo, for a full exposition of my views on that subject.

30. On the 4th instant, Mr. Clerk forwarded copies of demi-official letters from General Pollock and Sir R. Shakespear of the 26th April. From these it appears that Captain Colin Mackenzie, one of the prisoners had arrived at Jellalabad, on his parole, on the evening of the 25th, with proposals from Mahomed Akbar Khan, relative to the release of the prisoners. In consequence, I apprehend of the miscarriage of another letter from the Major-General, I am still uninformed of the precise nature of these proposals, though one of them would appear to have been a demand for the release of Dost Mahomed Khan. It is stated that Major-General Elphinstone died on the 23rd, and that his body was to be sent into camp by order of Mahomed Akbar Khan.

31. In a dispatch dated 30th ultimo, Major-General Pollock submitted copy of a letter to his address from Major Pottinger, dated "Castle of Afzul Khan, Tezeen," 26th April, stating that Mahomed Akbar had the preceding day sent to Jellalabad the body of the late Major-General Elphinstone, that it was intercepted by a party of Ghilzyes under the supposition that the prince in Cabool had sent it, when the party conveying it, were made prisoners, and the European servant who accompanied it, was wounded. The Sirdar is said to have been much grieved at this occurrence, and had dispatched a party with Private Moore, the General's servant, to convey the corpse to Jellalabad, where it arrived on the 30th ultimo.

32. On the 28th April, General Pollock reported that Captain Mackenzie would that evening return with his reply to the message received from Major Pottinger.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 265.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord, *Simla, March* 27, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to transmit for your Lordship's decision thereon, a letter addressed to the Secretary to Government, in the political department, by Major-General Pollock, soliciting authority to increase the irregular levy, now in pay at Peshawur, from 400 infantry, its present strength, to 800, leaving the mounted portion of the levy 120 men, as it hitherto has been, under the political agent.

2. There are several good reasons given by the Major-General for this increased expenditure, but I have always understood that General Avitabiel's new fort was to afford the required protection for baggage and stores left behind. If such shelter cannot be afforded, or is insufficient, it is certainly better to increase the levy, than to leave a large detachment behind when every man is, or may be, so much required.

3. Captain Mackeson proposes that the garrison of Ali Musjid should be exclusive of this corps; perhaps it is thereby meant that they may be again placed in that fort, as General Pollock proceeds towards Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 266.

Mr. Maddock to General Sir J. Nicolls.

Sir, *Fort William, April* 8, 1842.

I HAVE the honor, by direction of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 27th ultimo, and in reply, to inform your Excellency, that the sanction of Government to the proposed measure of increasing the irregular levy now in pay at Peshawur, has been communicated to Major-General Pollock.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 267.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Allahabad, April* 24, 1842.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, and of its several inclosures.

2. The Governor-General is of opinion, that the advance of the infantry of the 1st Reserve Brigade, and of the whole of the 2nd Reserve Brigade, which

last, it appears, may be expected to reach Peshawur by the 28th instant, will, after his recent successes, and especially after the victory of Major-General Sir Robert Sale of the 7th instant, place Major-General Pollock in a position of strength, which will enable him to hold the Khyber Pass, even though the whole Sikh army should retire from it.

3. To hold the Khyber Pass, however, with a British force of more than 10,000 men, including that under Sir Robert Sale, with the feeling that any material diminution of that force would embarrass the communications of the army, can never be an object of rational policy, unless some most essential objects were to be obtained beyond the pass by so holding it, and the communication between the pass and the Sutlej could at all times be certainly maintained, without dependence upon the continued friendship of a foreign State, or any material cost or difficulty.

4. But these latter considerations are altogether unattainable; and to hold the pass without having an army in the field beyond the pass, would be wholly unproductive of commensurate advantage, even if it could be certainly, easily, and cheaply effected.

5. To regain concentrated positions for our armies, having easy and secure communications with India, is the present object of the Government, and one not lightly to be changed.

6. The Governor-General, while he frankly acknowledges the valuable aid which, on the recent occasion, the British troops derived from those of the Maharajah in the attack on the Khyber Pass, cannot but feel that a British army places itself in a false position when it depends upon any force but its own, for the security of its communications; and he will not, willingly, continue a state of things which is neithe free from danger, nor consistent with the honor of the British arms.

7. The Governor-General has attentively considered the suggestion contained in your letter of the 14th instant relative to the giving over to the Sikhs of the fort of Jellalabad. His lordship entertains great doubt whether the Sikh Government, or the Jummoo Rajahs, could be induced to accept the custody of that place. To occupy it, would apparently place them in a false position. Nevertheless, if it should be agreeable to the Sikhs to receive that place into their hands, the Governor-General sees no objection to your opening a communication with them upon the subject. All that the Governor-General regards is the security of our communication with the troops beyond the Upper Indus, and their withdrawal, at the earliest practicable period, from their advanced positions, in a state of continued efficiency, undiminished by the climate, or by the enemy.

8. The first political object is the conservation of military strength, by which all political objects may be attained, and without which, none.

I have, &c.

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 268.

Major General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Gurdee, near Lalpoora, April* 13, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council, that I arrived here on the 10th instant, with a part of the force under my command, as per margin*. The remainder, under General Mc Caskill, was one march behind, in consequence of the impracticability of moving so much baggage through so narrow a pass at one time. On my arrival at the ground, I found the men of Lalpoorah under Saadat Khan were firing upon our people. I fired a few shells during the day at bodies of men near the banks of the river; intelligence was received during the afternoon that Saadat Khan intended quitting the fort and town during the night, but at night

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* One troop Horse-artillery—two Six-pounders, one Nine-pounder, and two Mountain Trains—Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons—the Irregular Horse—Her Majesty's 9th Foot—the 26th, 33rd, and 60th Regiments of Native Infantry—Captain Ferris's Jezailchees.

it was understood that he would not go unless forced, which I accordingly intended should be effected without delay, and for this purpose, and to prevent the risk of a failure I ordered a strong party as below*, under the command of Colonel Taylor, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, to move yesterday morning at 4 A.M. I also moved out three guns to the front of the Camp to divert the attention of the enemy, when the columns should advance, and the rear detachment mentioned in the margin was directed to remain on this side of the river at the ford, about six miles from our camp. About half-past 7 A.M., I saw a party of the enemy proceeding towards the ford. Saadat Khan was supposed to be with this party; but, when they saw the strength of the force sent against them, the Chief returned with his horsemen, and I saw them move off, after which not a shot was fired, and in a short time a messenger from the opposite bank of the river came to report that the whole of the enemy had absconded.

The ford was extremely difficult; and, I regret to say, that two men of the 3rd Light Dragoons were drowned. The troops are now re-crossing; but having only one boat, the process is tedious and slow: if the whole recross to-night, I shall move forward to-morrow morning. Toorabaz Khan accompanied our party across the river, and is now re-established in his chiefship.

2. I have the honour to inclose copies of a letter from Captain Mackeson to me, and of two letters from Captain Macgregor. The death of Shah Shooja must very materially affect the ulterior views of Government, and I beg that no time may be lost in sending me instructions for my guidance.

3. In my letter of the 8th instant, I have stated my intention of moving six companies of Native Infantry, to garrison Ali Musjid. This arrangement was subsequently changed, and the present garrison there consists of one company 6th Native Infantry; Captain Thomas, one regiment, and the men who formerly formed the garrison. I have sanctioned an increase to the latter to the strength of 600 men, and, I trust, that in a short time I shall be able to man the fort entirely under their protection, supported as they will be by their proximity to the Sikh army.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 269.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, April 25, 1842.*

IT is naturally a subject of anxious consideration in what manner it may be most expedient to endeavour to effect the restoration to their country of the prisoners now in the hands ot the Affghans.

2 The only safe and honourable course for a Government to pursue, under such circumstances, is to effect the release of prisoners by a general exchange.

3. The redemption of prisoners by the payment of a ransom, is a measure unknown to the modern practice of civilized nations, and which the Government of India cannot consent to revive.

4. If the Affghans had any regular Government with which it was possible to treat for the general exchange of prisoners, such a measure would be the most consonant to policy, and there would, on our part, be no reservation whatever of any prisoners in our hands.

5. But it is apprehended that the British prisoners are rather to be considered as being in the power of individual chiefs, and so held for the personal benefit of such chiefs in the matter of exchange or ransom, than as being the prisoners of any one chief, or of the State; and it may be impracticable to make their release the subject of a general arrangement.

6. If such should be the case, you are authorized to make such partial arrangements for the exchange of prisoners as you may deem most advisable, with this reservation, that the person of Dost Mahomed is not to be surrendered, in pursuance of any such partial arrangement, without the express authority of the Gover-

* Two Horse Artillery guns—one squadron Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons—one Rissallah Irregular Horse—two Companies Her Majesty's 9th Foot—one wing 26th Native Infantry—one wing 33rd Native Infantry—one wing 66th Native Infantry. Rear Detachment:—two Horse-artillery guns—two squadrons Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons—one wing 26th Native Infantry.

nor-General; nor is any expectation to be held out, that it will be so surrendered.

7. Your attention will naturally be, in the first instance, directed to the release of the female prisoners; the sympathies of all are engaged in their fate; nevertheless, the Governor-General feels it to be right to remind you, that all British subjects have an equal claim upon the consideration and protection of the Government, and that it is as much the duty of yourself, and of all the British authorities, to endeavour to effect the release of the last Sepoy, as that of the first European, by all means not tending to establish an injurious precedent, and consistent with the honor of the British Government.

8. You will take especial care, in any arrangement you may make, that you take full security for its due and faithful execution in all its parts.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 270.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, April* 28, 1842.

THE reports of the death of Shah Shooja are so long continued, and are, upon the whole, so consistent, that the Governor-General cannot but attach great weight to them.

The death of the Shah is certainly an event not hitherto contemplated, and which may tend to create new embarrassments in the settlement of the affairs of Affghanistan.

That country appears to be so divided, that, under present circumstances, it would be obviously impossible for the British Government to recognize any individual as the successor to the monarchy of Affghanistan.

In all measures which may hereafter be adopted for the settlement of that country, the Governor-General is most desirous of carrying with the British Government the willing acquiescence of the Maharajah Shere Sing.

At the present time, the only reply which can be prudently given to the application of any chief aspiring to the crown, for the recognition of the British Government is, that the British Government is sincerely desirous of seeing Affghanistan permanently settled under a national Government approved by the people; that such has always been its desire, however interested persons may have misrepresented, or others may have misunderstood, our views; that we are anxious to be enabled to establish relations of friendly intercourse with any such Government which may seem capable of maintaining them.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 271.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, April* 28, 1842.

ALTHOUGH by my dispatch of this date, you will have received the instructions of the Governor-General to withhold the recognition of the British Government from any competitor for the throne of Affghanistan (in the event of the death of Shah Shooja), you will understand that that instruction does not prevent your treating with a *de facto* Government for the general exchange of prisoners, if it should appear that any such Government is capable of carrying any such exchange into effect.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 272.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, April* 28, 1842.

THE aspect of affairs in Upper Affghanistan appears to be such, according to the last advices received by the Governor-General, that his Lordship cannot but contemplate the possibility of your having been led, by the absence of serious opposition on the part of any army in the field, by the divisions amongst the Affghan chiefs, and by the natural desire you must, in common with every true soldier, have of displaying again the British flag in triumph upon the scene of our late disasters, to advance upon, and occupy the city of Cabool.

If that event should have occurred, you will understand, that it will in no respect vary the view which the Governor-General previously took of the policy now to be pursued.

The Governor-General will adhere to the opinion, that the only safe course is, that of withdrawing the army under your command, at the earliest practicable period, into positions within the Khyber Pass, where it may possess easy and certain communications with India.

In whatever measures you may adopt for the purpose of so executing the Governor-General's intentions, you will have especial regard to the preservation of the health of the troops, a subject of the deepest interest to his Lordship, even if it were not so intimately connected with the efficiency of your army.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 273.

Mr. Maddock to Major Outram.

Sir, *Allahabad, April* 28, 1842.

THE recent events in the Khyber Pass, and at Jellalabad, having given apparently a new aspect to our affairs in Upper Affghanistan, I am directed to inform you, that those events have in no respect changed the view before taken by the Governor-General of the policy to be pursued with respect to the countries beyond the Indus.

The Governor-General adheres to the intention of withdrawing, at the earliest practicable period, the British forces now in Lower Affghanistan, into positions in which they will possess the means of easy and certain communication with India.

The Governor-General is in correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief, upon the subject of giving to the army, under Major-General Nott, a large reinforcement in cavalry, as soon as the season will permit of its moving to the Indus, his Lordship's intention being to render that army thoroughly efficient in all arms.

Unless you should have received instructions of a different tenor from General Nott, you will, at the first convenient period, without prejudice to your health, proceed to Quetta, or to such other point as may enable you to give the greatest aid in facilitating the movements of Brigadier England and the Major-General.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 274.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Willoughby, Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

Sir, *Allahabad, April* 29, 1842.

I AM directed by the Governor-General to inform you that his Lordship is of opinion, that it would be advisable that a general officer (inferior only in rank

to Major-General Nott) should be sent to take the command of the large body of troops of the Bombay Army now in Sinde and Affghanistan, and his Lordship requests that the Governor in Council will appoint such general officer, and direct him to proceed forthwith to assume the command of such troops.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 275.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, April* 16, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to report my arrival here this day, and I have been much gratified at finding the garrison in so very healthy a state, and have been much struck by the strength of the works which have been erected by the indefatigable exertions of the force under Major-General Sir Robert Sale.

2. I trust, either to-morrow or the next day, to be able to submit, for the consideration of the Governor-General of India, Captain Mackeson's report on the state of our negotiations with the Khyber tribes, and on which I shall have to make some remarks. I shall be under the necessity of sending a part of the force to meet and aid Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton in the protection of treasure, ammunition, &c., from Peshawur.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 276.

General Order by the Governor-General of India.

Head Quarters, Allahabad, April 30, 1842.

THE Governor-General has received a report from Major-General Pollock, C.B., dated the 16th instant, announcing his arrival at Jellalabad.

The Major-General has thus carried into effect the orders of the Government in a manner which entitles him to the highest approbation.

Receiving the command of the army at Peshawur under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, he has, in the midst of new and unforeseen embarrassments and disappointments, preserved a firm mind, and, justly relying upon his own judgment, he has at last, with equal discretion and decision, accomplished the object he was directed to effect.

The Governor-General requests Major-General Pollock to accept his acknowledgments of the good service he has thus rendered to the Government of India, and begs he will communicate to the gallant officers and troops under his command, the entire satisfaction with which their conduct has been regarded on this occasion.

The Governor-General has already, in communicating the despatch from Major-General Sir Robert Sale, K.C.B., dated the 7th instant, expressed his high sense of the services of that officer, and of the garrison of Jellalabad, terminating on that day by a decisive victory, which would have left nothing to desire had Colonel Dennie survived to enjoy it.

The garrison of Jellalabad having on that day achieved its safety by its own prowess, and being now reunited to the army by the movements of the force under the command of Major-General Pollock, C.B., it remains only for the Governor-General to testify his opinion of the just claims of that garrison to the gratitude of the Government and of their country.

The Governor-General is pleased to direct that the second company of the sixth battalion of Artillery shallbear upon its appointments, and the 5th Regiment of Light Cavalry upon its standards and appointments, and the 35th Regiment of Native Infantry upon its colours and appointments, a mural crown superscribed "Jellalabad," as a memorial of the fortitude, perseverance, and enterprise evinced by those several corps during the blockade of Jellalabad.

The Governor-General is likewise pleased, in conformity with the recommendation of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to direct that "in order to give

additional and lasting honours to the 35th Native Infantry, whilst it benefits the service generally, that corps shall hereafter be made a light infantry regiment, the duties of which it is already so well acquainted with, and has performed with so much zeal and spirit."

The Governor-General is further pleased to direct that a silver medal be made for every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, European and Native, who belonged to the garrison of Jellalabad on the 7th of April 1842, such medals to be all similar, and to bear on one side a mural crown superscribed "Jellalabad," and on the other side the words "April 7th 1842."

The Government of India will present such medal to every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, European and Native, belonging to their service, and will request the Home Authorities to lay before Her Majesty their most humble prayer that Her Majesty will be graciously pleased to permit the Major-General commanding, and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates in Her Majesty's service, who formed part of the garrison of Jellalabad, to receive and wear a medal similar to that which will be so presented to their brothers in arms.

The Governor-General, taking into consideration the many great privations to which the troops composing the garrison of Jellalabad were exposed during the blockade of that place, and the noble fortitude with which all such privations were borne, as well as the various losses the troops sustained, is pleased to direct that a donation of six months' batta be made to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, European and Native, who composed the garrison of Jellalabad on the 7th of April, 1842.

The Governor-General will request his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the army to give instructions in due time that the several corps composing the garrison of Jellalabad may, on their return to India, be received at all the stations on their route to their cantonments, by all the troops at such stations, in review order, with presented arms.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 277.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, April* 18, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to forward Captain Mackeson's report of negotiations which have for a considerable time been going on with the Maliks of the Khyber, and which, to all appearance, had ceased the day before I forced the Pass. When the troops had, contrary to expectation, succeeded, the Maliks again joined us, and I have no doubt that, through Captain Mackeson's exertions, the Pass will be opened on much the same terms that have been had recourse to hitherto, and which although good as long as they last, I can never depend upon, as any reverse on our side, or even the whim or caprice of a chief, might close the Pass in twenty-four hours.

The Sikhs at present occupy the Pass as far as Ali Musjid, and the fortress is occupied by irregulars. By the agreement entered into with Rajah Goolaub Sing, the Sikhs were to hold the Pass as far as Ali Musjid till the 5th of June. If they then quit it, and troops of our own are not sent to occupy it, I fear Ali Musjid must fall into the hands of the enemy, supposing our negotiations to fail. I hope the strength of the garrison will be increased by recruits for the irregulars, but whatever their strength, if they are the only troops of ours in the Pass, they will scarcely be persuaded to remain in so isolated a situation, and surrounded by an enemy.

The occupation of the Pass by our own troops is, I consider, absolutely necessary, if we are to depend on its being kept open in time of need; and the possession of Ali Musjid is of the highest importance to any troops retiring through the Khyber. On this side of it there is no encamping-ground for some miles; the heights to be taken possession of, to command the fort, can be approached only by a circuitous and difficult route, and when attained would be several miles from the camp. The difficulties would in every way be very great, and the process of a siege might be very tedious, while in the meantime forage would fail: indeed,

reviewing the whole question of the Khyber Pass, and the probability of a return through it, I cannot but look with anxiety to the probable loss of Ali Musjid, which is not very formidable to an advancing army, as encamping-ground is near at hand on the other side.

I now beg to bring to the notice of Government some points which are of a most serious nature, and go far to paralyze the movements of any army sent in this direction. The accompanying copy of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons will show that the camels are hired to Jellalabad, and I regret to say that nearly one-half never go beyond Peshawur, from which place they generally return, owing to the defection among the drivers, and the great want of carriage-cattle; it was with the greatest difficulty I could procure twenty camels to bring on two additional lacs of rupees (I have only four altogether), and much of the small arm ammunition I was obliged to leave behind.

From the Sikh authorities I obtained no assistance; indeed they made no effort to aid in recovering those who deserted: had we been assisted by the Sikh authorities I believe that every camel might have been recovered. In this crippled state I moved forward, and having arrived here the whole of the hired camel drivers have come forward in a body to say they have performed their engagement, and request that they may be discharged. The only alternative I have is to purchase the camels, but I fear the drivers will refuse to go. Captain Macgregor informs me he may probably get fifty camels, while I require at least 1500. My situation at the present moment is a difficult one, and much as I deprecate any retrograde movement, such a step is by no means improbable, as I have not yet been able to get in supplies in sufficient quantities to warrant my remaining here.

There is an abundance of grain at Peshawur, and Captain Lawrence has been exerting his influence to procure carriage; how far he will succeed by the time the 31st Foot move forward I cannot say, but I confess that in the interim I cannot help feeling very great anxiety on the subject.

I take this opportunity of bringing to the notice of Government that in consequence of a system which obtains in the dragoon regiments on the Bengal establishment, a regiment ordered on such service as this is literally in a fair way of becoming quite unserviceable in consequence of the horses not being able to procure forage.

It was not known to me till yesterday that the 3rd Dragoons have no grass-cutters, and this morning it was officially reported to me that the horses would starve unless forage was procured for them. I have made arrangements for the present, and I hope I may continue to supply them, but I would here compare their situation with that of the Native Cavalry who are abundantly supplied, having grass-cutters.

I am given to understand that dragoon regiments in the provinces have no grass-cutters, but that a chowdry is attached to each troop, who supplies grass on contract. Here such a system could not succeed, and it could hardly be expected that several hundred grass-cutters would be collected at short notice, and if collected, little dependence could be placed in them. The state of the dragoons now here sufficiently shows the evil of such a system, as the regiment is thereby rendered almost unserviceable.

I have not heard anything further of the prisoners than that Mahomed Akbar had taken them to Tazeen, where he had left them, and had proceeded to Cabool.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 278.

Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, Deputy Commissary-General, to Captain Mainwaring, Officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary-General.

Sir, *December* 18, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the whole of the hired or Rewarree camels engaged to carry public stores and private baggage from this place, with the corps and detachments recently gone towards Affghanistan, are only to carry their loads as far as Jellalabad. I have to request that you will, therefore, be good enough to prevent the owners of the cattle being forced to proceed beyond that

place, as I have pledged myself to them that they will not be forced to go on; and I shall be obliged, if you will, after their arrival at Jellalabad, have the camels returned to Peshawur as speedily as practicable, and procure them a guard to protect them on the journey to the latter place.

I have, &c.,
J. D. PARSONS

No. 279.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, April* 30, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch (No. 2), dated Camp, Jellalabad, the 18th ultimo; and in reply to inform you that the circumstances mentioned regarding defective arrangements in the Regiment of Dragoons will be communicated to the Commander-in-Chief. The Governor-General concludes that you will have taken the most effectual means in your power to supply the deficiency complained of.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 280.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 4, 1842.

THE Governor-General, seeing the extreme inconvenience and embarrassment to which you are exposed, through the hiring of camels, directs you to purchase such number of camels as you may deem necessary for the service of your army, and recommends that the drivers of such camels should be regularly enlisted into the service of the Government, so that they may be retained in the performance of the duty they engage to execute, by martial law.

2. If you should deem it expedient to form a corps of camel drivers under European officers, you are authorized so to do, and indeed to adopt any course which may seem to you to be best calculated to secure to the army the service of a sufficient number of camels.

I have, &c.
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 281.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, April* 28, 1842.

WITH reference to my letter (No. 2), dated 18th instant, I have now the honor to forward a report from Major Lockwood, which I called for yesterday. I have had a number of koorpas made for cutting grass, and I directed that the horses should be led out to graze, which has preserved their condition. If grass-cutters could by any possible means be sent from the provinces, I should feel much more easy about the efficiency of the 3rd Dragoons, which, when we advance, may possibly have to play a conspicuous part, though at present I believe there is not a soul to oppose us between this and Cabool.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 282.

Major Lockwood to the Brigade Major, Cavalry Brigade.

Sir, *Camp, Jelallabad, April* 28, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Assistant Adjutant-General, that I have up to this date registered seventy-two grass-cutters, who furnish me with grass for 128 horses, several of them having tattoes. I have also two chowdries appointed to superintend them. I beg to add that, from arrangements now in progress, I expect in a few days I shall be enabled to register 200 more, at least, from amongst the syces paid for by the men of the regiment, in addition to the establishment allowed by Government.

I have, &c.

G. H. LOCKWOOD.

No. 283.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 3, 1842.

THE expediency of forming at the earliest period a camp upon, or in the vicinity of the Sutlej, and of collecting in such camp a considerable body of troops, not less than 15,000 men of all arms, completely equipped for any service, has engaged the Governor-General's attention from his first accession to the Government, and his Lordship is in communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the army upon the subject.

2. It is his Lordship's intention to join such camp wherever it may be formed, probably early in October, and his Lordship would then desire an interview with the Maharajah.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India.

(Extract.) *Simla, April* 27, 1842.

I HAVE not ventured to give any instructions to Major-General Pollock. The 5th, 9th, 10th, and 11th paragraphs of your orders of the 15th March must now guide him. It is for him alone to decide between the practicability of a forward movement, either upon Cabool or Gundamuck (or its vicinity), and the withdrawal of the whole force to Peshawur.

The General is a clear-headed, good officer; and you have loaded his advance with heavy cautions; but he will stand alone, and treats those around him (as far as I know) rather as advisers than as his agents.

By his dispatch of the 16th, your Lordship will perceive that he feels it necessary to send back a part of his force to aid Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton through the pass. He promises an explanation of this necessity. My great doubt is, that he can equip the force for a movement in advance, at such a distance from our resources, and under the rooted dislike and fear of the Affghans, entertained by every class of camp-followers. If they move ill equipped, or are placed in an unhealthy position, the loses may be very heavy.

As to the power of the enemy, I do not anticipate any great difficulty in moving in any required direction, arising out of their resistance; but for sieges the General is unprovided.

No. 285.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 4, 1842.

THE Governor-General was in expectation that, in pursuance of the request contained in his Lordship's letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the 19th ultimo, (of which a copy was communicated to you,) his Excellency would probably have addressed instructions to you, founded upon the more recent and accurate knowledge of your situation, which his Excellency's position at Simla enables him to obtain; but his Lordship is now informed that his Excellency has not deemed it necessary to issue any such further instructions, relying upon your discretion in acting upon the instructions you already have, contained in the letter of the Governor-General in Council to his Excellency, dated the 15th of March.

2. You have since received, in the letter of the 19th ultmo above referred to, a further indication of the views of the Government—views which have been in no respect varied by the demise of Shah Shooja, or by the victory of Sir Robert Sale.

3. On the contrary, that victory, in conjunction with your success, going far towards the re-establishment, in the minds of the Affghans, and of our troops, and subjects, and allies, of that sentiment of confidence in our military superiority, which it is so essential to preserve; and the decease of Shah Shooja having manifestly relieved the British from all such engagements as might have been deemed to be of a personal character with him, it is in reality, and it will be in the opinion of all men, more easy for you to withdraw your troops from the advanced position they occupy, than it would have been, had political considerations of great importance appeared to require other and ulterior operations.

4. The most recent accounts which have been received of the difficulty experienced by you in obtaining supplies at Jellalabad, and in bringing forward supplies from Peshawur; and the very deficient means of movement, as well as of provision, which you possess, induce the Governor-General to expect that you will have already decided upon withdrawing your troops within the Khyber Pass, into a position wherein you may have easy and certain communication with India, if considerations, having regard to the health of the army, should not have induced you to defer that movement.

5. The Governor-General is satisfied that you will have felt that no great object can be accomplished by any army having deficient means of movement and supply, and that nothing but a great object could justify the incurring of great risks.

6. His Lordship is too strongly impressed with confidence in your judgment to apprehend that you will ever place the army under your command in a situation in which, without adequate means of movement and supply, it could derive no benefit from its superior valour and discipline, and might be again subjected to a disaster which, if repeated, might be fatal to our power in India.

7. The first object of the Governor-General's anxiety has ever been to withdraw, with honor, into positions of security, the several corps of the army which he found scattered and surrounded in Affghanistan. That object may now be accomplished as respects the army under your command; and the Governor-General could experience no higher satisfaction than that of hearing that, the health of that army, in whose welfare he takes so deep an interest, having been preserved, it was in a secure position, having certain communication with India.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 286.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India.

My Lord, *Simla, April* 29, 1842.

I HAVE been honored by the receipt of your Lordship's dispatches of the 19th instant; and, having reconsidered the whole subject, I have to report to your Lordship that I have this day directed Major-General Pollock to withdraw the troops from Jellalabad.

2. Inclosed I have the honor to transmit a copy of my letter of this date to the Major-General, as it may be of importance to assist your Lordship in conveying your further orders, regarding the return of the troops to the provinces.

3. I trust that the early return of the Jellalabad brigade, which I have directed, may be approved; and that I may not be considered to have erred in giving some latitude, in certain specified cases, to the Major-General.

4. My opinion is, that the whole force should be withdrawn to our own frontier, if the season will admit. They cannot be accommodated in buildings at or near Peshawur, I apprehend; and tents, and even huts, in such a climate, afford very insufficient shelter.

5. On this subject, however, the Major-General has been directed to attend to the advice and wishes of your Lordship's Agent on this frontier, in conformity with Mr. Secretary Maddock's letter of the 10th February to Mr. Clerk, and with my instructions of the same date.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

P.S.—I have just received from Mr. Clerk a copy of his letter of the 24th to Mr. Maddock, and of Captain Mackeson's to him, of the 17th, also of Mr. Clerk's letter of the 23rd to Mr. Maddock; but I am not disposed to qualify, or even to postpone, the instructions to General Pollock, which I had previously prepared.

No. 287.

General Sir Jasper Nicolls to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Simla, April* 29, 1842.

THE Governor-General having transmitted to you a copy of his Lordship's dispatch to my address of the 19th instant, you will be prepared to receive a communication from me on the important subject thereof. You will be pleased, therefore, to conform to the following instructions.

2. Shah Shooja being dead, Ghuznee lost, and Major-General Nott directed by his Lordship's command (also of the 19th instant), to withdraw the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, to evacuate Candahar, and to retire, first upon Quetta, and when the season admits, upon Sukkur; you are required to make a similar movement in Upper Affghanistan, and to withdraw every British soldier from Jellalabad to Peshawur.

3. You are to destroy the fort and any useless guns; but as there need be no haste in the retreat when commenced, you are requested not to leave any trophies.

4. The only circumstances which can authorize delay in obeying this order are,—

1st. That you may have brought a negotiation for the release of the prisoners lately confined at Buddeabad, to such a point that you might risk its happy accomplishment by withdrawing.

2nd. That you may have detached a lightly equipped force to endeavour to rescue them.

3rd. That the enemy at Cabool may be moving a force to attack you. In this improbable case, should any respectable number of troops have descended into the plain below Jugdulluck with that intent, it would be most advisable to inflict such a blow upon them as to make them long

remember your parting effort. If you should have such a glorious opportunity, I advise you to send your weak and inefficient men previously to Lalpoora.

5. I do not recommend delay in the first case, unless the prisoners are actually on their way to your camp, as no faith can be placed in Affghan promises or oaths. The second would, of course, require that you should await the return of the detachment.

6. I allude entirely to the officers and ladies now or lately at Buddeabad, or its vicinity. Those at Cabool cannot, I think, be saved by any treaty or agreement made under existing circumstances at Jellalabad.

7. You will be pleased, on reaching Peshawur, to dispatch to Ferozepore, without delay, the troops of all arms which so gallantly upheld our country's name at Jellalabad; and further instructions will be sent to you regarding the disposal of the other brigades. Sir Robert Sale may be permitted to remain at your head-quarters, should he desire to do so, and you will transfer him accordingly to another command, placing Brigadier Monteath in charge of the returning column.

I have, &c.,
J. NICOLLS.

No. 288.

The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

General, *Allahabad, May* 6, 1842.

YOUR Excellency's letter of the 27th ultimo, informing me that you had not given instructions to Major-General Pollock, and that the 5th, 9th, 10th, and 11th paragraphs of the orders of the 15th of March must now guide him, was received by me on the 3rd instant. On the 4th I addressed to Major-General Pollock the letter, of which a copy was transmitted to your Excellency. Yesterday evening, the 5th, I received your Excellency's letter of the 29th ultimo, communicating to me the instructions you had on that day addressed to Major-General Pollock.

I have to thank your Excellency for having had the goodness to give those instructions, of which I entirely approve.

They are in accordance with the general principles which, in my letter of the 19th ultimo, were laid down for the Major-General's guidance.

I have this day addressed a letter to the Major-General, of which I inclose a copy.

Your Excellency will perceive that, under certain circumstances, the fort of Jellalabad may be placed in the hands of the Sikh troops upon the withdrawal of our army. This instruction is founded upon a communication I received, which led me to think that the Sikhs were not unwilling to receive that fort.

I inclose a copy of an extract from a letter addressed by my direction to Mr. Clerk upon that subject.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 289.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 6, 1842.

I AM directed to inform you that the Governor-General received yesterday evening from the Commander-in-Chief a copy of the instructions his Excellency addressed to you on the 29th ultimo.

2. Of those instructions the Governor-General entirely approves. They are in accordance with the general principles laid down by his Lordship for your guidance, and you will execute them to the best of your ability, having regard always to the health of your troops, and to the efficiency of your army,—objects of primary importance.

3. There is one point upon which I am directed to desire you to attend to the instructions of Mr. Clerk. If that gentleman, the Governor-General's Agent at the Court of Lahore, should, upon your quitting Jellalabad, instruct you to deliver up that place to the Sikhs, you will do so, leaving the fortifications as they are; but you will on no account deliver up that place to the Sikhs, in pursuance of any such instructions, one hour sooner than you may deem it to be consistent with the interests of your army to give it into their hands.

4. You will of course keep possession of Ali Musjid, until the last British soldier has passed it.

5. The Governor-General trusts that you will have had the discretion not to mention the nature of the orders given to Major-General Nott, which are referred to in the letter to you from the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 29th ultimo.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 290.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.

(Extract.) *Allahabad, May* 7, 1842.

THE Governor-General deems it expedient to inform you that instructions similar to those addressed to you on the 19th ultimo, have now been addressed to Major-General Pollock, and that officer will withdraw his army into positions wherein they may have easy and certain communication with India, at the earliest practicable period, regard being always had, in the making of such movement, to the health and efficiency of the troops,—objects of primary importance.

The Governor-General feels assured that, in whatever movements you may have made, or may make, in pursuance of your instructions of the 15th of March and 19th ultimo, you will have had the same object in view, and will deem it to be your highest praise to bring back your army in health and undiminished strength.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 291.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, March* 24, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you, that a copy of a demi-official communication, dated the 25th of February, 1842, addressed by Mr. Clerk to Major Outram, has just reached Candahar; from which I learn that "Government have directed the Commander-in-Chief to require Major-General Pollock to withdraw the Jellalabad garrison, unless unforeseen circumstances," &c.

When I view the intimation, thus received, of the orders of Government, in connexion with their intentions, conveyed to me in dispatches, and also with their avowed determination to redeem the credit of the British arms in Affghanistan, publicly notified in general orders, under date the 31st of January last, I feel that a degree of perplexity and embarrassment has been thrown upon my position at Candahar, which I did not contemplate, and could not have contemplated, when the letters I have hitherto addressed to you were written.

The communications I have hitherto received from Government have, it is true, prescribed to me no decided line of conduct; but I am warranted in saying, that their general tenor was to the effect that, if, under existing circumstances, I could maintain my position at Candahar, without risking the safety of my troops, it would be consonant with the views and wishes of Government that I should do so.

I had a considerable body of troops, and, with much pains, had collected a reserve of upwards of six months' provisions. I felt assured of support, and of the receipt of the ammunition and stores I stood in need of, from Sinde or India;

I knew that Jellalabad was in our possession, and that it was the resolution of Government to maintain it; that large reinforcements were preparing for its support; I could not over-estimate the value of this powerful diversion in my favor, nor could I shut my eyes to the fact, that the abandonment of Candahar by me, must have an unfavorable effect upon the measures in progress for the retention of our position at Jellalabad. Under these circumstances, I never had a moment's hesitation as to the course I ought to pursue, so long as discretionary power was left to me; and all my arrangements have, consequently, been made with a view to the present maintenance and future extension, should such prove desirable, of our power in this country.

But, could I have foreseen that so immediately following their proclamation of the 31st of January, Government would have determined on withdrawing their troops from Jellalabad, excepting on the occurrence of "unforeseen circumstances," I should most probably have regarded this resolution of theirs, as distinctly pointing to their intention of evacuating the country altogether, and have taken measures accordingly.

Now, however, the position of the troops at Candahar is so far fixed, that I consider retirement would not only be disadvantageous, but almost impracticable, until the autumn; and I trust that my having determined on remaining, may ultimately prove fortunate; but the state of uncertainty into which I am now thrown, regarding our present position at Jellalabad, and the probable future policy of Government, must preclude my acting with full confidence in measures calculated to restore British influence in the country, by force of arms. I am also become doubtful of the propriety of retaining Kelat-i-Ghilzye as a separate garrison; for there is but too much reason to fear, that the sacrifice of the garrison at Ghuznee must closely follow on the abandonment of our position at Jellalabad.

As long as both the positions of Candahar and Jellalabad are occupied by us, the attention of the insurgents in Affghanistan is distracted. No general or combined movement can be made by the Affghans while they are threatened from both these points; but if one source of apprehension be removed by the withdrawal of our troops from Jellalabad, the undivided force of the people backed by success, and inflamed by religious enthusiasm, will be at liberty to concentrate its energy against our position at Candahar.

I believe that many people have been prevented from joining the rebel chiefs, now in arms against us near Candahar, from a feeling that we meditate the re-occupation of Cabool from the side of Jellalabad,—an impression that has been confirmed by the non-arrival of succour from Cabool, since the deputation of Atta Mahomed, on the first outbreak of the insurrection in that city. While we maintain an imposing attitude at Jellalabad, even supposing no advance takes place beyond that post, it is my opinion that but few troops and no artillery will be sent from Cabool in aid of the rebel cause at Candahar; but, if Jellalabad be abandoned, I not only look forward to having to contend with a force from Cabool, much better equipped than is ordinarily the case with Affghan troops, but I anticipate a general movement against us from every part of the country.

If Government intend to recover, even temporarily, and for the saving of our national honor, their lost position in this country, even if doubtful of the policy that it may be deemed expedient to pursue, I earnestly hope that, before any immediate retrograde step is made in either direction, our whole position in Affghanistan will be attentively viewed; and that the effect which a hasty retirement would certainly, and instantly, have on the whole of Beloochistan, and even on the navigation of the Indus, will be taken into consideration. At the present time, the impression of our military strength among the people of this country, though weakened by the occurrences at Cabool, is not destroyed; but if we now retire, and it should again become necessary to advance, we shall labour under many disadvantages, the most serious of which, in my opinion, will be a distrust of their strength among our soldiers, which any admission of weakness is so well calculated to induce; and in what other light could a withdrawal from Jellalabad or Candahar be viewed?

If retirement should become necessary, it should take place simultaneously, and at a proper season. If Government should select Candahar as the point whence future operations against Cabool are to be directed, still the retention of a position at Jellalabad in considerable force, will be of the most essential

service in all future contemplated operations. In the sanguine hope that some unforeseen circumstance may have occurred to postpone the execution of the Government order for the evacuation of Jellalabad, I have thought it incumbent on me to address this letter to you.

Before closing my letter, I may mention that I am now in expectation of the march of Brigadier England from Quetta, with supplies for Candahar. I have no correct information regarding the probable date of his quitting that post, nor of the strength of his force; but there is room for apprehension that the convoy he has to escort will be but weakly guarded, and every probability that it may be attacked. I am at present, therefore, compelled to remain at Candahar, prepared to move with a sufficient body of troops to the Brigadier's support, whenever I may receive certain intelligence of his movements.

I have, &c.,
W. NOTT.

No. 292.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, March* 29, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you that, in consequence of the disputes between the troops and camp-followers and the Affghans in making purchases within the city, and to induce the people of the country to bring in supplies, I have been under the necessity of establishing a bazaar, on the outside of the town, and in order to its being properly regulated, and to prevent exactions and oppression towards the inhabitants of the district, to appoint a European officer to superintend it.

This bazaar was established on the 16th instant, and has been attended with the very best results; the people now willingly bring in every article they have for sale, and thus preclude the inconveniency of sending troops to the villages for supplies.

Under these circumstances I trust that Government will confirm the arrangement I have made, at least as a temporary measure.

I appointed Lieutenant Tytler to the charge, owing to his knowledge of the Persian and Hindoostanee languages, and to his great control of temper, which will, I hope, tend to conciliate the people bringing in supplies.

I trust that Government will grant Lieutenant Tytler the indulgence of a salary for the period he may be permitted to act in the situation in which circumstances have obliged me to place him.

I am, &c.,
W. NOTT.

No. 293.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, April* 18, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th ultimo, inclosing copy of instructions addressed by his Lordship in Council to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, bearing date the 15th of March, 1842. It shall be my constant endeavour to carry into effect these instructions as far as circumstances will admit.

I have at present 7000 men of all arms at Candahar, exclusive of sick and wounded: 700 of these are cavalry of a very inferior decription, indeed are nearly useless in the field; and three of the infantry regiments are composed of the Shah's Hindoostanee troops. The extent of the walls of the city is so considerable, that I conceive even a garrison of 3000 men would be barely sufficient for its defence, in the event of the troops being employed on distant operations in the field; and containing, as it does, all our provisions, ammunition, &c., it is of vital consequence to the troops under my command.

In the event of field operations, the deduction of these 3000 men would leave me scarcely 4000 troops, including this cavalry, to oppose the enemy in the field, and to guard a long train of provision and carriage-cattle; and, however distant the service from this important magazine, every particle of food must be carried with the force; thus crippling and retarding all its movements.

The troops and establishments at Candahar are four months in arrears, and there is not a rupee in the treasury; nor can money be borrowed. We have no medicine for the sick and wounded; and, in the event of much service in the field, I fear we should run short of musket-ammunition, although I have contrived to have a considerable quantity prepared from old and damaged powder; frequent application has been made to the authorities in Sinde, during the last four months, for treasure, ammunition, stores, medicines, and particularly for cavalry, but no aid whatever has been afforded.

I want draught and baggage-cattle to enable me to move; but without money, in a country like this, I can neither purchase nor hire them. I have no cattle for moving even three regiments; during our field operations of last month, both officers and men marched without tents. Under these circumstances, my difficulties were certainly great; but, although I consider it to be my duty to state these facts, the Government may rest assured of my best and unremitting exertions to carry into effect its views and instructions and to uphold the reputation of our arms, and the honor of my country.

Perhaps it is not within my province to observe, that, in my humble opinion, an unnecessary alarm has been created regarding the position of our troops in this country, and of the strength and power of the enemy we have to contend with. This enemy cannot face our troops in the field with any chance of success, however superior they may be in numbers, provided those precautions are strictly observed, which war, between a small body of disciplined soldiers, and a vast crowd of untrained, unorganized, and half-civilized people, constantly renders necessary. True, the British troops suffered a dreadful disaster at Cabool, and it is not for me to presume to point out why this happened, however evident I may conceive the reasons, and the long train of military and political events which led to the sad catastrophe.

Had I been reinforced with a single regiment of cavalry, I feel convinced that I could long since have tranquillized or subdued the rebellious feeling in the provinces dependent upon Candahar, and that a very few additional troops from Sinde, to garrison this extensive and important city, would have set me free from my present difficult position, and have enabled me at this moment to have been on my march to Ghuznee and to Cabool; but, although near six months have elapsed since the outbreak at that city, no aid of any kind has been sent to me; and the circumstances I have now detailed still confine me to this post, and its immediate vicinity.

It is with deep concern that I feel myself disappointed in the long-expected convoy from Sinde; no doubt Major-General England has fully acquainted Government with the unfortunate check received by the detachment under his command in Pisheen, on the 28th ultimo, the moral influence of which has been great throughout the country, and has added considerably to the difficulties of my position. I am now under the necessity of directing a strong brigade to march as far as the Kojuck Pass, in hopes of at length getting the treasure, stores, &c., I stand so much in need of, and without which my force is paralyzed. I have requested Major-General England to send a detachment from Quetta for its conveyance. This strong brigade will be absent from Candahar for fifteen or twenty days, at a most critical period. I herewith transmit copies of letters transmitted by me to that officer on this subject.

I have not received a line from Colonel Palmer since November last; and although I have no authentic information of the surrender of Ghuznee to the enemy, I fear there can be no longer a doubt of its having fallen into their hands in the beginning of March, and that the European officers are now prisoners in that garrison. This has been repeated by so many natives of the country, as to induce me to give credit to their assertions. They also declare that the surviving Sepoys have been sold into slavery. Whether the place surrendered for want of water, or whether Colonel Palmer acted upon the circular letter signed "Pottinger and Elphinstone," directing Jellalabad, Ghuznee, Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and Candahar, to be given up, I have not been able to ascertain.

What effect the murder of His Majesty Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk may have

on this part of Affghanistan, it is at present difficult to say. His Royal Highness Prince Timour, who appears to be sincerely attached to the British Government, has formed no party, and, at this moment, possesses no influence in this country. I have not yet been able to ascertain his real sentiments regarding the murderers of his royal father, and the scenes now passing at Cabool, or what steps he has determined to pursue; but I will take care to avoid offering any pledge on the part of the British Government to any future line of conduct towards His Royal Highness.

I have frequent communications with the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye. I have no intention of withdrawing the troops from that post for the present; it is well supplied with provisions and water.

I am, &c.,
W. NOTT.

No. 294.

Major-General Nott to Brigadier England.

Sir, *Candahar, March* 13, 1842.

I HAVE been favored with a copy of your letter, of the 1st instant. I regret to find that you intended to march with treasure, ammunition, &c., and under charge of only half the force you originally arranged. I would suggest, under circumstances, that you should halt at Quetta until you can assemble the force you noted in your letter now acknowledged. The delay of ten or fifteen days, as far as treasure is concerned, will be of no consequence whatever.

You will, of course, bring forward with you the company of Bengal Artillery now at Quetta, as well as the officers belonging to regiments at Candahar.

It is, in every point of view, desirable, that a strong brigade (such as noted by you) should push on to Candahar as soon as possible.

I am, &c.,
W. NOTT.

Major-General Nott to Brigadier England.

Sir, *Candahar, March* 22, 1842.

I HOPE you have received some of my letters. It is desirable that ammunition, stores, medicine, and money, should be sent to this place; but the state of the country renders it expedient that the convoy should come under a very strong escort. I can spare no troops from this; and all I could possibly do would be moving a brigade a few marches to meet your force, and to do so it would be absolutely necessary that I should know the exact day on which your force may march from Quetta.

If it should be the wish of Government to retain Affghanistan, or to aid the garrison of Ghuznee, or to bring it off, it is absolutely necessary to push a strong brigade from Sinde to Candahar without delay. It is five months since the first outbreak at Cabool; and in all that time, not the least aid has been sent here from Sinde; on the contrary, our communication has been cut off by the unaccountable withdrawal of the important post of Killa Abdoolla; the company of European Artillery sent from Bengal expressly for Candahar, has been detained for months at Quetta. I should feel obliged if you could forward a copy of this note to Major Outram, or the original.

I am, &c.,
W. NOTT.

P.S. No important success can be gained here without a good body of cavalry.

No. 297

Major-General Nott to Major-General England.

Sir, *Candahar, April* 18, 1842.

I HAVE been favored with your letters of the 1st and 10th instant. I have also heard of the affair you had with a party of the enemy on the 28th ultimo, and deeply regret the result. I have attentively perused the Government dispatch of the 15th ultimo, forwarded through you. I have looked at our position in Affghanistan in every point of view that my judgment, aided by three years' experience of its people, will admit of. I now deliberately note what I conceive to be necessary to carry out the intention of the Supreme Government, and to assert and uphold the honor of our country. Even should the Government ultimately determine on withdrawing the British troops from the right of the Indus, it would be impossible to retire the troops below the passes before October. The troops at Candahar are four months' in arrears, and we have not one rupee in the treasury. In the event of much field service, we should run short of musket-ammunition; and we are without medicine for the sick and wounded. I think it absolutely necessary that a strong brigade of 2,500 men should be immediately pushed from Quetta to Candahar, with the supplies noted in the foregoing paragraph. I, therefore, have to acquaint you, that I will direct a brigade of three regiments of infantry, a troop of horse artillery, with a body of cavalry, to march from Candahar on the morning of the 25th instant. This force will certainly be at Chummun, at the northern foot of the Kojuck, on the morning of the 1st of May, and possibly on the 30th of this month. I shall, therefore, fully rely on your marching a brigade from Quetta, so that it may reach the southern side of the pass on the above-mentioned date. I believe there can be no difficulty whatever in accomplishing this, nor of crossing the Kojuck without loss, provided the heights are properly crowned on either side. I have crossed it three times in command of troops, and I know that what I now state is correct. There can be no danger in passing through Pisheen, provided a careful and well-ordered march is preserved, and patroles and flanking-parties of horse are thrown well out. The people of this country cannot withstand our troops in the open field. I am well aware that war cannot be made without loss, but I yet hope that British troops can oppose Asiatic armies without defeat; and I feel and know that British officers should never despair of punishing the atrocious and treacherous conduct of a brutal enemy. You say that you are "not aware if you know the localities of Quetta:" I know them well, and I hope I shall be excused when I express my surprise that the authorities of Quetta should for a moment have thought of throwing up breastworks, and intrenching that straggling and wretched cantonment, when the town and citadel is so well calculated for every purpose which can render a post at all desirable in Shawl, and I am quite certain may be well defended by 500 men. Did I command at Quetta, I would relinquish the cantonment; it is useless. Quetta is not a place for a large body of troops. I feel obliged to you for pointing out the many difficulties attending our position, but you are well aware that it is our first and only duty to overcome difficulties, when the national honor and our military reputation are so deeply concerned. Nothing can be accomplished without effort and perseverance. In reply to the last paragraph of your letter of the 10th instant, I have only to observe, that I have not yet contemplated falling back; without money I can neither pay the long arrears due to the troops, nor procure carriage for field operations. I deeply regret this state of things, which ought to have been attended to months ago; had this been done, I should now have been on my march to Ghuznee. I shall fully rely on your brigade being at the Kojuck on the 1st of May or before. This letter I request may be forwarded to Major Outram.

I have, &c.,
W. NOTT.

P.S.—You will of course perceive that I intend that your brigade should join and accompany the detachment sent from this, to Candahar. I have no cattle for treasure or stores.

No. 298.

Major Outram to Captain Durand, Private Secretary to the Governor-General.

Sir, *Sukkur, May* 1, 1842.

LEST his Lordship should be doubtful of the means of moving the troops at Quetta, I give you an estimate of the troops at our disposal there. I presume that the carriage which took the brigade which accompanied or followed Major-General England from Dadur on the 7th March, and subsequently, must be equal to carry on the same force with ten days' provisions (which they took up the pass), for I calculate that the few camels previously at Quetta, together with what carried the large portion of stores which would remain at Quetta, and some that have been purchased since the troops went up, must more than counterbalance the casualties incurred on the advance to, and retreat from, Hykulzye. Those troops are (I roughly estimate the strength of the corps, but believe I am near the mark):—

One troop Horse Artillery, 6 guns	130	
Her Majesty's 41st Regiment	750	Bayonets.
6th Regiment Native Infantry	850	,,
Four Flank Companies	400	,,
Three troops Light Cavalry	220	Swords.
Poona Horse	250	,,
	2,400	

The convoy now going up, and which made the first march into the pass to-day, consists of—

Two 24-pounders, Howitzers	50	
One squadron Light Cavalry	150	Swords.
One strong regiment Native Infantry	1000	Bayonets.
Also one company of European artillery-men, without guns	120	
	3,600	

That convoy took from hence 2080 camels, of which 1000 had just arrived from Joudpore; and all were reported to have reached Dadur in excellent condition, excepting the smaller portion with the rear wing of the 12th Regiment, which had not arrived actually at Dadur when I last heard, but the accounts regarding them within four marches of Dadur were equally favorable. At Dadur, a considerable quantity of fresh camels had been purchased, which also will, I presume, accompany the convoy, which must thus have a large portion of spare carriage, besides much of the stores carried up by it being only intended for Quetta.

There can be no difficulty, therefore, in General England moving that amount of force, *i. e.*, 3,600 men of all arms, when the 12th Regiment joins, if he does not do so before with a smaller body, which I should not be doubtful or anxious as to the result of, if met by a brigade from Candahar at the Kojuck, nor should I have any fears for Quetta with a single regiment (and artillery) for the short time which would intervene ere the reinforcement got up, having now every confidence that our Brahoee allies will keep faithful, and, so long as they do so, the Kaukers alone would not dare to oppose Major Reid's strong convoy; while the Affghans will have enough to do with General England's brigade. The above calculation of 3,600 men being available after Major Reid's junction, is allowing two regiments of Native Infantry and six guns for the garrison of Quetta, which ought to insure the safety of that post. His Lordship will observe in my diary, dispatched to-day, that the officers commanding the Dadur and Sebee posts report their positions perfectly tenable against any native enemy, without further reinforcements, but that my assistants, in charge of Cutch, and with the Khan of Kelat, are quite confident that no attempt will be made upon them.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have received packets from Dadur 28th ultimo, Quetta 23rd, and Candahar the 17th and 18th, the latter containing a copy of a letter from General Nott to General England, the most refreshing draught I have quaffed since our reverses commenced, as giving the best possible assurance that General Nott is fully equal to the powers vested in him,— is fully bent on retrieving our honor, and fully powerful enough to insure his doing so, in conjunction with General Pollock. How fortunate it is Prince Timour has remained faithful throughout, which will greatly facilitate the settlement of the Candahar kingdom, whatever may be done with Cabool. All the gentlemen with me are employed in running off copies of these Candahar dispatches for General Pollock and Mr. Clerk, which will be sent off with this express. Mr. Hammersley writes, in forwarding them, that General England, in consequence of General Nott's orders, was to march on the 26th ultimo with 2,500 men, including all the regular, and nearly all the irregular, cavalry, the European company of Bengal artillerymen, troop of horse artillery, &c. Although still far from well, the General goes himself. My assistant at Dadur reports on the 28th instant, "The pass clear,—no want of carriage, camels in abundance for sale and hire." Major Reid's convoy was to march into the pass on the 1st instant (to-day), after closing up the rear wing.

No. 299.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 13, 1842.

THE Governor-General has received, in a manner which leaves no doubt of its authenticity, a copy of the letter addressed by you, on the 18th ultimo, to Brigadier England, directing that officer to move with 2,500 men upon the Kojuck Pass, and intimating that you would move a force to meet him.

2. Under the circumstances stated by you, of your want of treasure, ammunition, and medicines (with all of which Brigadier England could supply you), the combined movement so directed by you for the purpose of obtaining those supplies, is entirely approved.

3. The Governor-General, however, cannot but express his fear that Brigadier England having been ordered by you to bring on to Candahar the whole force of 2,500 men, with which you instructed him to move upon the Kojuck Pass, your communications with the country below the pass will remain without any security.

4. Your position, when supplied with treasure, ammunition, medicines, will be more favorable than the Governor-General had reason to suppose it would be, when the instructions of the 19th ultimo were addressed to you; but this improvement of your position is not such as to induce his Lordship to vary those instructions, in so far as they direct your retiring upon Sukkur.

5. That movement you will make at such period and with such precautions as may best conduce to the preservation of the health of your troops and the efficiency of your army. The Governor-General understands that, consistently with the necessary regard to these objects of primary importance, you cannot retire below the passes till October.

6. Neither does the decease of Shah Shooja induce the Governor-General to vary those instructions, in as far as they relate to the measures you were directed to adopt on evacuating the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzye and the city of Candahar.

7. In the present divided state of Affghanistan, the Governor-General is not prepared to recognize any one as the sovereign of that country: but the fidelity of Prince Timour would justify his being put in possession of those places, and of Ghiriskh, on your retiring to the Indus.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 300.

The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

(Extract.) *Allahabad, May,* 14, 1842.

I INCLOSE a copy of a letter from Major-General Nott, to Brigadier England, dated the 18th of April, which was transmitted to my Private Secretary by Major Outram, and received here yesterday.

2. I likewise inclose a copy of the letter I addressed yesterday to Major-General Nott.

3. Some dispatch from Major-General Pollock to me has, I have reason to think, been intercepted, and I have not that intimation of his views which Mr. Clerk appears to have had, when he acknowledged the receipt of your Excellency's orders to Major-General Pollock on the 5th instant.

4. The advance of the season, however, which really renders the retirement of Major-General Pollock at the present moment a measure of some hazard to the health of his troops,—the improved facilities which the Major-General finds of obtaining supplies of provisions,—but, more than all, the influence which those now about him, anxious to vindicate the army by some signal blow against the Affghans, and to effect the restoration of the prisoners to liberty by negotiation supported by force, must necessarily have upon his mind,—all these things induce me to apprehend that it will hardly be until October that the Major-General will commence his homeward march.

5. Your Excellency is of opinion that Major-General Nott cannot safely commence his march to the plains before the same time.

6. It will therefore probably not be until the end of November that the army of Major-General Pollock, nor until the end of December that the army under Major-General Nott, will be established within the British territory.

7. I have hitherto succeeded in preserving absolute secresy with respect to the intentions I entertain as to withdrawing from Affghanistan. I have done so by unusual means, but I deemed it to be essential to the public interests that entire secrecy upon that point should be observed. I feel that the difficulties, with which the two armies would have to contend in making their retreat, would be greatly increased, were the Affghans now acquainted with their intention to retire; and, in order to mislead them upon this point, even were there no other object, I should be disposed to form an army of reserve in a position from which it might advance to the support of either Major-General Pollock, or Major-General Nott, and, at the same time, overawe the States of India; and to make public at once the intention of collecting such an army.

8. I should be happy to be favored with your Excellency's intentions as to the selection of corps, and all the subsidiary arrangements, as early as you can furnish them to me; and the necessary orders shall then at once be given.

9. I think it will be desirable that I should join your Excellency's camp as soon as it is formed, and remain there a few weeks.

10. The army collected should be termed the Army of Reserve, and the camp should be one of exercise in great manœuvres. As many European regiments as we can get together should form a part of the force collected.

No. 301.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, April* 19, 1842.

I HAVE this day ordered the force mentioned below, to march to Lundi Khana, and there assist the force under Colonel Bolton, in escorting treasure, ammunition, and grain to this place, should I find it advisable to remain here.

I have, &c.

G. POLLOCK.

Force ordered to march to Lundi Khana, under the command of Brigadier Monteath, C.B.

Five Mountain-train guns.
Two squadrons 10th Light Cavalry.
150 Irregular Horse.
Two Companies Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.
The 33rd, 35th, and one wing of 64th Native Infantry.
The Regiment of Jezailchees.

No. 302.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, April* 20, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward copy of a letter received from Captain Mackeson, Political Agent, to my address.

I have already stated my views with regard to the Khyber Pass. I have also shown that from the system of supplying carriage-cattle, I have not the means of moving, and the country around cannot supply my wants. To establish depôts or strong posts at intervals on the road between this and Cabool, would so reduce the numerical strength of this force, that by the time it reached the capital it would be too weak to effect the desired object. For several marches no forage is procurable. Even if we had carriage, the conveyance of forage would so increase the number of animals to be protected, that I should much doubt our being able to convoy them in safety; and, I confess, after the treachery we have experienced, I could have no confidence in any promises of support from an Affghan; he might engage to lay in forage at intervals, for the express purpose of leading us into a difficult position, and then glory in having served his own cause, by bringing us to the verge of destruction.

The devastation of a few villages in our vicinity, with all grain and forage, would be a small matter in the eyes of an Affghan, if he could thereby destroy our force—and such a measure would assuredly go near to effect it.

I have maturely considered the question of our advance by this road to Cabool, and I confess that I see too many difficulties to warrant our risking such a course. The force I have the honor to command, if well supplied, is ready to march anywhere, and if I could have advanced by the route of Candahar, our success would be certain. But to withdraw from this place at the present moment, would enable the enemy to concentrate all their strength in the vicinity of Candahar, which, until the junction of Brigadier England, would embarrass Major-General Nott.

I have not received any communication from any of the native chiefs since the death of Shah Soojah, or of his Naib Ameen Oollah, whose murder appears to be certain, though we have not yet received any particulars.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 303.

Major General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, April* 24, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to transmit herewith a copy and abstract translation of a letter received from Shah Baz Khan, and Meerza Mahomed Ameer to Mirza Aga Jan, the Governor of the Koorgeeanees, dated 17th instant.

The force said to be in preparation is supposed to be about 10 or 12,000 men, with which I should hardly suppose the enemy would venture on the plains. I am glad to say that supplies are coming in in greater quantities daily, and I expect 7,000 Maunds of Atta here from Peshawur with the 31st foot, which will, I hope, be at Ali Musjid the day after to-morrow.

I have, &c.

G. POLLOCK.

No. 304.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, April* 26, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, that late yesterday afternoon Captain Colin Mackenzie came into the Camp, being the bearer of a letter from Major Pottinger, C.B., a copy of which is enclosed herewith. I have thought it desirable, in communication with Captain Mackenzie, to confine my reply in this instance to the release of the prisoners, and the terms on which that very desirable object may be effected. A copy of my reply is also sent herewith, and I trust it will meet the approbation of his lordship. I regret to state Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., died on the evening of the 23d instant, about half an hour before Captain Mackenzie left Mahomed Akbar Khan, and the Sirdar promised that the body should be sent to me—it has not yet arrived. I have received a letter written by General Elphinstone to the address of the Secretary to Government; also a narrative of events by him, from the 30th April, 1841, up to the time of his being detained by Mahomed Akbar.

I have also received notes of operations during the siege, drawn up by Lieutenant Eyre, with a request that I will read and forward them to Captain Durand; there are also many other documents in the possession of Captain Macgregor, which it is desirable Government should be in possession of. As this will entail much writing, I have authorised Sir R. Shakespear to engage additional clerks until all are prepared, and any information I may obtain verbally, or in writing, I shall not fail to communicate without delay.

The remaining prisoners were well, and were as well treated as could be expected at the hands of an Affghan.

I have, &c.

G. POLLOCK.

No. 305.

Major Pottinger to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Tezeen, April* 20, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward by Captain Colin Mackenzie, the following message from Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan and the Ghilzie Chiefs, Mahomed Shah, Dost Mahomed, Khajewah Mahomed, and Gool Mahomed in Council (they inform me), with Khoda Baksh Khan and Azeez Khan.

The Sirdar wishes to know, in the first place, if we will consent to withdraw the greater part of our troops, and leave an Agent with a small body of men to act

with whoever the confederates may elect as chief, in which choice they propose to be guided by the wishes of the two factions in Cabool, and wish us to release Dost Mahomed Khan.

Secondly.—They propose that if the British Government have determined on subjecting the country, and continuing the war, that the prisoners at present in Affghanistan shall be exchanged for Dost Mahomed Khan, his family, and attendants, and that the issue be dependant on the sword.

Thirdly.—In the event of neither of these propositions being approved of, they wish to know what terms will be granted to themselves individually; whether we, in the event of their submission, will confine them, send them to India, take hostages from them, reduce their pay, or, in short, what they have to expect from our clemency.

Captain Mackenzie will verbally inform you of the state in which the affairs appear to us here, as well as what we hear of those at Cabool. The leaders appear panic struck, and endeavour to raise reports of our inhumanity and unforgiving nature, the better to keep the lower orders from awaiting our approach; they have, moreover, recourse to force when any of the clansmen show dilatoriness in moving. If the present overture fails, I understand that the Sirdar intends carrying his prisoners into the Ahmedzay country, and taking refuge in their stronghold, till he sees the result of your operations against Cabool; however every day causes him to change his resolution, as it brings fresh news from the different parties throughout the country.

The Sirdar proposed to send Captain Mackenzie, as a person he trusted would act with justice towards him and his party, as well as for the English.

I have, &c.

E. POTTINGER.

No. 306.

Major-General Pollock to Major Pottinger.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, April* 26, 1842.

The message from Mahomed Akbar Khan and other Chiefs has been communicated to me by Captain Mackenzie.

Kindness and good treatment of our prisoners will meet with due consideration at the hands of Government, and the release of them much more so; their release would also greatly facilitate further communications between the Governments.

If money be a consideration, I am prepared to pay into the hands of any one deputed by the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan the sum of two lacs of rupees whenever the prisoners shall be delivered to me in this Camp.

Security for the payment of the money will be given in the way the Sirdar may point out, the accommodation being mutual.

Mahomed Shah Khan, Dost Mahomed Khan, and Khojeh Mahomed Khan, (his brothers), to enjoy the advantages arising from their hereditary possessions.

Speed is necessary to evince sincerity, the good faith of the British Government is manifest.

The other points contained in your communication must remain for future consideration.

I have, &c.

G. POLLOCK.

No. 307.

Captain Lawrence Mr. Clerk's Assistant, attached to Major-General Pollock, to Mr. Clerk,

Sir, *Peshawur, April* 25, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to inform you that Rajah Golab Sing has consented to lend me 3,000 maunds of atta, delivering them the day after to-morrow at Ali Musjid. This, with the 2,000 maunds now being carried for us by the camels of

the Sikh troops, will make up the amount of grain dispatched from Peshwaur, to be not less than 10,000 maunds, being double the quantity stated by Captain Mackeson as sufficient to relieve the troops at Jellalabad from their temporary difficulties.

Colonel Bolton's detachment marched this morning, and will be at Ali Musjid to-morrow. I follow them to Jumrood immediately, and shall accompany the column to-morrow. Yesterday I procured hostages, eighteen in number, from the Kokie Kheil and Malik Kheil; the latter, occupying the road beyond Ali Musjid, had hitherto refused to give hostages.

I have, &c.
H. M. LAWRENCE.

No. 308.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, April* 28, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to report that Captain Mackenzie will return this evening with my reply to the message received from Major Pottinger. I have had a good deal of conversation with Captain Mackenzie on the subject of the message; he is of opinion, that although the name of Dost Mahomed has been introduced as if most anxious for his release, that in reality the Sirdars have scarcely a hope that their wishes will be attended to; but that their anxiety as to the third proposition is very great; that they are anxious to submit, but dread the climate of India, or a residence in London. Of this I was duly apprised before I wrote my reply; it was a point on which I could not offer an opinion, but one on which Captain Mackenzie would undoubtedly be questioned. I have, therefore, instructed him to anticipate any question which might be put, by being the first to say that the third proposition had been duly noticed by me, but that, at this stage of the affair, I did not consider it expedient to commit anything to paper, as the release of our prisoners would be the first indication on their part of good faith; that being accomplished, I should be better prepared to listen to any future overtures from the chiefs.

There was a fourth proposition or message, which was from Mahomed Akbar alone, delivered verbally to Captain Mackenzie, in the presence of Major Pottinger, but without the knowledge of even his cousin, Sooltan Jan. It related, as may be supposed, to himself and his own prospects, in the event of his submission. He instanced our treatment of Ameer Khan, who had long been our powerful enemy, and wished particularly to know what he might expect from our clemency, being willing to separate himself entirely from the faction now opposed to us. His position is evidently different from the others. That he was the murderer of the Envoy, there cannot be a question; and he evidently feels his guilt to be almost an insuperable bar to any terms from us; but he also feels that he has possession of the persons of our countrymen, and that circumstance seems to hold out to him a hope that his proffers of submission will meet with a favourable reception.

I think there can be no doubt that the Sirdar will again address me through Major Pottinger or Captain Mackenzie; I shall therefore be glad to be put in possession of the views of Government in this point in particular with as little delay as practicable.

I have, &c.
G. POLLOCK.

No. 309.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 15, 1842.

I AM directed by the Governor-General to inform you that your letter, apparently communicating certain propositions from Mahomed Akbar (referred to in your letter of the 28th ultimo) has not been received.

2. If those propositions related to the exchange of prisoners, you have been already instructed as to the principles upon which, alone, such exchange can be made, in my letter of the 25th ultimo; and you have been informed by my letter of the 28th ultimo, that you may negotiate for such exchange with a *de facto* Government.

3. The Governor-General is at a loss to imagine what propositions, relating to himself, Mahomed Akbar can have laid before you. That person is not only the acknowledged murderer of the late Sir W. Macnaghten, but he deceived and betrayed a British army into a position in which it was destroyed.

4. It is not consistent with the honor of the British Government to enter into any terms for the making of a provision for so great a criminal. We might engage to spare his life, if he were to fall into our hands, because it would be difficult so to bring him to trial as to protect the Government from a colorable charge of violently prosecuting an unworthy revenge; but no more than this can be done, and this only, if he should promptly do all he can to repair the crimes he has committed.

I have, &c.
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 310.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, April* 29, 1842.

I BEG to state, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, that a report has reached me of Timoor Shah Zadah having left Candahar on his way to Cabool, although the report is not of such a nature that I can vouch for its truth. I think it very probable that the Prince may proceed to Cabool on hearing of his father's death; and, having already heard from Futteh Jung, I may expect to have a message from the eldest son, Timoor; it is therefore in the expectation of such a communication that I beg to be informed of the intentions of Government, relating to the family of the late Shah Shooja

When I have received the instructions of Government on this point, I shall take the liberty of suggesting whatever may appear to me to be desirable as to the movements of this force. I hope I shall have authority to move forward gradually, which, under existing circumstances, will have a much better effect than moving at once to Gundamuck, and then halting a long period.

If, as I hope, it be intended that I should advance either this year or early the next, I would strongly recommend that two 18-pounders, with an ample supply of ammunition, be sent without delay. In this country, every town is a fortified place. The bullocks, for the battering guns, should be picked and of the best kind; and, considering the difficulty of the roads, to ensure efficiency, I would recommend a double set of bullocks. An artillery officer and men, with blacksmiths and carpenters, should accompany the guns; and whatever guard may be sent with them, instructions should be given for fatigue parties to accompany and assist the guns, to prevent their detention on the road. When the cattle are not only fatigued by a long march, but are kept from their food the greater part of the day, they very soon become unfit for any work.

With reference to the want of cattle with this force, I think it might, in a great measure, be remedied and with advantage, if Mr. Clerk were authorized to purchase mules and yaboos in the Punjaub. These animals abound in the Punjaub, and are of a superior description; they are very hardy animals and eat almost anything, whereas the camel of the Punjaub or of Hindoostan (of which we must have some) does not thrive in this country.

Camels of this country are sometimes procurable here, but there are none at present, for the alarm at the approach of this force seems to have driven every living creature to the hills—they are, however, now returning. In consequence of the absurd arrangement of hiring camels to Jellalabad and no further, I in common with many others am now distressed for carriage, and it is difficult to say how we can procure any. Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton lost nearly 300 camels by desertion before he reached Peshawur.

If my proposal for Mr. Clerk to purchase animals in the Punjaub be sanctioned a forward movement even to Cabool might be effected, if General Nott could move in concert.

I hope, in a day or two, to have authentic information from Cabool of the state of affairs, which was not, by the last account, at all settled.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 311.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Bushby, Secretary to the Government of India, at Fort William.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 7, 1842.

IN transmitting to you the letter from Major-General Pollock, dated the 24th ultimo, which encloses authenticated copies of the several letters addressed in December and January last, by Captain Lawrence and Major E. Pottinger to Captain Macgregor, with reference to the treaty entered into at Cabool, for securing the retreat of the army, to that retreat, and the subsequent disaster, and to the condition of the hostages and prisoners in the hands of the enemy, I am directed by the Governor-General to suggest to the President in Council that these documents, and all other documents relating to the conduct of the military and political authorities at Cabool, during the last three months of 1841, and in January, 1842, should be now placed in the hands of some perfectly impartial person, for the purpose of separating, as far as possible, such documentary evidence as relates to the military officers from such as relates to the political agents; and submitting to the Government a report upon which may be founded any charges to be preferred against the former before a court-martial, and against the latter before a court of enquiry.

2. The Governor-General is persuaded that the President in Council will feel with him that the selection of the person to whom these several documents are to be submitted, and by whom such report is to be made, is a matter of the highest importance, with a view to the satisfaction of the public mind, as well as to the instruction of Government itself; and his Lordship suggests that Mr. Cameron, the Law Commissioner, should be requested to undertake the office.

3. That gentleman having no connection either with the military or civil service, and being accustomed to bring the powers of an acute and accurate mind to the consideration of subjects with judicial impartiality, will be most competent to analyse the evidence, and to report upon it in a satisfactory manner.

4. If Mr. Cameron should be willing to undertake this office for the accommodation of the Government, the Governor-General suggests that the President in Council should at once make public the concluding paragraphs (2nd and 3d) of Major-General Pollock's letter of the 24th ultimo, and announce that the several documents therein mentioned, and all others relating to the subject have been placed in Mr. Cameron's hands, for the purpose of investigation and report, upon which formal enquiry may be instituted.

5. It is, in the opinion of the Governor-General, of much importance that no delay whatever should take place, or appear to take place, in the redemption of the pledge given by the Government in the notification of the 4th ultimo, which accompanied the despatch announcing the surrender of Ghuznee.

6. The Governor-General has addressed a private letter to Mr. Cameron requesting him to undertake the duty of so analysing the documents relating to the disasters at Cabool.

I have, &c.

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 312.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, *Allahabad, June* 8, *No,* 15, 1842.

THE short period which has elapsed since the date of my last letter to your Committee, though not marked by any events of striking importance, bearing on our relations with Affghanistan, has still been productive of considerable changes in the position of affairs in that country, and in the prospect of our early withdrawal of our armies from thence.

2. I must refer your Committee to the various inclosures which accompany this letter, which is a mere abstract of their contents, and designed to give you, in a small compass, such information of importance as they contain.

3. In the thirty-first paragraph of my letter of the 17th ult. to your Committee, I alluded to certain proposals which had been made by Mahomed Akbar Khan, to Major-General Pollock. Of the nature of these proposals, and the manner in which they had been received by the Major-General, I was then uninformed, for the despatches in which they were reported had been forwarded by mistake to Calcutta, and were not returned from thence till after the despatch of the last month's mail.

4. From these documents, and the further negotiation which has been carried on by Major-General Pollock for the release of the British prisoners still in the power of Mahomed Akbar, it will be seen that the terms of Mahomed Akbar's first proposal were, first, that we should withdraw the greater part of our army, and leave an agent with a small body of troops, to act with some one chosen by the two contending parties at Cabool, and that we should release Dost Mahomed Khan. Secondly, that if we determined to subjugate Affghanistan, the issue of that must depend on the fortune of war; but in the meantime the British prisoners in Affghanistan to be exchanged for Dost Mahomed Khan, his family, and attendants; and in the event of neither of those proposals being agreed to, the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar desired to be informed what terms would be granted to him and the other insurgent chiefs on their submission.

5. The only point to which Major-General Pollock referred in his reply to these proposals was that relating to the release of the British prisoners, and, for this, he offered to pay the sum of two lacs of rupees.

6. From the reply, which I directed to be made to the Major-General, you will perceive that I could not approve of the offer which had been made to ransom the British prisoners, but such offer having been made before the Major-General received the Secretary's letter of April 25, I could not refuse to sanction it, if any negotiation should have been brought to effect upon that basis. I regretted that any necessity should have arisen of diplomatic correspondence with Mahomed Akbar.

7. Your honorable Committee will perceive that, subsequent to the opening of this negotiation, the affairs of Cabool, where Futteh Jung, a son of the late Shah Shooja, had been raised to the throne by a party headed by Ameen Oollah, who is considered a chief not inimical to the British, and was opposed by another party headed by the chiefs of Barukzyes, fell into such a state of disorder, that Mahomed Akbar was invited, or himself resolved to repair to the capital, where he was by the last accounts employed in strengthening his party, and laying his plans to bring the prince Futteh Jung under his own control, and to possess himself of the Bala Hissar, and all the wealth and property of the late Shah.

8. This altered state of his own prospects, led the Sirdar to send to Major-General Pollock a second series of proposals, couched in a far higher tone than the first. No official report on the subject, nor the reply of the Major-General to the last proposals, have yet reached me officially, but they appear to be, for the most part, quite inadmissible.

9. It appears, from the accounts that I have received from Cabool, that, although the Barukzye party succeeded in capturing some of the small forts in the neighbourhood of the Bala Hissar, from which the garrison drew their provisions, their attempts on the fortress itself proved abortive, and they were therefore induced to enter into terms with the prince, through Ameen Oollah, the ostensible object being to unite all Mussulmans against the British power; but the real object of Mahomed Akbar and the Barukzyes being to obtain, eventually, possession of the

Bala Hissar, and the guns and munitions of war, and the treasure contained therein.

10. Meanwhile, Major-General Pollock's force, amounting to upwards of about 12,000 men, has remained stationary at Jellalabad. It has been prevented from either moving forward, or of retiring, according to my wish, to a more secure position on this side of the Khyber Pass, from a deficiency of carriage-cattle, which has arisen from some faulty arrangements in the Commissariat department, in arranging with the owners of camels, hired to accompany the different brigades of Major-General Pollock's army, that they should be discharged on reaching Jellalabad. I hope that greater efficiency will now be introduced into this department, and that a sufficiency of carriage-cattle will soon be pushed on to Jellalabad. The season is now, however, too far advanced to make it probable that Major-General Pollock will be able to commence a retrograde movement for some months, and my instructions to him have provided for the manner of employing his army if he should be thus detained beyond the Khyber Pass. According to the latest accounts from Jellalabad, the troops there remained healthy, and supplies of provisions were coming in abundantly.

11. Your honourable Committee's attention will be particularly drawn to the interesting report, by Major-General Sir R. Sale, of the siege of Jellalabad; and I need not press upon your notice the services of those officers who are named and recommended to distinction by the Major-General. The able services of Captain Macgregor, the Political Officer, at Jellalabad, have been specially acknowledged by me on the occasion of my abolishing the office of Political Agent at that place, as no longer necessary.

12. Your honourable Committee will peruse with deep interest the observations of the late Major-General Elphinstone, Major Pottinger, Captains Macgregor, Mackenzie, Conolly, and Mohun Lal Lallea, native of Hindoostan, formerly in the service of Sir W. Macnaghten and Sir A. Burnes, on the causes of the late insurrection in Cabool. These papers I have caused to be printed at a press which has been attached to the office of the political secretary of the Government of India, in attendance on me. They will be communicated to Mr. Cameron, to assist him in the enquiry on which he is employed; and I shall send six copies along with this despatch for the use of your honourable Committee. The Political Secretary has attached a note to these papers to guard against an impression, which the perusal of them might otherwise create, of the measures which are said to have caused the insurrection having been specifically sanctioned and enjoined by the Government of India.

13. On the side of Candahar, the interruption of communication by the Kojuck Pass has deprived me of the information, which I might otherwise have possessed, of the position of the army under Major-General Nott, and of the plans of that officer.

14. The following items of intelligence are derived from private communications received by Major Outram, and sent, for my information, in an unofficial shape.

15. After the repulse of Major-General England's brigade in the Pisheen country, near Hykulzye, that officer retreated to Quettah, and commenced fortifying the lines and town of that name. To this measure Major-General Nott objected, as calculated to produce an unfavourable impression; and directed Major-General England again to advance on the Kojuck Pass, where he would be assisted against all opposition to his passage, with his convoy of treasure, ammunition, medicines, &c. &c., by a strong force, principally of Infantry, that was to be detached from Candahar, to meet him. Major-General England accordingly marched from Quettah on the 26th of April, and although the enemy offered opposition near the same ground where they had before succeeded in checking his advance, the opposition was easily overcome, and the Major-General performed his march to Candahar with little further interruption.

16. Major-General Nott, since the arrival of this reinforcement, had resolved on the dispersion of the small parties of insurgents who remained attached to Prince Sufdur Jung, and a detachment had been sent out for the purpose, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Stacy.

17. The Prince Timoor Shah, eldest son of Shah Shooja, remains at Candahar, determined, apparently, not to make any effort for the assertion of his own rights of succession, or to undertake any operation on his own account without the full sanction and consent of the British Government.

18 aplains of the difficulty of procuring camels for the carriage of his army.

19. Everything remained quiet in the Ghilzie country, and the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie was unmolested. The same observation applies to the country near the Helmund and the frontiers of Giriskh.

20. No effort had been made by the authorities at Herat, or the Candahar refugees, to add to our embarrassments at Candahar, from the prevalence of the insurrection in that neighbourhood, and the interruption of the communication between those provinces and Shawl and Sinde.

21. The councils of the young Chief, at Kelat, have remained pacific and friendly to the British Government, and under the judicious arrangements of Major Outram, the tribes of Cutchee, and those bordering on the Bolan Pass, have shown no symptoms of hostility.

25. The most friendly intercourse continues to be maintained by Mr. Clerk, my agent on the north-west frontier, and the Court of Lahore. The Maha Raja has himself proceeded to the westward, to give the weight of his own presence and influence, for the purpose of restoring order and discipline in his army. Discussions have taken place between the Sikh commanders, at Peshawur, and the British authorities, as to the positions to be occupied by the divisions of their force which may pass the Khyber.

26. The Maha Raja, Shere Sing, appears to entertain a desire to be put in possession of the fort and district of Jellalabad, on the British army finally evacuating that country; and this rather with a view to the renown attending such an accession to his territories than from any well-considered views of the consequences of such an extension of his dominions.

27. Mr. Clerk has been authorised and instructed to explain generally to the Maha Raja the line of policy which it appears to me expedient for the future to adopt towards Affghanistan. He will inform his Highness that since the death of Shah Shooja, and the present anarchy prevailing at Cabool, the tripartite treaty must be regarded as extinct; but that I shall be prepared to enter into a new engagement with the Sikh state, the principal condition of which is that the Sikh Government will not acknowledge any ruler of Affghanistan without the previous recognition of the British Government.

27. Mr. Clerk is about to return to Lahore, where I have considered his presence to be highly desirable, while measures are in contemplation for the transfer of territory beyond the Khyber Pass to the Sikh Government, and while preparations are making for the eventual march of the large army under General Pollock's command, through the Maha Raja's territory.

28. Rajah Goolaub Sing, on leaving Peshawur, proceeded in the direction of Cashmere, to collect his forces and organize his plans for the defence of Ladakh, against the threatened invasion of the Tibetan army from Lassa, by which Zarawur Sing was overpowered.

29. The ex Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan has been removed from Seharunpore to Mussorie, for the advantage of the climate of the latter station. He has been suffering from fever, but is reported convalescent.

30. I have announced the intention of Government to form a large army of reserve in the Sirhind territory, after the rains.

31. The inclosure to the document noted in the margin,* is a report from Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., detailing the progress of events during the long and perilous siege, sustained by the force under his command, at Jellalabad. Major-General Pollock brings to the notice of Government the gallantry evinced by Major-General Sir R. Sale, and his small force, during the above eventful period; and several officers, both in the service of Her Majesty and the honourable Company, who have distinguished themselves, are recommended for honorary distinctions, or brevet rank, or both. A list of these officers will be found in the report of Sir R. Sale, adverted to above. The officers of all ranks, and soldiers of all Arms, European and Native, are likewise represented as generally and individually deserving of reward and encouragement. Major-General Pollock states that he has had an opportunity of inspecting the works thrown up for their protection, by the indefatigable exertions of Sir R. Sale's force; and that his surprise at their strength and extent was only equalled by his admiration of the excellent arrange-

* Letter from Major-General Pollock, C.B., April 19, 1842.

ment which must have pervaded all departments: since, after a siege of upwards of five months' duration, he found the garrison in excellent health and spirits, and in admirable state of discipline, with a good supply of ammunition, ready and anxious to take the field, and most willing to advance on Cabool.

32. In the letter from Mohun Lal, the intelligent moonshee of the late Sir A. Burnes, which forms one of the inclosures of the letter from Major-General Pollock, of the date noted in the margin,* your honourable Committee will be put in possession of the manner in which the King Shah Soojah ool Moolk, was, on the 5th April, treacherously murdered by a son of Nawab Mahomed Zeman Khan. It would appear that Prince Futteh Jung was placed on the throne of his deceased father on the 6th April, and that, at the same time, Nawab Mahomed Zeman Khan also declared himself to be king. Both parties collected adherents, but that of the Prince was the most numerous and formidable, owing to his having come in possession of the wealth (said to be twenty lacs, besides a considerable quantity of jewellery) which had been hoarded up by the late Shah. Various are the conflicts between these two factions which are stated to have taken place at Cabool, with varied success on both sides. Newab Zeman Khan, after having beaten Naib Ameen Oollah and the Populzies, had offered the crown to Mahomed Akbar Khan, he himself being content to be Vizier; and again Mahomed Akbar Khan had made the same proposal to Prince Futteh Jung, offering to be Vizier under him, which proposition is said to have been acceded to by the Prince, under an apprehension that otherwise the Bala Hissar would be delivered up by Ameen Oollah to Mahomed Akbar, and being at the time deserted by his partizans, a few Arabs and about 1,500 Indians being all that were left in the Bala Hissar. Prince Futteh Jung finding his position insecure, frequently urged on the British authorities at Jellalabad to advance with their troops on Cabool; but, though willing to do so, Major-General Pollock has not found it practicable to move forward, for reasons which will be noticed in a subsequent paragraph. The Major-General, however, seemed to doubt the sincerity of Prince Futteh Jung, as the negotiations which were on foot at Cabool were said to be for the purpose of gaining time—whether they would ultimately unite all parties remained to be seen. He observed that the compact between Mahomed Akbar and the Prince was a very unnatural one, and was entered into by the Prince solely on account of his weakness. The cassids who brought the above intelligence reported that when all parties were agreed, Mahomed Akbar would march a force against Jellalabad. This resolve appeared to form an article in every overture made by Mahomed Akbar; but the Major-General was of opinion that he would hardly venture to try again his strength with the British troops, after the signal defeat he sustained on the 7th April, from the troops under Sir R. Sale, which had caused great consternation among the rebels in Cabool, particularly the Barukzies. The utmost confusion and disunion was, from all accounts, prevailing at Cabool.

33. The correspondence specified in the margin† relates to the case of the officers who were serving with the force under Major-General Pollock, and had been formerly in the service of the late Shah Soojah. The Major-General wished to be informed as to what was the intention of Government in regard to them. He was informed accordingly that the several corps in the service of the late Shah Soojah could not be held to have survived that Sovereign, and that from the day of his death all the officers in question must be considered to have been placed at his disposal, and could only receive from that day the pay and allowances which they would have received if serving in Affghanistan with the corps to which they severally belong in the service of the company. As respects the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates of the several corps late in the Shah's service, their service was in the same manner considered to have ceased from the day of the Shah's demise; but the Major-General was authorised to issue to them the pay and allowances to which they would have been severally entitled in the Shah's service from that day, as a temporary arrangement. The Major-General was likewise apprised of my desire to frame some satisfactory arrangement, by which the service of these men may be continued, should they desire it.

34. In regard to the advance on Cabool, Major-General Pollock and his gallant forces were ready and willing to march anywhere, but a want of carriage, cattle

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* April 19, 1842, No. 4. † From Major-General Pollock, April 20, to ditto, May 16.

and forage, have compelled him to remain stationary at Jellalabad. This difficulty is ascribable to the mismanagement in hiring camels only to Jellalabad, and in neglecting to make other arrangements, which might have prevented the embarrassment which ensued from their being engaged to go only to Jellalabad, and be discharged there. In consequence of this, and with a view to prevent a recurrence of similar inconvenience, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was addressed on the 1st instant, suggesting to his Excellency the expediency of entrusting to some one officer (out of the usual routine) the sole duty, and thus imposing upon him the sole responsibility of making such purchases and hirings of camels and other animals as may be required for the effectual equipment of Major-General Pollock's forces; of placing all the officers now employed for such purposes, whether political or military, in communication with, and (for such purpose) in subordination to, such chief officer; and of directing such chief officer to furnish to his Excellency, to me, and to Major-General Pollock, weekly returns of his proceedings. The name of Major-General Battine, commanding at Ferozepore, having been brought to my notice as a valuable and energetic officer, I hinted to his Excellency that, in the event of his nominating either that officer, or the Quartermaster General of the Army, I would be prepared to invest the officer selected with the requisite authority.

35. In the inclosure of the letter from Major-General Pollock, dated 12th May, will be found a copy of the instructions issued to that officer by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, under date the 29th April last, as to the mode in which the retreat of the troops from Jellalabad to Peshawur was to be carried into effect, under my orders of the 19th April. On the 20th May, the Major-General, in reply to the letter addressed to him on the 4th, again represented the difficulty under which he laboured in procuring camels at Jellalabad; and, under the circumstances stated, requested that he might be permitted to defer his retrograde movement until the month of October or November next. But you will perceive elsewhere* that circumstances, connected with the disorganization of the Sikh troops in the rear of our army in Affghanistan, make me more earnestly desire the speedy return of that army to the Sutlej; and that, in order to enable Major-General Pollock to meet any difficulties in procuring carriage and supplies, treasure to the amount of ten lacs has been directed to be sent to Jellalabad.

36. A syce, who had been in the service of Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer at Ghuznee, had reached Jellalabad, and made the following statement regarding the destruction of the greater part of the force, which had been stationed in that fortress. Nine gentlemen† were prisoners in the citadel, and about 100 sepoys were kept in the neighbouring villages. The sepoys were induced to give up their arms, on Shumsoodeen swearing on the Koran that he would give them a safe escort to Hindoostan; after which the Ghazees commenced plundering them, when the sepoys fled and were either made prisoners or murdered. Lieutenant Lumsden and his wife were both killed on this occasion.

37. Captain Colin Mackenzie, one of the captives with Mahomed Akbar Khan, was sent by that chief to Jellalabad, and was the bearer of a letter from Major Pottinger. The following is the purport of the message sent by Mahomed Akbar. In the first place, he wished to know whether the British authorities will consent to withdraw the greater portion of our troops, and leave an agent, with a small body of men, to act with whoever the confederates may elect as chief (in which choice they proposed to be guided by the wishes of the two factions in Cabool), and he wished us to release his father, Dost Mahomed Khan. Secondly, he proposed that if the British Government has determined on subjecting the country and continuing the war, the prisoners in Affghanistan be exchanged for Dost Mahomed Khan, his family and attendants, and that the issue be dependent on the sword. Lastly, that in the event of neither of these propositions being approved of, he wished to know what terms would be granted to himself and the Ghilzie chiefs individually? whether we, in the event of their submission, will confine them, reduce their pay, or, in short, what is it that they have to expect from our clemency? The Major-General, in his reply, deemed it proper to confine

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* Letters to Commander-in-Chief, and G. G., Agent, N. W. F., 23rd May.

† Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, Political Agent, Captain Alston, Lieutenant Harris, Lieutenant Pratt, Lieutenant Barnes (blind from wounds), Ensign Williams, Ensign Nicholson, Doctor (name not known), Lieutenant Crawford, Bombay Cavalry.

himself to the release of the prisoners, and the terms on which that desirable object may be effected. Those terms were, that kindness and good treatment of the prisoners would meet with due consideration at the hands of the British Government, and the release of them much more so; and that their release would also greatly facilitate further communications between the two authorities: that, if money be a consideration, the Major-General was prepared to pay into the hands of any one deputed by the Sirdar, the sum of two lacs of rupees, whenever the prisoners should be delivered to him. That the security for the payment of the money would be given in the way the Sirdar may point out, the accommodation being mutual: that Mahomed Shah Khan, Dost Mahomed Khan, and Khajah Mahomed Khan (his brothers) would enjoy the advantages arising from their hereditary possessions: and that the other points contained in the Sirdar's communication, must remain for future consideration.

38. In acknowledging this letter from the Major-General, it was observed that to the first of Mahomed Akbar's propositions, it was inconsistent with honour and safety to accede.

The Major-General was further informed, that under paragraph 13 of the instructions issued to him on the 24th February last, he was authorised to speak of "the release of Dost Mahomed Khan, as an event which, under various contingencies of circumstances, might not be altogether impossible," and the death of Shah Soojah having evidently removed one obstacle to the release of Dost Mahomed Khan, I expressed my regret that the Major-General did not speak of that event, at least in the cautious terms he was authorised to employ. The third proposition was clearly one to which no reply could be made. I further observed, that the instructions of the 25th April will have placed him at liberty to negotiate for a general exchange of prisoners, not excluding Dost Mahomed Khan, and expressed my hope that he may have been enabled to conclude an arrangement upon that basis. The Major-General was informed that should he have pledged himself to the payment of any money for the release of any individual prisoner, under my previous instructions of the 24th February, I would sanction the same; but that after the receipt by him of my orders of the 25th April, he should adhere to the instructions they conveyed. I also stated, that I regretted the Major-General should have considered it to be necessary to have any diplomatic communication with Mahomed Akbar Khan, in whom it was impossible to place any trust.

39. Captain Mackenzie was sent a second time to Jellalabad, with very extravagant proposals from Mahomed Akbar Khan, which will be found detailed in a letter from Major Pottinger, forming inclosure of a demi-official communication from Major-General Pollock, dated the 8th May. Major Pottinger stated that Mahomed Akbar Khan felt disappointed with the offer made to him regarding the release of the prisoners—especially as not receiving any reply to his own overture: and advocated strongly the expediency, under existing circumstances, of conciliating, and thereby causing the separation from the Mahomedan cause, of one of its most powerful branches, the Ghilzies.

40. I regret to announce to your honourable Committee the death, on the 23rd April, of Major-General Elphinstone, said to have been hastened by the fatigue and privations endured by him in his captivity. The body of the deceased General was sent to, and interred at Jellalabad. Two letters which had been written by General Elphinstone, the one dated at Cabool, 8th December, 1841, and the other at Buddeabad, 23rd February, 1842 (copies of which accompany this dispatch), were forwarded to me in a letter from Major-General Pollock, dated 27th April last. From the first of these, addressed to the late Envoy and Minister, it will be perceived that Major-General Elphinstone had strongly advised a retreat from Cabool under the critical position of affairs consequent on the outbreak at that capital.

41. In the same dispatch from Major-General Pollock will be found certain questions put by him to Captain Mackenzie, on the occasion of that officer's embassy to Jellalabad, together with replies to them, regarding the late disasters at Cabool. It will be observed in Captain Mackenzie's reply to the fourth question, that he denied the report, that at the interview between Sir W. Macnaghten and Mahomed Akbar, the late Captain Trevor had fired at the Sirdar: and he confirmed what had become somewhat doubtful, that the late Envoy met his death by the hands of Mahomed Akbar himself.

42. In a letter from Moonshee Mohun Lal, dated Cabool, 9th May (inclosed in a dispatch from Major-General Pollock, dated 15th May, No. 47), your

honourable Committee will observe that, notwithstanding the vigilance observed in strictly guarding Dost Mahomed Khan within our provinces, it is alleged that he had found means to communicate with his son Mahomed Akbar. Captain Nicolson has been informed of this circumstance, and desired that in case he shall be enabled to intercept any letters to or from Dost Mahomed Khan, he will transmit them for my information, and furnish copies of them to my agent on the north-western frontier.

43. I have deemed it necessary to relieve Captain Macgregor from his political duties at Jellalabad, and have placed his services at the disposal of Major-General Pollock. In communicating this resolution to Captain Macgregor, I took the opportunity of according to him my approbation of the able and zealous manner in which he had discharged his duties as Assistant Political Agent. Major-General Pollock was, at the same time, informed that in the event of his having occasion for the services of any officer in the negotiation of any arrangement for the exchange of prisoners, or other duties, his secretary, Sir R. Shakespear, might be so employed.

44. With a view to keep myself regularly informed of the state of the army serving in Affghanistan, its means of supply, movements, &c., Major-General Pollock was, on the 29th ultimo, requested to submit periodical statements, furnishing the information required, together with a report of the actual position of the several parties in Upper Affghanistan.

45. The documents noted in the margin * forwarded in a demi-official communication from Major Outram, is a report from Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar, of his having dispersed a rebel force of 12,000 men, of which one-half were well-mounted cavalry, under the command of Prince Sufdar Jung, and other Affghan Chiefs, to which allusion was made in my last month's dispatch. The enemy having approached close to Candahar, Major-General Nott made the necessary arrangements for the safety of the city, and, leaving a garrison of about 2,000 men in it, moved with the remainder of his force against the enemy, who retired as he advanced. They were driven first across the Turunk, and then across the Argundab. They would not allow the infantry to come in contact with them. On the 9th of March, the General got near enough to open his guns upon the enemy with great effect, when they were soon broken, and fled. The Major-General states that want of good cavalry saved them from being totally destroyed, and that they were dispersed in every direction. During a march of five days, opposed to the enemy, not a camel was taken or a particle of baggage lost. The conduct of the artillery and infantry was said to be excellent. During the Major-General's absence, a strong detachment of the enemy made an attempt on the city, and succeeded in burning one of the gates, but they were repulsed with great loss by the gallantry of the troops in garrison under the command of Major Lane, of the 2nd Bengal Native Infantry.

46. Major Rawlinson, Political Agent at Candahar, states, in a letter dated 2nd April, that Prince Sufdar Jung had expressed bitter repentance for what he had done; but that if he would again be received into favor, he will go to Cabool, join his father (the late Shah Shooja), fight upon the side of the British Government, and after performing service in our behalf, look to restoration of our confidence in him. The Prince was expected to come in to Colonel Stacy.

47. In a despatch from the Political Agent, Sinde and Beloochestan, dated the 8th of May, that officer forwarded copy of a letter addressed by Major-General Nott to the Secretary to the Government, on the 18th of March last, the original of which had not reached him.

The following is a summary of the position of Major-General Nott, as detailed in the report adverted to:—The total amount of the force under his command was stated to be 7,000 of all arms (exclusive of sick and wounded), 700 of which were Cavalry of a very inferior description. The extent of the walls of the city is so considerable, that he conceived a garrison of 3,000 men would be barely sufficient for its defence, in the event of the troops being employed on distant operations in the field, thus leaving scarcely 4,000 troops, including the Cavalry, to oppose the enemy, and to guard a long train of provision and carriage-cattle. The Major-General then represents the want of money (the troops and establishments at Candahar being four months in arrear), medicines for the sick, and ammunition;

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* From Major-General Nott, dated March 12.

for all these he repeatedly applied in vain to the authorities in Sinde. The want of draught and baggage cattle was also felt, without which no movement could take place, nor was there money to purchase any. The Major-General observes, that an unnecessary alarm had been created regarding the position of the troops at Candahar, and of the strength and power of the enemy, and that if he had been reinforced with a single regiment of cavalry, he is confident that he could long since have tranquillized or subdued the rebellious feeling in the provinces dependant on Candahar; and that a very few additional troops from Sinde, to garrison Candahar, would have set him free from his present difficult position, and have enabled him to march to Ghuznee and Cabool; but although six months had elapsed since the outbreak at that city, no aid of any kind had been sent to him. The Major-General adds, that Prince Timoor, the eldest son of the late Shah Soojah, appeared to be sincerely attached to the British Government; that he had formed no party, and that he possessed no influence in the country.

48. Major-General Nott reported further, that he had frequent communications with the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, which was well supplied with provisions and water, and that he had no intention of withdrawing the troops from that post f r the present.

49. In reference to the measure indicated in the despatch of 21st of April, to the address of Major-General Nott, Major Outram* forwarded extracts from his demi-officia communications of the 2nd and 6th of January last, to the Private Secretary to the late Governor-General, containing his opinion of the policy it would be necessary to adopt with respect to the principality of Kelat. Major Outram is of opinion, that in the event of our retirement from Candahar, pecuniary aid should be substituted for military support to the Khanate of Kelat, which may be estimated at one and a half lac annually, and that it could be so arranged, in the shape of commutation for tolls, and remuneration for protection of merchandise throughout the Khan's territory, as would prevent any objectionable appearance to such arrangement. Should it be resolved to abandon the Kelat territory entirely, Major Outram would advocate the assumption, by the British Government, of the entire management of the whole of the Sukkur and Shikarpore districts on fair terms to the Ameers, as the means of rendering our power on the Indus invulnerable.

50. I deemed it proper to direct Major Outram, that with reference to the relative positions of himself and Major-General Nott, whenever his correspondence embraced matters of a political nature, he should communicate it through the Major-General.

51. The following are scraps of intelligence gleaned from Major Outram's communications.

52. Major-General England's column was expected to enter Candahar, on the 10th of May.

53. Colonel Stacy intended to move, on the 12th of May, with his brigade to Char Shukkur, some 35 miles from Candahar, to break up the Gazee camp, and to destroy some of their most notorious villages.

54. Major-General Nott intended going with whatever force he could carry supplies for, in support of Major-General Pollock.

55. Everything was stated to be quiet in the Ghilzie country.

56. From the digest of intelligence furnished periodically by the Political Agent in Sinde and Beloochistan, the following items are transferred to this letter for your honourable Committee's information.

From 2d to 8th of May.

Major-General England has carried the heights at Hykulzie, on the 28th of April, the enemy scarcely attempting resistance, and only ten being wounded on our side, among whom was an officer of Cavalry, Ashburner.

From 16th to 22d of May.

Toork Ali, leader of the Jekranees, had interceded for his pardon, and for his re-employment in the service of Government; to which the Political Agent had replied, that he would be pardoned and allowed to reoccupy his estates on making good the plunder he carried away with him, on his first flight to the hills, but that, after his repeated and last glaring breach of trust, he could not be readmitted into the service.

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* Letter dated 8th May.

57. The Bolan Pass continued unobstructed, and tranquillity prevailed throughout the whole of Sinde and Beloochistan, the frontier of the latter being no longer agitated by the endeavours of the Affghan rebel leader, Mahomed Sadeeg, to excite disturbances within the Kelat territory. All the chiefs of the neighbouring tribes, lately concerned with Mahomed Sadeeg, were endeavouring to make their peace with the British Government.

58. The correspondence noted in the margin, relates to the removal of Lieutenant Hammersley, from his political duties in Shawl. In the letter from the political agent will be found detailed circumstances, which he hoped would induce me to suspend the measure, until an enquiry had been instituted as to the extent of the Hykulzie defences, and the probable time that may have been occupied in their construction. To this recommendation of the Political Agent, I did not think it proper to acquiesce, but as the corps (41st Native Infantry) to which Lieutenant Hammersley belongs, is at Garruckpore, I authorised Major-General Nott to employ that officer in such military duties as he may think fit, pending the receipt of orders from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; and directed that, during his employment in such duties, Lieutenant Hammersley will be authorised to draw the same allowances as any other officer of his rank, serving with his regiment, above or below the passes, as the case may be, and no more.

63. In his letter of the 16th May, Mr. Clerk, agent on the north-west frontier, reported that he was using every exertion to apply the means of the Sikh Government, in men and money, to maintain the passage of the Khyber Pass; and expressed his opinion that it should rest with Major-General Pollock to discriminate what portions of that duty should be assigned to the Sikhs, what to the Political Agent under him for negotiation, and what to the troops newly entertained by him; and he suggested that the Major-General should be authorised to direct as many more men, such as those under Captain Thomas (Jezzailchees), as he thinks proper to be raised. In reply, I directed Mr. Clerk to be referred to the orders of the 15th March last, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, in which his Excellency was informed that the Government could not sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-General Pollock, unless he were satisfied that he could, without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the Pass, and without depending upon the ability of the Sikh chiefs to restrain their troops, feel assured that he could by his own strength overawe, or overcome, all who may dispute the Pass, and keep up, at all times, his communication with Peshawur and the Indus. I further observed to Mr. Clerk, that the recent insubordination of the Sikh troops had, in one important point, shown the correctness of the opinion expressed in the orders quoted, and had increased my desire to see the troops under Major-General Pollock again in possession of easy and certain communication with India; an object which I had no doubt but the Major-General would endeavour to effect at the earliest possible period. Mr. Clerk was also informed that Major-General Pollock was already empowered to add to the irregular force under his command.

64. With reference to my instructions of the 24th and 27th of April last, Mr. Clerk stated, in a letter dated the 18th of May last, that the Lahore Government had evinced considerable desire to receive possession from the British Government of either Jellalabad, or Cabool, or both; but that before engaging definitively to hold Jellalabad, the Durbar was anxious to ascertain the views of the British Government for the final adjustment of the entire Affghan question. Mr. Clerk added that at present, the thought most occupying the Maha Rajah, was the position of the Sindhanwala Chiefs. There is nothing which his Highness would at present feel so great an obligation, as the restraining those Chiefs from creating commotion in his army and their renewing their allegiance on perfectly submissive terms to the throne. The next present object to the Maha Rajah, was to ascertain what may be the plans of the British Government regarding Affghanistan for the future, with a view to acquire the renown of some possessions there, but in particular, to give employment and diversion to portions of his large army. The first present object (continued Mr. Clerk) of the minister's anxiety, was the critical position of his dominion in Ladakh; and in so far as this places Cashmere in jeopardy, the Maha Rajah was also dissatisfied with the reports that were received of the hostile intentions of the Chinese authorities and the rebellion of the Ladakhees instigated by them.

Mr. Clerk added, that before leaving the Court at Lahore, preparations

were making by the Maha Rajah for an explanation of my entire views in regard to Affghanistan, and by the Rajah (Minister) for an opinion of the point to which the British Government would tolerate Chinese incursions before co-operating with the Sikh Government to drive them back. Mr. Clerk was informed in reply, that the letter addressed to him on the 16th of May will have placed him in possession of my views upon the subject of the final adjustment of the Affghanistan question; and that he was thereby instructed to bring the Lahore Government to entertain similar views, namely, that the future object and the policy of the two Governments should be, to mantain Affghanistan in that state in which it may be unable to do anything against us, and that the visionary design should be foregone of placing it in a state in which it should possess power, and be content to use it against invaders from the West, without entertaining any designs of ambition against its neighbours in the East.

65. On the 16th of May Mr. Clerk transmitted an account of acts of insubordination which had taken place amongst the Sikh troops at Peshawur subsequent to the departure of Raja Golab Sing, and stated that the cause of so large an army being kept at Peshawur was to be found in the irregular longings so often manifested by the British authorities to obtain possession of that province. In reply, I observed to Mr. Clerk that the account forwarded by him had given me much disquietude; and that I have always viewed with much uneasiness the presence of a Sikh force so unnecessarily large at Peshawur, and that I would be glad to see it diminished. I also expressed my surprise at the *cause*, stated by Mr. Clerk, of the Sikh army being so numerous at Peshawur, and authorised him expressly to give to the Maha Rajah my assurances that my Government entertained no wish to possess, or occupy any portion of His Highness's dominions, and was only desirous that His Highness should long retain them all in honour and prosperity.

66. In a subsequent letter, dated the 21st of May, Mr. Clerk reported that the Lahore Government had issued orders for a disposition of its forces on the Indus frontier, by which so many of its troops as were now assembled at Peshawur, would not for the present remain there. In reply, I expressed my regret that he did not state for what place, and for what objects, the Sikh troops have been ordered to leave Peshawur.

67. With another letter of the same date, (21st of May,) Mr. Clerk forwarded a copy of one addressed by him to Major-General Pollock on the 18th, informing him, with reference to the instructions of Government of the 3rd of May, that the Sikh Government was not prepared to accept the occupation of Jellalabad at present, but that should the Major-General be absolutely withdrawing from Jellalabad to India, he thought the Sikhs would accept the post. Mr. Clerk stated that he had not himself opened any negotiation with the Sikh Durbar on this subject, as he did not believe that, with the negotiations pending in the Major-General's front, he would withdraw, or that, if such causes did not detain him, he could now withdraw with due regard to considerations relating to the health of his troops.

68. On the receipt of the foregoing letter, I caused Major-General Pollock to be addressed, that I did not suppose that he could have misunderstood the instructions of 29th April, issued to him by the Commander-in-Chief, which related to negotiations for the release of the prisoners; but that if the observation in Mr. Clerk's letter to him of 18th May had been suffered to pass in silence, that silence might have appeared to be acquiescence in a wrong interpretation, and he might possibly have been so misled into adopting it.

69. On the 23rd ultimo, the requisite instructions were issued for a dispatch of 10 lacs of treasure to Major-General Pollock, to enable him to meet any difficulties in procuring carriage and supplies, in the present disorganized state of the Sikh army, in his rear; and, in addressing the Commander-in-Chief on the subject, I reiterated my earnest desire for the speedy return of Major-General Pollock's army to the Sutlej.

70. In the circular order issued by my orders on the 26th ultimo, of which a copy is hereunto annexed, your Honourable Committee will observe that I deemed it expedient, under existing circumstances, to impress upon every officer employed either in the military or political service of Government, the necessity of preserving absolute secrecy in all matters of a military or political nature which may officially come to his knowledge.

71. On the 29th ultimo, Mr. Clerk was desired to acquaint the Maha Rajah

with my intention of assembling an army of reserve upon or near the Sutlej, at the end of the rainy season."

I have, &c.

ELLENBOROUGH.

P.S. I have this day received two dispatches from Major-General Pollock, dated the 25th ultimo, with one of which was transmitted a report from Cabool of the progress of affairs at that place up to the 22nd ultimo, when the Barukzye party was making strenuous efforts for the capture of the Bala Hissar. The Major-General's other letter represents the difficulties which would attend a retirement from Jellalabad at the present season.

I have also this day received a dispatch from Major Outram, dated the 28th ultimo, containing information from Candahar to the 10th ultimo, with an intimation of letters up to the 15th ultimo having been received from thence.

A translation of a letter from Prince Timoor to my address has been received in the same packet.

No. 313.

NOTIFICATION.

Allahabad, May 26, 1842.

THE Right Honourable the Governor-General of India has been pleased to direct the publication of the annexed copies of the dispatches from Major-General Pollock and Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B.

No. 314.

Major-General Pollock to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, April* 19, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to forward a letter from Major-General Sir Robert Sale, K.C.B., detailing the progress of events during the long and perilous siege sustained by the force under his command.

The gallantry of the Major-General and his small force are too well known to Government to require any commendations from me, but it is very pleasing to me to be the channel through which their many trials are brought to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council.

I have had an opportunity of inspecting the works thrown up for their protection by the indefatigable exertions of Sir R. Sale's force, and my surprise at their strength and extent has been only equalled by my admiration of the excellent arrangements which must have pervaded all departments, since, after a siege (by greatly superior numbers) of upwards of five months' duration, I find the garrison in excellent health and spirits, and in an admirable state of discipline, with a good supply of ammunition, ready and anxious to take the field, and most willing to advance on Cabool.

I have, &c.

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 315.

Major-General Sir Robert Sale to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir, *Jellalabad, April* 16, 1842.

THE relief of this place having been at length effected by the victorious advance through the passes of Khyber of the army under Major-General Pollock, C.B., I conceive that I owe it to the troops who have so long formed the garrison here to address to you a report, which may convey some notion of their conflicts, and the severity of their duties, labours, and privations. It has before been made known to the Government, that I reached Gundamuck on the 30th of October,

1841, under instructions from the authorities at Cabool, and there received intelligence of the breaking out of a terrific insurrection at the Affghan Capital, on the 2d November. My retracing my steps on that city was, in a military sense, impracticable, since the first inevitable sacrifice would have been of the lives of 300 sick and wounded, whom I could not have left in depot with the treasonable Irregulars at Gundamuck, whilst my cattle was unequal to the transport of my camp equipage, and my ammunition insufficient for protracted operations. In the position which I occupied, I could not absolutely command a day's provisions or even water, and should have been hemmed in on every side by hostile tribes, amounting to 30 or 40 thousand men, part of whom might have seized Jellalabad and reduced it to ashes, or, holding it, have left me no alternative but a disastrous retreat towards Peshawur. I therefore came to the resolution of anticipating any movement of this kind, and, by possessing myself of this city, establishing a point on which the force of Cabool might retire, if hardly pressed, and restoring a link in the chain of communication with our provinces. Two marches brought me, after a successful contest at Futtahabad, to Jellalabad. My breaking up from Gundamuck was followed by the immediate defection of the irregulars there, the destruction of the cantonment, and a general rising of the tribes. I found the walls of Jellalabad in a state which might have justified despair as to the possibility of defending them; the enceinte was far too extensive for my small force, embracing a circumference of upwards of 2,300 yards. Its tracing was vicious in the extreme; it had no parapet excepting for a few hundred yards, which there was not more than two feet high. Earth and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ramparts, that there were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There was a space of 400 yards together, on which none of the garrison could show themselves, excepting at one spot; the population within was disaffected, and the whole enceinte was surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and gardens, from which a fire could be opened upon the defenders, at twenty or thirty yards.

The garrison took full possession of the town, in such a state, on the morning of the 12th of November, and, in the course of the day, the place, and detached hills by which on one side it is commanded, were surrounded and surmounted by a force of not fewer than 5000 insurgents. A general attack, on the 14th of November, ridded us of these enemies, and a similar array, brought against us a fortnight afterwards, was dissipated by a second sally, on the 1st of December. But we had seized the town, having in our possession not quite two days' provisions and corn for our men and horses, and beheld the arduous task before us of striving to render the works defensible, and collecting supplies for our magazine from the midst of a fanatical and infuriated people, with very narrow means, in the way of treasure, to purchase them. I appointed Captain Broadfoot, of Shah Soojah's Sappers, Garrison Engineer, and Captain Abbott, of the Artillery, Commissary of Ordnance. Captain Macgregor, Political Agent, gave me the aid of his local experience, and through his influence and measures our Dak communication with India was restored, and a great quantity of grain collected, whilst the unremitting and almost incredible labours of the troops, aided by the zeal and science of Captain Broadfoot, put the town in an efficient state of defence. Captain Abbott made the artillery dispositions in the ablest manner, and used every exertion to add to, and economize, our resources in the way of gun and musquet ammunition, in both of which we were deficient for the purposes of a siege. Lead and powder were procured in and about Jellalabad, and a quantity of cartridges discovered in an old magazine, and thus the troops completed to 200 rounds per man. It is to be remarked, that I might, in the second week of November, have marched upon Pesh Bolak, relieved from investment the corps of Jezzailchees under Captain Ferris, and with it operated a doubtful retreat upon Peshawur. But I felt it to be my duty to give support to the last moment to our troops, struggling against their numerous enemies at Cabool, and maintain for them a point on which to retreat and rally, if they met with reverse.

On the 9th of January, I was summoned by the leaders of the Affghan rebellion to give up the place, in fulfilment of a convention entered into by the Political and Military Authorities at Cabool; but, as I was fully assured of the bad faith of our enemies, I refused to do this; and on the 13th received the melancholy intelligence of the disastrous retreat of our troops from the capital, and their annihilation in the Ghilzie defiles, by the rigours of the climate, and the basest treachery on the part of those in whose promises they had confided. Almost at

the same time it became known to us that the brigade of four regiments, marched to my succour from Hindoostan, had been beaten in detail, and forced to fall back upon Peshawur: my position was most critical, and I might, whilst our enemies were engaged in plundering the force from Cabool, have attempted, and perhaps effected, though with heavy loss, a retreat across Khyber, but I resolved, at all hazards, on not relinquishing my grasp on the chief town of the valley of Ningrahar, and the key of Eastern Affghanistan, so long as I had reason to consider that our Government desired to retain it. The discouragements of my garrison at this moment were very great, their duties most severe, their labours unceasing, and the most insidious endeavours made by the enemy to seduce the native portion of them from their allegiance. But their fidelity was unshaken, and their serenity amidst labours and privations unclouded. With reference, however, to the state of fanatical excitement and national antipathy which prevailed around us, I had been compelled, as a measure of prudence, to get rid, first of the corps of Khyber rangers, and next of the detachment of Jezzailchees, and a few of the Affghan sappers, and a body of Hindoostanee gunners, who had formerly been in the employment of Dost Mahomed Khan. Works had in the mean time been completed, of which the annexed reports and plans of Captain Broadfoot contain ample details. Generally, I may state, they consisted in the destruction of an immense quantity of cover for the enemy, extending to the demolition of forts and old walls, filling up ravines, and destroying gardens and cutting down groves, raising the parapets to six or seven feet high, repairing and widening the ramparts, extending the bastions, retrenching three of the gates, covering the fourth with an outwork, and excavating a ditch, ten feet in depth and twelve feet in width, round the whole of the walls: the place was thus secure against the attack of any Asiatic enemy not provided with siege artillery.

But it pleased Providence, on the 19th February, to remove in an instant this ground of confidence. A tremendous earthquake shook down all our parapets built up with so much labour, injured several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawur face, and reduced the Cabool gate to a shapeless mass of ruins. It savours of romance, but it is a sober fact, that the city was thrown into alarm, within the space of little more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks of this terrific phenomenon of nature.

The troops turned with indefatigable industry to the reparation of their walls, but at the moment of the great convulsion, Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan Barukzye, the assassin of the late Envoy, and treacherous destroyer of the Cabool force, having collected a body of troops, flushed with a success consummated by the vilest means, had advanced to Murkhail, within seven miles of our gates. He attacked our foraging parties with a large body of horse on the 21st and 22d of February, and soon after, establishing his head quarters to the westward, two miles from the place, and a secondary camp to the eastward, about one mile distant, invested the town, and established a rigorous blockade. From that time up to the 7th of April, the reduced garrison was engaged in a succession of skirmishes with the enemy, who, greatly superior in horse, perpetually insulted our walls by attacks and alerts, and compelled us daily to fight at disadvantage for forage for our cattle. The most remarkable of these affairs were those of the cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne, commanding a detachment of Shah Shooja's 2d cavalry, and Jemadar Deena Singh, 5th Light Cavalry, already reported; a sally under Colonel Dennie, C.B., to defeat a suspected attempt of the enemy to drive a mine, on the 11th of March; the repulse of an assault upon the transverse walls to the northward of the place, on the 24th of the same month, by detachments under Captain Broadfoot (who was severely wounded), and Captain Fenwick, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; the capture of bullocks and sheep by Lieutenant Mayne on the 30th and 31st of January; and the seizure of large flocks of the latter, in the face of Mahomed Akbar's army, by a force of infantry under Captain Pattisson, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and of cavalry under Captain Oldfield, on the 1st instant. These successes were crowned by Providence by the issue of the brilliant and decisive attack on the camp of the Sirdar, on the 7th instant.

I have to notice, as a measure of defence, my having enrolled as a provisional battalion a large body of our camp followers, and armed them with pikes and other weapons. On all occasions of assault and sally, these men were available to make a show upon our curtains, and I have pledged myself to them to recommend

to Government that they should enjoy all the pecuniary advantages of the native soldiers beyond the Indus. I at the same time held forth to the troops of Shah Shooja's force, the expectation that they would be put, during the especial service, on the same footing with their comrades of the Bengal army.

From the time that the Brigade threw itself into Jellalabad, the native troops have been on half, and the followers on quarter, rations, and for many weeks they have been able to obtain little or nothing in the bazaars to eke out this scanty provision. I will not mention, as a privation, the European troops from the same period having been without their allowance of spirits, because I verily believe this circumstance and their constant employment have contributed to keep them in the highest health, and the most remarkable state of discipline. Crime has been almost unknown amongst them, but they have felt severely, although they have never murmured, the diminution of their quantity of animal food, and the total want of ghee, flour, tea, coffee and sugar; these may seem small matters to those who read them at a distance, but they are serious reductions in the scale of comfort of the hard-working and fighting soldier in Asia. The troops have also been greatly in arrears of pay, besides their severe duties in heat and cold, wind and rain, on the guards of the gates and bastions. The troops, officers and men, British and Hindoostanee, of every Arm, remained fully accoutred on their alarm-posts every night from the 1st of March to the 7th of April. The losses of officers and men, in carriage and cattle, camp equipage and baggage, between Cabool and Jellalabad, were heavy; and their expenditure, during the siege and blockade, in obtaining articles of mere subsistence and necessity, has been exorbitant.

I feel assured that Major-General Pollock will consider it a most pleasing duty, to bring the series of labours, privations and conflicts, imperfectly sketched in the foregoing details, to the notice of the head of the Supreme Government in India, and through his Lordship to that of the Court of Directors and of our Sovereign, as a claim for public acknowledgment and substantial reimbursement and reward.

The report of Captain Broadfoot, in his capacity of Garrison Engineer, will meet with attentive perusal; I have already stated how much I have been indebted to his scientific attainments, as well as his distinguished activity and resolution during the siege. His fertility in resource obviated great difficulties, in procuring iron, timber, and charcoal; and to the foresight of his arrangements we owe our having had a very ample supply of tools. The corps under his command performed, from Bootkhak, the duties equally of good sappers and bold light infantry soldiers, and the Affghan Huzaree and Eusifzye portion of it have been singularly faithful in time of general defection. The two Infantry Regiments, under the lamented Colonel Dennie and Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, have vied with each other in the steady performance of the duties of that Arm: and it would be impossible for me to discriminate in favour of either, in awarding praise to the squadron of 5th Light Cavalry under Captain Oldfield, and the Rissallah 2d Shah Soojah's Cavalry, under Lieutenant Mayne: Lieutenant Plowden, of the former, has been distinguished on several occasions. The artillery practice of No. 6 Light Field Battery has ever been excellent, and has been equalled by that of the Mountain Train. Captains Abbott and Backhouse, and Lieutenant Dawes, have proved themselves excellent officers of Ordnance. I have more than once brought it to notice that Captain Macgregor, Political Agent, has cheerfully rendered very able assistance in serving the guns in every crisis of pressing danger. Of his labours in his own department, I ought not perhaps to attempt to constitute myself a judge; but I know that they have been unremitting; and their result in obtaining for my force supplies and information, and keeping up our communication with India and with Cabool, and securing for us Affghan co-operation, I may be allowed to appreciate, and am bound to point out to Government.

The medical duties of the garrison have been ably fulfilled by Surgeon Forsyth, Superintending Surgeon Shah Shooja's force, and Assistant-Surgeons Robertson and Barnes, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Hare, 35th Regiment and Brown, late in charge of the Irregulars.

Captain Mainwaring, Commissariat Officer to the force, has been indefatigable in his efforts to keep the garrison well supplied, and his arrangements in very difficult times have merited my highest praise. Captain Moorhouse, 35th Regiment Native Infantry, has satisfactorily discharged his duties as Brigade Quarter Master; he was severely wounded on the 7th instant.

It is gratifying to me to forward the opinion of my second in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, C. B., placed on record without solicitation, of the merits

of the 13th Light Infantry, of which corps I am proud of being a member: I fully concur in the sentiments which he expresses, and hope the distinction which he recommends for the officers of his own corps will be accorded. The cheerful and persevering manner in which the native soldiers laboured with the shovel, mattock, and hand-barrow were as surprising as their steadiness and courage in the field were conspicuous.

I have to acknowledge the zealous manner in which Brevet-Major Fraser, Light Cavalry, Brevet-Captain Gerrard, of the corps of Jezzailchees, Captain Burn, and Lieutenant Hillersdon of the Khyber Rangers, and Lieutenant Dowson, of the Janbazes, when their services could no longer be available with their corps, volunteered to do duty with any regiment in which they could be useful.

I must finally express my gratitude to Providence for having placed so gallant and devoted a force under my command; in every way it has exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I beg leave in the strongest manner to solicit the interposition of Major-General Pollock, C. B., who has nobly laboured and fought to relieve it from its critical position in the midst of a hostile empire, in now committing it to the protection and favour of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, and through him of the Court of Directors, and of our Sovereign.

I ask permission specially to recommend the following officers for honorary distinction, or brevet rank, or both, viz. Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, C.B., commanding 35th regiment Native Infantry, now second in command; Brevet-Major Fraser, Light Cavalry, who acted as my Aide-de-Camp on the 7th instant; Captain Abbott, Commandant of Artillery and Commissary of Ordnance; Captain Backhouse, commanding the Mountain Train and Senior Officer of the Shah's troops with my force; Captain Broadfoot, commanding Sappers and Garrison Engineer; Captain Oldfield, 5th Light Cavalry, Senior Officer of that Arm; Captain Seaton, 35th regiment Native Infantry, particularly recommended for his conduct on the 7th instant by Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath; Captain Younghusband, of the same regiment, who was distinguished with the advanced guard in the Khoord Cabool Pass, and there severely wounded; Captain Burn, late Commandant of the Khyber Rangers, and doing duty with the 35th regiment Native Infantry; Captain Wilkinson, on whom the command of the 13th Light Infantry devolved in the field on the fall of Colonel Dennie, C.B.; Captain Fenwick, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, whose highly deserving conduct in the Pass of Jugdulluck was noticed then in my dispatch; Captain Havelock, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Persian Interpreter to Major-Generals Elphinstone and Pollock, and attached to me as staff, and who commanded the right column in the final attack on Mahomed Akbar's Camp; and Captain Hamlet Wade, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, my Brigade Major, whose exertions in the action of the 7th I have elsewhere highly commended. Both these latter officers rendered most valuable services throughout the investment and siege. The officers of all ranks, and soldiers of all arms, European and Native, I have likewise to represent as generally and individually deserving of reward and encouragement, and I hope that the Government will sanction my calling upon Commandants of corps and detachments to send in rolls of such native officers as they may deem worthy of the insignia of the order of "Merit" and of "British India."

I have, &c.

R. SALE.

Rank and Names of Officers Wounded.

Artillery.—Captain Abbott, slightly.

Sappers and Miners.—Captain Broadfoot, severely.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.—Lieutenant and Adjutant Wood, and Ensign Oakes, slightly.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Troops under the command of Major-General Sir R. H. Sale, K.C.B., from 22nd February to 6th April, 1842.

No. 6, Light Field Battery.—1 corporal killed; 1 European officer, and 1 private wounded.

Detachment of 5th Light Cavalry.—1 havildar and 2 troopers killed; 4 ditto wounded; 1 horse killed and 12 wounded; 1 syce killed, 2 ditto wounded; and 1 grass-cutter killed of the Artillery and Cavalry.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.—4 privates killed; 2 officers, 1 corporal, and 11 privates, wounded.

35th Regiment Native Infantry.—1 sepoy killed; 1 corporal and 10 sepoys wounded.

Mountain Train.—No casualties.

Detachment 2d Cavalry S. S. Force.—1 trooper killed; 4 ditto wounded; 9 horses killed, and 3 wounded.

Sappers and Miners.—4 privates killed; 1 European officer and 30 privates wounded.

Detachment 6th Light Infantry.—No casualties.

Total killed 14; wounded 66, not including camp followers, &c.; horses killed 10, wounded 15.

Return of Camp Followers Enlisted on the 15th January, 1842, by order of Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., as a Provisional Garrison.

Jellalabad, April 1, 1842.

No. 6, Light Field Battery.—Mustered followers, armed 36; not mustered, armed 61; total 97; killed during the siege, 2.

Squadron 5th Light Cavalry.—Mustered followers, armed 7, unarmed 69; not mustered, armed 6, unarmed 19; total 101.

Rissalah Anderson's Horse.—Mustered followers, armed 4, unarmed 11; not mustered, unarmed 57; total 72.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.—Mustered followers, armed 124, unarmed 238; not mustered, armed 100; total 462.

35th Native Infantry.—Mustered followers, armed 77, unarmed 46; not mustered, armed 55, unarmed 110; total 288.

Sappers and Miners.—Mustered followers, armed 69, unarmed 19; not mustered, armed 40, unarmed 61; total 189.

Commissariat.—Mustered followers, armed 103; killed during the siege 7, and wounded 6.

Grand total—1312; killed 9; wounded 6.

Those followers that were unarmed were told off to the ramparts, for the purpose of throwing large stones, a great quantity of which were collected. The whole of the camp rendered much assistance in the conveyance of building materiel, and working with furwahs and spades.

R. SALE.

No. 316.

Captain Broadfoot to Major-General Sir Robert Sale.

Note.—On the defensive works in Jellalabad, prepared by order of Major-General Sir Robert Sale, K.C.B.

Sir, *Jellalabad, April* 16, 1842.

ON the 12th of November, the Major-General commanding having resolved to occupy Jellalabad, directed me with a committee of officers to examine and report on the works of the place.

The committee reported unanimously that they were then not defensible against a vigorous assault.

As will be seen by the accompanying plan, the town is an irregular quadri-

lateral, having half of the western side salient, and the southern side broken by a deep re-entering angle. It was surrounded on every side with gardens and houses, enclosed fields, mosques, and ruined forts, affording strong cover to an enemy; these were everywhere close to the walls, and in many places connected with them. Beyond these on three sides (north, east and west), at from 400 to 500 yards, run the ruins of the wall of the ancient city, on which the sand has accumulated so as to form a line of low heights, giving cover to the largest bodies of men. Opposite the south-west angle a range of heights, composed of bare gneiss rocks, commences at 330 yards from the works and extends about 400 yards from north-north-east to south-south-west; these completely overlook the town, and from the vicious tracing of the works enfilade some of the longest curtains: parallel to the north side, at 170 yards, runs a steep bank 20 feet high; it extends a considerable way to the west and several miles to the east, affording a secure and unseen approach to any number of men; it is, probably, an old bank of the river. From it numerous ravines run up towards the walls, affording the enemy a covered passage into the buildings and enclosures adjoining the works.

Two very solid walls, 300 yards apart, run from the place to this bank, thus enclosing on three sides a space, probably occcupied originally by the Mogul Emperor's palace, but found by us to contain a large mosque and numerous gardens, and houses occupied by Fakeers; one of the gates of the town opens into it, and it was traversed by a water course, about 10 feet wide, which entered the town by a tunnel under the rampart, large enough to admit several men abreast. A similar tunnel allowed it to pass out of the town, on the eastern side. The walls of the town extended about 2,100 yards, without reckoning the bastions, of which there were 33.

The works were of earth, and in the usual style of the country, viz.:—A high thin rampart, but in a state of ruin, without parapets and without ditch, covered way, or outworks of any kind.

The bastions were full, but in some places lower than the adjoining curtains, very confined, without parapets, and sloping downwards from the gorge to the salient, so that the terrepleine was completely exposed.

There were four gates and a postern, all of the usual vicious native construction, and, except that on the northern side, in a ruinous state.

To give some idea of the state of the works, I may mention that of the committee sent to inspect them on the 13th of November, not one, except myself, succeeded in making the circuit. Large gaps cut off the communication, or insecure footing compelled the officers to descend among the adjoining enclosures, from which it was difficult to find the way; while on the south side the ramparts were so imbedded in houses and surmounted by them, that its course could only be traced by laboously threading the lanes of the native town.

On the north side, the wall rose to a very great height towards the town, but sloped down to the interior in a heap of ruins, almost everywhere accessible; while at the foot, were houses and gardens so strongly occupied by the enemy, that during the night of the 13th of November our troops were unable to maintain their posts, and, with the exception of the gateway, a line of 400 yards, on the northern face, was without a man in the works. Had the enemy then attacked us we must have been reduced to a street combat.

On the following morning (14th November), the Major-General ordered a sortie in force, which drove the enemy from his positions with such loss that it was some time before he ventured near enough to disturb our works, which were now as vigorously prosecuted as our scanty supply of tools and the difficulty of procuring materials allowed.

We had only the tools, as per margin*, brought from Cabool with the Sappers for the operations expected in the Tazeen Valley; and we were without wood or iron. Wood was obtained from the ruins of the cantonment and from houses demolished in the town. Iron was collected in small quantities from the neighbourhood, but it was that of the country, good in quality but imperfectly melted, and requiring about ten times as much labour and time as English iron. By the persevering labour of the troops, however, much was done, and when the enemy next attacked us (1st December) ramparts had been made and the guns mounted

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* 330 Pickaxes, 390 shovels, with other tools in proportion; many tools, such as trowels, &c a ve been made here.

on the bastions, for which they were destined, the watercourses and other passages through the walls blocked up, the foot of the scarps cleared from rubbish, and parapets built in all the bastions and many of the curtains, while much of the external cover was destroyed.

On the 1st December the enemy were again routed, and the works proceeded with little or no interruption.

By the middle of January (the commencement of the rainy season) a parapet, nowhere less than 6 feet high, with a banquette, as wide as the nature of the rampart allowed, was completed entirely round the place. The gates were repaired and strengthened by buttresses; two of them were retrenched and a ditch carried round the north-west angle, while some of the most dangerous ravines were laid open to our fire, and roads were opened into the low ground on the north side.

By the middle of February the ditch was carried round the place, with as good a covered way as the size of the ditch and supply of earth allowed; while the mosques, forts, gardens, and cover of every description, had been destroyed for several hundred yards round the place.

At this time Mahomed Akbar Khan moved into the valley, in order to attack the place, but they were unable to effect more than a distant investment; they frequently occupied the rocks on the south-west, but the parapets and traverses rendered their fire harmless.

On the 19th February an earthquake, which nearly destroyed the town, threw down the greater part of our parapets, the Cabool gate with the two adjoining bastions, the north-west bastion and a part of the new bastion which flanked it. Three other bastions also were nearly destroyed, while several large breaches were made in the curtains; one on the Peshawur side, 80 feet long, was quite practicable, the ditch being filled and the ascent easy. Thus, in one moment, the labours of 3 months were, in a great measure, destroyed.

No time, however, was lost; the shocks had scarcely ceased when the whole garrison was told off into working parties, and before night the breaches were scarped, the rubbish below cleared away, and the ditches before them dug out while the great one, on the Peshawur side, was surrounded by a good gabion parapet.

A parapet was erected on the remains of the north-west bastion, with an embrasure allowing the guns to flank the approach of the ruined Cabool gate; the parapet of the new bastion was restored, so as to give a flanking fire to the north-west bastion, while the ruined gate was rendered inaccessible by a trench in front of it, and in every bastion round the place a temporary parapet was raised.

From the following day all the troops off duty were continually at work, and such were their energy and perseverance that by the end of the month the parapets were entirely restored, the Cabool gate again serviceable, the bastions either restored or the curtain filled in when restoration was practicable, and every battery re-established.

The breaches have been built up, with the rampart doubled in thickness, and the whole of the gates retrenched.

It is not easy to give an adequate idea of the extent of the labour performed by the troops.

The parapets, banquettes, &c. &c, are built of the ruins of the buildings thrown down, cemented with clay mixed with straw and bound together, when requisite, by bond timbers; of this masonry above 104,500 cubic feet had been built before the earthquake, and since then (including new works), about 103,900 cubic feet have been erected, making in all above 208,000 cubic feet of masonry. But the material had to be procured from a distance by the laborious process of demolition; and the ruinous wall had to be scarped, cleared at the base, and prepared for the work.

The quantity of walls of forts, mosques, gardens, &c. &c. destroyed, were considerably more than double that of the walls of the place, and the excavation from the ditch exceeds 860,000 cubic feet.

In addition to this the troops had to build barracks for themselves, and guard-rooms round the works, each corps undertook its own barracks, while the construction of the guard-rooms was superintended by Captain Moorhouse, Quartermaster of brigade, and Lieutenant and Quartermaster Sinclair.* of Her Majesty's

* To Lieutenant Sinclair, also, we owe the mill used by the Commissariat. I only furnished materials and workmen; the credit of the whole contrivance and construction is due solely to Lieutenant Sinclair.—G. B.

13th Light Infantry, whose assistance on this point left me more leisure for the defensive works.

The working parties, in emergencies, consisted of all men off duty, often assisted by the guards when the works were near their posts.

On ordinary occasions they consisted of all the Sappers and Miners, about 200 men of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 120 of the 35th Native Infantry, a party of Artillerymen of Captain Abbott's battery, and all the men off duty in Captain Backhouse's Mountain Train, and the detachment of the 6th Infantry, Shah Shooja's force, doing duty with the Mountain Train detachments, also camp followers were employed in bringing materials, &c.

Nothing could exceed the cheerful energy of every officer and man in these labours.

The Sappers and Miners worked from day-break to sunset (with two hours and a half for meals), and when occasion required, at night. Their conduct was such as to leave me nothing to desire, and it has been honoured with the Major-General's recorded approbation.

Lieutenant and Adjutant Orr, and Lieutenant and Quartermaster Cunningham, who acted as my assistants, rendered me the most zealous and efficient aid, and I beg most respectfully to bring their great merit to the Major-General's notice. The European non-commissioned officers also displayed a zeal and intelligence deserving to be reported to the Major-General, more especially Serjeant-Major Kelly, Quartermaster-Serjeant Bruen, and Acting Staff-Serjeant Hughes, from Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.

The other troops having very severe garrison duty, laboured for a short period, yet seldom less than six hours a day.

It will be seen that the largest parties were furnished by Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and I know not how adequately to express my sense of the services of this admirable body of men; though having little more than every other night in bed, they laboured for months, day after day, officers and men, with a cheerfulness and energy not to be surpassed. To enumerate all, whose zeal and intelligence were conspicuous, would almost require me to go over the list of the officers, and to mention even many of the valuable non-commissioned officers; but I cannot deny myself the pleasure of naming those whose more extended professional education gave their aid additional value, namely—Captain Fenwick, Lieutenant Frere, and Ensign Parker. Separate portions of the works were also entrusted at various times to other officers, especially Lieutenants G. King, G. Wade, and Ensign Scott; and I had every reason to be satisfied with their execution.

The 35th Native Infantry were much employed in destroying the forts and other covers around the place; and it is due to Captain Seaton to mention his great activity, and the skill with which, by directing the watercourses used for irrigation, on the most massive ruins, he effected a quantity of demolition which, with our short supply of gunpowder, would have otherwise been impracticable.

With the exception of a few of the larger bastions, the whole of the batteries were prepared by the Artillery themselves (both Captain Abbott's battery and Captain Backhouse's Mountain Train), under the superintendence of their own officers. Besides this, a party of Captain Abbott's artillerymen was always ready to assist in the works generally; and they were most ably superintended by Lieutenant Dawes, to whom I am indebted for aid, as constant as it was valuable and willingly given. Captain Backhouse, with his own men, and a detachment of the 6th Infantry, Shah Shooja's force not only prepared the parapets and embrasures for his own guns, and repaired the damages done to them by the earthquake, but he undertook and completed several of the most useful and laborious operations; he executed, among others, a large and widely branching series of ravines, giving cover to many hundred men, within pistol-shot of a very weak part of the works, which was filled up, or entirely laid open to fire, and that with a number of men, which without his untiring zeal and personal exertion would have been inadequate.

The camp followers were distributed to assist the troops, and they followed the example set them, and were extremely useful.

Appended are two plans and some sheets of sections. The first plan shows in some measure the way in which the space round the fort was originally encumbered by buildings and enclosures. The second gives an outline of the place as it

now stands, while the sections will give some idea of the profile of the works, as we found them, and as we leave them.

The gates have been retrenched inwardly because, from the fall of the ground outside, and its conformation, no adequate work could have been raised without a labour we could not at the time spare, and without occupying more time than we could ever reckon on for unmolested work.

The narrowness and shallowness of the ditch are owing to our want of tools, which limited the strength of our working parties so much, that anything stronger could not have been carried round in time to accomplish our object—that of interposing an obstacle to a sudden assault and escalade on every side, while the enemy were still numerous and elated by the Cabool disasters.

The breadth of the berm was necessary from the nature of the soil, a loose sand, and it varies as the necessity of including previous excavations, &c., obliged us to allow the tracing.

In conclusion, I have to solicit the Major-General's indulgence for this report, which has been prepared while suffering from a wound. If I have been diffuse in noticing the assistance received from the officers and troops, it must be ascribed to the admiration with which I daily, for many months, witnessed their labours under circumstances of extraordinary discouragement; on short allowance of provisions, with heavy duties of other kinds to perform, and, for a considerable time, harassed by incessant conflicts with the enemy during all this time, there was not only no murmuring, but the utmost cheerfulness and zeal prevailed: it was not once necessary to resort to punishment, and I never had to make a single report other than commendatory.

I have, &c.

GEORGE BROADFOOT.

No. 317.

Lieut.-Col. T. Monteath to Major-General Sir R. Sale.

Sir, *Jellalabad, April* 16, 1842.

THE exertions of the garrison of Jellalabad, beyond ordinary routine, having ceased since the decisive victory obtained over the enemy on the 7th instant, and now finally terminated by the arrival of the British army under Major-General Pollock, C.B., I trust I may not be considered as going beyond the limits of my proper duty in addressing you, to state as follows:

As doing but due justice on this occasion to Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry might be looked upon as a highly colored record of the merits of your own regiment, and seeing that no such partial bias can possibly be supposed to guide my feelings in the estimate I have formed of their deserts, I have pleasure in sincerely declaring that their conduct, throughout the painful and perilous position in which they have so long been placed, has been such as fully to deserve the applause and admiration of their country, and the confidence and best consideration of our well-beloved Sovereign.

On our throwing ourselves on the 12th of November last, into the old and ruined town of Jellalabad, without money, without food, and almost without protection, with a nation of highly excited and barbarous enemies in arms against us, our situation seemed as hopeless a one as British troops were ever called upon to confront; notwithstanding which, the enemy was twice within twenty days attacked, and on both occasions defeated with signal success.

You yourself will doubtless detail the works performed by the regiment; let it then be only my province who have witnessed their exertions almost hourly during a period of five months, to record, that their devoted perseverance and cheerfulness amidst all the gloom that surrounded them, after the destruction of their comrades of the Cabool force, could not have been surpassed by any troops in the world; and that after months of extreme toil, when an earthquake, such as man is not often in the habit of experiencing, in a moment left scarcely a vestige of their labour standing, their flying as they did with redoubled zeal to the work, and completing it in ten days (so that on the arrival of the enemy before Jellalabad, they declared that the calamity which had befallen the valley arose from

nothing but English witchcraft, it being the only place that had escaped uninjured), was what none but British soldiers could have performed, and what no price could have purchased, for it was the labour of the heart, work of all others most deserving of distinction and reward.

In regard to the Native Troops of all Arms, I shall refrain from saying much for a reason which has in a measure induced me to address this letter to you, but as you have yourself been a daily witness of their conduct under every description of circumstance, you have it fully within your own power to say all, of which the Government they serve may very justly feel proud, and it may serve to shew, as an example for imitation, what noble enthusiasm and zeal may be lighted up in their breasts by the high bearing and considerate conduct of determined British officers.

I shall conclude by observing that we can now, Sir, proudly march forth from this garrison with the enemy's standards in our hands, and their captured cannon to fire a salute, on delivering over the care of the honour of the British name, which we have had within our keeping for the last five months, pure and unspotted, and without a single circumstance existing to cast a breath upon its lustre.

The conduct of the officers of the 35th regiment generally, as well as those doing duty with it throughout the siege, I am proud to say, has been such as well to deserve any reward or distinction that can be conferred upon them.

Of those holding the rank of Captain and above it, which enables Her Majesty to advance them a step, I would strongly recommend Captain Seaton, 35th regiment; Captain Younghusband, 35th regiment (severely wounded); Brevet-Major Fraser, late 2nd Light Cavalry, and Captain Burn, 1st Regiment Native Infantry, both doing duty with the 35th regiment.

Of the Native Officers of the 35th regiment, I could also strongly recommend that six should, as a compliment to the regiment for its gallant and meritorious conduct, receive the order of "Merit" and of "British India;"—viz.:

SAHIB RAM, Subadar,
MANICK SING, Subadar,
DERRIOU SING, Jemadar,
RAMBUCCUS TEWARRY, Jemadar,
HOOLAS RAM, Subadar, and
HURRAM SING, Jemadar.

I have, &c.
T. MONTEATH.

No. 318.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 16, 1842.

YOU have been already informed that the Governor-General, on the 28th ultimo, adverting to the then accredited report of the death of Shah Shooja, informed Major-General Pollock that, in the present divided state of Affghanistan, it would not be prudent to recognise any individual chief pretending to the throne of that country.

2. The Governor-General is disposed to think that the Government of Lahore will take the same view of the course which, under present circumstances, it is prudent to adopt upon that subject. To recognise any pretender whom we might prefer, would, at the present moment, certainly have the effect of uniting the largest portion of the Affghans against him, and thus impose upon his allies the burdensome and fruitless obligation of supporting a powerless chief against the people whose allegiance he claimed. To abstain from recognising any pretender is probably to continue the state of disunion and confusion in which Affghanistan is involved. The Governor-General is persuaded that the Government of Lahore will have perceived the great practical change which the events of the last four years have effected in the situation of Affghanistan, and the permanent influence which that change must have upon its future relations with the adjoining States.

3. The British Government, in conjunction with the late Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing, moved against the Affghans, in order to remove from the Government of Affghanistan an able chief, who had in the course of many years succeeded in

uniting it under his rule, who was forming and disciplining an army, and was supposed to entertain, in conjunction with the powers of the West, projects of hostility to the adjoining States upon the Indus.

4. That (our first) object has been completely effected: not only has Dost Mahomed Khan been removed from the Government of Affghanistan, but that country has been so entirely convulsed by the war, that, if Dost Mahomed were to be restored to-morrow, he would find an altered nation, and be unable to re-establish his authority in its former strength.

5. A further object of the advance of the allies against Affghanistan was to substitute for the authority of Dost Mahomed, which was deemed to be hostile, that of Shah Soojah, which, it was expected, would be friendly. Whether Shah Soojah did in reality justify that expectation, is a question it is no longer necessary to investigate. This, however, would be manifest from our recent experience in Affghanistan, if it had not been proved by all former experience in similar cases, that a sovereign who appears to be altogether the instrument of a foreign State, cannot obtain the willing support of his subjects, so as to wield their power in favour of that foreign State; on the contrary, he will be an object of hatred or contempt to his subjects, and his only resource, if he be desirous of securing their willing allegiance, will be in throwing himself into their arms and in asserting his independence of the foreign State which placed him on the throne. Had we succeeded in maintaining Shah Soojah upon the throne, we should have had a friendly sovereign, and a hostile people, in Affghanistan, and have been compelled to support that sovereign, in the event of an attack from the West, not only against his subjects, in a position distant from our own frontier, which nothing but the presumed support of the people of the country oculd justify us in taking up.

6. The effect of our proceedings has been to render, for the present, equally impossible in Affghanistan the existence of a hostile or of a friendly sovereign wielding the united force of the nation. As against an invader, the Affghans are powerful in their mountains, and in the poverty of their country, but their poverty, combined with their divisions, will render them henceforth, as in all recent times, powerless as invaders. Their power against an invader will be exerted equally against an invader from whatever quarter he might come. It is for us to do nothing which can put an end to the divisions amongst themselves, which deprive them of all power beyond their frontier, which might be exerted against us.

7. You will endeavour to bring the Government of Lahore to entertain these views, and to regard as the future object of our joint policy the maintenance of Affghanistan in that state in which it may be unable to do anything against us; foregoing the visionary design of placing it in a state in which it could, as a united monarchy, be powerful for us against an enemy advancing from the West, and yet be content to entertain no views of ambition against its neighbours in the East.

8. It appears to the Governor-General that this joint object of the two Governments, equally interested in its accomplishment, will be best effected by leaving the Affghans to themselves.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 319.

Major-General Pollock to the Governor-General of India.

My Lord, *Jellalabad, May* 8, 1842.

AS nothing can be more gratifying to me than to know that any feeble endeavours of mine have met with your Lordship's approbation, I gratefully acknowledge the expression of your sentiments on the occasion of my late advance into the Khyber Pass. To the army which I have the honour to command, I owe the success which I have hitherto had the good fortune to experience, and I sincerely hope that we shall continue to deserve the encomiums your Lordship has conde-

scended to pass on our operations thus far. I forwarded to Sir R. Sale your Lordship's letter for perusal, but have not received a reply; the General has for two days been ill, but is now better and out of danger.

Captain Mackenzie has to-day again reached our camp, sent by Mahomed Akbar with very extravagant proposals, which will be forwarded officially with my reply; he represents himself as having been called upon to fill the throne; that his party is in the ascendant; but that his sole object is to be on friendly terms with us. My reply will require some consideration, and must necessarily be very guarded. I know from other sources that there has been a struggle at Cabool; but I have good reason to believe that, so far from the Barukzye interest being powerful, that the Prince's party was successful, and that Mahomed Zemaun, one of the chief rebels, was very much dispirited. I experience considerable difficulty in framing answers, to keep up the communication with both parties, and still in no way commit the Government; but if I could be informed of the ulterior views of Government, it would greatly facilitate the duty I have to perform. Although the official report will contain copies of all documents, I now take the liberty to inclose three. One from Meeria Aga Jan,* giving an account of the affray at Cabool, a letter from Major Pottinger, and copy of Mahomed† Akbar's letter to me, to which he did not affix his seal, as he feared it might be produced against him. That Mahomed Akbar is ready to separate himself from his party and deliver up his prisoners, I have no doubt, but his terms I consider quite inadmissible; he cannot, and I am sure he does not, expect that they will be complied with; but I believe he considers his cause a bad one, and that I may not suspect the real truth, he has increased his demands; his sending Captain Mackenzie again, shows it was his anxiety on the subject, and he feels that his having possession of the prisoners must weigh with us in treating with him.

I may here perhaps be allowed to remark, that in any negotiations with these people, they cannot or will not understand the necessity of a reference to my own Government; they suppose that I have full powers, and consider a reference a mere subterfuge to deceive them.

All is quiet around us at present, the chiefs are coming in daily, and provisions are abundant; the weather up to this period has been favourable; but, unless I receive instructions to the contrary, I propose moving forward gradually, till I reach a better climate, as I understand Jellalabad will become unhealthy as the season advances. I have difficulty in moving, in consequence of the great want of carriage cattle.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 320.

Major Pottinger to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Teezeen, May* 3, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 26th ultimo, which was delivered to me by Captain Mackenzie.

Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan was disappointed with the offer made to him, and particularly the not receiving any reply to his own overture, when Mahomed Shah and Dost Mahomed Khan's names were both specified. Situated as I am, my opinions are open to the charge of selfishness, if I give them in favour of the person who holds me prisoner; however, as I can bring testimony that I have always opposed any propositions that have hitherto been made for our ransom (because I considered it an improper precedent to be established in the first place, and in the second as being detrimental to the interests of the state, supplying an enemy with money while the scales were tolerably even), I will now venture a few observations on the subject, noticing, however, that I still consider ransoming prisoners for money as very objectionable.

At present the case appears to me in a peculiar light, and that Government

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* Not received. † Ditto.

may succeed in causing the separation from the Mahometan cause of one of its most powerful branches (the Ghilzees), through whose country we must pass if we advance; at the same time, rendering the most energetic man of the party suspected, and releasing the families, and officers, &c., prisoners in their hands. Further, in the case of advancing on and garrisoning Cabool, the safety of our communications imperatively calls on us to be friendly with the tribes that can interrupt them, and therefore, sooner or later, unless we only mean to make a retributive inroad, the above-mentioned tribe must be gained to our interest.

There is doubtless a considerable chance of deceit, and of using such money to organize resistance to us; but for my own part such I consider would be a fortunate circumstance, as a greater chance would be afforded of striking a decisive blow in the beginning of the campaign.

Mahomed Akbar Khan has written a letter as a memorandum, which Captain Mackenzie will lay before you; the Sirdar has not signed it, as he fears it may be used against him in case of your not closing with his terms. What he states is, I believe, substantially true; and I do not think it unreasonable he should demand a promise of protection and friendly treatment, if he breaks with his supporters, which the delivery of the prisoners is likely to cause. The detail of his wishes appears to me to be considerably more in a pecuniary light than he can expect under any circumstances, but his other demands are moderate. His requests are, 1stly. That a written promise of amnesty be given to himself, Mahomed Shah Khan, and the latter's family, for all past acts up to the date of delivery. 2ndly, That neither he or any of the above-mentioned family shall be sent out of the Cabool and Jellalabad districts, against their wishes. 3rdly, That they may not be obliged to pay their respects to you in our camp, till they be assured against any danger. 4thly, If we merely intend to revenge ourselves on the enemy, and then leave the country, he trusts the Government will be conferred upon him. 5thly, He wants a Jaghire to support his family, and names two lacs as adequate. 6thly, He wants eight lacs of rupees as a present to start him with. His great fear (as it is of all Affghans) is of being removed from this country. He also asks for his own women who are in his father's haram serai. They have asked for the money, if it is paid, to be given to his Colund Khan, who will remain as a hostage till the prisoners are delivered; or that you pay it to Hindoos, who can empower their agents in Cabool to pay it, on delivery of the prisoners.

The last news from Cabool is, that Nawab Zeman Khan and his party have thrashed Nayb Amanollah and the Populzie party, and have offered the crown to Mahomed Akbar Khan, with the Newab Zeman Khan for his Vizier. Parties have been coming in for several days to pay their respects, and invite the Sirdar to the capital. Under these circumstances, the conduct of the Sirdar, in continuing the negotiation, appears a proof of his sincerity; and I trust I may be pardoned for remarking, that if his overtures, either as they are, or in a modified form, appear deserving of attention, that you will recollect that the delay of referring this to Government will lose us the opportunity which now apparently offers itself; and that the principal cause of the suspicions which eventually caused the failure of Sir A. Burnes's mission in 1837, and chiefly led to the necessity of the present war, was the making of such references. As the Affghans do not understand the system, they look on such an answer as an attempt to overreach them, and get exasperated more than they would be by a decisive negative.

I have, &c.,

ELDRED POTTINGER.

P.S. I beg to apologize for the blotted state of my letter, as I only have time to write this while Captain Mackenzie is sleeping, preparatory to resuming the march.

No. 321.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, May* 10, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the following documents:—Copy and translation of a memorandum, said to be written by Mahomed Akbar, but

without seal or signature.—Copy of my reply to Major Pottinger, and of my notice of the memorandum.

2. I naturally feel some difficulty in replying to such documents, placed as I am in a novel situation, and without instructions to guide me. I have endeavoured to be guided in my reply, and to concede nothing that might hereafter embarrass the Government. I shall feel anxious to know if my reply meets the approval of the Governor-General. Captain Mackenzie, on his return to Mahomed Akbar, was not detained seven hours, but sent again with overtures now forwarded. I have reason to believe that he considers his situation a desperate one, and if so, he will be glad to accept moderate terms; but I hope I shall be in possession of the wishes of the Governor-General before I can receive another message from any of the parties. I am daily expecting to hear from the Shah Zadh.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 322.

Translation of a Paper from Mahomed Akbar Khan, received on the 8th May, 1842, by the hands of Captain Mackenzie.

My Friend,

IN the letter for Pottinger Saheb, whichMackenzie has brought, there is nothing to give me confidence. I have, therefore, thought it necessary to send Mackenzie Saheb to you a second time.

When first Secunder Burnes came, I did all in my power that the wishes of the English Government might be realised; but the English Government would not agree to give assistance if a foreign enemy invaded this country, and nothing was settled. After that, when an English army entered my country, I was compelled to be your enemy, and was three years a wanderer, and returned at the end of the confusion (Cabool insurrection). In the time when Pottinger, Lawrence, and Mackenzie Sahebs came at the stage of Bootkak, I agreed to their wishes, and did all in my power to protect the army, as is well-known to the above-mentioned Sahebs: but I could not save them from the hands of the multitude, as all the army * was disorganized, and the British soldiers could not protect themselves on account of the frost, and, moreover, the gentlemen did not attend to my advice.

2dly. If I allow the English, who are my guests, to depart according to your suggestion, or according to Pottinger Saheb's advice, if I allow the English ladies to depart before the gentlemen, in either case all Mahomedans will look upon me as their enemy, and the whole multitude will be opposed to me. Under these circumstances, I beg you to reflect that, not having come to an understanding with you, and having made enemies of them (Mahomedans), how can I exist? At present, my friends and allies have possessed themselves of the government of Cabool, and all of them send daily to me three or four men with oaths and protestations, requesting me to come and to be their king; and Mahomed Zeman Vuzeer—all the Ghilzies are my friends: and I, from the friendship I bear you, do not consent to be the king of Cabool, since to be so must involve the necessity of being your enemy. I prefer your friendship to the throne (of Cabool), because if I was to go to Cabool now, the men of Cabool would push me forward, and then it would be difficult to release my guests, and to be on friendly terms with you. On this account I have written to show my friendship for your Government. Please God my services shall exceed the injuries I have done you. On condition that we are friends, let the terms of friendship between me and my friends such as Mahomed Shah Khan and others be written out, and be sent before the receipt of my guests in your camp, that I may feel confidence. The other matters have

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* Note.—Captain Mackenzie says the word "Nisard" alludes to the mob of Affghans, whom the Sirdar means to say he could not govern.

been explained to Captain Mackenzie verbally, and he will make them known to you. I hope that you will write down every article in a treaty, signed and sealed.

(There is no seal to this document.)

No. 323.

Major-General Pollock to Major Pottinger.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 10, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 3rd instant. I regret that Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan should have been disappointed at my last reply, because I fully understood that I replied to his overture when I made the offer for the prisoners, and which I intended should be the basis of any negotiations that might afterwards be entered into. This point was, therefore, more particularly addressed to Mahomed Akbar Khan, and the other Sirdars not being included in this arrrangement were particularly specified by name. This will, perhaps, account for what the Sirdar supposes an omission. Some parts of the commencement of your letter do not require an answer.

The circumstance of receiving a Persian memorandum without seal or signature does not evince that confidence and good faith which ought to be shown where a good understanding between parties is desired. Protection would always be afforded to the Sirdar's person, if he break with his supporters in consequence of the delivery of the prisoners; but I had better, at once, answer the requests you have mentioned.

With regard to the first, it follows as a matter of course, that whenever we agree to any terms, amnesty for the past will result. The second request about residing at Cabool and Jellalabad is out of place now; it must depend upon contingencies, and be discussed only after other and more important points have been agreed upon.

With reference to the third request, the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar may be assured that I would guarantee his personal safety whenever he may visit my camp; but his doing so would require some preliminary arrangement, unless he voluntarily claims our protection, in which case I could immediately arrange for his safety and appeal to the Government in his behalf.

The fourth request refers to matters entirely depending on future results, and which are known to God alone. It would, therefore, be vain to speculate on them at this stage of our negotiation.

With regard to the fifth and sixth requests, I have already told you that I suppose the Sirdar rests his claim to any present on his delivering up the prisoners, which, as I have before stated, will be the best evidence of good faith, and a sincere wish for favourable terms with the British Government.

I have accordingly already mentioned the sum of two lacs of rupees: the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar must recollect that he is desirous of obtaining the females of his own family—the British Government will not require any money to be paid on their account; and I hereby guarantee that on all the prisoners being delivered over to me, I will write to India for the women of the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar, and I have no doubt that my request will be complied with.

As to the payment of the money for the prisoners now with or in the power of Mahomed Akbar, it shall be made to any person the Sirdar may appoint to receive it, or it shall be paid to Hindoos who can give bills on Cabool. The good faith and honour of the British nation is not doubted, and I therefore hereby pledge myself to pay the two lacs of rupees on account of Government whenever the prisoners are made over to me.

The news you have heard from Cabool is not correct: perhaps you refer to some old news which I may have forgotten, but the latest news I have from good authority, is in every respect different, and need not be mentioned here.

You observe that the conduct of the Sirdar in continuing the negotiation, appears a proof of his sincerity—it evidently does show his desire to come to terms.

You seem to think that the overtures as they are, or in a modified form,

should meet with immediate attention, and without reference to Government, which latter course you surmise, might cause the Sirdar to break off the negotiation. This I cannot believe; because if, as I am to understand, the Sirdar is really sincere, he will have the good sense to know that one Governor-General having gone, and his successor Lord Ellenborough having scarcely completed his journey to the Upper Provinces, it is impossible he can have given me the full instructions he will do when he has considered the state of the country.

When Burnes went in 1837, there was no change in the Government; the same necessity, therefore, did not exist for receiving instructions.

This is a point which you should carefully explain to the Sirdar, because it is of great importance that he should not be deceived.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 324.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 12, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to forward a copy of a postscript, which I added to the letter which I addressed to Major Pottinger, relating to the prisoners—a copy of the letter has already been forwarded to you.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 325.

Postscript of a letter from Major-General Pollock to Major Pottinger.

Jellalabad, May 10, 1842.

P.S.—I ought, in the body of this letter, to have requested of you to remind Mahomed Akbar Khan that the treatment which the principal prisoner (General Elphinstone), of high rank and importance, met with, caused his death. He was in bad health, and at the time when he could not move without assistance he was hurried away from his residence, exposed to great heat and rain—his death was the consequence—and the greatest solicitude is shown about the health of the Sirdar's father, who has been removed, for the benefit of cool air, to Deyrah Dhoon; these are facts which should weigh with the Sirdar when he must know that he is not swayed by any political consideration in retaining helpless females as prisoners; indeed, the gentlemen he has possessed himself of, are all of no importance, in a political point of view.

G. POLLOCK.

No. 326.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 19, 1842.

THE Governor-General directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 8th instant, addressed to his Lordship, and inclosing certain letters relative to past events at Cabool, furnished to you by Captain Macgregor, and communicating your opinion, while you request instructions from the Governor-General as to the course you should pursue.

2. Those instructions have already been furnished to you by my letters of the 25th and 28th of April, and of the 4th and 6th of May, and by the orders you received from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 19th of April.

3. As, however, notwithstanding your being in possession of sufficient instructions for your own guidance, it may be convenient that you should be fully informed of the general views of the Governor-General, with respect to Affghanistan and the Sikhs, his Lordship has directed me to enclose, for your own sole information, copies of letters addressed by me on the 27th ultimo, and on the 16th instant, to Mr. Clerk.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 327.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahábad, May* 21, 1842.

YOUR letter of the 26th ultimo, having been mis-sent to Calcutta, was only received by me this day.

2. That letter incloses a copy of a letter from Major Pottinger, now a prisoner in the hands of Mahomed Akbar Khan, conveying a message from that person, and certain other Affghan chiefs, with the following three propositions:—

First.—The Sirdar wishes to know, in the first place, if we will consent to withdraw the greater part of our troops, and leave an agent, with a small body of men, to act with whomever the confederates may elect as chief; in which choice they propose to be guided by the wishes of the two factions in Cabool, and wish us to release Dost Mahomed Khan.

Secondly.—They propose that if the British Government have determined on subjecting the country and continuing the war, the prisoners at present in Affghanistan shall be exchanged for Dost Mahomed Khan, his family and attendants, and that the issue be dependent on the sword.

Thirdly.—In the event of either of those propositions not being approved of, they wish to know what terms will be granted to themselves individually; whether we, in the event of their submission, will confine them, send them to India, take hostages from them, reduce their pay; or, in short, what they have to expect from our clemency.

3. Your answer to these propositions appears to have referred only to two points,—the release of the prisoners in the hands of the Affghans, and the terms to be granted to certain chiefs.

4. To effect the release of the prisoners you offered two lacs of rupees.

5. You consented that three chiefs, named by you (and mentioned by Major Pottinger as being with Mahomed Akbar Khan), shall enjoy the advantages arising from their hereditary possessions.

6. The Governor-General observes, that to the first of the propositions so made it was evidently inconsistent with honor and safety to accede.

7. Under the 13th paragraph of the instructions issued to you on the 24th of February (of which alone you were in possession on the 26th of April), you were authorised to speak of "the release of Dost Mahomed Khan as an event which, under various contingencies of circumstances, might not be altogether impossible;" and the death of Shah Shooja, then known to you, having evidently removed one obstacle to the release of Dost Mahomed Khan, it is to be regretted that you did not speak of that event, at least in the cautious terms you were authorised to employ.

8. The third proposition was clearly one to which no reply could be made.

9. The instructions contained in my letter of the 25th ultimo will have placed you at liberty to negotiate for a general exchange of prisoners, not excluding Dost Mahomed Khan; and it is the hope of the Governor-General that you may have been enabled to conclude an arrangement upon that basis.

10. Undoubtedly, on the 26th of April, you remained authorised, by the instructions of the 24th of February, to give money, on the public account, for the release of individual prisoners; and if, previously to the receipt of my letter of the 25th of April, you should have concluded a negotiation for the release of any individual prisoners on that condition, the Governor-General would feel himself under the necessity of sanctioning any payment of money to which you

may have then pledged yourself. After the receipt of that letter, you will, of course, in any further negotiation, have adhered to the instructions contained in it.

11. It cannot but be a subject of much regret that you should have considered it to be necessary, under any circumstances, to have any communication whatever of a diplomatic nature with Mahomed Akbar Khan, in whom it must be impossible for any one to place any trust.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 328.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 12, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated Allahabad, 25th of April, 1842, relating to the release of prisoners.

I take this opportunity of stating that the despatch, dated 19th of April, alluded to in the accompanying copy of a letter* which I have received from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, has not been received by me.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 329.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Jugrawan, May* 10, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a letter from Captain Lawrence, dated the 3rd instant, and, with reference to its contents, I beg leave to state that I ascribe the backwardness of the Sikh authorities in the camp near Peshawur to provide carriage in general to the British Commissariat, to the expectation that all the carriage which they can command, and which is not excessive, ought to be held available for their own troops in that quarter, amounting to thirty thousand men, and their aversion to provide bullocks in particular to a religious and invincible repugnance to consign them to a kine-killing country.

Every instance advanced as exhibiting a want of accommodation on the part of Rajah Goolaub Sing strikes me rather as marking defects in our own Commissariat there. For instance, the grain bags, the use of which to Ali Musjid were offered by the Sikhs, which they could scarcely have expected to see again, if carried beyond Ali Musjid to the camp of a large army, where the article must be also in so great demand.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK.

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* Dated, April 29.

No. 330.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 15, 1842

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 28th ultimo, authorising me to treat for the release of prisoners with a *de facto* Government. I regret that the prisoners are not with the present ruler at Cabool (Futteh Jung), but, if he succeeds in his present struggle, I think it very probable he may secure the prisoners at Cabool, and his success will be the signal to Mahomed Akbar again to ask for terms.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 331.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir. *Jellalabad, May* 15, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 28th ultimo, on the subject of Shah Soojah's death, and the impossibility in the present unsettled state of affairs for the British Government to recognise any individual as the successor to the monarchy.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 332.

Major-General Pollock to Lieutenant-Colonel Luard.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 14, 1842

I HAVE the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter I have just received from the Secretary to Government; also a copy of my reply. I trust I shall be excused for delaying a few days, after I may be ready to move, to receive another letter from Government. Indeed, it is by no means certain that I shall have sufficient cattle to move, even when the reply from Government may arrive, for I require upwards of 2,000 camels, not reckoning those which must carry grain; it is, however, probable I may obtain yaboos and mules for grain. I shall be glad if it so turn out, for camels do not thrive here.

I trust the view I have taken of our situation here will meet the approbation of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief.

I have, &c.,
G POLLOCK.

No. 333.

Lieutenant-Colonel Luard to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Simla, May* 28, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated Jellalabad, 14th May, 1842, inclosing a copy of a letter from the Secretary to Government, and your reply thereto.

In answer to your remark that you hope the view you have taken of your situation will meet the approbation of the Commander-in-Chief, I am desired by

his Excellency to state that his order to you, dated 29th April, to withdraw the force under your command from Affghanistan, was sent under authority of the Governor-General of India (as therein stated, dated 19th April, 1842), and his Lordship has since approved of the spirit and wording of that order. His Excellency cannot observe, from Mr. Secretary Maddock's letter of 28th April, that any discretionary power was conveyed to you; on the contrary, you are therein told that, even had you advanced upon Cabool, his Lordship's view, previously taken, of the policy to be pursued, that is, "withdrawing at the earliest practicable period within the Khyber Pass," remained unaltered.

Mr. Maddock's letter of the 4th and 6th instant repeat this opinion.

On the 14th instant, by the Commander-in-Chief's order, I apprised you of the arrangements intended to make your troops more comfortable when they had crossed the Indus: from this you will perceive that no change had taken place up to that date: these arrangements have now been approved by his Lordship in a letter of the 20th. The elephants and bearers will in part be assembled at Ferozepore; but his Excellency fears that your long delay, after the receipt of his instructions of the 29th ultimo, will not now allow of any troops passing through the Punjaub, though so much desired.

At all events, aid of all kinds may be given to you when you enter the Sikh country, which would have been impracticable had the Khyber Pass been again closed in your rear.

I have, &c.,
J. LUARD.

No. 334.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 23, 1842.

THE accounts transmitted in your letter of the 16th instant, just received, of the acts of insubordination which have taken place amongst the Sikh troops at Peshawur, subsequently to the departure of Rajah Goolaub Sing, have given the Governor-General much disquietude. His Lordship fears that the difficulties already so great in procuring provisions and carriage for the British army will be most seriously increased.

2. The Governor-General always viewed with much uneasiness the presence of a Sikh force so unnecessarily large at Peshawur, and he would be glad to see it diminished by any extensive grants of furlough. His Lordship desires that you will take an opportunity of expressing to the Maha Rajah his high sense of the energy displayed by his Highness, under these circumstances, in proceeding in person towards Peshawur, as well as of the provident wisdom evinced by his Highness in the measures which have been taken for bringing forward the means of carriage and supply.

3. The Governor-General has learnt with surprise that, in your opinion, "the cause of the Sikh army being so numerous at Peshawur is to be found in the irregular longings so often manifested by our authorities to obtain possession of Peshawur."

4. You are expressly authorised to give to the Maha Rajah the assurances of the Governor-General that his Government entertains no wish to possess or occupy any portion whatever of his Highness's dominions, and is desirous only that his Highness should long retain them all in honor and prosperity,—the faithful ally of the British Government, as his great predecessor, the Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing, was for many years.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 335.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 23, 1842.

THE Governor-General is apprehensive that Major-General Pollock may experience some difficulties in his endeavours to procure carriage and supplies, from a deficiency of treasure.

2. If you should have reason to think that this is the case, you are authorised to take such means as, in the present state of the Sikh country and its army, may appear to you to be most secure, for the purpose of forwarding to the Major-General the sum of ten lacs of treasure.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 336.

The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

General, *Allahabad, May* 23, 1842.

UNDER the apprehension that Major-General Pollock may be in want of treasure, and so subjected to great difficulties in the procuring of carriage and supplies (in the present disorganised state of the Sikh army in his rear), I have authorised Mr. Clerk to send ten lacs to the Major-General, in such manner as he may deem most secure.

2. As a payment of ten lacs will be immediately made to the Sikh Government on account of sums received for them from Sinde, and that sum is now at Ferozepore, Mr. Clerk will probably be enabled to take advantage of any escort the Maha Rajah may send for that sum, to protect the transport of the treasure intended for Major-General Pollock: such, at least, is Mr. Clerk's opinion.

3. I have suggested to Mr. Clerk that it would be well to induce the Sikh Government to grant extensive furloughs to their troops at Peshawur.

4. I have removed, I trust, by the declaration I have made, the apprehension which appears to have been entertained that the British Government desired to have possession of Peshawur. This apprehension, in Mr. Clerk's opinion, led to the congregating of so large a Sikh force there.

5. All these events and circumstances only make me the more earnestly desire the speedy return of Major-General Pollock's army to the Sutlej.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 337.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 25, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th instant, No. , wherein you state that you are using every exertion to apply the means of the Sikh Government, in men and money, to maintain the passage of the Khyber Pass, and express your opinion that it should rest with General Pollock, to discriminate between what portions of that duty should be assigned to the Sikhs, what to the Political Agent under him for negotiation, and what to the troops newly entertained or to be entertained by him, and suggest that the Major-General should be authorised to direct as many more men, such as those under Captain Thomas, as he thinks proper, to be raised.

2. I am directed by the Governor-General to refer you to the following passage in the letter, dated the 15th of March, 1842, from the Governor-General in Council to the Commander-in-chief, which letter has been communicated to you:—

"His Lordship in Council cannot sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-General Pollock, unless that General should be satisfied that he can,—without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the Pass, which, obtained only by purchase, must, under all circumstances, be precarious, and without depending upon the fidelity of the Sikh Chiefs, or upon the power of those chiefs to restrain their troops, upon neither of which can any reliance be safely placed,—feel assured that he can, by his own strength, overawe or overcome all who may dispute the Pass, and keep up at all times his communication with Peshawur and the Indus."

3. The Governor-General has never seen reason to alter the opinion thus expressed.

4. The recent insubordination amongst the Sikh troops has, in one important respect, shown the correctness of that opinion, and has increased the Governor-General's desire to see the troops under Major-General Pollock again in possession of easy and certain communication with India, an object which his Lordship can have no doubt that the Major-General will, in obedience to his instructions and to the clearest dictates of military prudence, endeavour to effect at the earliest period.

5. The Major-General is already empowered to add to the irregular force under his command.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 338.

Mr. Maddock to the Secretary to the Government of India at Fort William.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 26, 1842.

THE Governor-General deems it right to impress upon every officer employed either in the military or political service of the Government the necessity of preserving absolute secrecy in all matters of a military or political nature which may officially come to his knowledge. Such secrecy, the want of which is at all times disparaging and injurious to a government, is at the present moment essential to the success of measures upon which the safety of armies may depend.

2. The comparative unimportance of all movements of troops, and of most political transactions during a long and profound peace, may gradually have led to the habit of inconsiderately divulging the orders and intentions of the Government, but this cannot be done without the most extensive injury to the State in time of actual or apprehended war, or at a period of great political excitement; and the Governor-General must observe that officers, whose knowledge is limited to what comes before them in their official capacity, are not competent judges of the importance of the several facts thus brought to their knowledge; and, in divulging that which to them may seem little and unimportant, they may really be divulging that which, taken in conjunction with other facts not known to them, may convey very valuable intelligence to theenemy.

3. The Governor-General hopes that it will be enough thus to convey his opinion to the several higher officers of the military and political departments to secure their own absolute secrecy and their active aid in preventing the publicity which, through the means of their subordinates, may be given to matters of high public concernment.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 339.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 26, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant, informing me that the Lahore Government evinces considerable desire to receive possession of either Jellalabad, or Cabool, or both; but that, before

engaging definitively to hold Jellalabad, the Durbar is anxious to ascertain the views of the British Government for the final adjustment of the entire Affghan question.

2. The letter addressed to you by me, on the 16th instant, will have placed you in possession of the Governor-General's views upon the subject, and you are thereby instructed to endeavour to bring the Lahore Government to entertain similar views, namely,—that the future object of the policy of the two Governments should be to maintain Affghanistan in that state in which it may be unable to do anything against us, and that the visionary design should be foregone of placing it in a state in which it should possess power, and be content to use it against invaders from the West, without entertaining any designs of ambition against its neighbours in the East.

3. You have likewise been informed, by my letter of the 27th ultimo, that, if the Lahore Government, or the Jummoo Rajahs, with its permission, should be desirous of adding to its dominion the territory lying between the right bank of the Indus, the Suffeed Koh range, and the Himalaya, the British Government would, under present circumstances, not object to the carrying of that object into effect, and would facilitate its accomplishment by placing Jellalabad in the hands of the Sikhs.

4. But that place can in no case be evacuated by the British troops one hour sooner than may be deemed consistent with their safety to give it up.

5. If the Lahore Government should be disposed to entertain these views, and to employ on its own account its too numerous army for the purpose of making these acquisitions, tending so much to its renown, the formation of a British army upon the Sutlej would strongly contribute to the maintenance of tranquillity amongst the Sindhawalla chiefs.

6. But, as a true friend of the Lahore Government, the Governor-General would not advise it to engage in new designs for the acquisition of territory beyond the Indus, and, at the same time, to project conquests beyond the Himalaya. You have been already informed that the Governor-General will not engage in an armed intervention between the Sikhs and the Chinese, although his Lordship is willing to use his good offices for their reconciliation.

7. The Governor-General is prepared, therefore, to facilitate all the reasonable objects which the Lahore Government may entertain. It appears to the Governor-General that it would be most desirable that the Sikh army should not block up the Khyber Pass in the rear of Major-General Pollock, but either occupy positions in his front, or on the left bank of the Cabool river, so that it might at once be put in possession of the territory which may ultimately be annexed to the Lahore dominions.

8. To place a considerable force of Sikhs, in the present disorganized state of the Sikh army, in the rear of Major-General Pollock's position at Jellalabad, and between him and the mouth of the Pass, seems to be a measure fraught with danger, and, if it should produce no other effect, must seriously interfere with the present supply of Major-General Pollock's army.

9. That army has not the means of moving in advance, even if it were strong enough to do so, holding the passes in its rear, and securing, as it advanced, the several points which must be occupied in succession, to maintain its communication with India.

10. A British army must not depend, for the maintenance of its communications, upon the precarious discipline of Sikhs, and the yet more precarious fidelity of Afreedees. It must depend upon its own intrinsic strength; and, if that strength neither is, nor can be made, sufficient for the purpose, retirement, at the earliest period consistent with the health of the troops, however painful that retirement may be, will be found the safest, and, in the end, the most honourable course for it to pursue.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 340.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 27, 1842.

THE Governor-General has observed that in the letter of the Maha Rajah, dated the 5th May, in your letter in reply to the same, and in the reported conversations of Raja Goolaub Sing, the Sikh troops which appear to have been ordered to advance through the Khyber Pass are termed the "stipulated troops."

2. There is no stipulation between the British Government and the Lahore Government with respect to the advance of any Sikh troops, or to the service of any Sikh troops with the British army.

3. The stipulation contained in the 15th article of the tripartite treaty, for holding in readiness a body of 5,000 Mahomedans for the support of the late Shah, must of necessity have now ceased to have effect, when the Shah has been murdered, and no successor to the throne has been recognised by either Government, when therefore there is no object whatever under that treaty for which such troops thereby stipulated could be employed,

4. The inconsiderate adoption of this expression may lead the Lahore Government or its officers to the erroneous supposition that the British Government still deems the tripartite treaty, or part thereof, to be in force, whereas with respect to the provision in the 15th article of that treaty the Governor-General entertains doubts whether it has ever been observed so as to give the Lahore Government a just claim to the payment of any part of the annual sum thereby guaranteed to the Lahore Government; and, with respect to the treaty generally, the Governor-General has no doubt that one of the contracting parties, in whose behalf and in whose favour it was executed, being no longer in existence, and there being no successor to such contracting party capable of executing its provisions, the treaty is, as regards the future, altogether abrogated and null.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 341.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 29, 1842.

THE Governor-General has experienced much disappointment at not receiving from you, from time to time since your arrival at Jellalabad, detailed statements of the condition of the army under your command, showing the number of effectives present, and of sick, and your means of supply and movement; and his Lordship directs me to request that such statements may be regularly and frequently transmitted to him, together with a report of the actual position of the several parties in Upper Affghanistan.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 342.

Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Basseean, May* 21, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to transmit, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, copy of a letter addressed to Major-General Pollock, C.B., on the 18th instant.

I have, &c.,
G. CLERK.

No. 343.

Mr. Clerk to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Basseean, May* 18, 1842.

WITH reference to the instructions of Government, addressed to you on the 3d instant, I have the honor to inform you that the Sikh Government is, at present, not prepared to accept the occupation of Jellalabad.

2. It seems that the Sikh Government would be glad to accept that, or any other fortress in Affghanistan, which the British Government might determine on abandoning; but that it feels there would be much indiscretion in stopping in a prominent position in that country until a declaration, by the British Government, of its ultimate views there, should enable the Sikhs to render their measures for the security of such positions more or less extensive and circumspect, according to the nature of those views.

3. Nevertheless, should you be absolutely withdrawing from Jellalabad to India, I think the Sikhs would, without further explanation of future plans, accept Jellalabad from you; and I think it would be in accordance with the intentions of the Governor-General that you should, at such a time, offer it to them.

4. I have not opened myself any negotiation with the Sikh Durbar on this subject, on such grounds; for I do not believe that, with the negotiations pending in your front, you will withdraw; or that, if such causes did not detain you, you could now withdraw, with due regard, to considerations relating to the health of your troops, as adverted to in the fourth paragraph of the instructions in Mr. Muddock's letter of the 4th instant, to your address.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE CLERK.

No. 344.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 29, 1842.

THE Governor-General has observed that, in a letter addressed to you by Mr. Clerk on the 18th instant, that gentleman remarks that "he does not believe that, with the negotiations pending in your front, you will withdraw."

2. As Mr. Clerk was, on the 18th instant, in possession of the orders addressed to you by the Commander-in-Chief on the 29th ultimo, the Governor-General infers that in so expressing his "belief that you would not withdraw with the negotiations pending in your front," he had in view the paragraphs in those orders which relate to negotiations for the release of the prisoners, which paragraphs are in these words:—

"The only circumstances which can authorise delay in obeying this order, are:—1st. That you may have brought a negotiation for the release of the prisoners lately confined at Buddeabad, to such a point that you might risk its happy accomplishment by withdrawing." Further on:—

"I do not recommend delay in the first case, unless the prisoners are actually on the way to your camp, as no faith can be placed in Affghan promises or oaths." Further on again:—

P. 6. "I allude entirely to the officers and ladies now, or lately, at Buddeabad, or its vicinity; those at Cabool cannot, I think, be saved by any treaty or agreement made under existing circumstances at Jellalabad."

3. All these instructions obviously relate to negotiations almost brought to accomplishment at the time of your receiving the Commander-in-Chief's letter, not to negotiations which might then be pending, and of dubious event, still less to any which might be subsequently instituted.

4. The Governor-General is only at present acquainted with certain propositions having been made by Mahomed Akbar Khan (the Affghan, of all others, in whose promises and oaths no faith can be placed), to which you replied, through Major Pottinger, by the postscript to another letter from you to Major Pottinger, conveying a message to the same Mahomed Akbar Khan.

5. Nothing has come to his Lordship's knowledge which could lead to the conclusion that any negotiations with Mahomed Akbar Khan ever had been in the state which alone could have justified delay in withdrawing, in pursuance of the extracts I have cited from the Commander-in-Chief's instructions to you, of the 29th ultimo.

6. The Governor-General does not suppose that you can have misunderstood those instructions; but, if the observation in Mr. Clerk's letter of the 18th instant had been suffered to pass in silence, that silence might have appeared to be acquiescence in a wrong interpretation, and you might possibly have been so misled into adopting it.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 345.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Allahabad, May* 29, 1842.

THE Governor-General is desirous that no time should be lost in acquainting the Maha Rajah with the intention of assembling an army of reserve upon, or near, the Sutlej, at the end of the cold season, as his Lordship is of opinion that it would be desirable at once to announce that intention publicly.

I have, &c.

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 346.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 19, 184 2

I HAVE this day received a copy of your dispatch (No. 26, of 1842), dated 27th ultimo, to Mr. Clerk, in which it is proposed that Jellalabad may be made over to the Sikhs. Such a measure would greatly facilitate the withdrawal of our troops from Affghanistan, as the Sikhs, for their own interest, would secure the Khyber Pass.

In any such arrangement it appears to me that the retrograde movement of our troops should be delayed till a more favorable season. At the present time, there is great scarcity of water in the Pass, and the troops would suffer much in consequence; and, moreover, the negotiations for the release of the prisoners would be materially affected by retracing our steps now.

I am averse to having the Sikhs in my neighbourhood, on account of forage and supplies, but have suggested their advancing to the vicinity of Pesh Bolak or to Ali Lughman. I have preferred the former place, because the Malliks of Kote

refuse to pay the revenue, and the proximity of any force to Kote is likely to produce the desired effect, without the necessity of my moving the British troops at this season more than is absolutely necessary. I shall be glad if any arrangement which may be made, touching the delivery of the fort of Jellalabad to the Sikhs, be kept secret, as its being known would operate against the release of the prisoners, and the fort should not be made over until our troops actually retire.

I have no intention of sending troops to Bazaar and Chora at present. They must necessarily go without tents; and although two days only are mentioned, they might be detained longer; and at this season, unless absolutely necessary, I think it would be an injudicious exposure of men to obtain a doubtful object.

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter from Captain Mackeson to my address, and copy of a letter from Captain Lawrence to the address of Mr. Clerk.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 347.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 20, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letteri dated the th instant, on the subject of my withdrawing from Jellalabad to Peshawur; the dispatch of the 19th ultimo I have not yet received.

I have already in my letter, dated the 13th instant, entered on the subject, and must receive a reply before I shall be able to move.

I have endeavoured to procure camels here, and have written to Peshawur; but I fear I cannot expect more than 400, including those coming from Ferozepore; and unless more be sent from the provinces, I don't know where to look for them; I have been able to purchase only a few here, and am therefore unable to move the whole force.

In order to meet the wishes of Government by retiring, the first object would be to secure the Khyber Pass with our own troops, leaving one regiment at Ali Musjid, and two at Lundi Khana, one of the latter being Europeans. I should also be obliged to send several hundred camels laden to Peshawur, with superfluous stores, which must return to take baggage, &c., of the force; but, even then, I should not be able to move the remainder. I shall therefore be glad if any letter from Government may authorise my remaining till October or November, in which case General Nott should also be directed to remain.

Although I do not think the troops suffer more in marching in hot weather than in a standing camp, yet I should be glad to spare them a march to Peshawur, at this season, certainly not more healthy than this place, for there are difficulties now which we should not experience in October or November. At present there is a great scarcity of water in the pass; from Lundi Khana to Ali Musjid there is hardly a drop. At the top of Lundi Khana there are two wells; but they could not supply water for a third of this force, and that only for a short time. The water below, on this side, is scantily supplied, and I fear there would hardly be sufficient for the troops on arriving there, and they would require to take on a large quantity. I am glad to say that supplies come in plentifully, and I have now upwards of forty days' attah and rice on full rations; on this score, therefore, I have no fear; and if, in the mean time, exertions are made to send me camels, elephants, mules, or yaboos, I will move back whenever a good opportunity offers.

With regard to the Pass, the Sikhs being desirous of coming to this side of it, will, I doubt not, hold it on their own account; and if Jellalabad be made over to them, it will greatly facilitate our return to Peshawur.

I have been with the Commissariat officer for some hours, endeavouring to make some arrangement by which I could move, but without success.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 348.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 20, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 4th instant, authorising me to purchase camels; a few have been purchased, and I hope the natives will be induced to bring them in greater numbers when they find a ready sale.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 349.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 20, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 30th of April, 1842, on the subject of the dragoon regiment. A number of grass-cutters have been engaged; and I have written to Peshawur for men, if procurable; in the mean time, the horses are daily improving on bhoosa mixed with grass. I hope soon to see them in as good condition as any cavalry horses here.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 350.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 1, 1842.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th ultimo, and to express the extreme regret of the Governor-General that your army should be so deficient in carriage as you represent, and thus unable to move.

2. The retirement of your army immediately after the victory gained by Sir Robert Sale, the forcing of the Khyber Pass, and the relief of Jellalabad, would have had the appearance of a military operation successfully accomplished, and even triumphantly achieved.

3. Its retirement, after six months of inaction, before a following army of Affghans, will have an appearance of a different and less advantageous character.

4. It would be desirable, undoubtedly, that before finally quitting Affghanistan, you should have an opportunity of striking a blow at the enemy; and since circumstances seem to compel you to remain there till October, the Governor-General earnestly hopes that you may be enabled to draw the enemy into a position in which you may strike such a blow effectually. You have already full powers to do everything you may deem necessary for the comfort of your troops, and for their efficiency.

5. The officers, termed Political Agents, well acquainted with the country, and with the people, are at your disposal, for the purpose of aiding you in the equipment of your army.

6. The Governor-General will request the Commander-in-Chief to select an officer who may be solely responsible for the procuring for your army of the means of movement, and bring into efficient co-operation all the several persons now employed for that purpose. This officer will be directed to report weekly to the Governor-General, and the Commander-in-Chief, and to you.

7. It will be for your consideration whether your large army, one-half of

which would beat, in open field, everything that could be brought against it in Affghanistan, should remain entirely inactive during the period which must now apparently elapse before it can finally retire. Although you may not have, or soon be able to procure, the means of moving your whole army, you may possibly be able to move a part of it rapidly against some portion of the enemy's force incautiously exposed, and of giving it a severe blow.

8. You may possibly be able to throw a portion of your force over the Cabool river, for the purpose of a chuppow, and of bringing in prisoners of importance, whom you may use in exchange. You may make your strength severely felt by sallies of this description, should they be practicable, and create a strong desire, on the part of the enemy, to induce you to leave the country.

9. You will recollect, in all you may undertake, that you must keep your communications in your own power, and not depend upon Sikhs or Afreedees.

10. The Sikhs you will endeavour to induce to occupy the left bank of the Cabool river, so that the road to your rear may be always unencumbered and free.

11. You have properly no political duties; you are to be governed by military considerations alone, to make the force you have at your disposal felt by the enemy, whenever you can, and withdraw it at the earliest period, consistently with its health and efficiency, into positions wherein you may have easy and certain communication with India. The execution of these military objects will, of itself, accomplish all the political objects which the Government now has in Affghanistan.

12. It has already been intimated to General Nott that it is expected that considerations, connected with the season and the health of his troops, will not enable him to withdraw below the passes till October.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 351.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 1, 1842.

I AM directed to inform you that, in consequence of the very defective state of the means of movement possessed by Major-General Pollock, it appears to be out of his power to retire from Jellalabad until October, when his retirement will certainly take place.

2. You will take care that the garrisons of Kelat-i-Ghilzie and Ghiriskh shall be drawn away in such time as to enable you to move your army towards Sukkur as soon as the season will permit.

3. Every effort will be made by Major Outram to procure for you sufficient means of movement.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 352.

Mr. Maddock to Major Outram.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 1, 1842.

IN communicating to you a copy of a letter this day addressed by me to Major-General Nott, I am directed to remind you that, it being necessary at the same time to provide the means of movement for Major-General Pollock's army, as well as Major-General Nott's, and likewise probably to move a large body of troops to a camp on, or near, the Sutlej, it is desirable that the several officers charged with the procuring of camels and other animals for these several purposes should confine themselves to particular portions of country, and not bid against each other.

2. You will, therefore, on your part, or on that of your subordinate officers, not make any purchases of animals, or engage any on hire, in the country to the astward of Mitton Kote, and of the state of Jessulmere.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 353.

The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

General, *Allahabad, June* 1, 1842.

IN communicating to your Excellency copies of the several letters addressed by my direction this day to Major-General Pollock, Major-General Nott, and Major Outram, I have to suggest to you the expediency of intrusting to some one officer the sole duty, and thus imposing upon him the sole responsibility, of making such purchases and hirings of camels, and other animals, as may be required for the effectual equipment of General Pollock's force, of placing all the officers now employed for such purposes, whether political or military, in communication with, and (for such purposes) in subordination to, such chief officer, and of directing such chief officer to furnish to your Excellency, to me, and to Major-General Pollock, weekly returns of his proceedings, showing the number of each description of animals with Major-General Pollock, and on the route to join him; the probable period of arrival; the probable position at the date of the return; the number and description of persons accompanying the several convoys of animals, and under what terms engaged; and the cost of the animals, if purchased,—their hire, if hired,—should be annexed.

The officer selected by your Excellency should take care not to draw any supplies of animals from the country to the west of Mittun Kote and to the west of the States of Bhawulpore, Bickanere, and Jeypore, which has been allotted to Major Outram, for the use of the army of Major-General Nott.

The extreme deficiency of animals which appears to exist with the army under Major-General Pollock, and the necessity of providing at once for his wants, and for those of Major-General Nott, may render it difficult and expensive, to a great degree, to bring together the proposed army of reserve. Certainly, that army would only begin to move at the time when all the animals required for the armies beyond the Indus must be already with them, and it might draw its animals from other portions of territory: still, I apprehend, there would be very considerable difficulty in equipping it.

As the appointment of an officer with such high responsibility, and such important duties, is necessarily unusual, I am disposed to think that it would be perfectly justifiable to depart from usual rules in the selection of him; and, if your Excellency should be of opinion that Major-General Battine, who commands at Ferozepore, and of whom I have heard a high character, would be most competent to perform the duty, or if your Excellency would intrust it to the Quarter-Master-General, I shall be prepared to do anything that may be required for the purpose of affording to him all the requisite authority.

The cause of the whole mischief, is the having hired camels to Jellalabad, only with the condition that, immediately on arriving there, they should be sent back to Peshawur; so that in no case could they have been used for an advance, and for retirement only, in the event of its being immediate.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 354.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 1, 1842.

I AM directed by the Governor-General to communicate to you a copy of a letter addressed by his Lordship, this day, to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. You will, of course, give, as indeed you have done, every aid in the procuring of the necessary equipment in animals for Major-General Pollock's army, and communicate confidentially, and zealously co-operate with any officer whom, at the request of the Governor-General, his Excellency may charge with the duty of superintending in chief the equipment of the army at Jellalabad.

3. The Governor-General entertains much doubt, whether it will be possible to furnish, at the same time, with the means of movement, two armies in the field, and the proposed army of reserve; but his Lordship would forego with much regret the intention of bringing together the army of reserve at the place, and of the force, already indicated to you, as he attaches great importance to it.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 355.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 4, 1842.

THE obtaining of a sufficient supply of animals of burthen and draught for the use of Major-General Pollock's army is deemed by the Governor-General to be, at the present moment, the matter of most importance, inasmuch as that army, without such means of movement, is not only in a state of necessary inactivity, but in one of danger.

2. The Governor-General is satisfied that your most zealous exertions will be directed, in communication with the officer who may be specially made responsible for the management of this branch of the service, to the accomplishment of this essential object; and the Governor-General invites you to acquaint him forthwith with your views upon the subject, and with such calculation as you may be enabled to make of the means of movement which, before the 1st of October, may be placed at Major-General Pollock's disposal.

3. The number of camels, whereby the five brigades were accompanied, appears to have been about 4,000, whereof 1,600 only were Government property; and all the hired camels, it is to be feared, have been withdrawn, while considerable losses have taken place amongst the camels which were Government property. The brigade under Major-General Sale likewise requires the means of movement, as it is apprehended that the Major-General was under the necessity of destroying the few camels he had some days previous to his victory of the 7th of April. Captain Mackeson appears to have been eminently unsuccessful in procuring camels at Peshawur.

4. Another matter of great importance, with a view to the retirement of the army of Major-General Pollock across the Punjaub, is the preparation of boats in sufficient number, and of ample size, for the passage of the several rivers. The Governor-General desires that there should, if possible, be procured ample means of passing all the rivers by more than one bridge.

5. The Major-General commanding in Affghanistan will, in due time, communicate to you at what points he may be desirous of having such bridges prepared, as he may see fit to move his army by more than one route.

6. The provisioning of the army on its march across the Punjaub is also a subject for previous preparation. If provisions can be collected at various points upon the route, the means of transport may be proportionately diminished; but

the army should, at all times carry with it, even under the most favourable circumstances, provisions for fourteen days, so that it may be at all times independent, and capable of acting as a military body.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 356.

Mr. Maddock to Major Outram.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 4, 1842.

I AM directed by the Governor-General to request that you will report regularly and frequently respecting the camels and baggage-cattle with the troops, above and below the Pass, and upon the steps in course of being taken for adding to the means of carriage.

2. His Lordship desires that, as soon as a sufficient number of cattle shall have been provided for the wants of Major-General Nott's force, all further supplies of carriage and baggage-cattle should be directed to the north-western frontier, where there will exist still greater want of means for the movement of troops than you are likely to have to contend with.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 357.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 23, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 6th instant, intimating that the instructions sent to me by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief had met the entire approbation of the Governor-General, but that one point remained to be decided, viz., the delivery of the fort of Jellalabad to the Sikhs. I conclude that I shall hear from Mr. Clerk very shortly on the subject, and will act accordingly.

I have written to Peshawur, to ascertain what assistance can be given in Puckauls for the supply of water, the want of which appears to me to be the greatest difficulty I have to contend against in returning. I have also written to Captain Mackeson, to report on the quantity of water at the stream below Lundi Khana. If that stream is found to afford a larger quantity than I have been given to understand it does, I hope to be able to supply the Europeans and Mussulmans of the force from Mussucks and Puckauls; and there are a number of large brass pots, which were procured for the Hindoos on the day we entered the pass. It is impossible to say what may be necessary in returning through the Khyber; but every precaution shall be taken whenever such an event takes place.

I have in a former letter stated that I do not think the troops suffer when marching in hot weather, more than they do when halting under canvas. I shall endeavour to move as much as possible during the night, to prevent exposure to the sun. I am still without the means of moving. I require many hundred camels.

There are 350 which have probably reached Peshawur, and about the same number are following from Ferozepore; but many more are required.

We arrived here, as you know, on the 16th ultimo, and, up to this date, I have lost only one European of the artillery by disease, and that not attributable to the climate; of the other European regiments (dragoons and infantry) not one man has died of disease. Considering the number of Europeans with the force, the climate may, up to this date, be considered, perhaps, superior to that of the

provinces; but I fear the four next months would not prove so favourable. The prevailing sickness here is diarrhœa and dysentery, which I attribute partly to the water, and partly to too great indulgence in the fruit, which is just beginning to get ripe: there are also some cases of fever from exposure.

Supplies continue to come in abundantly, and I am happy to say that the horses of the dragoons are daily improving.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 358.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 6, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 23rd ultimo.

2. In that letter you acknowledge the receipt of my letter, of the 6th ultimo, in terms which induce the Governor-General to think it necessary to guard against the possibility, however improbable, of your having on one point misunderstood the instruction therein conveyed to you.

3. You say, "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 6th instant, intimating that the instructions sent to me by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief had met the entire approbation of the Governor-General, but that one point remained to be decided, viz., the delivery of the fort of Jellalabad to the Sikhs. I conclude that I shall hear from Mr. Clerk very shortly on the subject, and will act accordingly."

4. The words in my letter of the 6th, to which you refer, were these:— "There is one point upon which I am directed to desire you to attend to the instructions of Mr. Clerk. If that gentleman, the Governor-General's Agent at the Court of Lahore, should, upon quitting Jellalabad, instruct you to deliver up that place to the Sikhs, you will do so, &c."

The Governor-General thinks it is scarcely possible that, from these words, you can have inferred that you were to delay your movement from Jellalabad, until it had been decided whether it should be given up to the Sikhs or not; nevertheless, the expressions in your letter of the 23rd ultimo, which I have cited, lead his Lordship, in caution perhaps extreme, to direct me to inform you that you are not to wait for any instructions from Mr. Clerk upon the subject of giving up Jellalabad to the Sikhs, but only to obey those instructions, if you should receive them before you leave that place.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK

No. 359.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 6, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Governor-General has, this day, published a general order for the assembling of an army of reserve in the Sirhind division.

2. The army will consist of twelve regiments of Infantry, of which four will be European, of five regiments of Regular Cavalry, of which one will be European, and of two regiments of Irregular Cavalry. There will be attached to the army four batteries of Horse Artillery, and three batteries of Foot Artillery.

3. I am likewise directed to inform you that the Governor-General will at an early period, give orders for the formation of a moveable camp in Bundlecund, and of another moveable camp in the vicinity of the Nerbudda and Taptee.

4. It may be expedient, likewise, to form a similar camp in the district of Tirhoot; but the Govenor-General entertains no serious apprehensions of any hostile movement on the side of Nepal, and relies upon the effect which the general display of armed preparation will have upon the Durbar of Katmandhoo, to preserve tranquillity in that quarter.

5. The large reinforcements of British troops, which will begin to arrive before the end of the rains, will enable the Governor-General to give the requisite strength to any corps it may become necessary to assemble on the frontiers of Nepal.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 360.

Mr. Maddock to Major Outram.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 7, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated Sukkur the 27th of May, 1842.

I am directed by the Governor-General to inform you that his Lordship highly appreciates the public zeal you have manifested in the performance of your duty, at much personal risk, by proceeding at this season, to Quetta, where your exertions are especially required in aid of Major-General Nott's army.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 361.

Major-General Pollock to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 24, 1842.

SINCE the receipt of your orders, I have been endeavouring to procure carriage-cattle, for the purpose of withdrawing the troops; but I am sorry to say I am entirely dependent on Peshawur, or the provinces: 350 camels will, I believe, have arrived at Peshawur from Ferozepore, and 350 are, I believe, on their way; but still I shall require many. Captain Lawrence is endeavouring to procure even bullocks; but there seems to be great difficulty; and, at present, I must wait the result of Mr. Clerk's communication to the Sikh Government at Lahore, about Jellalabad.

I heard yesterday evening that an officer on your staff had written to an officer here that we were ordered back. Sir Robert Sale has endeavoured to counteract the bad effect such a report might create. A few days ago I was on the point of ordering a brigade to occupy the Pass, and then requested of Sir Robert Sale, and others, to whom I was obliged to communicate the true state of the case, to give out that we required treasure from Peshawur, and were sending in superfluous baggage. But the letter which has been received, and coming from the quarter it does, has evidently made an impression; and I only hope it may not extend to the native population, which would, indeed, be ruinous. In a late letter to Government, you will have seen how anxious I was that any proposed movement towards Peshawur should be communicated to no one from whom it could be withheld. The moment such a thing is known, it is probable supplies will cease to come in; we should be in difficulty about forage; all who are now friendly would be ready to oppose us; and, if I had not time to secure the Pass, the consequences might be serious indeed. I fear this will be much too late to prevent future communications of the kind; but I consider it my duty to point out how dangerous they are, and how much our difficulties might be increased by their being known to the natives of the country, especially those connected with the Khyber Pass. I have just heard that bets were made at messes as to the probable date of our moving, and

this before native servants, who will, I fear, make the report current in the bazaar. I have taken steps to prevent any great mischief resulting, by ordering the Deputy-Quarter-Master-General, a few miles in advance, to mark out a new encamping ground; and I shall have such inquiries made among the natives about bringing stores (supplies) there, that will make them believe I shall move forward. I am sorry to have had occasion to write on such a subject to you, but I have no alternative.

I have to thank you for your congratulatory letter on my reaching Jellalabad. It is a great pity I had not the means of returning, as Government is so anxious on the subject. I have now ordered rafts to be made, by which I can float down a number of stores, which would otherwise require land carriage.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 362.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 25, 1842.

WITH reference to my letter of the 23rd instant, relating to the practicability of retiring through the Khyber at this season, I have now the honor to forward letter from Captain Mackeson, whom I had requested to offer any observations on the difficulty or otherwise of now retiring through the Pass. His letter seems to bear me out fully in the opinion I had expressed that we should not withdraw till a more favourable season.

The necessity of crowning the heights the whole way cannot be questioned, for plunder will at all times attract numbers; and, from my own experience, I know how trying it was to the troops (even in the beginning of April) on the heights, although every precaution was taken to supply them with water. Now the difficulty would be much greater, and I could not expect to supply water during the whole time we should be making each march, and without it the men could not ascend steep and precipitous mountains. I therefore strongly urge the necessity of remaining in this vicinity till the season becomes more favourable. With regard to our situation here, or a march or two in advance, we need have no fear of want in provisions. Supplies come in quicker than we can store them; grain is becoming cheaper; and when the crops are collected, the price will fall still lower, and the supply will be even more abundant; in the mean time, carriage-cattle can be collected, and I hope ere long I may be able to obtain the prisoners. The whole country around is perfectly quiet, and as long as we remain in advance, in force, the passage of the Khyber may be considered quite safe. I propose (if Government will sanction the measure) having the old Ali Musjid garrison increased to 1,000 men; and the newly raised regiment, under Captain Thomas, I propose stationing at Lundi Khana. One regiment, and a wing of another, with Captain Ferris's Jezzailchees, five mountain-train guns, and 200 irregular horse, are stationed at Dhaka. With regard to the climate, it is hot, but I do not think it more so than in the provinces, and I consider it far superior to Peshawur, and I can at any time improve it by moving forward; but I must confess, I cannot but look upon a retrograde movement, at present, as pregnant with great distress to the whole force, and very probably loss of life.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

363

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, May* 21, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward herewith, for the information of the Governor-General of India, copies of a P.S. from General Nott, and a letter from Major Rawlinson, both dated the 6th instant.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 364

Postscript of a Letter from Major-General Nott to Major-General Pollock.

Candahar, May 6, 1842.

ENGLAND has now, with the aid of my brigade, crossed the Pass. He brings with him two 12-pounder howitzers; but for these, I should not have a single howitzer at command. Mortars I have none. I expect the troops here on the 10th. The Ghazees still keep head within a few miles of us—not in great strength; the nucleus however exists. I have directed all camels within reach to be procured on any terms; want of money alone prevented me doing this earlier. The force I shall take from this must depend on the available carriage. I trust it may amount to 5,000 men. Rely on my making every effort to communicate with you; but, from past experience, I must regard this as extremely doubtful, and that we must not depend on mutual intelligence, enabling us to make combined movements. No opportunity shall be lost; but, if all attempts at correspondence fail, I will still hope that, as we have one object at heart, the similarity of our operations may, in some measure, supply the want of concerted plan.

I have, &c.

W. NOTT.

No. 365.

Captain French to Major Outram.

Sebee, May 10, 1842.

IN reply to the inquiries made by you relating to the probable number of camels that could be procured by October next, I have the honor to state I am informed by the officer in charge of the Commissariat at Dadur, that 1,000 could be purchased by the named month, and that, provided twenty days' previous notice were given him, he could hire about 2,000 more.

The number of Government camels now here, and at Dadur, is 382, but they are chiefly sick ones.

Should camels, to any great amount, be essentially requisite, the sooner authority for purchasing them is given, the better. I think I could purchase many in the Murree hills.

I have, &c.,

P. FRENCH.

NOTIFICATION.

No. 366.

Allahabad, June 11, 1842.

THE Right Honourable the Governor-General of India is pleased to direct the publication of the annexed copies of despatches from Major-General Nott, commanding the British force at Candahar.

By order of the Governor-General,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 367.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, March* 29, 1842.

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of my letter to your address, under date the 12th instant, I have now the honour of forwarding to you Major Lane's report of an attack made on one of the city gates of Candahar, which was most gallantly repulsed by the Bengal Sepoys, small details from Her Majesty's 40th regiment, and from the 4th company 2nd battalion of artillery.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 368.

Major C. R. W. Lane to Captain Scott.

Sir, *Candahar, March* 12, 1842.

FOR the information of Major-General Nott, commanding, I have the honour to report the following particulars of an attack made upon Candahar, on the night of the 10th instant.

During the forenoon of the above date, large bodies of the enemy, horse and foot, were observed assembling from all quarters, taking up a position near old Candahar and the adjoining villages; and in the course of the day their numbers rapidly increased, parties from the main body moving round, and establishing themselves in front of the Shikarpore gate. As their object was evidently to attack the garrison, the Political Agent directed the inhabitants to shut their shops, and remain within their houses, and precautions were taken to secure the gates by piling bags of grain inside.

About eight o'clock, P.M., a desperate attack was made upon the Herat gate; and, owing to the darkness of the night, some combustibles were placed near it and ignited unperceived, and in a few minutes the gate was in flames. I immediately ordered a party of 100 rank and file from the 2nd regiment, and a company from the Shah's 1st Infantry, to support the guard at the gate; and two guns were also placed in position commanding the entrance.

Dense masses of the enemy had now collected at this point, keeping up an incessant and heavy fire, which was returned with great effect from the ramparts, but so reckless and daring were the assailants that notwithstanding the fearful havoc among them, eight or ten men actually forced their way, by tearing down the burning fragments of the gate, and scrambling over the bags of grain; these were instantly shot, and their fate, together with the galling fire from the walls, dismayed the attacking party, who retired about midnight, after four hours' resolute fighting.

Another attack took place at the Shikarpore gate about nine P.M., and a similar attempt was made to fire it, which, however, failed, and the assailants were driven back. A small party also approached the Cabool gate; but, the garrison being everywhere on the alert, the enemy was compelled to retire about one o'clock A.M. of the 11th; and when the day broke, not a soul was visible.

The guards over the several gates were so completely sheltered, that not a single casualty occurred, whilst the well-directed and destructive fire which was maintained for nearly four hours must have done great execution. Upwards of fifty dead bodies were found in and near the Herat gate, and from the determined assault of the enemy who came close up to the walls, their loss must have been immense: report estimates it at 1,000 killed and wounded; and I am informed by Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, that Prince Suftur Jung, Meerza Ahmed, and other Sirdars, were present, encouraging the assailants.

A considerable quantity of grain was unavoidably destroyed at the Herat gate, but, as it presented a strong barrier, I trust the sacrifice will be considered unim-

portant. This gate has been built up, and the others have been temporarily barricaded with grain bags.

Before concluding my report, I would beg to acknowledge the valuable assistance rendered me on this occasion by Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, and Captain Ripley, Fort Adjutant. The exertions of every officer and soldier in garrison were unremitting, and it affords me infinite pleasure to bear testimony to the admirable conduct of all parties during the attack.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES R. W. LANE.

No. 369.

Major-General W. Nott, to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, March* 28, 1842.

HAVING deemed it desirable to detach a brigade under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer, for the double purpose of foraging, and giving protection to the numerous villages along the left bank of the Urghundab river against the marauding system adopted by the rebel army, commanded by Prince Suftur Jung and other Affghan chiefs, I have now the honour to forward to you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, a report from that officer of an attack made on his detachment, and of the complete defeat of the enemy. I have ascertained that their loss was great, and that several of their chiefs were killed and wounded, while our loss was comparatively trifling.

On my arrival on the field, I was pleased with the judicious arrangements made by Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer; and the cool and determined manner in which he opposed the enemy and protected his convoy did credit to our arms; and I beg leave to bring him under the favourable notice of Government.

The enemy were finally driven across the Urghundab, in the greatest confusion, and with very considerable loss. The Artillery and Infantry distinguished themselves,

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 370.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. P. Wymer to Captain Scott,

Sir, *Candahar Camp, Baba Wullee, March* 27, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to report for the information of Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar, that, in obedience to his instructions, I marched from that place with theforce noted in the margin,* on the morning of the 25th instant, with the intention of foraging for the cavalry and cattle at the village of Seikhchulah; but, on receiving a report from Captain Dallas, that the country thereabouts had recently been foraged over, and the water turned off by the enemy, he suggested the advantage to be derived by a move upon Baba Wullee, which was adopted. On reaching that place, I sighted the rebel camp on the opposite side of the Urghundab, distant about four miles, and large bodies of cavalry grazing their horses between it and the river. I continued my march to the spot selected for my encampment, and, shortly after reaching it, at half-past ten, or eleven, a large body of the enemy's cavalry was observed forming and occupying the pass in my rear; on which I reinforced the rear-guard with two guns and a wing of the 38th Native Infantry, placing the convoy under the hills in the rear, and protecting its front and flanks with the force at my disposal, which

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* One troop Shah's H. Artillery; half a troop Haldane's Horse; half a troop Leeson's Horse; 16th regt Bengal N. I.; 38th regt. ditto; 2nd Shah's regt.

had hardly been effected, when, finding the force above mentioned fast increasing, I deemed it highly necessary to move back for their dispersion, taking with me two horse-artillery guns, under Lieutenant Turner, the 38th Regiment, and a party of Skinner's Horse, under Lieutenant Travers, detaching two companies 38th Regiment, to drive the enemy from the tops of some low hills they had crowned with horsemen on my left, which was speedily done, and the well-directed fire from Lieutenant Turner's guns soon drove in the body of the enemy collected on the pass, commanded, I am told, by Salloo Khan and Taj Mahomed, who moved round to join the party then threatening the right flank of the convoy. On this, I retraced my steps, and rejoined the convoy, which had been left under Lieutenant-Colonel McLaren's charge, during my absence, and who had dislodged a third body of the enemy from the inclosed gardens and villages in his front, with a part of the 16th Regiment. On my reaching the convoy, I directed Captain Macan, commanding the Shah's 2d Regiment, to move his corps, supported by two guns, and the half of Leeson's Horse, under Ensign Chamberlain, against the party on the right flank, which movement had been partly executed, when the force under the Major-General's personal command arrived to my support, at the time when the party of cavalry, under Ensign Chamberlain, received a partial check from an overpowering body of the enemy, and that officer was severely wounded, and Lieutenant Travers slightly, who acted in concert with him.

Inclosed I have the honor to forward a return of the killed and wounded on the occasion, and to express my entire approbation of the conduct of all officers and men engaged in the action.

I trust I may be permitted to bring to the Major-General's notice the admirable practice of the artillery, under Lieutenant Turner's guidance, every shot from which told with beautiful effect upon the dense masses of the enemy.

To Lieutenant Waterfield, Adjutant 38th Regiment, who acted as my personal staff on the occasion, I am much indebted for the very able manner in which he conducted the various duties assigned him.

I have, &c.

G. P. WYMER.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer, in the engagement with the Enemy, near Baba Wullee, on the 25th instant.

Camp, Baba Wullee, March 27, 1842.

Horse Artillery S.S.F.—1 syce wounded.

16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.—2 havildars, 3 privates, wounded.

38th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.—1 jemadar, 12 privates, wounded.

Shah's 2d Regiment of Infantry.—1 naick, 3 privates, wounded.

Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry.—1 private, 1 horse, killed; 1 ensign, 1 naick, 6 privates, 7 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Detachment 1st Irregular Bengal Cavalry.—2 privates, 4 horses, killed; 1 lieutenant, 2 naicks, 5 privates, 5 horses, wounded.

Total.—3 privates, 5 horses, killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 1 jemadar, 2 havildars, 4 naicks, 29 privates, 1 syce, 12 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Grand Total of killed, wounded, and missing.—42 officers and men; 18 horses.

Names of Officers wounded.

Doing duty with Detachment 1st Irregular Bengal Cavalry.—Lieutenant Travers, 2d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, slightly.

Doing duty with Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry.—Ensign N. B. Chamberlain, 16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, severely.

G. P. WYMER, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Detachment.*

Examined.

J. WATERFIELD, *Lieutenant, Acting Detachment Staff.*

No. 371.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, May* 17, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th ultimo, which reached me last evening, conveying to me the orders of the Governor-General of India, for the withdrawal of the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie and Candahar, and for the posting of the troops in the valley of Shawl, with the ultimate view of marching them upon Sukkur.

These measures shall be carried into effect, and the directions of his Lordship accomplished in the best manner circumstances will admit of. I shall experience a great want of carriage; the force, at present, is large; the camp-followers numerous; stores, guns, &c., very considerable; and, when it is known that the British troops are about to retire from Affghanistan, which the evacuation of Kelat-i-Ghilzie will render obvious, many difficulties will arise: from that moment we must not expect the least aid from the natives in the country, in providing supplies or carriage, or rendering assistance in any way whatever; on the contrary, we must expect to encounter every impediment, and every annoyance; those who are now our friends, and they are many, must, in all appearance at least, oppose us in everything to prevent their being compromised in the eyes of their countrymen. It must be for me to endeavour to overcome these and many other difficulties, and to do all in my power to uphold the honour of our country.

I will not conceal from you that I have, and still may experience much inconvenience, in consequence of the measures directed in your communications being made public; the subject of your letter of the 15th March was speedily known, even to the Affghan chiefs, although I have not, up to this moment, made known its contents to my old and confidential staff; and your communication, now under reply, may possibly become equally public, and still more seriously injurious. I have not received the original, but a copy, signed, "Outram, Political Agent."

The climate of Quetta is so very unhealthy in July, August, and September, that I could have wished to have avoided exposing the troops to its dreadful effects during these months; but, on the withdrawal of the garrison from the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, the period of my continuance at Candahar must depend upon the feelings perceptible in the country towards the British force.

I am of opinion that Prince Timoor is sincerely attached to the British Government, but I believe he has no influence in this country, and that he will be desirous of accompanying the English troops. I shall be most anxious to receive the orders of the Governor-General of India regarding him.

I shall, of course, regularly communicate to you my proceedings in carrying into effect the orders now received.

Under the circumstances noted in your letter, it is almost useless for me to acquaint you that I have in a great measure put down rebellion, and tranquillised the districts of Candahar; the people are cultivating their lands, and living in peace, with the exception of 500 or 600 men under Prince Sufter Jung.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 372.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, May* 21, 1842.

WITH reference to your letter to my address, under date Benares, the 19th of April, 1842, I have now the honour to acquaint you that I have ordered the small fort of Killa Abdoollah, situated at the southern foot of the Kojuck Pass, to be reoccupied by British troops (Sepoys), for the purpose of facilitating the movement directed in your letter above alluded to, and I have made arrangements for depositing there grain and other supplies, which will be necessary for the retiring troops.

I have directed all public cattle now at Quetta to be immediately sent, under

a proper escort, to Killa Abdoollah, where I shall have a brigade from this to receive charge of them, and to bring them on to Candahar. It would be very desirable for the troops to remain at Candahar until the end of September, to preserve them from the ill effects of the Quetta climate. But the period of my continuance here must depend upon the state of the country, after the withdrawal of the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and the state of British affairs at Jellalabad; for although I have in a great measure succeeded in tranquillising the Candahar nistricts, yet the possible event of the withdrawal of the troops from Jellalabad, add the fact of the retirement of the Kelat-i-Ghilzie garrison, would probably induce those villagers who have retired to peace and to the cultivation of their lands to re-assemble in arms, and once more place themselves under the guidance of those chiefs who are now fugitives, owing to the success of our arms, and the subsequent measures adopted to conciliate the people whom they and the Moollahs had seduced into rebellion.

I shall therefore not lose a moment in making all necessary arrangements for carrying into effect the orders I have received, without turning to the right or to the left, by the idle propositions and wild speculations daily and hourly heaped upon me from all parts of Affghanistan and Sinde, by persons who are, or fancy themselves to be, representatives of Government west of the Indus. I know that it is my duty, and their duty, implicitly and zealously to carry into effect every order received, without inquiring into the reasons for the measures adopted, whatever our own opinions or wishes may be, and without troubling Government with unnecessary references.

After due consideration, I am come to the conclusion that his Royal Highness Prince Timoor has no party, no influence, and that he cannot remain in this country with safety to his person on the retirement of our troops. I, therefore, beg for instructions to guide me in my conduct towards him.

There are also many individuals in important situations here, who have shown attachment to us, and who have committed themselves by serving the British Government. I believe that some of these will petition for permission to accompany the force under my command, at least as far as Shikarpore. Am I to afford protection to these people, or how am I to act towards them? I will direct Major Rawlinson to draw up a memorandum regarding these persons, and, should I then deem it of sufficient consequence, will forward it for the information of Government. I have permitted the Chief Saloo Khan of Pishen, who had joined the rebels, to return to the head of his tribe; and he has promised to exert himself to keep open the communication between Candahar and Quetta, and to forward our dawks.

I have, &c.,
W. NOTT.

No. 373.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, May* 21, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that on the 19th instant I detached the following force to Kelat-i-Ghilzie, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer, of the 38th Regiment Native Infantry, for the purpose of carrying into effect the orders of the Governor-General of India, contained in the first paragraph of your letter of the 19th April, 1842.

1st troop Bombay Horse Artillery.	Her Majesty's 40th Regiment.
Captain Blood's battery, four 9-pds.	2nd Regiment Native Infantry.
Detail 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.	16th " "
Half Shah's 1st Cavalry.	38th " "
Detachment, Captain Haldane's 1st Irregular Horse.	Detail of Madras Sappers.
	Detail of Bengal Foot Artillery.

Having received information that a body of Ghilzies, amounting to about 5,000 horse and foot, had assembled in the vicinity of the fort of Kelat, determined me on sending a force able to overcome all opposition.

Before the receipt of your letter of the 19th April, I had equipped this force,

which, with two additional regiments of infantry, another troop of horse artillery, and the remainder of the Shah's 1st cavalry, I had intended to march in command of, for the purpose of throwing supplies into Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and endeavouring to recover the late Ghuznee garrison, now in the hands of the enemy, and making a diversion in favour of General Pollock's army.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT

No. 374.

NOTIFICATION.

Allahabad, June 27, 1842

THE Right Honourable the Governor-General of India is pleased to direct the publication of the following despatches from Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar:

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, May* 21, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward to you a despatch from Major-General England, No. 254, of the 29th ultimo, detailing an affair with the enemy in Pisheen.

I am, &c.

W. NOTT.

No. 375.

Major-General England to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Candahar.

Sir, *Camp, at Lora River, April* 29, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Major-General commanding the troops in Lower Affghanistan and Sinde, that I yesterday attacked the enemy's strong position in front of the Hykulzie, with the troops mentioned in the margin,* and dispersed them in all directions.

2. The three columns of attack were led by Major Simmons, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment; Captain Woodburn, 25th Bombay Native Infantry; and Major Cochran, Her Majesty's 41st; the latter being accompanied by a wing of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, under Captain Teasdale, commanding that corps.

3. The reserve was in the hands of Major Browne, commanding Her Majesty's 41st Regiment.

4. Nothing could be more successful than the combinations; and the insurgents, after a short resistance, fled into the rugged mountains in their rear, leaving their standards, and being closely and gallantly pursued by the 3d Light Cavalry, under Captain Delamain.

5. The practice of Captain Leslie's horse artillery battery was, as usual, most effective; and the conduct of the troops excellent.

6. I beg to annex a list of the casualties which have occurred in this affair.

I have, &c.

R. ENGLAND.

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* One troop Bengal Horse Artillery—3rd Light Cavalry—Poona Horse—Her Majesty's 41st Regiment Light Battalion—25th Regiment Native Infantry.

SINDE FIELD FORCE.

Return of Casualties in Action with the Enemy near Hykulzie, this day.

Camp, near Hykulzie, April 28, 1842.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment.—2 rank and file wounded.

3d Light Cavalry.—1 lieutenant, 1 havildar, 3 rank and file, 7 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Light Battalion.—2 rank and file wounded.

General Staff.—1 captain wounded.

Total.—1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 havildar, 7 rank and file, 7 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Grand Total.—10 officers and men, 7 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Remarks.

Wounded.—4 rank and file severely; 4 rank and file slightly.

Names of Officers wounded.

Lieutenant W. Ashburner, 3d Cavalry, severely wounded.

Captain Deere, A.D.C., slightly wounded.

R. ENGLAND.

No. 376.

Major-General W. Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, May* 29, 1842.

AKTAR KHAN, Chief of Zamindawur, having assembled three thousand men, crossed the Helmund, and joined the rebel force under Prince Suftur Jung and Atta Mahomed, on the right bank of the Urghundab, taking advantage of the absence of Brigadier Wymer, who had been detached into the Ghilzie province with a large portion of my force, and nearly the whole of my cavalry. The enemy, under an impression that we had not a sufficient number of men to hold the city, and at the same time to attack them in the field, took possession of some steep rocky hills within a mile of the city walls. I instantly moved out with the troops noted in the accompanying field return, leaving Major-General England, K. H., in command of the city. The Ghazees had about 8,000 in position, and 2,000 men guarding the Baba Wullee pass, and roads leading to their camp. Our troops carried all their positions in gallant style, and drove them in confusion, and with great loss, across the Urghandab river.

I was ably assisted by Brigadier Stacy and every officer present.

Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, with his accustomed zeal, was in the field, and gallantly led a small body of Persian and Affghan horse to the charge.

I inclose a list of killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

Field Return of the Troops present in the Action of the 29th of May, 1842, *under the command of Major-General W. Nott, Commanding in Lower Affghanistan and Sinde.*

Horse Artillery, S. S. F.—1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 1 adjutant, 4 staff-serjeants, 2 farrier-serjeants, 1 native doctor, 2 subadars, 2 jemadars, 13 serjeants 16 corporals, 3 trumpeters, 8 rough-riders, 102 gunners, 58 syces, 130 horses, 12, six-pounder guns.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment.—1 major, 1 captain, 7 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 1 surgeon, 1 assistant-surgeon, 19 serjeants, 13 corporals, 10 drummers, 339 privates

42d Regiment Bengal N. I. 2d Brigade.—1 major, 2 captains, 5 lieutenants

3 ensigns, 1 assistant-surgeon, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 serjeant-major, 1 quartermaster-serjeant, 1 native doctor, 6 subadars, 8 jemadars, 47 havildars, 41 naicks, 10 drummers, 515 sepoys.

43d Regiment Bengal N. I. 2d Brigade.—1 major, 4 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 1 assistant-surgeon, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 serjeant-major, 1 quartermaster-serjeant, 4 subadars, 3 jemadars, 23 havildars, 19 naicks, 9 drummers, 303 sepoys, 1 lascar, 6 bheestees.

Detachment Light Battalion, Bombay.—1 ensign, 1 jemadar, 3 havildars, 2 duffadars, 26 sepoys.

Detachment 25th Regiment, Bombay N. I.—1 ensign, 1 subadar, 2 havildars, 2 duffadars, 1 bugler, 31 sepoys, 1 bheestee.

Detachment Poona Horse.—1 naib ressaldar, 1 kote duffadar, 1 duffadar, 1 farrier, 79 troopers, 83 horses.

Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry.—1 ensign, 4 ressaldars, 5 naib ressaldars, 22 duffadars, 6 nagarchees, 206 sowars, 243 horses.

Total.—3 majors, 4 captains, 18 lieutenants, 11 ensigns, 1 surgeon, 3 assistant-surgeons, 3 adjutants, 2 quartermasters, 2 serjeant-majors, 2 quartermaster-serjeants, 4 staff-serjeants, 2 farrier-serjeants, 2 native doctors, 17 subadars, 20 jemadars, 108 serjeants, 116 corporals, 39 trumpeters and buglers, 9 rough-riders and farriers, 1601 gunners, troopers, privates, sepoys, &c., 58 syces, 456 horses, 12 6-pounder guns, 1 lascar, 7 bheestees.

W. NOTT.
Examined. THOS. POLWHELE.

N.B.—Brigadier L. R. Stacy, commanding 2d brigade; Captain T. Dixon, Major of Brigade.

Return of Killed and Wounded of the Troops engaged with the Enemy near Candahar, on the 29th May, 1842.

Horse Artillery S. S. F.—1 havildar, 3 privates, 1 syce, wounded.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment.—11 privates wounded.

42d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.—1 lieutenant, 6 privates, wounded.

43d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.—1 havildar, 18 privates, 1 bheestee, wounded.

Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry.—1 private, 1 horse, killed; 1 ensign; 1 jemadar, 1 naick, 5 privates, 11 horses, wounded.

Total.—1 private, 1 horse, killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 1 jemadar, 2 havildars, 1 naick, 43 privates, 1 bheestee, 1 syce, 11 horses, wounded.

Grand Total of Killed and Wounded.—52 officers and men, and 12 horses.

Officers Wounded.

Lieutenant J. J. Mainwaring, 42d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, slightly.

Doing duty with detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry, Ensign N. B. Chamberlain, 16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, severely.

Manour Khan, Naib Ressaldar, Shah's 1st Cavalry.

W. NOTT.
Examined. THOS. POLWHELE.

No. 377.

Major-General Nott to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Candahar, May* 30, 1842.

I WAS, last evening, favoured with your note of the 15th instant. Agreeably to the orders of the Supreme Government, under date the 19th April, I have withdrawn the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie; the order left me no discretion; the same order applies, in the same positive manner, to Candahar; however, it will take some time to arrange, and, before I can possibly carry it into effect, there will be ample time for the Government, should they deem it advisable, to send me other

orders. I shall be prepared to advance, or retire, agreeably to the pleasure of Government. I found it necessary to send the chief part of my force to bring off the troops, guns, and stores from Kelat-i-Ghilzie; the enemy took advantage of this, and 8,000 Ghazees came and took possession of some rocky hills within a mile of the city-walls, under an impression that I had not sufficient men to hold the city, and, at the same time, to attack them; however, I moved out with Anderson's guns, 1,000 infantry, and about 250 horse. Our troops carried the enemy's positions in gallant style; it was the finest thing I ever saw. These 8,000 Affghans, led on by Prince Suftur Jung, and many chiefs, could not stand our 1,200 men for one hour; and yet the cry of the press is, that our Sepoys cannot cope with the Affghans. I would at any time lead 1,000 Bengal Sepoys against 5,000 Affghans. I hope you have received some of my letters. My beautiful regiments are in high health and spirits.

I have, &c.,
W. NOTT.

No. 378.

NOTIFICATION.

Allahabad, July 2, 1842.

THE Governor-General has great satisfaction in making public the following despatch from Major-General Nott, and the report from Captain Craigie, commanding the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, of the gallant and successful defence made by that garrison against a large force of Affghans by which it was assaulted. On this occasion, the late Shah Soojah's 3d Regiment of Infantry and the detachment of the Bengal 43d Regiment Native Infantry displayed that decided superiority over their enemies which has been uniformly manifested by the several corps composing Major-General Nott's army.

No. 379.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, May* 27, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, that an attack was made on the Fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, on the morning of the 21st instant, by a body of four thousand Ghilzies; the accompanying letter from Captain Craigie details the result.

I am, &c.,
W. NOTT.

No. 380,

Captain J. H. Craigie to Captain Thomas Polwhele.

Sir, *Kelat-i-Ghilzie, May* 21, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of Major-General Nott, commanding in Lower Affghanistan and Sinde, that Kelat-i-Ghilzie was attacked, at a quarter before four o'clock this morning, in two places, viz., at the long neck to the north-east, and at an outwork constructed last winter by the sepoys, to give a raking fire in rear of the barracks.

The enemy advanced to the assault in the most determined manner, each column consisting of upwards of 2,000 men, provided with thirty scaling ladders; but, after an hour's fighting, they were repulsed, and driven down the hill, losing five standards (one of which was planted three times in one of the embrasures), and the whole of which are now in our possession.

Of the enemy's loss I am unable to give any correct account, as their killed

and wounded, during the greater part of the attack, were immediately taken to the rear; but one hundred and four (104) dead bodies were left on the slope of the hill, and from six A. M. till three P. M. the enemy were employed in carrying off such of their dead and wounded as had been taken to the rear.

The greatest gallantry and coolness were displayed by every commissioned, non-commissioned officer, and private (both European and native) engaged in meeting the attack of the enemy, several of whom were bayonetted on the top of the sand-bags forming our parapets. On our side, I am happy to say, only six (6) sepoys were wounded, viz., two of the detachment 43d N. I., and four of the 3d infantry.

A body of about 300 of the enemy, when driven back, took shelter under the rocks below the outwork, but were immediately dislodged by a company of the 3d infantry, which I detached for that purpose.

I have, &c.,

J. HALKET CRAIGIE.

No. 381.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

Honourable Sirs, *Allahabad, July* 8, No. 22, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to transmit, in a separate packet, by the present mail, copies of all papers and correspondence relating to affairs in Affghanistan and the Punjaub, which have been placed on record since the date of my last despatch on the same subjects.

2. To those papers and the abstracts of the correspondence, I must refer your honourable Committee for the details of occurrences in the past month, and of the instructions which I have issued to the officers charged with the management of military and political affairs in those countries, and I propose in this address no more than to give your honourable Committee a brief outline of the events which have occurred in the past month.

3. The force under Major-General Pollock at Jellalabad has during this period remained nearly inactive, and the weather not having been so hot as in these provinces, the health of the troops had not been affected at the date of the major-general's last reports.

4. My instructions of the 1st ultimo to Major-General Pollock have induced him to contemplate a forward movement of such portion of his army as he has equipment for, which may be of political advantage in displaying his force in a state of activity, and may afford to that portion of it which will advance towards the upper end of the Jellalabad valley a still more temperate and salubrious climate than that of Jellalabad. The major-general has already moved a brigade of his army on Pesh Bolak, a measure which he deems prudent as a demonstration to overawe the turbulent tribes situated on the flanks of his future line of march when he retires through the Khyber.

5. For the convenience of immediate reference, I insert below* an abstract of the strength of the major-general's force and of the carriage which he possesses, and of that which is required to render the whole force efficient for movement. To the deficiency of beasts of burden and of draught, under which this force labours, is to be attributed mainly, the state of inactivity in which it has so long remained. Had the major-general found his force properly equipped in this respect after his reaching Jellalabad on the 16th April, he would probably have immediately moved forward, and when he received the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, directing him to retire to the eastward of the Khyber Pass, he would immediately have acted on those directions, but for his inability to move his whole force from a deficiency of carriage cattle.

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* Officers, 348; Non Commissioned Officers, 1809; Privates, 12778—Total, 14,935: deduct sick.

Cattle present:—Elephants, public, 71; Camels, public 3,323, hired 98; Bullocks, ordnance, public, 141; train, public, 447; carriage, public, 24, hired, 2,093; Mules, public, 80, hired, 22; Asses, hired, 64.

Carriage required:—Elephants, 52; Camels, public, 3,559, private, 1994; Bullocks, public, 3,906, private, 18; Bullocks for trains, 447; Mules, Yaboos Asses, 106.

6. The defective arrangements of the Commissariat in the hiring of camels were the original cause of this embarrassment. I have taken measures to ensure more activity and intelligence in the direction of this essential branch of military preparation, but a considerable time must elapse before the whole of Major-General Pollock's army can be properly equipped for any extensive movement.

7. A Sikh force of between 4,000 and 5,000 men with guns has advanced to Jellalabad, and is now encamped on the left bank of the Cabool river.

8. Boosah or chopped straw for the use of the cattle of the army is the only article of supply of which any serious deficiency is contemplated; but as a forward movement will place the resources of the country more at our disposal, and the revenues of the Jellalabad district are collected by officers, under Major-General Pollock's orders, in kind, I am in hopes that the supply of this article will become more abundant.

9. The intelligence which has been lately received by Major-General Pollock from Cabool with great despatch and regularity contains a clear and connected account, mostly from the pen of Moonshee Mohun Lall, of the progress of events at that capital since the date of my last despatch: and from it your honourable Committee will regret to perceive that, notwithstanding the existence of a strong party at Cabool opposed to the ambitious designs of Mahomed Akbar, and the persevering resistance offered to his attacks on the Bala Hissar by the Arab and Hindoostanee followers of the Prince Futteh Jung, Mahomed Akbar at length succeeded in making himself master of the principal portion of that fortress, and in compelling the prince to acknowledge him as his prime minister, and to admit 2,000 of his troops into the fort. The prince has been compelled to make large advances in money to Mahomed Akbar, and must be considered at the date of the last accounts to be in the power of that chieftain, though he still continues to hold out hopes of his being able to free himself from this thraldom if the British force should move on the capital; and the party of Zemaun Khan, which is decidedly opposed to the usurpation of Mahomed Akbar, is still unsubdued and in force in Cabool, where the Persian party of kuzzelbashees is also thought to favour the prince.

10. The letters from Prince Futteh Jung and Mohun Lall to Captain Macgregor at Jellalabad previous to the capture of the Bala Hissar by Mahomed Akbar, had repeatedly urged the expediency of the advance of the British army, even as far as Gundamuk, as a measure which would lead almost certainly to the dispersion of the Barukzye party, and the probable flight of Mahomed Akbar and the liberation of the British prisoners.

11. These unfortunate persons have been removed from their former places of confinement to the neighbourhood of Cabool, and it is supposed with the view of their being carried off to Toorkistan if the advance of General Pollock had forced Mahomed Akbar to quit Cabool.

12. The despatches from Candahar, which will be forwarded to your honourable Committee by the present mail, comprise the official reports from Major-General Nott, commencing with that dated the 12th of March, of the state of affairs in that quarter, and of military occurrences of which intelligence had already reached me from other quarters, and has been communicated to your honourable Committee. The delay which has attended the transmission of these reports must be mainly attributed to the interruption of correspondence by the Kojuck Pass, till that pass was cleared of the insurgents by the advance of Major-General England, after the defeat of the enemy at Hykulzie on the 29th of April.

13. On the 17th of May, Major-General Nott acknowledged the receipt of my instructions of the 19th of April, directing him to evacuate Kelat-i-Ghilzie and Candahar, and to withdraw his army to Shawl. Previous to the receipt of these instructions the major-general, after he had been reinforced by the junction of the troops under Major-General England, was making preparations for organizing a sufficient force with which he proposed to advance in person for the relief or recapture of Ghuznee, and to co-operate with Major-General Pollock. But on the receipt of my orders of the 19th of April, given immediately after the receipt of the intelligence of Major-General England's repulse at Hykulzie on the 28th of March, and when it seemed uncertain whether any part of his brigade would return, he immediately relinquished this enterprise and proceeded to carry into effect the first part of my orders, by withdrawing the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and dismantling the fortifications erected there. A detachment under Brigadier Wymer was ordered to

Proceed to Kelat-i-Ghilzie for this purpose, and the Brigadier returned to Candahar on the 11th of June, having destroyed the works at that place, and bringing away the guns, ammunition, &c.

14. Meanwhile, however, a bold attack had been made by the neighbouring tribes on the position of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, who to the number of two thousand or more approached the place on the morning of the 21st of May, and commenced a determined assault, in which, although some actually reached the embrasures, they were repulsed with great loss, leaving 104 dead bodies on the slope of the hill, besides great numbers carried off by themselves, and leaving behind them five standards and all their scaling ladders.

15. Captain Craigie's report of this gallant affair, in which the garrison sustained a very trifling loss in wounded, has been published by my orders in the Gazette.

16. Major-General Nott's despatch of the 29th of May reports that the notorious chief Aktar Khan, having joined the insurgents under Suftur Jung with a body of 3,000 troops, their united force amounting to about 10,000, taking advantage of the absence of Brigadier Wymer's detachment and the best part of the cavalry of the Candahar division, took up a strong position within a mile of Candahar, when they were attacked by the major-general with a force of arms of about 1,600 men, and were quickly defeated and dispersed with great loss.

17. The major-general's report of this gallant action has been published in the official Gazette.

18. All the country to the south of the Pesheen valley has remained tranquil. The tribes in that quarter, including some of the Kakurs who had been induced to join Mahomed Sadik, have made their submission to the Political Officer at Quetta. The Bolan Pass has continued undisturbed, and the Government of Nusseer Khan, the young chief of Kelat, has actively co-operated with the British authorities in maintaining the peace of the country. The Ameers of Sinde have also made preparations for liquidating the arrears of their tribute, and appear to have desisted from the hostile intrigues in which there is reason to believe they were till lately engaged.

19. Major Outram has at my suggestion proceeded to Quetta, where his influence and activity may be of great benefit in the arrangements which will be required to facilitate the march of Major-General Nott's force to the plains of Sinde.

20. My attention having been drawn to the excessive number of officers employed in political duties in Western Affghanistan and Sinde, I have dispensed with the political services of the following officers, and placed them at the disposal of the commander-in-chief.

Lieut. E. K. Elliott, 43d N.I.	Lieut. J. D. Leckie, 22d By. N.I.
Lieut. C. A. Jackson, 31st N.I.	Lieut. E. B. Eastwick, 6th do.
Lieut. J. T. Pattenson, 2d N.I.	Lieut. H. J. Pelly, 8th do.
Lieut. C. F. North, Bo. Eng.	Lieut. G. H. Robertson, 25 do.
Lieut. T. Postans, 15th By. N.I.	

21. I shall carry these reductions much further at the earliest possible period.

22. The Government of Lahore has continued to evince a firm disposition to co-operate cordially with us, and to improve and strengthen its alliance with your Government. As I have already mentioned, a Sikh army of between four and five thousand men has advanced through the Khyber Pass, and taken up a position near Jellalabad, subject to such directions as its commander may receive from the British general.

23. The only occurrence of unusual importance which has been reported to me from the Punjaub, since the date of my last despatch, is the death of Maee Chund Koonwur, the widow of the late Maha Raja who opposed the accession of Maha Raja Shere Sing. She was barbarously murdered by her own female domestics during the absence of Shere Sing from Lahore. The violent death of a lady who has held so exalted a position in the state is calculated to excite suspicions, from which it must be desirable that the minds of the Sikh soldiery should be diverted, and I have communicated my views to this effect to Mr. Clerk.

25. The death of Maee Chund Koonwur has recalled the Maha Raja to Lahore, but I have not yet heard of his arrival.

26. The Sikhs have continued to occupy and guard the Khyber Pass from its eastern extremity as far as Ali Musjid, and Major-General Pollock has been in

correspondence with Mr. Clerk on the subject of arrangements for putting the Sikhs in possession of the Jellalabad valley on its evacuation by the British army.

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 382.

Mr. Hamilton to Mr, Maddock.

Sir, *Agra, June* 10, 1842.

IN continuation of my letter of the 7th instant, I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to request that you will inform the Governor-General that replies have been received to the communication made in a private form to the several magistrates noted in the margin,* regarding the number of mules and ponies they might be able to collect in their respective districts. It would appear that the numbers, stated opposite to each district, may be obtained within two months, at a price ranging from forty to seventy rupees for mules, and from twenty to fifty for ponies.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor is still of opinion that Major Gwatkin would be the person best qualified to have the general charge of the whole arrangements; but, as it might be inconvenient to bring all the cattle to Haupper, a subordinate of the stud department might be stationed at Loodiana, subject to the Major's orders, there to receive the animals purchased in the upper districts.

3. I am desired to take this opportunity to notice the necessity of early orders for the preparation of pack-saddles and halters, in the event of its being determined to adopt this plan of procuring baggage-cattle.

I have, &c.,

N. HAMILTON

No. 383.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 10, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt, this day, of your several letters of March the 12th, 16th, 24th, 28th, 29th, 31st, of April the 24th and 28th, and of May 17th.

2. The Governor-General fully appreciates the zeal with which you have applied yourself to the execution of the orders conveyed to you in my letter of the 19th of April. It would have been gratifying to his Lordship if Prince Timoor, who appears to have remained uniformly faithful to the British Government, by which his family have been so long supported, had been able to establish some influence in the neighbourhood of Candahar, which would have rendered it possible to leave him in possession of that city, with the prospect of his being able to preserve it by his own means.

3. If that should not be the case, upon your leaving Candahar you will execute the instructions contained in my letter of the 19th of April, with respect to that city.

4. In the event of Prince Timoor desiring to accompany your army to the Indus, you will permit his Highness to do so, treating him always with the respect

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*

Magistrates of	Mules.	Ponies.
Bareilly	1,000	4,000
Seharunpore	1,500	—
Mooradabad Meerut	1,000	1,000
Agra	300	not stated but numerous.
Delhi	200	
Bijnore	250	—
	4,250	5,000

due to his misfortunes and his fidelity, and you will assure him that he will be received in the British dominions with distinguished consideration, and the hospitality which the British Government extends to the unfortu nate.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 384.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, June* 2, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 185) dated 19th May, 1842, with annexed copy of a letter to the address of Captain Macgregor.

I feel greatly obliged by having the services of Captain Macgregor continued to me, for I have no hesitation in saying that under existing circumstances they are invaluable. To his judicious management I am indebted for the abundant supplies which pour in from every quarter; his knowledge of the whole country hereabouts, and his personal acquaintance with the Chiefs, enable him to overcome difficulties where another would in all probability fail. At my request he will continue to afford all the aid in his power, and I trust that his continued exertions will be duly appreciated and remunerated by Government.

With regard to the Khyber, I confess I should very much regret placing the negotiations connected therewith in the hands of any other than Captain Mackeson until we are able to retire through it; it requires that a person should be on the spot to watch narrowly the proceedings of the Malliks, and if the Sikhs do not aid in keeping open the communication, the greatest caution must be observed. Captain Mackeson is now at Dakka, and is certainly indefatigable in his endeavours to secure the safety of the parties going to and fro. I therefore earnestly beg that no change may take place in the management of the affairs of the Khyber, which, it seems to me, would involve the more than probable result of our communication being cut off; and in that case the certainty of my being again obliged to force my passage under less fortuitous circumstances than attended my advance—and I am still without carriage cattle to enable me to move, for which I must look to the provinces. With reference to Captain Macgregor, I should observe that he is collecting the revenue of the valley in kind, and thereby saving to Government a heavy expenditure for grain and forage. I am not aware what measures are being adopted for supplying me with carriage. 350 camels were despatched from Ferozepore, I think some time in April, and should have reached Peshawur; 350 more, with a company of sappers, are also on their way; bue even if they arrive, there will still be a great deficiency. I have already stated tht difficulty of retiring now through the Khyber. I have no greater fear for the troops when marching than in a standing camp; but the want of water is the most serious evil, and would be most severely felt in the Pass. If, however, the Governor-General is still of opinion that the trial should be made, I would suggest the following:—

That the Sikhs be required to hold the Pass up to Ali Musjid; that carriage-cattle, either camels, mules, or yaboos, be sent in sufficient numbers, with all practicable dispatch, to enable me to move; and I would direct Captain Lawrence to send on the animals with empty water jars, to be deposited at the top of Lundikanna, from whence every available puckaul, bhistie bag, and brass pot should be filled, and the march thence to Ali Musjid undertaken, during a moonlight night; but the move should be kept secret. I don't think I have any right to complain of unusual sickness yet, but this is the first of four hot months; and although I shall endeavour to get the men into houses as comfortably as I can, I am aware that we must expect sickness, though not more, if so much, as at Peshawur.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 385.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, June* 3, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 21st May, 1842.

With reference to my offer of two lacs of rupees, I beg to state that I made it under the belief that such an offer had already been made; and it was done previously to the receipt of your letter, dated 25th April, 1842.

With regard to my not having noticed that the release of Dost Mahomed, under various contingencies, was not altogether impossible, I felt that I was then replying to Major Pottinger's proposals from Mahomed Akbar, who had possession of only some of the prisoners, and that he had certainly not then the power of releasing all; and, moreover, Captain Mackenzie seemed to speak distinctly as to the indifference of the chiefs about Dost Mahomed's release; and I may add that I had very great reluctance to communicate with Mahomed Akbar at all; but there was no other channel through which I could negotiate for the prisoners he retains in his possession.

Your letter, dated 25th April, paragraphs 5 and 6, seems to me to imply that, in treating, as I did, for only a portion of the prisoners, I should not be justified in naming Dost Mahomed; but that whenever an opportunity might offer for negotiating for the whole, I might include his name.

With reference to the 10th paragraph of your letter, I shall not of course, make any pecuniary offer. I regret the application of this rule to all cases; because, although I have been disappointed about the prisoners at Buddeabad, I have just now some hope of men of the 44th, and artillery being released. The sum demanded was 1,200 rupees. There are, I believe, nineteen altogether.

With reference to the 13th paragraph of your letter, I can only express my regret that I should have erred in communicating, through Major Pottinger, with Mahomed Akbar. I did so with very great reluctance, but I saw no other hope of obtaining the release of the prisoners he has in his power.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 386.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock,

Sir, *Jellalabad, June* 11, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your circular letter, dated May 26, 1842.

The very serious evil which might accrue to the forces in this country by any premature and unnecessary disclosure of an intended movement, especially a retrograde movement, is so fully felt by me, that nothing could have induced me to divulge the orders of Government on such a subject. The consequence was, that officers in the camp were not aware of any intended move, till communicated to them from the provinces.

I state this, because it might be supposed that I had incautiously mentioned that General Nott and I had been directed to retire.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 387.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, June* 12, 1842

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 242 of 1842, dated 26 May, enclosing copy of a letter to Mr. Clerk, No. 241 of 1842, of the same date. In the event of the Sikh Government determiningt o occupy Jellalabad and the valley of Ningrahar, I conclude they would do so in great numbers; of this I should wish to have timely notice, as the presence of so large a force would or might seriously affect my supply of forage. It appears to me also, that if they do come, the sooner I withdraw after their arrival the better. For the next two months it would hardly be desirable that they should march so large a force into the country, as in that case I should certainly be distressed for forage, and there is nothing now on the ground for cattle.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 388.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, June* 13, 1842.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your letter, No. 254, of 1842, dated 29th May, 1842, on the subject of a remark made by Mr. Clerk in a letter to me, dated 18th May, 1842.

I beg to say, in reply, that if I had had carriage cattle to move the force when I received the orders of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, I should have marched for Peshawur forthwith. I regret to state, that, of the camels which were coming with Lieutenant Goodwin, of the Engineers, 274 have deserted at the Attock.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK

No. 389.

The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

General, *Allahabad, June* 18, 1842.

MR. CLERK will make arrangements to the effect that all the States in his neighbourhood, except Putteeala, shall contribute their means of cariage to Major-General Pollock's army; and the extensive resources of Putteeala will be reserved for the use of the army of reserve.

It is very right to send for the Commissary-General, but our arrangemnts with the Sikh Government are now so far advanced, that we ought to be prepared to move Major-General Pollock's force long before the Commissary-General will be near the Sutlej; and I must again suggest to your Excellency the expediency of appointing, in this emergency, some able officer who may temporarily have the whole responsibility of providing Major-General Pollock's force with the means of movement. Upon this subject such officer should, of course, place himself in communication with Mr. Clerk.

I should not object to his having three or four very active temporary assistants under him; not to sit copying letters, but to move about, and communicate personallywith the several individuals from whom the supplies must be procured.

Will your Excellency act at once in this matter, and place in the hands of the officer you may select, the Lieutenant-Governor's proposition for the purchase of mules andponies for his consideration?

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 390.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Noti.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 25, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your several despatches of the 21st and 29th of May, and I am directed to express to you the Governor-General's entire approval of the measures therein reported to have been adopted by you. I am at the same time directed to offer to you his Lordship's sincere congratulations on the good conduct and success of your troops, in the attack directed by you, upon the enemy's position in the vicinity of Candahar, on the 29th ult.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK

No. 391.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 25, 1842.

THE Governor-General heard yesterday, with extreme regret, that there had been a very extensive desertion amongst the hired camel-drivers, at Attock; and that, on the 7th instant, 319 loads were lying there, without camels to carry them.

2. If this should be the consequence of the desertion of 319 out of the 350 camels, you had reason to expect, in one convoy from Ferozepore, it is serious indeed.

3. The Governor-General has taken, both before he heard of the last misfortune, and since, every step which has occurred to him for the supply of your army with its necessary means of carriage, and has distinctly expressed his opinion to the Commander-in-Chief that this is an object which must be effected, at whatever cost, at the earliest possible period.

4. His Lordship has suggested that, in order to secure the fidelity of the camel drivers, yet more than it may be secured by keeping back a portion of their pay, a force of irregular cavalry should accompany the next convoy. Mules and ponies will be purchased, as well as camels. The hiring system will be discontinued, and all the drivers will be in the service of Government.

5. A force of nearly 5,000 Sikhs having now moved through the Khyber, and the portion of the Sikh army which is at, and near, Peshawur, having evinced much want of discipline, it is a matter for your consideration, whether you should not move a brigade through the pass, to remain there, near Peshawur, for the protection of your communications.

6. In deciding upon this point, you will consider the effect which a change of position will have upon the health of the troops.

7. The Governor-General hopes that you would, without difficulty, be able to conceal your intention of making a movement with a view to a permanent change of position, by combining it with the march of some convoy, and giving to it the appearance of a movement made for its protection.

8. The late unfortunate event at Lahore—the murder of Maee Chund Koonwar—may detain there Rajah Dhian Sing, and may thus, for some time, prevent his joining the Sikh camp near Jellalabad, as he apparently intended to do, for the purpose of making the necessary preliminary arrangements for his having that place given up to him.

9. The same event may possibly, too, have some effect upon the discipline of the Sikh troops in your rear. You will, therefore, perhaps, have to rely more than ever upon your own resources, and you must look to nothing but the security of your army.

10. If you should move a brigade to the neighbourhood of Peshawur, you will make such communications as may seem to you to be expedient, to the officer in command of the Sikh troops; but, as a month will have elapsed since the date of

the last letter from you, before you can receive this, it is obviously impossible to give you any precise instructions.

11. Upon that point you will understand only, generally, that it is the Governor-General's wish to take all measures in communication with, and in concurrence with, the Sikhs; but you must consider the security of your army to be the object paramount to all others in his Lordship's mind.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 392.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, June* 14, 1842.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your despatch, No. 277 of 1842, dated June 1st, 1842, conveying to me the instructions of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, consequent on the report his lordship has received of the great want of carriage-cattle with this force. I feel greatly indebted for the prompt measures which have been taken to supply me; and I hope I shall soon be able to take advantage of the instructions contained in your letter, by moving a brigade towards Pesh Bolak and some other places, which, being connected with the Pass, require strong measures, that they may know what they are to expect, in the event of their attempting any obstruction to its free passage. With reference to Pesh Bolak, treasure to the amount of more than 30,000 rupees, and a gun, are now in their possession.

I will do myself the honour to write again on this subject, when my plans are more matured.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 393.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, June* 30, 1842.

I HAD, yesterday, the honour of receiving your letter of the 16th instant, inclosing returns, in compliance with the request conveyed in my letter of the 1st instant, of the strength of your army, and of the carriage and supplies at your disposal, as well as a statement of your daily consumption, and of the additional carriage you require.

2. It must be evident to you, that without frequent and detailed information upon all these points, it must be impossible for the Governor-General to know what service the army, under your command, is competent to perform; nor can his Lordship provide you with every necessary equipment without being accurately informed of your wants.

3. There have been some inaccuracies in the returns so furnished by you, which I am directed to bring to your notice.

4. In the return of the strength of regiments, the number of horses attached to the 10th Light Cavalry is altogether omitted.

5. In the return of camels and of the animals required for the army, the number of private camels is stated, but in the return of camels and other animals attached, there is no entry at all under the head of private camels.

6. The Governor-General has heard, with extreme regret, of the desertion of the camel-drivers at Attock, on the 7th instant; and his lordship fears that you may be exposed to great inconvenience, for want of the stores that convoy of camels was conveying to you.

7. Every exertion is now making to effect the purchase of 4,000 mules in the upper provinces, and Mr. Clerk is likewise exerting all his influence in the endeavour to purchase camels in the territory adjoining the Sutlej.

8. The Governor-General hopes, that by the middle of August or the beginning of September, your army will be fully equipped with carriage.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 394.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, June* 11, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th of May, 1842, and beg to assure you, for the information of the Governor-General of India, that my best endeavours shall be constantly exerted to carry into effect the orders conveyed in your letters of the 13th and 19th of April, and that of the 7th ultimo.

Being well aware, from experience, of the unhealthy state of Quetta during the months of July, August, and September, it is my wish to keep the troops at Candahar until the 15th of September; but should circumstances render it necessary for the safety of the troops under my command that retirement should take place at an earlier period, his Lordship may rely upon my doing what may be requisite for the reputation of our arms and for the honour of our country.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 395.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Candahar, June* 11, 1842.

WITH reference to your letter of the 19th of April, 1842, and to my reply under date the 21st ultimo, I have now the honour to acquaint you that Brigadier Wymer's detachment has returned to Candahar, giving escort to the guns, ammunition, &c., from Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and that he reports having destroyed the works of that fort, agreeably to his instructions.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 396.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, June* 18, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 4th instant, giving cover to one from you, to the address of Mr. Clerk, instructing him to procure carriage-cattle for this force. I trust that, through Mr. Clerk's

exertions, I shall not long be without the means of moving. I shall keep Mr Clerk informed of our wants from time to time.

By the 1st October it is to be hoped the rivers will have fallen, in which case they will be fordable at certain parts, when fewer boats would perhaps be required to form a bridge.

With regard to passing through the Punjaub, by different routes,—if supplies are forthcoming, the whole force might return on one route in two divisions, leaving an interval of a day between each, and, by this means, there would be less destruction to the cultivation.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK

No. 397.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, June* 21, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of date 6th June, 1842. I beg to state that had it been in my power to retire on Peshawur, I should not have delayed doing so, for the purpose of making over Jellalabad to the Sikh troops, unless the transfer could have been effected immediately. It will be observed that in my letter, No. 64 (to which yours, No 313, is a reply), I have stated that, owing to the want of carriage-cattle, it was not in my power to withdraw this army.

I consider it highly desirable that the transfer of this valley should be made to the Sikh Government before the army under my command is withdrawn; and as the arrangements for this measure will necessarily occupy some time, I have deemed it advisable to write to Mr. Clerk on the subject, a copy of which letter I have now the honour to inclose.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK

No. 398.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, June*, 21, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to forward copies and translations of a letter from Mahomed Shah Khan Ghilzie to the address of Captain Macgregor, and of my reply thereto.

It is proper to mention Capt. Macgregor's letter to Mahomed Shah Khan was written before my arrival here.

I have, &c.,
GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 399.

Translation of a Letter from Mahomed Shah Khan Ghilzie to Captain Macgregor, without date.

YOUR letter has been received, and has afforded me much pleasure. I have been much pleased with what you say regarding the release of the English gentlemen who are under my protection, and the friendship which you express for my relations, and the message which you sent by the bearer of the letter, desiring me to send, or cause to be sent, the gentlemen to Major-General Pollock, as the English Government would reward such service. My friend, ingratitude is not permitted in your religion nor in mine. I also wish, that in the way of friendship, they (the prisoners) may be released from the Sirdar (Mahomed Akbar), you should make a good arrangement for their release, and write me the particulars, that I may discuss the proposal with the Sirdar. I hope in God that my friendly disposition to the English may be always known.

No. 400.

(Translation.)

Captain M'Gregor to Mahomed Shah Ghilzie.

Jellalabad, June 21, 1842.

THE friendly letter which you wrote to Captain Macgregor has been received, and I have perfectly understood its contents. You write "that an arrangement connected with the release of the prisoners ought to be explained and discussed here." It is very desirable that an arrangement should be made for releasing all the prisoners who are at Cabool, Ghuznee, and Buddeabad. If all the English prisoners who are in this country are collected together and released, the Affghans who are in Hindoostan shall also be set free. You should arrange this matter so that there may be no mention of paying money, and according to the proposal I have made of an exchange of prisoners, because it is not according to the custom of nations to purchase the release of prisoners.

It is desirable that to attain that object some trustworthy person be sent by the Chiefs as an ambassador, with whom the matter can be discussed.

No. 401.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.

Sir, *Allahabad, July* 4, 1842.

THE Governor-General having understood that Major-General Pollock was, on the 17th ultimo, about to move a force upon Pesh Bolak, and subsequently to make a movement in advance, thinks it expedient to transmit to you a copy of my letter to the Major-General of the 1st of June, that you may not be misled into the belief that any change has taken place in the main object of the instructions heretofore furnished to the Major-General.

2. His Lordship has heard with great satisfaction that a convoy of 3,000 camels has passed up the Kojuck Pass, and he now hopes that your army, or the principal part of it, will be sufficiently equipped with carriage.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 402.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, July* 4, 1842.

IT has given great satisfaction to the Governor-General to learn, from your letter of the 14th ultimo, that you have sufficient means of movement to be enabled to act upon the suggestions contained in my letter of the 1st ultimo.

2. You will not have mistaken the object of that letter, which was merely to suggest that, as far as your means of movement allowed, you should make your strength felt by the enemy during the period of your necessary detention in the valley of the Cabool river.

3. No change has, from the first, taken place in the Governor-General's views of the expediency of withdrawing your army at the earliest period, consistent with the health and efficiency of the troops, that is, as is now understood, in the beginning of October.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 403.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, *Allahabad, July* 8, No. 24 *a*, 1842.

I SEND herewith copies of letters addressed by me to Major-General Nott, to Major-General Pollock, to Major Outram, and to the Governor of Bombay, and of a memorandum for Major-General Sir Charles Napier.

All these documents I have deemed it necessary to withhold, for the present, from the records of the offices here, on account of the absolute necessity of preserving secrecy in the important matter to which they refer.

They will be placed upon the records as soon as Major-General Nott's decision shall be known.

My letter to Major-General Nott so fully explains the grounds upon which I have ventured to afford him an option as to the line of his retirement upon the Indus, that I deem it unnecessary to do more than refer you to the document itself. for an explanation of my views upon the subject.

I have, &c..
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 404.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Nott.

General, *Allahabad, July* 4, 1842.

YOU will have learnt from Mr. Maddock's letters of the 13th May, and 1st of June, that it was not expected that your movement towards the Indus could be made till October, regard being had to the health and efficiency of your army.

You appear to have been able to give a sufficient equipment to the force you recently dispatched to Kelat-i-Ghilzie, under Colonel Wymer; and, since his return, you will have received, as I infer from a private letter addressed by Major Outram to Captain Durand, my private secretary, a further supply of 3000 camels.

I have now, therefore, reason to suppose, for the first time, that you have the means of moving a very large proportion of your army, with ample equipment for any service

There has been no deficiency of provisions at Candahar at any time; and, immediately after the harvest, you will have an abundant supply.

Nothing has occurred to induce me to change my first opinion, that the measure, commanded by considerations of political and military prudence, is to bring back the armies now in Affghanistan at the earliest period at which their retirement can be effected, consistently with the health and efficiency of the troops, into positions wherein they may have easy and certain communication with India; and to this extent the instructions you have received remain unaltered. But the improved position of your army, with sufficient means of carriage for as large a force as it is necessary to move in Affghanistan, induces me now to leave to your option the line by which you shall withdraw your troops from that country.

I must desire, however, that, in forming your decision upon this most important question, you will attend to the following considerations.

In the direction of Quetta and Sukkur, there is no enemy to oppose you: at each place occupied by detachments, you will find provisions: and, probably, as you descend the passes, you will have increased means of carriage. The operation is one admitting of no doubt as to its success.

If you determine upon moving upon Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jellalabad, you will require, for the transport of provisions, a much larger amount of carriage; and you will be practically without communications, from the time of your leaving Candahar. Dependent entirely upon the courage of your army, and upon your own ability in directing it, I should not have any doubt as to the success of the operation; but whether you will be able to obtain provisions for your troops, during the whole march, and forage for your animals, may be a matter of reasonable doubt. Yet upon this your success will turn.

You must remember that it was not the superior courage of the Affghans, but want, and the inclemency of the season, which led to the destruction of the army at Cabool; and you must feel as I do, that the loss of another army, from whatever cause it might arise, might be fatal to our Government in India.

I do not undervalue the aid which our Government in India would receive from the successful execution by your army of a march through Ghuznee and Cabool, over the scenes of our late disasters. I know all the effect which it would have upon the minds of our soldiers, of our allies, of our enemies in Asia, and of our countrymen, and of all foreign nations in Europe. It is an object of just ambition, which no one more than myself would rejoice to see effected; but I see that failure in the attempt is certain and irretrievable ruin; and I would endeavour to inspire you with the necessary caution, and make you feel that, great as are the objects to be obtained by success, the risk is great also.

If you determine upon moving by Ghuznee, and entirely give up your communications by Quetta, I should suggest that you should take with you only the most efficient troops and men you have, securing the retreat of the remainder upon Killa-Abdoolla and Quetta.

You will, in such case, consider it to be entirely a question to be decided by yourself, according to circumstances, whether you shall destroy, or not the fortifications of Candahar; but, before you set out upon your adventurous march, do not fail to make the retirement of the force you leave behind you, perfectly secure, and give such instructions as you deem necessary for the ultimate retirement of the troops in Sinde, upon Sukkur.

You will recollect that what you will have to make is a successful march; that that march must not be delayed by any hazardous operations against Ghuznee or Cabool; that you should carefully calculate the time required to enable you to reach Jellalabad in the first week in October, so as to form the rear-guard of Major-General Pollock's army. If you should be enabled by a *coup-de-main* to get possession of Ghuznee and Cabool, you will act as you see fit, and leave decisive proofs of the power of the British army, without impeaching its humanity. You will bring away from the tomb of Mahmood of Ghuznee, his club, which hangs over it; and you will bring away the gates of his tomb, which are the gates of the Temple of Somnaut. These will be the just trophies of your succesful march.

You will not fail to disguise your intention of moving, and to acquaint Major-General Pollock with your plans, as soon as you have formed them. A copy of

this letter will be forwarded to Major-General Pollock to-day; and he will be instructed, by a forward movement, to facilitate your advance; but he will probably not deem it necessary to move any troops actually to Cabool, where your force will be amply sufficient to beat any thing the Affghans can oppose to it. The operations, however, of the two armies, must be combined, upon their approach, so as to effect, with the least possible loss, the occupation of Cabool, and keep open the communications between Cabool and Peshawur.

One apprehension upon my mind is that, in the event of your deciding upon moving on Jellalabad, by Ghuznee and Cabool, the accumulation of so great a force as that of your army, combined with Major-General Pollock's, in the narrow valley of the Cabool river, may produce material difficulties in the matter of provisions and forage; but every effort will be made from India to diminish that difficulty, should you adopt that line of retirement.

This letter remains absolutely secret.

I have, &c., ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 405.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.

General, *Allahabad, July* 4, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to communicate to you a copy of a letter I have this day addressed to Major-General Nott. You will endeavour to combine your movements as far as you can with those of the Major-General, should he decide upon adopting the line of retirement by Ghuznee and Cabool; and as soon as he shall have advanced beyond Ghuznee, you will, as senior officer, issue such orders to Major-General Nott as you may deem fit; but until the Major-General shall have passed Ghuznee, his movements must rest with himself, as he alone can know all the circumstances by which they must be determined.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 406.

(Extract.)

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Nott.

Allahabad, July 5, 1842.

IN the event of your availing yourself of the option given to you in my letter of yesterday's date, and of your deciding upon the route of Ghuznee and Cabool, I have to express my wish that you should send Major-General England to command at Sukkur.

In the event of your moving upon Ghuznee, I request you will give the earliest intimation of your intention to Sir George Arthur, the Governor of Bombay. I shall write confidentially to Sir George Arthur, and desire him, in such an event, to send, as soon as the season will permit, Major-General Sir Charles Napier to command all the forces between the Kojuck and the Indus.

No. 407.

Memorandum by the Governor-General of India, for Major-General Sir Charles Napier.

Allahabad, July 6, 1842.

IT is to be expected that, in the event of Major-General Nott's moving upon Ghuznee and Cabool, he will take with him the two British regiments, and nearly all his cavalry; and that the force which he will send back into Sinde will consist of Bombay troops, and the late Shah Shooja's, and the Poonah Horse, and to these may probably be added detachments of nearly all the regiments taken on to Ghuznee, consisting of the old and weak and sickly men.

Probably the force taken on will not exceed 7,000 men. There has been no return for a long time of the amount of force Major-General Nott has; but probably about 4,000 men would, together with some number of refugees, proceed to the valley of Pisheen.

The whole object of the Government is to draw down to Shikarpore, Sukkur, and Bukkur, all the troops left by Major-General Nott, and all those now below the Kojuck Pass, at as early a period as may be consistent with their health and efficiency. They cannot begin to move till October, and their march need not be hurried.

It is apprehended that there will be a great deficiency of cavalry with this force; and Sir George Arthur will have the goodness to consider with Sir Charles Napier how the deficiency can best be supplied. Our allies, the Ameers of Khyrpoor and Hydrabad, have not been wholly without suspicion of infidelity to the British Government; and it is not quite impossible that a portion of the force may be required to visit Hydrabad before its return to Bombay. There are likewise some arrangements to be made respecting the Island of Bukkur and the town of Sukkur, which will be facilitated by the presence of a considerable body of troops at that point.

The Bengal Regiment there would be withdrawn.

In any case, some force, amounting, at least, to a strong brigade, would be left at Bukkur and Sukkur.

Kurachee will continue to be held for a time. The garrison there might be strengthened, if necessary, but no more troops will be sent from Bombay thither.

Major Outram, and all the political authorities, would be placed under the Major-General.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 408.

The Governor-General of India to Major Outram.

Sir, *Allahabad, July* 7, 1842.

IT is expedient that Major-General Nott should have sent up to him, without delay, every camel and other animal of burthen or draught you may be able to dispatch to him with security.

I desire, therefore, that you will take immediate measures for sending them up.

You will have the goodness not to mention your having received this letter except to the Major-General; and it would be desirable that the frequent transmission of public despatches to Candahar should not be taken notice of.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 409.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, *Allahabad, August* 6, No. 28, 1842.

MR. CLERK informed me, on the 23rd of July, that the state of his health would render it necessary for him to proceed to the hills at the latest on the 10th of September, and to abstain from all business for six months or a year.

2. Until the 10th of September, Mr. Clerk feeling the urgency of the several matters he had in hand, is willing to remain, although with considerable risk to himself.

3. Your Honorable Committee are well aware of the value of Mr. Clerk's services, and of the extent of his personal influence with the Durbar of Lahore and the Sikh chiefs, and population on both banks of the Sutlej,—an influence without which, at the present time, it would be perfectly impossible to furnish Major-General Pollock's army with the supplies required to make it capable of executing any extended military movement.

4. By you, therefore, as by me, the temporary retirement of Mr. Clerk must be felt as a very serious public misfortune. To me it seemed so nearly to affect the success of the several measures in which he is now engaged as the Governor-General's Agent, that I decided at once to proceed to join him as soon as the overland mail, which will convey this letter, may be dispatched; and I hope that I may be able, after passing two days at each of the stations of Cawnpore, Meerut, and Kurnaul, to arrive at Simla on or about the time of Mr. Clerk's arrival there, and to have the opportunity of communicating personally with him, and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, for six or seven weeks, before I proceed to join the army of reserve at Ferozepore.

5. The time and place of assembling that army had, until within these few days, been left undecided; but the recent complexion of the accounts from the Punjab, and Mr. Clerk's opinion, in conformity with that I have been led to form, that the continuance of the existing Government in that country is very doubtful, induced me at once to fix Ferozepore as the place of assembly, and the 15th of November as the time.

6. The assembling of so considerable an army at that time at that point will have a material effect in strengthening the existing Government of Lahore; it will, I trust, generally facilitate the operations of the armies in Affghanistan; by the appearance of assured support, it will give confidence to the troops composing the force itself, and some experience in the greater movements of war to our officers; while exhibiting our undiminished military strength to the States by which we are surrounded, it will induce the abandonment of any intentions they might entertain of hostility to our Government.

7. I have from the first been so satisfied of the policy of assembling this army, that I have hardly deemed it necessary to advert to the obvious reasons for it. If I could at any time have entertained a doubt about the expediency of the measure, that doubt would have been removed by Mr. Clerk's having suggested it very soon after I was in communication with the Commander-in-Chief upon the subject, and by his having more than once, and again recently recurred to it, as a step calculated to be eminently useful in the present state of affairs.

8. I proceed to Simla for the same reason for which I came to Allahabad, with the view of placing myself in the position in which the presence of superior authority for the direction of political and military measures, seems to be most essential to the public service.

9. There are inconveniences undoubtedly attending the separation of the Governor-General from the Council of India, and I see and feel their weight. I was in hopes, that under very favourable circumstances, I might have been enabled to return to the Presidency in January, after having arranged in a secure manner the affairs which drew me hither; and those hopes are not yet renounced; but I must admit that the circumstances developed in the "Punjab Intelligence," the murder of Maee Chund Koonwur, the evident suspicions of Raja Goolaub Sing, the jealousies and uneasiness manifested by the Maharaja, and his occasional indiscretion in making known his feelings, together with the

conversations in the Durbar, which exhibit generally, on the part of the Chiefs, doubts of the continuance of our power, and suspicions of our intentions, if we should retain it. All these circumstances concur to make me apprehensive, that however favorable may be the result of our proceedings in Affghanistan, it may still be necessary that I should remain during the next hot season, especially in the absence of Mr. Clerk, to watch events, and provide for all contingencies.

I have, &c.

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 410.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, *Allahabad, August* 16, No. 29, A, 1842.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you several letters, written subsequently to my secret and confidential dispatch, in which I communicated the option I had offered to Major-General Nott, of retiring by Ghuznee and Cabool, instead of by Quetta.

These letters I have, equally with the others, deemed it necessary for the good of the public service, to keep this day entirely secret.

I have only communicated, generally, in a private letter to Mr. Clerk, my Agent on the north-west frontier, the substance of the instructions addressed to Generals Nott and Pollock, with a view to his guidance in negotiations with the Durbar of Lahore.

You will perceive, from the perusal of these letters, that I adhere absolutely to my original intention of withdrawing the whole army from Affghanistan; and that I have, in the most emphatic manner, repeated the order before given for that withdrawal.

Some risk I deem it justifiable to incur for the recovery of the guns and of the prisoners, and with the view of exhibiting the triumphant march of a British army over the ground, on which it once suffered defeat; but I consider the preservation of the army in Affghanistan essential to the preservation of our empire in India; and, however the world might forgive or applaud me, I should never forgive myself, if I exposed that army to any material and serious danger, for the possible accomplishment of any object now to be obtained in Affghanistan.

My hope and expectations are that, without incurring such danger, I shall effect, through the instructions I have given, every object now desired by the people of England.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 411.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Nott.

General, *Allahabad, July* 10, 1842.

YOUR means of communication with Major-General Pollock must be so uncertain, that I think it right to send you a copy of a letter I received from him to-day, conveying information as to his present plans, and as to the extent of carriage he possesses; which may be of use to you in enabling you to come to a safe decision, as to your line of retirement.

Every effort is making to increase Major-General Pollock's amount of carriage; but there is such a terror of Affghanistan, on the part of the drivers of camels, that further, and extensive, desertions may be expected, and the animals which leave Ferozepore may never reach Jellalabad.

Your success and your safety must, in a great measure, depend upon the support you may receive from the Major-General, by a march upon Cabool, simultaneous with yours; and you see what apprehensions he entertains of passing Gundamuck.

The return of your two armies to India, in a state of efficiency, is of more

importance than any success you might obtain at a great cost of men; and, as I have already told you, the occurrence of another great reverse, would be of very fatal consequence.

With these cautions, I must again leave the line of your retirement to your own decision, to be founded upon your knowledge of circumstances, at the period when your march would commence; and I can only again assure you, that the most favorable construction will be put upon your conduct.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 412.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Nott.

(Extract) *Allahabad, July* 16, 1842.

SUCH earnest representations have been made to the Deputy Commissary-General, who is at Loodiana, to Mr. Clerk, and to Major-General Battine, who are in communication with the Deputy Commissary-General, upon the subject of the carriage and supplies required for Major-General Pollock's army, and it has been so distinctly stated to them, that it is absolutely necessary that Major-General Pollock should have the means of moving his whole army, with fourteen days' provisions, by the 21st of September; that I feel satisfied that every exertion will be made, and that, if that army be not on that day so equipped as to be enabled to move in any direction, it will be the result of circumstances beyond human power to control.

I have suggested that the supplies furnished to Major-General Pollock should be calculated for 7000 men beyond the number of the troops now with him, on the ground that it may be necessary to give provisions from our own magazines to the Sikh troops; but, in fact, with a view to the possible advance of the army under your command.

Mahomed Akbar has told Mohun Lall, that, in the event of the British army advancing, he shall not meet it in the field, but defend the town of Cabool; upon which I immediately sent 400 more rockets to Major-General Pollock.

I hope you have received the rockets I sent to you by dawk. They left Allahabad on the 14th of May, and were, I believe, at Ferozepore, on the 10th of June. Your engineer officers will be aware that the composition in the rockets should be taken out, and re-made, as it will have been injured by the heat.

I do not know whether you are aware, that Major-General Pollock has no battering guns.

No. 413.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.

General, *Allahabad, July* 17, 1842.

THE accounts I have received to-day from Major Outram, of Major-General Nott's present means of carriage, and of the facilities which exist for increasing them, lead me to think that no difficulty on that head will occur, to prevent the Major-General from executing the march upon Ghuznee and Cabool, which he was authorized to make by my letter of the 4th instant, of which I transmitted a copy to you.

Major Outram says, that Major-General Nott has already sufficient carriage for present purposes; and he can obtain, on hire or by purchase, 3000 or 4000 more camels for his force, whenever he pleases. Major Outram has directed about 1300 camels, now at Sukkur, to proceed to Ferozepore, if the march can be made at this season. I have sent instructions to Mr. Clerk, to communicate with the Lahore Government, about the march of these camels by way of Mooltan, or any shorter (and practicable) route to Peshawur.

Your carriage will, if my orders can be obeyed, be completed by the 21st

of September, to what will be sufficient to move, in any direction, your whole force.

I really do think that at last all are working zealously and earnestly for your equipment.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 414.

The Governor-General of India to Major Outram.

Sir, *Allahabad, July* 17, 1842.

I GATHER from Major-General Nott's letter to you of the 22nd ultimo, and your reply thereto, that the Major-General was in want of money, and that you had six lacs in the treasury at Quetta.

In all probability the Major-General will therefore have given you instructions to send up the largest portion of the money in your treasury to him at Candahar; but, whatever may be the state of your treasury when you receive this letter, I request that you will at once, if you can do so safely, send up to Major-General Nott all you have disposable; and, deeming the urgency of supplying his force to be greater than that of supplying the force below, you will even run the risk of exposing yourself at Quetta to temporary inconvenience, in your endeavour to meet the demands of the force at Candahar.

I am much gratified, by the accounts received from you to-day, of the extent of carriage now at Major-General Nott's disposal, and of the facilities with which you think it can be immediately increased. It is essential that the Major-General's army should have furnished to it ample means of moving in every direction; and I indulge the hope that, through your able and zealous exertions, this has now been done.

I have, &c.
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 415.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.

General, *Allahabad, July* 23, 1842.

I AM in hopes that Major-General Nott will to-day be in possession of my letter of the 4th instant, and that you will, very soon after you receive this letter, be made acquainted with the Major-General's intentions.

My expectation is, that Major-General Nott will feel himself sufficiently strong, and be sufficiently provided with carriage, to march upon Ghuznee and Cabool.

I have taken the precaution of instructing Major Outram to send up to Candahar every disposable camel, and all the treasure at Quetta, about five or six lacs; and I have likewise instructed Major Leech, who may have reached Quetta, to return to Candahar. Major Leech's local knowledge will be of much use to Major-General Nott, if he should advance on Ghuznee and Cabool.

Major-General Nott, looking forward to the difficulties of the march, and the uncertain time it may occupy, and necessarily impressed with a deep sense of the importance of terminating the whole combined operations, and bringing off the two armies into the plains before the commencement of severe weather, will hasten his preparations for leaving Candahar, and I anticipate his being able to do so by the 15th of August.

I do not apprehend that between Candahar and Ghuznee any obstacles will be offered to his march, by an enemy disheartened by repeated discomfiture, and completely taken by surprise; and I look forward to the army from Candahar being to the north of Ghuznee by the 10th of September.

I have used every exertion in my power to complete the equipment of your army with carriage. From fifteen to twenty lacs of treasure will be forwarded to you, in addition to the ten already transmitted; and the Commissariat has been

directed to provide the means of carriage for provisions for 7500 men beyond the amount of your present force, such carriage being equal to the transport of fourteen days' supply.

I am assured by Mr. Clerk, that the requisite carriage will be furnished by the time fixed—that was, originally, the 1st of October; and since, the 21st of September.

I am hardly sanguine enough to think that all I have directed to be done, will be done by that earlier day; but I certainly entertain the expectation that, leaving, as you probably will, the 2nd Regiment of Native Infantry, and 200 Irregular Cavalry, in the Khyber Pass, to occupy that position, and leaving likewise a garrison in Jellalabad, you will possess sufficient carriage to move the remainder of your army in advance, to support the march of Major-General Nott upon Cabool.

Mahomed Akbar Khan will probably retire from Cabool, on the appearance of the combined army.

The expectations of its advance will revive and invigorate the factions opposed to that chief; and it is not altogether improbable, that the result may be his overthrow, and the nominal establishment of a Royal Government, in the person of some other chief, or of the Prince Futteh Jung.

You are already authorized to treat with a *de facto* Government for the exchange of prisoners; but you will avoid doing any act from which it might be inferred that the British Government recognized any authority which may be established in Cabool.

You will distinctly declare that you are not authorized to make any such recognition, and you will refer the matter to me.

The object of the combined march of your army, and Major-General Nott's upon Cabool, will be to exhibit our strength where we suffered defeat; to inflict just, but not vindictive, retribution upon the Affghans; and to recover the guns and colours, as well as the prisoners, lost by our army.

The first of these objects is evidently attainable; but I cannot but entertain much doubt whether even the presence of two victorious armies at Cabool will effect the recovery of the prisoners.

The difficulty of recovering the prisoners arises from the circumstance of there being no strong established Government in Cabool, which would have at once the will, and the power, to coerce individual chiefs, and to compel them to surrender the prisoners they may respectively have in their possession, for the purpose of relieving the country from the presence of a foreign army.

Our coercion of the Government of Algiers in 1816 led to the restoration of slaves, the private property of individuals; but the Government of Algiers was strong, and had power to compel such restitution. The apprehension of the consequences which might result from further refusal to surrender the Russian slaves, led the Government of Khiva, in the last year, to compel individuals to give up their property; but the Government of Khiva, too, was strong, and had the power to enforce obedience to its will.

There is no such Government, and there is no present prospect of the establishment of any such Government, at Cabool; and, most unfortunately, the early and frequent mention of ransom has led those who hold our prisoners in their power, to consider them as a valuable property.

The pressure of war may undoubtedly become so severe as to induce a somewhat general desire amongst the Affghans to terminate hostilities with us, by the surrender of all they have taken from us, and this general desire may practically compel the restitution of the prisoners; but I look to this event, as one rather to be desired than expected.

There is one other event, too, rather to be desired than expected, perhaps, but which must be deemed of not impossible occurrence,—the surrender of Mahomed Akbar Khan into your hands by the faction hostile to him.

To the possession of that chief's person, I attach very great importance. You are already authorized to give an assurance, that his life shall be spared; but you will not make any other condition, nor make that lightly. I earnestly desire that that chief, the avowed murderer of Sir William Macnaghten, and the betrayer of a British army, should come into our power without any condition whatsoever.

Should Mahomed Akbar retain his authority after your advance upon Cabool, he will endeavour to protract any negociation, in which he will involve

you, so as to detain you at Cabool until the severe season shall return, when he will expect to obtain over you the same success which he obtained over our army last year, through the same means of cold and famine.

You will, therefore, not delay any operation whatever, which military considerations would suggest to you, in consequence of any pending negotiation. You will, as long as the season permits you to remain with perfect security, rely upon your own force, and upon that alone, for the effecting of your objects, and exert that force vigorously, giving every proof of British power, which is not inconsistent with the usages of war, and the dictates of British humanity; but you will never forget that, after so exhibiting that power, you are, without allowing yourself to be diverted therefrom by any object, to obey the positive orders of your Government to withdraw your army from Affghanistan.

It will be your highest praise, after having re-established the opinion of the invincibility of the British arms upon the scene of their late misfortunes, to restore its armies to India in a perfectly efficient state, at a period, when I assure you that their presence in India is most desirable.

I trust that the last man of the two armies will have repassed the Sutlej by the 1st of January, and that I may then have the satisfaction of offering to you my personal congratulations upon your having successfully accomplished every object you have been directed to effect, and realized every reasonable wish of your country.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 416.

Major-General Nott to the Governor-General of India.

My Lord, *Candahar, July* 26, 1842.

HAVING well considered the subject of your Lordship's letter of the 4th instant; having looked at the difficulties in every point of view, and reflected on the advantages which would attend a successful accomplishment of such a move, and the moral influence it would have throughout Asia; I have come to a determination to retire a portion of the army under my command, *viâ* Ghuznee and Cabool. I shall take with me, not a large, but a compact and well tried, force, on which I can rely. Your Lordship may rest assured that all prudence, and every military precaution, shall be observed: there shall be no unnecessary risk; and, if expedient, I will mask Ghuznee, and even Cabool. But, if an opportunity should offer, I will endeavour to strike a decisive blow for the honor of our arms.

The greatest difficulty I am likely to experience will be the want of forage in the neighbourhood of Cabool, and thence to Jellalabad, in consequence of the large bodies of horse, which have so long consumed, and still continue to consume it. I, therefore, hope that measures will be taken to have supplies of forage, and a few comforts for the European troops stored at Jellalabad, which place I shall endeavour to regulate my march so as to reach the first week of October.

I have commenced arrangements for the remainder of the force retiring upon Sukkur, under the command of Major-General England, who will receive the necessary instructions for his guidance in withdrawing the troops from Candahar, and the different posts between this and Shikarpore.

I am most anxious, notwithstanding the conduct of the Affghan chiefs, that our army should leave a deep impression on the people of this country, of our character for forbearance and humanity.

All our guns, also six brass pieces, belonging to the late Shah Shooja-ool-Molk, shall be taken to Sukkur. All unserviceable articles, not worth the carriage, will be destroyed.

Having now acquainted your Lordship of my determination, I shall not fail to keep your Lordship constantly informed of my proceedings.

I have, &c.
W. NOTT.

No. 417.

Major Outram to the Governor-General of India.

My Lord, *Quetta, July 26, 1842.*

I HAD the honor to receive your Lordship's commands, dated 7th instant, this morning, and I beg to inclose, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a letter I immediately addressed to Major-General Nott in consequence.

The Major-General having intimated, on the 19th instant, that he had then within 800 camels of what he required, to move all the troops at Candahar; and, as he must have since provided some, by purchase, I presume that the additional 500 I now purpose sending, will meet his entire wants.

Having, I confidently trust, secured the resources of Beloochistan, I have no fear of not being able to furnish what may hereafter be requisite for the troops to the southward of Candahar.

I have, &c.
J. OUTRAM.

No. 418.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.

General, *Allahabad, July 29, 1842.*

THE information conveyed in your letter of the 14th instant, with respect to the opening of a negotiation for the exchange of prisoners, will not induce me to relax in my endeavors to supply your army with the means of movement; nor are you to consider the orders you before had, to be, in any respect, varied, in consequence of the mission of Hajee Buchtiar Khan to your camp.

Before your letter of the 14th instant was received, directions had been published for the assembly of the army of reserve at Ferozepore, on the 15th November, and those directions will be executed.

I had, likewise, before the receipt of that letter, given directions for the formation of my own camp at Goruchtesir Ghaut, on the 15th of October, instead of at Cawnpore; and, I trust, I shall be able to join the army of reserve, very soon after it is assembled.

No new orders will be sent to Major-General Nott. I expect that the advance of the army from Candahar will facilitate your negotiations at Cabool.

In the event of all your demands being complied with, by the surrender to you, of all the guns, colours, and trophies of war, taken from us, and of all the British prisoners within the reach and power of the *de facto* Government of Cabool, and of your consenting thereupon, according to the instructions I have sent to you to-day, to desist from military operations, it will be necessary to make provision with respect to the army of Major-General Nott, which may then be in march for Ghuznee and Cabool.

It appears to me to be far better, and more honorable to our arms, that that movement should be continued, than that, even on the actual delivery of the guns, colours, trophies, and prisoners, it should be countermanded; but there may be military reasons, connected with carriage and supply, which may render it, under such circumstances, more convenient, that Major-General Nott should retire by Quetta, rather than by the route of Ghuznee and Cabool.

If this should be your decided opinion you are at liberty to give instructions, accordingly, to Major-General Nott.

In either case, whether the movement of the army from Candahar shall be continued in the direction of Ghuznee and Cabool, or countermanded upon Quetta, you will provide that two commissioners, one being a British officer, late a prisoner, and the other an Affghan chief, of rank and respectability, shall proceed to the camp of Major-General Nott with your orders, and that all the resources of the country shall, by the *de facto* Government, be placed at the Major-General's disposal, for the use of his army during its march.

Such march would be conducted as through a friendly country, with all the precautions of war, not one of which could be safely omitted.

I entertain great doubts of the recovery of the British prisoners at Ghuznee, unless Major-General Nott should advance to that place; and his retirement by Quetta, after his movement upon Ghuznee and Cabool shall have been commenced, would, under any circumstances, be misrepresented, to the prejudice of our arms.

Still there may exist reasons, as I have already said, for his retirement by Quetta, and you will give directions according to your discretion.

It will be safer that you should consider any arrangements you may negotiate, for the surrender to you, of the guns, and colours, and for the exchange of prisoners, and for the cessation of hostilities, and for the march of Major-General Nott's army, as forming parts of a purely military convention, such as any General, commanding an army in chief, must, of necessity, be competent to make; leaving it to political authorities to enter into terms of peace.

Such terms of peace can only well be settled after further communication with the Government of Lahore, by Mr. Clerk, my Agent for the North-Western Frontier.

You are fully authorized, however, to declare that the British Government neither had, nor has, any desire to dictate to the Affghans the form of Government they shall adopt, or to designate the person upon whom they shall confer supreme authority.

We desire only, that the Affghans shall have a Government capable of maintaining, and willing to maintain, the relations of peace and friendship with its neighbours; and such a Government, when satisfied that it has the character of permanence, we shall be forward to recognize.

We desire to see, firmly established in Affghanistan, a friendly and independent Government. It was because the Government of India thought it had reasons to believe that the Government of Cabool was forming connections which were inconsistent with its independence, and evinced hostility to the British power, that an army was directed to march upon the Indus, and a Sovereign, having hereditary claims, and supposed to be, not only friendly towards us, but popular with his former subjects, was supported in his endeavours to repossesss the throne. That Sovereign is no more. Our engagements, whatever they may have been, have died with him, and we are now at liberty to concur in the establishment of the independence of Affghanistan, under whatever Government, or person, the Affghans may prefer.

I have, &c.
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 419.

Major-General Nott to the Governor-General of India.

My Lord, *Candahar, July* 28, 1842.

I HAVE been honored with your Lordship's letter of the 5th July, 1842. My letter of the 26th instant, will have acquainted your Lordship of my having determined on retiring a portion of the army under my command, *vid* Cabool and Jellalabad.

I shall lose no time in intimating my intention to Sir George Arthur, Governor of Bombay.

The inclosed memorandum will show your Lordship the intended division of the troops.

There may be some little alteration, when I shall have fairly calculated my means of carriage for both divisions.

I certainly could have wished to have taken Her Majesty's 41st Regiment with me, knowing the great consequence of the adventurous march before me. But, when I look to Sinde, and to the want of confidence in our brave troops, shown by certain officers, I must give up that wish, however desirable, to insure the safety of the division which I am not to accompany.

I can see no difficulty or danger to the division which will retire to Sukkur; and their numbers will be augmented at every post on their route. What the

division, retiring *viâ* Ghuznee and Jellalabad, may have to encounter, remains to be seen; but I trust our exertions will overcome all difficulties, and that your Lordship will not be disappointed.

I have, &c.,
W. NOTT.

Detail of Troops about to move under the command of Major-General Nott.

Two troops of Horse Artillery.
9-pounder Foot Battery.
3rd Bombay Cavalry.
Five Rissalahs, Christie's Irregular Horse.
Five ditto, 1st Bengal ditto.
Her Majesty's 40th Regiment.
2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, 43rd } Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry.
3rd, or Captain Craigie's Irregular Bengal Infantry.

To retire on Sukkur, under command of Major-General England.

One troop, Captain Anderson's Horse Artillery.
One Foot Battery (six guns) Bullock.
Four 18-pounders.
3rd and 4th Companies 2nd Battalion Bengal Foot Artillery.
A detachment of Poona Horse.
Two brigades of Christie's Horse.
Her Majesty's 41st Regiment.
25th Bombay Native Infantry.
Seven companies late Bombay Light Infantry Battalion.
1st, or Captain Griffiths', Irregular Infantry.
2nd, or Captain Macan's, ditto.
3rd, or Captain Mc Donald's ditto.

No. 420.

Major-General Pollock to the Governor-General of India.

My Lord, *Jellalabad, July* 17, 1842.

I HAD the honor to receive your Lordship's letter dated the 4th instant, late yesterday afternoon; also a copy of your dispatch to General Nott. I have already written to the General, to ascertain what his plans will be, after the receipt of your Lordship's letter, apprizing him that, if he returns by Ghuznee and Cabool, he should give me the earliest information of the strength of his force, in order that I may lay in supplies accordingly.

When I receive his reply, I shall be able to determine on my own movements, which, from your Lordship's exertions in my behalf, will not, I hope, much longer be crippled. I had the honour to forward, three days ago, the substance of my reply to the messenger from Cabool. It will be quite evident to your Lordship that, although the messenger is sent in the name of Futteh Jung, the nobles and people of Cabool, the prime mover is Mahomed Akbar.

The King is a mere puppet in his hands, and both are now much in want of money. I confess I do not expect that all the terms will be agreed to, in consequence of the introduction of the clause about the guns. If an objection be started, or, as I expect, money be demanded, in either case it will enable me to cease negociating; for I beg, with submission, to state that I would rather dictate terms at Cabool, or leave lasting marks of our retrieved honor there, than encounter the treachery which other modes of dealing with Affghans must always be open to. It is supposed by natives here, that the present mission from Cabool as a mere ruse to prevent my despoiling the lands, forts, &c., of

Mahomed Shah, in Lughman. He is our bitterest enemy now. His possessions are, however, I am afraid, secure; for, on sending to inquire, I find that the three rivers to cross are not fordable, and that the whole country is under water, with rice crops. I have not yet settled all accounts with the Shinwarrees, who have been, all along, opposed to us. Two or three of their Chiefs are servants of Mahomed Akbar, and are now at Cabool.

Brigadier Monteath will accordingly destroy their forts, and secure a further supply of grain and bhoosa to be sent in to me.

Captain Macgregor's exertions on this occasion have been unceasing, although occasionally, as at present, suffering from fever and ague.

I hope the brigade will not be detained many days more; they have effected all I could expect.

The punishment inflicted on delinquents has had a most salutary effect, and not a shot has been fired. The weather, for some days, has been very hot, and we are looking anxiously for rain.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 421.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.) *Allahabad, August* 17, 1842.

SINCE the dispatch of the last mail, I have continued to receive constant reports furnished by Moonshee Mohun Lall, of the progress of events at Cabool, and from them your Honorable Committee will learn that Mahomed Akbar has succeeded in overcoming the parties of Zeman Khan and Khan Shureen, and installing himself in the office of Vizier to Prince Futteh Jung, whom he has formally proclaimed king. The Prince is not, however, allowed to enjoy any power or authority; he has been compelled to surrender to Mahomed Akbar the money and property of the late Shah Shooja, which had come into his possession, and he is retained in his present situation merely as long as it may suit the convenience of Mahomed Akbar that he should hold it. Many of the influential chiefs of Cabool and the provinces are believed to be inimical to Mahomed Akbar, and a small portion of the country is already said to be in insurrection against the ruling authority.

2. The British prisoners, who were in the hands of Mahomed Akbar, have all been brought to Cabool or its vicinity: this measure having been resolved upon to secure them against any sudden effort which General Pollock might make for their recovery, and with a view to their removal to Toorkistan, if, that general advancing on Cabool, Mahomed Akbar should find himself compelled to fly in that direction. Measures were taken by General Pollock to counteract this design, and he received assurances from many of the most powerful chiefs that they would not permit it to be carried into execution. Meanwhile a correspondence has been entered into between General Pollock and the Authorities at Cabool, which is designed on the General's part to lead to a negotiation for a general exchange of prisoners, and the restoration of the guns and other military trophies of the late Cabool force, now in the hands of the Affghans.

3. My instructions of the 29th ultimo, addressed to the Major-General, will apprise your Committee of my views and intentions as to the tone in which such negotiations should be carried on. I have therein told the Major-General that when every gun, and colour, and military trophy in the hands of the Affghans, and every prisoner within the reach and power of the *de facto* Government of Cabool, have been surrendered to him, and not till then, he may give orders suited to a state of returning peace; and I have authorized the Major-General to declare that, when this condition shall have been fulfilled, I will cause Dost Mahomed Khan, and all the prisoners in our hands, to be honorably conveyed to the frontier, and delivered over without condition. I have strongly objected to any payment being made on account of the maintenance of the British prisoners in Affghanistan, though that course has been advocated by some of the British officers now in confinement at Cabool; for I apprehend that any such concession would lead to a belief that, while ransoming our own prisoners, we were compelled to give theirs without ransom.

4. I have no reason to believe that these negotiations are now assuming a form which promises to lead to any satisfactory result, but, as abundant supplies of carriage cattle are on their way to Jellalabad, from Hindoostan, Major-General Pollock will, in the course of next month, be enabled to give such weight to the demands which he is directed to make, as will result from the perfect efficiency of his force, for any operation which it may then be desirable to undertake. Some obstacles may be found to exist to the entire restoration of all our prisoners, in the circumstance of a portion of them being in the power of Shumsoodeen Khan, the Governor of Ghuznee, who has not yet apparently yielded allegiance to the existing Government of Cabool.

5. Your Honorable Committee will observe that the operations conducted by the force under the command of Brigadier Monteath have been perfectly successful. I have the honor to inclose a copy of the order with which I published the Brigadier's report of proceedings in the Shinwarree Valley.

6. Your Honorable Committee will find amongst the inclosures No. 24, an interesting paper, by Moonshee Mohun Lall, on the causes of the Affghan insurrection, and on the events which succeeded the outbreak at Cabool in November last. I would also draw your attention to the copy of an unfinished letter from the late Sir William Macnaghten, to the address of the Secretary of the Government of India, in the Secret and Political Department, which is the only document that has reached the Government of India from the late Envoy since the first breaking out of the insurrection. Some additional information is now constantly reaching me of the circumstances which preceded and attended the destruction of the Cabool force, and these are regularly transmitted to Mr. Cameron, the officer who has been selected to examine and report upon all such documents, with a view to ascertain to what causes that event, and the subsequent loss of Ghuznee, are attributable.

16. From the correspondence your Honorable Committee will learn the arrangements that have been in progress, under my orders, for supplying carriage to the forces under the command of Generals Nott and Pollock, and for providing what may be required for the use of the army of reserve that is to be assembled at Ferozepore in the month of November.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 422.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.) *Allahabad, August* 17, No. 35, 1842.

DURING the five weeks which have elapsed since I last had the honor of addressing you, I have taken every possible measure for the furnishing of Major-General Pollock's army with carriage; and I have every reason to expect that, by the 21st of September, or, at the latest, by the 1st of October, that army will be enabled to move in any direction.

2. Major-General Nott's army will certainly, by the same period, be amply provided with the means of movement.

3. You will observe that overtures of negotiation, for an exchange of prisoners, have been made by the *de facto* authorities at Cabool. Those overtures, if serious, must have been based upon a very false view of the present disposition of the British Government, and of the force of the army.

4. The replies of Major-General Pollock have been in perfect accordance with my instructions, founded, I hope, upon true principles of policy, and upon just views of national dignity and honor.

5. I do not expect that these negotiations will have any result; but I do expect that the trophies of war which fell into the hands of the Affghans, in January last, and most of the prisoners then taken from us, will be ultimately restored upon honorable conditions.

6. You will perceive that I have instructed Major-General Pollock to place Mahomed Akbar Khan upon his trial; and, if he should be convicted, to deal with him as he would with any person who might be convicted, under similar circumstances, of the crime of murder, of which that chief is accused.

7. I have adopted this step, upon full consideration, and with a thorough conviction of its expediency.

8. You will be gratified to learn, that every expectation exists that the neighbourhood of Jellalabad will afford ample supplies of provision to the army, without drawing upon Peshawur, which is itself fully supplied.

9. The army has at present three months' supply of attah and wheat.

13. I have informed Mr. Clerk, that I have no desire that the occupation of Jellalabad, upon the retirement of the British army, should be at all pressed upon the Maharajah. The delivery of that place to the Sikhs, would be a measure of unmitigated hostility to the Affghan nation, precluding all hope of any pacific arrangement upon any point.

14. The circumstances which existed when I consented to deliver Jellalabad to the Sikhs, may have justified the measure; but, if there should arise the chance of the establishment of any permanent Government at Cabool, capable of maintaining, and willing to maintain, relations of amity with neighbouring States, it would be desirable that we should retain the means of forming such amicable relations, and of effecting a settlement which might produce tranquillity on both banks of the Indus.

No. 423.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, June* 23, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to transmit herewith copy of a report from Brigadier Monteath. The lesson taught to the people in the direction of Pesh Bolak, will prove very beneficial, and tend to secure our communication with the rear. There are large quantities of bhoosa, which will be collected, and sent for the use of the force.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 424.

Brigadier Monteath to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Camp, Goolai Forts, June* 22, 1842.

I HAVE the honor of reporting for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., that I yesterday obtained possession of the gun which was taken when Captain Ferris retired from his position at Pesh Bolak; the chief in whose fort it was deposited, distant about three miles from hence, having surrendered it.

As the people of the five-and-twenty Golai forts taken by this force, made no attempt to enter into any arrangements as to restitution or compensation for the British property plundered and destroyed by them, I have commenced upon the removal of the grain and wood into the camp, and have sent working parties to cut down all the trees, mulberry and willow, about the forts, amounting, I should think, to about eight or nine hundred, which might, if cut up, be of great service as fuel for the army; but independent of this supply, the engineer officer informs me, that the rafters lying in piles and in the roofs of the houses, would alone be equal to the consumption of two months for the army, therefore, it might be worth General Pollock's consideration, whether or not it be in his power to remove it from Barruk-ab (distant twenty miles from Jellalabad) where a depôt might be formed, in the first instance, by the wood being sent from hence to that place: the village belongs to Kalat Khan, and is looked upon as safe.

Captain Macgregor having procured eight hundred bullocks from the country, I have directed Lieutenant Becher to select 4000 of the best rafters for building purposes, which shall be dispatched to-day, if possible, to Baruk-ab, from whence they must be taken up by cattle from Jellalabad.

The country here I consider as very favorable for troops, as it is very open and high, abundance of the best water, and plenty of good grass and forage for horses and camels, and as all at present seem pleased with the change from Jellalabad, the force might conveniently remain here until everything useful was

removed. Of bhoosa there seems to be a great quantity, and as there are ten or twelve mills available for our use I understand, should our remaining here for a time be thought advisable, the wheat, if I can find the means of winnowing it, shall be ground into flour for our own uses.

Captain Lloyd has this morning reported to me, that he yesterday procured atta to an extent beyond the consumption of a day. If equally successful for the future, it will give us leisure to convert our own wheat into flour. Therefore if it, bhoosa and wood, can be brought to account, the saving to Government will be very considerable.

When the whole of the wheat and bhoosa has been brought from the forts into camp, which I hope will be the case in a couple of days from hence, I will then make make my report on the subject.

The Chiefs on the opposite side of the valley were yesterday in consultation as to the sums to be paid by them in the way of recompense to us for our losses, but I have not yet learnt their determination. Unless, however, they are of a satisfactory nature, I shall move down upon them as soon as I am a little at leisure.

Barley for the horses seems to be our chief difficulty, and should we not succeed in our endeavours to obtain it in sufficient quantities, it must be sent from Jellalabad or Dakka. Ghee and dhal will also be required for the natives; and tea and other necessaries, which Captain Lloyd will apprize Major Thompson of, for the Europeans.

I have detached one hundred men under a European officer to Pesh Bolak, distant about one mile and a half, to protect it, as from thence our supplies are drawn.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of the copy of the opinion of Government as to the legality of corporal punishment being inflicted on Native soldiers by the Provost Marshal when found marauding.

I have, &c.,
J. MONTEATH.

No. 425.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Candahar, July* 4, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th ultimo, relative to the formation of an army of reserve in Sirhind after the rains.

I have nothing new to communicate: all has been tranquillized in the vicinity of Candahar; the people have returned to the cultivation of their lands, but the several chiefs talk of assembling forces from the province of Zumindawur and other districts. I do not think they will succeed, and if they do, they will not be able to face the force under my command.

I have the honor of inclosing the translation of an intercepted letter from Prince Futteh Jung to his brother Sufter Jung; the latter is now living in the city of Candahar.

I have, &c.,
W. NOTT.

No. 426.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, July* 2, 1842.

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of my letter to your address, of date the 27th ultimo, I have now the honor to forward a statement showing the quantity of carriage cattle required for each regiment and detachment of this force, and also the total number required for the whole force, together with the number now in our possession, I beg to draw attention to the N.B. at the bottom of this document, in which the causes of the increase in the number of camels required are explained.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE POLLOCK.

Detail of Cattle required for the Force under command of Major-General Pollock.

Camp, Jellalabad, June 27, 1842.

	Elephants.	Camels.		Banjarree Bullocks.		Transport Train Bullocks.	Ordnance Bullocks.	Carriage Bullocks.	Mules, Yaboos, and Asses.
		Public.	Private.	Public.	Private.				
3rd Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery	7	37	26	..	..	..	..	..	..
3rd ditto 2nd ditto ditto	..	67	34	..	..	47	..	..	..
Veterinary Surgeon	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2nd Company 2nd Battalion European Foot Artillery	..	37	6	24	16	..	141	..	..
4th ditto 6th ditto Native Infantry	..	6	13	..	..	..	..	..	..
2nd ditto 6th ditto ditto	..	226	34	..	..	..	..	..	..
Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons	23	298	117	..	..	..	..	..	..
1st Regiment Light Cavalry	..	98	75	..	..	..	..	..	..
10th ditto ditto	..	98	111	..	..	..	..	..	..
3rd ditto Irregular ditto	..	18	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Party of 1st and 4th ditto	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..
Detachment 5th Light Cavalry	..	51	45	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ditto 2nd ditto, S. S. F.	..	3	25	..	..	..	..	..	..
Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry	..	366	169	..	..	..	..	..	..
35th Regiment Native Infantry	..	70	115	..	..	..	..	..	..
Sappers and Miners (Broadfoot)	..	75	72	..	..	..	..	..	75
Jezailchees	..	9	9	..	..	..	..	..	..
Her Majesty's 9th Regiment Foot	..	366	75	..	..	..	..	..	..
26th Regiment Native Infantry	..	88	102	..	..	..	..	..	..
60th ditto ditto	..	80	132	..	..	..	..	..	..
Sappers and Miners	..	26	14	..	..	..	..	..	..
30th Regiment Native Infantry	..	86	132	..	..	..	..	..	..
53rd ditto ditto	..	97	101	..	..	..	..	..	..
64th ditto ditto	..	102	108	..	..	..	..	..	..
Her Majesty's 31st Regiment of Foot	31	242	161	..	..	..	..	..	..
33rd Regiment Native Infantry	..	103	179	..	..	..	..	..	..
6th ditto ditto	..	115	132	..	..	..	..	..	..
Field Ordnance, Park or Magazine	..	110	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Paymaster to the Force	..	2	1	..	..	..	..	..	..
General Field Hospital	..	13	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Medical Department	..	13	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Staff of Division of Infantry under General Mc Caskill	..	1	10	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ditto 2nd Brigade of Infantry	..	..	7	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ditto 4th ditto ditto	..	..	10	..	..	..	..	..	..
Commissariat Treasuries	..	14	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
General Staff	..	10	26	..	..	..	..	..	..
For Hospital Khajawahs not indented for	..	198	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Puckals, &c.	..	95	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Field Depôt, Brigade Go-downs, and Commissariat Officers	..	500	..	7110	..	..	..	24	208
Field Magazine, Treasure, and spare Carriages for Horse and Foot Artillery	..	..	..	..	..	401	..	..	..
Mountain Train	..	8	10	..	..	..	..	..	..
Spare	..	373	205	704	2	..	..	..	..
	66	4102	2257	7838	18	448	141	24	283
	66	6359		7856		448	141	24	283

N.B. The increase upon the last return is caused by the troops detached being now included, which they were not before, and the calculation for the carriage of supplies being now made for fourteen days, instead of for seven, as formerly, and seven for victualling stores for Europeans, instead of for three days; also three days' grain for cavalry and artillery horses.

W. J. THOMPSON,
Assistant Commissary-General.

Statement showing the quantity of Carriage required, present, and wanting to complete, for the Force under Major-General Pollock.

Camp, Jellalabad, June 27, 1842.

	Public.						Hired.		
	Elephants.	Carriage Camels.	Ordnance Bullocks.	Transport Train Bullocks.	Carriage Bullocks.	Mules, Yaboos, Asses.	Rewarree Camels.	Bunjarree Bullocks.	Mules, Yaboos, Asses.
Required as per annexed detail	66	6359	141	448	24	109	..	7856	174
Present .. .. N.B.—5 Elephants and 178 Camels sick, not included.	66	3293	141	448	24	109	98 under discharge.	2106	174
Wanting to complete		3066						5750	

W. J. THOMPSON,
Assistant Commissary-General.

No. 427.

Mr. Maddock to Lieutenant Brown, Assistant to the Political Agent in Sinde.

Sir, *Allahabad, July* 17, 1842.

WITH reference to Major Outram's letter to you dated the 27th ultimo, respecting the sending of all the available camels at Sukkur to Ferozepore, "provided Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons considered it advisable, and you found that the animals could travel that road at this season," I am directed by the Governor-General to instruct you to despatch all such available camels to Ferozepore, if the march should be now practicable, whatever may have been the reply given to your reference by Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, unless you should have received orders to the contrary from Major Outram before the receipt of this letter.

2. I have addressed a letter this day to Mr. Clerk, informing him of the probable march of these camels, in number, as it is understood, about 1,300, and have transmitted to him the instruction of the Governor-General to communicate with the Lahore Government upon the subject, and to obtain their consent to the passage of the camels by Mooltan, or any other route which may be shorter than that to Peshawur by Ferozepore, and equally practicable. A copy of this letter is sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, who will communicate with Mr. Clerk, and if an ample supply of camels and other animals shall have been already sent to Major-General Pollock, the camels from Sukkur will march to Ferozepore for the use of the army of reserve.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 428.

Major-General Pollock to Lieutenant Conolly, a prisoner at Cabool.

Sir, *Jellalabad, July* 4, 1842.

WITH reference to your letter to Sir R. Shakespear, of date 26th ultimo, if you think your coming here can, in any way, facilitate the release of the prisoners, I shall be happy to see you; but I think that some person on the part of the Chiefs you mention, viz., Meer Hajee, Mahomed Zeman, and Khan Shureen, Khans, should be deputed to accompany you, with some powers to treat

about a general release of all prisoners in Hindoostan, and all in Affghanistan, without reserve. The above Chiefs are mentioned, because they are all respectable, and they have shown kindness to the prisoners they have had charge of; and it would not, perhaps, be a difficult matter for them (respected as they are) to possess themselves of all the prisoners, including those at Ghuznee, and then determine on any final arrangement for the exchange. They would not doubt our sincerity. With regard to the passing of a bill for 107,852 rupees, I will refer your letter to the Governor-General, but I can hardly expect a favorable result to such a demand, without an account of any kind. If sums are charged, which are not expended for the expenses of the prisoners, and they are paid, it is an inducement to retain the prisoners. How many prisoners are there? and how can such a sum have been expended since early in January? I am very glad to find a disposition on the part of Meer Hajee, Zeman Khan, and Khan Shureen, to treat for the liberation of the prisoners, and hope soon to hear again that measures are being taken by them, and others, for so desirable an end.

A very large force of about 25,000 men is ordered to assemble at Ferozepore under the Commander-in-Chief.

There are about 20,000 men here, and there are about 15,000 with Nott.

10,000 men are also on their way from England, and will make an overwhelming army; and it will be a fearful day for Affghanistan, if such an army advance. The release of the prisoners, and delivery of our guns, no doubt, will go far to appease the British Government, but any further treachery will doubtless be visited by some signal blow.

I have, &c.

G. POLLOCK.

P. S. I have, in reply to a letter from him, written to Mahomed Shah Ghilzye, mentioning that no difficulty would be made by me regarding an exchange of prisoners.

No. 429.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, July* 10, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward a copy of a letter from Moonshee Mohun Lall, of date the 4th instant, in which it will be observed, that Aga Humza is willing to raise 5,000 men to prevent Mahomed Akbar from carrying off the prisoners; for this service, it is suggested that 10,000 rupees would be required. I am doubtful if such a sum would be sanctioned by the Governor-General, though it does not appear to me to be objectionable, as it is money paid for service done, and not as a ransom. I should, of course, agree to pay only on reaping the advantage; but, with my present instructions, I should hardly consider myself justified in authorizing the payment of any money for the prisoners, unless for their support. I am afraid it will be difficult, if not impracticable, to obtain a general release. The prisoners are retained by different parties, each being desirous of making his own terms. I did hope that my letter to Mahomed Shah would have produced a favorable reply, but none has been received. There is scarcely time for a reply from Lieutenant Conolly, but, even if all the prisoners now at Cabool could be placed under one chief, it is doubtful if Shumsoodeen at Ghuznee would give up his. Mahomed Akbar is evidently in difficulty about money; and, notwithstanding his having raised himself as he has, he appears to have made no friends, and if he fails in raising money, he will not long have power; he is a sad stumbling-block in the way of all negotiations.

I have, &c.

G. POLLOCK.

No. 430.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, July* 12, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward copies of letters which I received yesterday from Moonshee Mohun Lall, of date the 6th, 8th, and 9th instant. It will be seen by these letters, and by the copies of Captain Conolly's letters, yesterday forwarded, that there is a party at Cabool anxious to assist in preventing the removal of our prisoners. I cannot but think that the liberation of the prisoners is an object which it is my duty to effect, by every means in my power, consistent with the orders which I have received.

2. In the 11th paragraph of your letter, of date 1st ultimo, I am told that I have properly no political duties, but am to be governed by military considerations alone. I trust that I am not wrong in thinking that the above instructions do not preclude negotiation regarding the prisoners. It will be observed, by the letters now forwarded, that, with the exception of those at Ghuznee, all the British prisoners are now assembled in the Bala Hissar, at Cabool, and it is possible that Mahomed Akbar may have been induced to thus collect them, by my letter to Mahomed Shah Khan Ghilzye, a copy of which I forwarded to you, with my letter, No. 126, of 1842; but it is of course desirable to avoid, if possible, any negotiation with Mahomed Akbar, and also to put it out of his power to remove the prisoners.

3. There are conflicting interests at Cabool which are not easily reconciled, and leave me very doubtful of success, and make me hesitate to commence any negotiation; but I trust that the Right Honorable the Governor-General will not disapprove of my having written the inclosed letters to Meer Hajee and Ameen-oollah, with a view to interesting them in preventing the removal of our prisoners. I have also the honor to inclose copy of Sir R. Shakspear's reply to Moonshee Mohun Lall's letters.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK

No 431.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, July* 27, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 150, and I am directed by the Governor-General to inform you that the opinion you therein express, "that it does not appear to you to be objectionable to pay 10,000 rupees for the purpose of raising men to prevent Mahomed Akbar from carrying off the prisoners," is perfectly correct, and for the reason given by you, namely, that that "would be money paid for service done, and not as a ransom."

2. The Governor-General would readily sanction any expenditure you may deem necessary for the purpose of raising a corps in the rear of Mahomed Akbar, on the road to Bameean, with the view of intercepting the prisoners, should he attempt to send them off in that direction.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 432.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, July* 13, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 25th June, 1842, relating to the loss of camels near the Attock, and am very glad that the system of hiring will hereafter be discontinued.

With regard to the Sikhs here, they have conducted themselves generally very well, since their arrival; they have been much delayed in crossing the river, in consequence of the rapidity of the stream, and having only one boat; but nearly the whole are across; and Captain Lawrence, who has lately come from Peshawur, states that the conduct of the Sikh soldiery at that place has of late much improved; they have also been diligent in the duties required of them in the pass, which they still hold up to Ali Musjid.

The five companies and three guns in Ali Musjid make that place quite secure. Captain Thomas, with a part of his corps, was ordered to Lundi Khana some days ago. A regiment and a wing of Native infantry, with five guns, and 200 irregular horse, are at Dhaka; and I have ordered the Jezailchees to proceed thither, whenever their services can be dispensed with by Brigadier Monteath. Whenever I return, I must send a brigade to occupy the pass near Lundi Khana; the object would be concealed, in the same way that I have hitherto done, by putting in orders, that the party is for the relief of the troops at Dhaka; but, in all such cases, the officers (there are only a few I hope) do the mischief: if there is any suspicion, they do not hesitate to talk of it, and some, I am sorry to say, are supposed to be paid for making communications to the papers, which would not, generally speaking, be of much importance, if they were always founded on truth.

The death of Raee Chund Koonwur, does not appear to have created the slightest sensation among the Sikh troops here, or at Peshawur.

At this season, I do not think I could, with reference to the health of the troops, occupy the pass at any point except Lundi Khana. From Dhaka, the troops could move to Lundi Khana in a few hours; the latter place is now I think, secure; and the troops, as long as circumstances will admit, are better at Dhaka than in the pass, as there is a difficulty about water, and little space on which to encamp with safety.

Whenever I return, I must expect some opposition; but as I have made my way through once, I hope I shall be equally fortunate in a second attempt, by making proper arrangements.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 433.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, July* 14, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, that Captain Troup, of the 48th Regiment Native Infantry, arrived in this camp late yesterday afternoon, having left Cabool on the 11th instant. A Barukzye chief accompanies him on the part of Futteh Jung and (as reported to me by Captain Troup) the whole of the chiefs and people of Cabool, his name is Hajee Buktiwar Khan; he is a native of Candahar, and has been selected for this mission as being a very intelligent man, neutral, and as knowing much of European character, having been at Bombay and other places within our provinces. I had a long conversation with Captain Troup early this morning, and at twelve o'clock to-day, he brought Hajee Buktiwar Khan to me. It appears that the latter has no specific terms to offer on the part of the authorities of Cabool, but he has been sent to endeavour to effect a change of prisoners, and to ask our wishes on the subject. I have told him that on the release of the whole of our prisoners, including those at Ghuznee, the British Government will release those now in Hindoostan, including Dost Mahomed Khan; and that we shall expect to have our guns restored. The terms proposed by me appeared to be well received, but the chief, as if not altogether unprepared for the announcement of the release of Dost Mahomed, expressed considerable anxiety on the part of his employers, as to the terms on which the Ameer would be released. On this point I could not, of course, give him any information, but I promised to refer the subject to the Governor-General by express. At first the Chief seemed to doubt my being without instructions on such a point, having at the same time authority to intimate the terms on which

the Ameer's release would be granted. The Chief stated that His Majesty Futteh Jung, the nobles and people of Cabool, were most anxious that some treaty of friendship should be entered into between the British Government and Dost Mahomed, previously to his leaving Hindoostan. I stated that I would communicate these wishes to the British Government, and expressed a hope, indeed a belief, that whenever the release of the Ameer might take place, it would proceed from a desire to be on friendly terms, but that I could not say what terms might be proposed or accepted. I was asked whether it was our intention to interfere in the Government of the country; my reply was, that from the first we never intended remaining in the country, and that we should not interfere in their choice of a king; that I understood Futteh Jung had been raised to the throne by general consent, and that I looked upon the Chief as a messenger from the king, the nobles, and the people of Cabool. This explanation on my part appeared to be perfectly satisfactory.

The Chief will write to the Cabool Government to-day, and with Captain Troup, proposes remaining here until I can receive a reply to this letter, unless recalled by the Cabool authorities.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a letter from Major Pottinger, on the subject of this letter. Captain Troup has explained to me that the offence taken at my letter arose from the circumstance of my having been informed that General Elphinstone's death was occasioned by the treatment he received.

With regard to the proposal that Maharajah Shere Sing should be a mediator between the British Government and the Affghans, as I apprehended that there might be a difficulty, and, moreover, as I saw no good reason why such a course should be pursued, I preferred omitting all mention of the Sikhs, especially as the Barukzye Chief made no mention of them; he adverted to the difficulty of settling where and how the prisoners on either side were to be delivered; to which I replied, that the preliminaries having been generally agreed to, the subsequent arrangements for carrying them out must be determined hereafter, but that the Affghans had already experienced sufficient proof of our integrity not to doubt us. As there may be a hesitation on this last question, I shall be glad to receive any instructions which may be deemed advisable.

I have not on this occasion replied to Major Pottinger; as a prisoner, I cannot consider him a Political Agent; but I have told Captain Troup that he may write if he pleases, and that when Futteh Jung addresses me, I shall not fail to reply.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 434.

Major E. Pottinger to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Cabool, July* 10, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 10th May, 1842, and have to inform you that it was regarded as most offensive by Akbar Khan, and as evincing hostility rather than a wish to treat.

It is not my duty to comment on your letter, and as my opinions are laid before you in my letter of the 3rd May, there is no reply required from me, but to the 10th paragraph, which refers to myself, and the postscript regarding General Elphinstone's death.

Firstly.—Regarding the 10th paragraph; the position of affairs at this place will, I trust, ere this have proved to you that the information I had the honor of submitting in my letter of the 3rd May was correct.

Secondly.—In attributing Major-General Elphinstone's death to his removal from Buddeabad, I believe you have been misinformed, for I have heard Mr. Surgeon Magrath state before we left the above-named place, that the General's case was hopeless. His death was probably hastened by the heavy rain we experienced on our march from Soorooby to Teezeen; previous to that the General told me he felt advantage from the change of air. In corroboration of this, I have the honor to transmit a private note on the subject from Dr.

Magrath himself. I also feel it but proper to assure you, that in the Affghan fashion, every attention was paid which prisoners could expect, and that any incivility we received, was from the inferior agents, against the wish of Mahomed Akbar Khan, who, on complaint, gave redress as far as lay in his power.

Being very anxious to transmit as full an account as possible of the events in the beginning of last winter, I have at last succeeded in persuading Mahomed Akbar Khan to again make an overture. Captain C. Troup, 48th Bengal Native Infantry, Brigade-Major S.S.F., has therefore been allowed to proceed, and will deliver this letter.

I have sounded Mahomed Akbar, as far as possible, on the subject of his feelings towards us; they appear hostile, and I much doubt if he will consent to treat on any terms but those of retaining the country. I have told him that in my own opinion, such will be inadmissible as a preliminary, if even at all so; and that you have demanded the release of the prisoners on equitable terms, as a proof of sincerity, and without which you will not treat. He then offered to exchange the whole of the prisoners for those in India. (His offer includes the hostages and wounded left in Cabool.) His father having given himself up voluntarily, he argues, we have no right to detain. He also proposed to make his prisoners over to the Sikhs, if the British do so by theirs, and to make the Maharajah mediator in the quarrel. I could, of course, hold out no hope to him of his father's release, or the last question, and therefore avoided the subject, lest hinting at refusal should militate against sending an officer to your camp. At present I do not think it would be advisable to ransom us for money, as he is in want of that necessary; and the name and character of the British must suffer in the opinion of our own subjects, and soldiers in India, if we were to pay for the release of a few Europeans, while so many hundreds, indeed I may say thousands, of our native soldiery and camp followers are reduced to the condition of slavery throughout this country, and many other poor wretches deprived of their hands and feet, or otherwise mutilated or diseased, are supporting their precarious existence by beggary. If these latter persons be not released, many, if not all, must perish in the ensuing winter; and it appears to me that Government will lay itself open to the odium and charge of undue partiality if it release, as above, by ransom.

The officers of the 27th Bengal Native Infantry at Ghuznee are said to be exposed to great hardships, and it is reported that Colonel Palmer has died under torture to extract money. I have heard this from so many quarters, and from such respectable persons, that I fear the account is but too true, as it is so consonant with the usages of these tribes. Shumsoodeen Khan has also, I am told, refused to deliver up those officers to Mahomed Akbar; but the latter is so determined to hold all our prisoners, that I expect soon to hear of his having overcome the objections of his cousin.

Cabool is now completely in the hands of this Chief. Many are inimical to him, but his own energy and that of his supporters is so much the greatest, that no one is likely to oppose him, unless the British troops advance, and even then, I think, he will always be able to make his retreat good before any one here has courage to move. A proclamation, threatening punishment if the ladies are withdrawn might do good. Letters to the Hazara Chiefs of the family of Yazadan Buksh, in Beysunt, Meer Mowhill of Yekawbaz, Meer Buz Ali, and Meer Mahomed Hoozyn, and Meer Yakawb of Deh Zingy, and to Zool Fezar Khan, Governor of Bameean, would probably prevent the carrying us off through those districts, either west or north, Mahomed Shah Khan is the right hand and head of Mahomed Akbar, and I regard it as nearly impossible to detach him from the party at present. He has got enemies, and I have, without evincing hostility, endeavoured to form a party against him; my hostility has, however, been suspected by him; but I trust that his suspicions of me are a little allayed. Any offers you make to him he communicates to the Chief, and enhances his own support and fidelity by so doing, as he has chosen his principal line of action as our open enemy, and only enters into negotiations with you for the purpose of gaining insight into your plans, keeping up communication with the Affghans about you, and probably hopes to secure his Lughman property, and may be, eventually, his pardon by such conduct. He, however, is our bitterest as well as ablest enemy, and will be the last to submit to our sway. By reducing his castles and property in Lughman, you will cripple his means, and, it may be, oblige him to fall on his master for money. This will give opportunity for his enemies

to undermine him; and, if not to overthrow him, certainly to weaken his influence. Under such circumstances he may yield to our offers, though I much doubt it.

Captain Conolly, and the other officers and men left here, have been delivered up to Mahomed Akbar Khan. Captain Conolly was authorized to draw bills on the Governor-General, to meet the expenditure of the sick and wounded left behind, and of the officers left as hostages. As I feared the Affghans might use force, or threaten him, I publicly limited him to the sum of 10,000 rupees a month, with the understanding, that he should only draw for the sum actually requisite, without reference to the amount of pay due to those left behind. There was, besides, a certain sum allowed as hire for the fort or castle in which the sick and wounded were left, and for the support of the guard of Affghans, to secure them from insult. I have not the means of consulting the documents, or should send you copies of all connected with the arrangements. Captain Conolly informs me you have dishonoured his drafts. I therefore enter into this explanation, to account for the drafts. In addition to the men left, a number of fugitives from the retreating force returned to Cabool, who it was necessary to take care of, and they increased the expenditure above what I originally contemplated. In consideration of this explanation, I trust you will accept the bills tendered: in our present state of surveillance it is utterly impossible to render regular accounts; and to attempt it would cause suspicion. Hereafter I suspect the expences of the hospital will be defrayed by Mahomed Akbar Khan, and of course such bills need not be drawn; and will, if necessary, continue to be drawn by Captain Conolly, as originally appointed.

I have, &c.
ELDRED POTTINGER.

No. 435.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.

General, *Allahabad, July* 29, 1842.

MR. MADDOCK, the Secretary to the Government of India, has submitted to me your letter of the 14th instant, communicating the arrival in your camp of Captain Troup, of the 48th Regiment of Native Infantry, (a prisoner to the Affghans,) and Hajee Buktiar Khan, a native of Candahar, deputed to you, as Captain Troup informed you, by Futteh Jung, and the whole of the chiefs and people of Cabool.

2. The letter of Major Pottinger, which you inclosed, gives a different character to Captain Troup's mission to your camp, for that officer attributes it to his having persuaded Mahomed Akbar Khan to make another overture, and to send Captain Troup with his letter.

3. You acted properly in not replying to Major Pottinger's letter on this occasion: and you have taken a correct view of that officer's position, in considering that, as a prisoner, he cannot be a Political Agent.

4. The explanation you gave to Hajee Buktiar Khan, of the views of the Government of India, was in conformity with your instructions; but as you were distinctly authorized to negotiate with a *de facto* Government of Cabool, for a general exchange of prisoners, not excepting Dost Mahomed Khan; and it has never been on any occasion intimated to you, when such general exchange of prisoners has been mentioned, that any specific terms were to be attached to the delivery of Dost Mahomed Khan; I regret that you should have imagined that any further instructions could be required upon that head. In a general exchange of prisoners, Dost Mahomed Khan would be given up unreservedly, and without any conditions, exactly as any other prisoner.

5. It appears, that in the name of Futteh Jung, Mahomed Akbar Khan is exercising a more extensive authority than it has hitherto been deemed probable that the divisions amongst the chiefs would permit to be concentrated in the same hands, and that he has obtained possession of the persons of *all* the prisoners except those at Ghuznee, whom he is understood to have demanded from Shumsoodeen Khan.

6. These circumstances afford better hopes of the ultimate recovery of all

the prisoners, than it has yet been allowable to entertain; but I must impress upon you, that no trust whatever is to be placed in any Affghan; and that all military operations must proceed as if no negociation was in progress.

7. When every gun, and colour, and military trophy in the hands of the Affghans, and every prisoner within the reach and power of the *de facto* Government of Cabool, has been surendered to you, then, and not till then, you may give orders suited to a state of returning peace.

8. You may inform the Affghan chiefs, that these are your positive instructions. But that immediately upon receiving from you the report of the surrender to you of the trophies of war, and of the prisoners, I will direct Dost Mahomed Khan, and all the prisoners in our hands, to be honorably conveyed to the frontier of Cabool, and delivered without any condition. I will likewise then consent that there shall be peace between the British Government and the Affghan people, and I will recognise the Government which the Affghans may seem to prefer.

9. It is my wish to carry with me, in all measures relative to Affghanistan, the willing acquiescence of the Maharajah Shere Sing; but you rightly judged that the intervention of the Sikhs, as mediators, could not be allowed, nor indeed could such a proposal be seriously made. The Maharajah is at war with the Affghans as we are, and peace, as well as war, will be common to the two Governments.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 436.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, July* 29, 1842.

IT is to be expected that in the event of any arrangement being made for the general exchange of prisoners, a demand will be brought forward by the Affghans for the payment of money on account of the maintenance of the British prisoners while in their hands.

2. The Governor-General directs me to remind you that the British Government has expended a large sum in the maintenance of Dost Mahomed Khan and his family, and of the other Affghan prisoners in our hands.

3. Although this sum must be much larger than any sum really expended by the Affghans in the maintenance of British prisoners, yet seeing the improbability of our coming to any settlement with the Affghans whereby any balance which might appear to be due to us would be paid, the Governor-General is willing to cancel the account on both sides.

4. The strongest objections exist to our agreeing, in any general exchange of prisoners, to pay any sum on account of maintenance.

5. It would be represented that the Affghans had compelled the surrender of the prisoners in our hands, and had only given up the prisoners in their hands for a ransom.

6. The Governor-General cannot consent to any arrangement which can be so represented.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 437.

Major-General Pollock to Mr Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, July* 16, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, copy of a letter from me to Major Pottinger, C.B. I have deemed it proper to send this letter, for though it is little more than acknowledging the receipt of his communication (copy of which was for

warded to you with my letter of 14th July, 1842), still it will prevent any misunderstanding as to my not sending him replies to the proposals he has sent.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK

No. 438.

Major-General Pollock to Major Pottinger.

Sir, *Jellalabad, July* 15, 1842.

I HAVE had the honor to receive your letter, dated the 10th instant, which was delivered by Captain Troup, who was accompanied by an Agent from Cabool. I have communicated to Captain Troup and the Agent all that appears necessary on the subject of an exchange of prisoners. While you continue a prisoner, and consequently not a free agent, I see no necessity for your being the channel of communication.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 439.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, August* 3, 1842.

IN the event of Mahomed Akbar Khan's coming into your hands, without any previous conditions for the preservation of his life, I request that you will inform him, that he will be tried for the murder of Sir William Macnaghten, and confine him accordingly, as you would any other person accused of a similar crime, and try him as you would any other person, and deal with him, if he should be convicted, as you would any other person found guilty of murder under similar circumstances.

You will not hurry his trial, so as to commence it with insufficient proof of his undoubted and admitted guilt.

The only other circumstance which should induce you to delay his trial is, the consideration that British subjects still remaining, at the capture of Mahomed Akbar, in the hands of the Affghans, might possibly be made to suffer in the event of his execution. Upon this point you will act according to your discretion.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH

No. 440.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, July* 25, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to request that you will bring to the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General the following circumstances.

I have found it necessary during my halt here to send escorts with every string of camels sent from camp, for the purpose of bringing in supplies of grain and bhoosa, and notwithstanding every precaution, on some occasions, camels have been carried off by small parties of thieves, who conceal themselves in certain strong places near the high road. These places are protected by the Affghan rulers when governing this country, by posting thannas of twenty or

thirty men, who hold a breastwork near them, and protect kafilahs and travellers; but it would obviously be objectionable to employ regular troops in this duty; and, owing to the employment of Captain Ferris' regiment of Jezailchees, with Brigadier Monteath's force and Captain Thomas' regiment in the Khyber, I have not had any Irregular Infantry disposable for this duty except the Sappers and Miners under Captain Broadfoot, and the men of this regiment have been constantly employed in building hospitals for the European regiments until within the last two days, when I have taken the earliest opportunity of detaching 200 of them, and 200 Irregular Horse, under the command of Captain Broadfoot, to Killa Mahomed Hoosain Khan, a fort about fifteen miles from camp. This fort has been carefully examined, and the adjacent country reconnoitred, by the chief engineer and the Assistant Quartermaster-General, who report very favorably upon it. I have given directions for the collection in it of a large supply of grain and bhoosa, and I would wish much to have a post of Irregular Infantry stationed about half way between it and this camp, but I have no Irregulars disposable. Again, in another direction, Chiprecal, from which a very great portion of our supplies are drawn, I have no resource but to send strong escorts of regular troops with each string of camels sent for grain or bhoosa, and these duties are found to be very harassing to both infantry and cavalry. For these reasons I should beg to suggest that I be allowed to entertain one or even two hundred of the inhabitants of this valley, who could be employed with great advantage if posted in small parties along the main roads from the chief villages to camp. The expense of a body of 200 of these men would be under 2000 rupees per mensem, and I think it very probable that many camels might be saved by them which would otherwise fall into the hands of the enemy. A party of twenty-eight Ghilzyes under a Chief, whose fidelity has been tested, are now in this camp. They have been hitherto employed under Captain Mackeson at the Peshawur agency, but I have directed them to remain with this camp from the 1st instant: and should the proposal I have made meet the sanction of Government, the chief I have alluded to would have no difficulty in completing his party in a few days to the number of men mentioned.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 441.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, July* 27, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward the following documents connected with a reconnoissance, made on the 24th instant, from Brigadier Monteath's camp, preparatory to the advance of the Brigadier's force into the valley of the Shinwarees; this advance was fixed for yesterday, the 26th instant, but I have not yet received official reports of further operations from that quarter.

Inclosure No. 1.—Copy of a letter from Brigadier Monteath, C.B., to Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant-General, dated Camp, Muzzeena, 25th July, 1842.

Inclosure No. 2.—Copy of a letter from Captain Willis, Her Majesty's 31st Foot, commanding the party, dated Camp, Muzzeena, 24th July, 1842.

Inclosure No. 3 —Copy of a letter from Captain Ferris, commanding the Regiment of Jezailchees, dated Camp, Muzzeena, 24th July, 1842.

Inclosure No. 4.—Copy of a Report on the country reconnoitred by Captain Robertson, Field Engineers, dated 24th July, 1842.

Inclosure No. 5.—Return of killed, wounded, and missing.

Inclosure No. 6.—Return of ammunition expended.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 442.

Brigadier Monteath to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir *Camp, Muzzeena, July* 25, 1842.

I HAVE the honor of addressing you to state, for the information of Major-General Pollock, that on account of the confined and extremely difficult nature of the country from hence to the entrance of the Shinwaree Valley, and which difficulties are to be encountered throughout it, I deemed it expedient, before committing the troops under my command in an advance, to send out Captain Robertson, of the Engineers, to make a reconnoissance of the road and country in our front, giving him an escort of 400 regular troops, under Captain Willis, Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, and the Jezailchees, under Captain Ferris.

Inclosed I beg to send Captain Robertson's report, and that of Captain Willis, together with returns of the troops employed, killed, and wounded, and ammunition expended on the occasion.

I have, &c.,
T. MONTEATH.

No. 443.

Captain Willis to Captain Lugard, Major of Brigade.

Sir, *Muzzeena, July* 25, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, that this morning, agreeable to instructions received last night from Brigadier Monteath, C.B., commanding, I proceeded with the following reconnoitring party, towards Muzzeena,—viz. 27 officers, 55 serjeants, 10 drummers, 724 rank and file, 1 jemadar, and 20 troops; after passing a river, about two miles from camp, we ascended a bare hill, and proceeded along its ridge for about two miles farther, when the advance guard, composed of a corps of Jezailchees, under Captain Ferris, was fired on by a party occupying the adjoining heights, killing one non-commissioned officer, and wounding two or three of the men. In my course to the termination of the ridge, the enemy skirmished with the advanced-guard, who drove them before it. I halted here a short time, when Captain Robertson, of the Engineers, reported that he had completed his observations. In obedience to my instructions, I prepared to return to camp. By this time the surrounding hills were covered with the enemy, who, by the beat of tom-toms, were collecting in great force, and advancing towards my position on the ridge of the hill. The Jezailchees descended the hill, and drove the enemy back, when I recalled them, covering them as they fell back, by the grenadier company of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment. I continued my return, skirmishing for about four miles with the enemy, who in number, perhaps, from 800 to 1000, hovered round for that distance. I am not able to estimate the loss the enemy suffered, but am sorry to report that of my own party were three killed and twenty-six wounded, as the accompanying return will show.

I also beg to inclose the report of Captain Ferris, commanding the Jezailchees.

I have, &c.,
W. G. WILLIS.

No. 444.

Captain Ferris to Captain Willis.

Camp, Muzzeena, July 24, 1842.

I HAVE to report for your information, that having been ordered to take the whole of my regiment,* and form the advance guard of the troops employed on the reconnoissance of the Shinwarrie Valley, this morning, I detached my native Adjutant, Ali Wurdee Khan, with twenty men, to skirmish on my part, and cover my advance along the ridge of the hills over which the road runs. After I had advanced about one mile and a half along the ridge, I found myself opposed by about 200 Shinwarrees, who were speedily dislodged by Ali Wurdee Khan's party, which on seeing the enemy, I had reinforced by another company. After this my advanced party was skirmishing with the enemy the whole way to Sekunder Khan's fort, at which I halted my regiment and waited till your arrival. I need not detail the operations in which my regiment was engaged after this, as you yourself witnessed the whole of them. I, however, beg leave to bring to your notice the great assistance I received from Lieutenant Dowson, my Adjutant, and from Hyder Ali Khan and Ali Wurdee Khan, my Native Commandant and Adjutant.

I have, &c.
J. FERRIS.

No. 445.

Captain Robertson to Brigadier Monteath.

Camp, Muzzeena, July 24, 1842.

REPORT OF A RECONNOISSANCE OF THE YAGHI FORTS.

I EXAMINED the ground this morning for a distance of about seven miles from camp. The route lies at first across the fields, and numerous water-courses. At about 1½ mile from camp a stream is passed, flowing from the valley over a wide bed of large pebbles and boulders. The water at present does not occupy more than 10 feet in breadth, and is shallow; half a mile further on the ridge, bounding the valley to the eastward, is reached. Up to this point the road has been made practicable by Lieutenant Becher of the Engineers.

The slope up the side of the ridge is practicable, though steep; it is rocky, and strewed with small stones, which would be a severe trial to laden camels.

Along the ridge we proceeded for about five miles; the route is practicable, but, from its stony nature, camels would only proceed slowly, and accidents would be probable. The ridge is crossed by hollows about at right angles to its course, forming a series of transverse ridges; all those passed are practicable. The slope from this range down to the valley varies, but is for the most part easy, though not practicable, without difficulty, for camels, except in one or two places. On the opposite side of the valley the slope from the heights is more abrupt; in some places precipitous. The altitude of these bounding heights is about 200 or 250 feet in general.

The valley is between 800 and 900 yards wide from ridge to ridge. A rough measurement at the place where our reconnoissance terminated, gave 864 yards.

The valley is at present a swamp, the paddy fields being under water. During the skirmishing this morning it was quite clear the fields were impassable, the enemy always advancing and retiring on the dividing ridges.

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* Strength: 1 commandant, 1 adjutant, 1 native commandant, 1 native adjutant, 6 jemadars, 6 naib jemadars, 36 havildars, 36 naiks, 350 rank and file.

This valley contains several forts; all seemed to be unoccupied; and the most part much ruined and dilapidated. These forts appear to be of the same construction as others on this part of the country. They are of small size; the largest did not appear to have a side of 100 paces. Their shape is quadrangular, with towers at the corners, two tiers of loop-holes in the towers; and the curtains usually contain a few. The gates of most of the forts I have examined are open to attack, and very slight; and from the appearance of those viewed from the heights to-day, I do not think they are strong. The houses in some of the forts abut on the walls, forming a sort of rampart, the curtain being usually 12 or 15 feet higher than the roof (which is 10 feet from the ground). The walls are about 6 feet thick below, tapering to 6 inches above. This description, I conceive, will be found generally applicable to the forts near this. From the swampy state of the valley the approach of the gate may be difficult.

The fort (Sekunder Khan's) to which my attention has been particularly called, if Toorabaz Khan's people correctly pointed it out, is more ruined than the generality, and it appears to me most improbable that it is now occupied, or that any enemy could dream of defending it. The place is situated on the eastern side of the valley, and the hill slopes down to it. On this slope, encamping ground may be found, but stony and rocky; forage for horses or cattle I doubt the possibility of obtaining.

A force proceeding up this valley, even on the ridge traversed to-day, would always (especially during a retrograde movement), be liable to many casualties, particularly when encumbered with a train of baggage animals; many of the latter would be shot, as the enemy would be incited by a hope of plunder. The exposed nature of the ground would render this very probable.

I have strong doubts whether the fort was correctly pointed out to me. Some of the Jezailchees of the escort stated, that the principal fort was further up the valley, and from their indications of its position, I conceive it to be full three miles further than the point at which our progress terminated, as it was deemed inadvisable to proceed further from camp.

I have, &c.,

Return of Men killed, wounded, and missing, of a Reconnoitring Party, under the command of Captain Willis, H. M. 31st Regiment.

Mazeena, July 24, 1842.

CORPS.	KILLED.							WOUNDED.							MISSING.							REMARKS.
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Privates.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Privates.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Privates.	
Her Majesty's 31st Regiment	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
33rd Regiment Native Infantry	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	10	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
53rd Regiment Native Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
Jezailchees	..	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	2	1	..	10	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	And 1 Native Adjutant wounded.
Total of each	..	..	..	..	2	..	1	..	..	..	4	1	..	21	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
Grand Total	3							26							..							

W. G. WILLIS,
Captain.

Return shewing the strength of the Reconnoitring party under Captain Willis, H. M. 31st Regiment.

Mazeena, July 24, 1842.

Corps.	Officers E. and N.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and file.	Total.	Remarks.
Her Majesty's 31st Regiment	5	8	3	133	149	
33rd Regiment Native Infantry	3	6	1	106	116	
53rd Regiment Native Infantry	3	5	2	105	115	
Jezailchees	16	36	4	380	436	
Total . . .	27	55	10	724	816	

W. G. WILLIS, Captain.

Return of Ammunition expended by a Reconnoitring party, under command of Captain Willis, H. M. 31st Regiment.

Mazeena, July 24, 1842.

Regiments.	No. of rounds expended.	Remarks.
Her Majesty's 31st Regiment	1403	
33rd Regiment Native Infantry	4357	
53rd Regiment Native Infantry	906	
Total . .	6666	

W. G. WILLIS, Captain.

No. 446.

Notification by the Governor-General of India.

Allahabad, August 11, 1842.

THE Right Honorable the Governor-General is pleased to direct the publication of the following letter from Major-General Pollock, and of the Report from Brigadier Monteath, of the successful operations of the force under his command in the Shinwaree valley.

By order of the Right Honorable Governor-General,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 447.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, July* 29, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward herewith a copy of my letter to the Adjutant-General of the Army, of this date, forwarding copies of letters and other documents from Brigadier Monteath, reporting the result of an attack on the enemy in the Shinwaree valley.

The loss sustained by the enemy must have been considerable, for in a letter which one of the Chiefs addressed to Captain Macgregor on the 28th instant, he states, that they were still burying their dead. The effect in the whole valley by such a complete defeat of the Shinwarees, and the destruction of so many of their forts, will be productive of the most beneficial effects.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 448.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, July* 29, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, copy of a letter, dated Camp Mazeena, 27th instant, from Brigadier Monteath, C. B., commanding the troops in the Shinwaree valley, together with copies of the documents to which it refers. Although the loss of the enemy on this occasion has not been stated by Brigadier Monteath, I have every reason to believe, from authentic sources, it has been considerable. One of the chiefs, Shadoo, had a nephew and a first cousin killed in the action, and another chief, Hoosain, also lost a son.

The enemy were busily employed during the afternoon of the 26th in burying their dead, and on the day subsequent to the engagement, the Shinwaree chiefs sent into camp to express their willingness to pay the revenue.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 449.

Brigadier Monteath to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Camp, Mazeena, July* 27, 1842.

I HAVE the honor of addressing you, to state, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C. B., that, in accordance with the intention expressed by me in my letter of the 24th instant, I marched out yesterday morning at day-light, to attack the enemy with the following troops and guns:—five nine-pounders, one twenty-four pounder howitzer, fifty sappers and miners, one

squadron 1st Light Cavalry, seven companies Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, seven ditto 33rd Native Infantry, seven ditto 53rd Native Infantry, Ferris' corps of Jezailchees.

As the road into the enemy's country was nearly impracticable for loaded animals, and we must have lost a great many camels had I attempted to move with our baggage, I resolved on returning to my present position after the operations I had in view had been concluded; therefore, having compressed the camp as much as possible by striking a portion of it, and collecting the tents and baggage on one spot, I left it in charge of Major Hewitt, 33rd regiment, with the following troops:—two companies Her Majesty's 31st regiment, ditto 33rd Native Infantry, ditto 53rd Native Infantry, two squadrons 1st Light Cavalry, fifty Jezailchees, and one hundred of Toorabaz Khan's men.

On the troops gaining the left ridge of the Shinwaree valley, which was the most practicable, the enemy retired out of their forts, and I detached Lieutenant Becher, of the corps of engineers, with the sappers and miners, to set fire to them, which he did in succession up to the fort of Secunder Khan, at the head of the valley, the force moving parallel along the ridge for the protection of the party. Thus at one time the interiors of five-and-thirty forts were in a blaze along the valley, the enemy contemplating the scene from the heights in the vicinity of Secunder Khan's fort, where they had taken up positions, and from whence they were driven in gallant style by the advance, consisting of the light and two battalion companies Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, the light companies 33rd and 53rd Regiments, and the Jezailchees, under Major Skinner, H.M. 31st Regiment.

At this moment the guns, having been brought into position by Captain Abbott, opened a fire of Shrapnell shells upon them, which did considerable execution, and so disconcerted them, that parties left the field altogether and never returned.

Having effected everything in the way of destruction, I caused two companies of the 53rd Regiment to be extended along a ridge below that from whence the advance had driven the enemy, and of which it remained in possession. In the rear of the companies of the 53rd, a company of the 33rd was extended along the top of another ridge, and in rear of that company, on a higher ridge, two guns were placed in position to aid in covering the retirement of the advance from the enemy, who were all ready to attack them as soon as they should commence their descent from the heights. On these arrangements being completed, the recall was sounded to the advance, and I am happy to say, the whole joined the main body without a single casualty occurring.

Major Skinner's party being exceedingly fatigued, for the heat had been excessive, and the labour great, I directed them to fall in with the main column, and ordered out two companies from each of the three regiments, to cover our retrogression homewards. These were formed into two parties, and extended across the ridge in two lines of skirmishers. In the rear of the second line I placed two guns, with a company of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment flanking each of them, also a party of forty cavalry; and a line of skirmishers was thrown out along the whole right flank of the column to the edge of the ridge (where the ground, from its broken character, was most favourable for the enemy,) and which communicated with the rear line of the covering force placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton, Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, at his own solicitation.

In this order we retired seven miles and a half over as bad a road as can well be supposed, and although I had anticipated loss and great annoyance from the enemy throughout the march, yet it seemed as if they had had enough, as their attacks were languid and remarkably cautious throughout, and I am rejoiced to say that at half-past 3, P. M., we arrived in camp without loss or injury of any kind.

It gives me great pleasure to record the zealous conduct of the troops generally, and the cheerful and praiseworthy manner in which the soldiers of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment laboured to drag the guns up such places as the horses, notwithstanding their unequalled qualities, were incapable of doing.

Herewith I beg to inclose Major Skinner's Report, and I can myself bear ample testimony to the gallant conduct of himself, and those under his command; and I should be unjust were I not to say that the conduct of Captain Ferris, his Native Commandant, Hyder Ali, and the whole corps of Jezailchees, was highly distinguished.

My thanks are very justly due to Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton, Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, for the able manner in which he conducted the duties of covering the retirement of the force, and particularly so to Major Skinner, for the zealous and gallant manner in which he led the advance against the enemy; to Captain Ferris, for the gallant manner in which, with his corps of Jezailchees, he drove the enemy from their position on the heights; to Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Dawes, for the very successful practice of the guns; to Lieutenant Becher, for the zealous and satisfactory manner in which he, with the detachment of sappers and miners, constructed a road for the guns, and fired the enemy's forts in the valley; and to Lieutenant Lugard, Her Majesty's 31st regiment, Major of Brigade; Lieutenant Mayne, Assistant-Quarter-Master-General; Captain Lloyd, Sub-Assistant-Commissary-General, and Captain Robertson, Field Engineer, for the assistance afforded me by them in the field.

I have also to express my thanks to Captain Macgregor, Political Agent, who, when the opportunity offered itself, served the guns.

Inclosed is a return of killed and wounded of the force employed, and one of ammunition expended.

I have, &c.
T. MONTEATH.

No. 450.

Major Skinner to Brigadier Monteath.

Sir, *Camp, Mazeena, July 27, 1842.*

I HAVE the honor to report to you, that when the advanced guard, composed of the following details, viz.—the three light companies of the brigade, with two battalion companies of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, and the corps of Jezailchees, reached the crest of the ridge over which the main column was moving, about eight o'clock, A. M., I observed the enemy posted in small bodies upon the different heights and ridges in my front, while several parties occupied gardens and broken walls at the foot of the line of hills I was upon, above the valley on the right hand.

A sharp fire was opened upon the line of skirmishers, who quickly advanced and drove the enemy off. The corps of Jezailchees swept the front, the left hills were cleared by the light company of the 31st Foot; and the light company of the 33rd Native Infantry on the right skirmished throughout that part of the valley nearest the ridge; the remaining companies were in support. We advanced to Secunder Khan's fort of Muriaz, over very broken and difficult country, with frequent descents and ascents, the enemy sometimes keeping up a good fire, but always abandoning the line of heights as we ascended, and falling back to others. I halted at Secunder Khan's fort, from which a few shots were fired as we advanced, when it was evacuated.

This fort hangs over a narrow valley on the right hand, fields of rice in many parts of it now under water. A narrow stony ridge in the midst of this valley was occupied by the enemy, and commanded the post among trees at the foot of the fort, which I wished to hold; the enemy was soon driven off the first part of the ridge, and fell back to a higher peak, from which it became also necessary to drive them; this was done by the Jezailchees, under Captain Ferris, in very good style, who held it till withdrawn. At the head of the valley in which we now were, there stands a high hill with a fort upon its summit, a considerable distance off. All the ridges from which the enemy had been driven appear to draw to a point at this fort, and their retreat was always towards it.

Many men were collected there, and large parties were sent out to my right; this induced me to draw the companies of the 31st Foot on the left nearer to me. The enemy soon appearing on the summit of a hill above my left, however, I sent one company of the 31st Regiment to drive him away and occupy the hill. This duty was remarkably well performed by Captain Marshall, of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, whose company was employed upon it. The enemy retreated with some loss, and took up another position under cover of a sungah, or breastwork of stone, within shot. He was driven from it with

great gallantry by Lieutenant M'Ilveen, of the 31st Regiment, and a party of No. 7 company of that corps. Lieutenant M'Ilveen (a very promising young officer indeed) was, I regret to say, killed in this assault upon the sungah.

A narrow valley of rice fields, completely swamped, separated the ridge, on which my right was, from two small forts; a garden at one end of the rice valley below the ridge towards the first of the two forts, was held by the light company of the 33rd Native Infantry: the enemy descended from a high line of sand-hills, and occupying these two forts, annoyed my position a good deal. He was driven from them by the Light Company and part of No. 6 of the 31st Regiment, who had no other ground to advance on but the narrow ridges that divided the terraces of rice; they moved along these under a sharp fire, and drove the enemy from his position. I occupied these forts, and leaving Brevet Major Urmston, of the 31st Regiment, in command of the post, ceased from further operations. None of the forts I have mentioned were tenable by the enemy; the walls were breached in many places by the earthquake in February last. When I was ordered to fall back on the main body about half-past one, P.M., Major Urmston retired in good order (followed at a distance by the enemy, who had fired constantly into the forts when we occupied them), over the difficult ground behind him, having set fire to the villages within the two forts before he left them.

The advance guard being collected together above Secunder Khan's fort, joined the main column. I have great pleasure in assuring you, that during several hours of most active operations over the difficult country we were in, every officer and man under my command behaved admirably.

I have, &c.,

THOS. SKINNER.

Return of Killed and Wounded in Action, under the Command of Brigadier Monteath, on the 26th July, 1842.

Camp, Mazeena, July 27, 1842.

Her Majesty's 31st Regiment—1 officer killed; 7 rank and file wounded.
33rd Regiment Native Infantry—1 serjeant, 8 rank and file, wounded.
53rd Regiment Native Infantry—5 rank and file wounded.
Jezailchees—2 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file wounded.

Total—3 killed; 23 wounded.

Strength of the above Corps.

Captain Abbott's Battery—2 Officers, European and Native, 2 Serjeants.—No. 6, Light Field Battery.
Squadron 1st Light Cavalry—11 Officers, European and Native, 10 Serjeants, 129 Rank and File.
Her Majesty's 31st Regiment—24 Officers, 34 Serjeants, 500 Rank and File.
33rd Regiment Native Infantry—26 Officers, European and Native, 32 Serjeants, 494 Rank and File.
53rd Regiment Native Infantry—25 Officers, European and Native, 42 Serjeants, 542 Rank and File.
Jezailchees—15 Officers, European and Native, 32 Serjeants, 343 Rank and File.

Total—103 Officers, European and Native, 152 Serjeants, 2,008 Rank and File.

T. MONTEATH.
EDWARD LUGARD.

Return of Ammunition expended in Action, under the Command of Brigadier Monteath, on the 26th instant.

Camp, Mazeena, July 27th, 1842.

Captain Abbott's Battery—37 rounds.—Shells, Shrapnell, 24-pounder, 6.—Do. 9-pounder, 23, and round shot 9-pounder, 8.
Squadron 1st Light Cavalry—None.
Her Majesty's 31st Regiment—4,889 rounds.

33rd Regiment Native Infantry—2,892 rounds.
53rd Regiment Native Infantry—4,954 rounds.
Jezailchees—6,678 rounds.

Total—19,450 rounds.

T. MONTEATH.
EDWARD LUGARD.

No. 451.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, August* 2, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report the arrival in camp this morning, from Cabool, of Captains Lawrence and Troup, accompanied by Hajee Bukhteear Khan, and bringing letters from his Majesty Futteh Jung, Sirdar Mahomed, Akbar Khan, and the Chiefs of Cabool. I will do myself the honor of sending copies and translations of these letters together with my replies to-morrow.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 452.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, August* 3, 1842.

CAPTAIN TROUP assures me that the Wuzeer is sincere in his offer of liberating the prisoners, if I promise that our troops shall be withdrawn from Affghanistan, but this of course it is not in my power to do, more than appears in my letter in reply to his Majesty Futteh Jung (Inclosure No. 11), which will be sent to Cabool this evening. I think that my advancing to Futteehabad with a part of this force may expedite the release of the prisoners.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 453.

Translation of a Paper received from Hajee Bukhteear, inclosed in Letter from His Majesty, Futteh Jung.

July 30, 1842.

The contents of this paper are—

1st. Such English gentlemen and ladies as are in Affghanistan, Wuzeer Mahomed Akbar Khan will convey to Jellalabad, and make them over to the English Government.

2nd. General Pollock, with all the English army, shall start immediately from Jellalabad towards their own provinces, and shall not on any account delay. And the gentlemen and the Candahar force, and the troops in all other parts of Affghanistan, shall march by my (General Pollock's) order through the Bolan Pass; and quitting the whole of Affghanistan, we will depart and will not interfere in any way with the affairs of Affghanistan.

3rd. The Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, with all his relations and dependants, and all other natives of Affghanistan who are in Hindoostan, shall be released; and I will have them taken to Mahomed Ukbar Khan. And in the matter of the army of the English Government, whatever is in the hands of Mahomed Akbar Khan shall be given up to me; and whatever *is* not at present collected shall be forwarded to India, as soon as possible, by two gentlemen whom I will leave for that purpose; and the English army shall not delay its march on their account. Also there shall be no delay in the arrival of Dost Mahomed Khan. These few lines have been written as the basis of a Treaty.

No. 454.

Translation of a Letter from Major-General Pollock to His Majesty Futteh Jung.

A. C. *Jellalabad, August* 30, 1842.

I HAVE received your letter of 30th of July. When I heard of the approach of European gentlemen from Cabool, it was my belief that you had agreed to all terms, and that the whole of the prisoners, European and native, would immediately be sent; and I was prepared, on my part, to send to Hindoostan for all the prisoners who are retained there.

There is delay without a cause. It is well known to you that if I promise and affix my seal to any paper, it need not be doubted. I have already written distinctly the terms in my letter of 24th of July, to which you appeared to agree.

They are, that on delivery (or as soon after as practicable) of our prisoners and hostages, European and native, and restoration of the guns left on the march, the whole of the Affghan prisoners, including the Ameer, in Hindoostan, shall in like manner be restored without delay to their own country.

I have already said that the English did not come to Affghanistan to remain, but they cannot submit to be dictated to as to the time of their quitting it. Your Majesty must know that this is not the season at which to move troops, I therefore must suppose if the prisoners are detained any longer that the offer of an exchange has not been sincere. I cannot, of course, see the object in prolonging this state of enmity, especially after hearing that your Majesty, the nobles, and people of Cabool, were desirous of ending the strife.

It will be for you to determine whether good faith has been preserved, and whether the line of conduct pursued by you or your advisers has evinced an earnest and sincere disposition for peace. I have written one word, and I have not swerved therefrom.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 455.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Allahabad, August* 17, 1842.

I AM directed by the Governor-General to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 3rd instant, and to communicate to you his Lordship's entire approval of the answers you addressed to Prince Futteh Jung and Mahomed Akbar Khan, as well as of the measure adopted of extending to Mohun Lall the protection of the British Government. With reference to the negotiation now in progress, and to the terms of your former instructions with respect to an exchange of prisoners, I am directed to observe that of course you understand that the whole family of Dost Mahomed Khan must follow the condition of that chief, and be either retained or exchanged, as he may be.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 456.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.) *Simla, September* 16, No. 37. 1842.

THE first part of the operation of withdrawing the armies from Affghanistan has been most successfully effected by Major-General England, who arrived at Quetta on the 26th ultimo with the following troops:—one troop of Captain Anderson's Horse Artillery; one Foot battery, six guns, bullocks; detachment of the Poona horse; two rissalahs of Christie's horse; 25th Bombay Native Infantry; seven companies late Bombay Light Infantry battalion; 1st, or Captain Griffiths' Irregular Infantry; 2nd, or Captain Macan's ditto, ditto; 5th, or Captain Macdonald's ditto ditto; and all the invalids and useless followers of the Candahar army, together with Prince Timour.

2. The convoy was accompanied by nearly 10,000 animals.

3. The Major-General having left Candahar on the 7th of August reached the foot of the Kojuck Pass on the morning of the 16th. The troops had marched twenty-four miles during the night, but the heights being unoccupied, a force was immediately detached to take possession of them, and succeeded in that object. By the evening of the 18th all the difficulties of the pass were surmounted, the loss sustained having been very trifling.

4. The further progress of the column to Quetta was unopposed.

5. It is the intention of Major-General England to move his whole force in three divisions to Dadur. The first division will leave Quetta this day, and the last, which the Major-General will accompany, will march on the 2nd of October.

6. Major-General Sir C. Napier, K.C.B., appointed to command all the forces below the Kojuck mountains, and on both banks of the Indus from Sukkur to the Sea, will have sailed from Bombay on the 1st instant in the Zenobia, with 200 of the 28th Queen's. The remainder of that regiment will follow to Kurachee, and the 22nd Queen's will be concentrated at Sukkur. The column under Major-General England being without any European troops, this measure became necessary.

7. Its weakness in cavalry compels me to detach from Ferozepore to Sukkur the 9th Light Cavalry.

8. I do not at present anticipate that it will be necessary that the troops in Sinde should enter upon any active operations; but without European troops or regular cavalry, the large body of men under Major-General England's command can hardly be considered an army; and it ought to be rendered capable of engaging in any operation which may be required from it.

9. It has ample means of carriage. It has, I hope, sufficient supplies of provisions; and there are ten lacs at Sukkur, besides the sums in the treasuries of Hyderabad and Kurachee. Fifteen lacs are to be forwarded from Bombay as soon as the season will permit.

10. Major-General Nott moved from Candahar on the 10th ultimo, with the following troops:—Two troops of Horse Artillery, one 9-pounder Fort Battery, four 18-pounders, with two companies Bengal Foot Artillery, 3rd Bombay Cavalry, five Rissalahs Christie's Irregular Horse, three Rissalahs 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry, Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, 2nd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, 16th ditto, 38th ditto, 42nd ditto, 43rd ditto, 3rd, or Captain Craigie's Irregular Bengal Infantry.

11. More than one letter addressed to me by the Major-General must have been intercepted. I have reason to believe that he has taken with him the four 18-pounders; but my official information would have led me to suppose that those guns had been sent with Major-General England's column.

12. The calculation of Major-General Nott was, that, allowing for a halt at Ghuznee, he should reach Cabool between the 15th and 20th of this month.

13. He was to carry with him forty days' provisions.

14. I do not know officially the extent of his means of carriage; but I gather from the extract from a letter from Major Rawlinson to Major Outram, which was communicated by the latter officer, that the number of camels was only 800, the remainder of the animals being probably mules and yaboos, much better adapted to the country than camels.

15. The Major-General carried with him a large quantity of ammunition.

16. Major-General Nott appears to have been disappointed in the amount of treasure furnished to him, and to have only ten lacs when he expected to have had twenty.

17. I entertain the highest expectations of success, founded on the soldier-like qualities of this well-disciplined and brave army, which has long acted together, commanded by a general and officers in whom it has entire confidence, and accustomed to beat the enemy whenever it has been able to meet them.

18. Major-General Pollock has received only one communication from Major-General Nott, dated the 26th July, announcing his intended movement, and the probable time of his arrival at Jellalabad, namely, the first week in October.

19. Major-General Pollock has advanced three brigades of his army to Gundamuck, and will have moved on Cabool on the 5th or 6th instant.

20. The brigade under Brigadier Monteath made an attack upon the forts

and villages in the Shinwarree valley before it joined head-quarters, and was thoroughly successful, destroying everything in the valley, and effecting its retreat with little loss.

21. The advance guard of Major-General Pollock's force, under the Major-General himself, drove a body of the enemy from a very strong position at Mamoo Khail, three miles to the southward of Gundamuck, on the 24th ultimo, and that position has since been occupied by our troops.

22. Every possible effort has been made to supply Major-General Pollock's force with carriage, and to provide for the expected wants of Major-General Nott's force, when it joins the army in the Cabool valley.

23. In the ten weeks ending the 8th of September, there have been purchased 7,653 camels, and 5,026 mules and ponies; 1,265 Bringaree bullocks have been hired, and 1,000 camels; and I have reason to think that 1,500 more Bringaree bullocks have been hired at Peshawur, making in all 16,444 animals.

24. The purchases of camels continue, and I have directed that every mule may be procured which can be deemed fit for service.

25. I am satisfied that I shall have the entire concurrence of your Committee in the opinion I have expressed to the Commissary-General, that the army *must* be supplied, cost what it may; and that it is better to have a thousand animals too many than a hundred too few.

26. The losses of animals, however, must of necessity be so large that I have no hope that all my efforts will do more than provide for the absolute requirements of the retiring army.

27. Camp equipages, clothing, shoes, medical and other comforts, are to be forwarded by these animals; and I trust the army will feel that it incurs no suffering which could have been obviated by the paternal care of the Government.

28. Major-General Pollock has with him 10 lacs, and 20 more lacs are in progress through the Punjab.

29. Measures are already directed to be taken for the provisioning of the army during its homeward march.

30. The last convoys of animals will meet it on march, and supply the daily losses.

No. 457.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.

General, *Allahabad, August* 17, 1842.

YOU will have heard, I conclude, that Major-General Nott has resolved on retiring a portion of his army by the route of Ghuznee and Cabool.

He will take with him Her Majesty's 40th, the five Bengal Regiments, the late Shah's Regiment, which was at Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and about 1000 cavalry, with two troops of Horse Artillery, and a battery of Foot Artillery 9-pounders. I think the Infantry will amount to 4,500 or 5,000 men.

The Major-General calculates upon reaching Jellalabad by the first week of October.

I have directed comforts and necessaries for the 40th Queen's, to be sent to Jellalabad.

Every exertion will be made to send bhoosa to you by the animals now on their march.

The Major-General seems to apprehend that the greatest difficulty he will have to encounter is from the want of forage, between Cabool and Jellalabad.

I rely with confidence upon Major-General Nott's receiving the most efficient cooperation from yourself, and from every man in your army. I know all the difficulties which both armies have to contend with, but the permanent advantage of success will be great, and it will shed imperishable glory upon all who have the good fortune to contribute to obtain it.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 458.

The Governor-General of India to Major Burlton, Commissary General.

Sir, *Allahabad, August* 17, 1842.

MAJOR-GENERAL NOTT has availed himself of the option as to his line of retirement given to him in my letter of the 4th ultimo; and he will march upon Ghuznee and Cabool with the five Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry, the Regiment of the late Shah's Infantry, which was at Kelat-i-Ghilzye, Her Majesty's 40th Foot, and about 1000 cavalry, with two troops of Horse Artillery, and a 9-pounder battery of Foot Artillery.

The Major-General calculates upon reaching Jellalabad by the first week in October.

I request that you will take measures for dispatching immediately to Jellalabad the comforts and necessaries which the 40th Queen's will require on their arrival. They will probably be very deficient in shoes and clothing, and in all camp equipage.

It may be advisable to send an additional quantity of medicines.

As it is possible that the operations in the Cabool valley may be protracted to a later period than is now anticipated by unforeseen events, it is desirable that some quantity of warm clothing should be sent; but nothing must be allowed to delay the progress of the mules now on their march to Peshawur.

The main difficulty will arise out of the want of forage; and any possible measure should be adopted for sending bhoosa to Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 459.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, August* 5, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, that subsequent to the dispatch of my letter No. 189, of date the 3rd instant, a letter was received by me from Mahomed Akbar Khan, complaining of my having moved troops into Lughman during the pending negotiation. This report must have originated in a reconnoissance made by Captain Lawrence with a small escort of Sikh troops, on the other side of the river. Hajee Buktiar, when talking on this subject, remonstrated against my advance to Futteeabad, but as I had previously decided on this measure, I have thought it proper to add a postscript to my letter to His Majesty Futteh Jung (Inclosure No. 11, to my letter to your address above alluded to), to the effect that "It is my intention to advance a force to Futteeabad, and to delay them until eight days, to admit of an answer being received from Cabool." Captains Lawrence and Troup, with the Hajee, will start for Cabool to-morrow, taking with them my replies. When I last wrote I believed my letter to Futteh Jung would have been forwarded that evening, but it was not sent, and the arrival of the horseman the following day, caused another delay in its dispatch.

I have directed Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., to march to-morrow to Futteehabad with Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 35th Regiment Native Infantry, 3rd troop first brigade Horse Artillery, and I have directed Brigadier Wild to proceed to-morrow with the 30th Native Infantry, and the Jezailchee corps, to Dakka, and on his arrival to assume charge of the troops at that post. I have reason to expect that the ten lacs of treasure will shortly arrive at Peshawur, and the 6th Native Infantry will escort it from Dakka to this place; the 30th Regiment of Native Infantry remaining at Dakka.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 460.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, August* 6, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward copy of a document received from Captain Troup, being translation of a conversation which took place with Mahomed Akbar during the short stay made by Captain Troup in Cabool, after his return with my first answer. I take this opportunity of stating that it is my opinion that Mahomed Akbar's chief object in desiring me to give a sealed paper, specifying that I will withdraw all troops from Affghanistan, is to strengthen himself by the publication of such a document at Cabool, the effect of which would be to thoroughly dishearten such Chiefs as look to our assistance for the means of freeing themselves from his tyranny. Were I to say that I should leave this valley in October, the reply would be that the prisoners should be sent then; but such a promise would so strengthen Mahomed Akbar, that I think it probable that he, when the time arrived, finding that our advance on Cabool was impossible for the next seven months, might be tempted to procrastinate, under the idea that we had determined to withdraw our troops, and that after our departure he might obtain a large sum as ransom for the prisoners. Apart from this, it is impossible for me to pledge myself to withdraw on a certain date, and I, of course, could not take upon myself to issue any order to General Nott.

The advance of a brigade to Futteeabad will tend to alarm Mahomed Akbar, and make him the more anxious to induce us to quit the country. Captain Troup has expressed a doubt on this subject, and fears that this step may induce Mahomed Akbar to send the prisoners to Toorkistan, but I cannot think this will occur, as I have reason to suppose that there is a strong party at Cabool, which has determined not to allow the removal of our prisoners, and I also believe that the Wallee of Khooloom has written, refusing to receive Mahomed Akbar if accompanied by the prisoners.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 461.

Conversation between Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan, Major Pottinger, and Captain Troup, on the morning of the 29th July, 1842.

MAHOMED AKBAR opened the conversation by stating that it was recommended that great men should ask advice of each other, even if inimical to each other, and related the fable of the besieged King; he then told us, he wanted advice as to what he should do, and in answer to the question what his own wishes were, declared he required only our promise of friendship. Major Pottinger, then, presuming that he must bear in mind that, though the Vizier had his own authority in full, we were servants, and could, therefore, not give advice, if our opinions ran contrary to our King's interests, however as far as did not clash with our duty, we would be happy to do so, and therefore advised that the prisoners should be at once sent down, for if a delay took place, it would come within the declaration of General Pollock that the business was off if any delay took place; however, as the Chief stated, he agreed to the General's proposition, it might pass if he wrote down that he agreed to the proposition, but as the Affghans considered the statement confused and a little doubtful, he sent a memorandum of what they thought was the meaning, and begged if it were correct that the General would kindly inform him of it by affixing his seal to such a writing. Under these circumstances, the General might not consider the stipulation broken, but as it would virtually be so, we thought it most advisable for him to at once send down the prisoners, if he really wished to make terms. The Vizier said that he would not give up the prisoners without a written promise, and that the people were all determined to support him; that we must put it out of thought that we could release the prisoners by force; that as soon as he heard our troops had reached Charbagh he

would send the ladies, &c., off to Toorkistan, and fight here as long as he could, and that if obliged to flee he would take care not one of the prisoners should return to the English, for he would scatter them by twos and threes through Toorkistan with all the chiefs. He was very anxious that a specification should be in the document regarding giving up Candahar to Prince Timour, but modified the proposal to requesting a general assurance that we would not interfere in the arrangements of the country.

No. 462.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Jellalabad, August* 8, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, the copy of a memorandum by Captain Macgregor, on the progress of the brigade under the command of Brigadier Monteath, C.B., detailing the movements of this force, and the advantages which have accrued from its having been detached on this duty.

I have reason to believe that the operations of this force have been attended with the very best results. The tribe of Shinwarrees took a prominent part in the attack on the late Cabool force, and shared largely in the plunder of its baggage, and the murder of our unfortunate soldiers and camp followers when disabled by the excessive cold.

This race has ever been deemed dangerous by the Affghan rulers; they have for ages committed their depredations, almost with impunity; and retiring to their mountains, have derided the power of the governors of Jellalabad.

They had lately attacked some camels close to the camp, and when an attempt was made to seize them, they succeeded in killing the son and wounding the followers of the chief employed against them. They were thus fitting subjects for chastisement, and the destruction of their forts has proved to all the tribes in this valley, that their mountain strongholds cannot protect them from punishment if they provoke us to attack them.

Many of the chief supporters of Mahomed Akbar have lands and possessions on this and the other side of the river, and the movements of this brigade have caused great alarm to these people.

I should do great injustice to Captain Macgregor if I failed in bringing to the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, the very valuable assistance which he has afforded on this and every other occasion. From him every information was received regarding the country and its inhabitants, and through his exertions and influence supplies were procured not only for the consumption of the brigade, but also a very valuable addition to the stores of the force at Jellalabad. During the greater part of the time this brigade was detached, he suffered from fever and ague, but he never allowed sickness for a day to interrupt his duties.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 463.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.

(Extract.) *Bewar, August* 26, 1842.

I HAD the honor of receiving this day your letters of the 13th and 15th instant. I rejoice that you have heard directly from Major-General Nott, of his intention to move upon Ghuznee and Cabool.

In my letter of the 29th July, I referred to the possible occurrence of circumstances under which the guns and prisoners having been delivered to you, you might, on account of the deficiency of supplies in the vicinity of Cabool, deem it expedient that Major-General Nott should return to India by some other route.

I provided for an extreme case only, and so you must have understood me to consider it, for I can hardly imagine the existence of circumstances which could justify the diversion of Major-General Nott's army from the route of Ghuznee and Cabool, when his intention of marching by that route shall have been once clearly indicated.

Further, from the accounts I have received to-day, I should apprehend, that Major-General Nott's army, now retiring by any other route than that it has taken, would be exposed to greater dangers and hardships than can attend it in the valley of the Cabool river. You will have heard, subsequently to the receipt of Major Rawlinson's letter, inclosed in your letter of the 15th instant, that I have directed that Prince Timour and Major Rawlinson shall both accompany Major-General England's force. Prince Timour's presence in Cabool could not but have been injurious. He might have divided the party, such as it is, of the late Shah's family, and he is a man without ability.

No. 464.

Mr. Maddock to the Superintending Surgeon of the Army.

Sir, *Meerut, August* 30, 1842.

I AM directed by the Governor-General to inform you that a supply of medicines will be required immediately for two regiments of European Infantry, and two troops of Horse Artillery, one company of Native Light Artillery, and six Native Regiments of Infantry, and about 800 Native Cavalry at Jellalabad, in addition to the force now there.

2. The Commissary-General will immediately provide the necessary carriage, on being informed of its amount.

3. He is at Ferozepore.

4. The greatest dispatch is to be used in carrying into effect this order.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 465.

Mr. Maddock to the Quartermaster-General of the Army.

Sir, *Meerut, August* 30, 1842.

I AM directed by the Governor-General to inform you that a supply of camp equipage for the following strength of force, in addition to that at present under the orders of Major-General Pollock, will be required at Jellalabad:—

2 Troops of Horse Artillery.
1 Company Native Foot Artillery.
1 Regiment of Native Cavalry.
8 Rissalahs of Irregular Horse.
2 Regiments of European Infantry.
6 Regiments of Native Infantry.

2. The arrival of the above additional amount of camp equipage, without delay, being urgent, a copy of this letter has been transmitted direct to the Commissary-General, and to the officers of the Commissariat Department at Kurnaul and Delhi, as also to the Commissary of Ordnance at Delhi with the view of the necessary steps being immediately taken for the preparation and transmission of the required camp equipage.

3. I have been directed, in the absence of the Military Secretary to Government, to request that you will authorize the issue upon such indentures as may be served in consequence of these instructions.

4. A copy of this letter will be sent to the Military Secretary to Government, Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 466.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Sultanpoor, August* 20, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, copy of my letter addressed to the Adjutant-General of the Army, reporting my having marched towards Gundamuck with the troops detailed therein.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 467.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Sultanpoor, August* 20, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I marched this morning, with the troops as per margin*, towards Gundamuck, where I shall assemble the whole of the force intended to proceed to the capital. I shall have to remain at Gundamuck some days, to await the arrival of the remainder of the troops, and to enable the Commissariat officer to send up the supplies for the march.

I propose taking to the capital the undermentioned troops:—

3rd Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery - -	4 guns.
3rd ditto 2nd ditto ditto. - -	4
Captain Abbott's Battery - - - -	6
Captain Backhouse's Mountain Train - -	3
Total	17 guns.

5th Company Sappers and Miners.
Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons.
1st Regiment Light Cavalry.
Squadron 5th Light Cavalry.
Head Quarters, and a Squadron 10th Light Cavalry.
600 Sowars of 3rd Regiment Irregular Cavalry.
The whole of Sir R. Sale's Brigade of Infantry.
Ditto Brigadier Tulloch's ditto.
Her Majesty's 31st Regiment of Foot.
33rd Regiment Native Infantry.
Regiment of Bildars under Mr. Mackeson.

The whole of the troops move in the lightest marching order, and are in excellent spirits at the prospect of advancing.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 468.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Neemla, August* 22, 1842.

THE force having advanced, the Sikhs, who were on the left bank of the Cabool river, have requested permission to be allowed to recross. They have

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* Captain Abbott's Battery; 5th Company's Sappers and Miners, one squadron 5th Light Cavalry; Head Quarters and 1 squadron 10th Light Cavalry; Her Majesty's 9th Foot; 26th regiment Native Infantry; 60th ditto ditto.

urged that when we advance, they are left, as it were, alone. I have yielded to their wishes, on their consenting to take up a position near Gundamuck, in the valley of Hissaruck, which will be pointed out to them, and which will tend to facilitate our communication with the rear.

They are very anxious to participate in our advance movement, and as their conduct since their arrival has met my entire satisfaction, I shall, perhaps, let a small portion go on, if their prejudices are not allowed to interfere with the European troops. I shall, however, take every precaution to prevent the least misunderstanding on their part. They have solicited this indulgence; and I understand from Captain Lawrence that they are most anxious to be employed. They would most willingly have gone to Lughman, had the state of the country admitted of such a move; but I found that nearly the whole country was under water with rice cultivation, and therefore not practicable with guns, and they requested that a part of this force might accompany them.

They will, of course, carry their own supplies, if they advance with us.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 469.

Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.

Camp, near Killa Abdoolla,
August 19, 1842.

Sir,

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that the British force at Candahar having evacuated that city on the 7th and 8th, I moved from my encampment, near its walls, on the 10th, pursuant to instructions, with the detachment mentioned in the margin *, en route to Quetta, and that I arrived on this ground yesterday.

2. It was communicated to me on the 9th and subsequently, that the insurgents were preparing to attack the column and convoy under my charge in its passage, and especially that they would make efforts to intercept it in the strong country of the Kojuck range, at the northern extremity of which I arrived, with little molestation, on the morning of the 16th.

3. Whatever might have been the intention of the enemy, it was ascertained by reconnoitring, that the highest points of the mountain were not yet occupied by them, and I thought it right, therefore, notwithstanding that the troops had just completed a night march of twenty-four miles, to push forward a light column to seize the summit at once.

4. This operation was performed by three battalions, and the most important ridge, and all the peaks commanding the principal passes were gained by the troops before dark.

5. On the following morning, the insurgents began to appear in small bodies on different hills, but, the route being flanked, they did little mischief, and the baggage, artillery, and immense retinue under the protection of this camp, including 9,000 or 10,000 beasts of burden, began the ascent, covered by a rear-guard of two battalions and the cavalry; and I was soon made aware of our good fortune in having seized the heights on the previous evening, for the number of the enemy gradually increased, but all their efforts to capture the baggage, or indeed to interrupt us to any serious extent, were frustrated, and the passage across the Kojuck mountains may be said to have been perfected by noon on the 18th.

6. I have had the highest reason to be gratified with the exertions of all the officers and troops on this occasion, and it is entirely owing to their incessant efforts in duties of great fatigue, under a privation of water, both in climbing up the extreme points of the range to drive off the enemy whenever they appeared, and in dragging thirteen pieces of artillery over the ridge, that this service has been accomplished with so little loss on our side of life or of convoy.

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* One troop late Shah's Horse Artillery, 7 guns drawn by bullocks, 2 rissalahs Irregular Horse, 1 rissalah Poonah ditto, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, late Light Battalion ditto, 1st, 2nd, and 5th regiments late Shah's Infantry.

7. I beg to inclose a list of the casualties in killed and wounded of this column which have occurred since I left the immediate vicinity of Candahar.

8. My last accounts of Major-General Nott were of the 13th, three marches north of Candahar.

9. His Highness Prince Timour and his family are in my camp, and every possible attention is paid to his comfort and safety.

10. The Right Honorable the Governor-General will have been informed that the Chief Saloo Khan, who had taken service with us after the affair with the enemy of the 28th of April, near Hykulzye, suddenly absconded from the military post held by us at this place on hearing of our abandonment of Candahar: and it was presumed, therefore, that he was at the head of the insurgents in the Kojuck Hills, but I am not inclined to believe that he was thus employed, and I think it more probable that he may have proceeded to join Prince Sufter Jung, who had placed himself at the head of affairs at Candahar.

11. I have no information to warrant the expectation of any serious opposition between this and Quetta, especially as the Brahoe connexion with the Affghans seems severed for the present, and I hope to be enabled to report my arrival at Quetta to his Lordship on the 27th or 28th instant.

12. Pursuant to the instructions of Government of the 19th of March, I have assumed the political responsibilities as well as military command, vacated by the casualty therein contemplated, in the departure from these countries of Major-General Nott.

I have, &c.,
R. ENGLAND.

Return of Casualties among the Troops under the Command of Major-General R. England, since leaving Candahar up to this date inclusive.

Camp, at Killa Abdoola, August 19, 1842.

1st Irregular Cavalry—1 private, 1 horse, killed; 1 private, 1 horse, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Poonah Horse—1 bheestee wounded.

Detachment 12th Regt. N. I.—1 private killed.

25th Regt. N. I.—1 private wounded.

Light Companies—1 havildar wounded; 1 private missing.

1st Irregular Infantry—1 havildar, 1 private wounded.

5th Irregular Infantry—1 havildar, 1 private wounded.

Total—2 privates, 1 horse, killed; 3 havildars, 4 privates, 1 bheestee, 1 horse, wounded; 1 private, 1 horse, missing.

W. WYLLIE.

No. 470.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Camp, Mammoo Khail,
August 25, 1842.

Sir,

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I reached Gundamuck on the morning of the 23rd instant, with the following troops:—

One squadrom 5th Light Cavalry, head quarters and one squadron 10th Light Cavalry, No. 6 Light Field Battery, 5th company Sappers and Miners, H.M. 9th Foot, 26th Native Infantry, 60th Native Infantry.

On approaching the ground, a few horsemen appeared, but retired as we advanced. I soon learnt that the enemy, under the Chiefs Hadji Ali and Khryroollah Khan, occupied the village and fort of Mammoo Khail, about two miles from Gundamuck, and I determined upon attacking them the following morning.

I ordered up a squadron of the 3rd Dragoons and Captain Broadfoot's corps of Sappers from General Sale's camp, and they joined before daylight the following morning.

At four, A.M., yesterday morning, I moved towards the enemy with the troops undermentioned :—

One squadron 5th Light Cavalry, one squadron 10th Light Cavalry, No. 6 Light Field Battery, 5th company Sappers and Miners, H. M. 9th Foot, 26th Native Infantry, 60th Native Infantry, and Broadfoot's Sappers.

On clearing the broken ground in front, I divided the infantry into two columns, with a wing of Her Majesty's 9th Foot at the head of each, and skirmishers in front. I directed Captain Broadfoot, with his corps, to go to the right. The cavalry also advanced on the right to cut off the retreat of the enemy.

Captain Abbott's battery accompanied the columns, and, as we advanced, occasionally opened on the enemy, who continued in position so long we hoped they would oppose us with their whole force, but they retired on our approach, and we entered the village.

The fields in front of the village were purposely flooded to prevent our advance. The left column then went towards the fort of Mammoo Khail, and the right column proceeded to Kooclee Khail; the ground was impracticable for cavalry, nearly the whole distance, but on one or two occasions an opportunity did offer, and the enemy suffered accordingly. Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, with some companies of the 9th Foot and 26th Native Infantry, occupied part of the heights in front of the village of Kooclee Khail, while Captain Broadfoot, and some of the 26th Native Infantry, cleared the hills to the left of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor's position. As Kooclee Khail is about two miles from Mammoo Khail, and as a position there might have been attended with risk, unless very strongly supported, I directed Major-General Mc Caskill to retire on Mammoo Khail. As I considered it of importance to hold Mammoo Khail, which was the enemy's position, I wrote for the whole camp to be brought here, and it arrived in safety yesterday afternoon.

I left the camp standing, and selected Major Davis, of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, to command the party as per margin* for its protection. The duty was one of considerable importance, as it was by no means improbable that the enemy would take advantage of our advance to send a party to the camp. The squadron of dragoons having arrived just as I was starting, their horses would not have been equal to a day's hard work, which induced me to leave them in camp. The overthrow of this party of the enemy must, I conclude, have been very unexpected, as the whole of their camp equipage, with its carriage cattle, was captured by Captain Broadfoot's corps and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

I have much much gratification in reporting that the troops, both European and Native, of each branch and department, well supported the character of British soldiers.

Where all are equally zealous in the cause, and devoted to their duty, my thanks are equally due to all; but I may be permitted to mention the names of corps and departments employed. Major-General Mc Caskill, K.H., commanding the right column; Brigadier Tulloch, commanding the left column; Captain Abbott, commanding light field battery; Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, K.H., commanding Her Majesty's 9th Foot; Major Huish, commanding the 26th Native Infantry; Captain Napleton, commanding the 60th Native Infantry; Major Blair, commanding the 10th Light Cavalry; Captain Oldfield, commanding a squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry; Captain Tait, commanding the 3rd Irregular Cavalry; Captain Abbott, Field Engineer; Lieutenant Becher, commanding Sappers and Miners; and Superintending-Surgeon Stiven, and Captain Nugent, officiating Sub-assistant Commissary-General. The officers of the Staff who conveyed my orders to the different columns, and otherwise aided in the movements of the day, were Captain Havelock, Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-General; Captain Smith, Major of brigade; Captain Ponsonby, Assistant-Adjutant-General; Captain Mc Adam, Deputy Judge-Advocate-General; Captain Lane, Commissary of Ordnance; Lieutenant Sir R. Shakespear, Military Secretary; Captain Codrington, Assistant Quarter-Master-General; Lieutenant Mayne, Officiating Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General, who was most

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* Three companies of the 26th Native Infantry, three companies of the 60th Native Infantry, and 50 sowars of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

active throughout the day; Lieutenant Tytler, Baggage-master; Lieutenant Pollock, Aide-de-Camp, and Captain Macgregor, Aide-de-Camp; to the last mentioned officer I am not only indebted for services in the field, but for valuable information, and for constant exertions to obtain supplies for the force, which his local knowledge and personal acquaintance with the Maliks enabled him to do.

I have this morning heard from several quarters, that the two Chiefs Hadji Ali and Khyroollah Khan have gone to Cabool, attended by about 60 men. If I had removed to camp at Gundamuck yesterday, there can be little doubt that the enemy would have reoccupied this place, and he would have announced to the Cabool authorities he had beaten us back. Kooclee Khail has been destroyed by fire; the fort and village of Mammoo Khail have been also destroyed by fire; and, before I quit this place, the trees, to which much value and importance are attached, will be cut down.

I have the honor to inclose a return of casualties. I regret I shall be deprived of the services of Major Huish, 26th Native Infantry, and Captain Edmonds, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, for some time, though I hope not long. Lieutenant Robertson, of the 37th Regiment Native Infantry, doing duty with the 26th Native Infantry, is slightly wounded, and will, I trust, soon return to his duty.

I have the pleasure to inclose reports from Major-General Mc Caskill, K. H., and Captain Broadfoot.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 471.

Major-General Mc Caskill to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Camp, Mammoo Khail, August* 25, 1842.

I BEG to detail to you, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C. B., the operations of the right column in the affair of yesterday, after it had become separated from that of the left, on the complete success of the combined attack on the enemy's position in advance of Mammoo Khail.

You are aware that this force consisted of four companies of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and six of the 26th Regiment Native Infantry, under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, K. H., of the former corps. The enemy had fled before our troops, and abandoned the village of Kooclee Khail, but reinforced strongly by the fugitives driven back by Brigadier Tulloch's column, he assumed a menacing attitude, and occupied in force a range of heights and detached summits in the Soofaid Koh. The most salient of these was a spur of the mountain within long musket range of the buildings of Kooclee Khail. From this and from other eminences of the most precipitous character the Ooloos were dislodged with the utmost spirit and gallantry by the details under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, aided in the most effective manner by a party of Captain Broadfoot's corps of Sappers and Miners. The enemy were reinforced from time to time, and made many bold attacks, and kept up a sharp fire of jezails from the loftiest peaks of the mountain, but our troops, though so much pressed as to be compelled to recede from ground which they had gained in one direction, maintained an advanced position among the hills, until withdrawn by order of Major-General Pollock, first into the plateau in front of the village of Kooclee Khail, which they burnt down, and then back upon the present site of encampment. In retiring over the plain between the two principal villages the movement was covered by a squadron of the 5th, and another of the 10th Light Cavalry, but the attempts of the Ooloos to annoy were timid and feeble in the extreme, and our troops did not sustain a single casualty from their effects. Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor speaks in high terms of the support which he received from Major Huish, commanding the 26th Regiment Native Infantry, who was wounded, and afterwards from Captain Handscomb, of the same corps, and from Captain Ogle, commanding Her Majesty's 9th Foot; and I beg to be permitted to bear my testimony to the merits of the Lieutenant-Colonel's own exertions on this

occasion, as well as to express my sense of the gallantry of all the troops engaged, and to acknowledge the able assistance which I received from Captain Havelock, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Mayne, 37th Regiment Native Infantry, Officiating Deputy-Assistant Quarter-master-General, and Lieutenant Bethune, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, my Aide-de-Camp. The intrepidity also with which Captain Broadfoot's Sappers and Miners aided in the attacks on one of the advanced heights deserves my marked commendation.

I have, &c.,
JOHN McCASKILL.

No. 472.

Captain Broadfoot to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Camp, Mammoo Khail, August* 25, 1842.

AGREEABLY to orders, I have the honor report the proceedings of the column intrusted to me by the Major-General commanding, in the action of yesterday.

I moved, as directed, with the Sappers (about 220 men) and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry (250 men), across the ravine on the right of the force. We found the enemy strongly posted in an orchard, with some inclosures; and the usual field-works of loose stones in their front, were also occupied. This position flanked the approach of the main body.

Having formed an attacking party in front, I sent the rest of the Sappers in column under Lieutenant Orr, to turn the enemy's left flank, and Captain Tait's Horse still more to the right, and in advance, to cut off their retreat. While we waited in this order the advance of the force, the enemy reinforced the orchard, and moved out to attack us. I was therefore obliged to advance before the force arrived. The enemy's positions were quickly carried in succession. One party was driven towards the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, who pursued, and the remainder fled to the village of Mammoo Khail, into which the main body of the enemy were at this moment driven by the fire of our artillery; they opened a fire on us, ill-directed, but so heavy that we were obliged to attack the village. They fled when we reached it, and the Sappers pursued to the fort, but were so exhausted by the march from Futtehabad and the previous operations, that the enemy was able to enter and barricade the gate. Their fire was kept down by one party of the Sappers, while the rest climbed on each other's shoulders over a half-repaired bastion, about eight feet high, and covered with thorns. The enemy fled over the walls on the other side, leaving the rear-gate barricaded. This, and descending from the walls, lost so much time that pursuit was nearly hopeless, so far as our now exhausted men were concerned. We pressed on with the least fatigued, however, and keeping up to the hills, forced the enemy into ground, our cavalry were approaching, and we had the satisfaction of seeing the cavalry overtake and attack them.

Parties were directed to destroy the forts abandoned on the cavalry approaching, while with a few men I pushed on to the last village near the hills. There we surprised the enemy, whose head-quarters were there, driving them out of the village and adjoining camp, and obtaining their tents, cattle, and ammunition, and a good quantity of provisions. The enemy (who were evidently the Jezailchees from Cabool) fled to the hills, the fire of which swept the village.

I was now directed to take a party of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, the Sappers being now worn out, except about six men, and attack the hills; the first and second heights were carried at the point of the bayonet, and flanking parties having turned the shoulders of the high range, we were advancing up it when the main force arrived, and our further progress was stayed My separate command now ceased, and I was soon after ordered with the Sappers to head-quarters.

The conduct of the troops, officers and men, European and Native, was admirable; and it is due to the 26th Native Infantry to mention, that, in

storming the second height with a party of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, a party of the former corps joined us, and behaved with the same spirit as the rest.

I have, &c.,
G. BROADFOOT.

No. 473.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of Troops under the personal command of Major-General Pollock, 24th August, 1842.

Detachment 5th Cavalry—1 sepoy wounded; 1 horse missing.

3rd Irregular Cavalry—1 sepoy, 1 camp follower, 3 horses, killed; 1 European officer, 1 sepoy, 1 camp follower, 5 horses wounded.

No. 6 Lt. Field Battery—1 camp follower wounded.

H. M. 9th Foot—2 privates killed; 1 officer, 1 serjeant, 7 privates, wounded.

26th Regt. N. I.—1 sepoy killed; 2 European officers 4 havildars, 4 naiks, 17 sepoys wounded.

Capt. Broadfoot's corps of Sappers and Miners—2 sepoys killed; 1 serjeant, 1 native officer, 1 drummer, 4 sepoys, wounded.

Total—2 privates, 4 sepoys, 1 camp follower, 3 horses killed; 4 European officers, 2 serjeants, 7 privates, 1 native officer, 4 havildars, 4 naiks, 1 drummer, 24 sepoys, 2 camp followers, 5 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Names of Officers wounded.

Captain Tait, commanding 3rd Irregular Cavalry, slightly.
Captain R. S. Edmonds, H. M. 9th Foot, severely.
Major G. Huish, 26th Regt. N. I. severely.
Ensign G. Robertson, 37th Regt. N. I. slightly.

G. PONSONBY.

No. 474.

Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor to Captain Havelock.

Camp, Mammoo Khail,
August 26, 1842.

Sir,

IN my report of yesterday's date to you, for the information of Major-General McCaskill, K.C., commanding the troops engaged on the hills and in in front of Kooclee Khail, on the 24th instant, with the enemy, I beg to observe that I have inadvertently omitted to mention that Captain Taylor, of the 26th Native Infantry, was in command of that portion of the force, consisting of two companies of the 26th Native Infantry, half a company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and about thirty or forty Sappers, which were so warmly engaged during the day in defence of the left of our position, when much pressed by the enemy retiring before Brigadier Tulloch's column. Those troops behaved with great spirit and gallantry; and Captain Taylor deserves every praise for his zeal and exertions on the occasion.

I have, &c.,
A. B. TAYLOR

No. 475.

Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.

Sir *Camp at Quetta, August* 26, 1842.

IN continuation of my dispatch to your address of the 19th instant, I have now the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that I withdrew the garrison of Killa Abdoolla on the morning of the 22nd, and that the column and convoy under my charge arrived at this place this morning without difficulty or opposition.

I shall immediately enter upon the arrangements which will be necessary to give effect to the instructions of Government, in reference to our removal from hence, and shall have the honor of reporting from time to time the progress of these arrangements.

I have, &c.,
R. ENGLAND.

No. 476.

Mr. Maddock to the Commissary-General.

Sir, *Simla, September* 12, 1842.

THE Governor-General requests that you will inform him what measures you have adopted, or have it in contemplation to adopt, for the supply of the armies which may be expected to cross the Punjab on their return from Affghanistan in November and December.

2. You must bear in mind that they will, in all probability, be accompanied by large numbers of followers and have many sick and wounded.

3. The Governor-General desires that you will, upon this subject, place yourself in communication with Mr Clerk who is now at Simla.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 477.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Gundamuck, August* 31, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters as per margin* in the Secret Department. With reference to the second paragraph of the letter, I beg to state, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, that I have made arrangements for raising a body of 200 men, armed with jezails, for the purpose of holding posts between this and Jellalabad, for the protection of the road. I anticipate much advantage from the employment of these men; but more particularly in security for the passage of the dawks, which have for the last two days been detained by a party of thieves, holding a position at Neemlah, between this and Sir Robert Sale's camp at Futteeabad. I have fixed the rates of monthly pay for these men as follows, and I trust that this arrangement will be sanctioned by the Right Honorable the Governor-General:—

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* Allahabad, August 9, 1842; Allahabad, August 10, 1842.

1	Native Commandant at	100	rupees per mensum	-	100
2	Rissaldars -	50	,, -	-	100
10	Havildars -	14	,, -	-	140
2	Standard Bearers	10	,, -	-	20
1	Meerza or Scribe	15	,, -	-	15
2	Bheestees -	6	,, -	-	12
200	Privates -	8	,, -	-	1,600
			Total -	-	1,987

The rate of pay for each private is fixed at 8 rupees, on the understanding that each man is to provide himself with powder and ball; and no man is to be enlisted who cannot produce a good sword and matchlock.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 478.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Gundamuck, August* 31, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to inclose, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, copy of a letter which I yesterday addressed to the Adjutant-General of the Army, reporting my return to this camp, with the troops therein detailed. The village of Mamoo Khail is not on the road to Cabool; as the enemy had taken up a position there, it was necessary to attack and disperse them, and to punish the inhabitants of the village for having harboured them. But these objects being attained, my return to this position became desirable, for the purpose of collecting supplies, and making all the arrangements for an advance upon Cabool.

A party of 200 horsemen is said to be on the road between this and Saarkhab; and the brother of Mahomed Shah Ghilzye, and some other chiefs are said to be at Hissaruck with some followers; but they are in want of pay and in a disorganized state.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 479.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Simla, September* 13, 1842.

I AM directed by the Governor-General to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, announcing the unexpected arrival of Prince Futteh Jung in your camp.

2. It is satisfactory to his Lordship to be informed of his Royal Highness's safety.

3. When the movement of Major-General Nott upon Cabool was first contemplated, the Governor-General directed that Prince Timour should not accompany the army of Major-General Nott, but should be sent with the portion of the force retiring by Sinde, his Lordship being unwilling to give to Prince Timour any appearance of support, and to divide, in any manner, the party attached to the family of the late Shah Shooja at Cabool.

4. Prince Timour has, accordingly, accompanied Major-General England's column.

5. No event has occurred to alter, in the slightest degree, the Governor-General's original determination to abstain, under the present circumstances of Affghanistan, from recognizing as Sovereign any pretender to the throne of Cabool. At the same time, his Lordship directs me to renew the expression of his willingness, and of his desire, to be enabled to recognize, at the earliest period, a Government in Cabool, supported by the Affghans themselves, and capable of maintaining relations of friendship with neighbouring States.

6. The Governor-General cannot, however, delegate the power of recognizing a new Sovereign or Government; and you will report to his Lordship every circumstance tending, in your opinion, to guide his judgment in deciding upon that most important point.

7. If the Prince Futteh Jung should be still in your camp, when you receive this letter, or if you should have the means of communication with him, you are desired to inform his Royal Highness that, whatever may be the choice of a Sovereign made by the Affghan chiefs and people, his Lordship considers that the decease of his Majesty Shah Shooja, and recent events, have practically abrogated the Tripartite Treaty, entered into between the British Government, the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and the late Shah Shooja; and it may be advisable that, on any fitting occasion, you should intimate to the Affghan chiefs, that such is the understanding of the British Government.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 480.

Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Simla, September* 13, 1842.

THE Governor-General directs me to inform you that, in the event of the prisoners not being in your hands when you receive this letter, his Lordship deems it expedient that you should cause it to be intimated to Mahomed Akbar Khan that, in the event of any further delay taking place in their delivery to you, upon the proposed condition of the release of all the Affghan prisoners in our hands, it is his Lordship's intention to remove Mahomed Akbar Khan's family from Loodiana; and that it is under his Lordship's consideration, whether Mahomed Akbar Khan's wife and children should not be immediately sent to Calcutta, and eventually to England.

2. Mahomed Akbar Khan must be aware that the Government in England cannot afford to any one education in the Mahomedan faith, and that there are no means of obtaining it there.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 481.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock

General, *Simla, September* 16, 1842.

BEFORE you receive this letter every attainable object of your advance upon Cabool must have been accomplished, and you will be considering the period and the means of your return.

The efforts of the Commissariat are unremitting to increase the carriage at your disposal; so that there may be ample supply for the whole of your force and Major-General Nott's.

I have directed that the same machinery which was before employed may be again put in motion, for the purpose of procuring for you every mule, in the upper provinces, capable of service.

These will meet you on your march to the Sutlej, and fill up your losses. The Commissariat has already received an intimation that preparations must immediately be made for provisioning your army on its march back to the provinces.

The state of the Punjab is such, that you should not depend upon the country for your daily supplies. I have desired that you may have the means of carrying ten or fourteen days' provision.

The state of the Punjab to which I have adverted, makes me even more anxious than I have always been to see your army on this side of the Sutlej. I hope that no conflict between the parties at Lahore will take place, so as to

interfere, in any way, with the passage of the animals sent, and to be sent, to you; or with your obtaining the necessary supplies; but you must not consider such events as absolutely impossible.

Under all circumstances so imperatively demanding your return, I trust you will not permit any consideration whatever to delay your homeward march; but will put your army in motion for India at the earliest possible period, under the impression that no greater calamity could befall us, than your remaining at Cabool during the winter.

I have,&c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 482.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Simla, September* 21, 1842.

I AM directed by the Governor-General to transmit to you the inclosed extract from a letter from Major-General Pollock to the Adjutant-General of the army, showing the extreme disappointment the Major-General had experienced through the delay of the march of 500 bullocks, hired at Peshawur, and 700 camels, between Attock and that place.

2. The Governor-General desires that you will, as far as you can, ascertain the cause of this delay, so injurious to the Major-General's combinations; and especially, whether the Sikh authorities in any manner contributed to this untoward detention of the animals, by want of zeal in the execution of orders, or by throwing difficulties in the way of our officers.

3. The Commissary-General has been instructed to execute a strict inquiry upon the subject.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 483.

Mr. Hamilton, Secretary to the Government in the North-West Provinces, to Mr. Maddock.

(Extract.) *September, 6,* 1842.

COLONEL GWATKIN has reported the departure of the last drove of the baggage-train from Haupper, on the 22nd ultimo.

2. 2,230 mules are reported by Lieutenant the Honorable R. Byng, to have crossed the Sutlej up to the 19th ultimo; and divisions of 500 will be forwarded, at regular intervals, until the whole 4,500 have passed on. Lieutenant Byng has been directed to proceed to Peshawur with as much expedition as possible, to arrange for the distribution of the train under Major-General Pollock's orders, and to prevent any delay *en route*.

No. 484.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, *Simla, October* 5, No. 43, 1842.

THE dispatches from Major-Generals Pollock and Nott, which accompany this letter will inform you that, on the 30th August, Major-General Nott defeated Shumsoodeen Khan, about thirty-eight miles from Ghuznee; and on the 5th again, on the heights, on the north-east of Ghuznee; against which place batteries were prepared, on the night of the 5th, but the enemy evacuated the town and citadel during that night, and they were taken possession of by Major-General Nott's troops at daylight on the 6th.

The work of demolition was carried on during the 7th and 8th; and, on the 9th, Major-General Nott's army left Ghuznee, leaving the gates and

principal buildings on fire, and having totally destroyed the citadel, and made breaches in the walls, which, without immediate repair, must fall during the winter.

On the 8th of September, Major-General Pollock defeated the Ghilzyes and Jezailchees of Mahomed Akbar; and, on the 13th, the Major-General entirely defeated Mahomed Akbar, at the head of 16,000 men, at Tezeen.

On the 16th, Cabool and the Bala Hissar were occupied by the British troops.

On the 17th, the army of Major-General Nott arrived within five miles of Cabool.

Such of the prisoners, taken by the Affghans on the retreat from Cabool, as were near Cabool, came into the British camp on the 15th. 700 Kuzzilbashes, with Sir Richmond Shakespear, left Cabool for the Bameean road, on which the remaining prisoners had been carried; and it was expected on the 17th that, on the following day, they might be delivered up to Sir Richmond Shakespear.

The feelings with which I have regarded these successful operations will be seen on a perusal of the general orders prefixed to the dispatches published on the 21st and 30th ultimo.

It appears by a letter (private) from Major Outram, of the 20th ultimo, that, on the preceding day, Colonel Reid, with the first column of Major-General England's army, arrived safely at Dadur. The second column will have left Quetta on the 21st; and the last was to move about the 1st of this month.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 485.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Soorkab, September 7, 1842.*

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that I marched from Gundamuck this morning with the first division of the troops, under the immediate command of Major-General Sir R. Sale, G.C.B., as follows:—

First Division, under the command of Major-General Sir R. Sale, G.C.B.

Two guns, 3rd Troop, 1st Battalion Horse Artillery; 6 guns, No. 6, Light Field Battery; 3 guns, Mountain Train; Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons; 1 squadron, 1st Light Cavalry; 3 Rissallahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry; Her Majesty's 9th Foot; Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; 16th Native Infantry; 35th Light Infantry; 5th Company, Sappers and Miners; Broadfoot's Sappers; Mackeson's Bildars.

Second Division, under the command of Major-General Mc Caskill.

Two guns, 3rd Troop, 1st Brigade; 2 guns, 3rd Troop, 2nd Brigade; 2 squadrons and head-quarter 1st Light Cavalry; 3 Rissallahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry; Her Majesty's 31st Foot; right wing 33rd Native Infantry; right wing 60th Native Infantry; Sikh contingent, consisting of 200 horse, 300 infantry, 5 camel guns, 10 long jezails.

Troops at Gundamuck.

Two guns, 3rd Troop, 2nd Brigade; 1 squadron 5th Light Cavalry; 1 squadron and head-quarter 10th Light Cavalry; left wing 33rd Native Infantry; left wing 60th Native Infantry.

The Second Division will march under the command of Major-General Mc Caskill, K.H., to-morrow morning, and will be accompanied by the Sikh Contingent which arrived at Gundamuck yesterday.

I was under the necessity of leaving at Gundamuck the troops above-mentioned, and have written to have the party strengthened by a squadron of

cavalry and a wing of native infantry from Jellalabad. I have left an officer of engineers, and have ordered up a commissariat officer from Jellalabad to collect supplies for our return.

The camp will be entrenched, and it is in a good position.

I should hardly have considered it safe leaving the party at Gundamuck but that 1,000 Sikhs will arrive there to-morrow, and the remainder will follow in a few days. It will be a great object having a depôt of supplies on our return to Gundamuck.

With reference to the great want of carriage-cattle which I have experienced, I consider it my duty to report, that 500 bullocks were hired last month at Peshawur to go to Cabool; they were dispatched on the 22nd ultimo, and might with ease have reached me, but they did not come, and I have since heard that they did not leave Jumrood till the 30th. It has occasioned me very great disappointment. The unaccountable detention also of about 600 camels, between Attock and Peshawur, has been another source of annoyance, for, with the known difficulties I have had to contend against, they might have reached me by forced marches carrying no loads.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 486.

Notification by the Governor-General of India.

Simla, September 21, 1842.

THE Governor-General has this day received the reports of three victories obtained on the 30th of August, by Major-General Nott, over 12,000 Affghans thirty-eight miles south-west of Ghuznee; on the 8th of September, by Major-General Pollock, over the troops of Mahomed Akbar Khan, and the Ghilzye chiefs at Jugdulluck; and on the 16th of June by the expedition on the coast of China, within the mouth of the River Yang-tse-Kiang, at the city of Woosung.

In this last operation and those immediately succeeding it, Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker and Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Gough took 364 guns from the Chinese.

On the 3rd of September, Major-General Nott had advanced to Nanee, within a short march of Ghuznee.

On the 9th of September, Major-General Pollock had advanced to Kutta Sung, and had experienced no opposition.

Formed as the troops under Major-General Nott have mostly been, by four years of constant service, and habituated as they have been to victory under their able commander, the Governor-General, had anticipated their success against any force which could be brought against them. It is to the Governor-General a subject of sincere satisfaction, that the events of this campaign should have opened a more extensive field to that brave army on which it may make manifest to the world the high qualities which he has long known it to possess.

Major-General Pollock has, through the prudence of his arrangements, and the correctness of the movements directed by him, had the gratification of affording to his troops the opportunity of proving their superiority to the Affghans, on the very scene of the last disaster on the retreat from Cabool: and Major-General Sir R. Sale, at the head of the garrison of Jellalabad, worthily supported by the reinforcements from India, has had the glory of leading the army on its triumphant return to the capital of Affghanistan.

The Governor-General regards with the highest admiration the noble ardour which has, in these several operations, been manifested equally by the officers and soldiers of both nations and of all arms. He sees in the successes already obtained the certain promise of other more decisive victories, calculated to impress upon all the enemies of the British Government a conviction of the futility of resistance to the forces under his direction, and tending, under the continued favour of Providence, to effect the first object of his desire, the restoration of peace to Asia.

By order, &c,
J. H. MADDOCK.

No. 487.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Kutta Sung, September* 9, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, a copy of a letter which I have this day addressed to the Adjutant-General of the army, detailing the operations against the enemy near Jugdulluck yesterday.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE POLLOCK.

P.S. I have this moment received two letters from Major-General Nott to your address, which I have read, thinking they might contain information which would regulate my movements.

No. 488.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Kutta Sung, September* 9, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that I left Soork-ab on the morning of the 8th instant, in progress to Jugdulluck, with the following troops:—

1st division, under the command of Major-General Sir R. Sale, G.C.B., 2 guns 3rd troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery, 6 ditto No. 6 Light Field Battery, 3 ditto Mountain Train, Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, 1 squadron 1st Light Cavalry, 3 rissallahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 26th Regiment Native Infantry, 35th Regiment Light Infantry, 5th company Sappers, Broadfoot's Sappers, Mackeson's Bildars.

On approaching the hills which command the road through the Pass, I perceived their summits were occupied by a considerable number of men; and a nearer view enabled me to ascertain the nature of their position, which was one of singular strength and difficulty of approach. The enemy were assembled in bodies apparently under different chieftains, each having a distinguishing standard.

The hills they occupied formed an amphitheatre inclining towards the left of the road on which the troops were halted while the guns opened, and the enemy were thus enabled on this point to fire into the column, a deep ravine preventing any contact with them. The practice of the guns was excellent, yet the enemy appeared so determined on making a stand, that the bursting of the shells among them on the right hill, which was of a conical shape and difficult ascent, had not the effect of making them relinquish it, or of slackening their fire, which now became heavy from all parts of their position, causing several casualties.

It is with the deepest feeling of regret I have to deplore the loss of Captain Nugent, officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, who was shot here, and died almost immediately. I had lately received the most important and valuable assistance from him; the service has lost a promising officer, and the department to which he belonged a most efficient member.

As the guns appeared to have little effect in forcing the enemy to quit the heights, I resolved upon attacking them. For this purpose Captain Broadfoot was detached to the extreme left of the enemy's position, and his Sappers commenced ascending a steep hill, on the top of which the enemy were entrenched in a sungah. Her Majesty's 9th Foot, under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, were directed to cross a deep ravine and assault the hills on the opposite side, where the enemy held a ruined fort, and were with their chiefs and cavalry in considerable numbers. Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, led by Captain Wilkinson, commanding the regiment, attacked the hill, which may be considered the key of the position. The 9th, accompanied by two companies of the 35th Native Infantry, under Lieutenants Boileau and Trench; the 11th by 110 men of the

26th, led by Captain Gahan (Major Huish, although present in the field, was prevented by his wound, received at Mamoo Kheil, from assuming the command), rushed up the height simultaneously, and the animated and enthusiastic cheer they gave seemed to strike a panic in the enemy, for they dared not wait the collision, but fled down the hills, and were enabled to escape chastisement by the nature of the ground, which was so well calculated to favor their retreat. At this moment Major Lockwood, with Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, galloped up, and had very nearly succeeded in overtaking the enemy's cavalry; but I am sorry to say, they also effected their safety by flight.

Captain Broadfoot had completely succeeded in the attack he made, and the enemy were dispersed in every direction, a large body of them retiring to the summit of a high mountain. On this apparently inaccessible height they planted their standards, and showed every demonstration of maintaining it. As the achievements of the day would have been incomplete were they suffered to remain, I decided upon dislodging them. The troops named in the margin,* advanced under cover of Captain Abbott's guns, and those of Captain Backhouse's mountain train. Seldom have soldiers had a more arduous task to perform, and never was an undertaking of the kind surpassed in execution; these lofty heights were assaulted in two columns, led by Captains Wilkinson and Broadfoot; the discomfited Ghilzyes not relishing an encounter, betook themselves to flight, carrying away their standards, and leaving our troops in quiet possession of their last and least assailable stronghold.

It gratifies me to be enabled to state, that we have thus signally defeated, with one division of the troops, the most powerful tribes and the most inveterate of our enemies, the original instigators and principal actors in those disturbances which entailed such disasters on our troops last winter. The following are the chiefs who were present in the action:—

Uzeez Khan, Gool Mahomed Khan, Saadut Meen Khan—Jubber Kheil Ghilzyes.

Khodah Buksh Khan, Azul Khan, and Khojeh Mahomed Shah Khan.—Chiefs of Tezeen, Babukkur Kheil Ghilzyes.

Sirdar Khyroolla Khan, Barukzye, Shah Ghazee Khan, Gool Ghilzye, Hajee Ali Tajick.—Sent by Mahomed Akbar Khan from Cabool, to co-operate with the Ghilzyes.

Ibrahim Khan, and Mullick Suddoo.—Lughman Chiefs.

The petty chiefs of Hissaruck were also engaged, and indeed the whole strength of the Ghilzye force may be considered to have been brought against us, numbering, on this occasion, from four to five thousand men.

Let me now express how much I owe to the brave officers and soldiers who have thus gallantly asserted their superiority in arms; were I to name all who merit eulogy, I should feel obliged to enumerate every officer who was present.

I feel considerable diffidence in mentioning the name of Major-General Sir R. Sale, G.C.B., whose heroic conduct in the field stands so little in need of my commendation. On this occasion I was an eye-witness to the personal intrepidity of this highly-distinguished officer, as he led up the heights in advance of his own regiment under a very hot fire.

To the officers in command of regiments and detachments, and to the heads of departments, also to the officers of my personal and the general staff, I feel especially indebted to the zealous and efficient manner in which they performed their respective duties; and I trust his Excellency the Commander-in-chief will bring to the notice of his Lordship the Governor-General, that every individual engaged has exerted himself to the utmost to serve his country.

I have the honor to inclose a rough sketch of the scene of operations, and a return of the killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,
GEORGE POLLOCK.

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* Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 1 company 26th Native Infantry, 1 ditto 35th Light Infantry, 5th company Sappers under Lieutenant Becher, Broadfoot's Sappers.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Troops of the 1st Division of the Advance under the command of Major-General Sir R. Sale, at the Storming of the Heights of Jugdulluck, on the 8th of September, 1842.

General Staff—1 officer killed; 1 officer wounded.
No. 6, Light Field Battery—1 native officer, 2 privates, wounded.
Mountain Train—1 sergeant, 1 private, 1 driver, wounded; 1 mule, killed.
Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons—2 troopers wounded.
Squadron 1st Light Cavalry—1 horse killed.
Head-Quarters and Detachment 3rd Irregular Cavalry—1 trooper, 1 horse, killed; 2 troopers, 3 horses, wounded.
5th Company Sappers—1 private wounded.
Her Majesty's 9th Regiment—1 sergeant, 2 privates, killed; 1 sergeant, 16 privates, wounded.
Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—1 private, killed; 2 sergeants, 12 privates, wounded.
26th Regiment of Native Infantry—1 naick, 4 sepoys, wounded.
25th Light Infantry—4 privates wounded.
Captain Broadfoot's Sappers—1 sergeant, 5 privates, wounded.
Total—1 officer, 1 sergeant, 4 privates, 2 horses, 1 mule, killed; 1 officer, 1 native officer, 5 sergeants, 1 naick, 50 privates, 3 horses, wounded.
Total of all ranks killed and wounded 64.

Remarks.

Captain Nugent, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, killed, and Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., slightly wounded.
One dooly bearer killed, and one wounded.
One camp-follower wounded.

G. PONSONBY.

No. 489.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Kareez Oosman Khan, August* 29, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you, that on the morning of the 18th instant, a body of the enemy attacked our rear guard. I directed the officer in command of the cavalry to detach a party to assist in dispersing it.

The accompanying letter from Captain Christie details the result.

I have, &c.,
W. NOTT.

No. 490.

Captain Christie to Captain Delamain.

Sir, *Camp, Kareez Oosman Khan, August* 28, 1842.

AGREEABLY to the instructions conveyed to me through Lieutenant Forbes, Adjutant 3rd Light Cavalry, I proceeded to the rear with two rissallahs of the 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry, and three rissallahs of my own regiment, and now do myself the honor to report the result as follows, for the information of Major-General Nott:—

I proceeded at a trot for about a mile and a half, when we were closing well with the enemy; all of a sudden we came on a ravine with steep sides, which, for a time, completely brought us up; however, we managed to file down and form again on the opposite side. This delay allowed the enemy to move a long

way a-head; but getting the detachment into a smart gallop, we succeeded in coming up with them just as the foremost of them had reached the bottom of the hills. We cut up about fifty of them; Lieutenant Chamberlain's party from the other flank destroyed twelve more.

The enemy, I should think, amounted to about 300 horse and foot.

Every man did his duty; so it is impossible to offer any remark on individuals; and I shall only add, that I was quite satisfied with the conduct of all.

I beg to return lists of the killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,

J. CHRISTIE.

No. 491.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Camp, Gonine, 38 miles S.W. of Ghuznee,
August 31, 1842.

Sir,

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, that Shumsoodeen, the Affghan governor of the fortress of Ghuznee, brought nearly the whole of his army, about 12,000 men, into the vicinity of my camp yesterday, at three o'clock P. M.

I moved out with one-half of my force; the enemy advanced in the most bold and gallant manner, each division cheering as they came into position, their left being upon a hill of some elevation, their centre and right along a low ridge until their flank rested on a fort filled with men: they opened a fire of small arms, supported by two six-pounder horse artillery guns, which were admirably served: our columns advanced upon the different points with great regularity and steadiness, and, after a short and spirited contest, completely defeated the enemy, capturing their guns, tents, ammunition, &c., and dispersing them in every direction. One hour's more daylight would have enabled me to destroy the whole of their infantry.

Shumsoodeen fled in the direction of Ghuznee, accompanied by about thirty horsemen.

I inclose a list of killed and wounded on the 28th and 30th instant; also a return of ordnance, ammunition, &c. &c., taken from the enemy.

The behaviour of the troops, both European and Native, was such as I anticipated, and afforded me complete satisfaction.

I beg leave to bring to the favourable notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, the undermentioned officers: many of them have served under my command for the last three years, and have been conspicuous for their zeal and gallantry in the various affairs which have occurred with the enemy during that period, and especially in the action of the 12th of January last, and have invariably upheld the reputation of our arms, and the honour of our country.

Brigadier Wymer, commanding the 1st Infantry brigade; Lieutenant-Col. McLaren, commanding 16th Regiment Native Infantry; Major Hibbert, commanding Her Majesty's 40th Regiment; Captain Burney, commanding 38th Regiment Native Infantry; Captains Christie and Haldane, commanding corps of Bengal Irregular Cavalry; Major Sotheby, commanding the Artillery; Captain Blood, commanding Bombay Foot Artillery; Major Sanders, Bengal engineers; Lieutenants North and Studdert, Bombay engineers. Majors Leech and Rawlinson, of the political department, attended me in the field, and rendered me great assistance in conveying my orders.

My best thanks are due to my staff, Captain Polwhele, Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-General, Captain Waterfield, Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant Tytler, Deputy Assistant-Quarter-Master-General.

Annexed is a letter from Brigadier Wymer, speaking in the highest terms of his Brigade-Major, Captain T. H. Scott, of the 38th Regiment Native Infantry. I fully appreciate this excellent officer's merits; he has been with me in four actions. I trust I shall not be thought presumptuous in expressing a hope that he will receive some mark of the favour of Government, by Brevet or otherwise.

I cannot close this dispatch without expressing my admiration of the dashing and gallant conduct, rapid movement, and correct practice of Captain Anderson's troop of Bengal Horse Artillery; nothing could exceed it; and I beg leave to bring this officer, and Lieutenant Turner, attached to the same troop, to the particular notice of his Lordship, as officers who have on many occasions rendered me most essential service.

I have, &c.,
W. NOTT.

No. 492.

Brigadier Wymer to Major-General Nott.

Sir, *Camp, Chuppakhana, September* 1, 1842.

ADVERTING to division orders of yesterday, expressive of your praise and thanks to the troops employed under your command in action with the enemy on the afternoon of the 30th instant, I hope you will not consider it ill-judged on my part, bringing to your favorable notice the valuable assistance I derived from the active services of Captain Scott, Major of Brigade to the 1st Infantry Brigade, under my command, whose exertions during the fight on that day, demand and merit my best praise and acknowledgments. This being the second time of the display of Captain Scott's abilities when in action with the enemy, as my personal Staff, will, I hope, plead my apology for recommending him to your notice, and the favorable consideration of Government, in any way you may have it in your power to mention him as a meritorious and deserving officer.

I have, &c.,
G. P. WYMER.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Field Force under the command of Major-General William Nott, in the Engagements with the Enemy on the 28th and 30th of August, 1842.

2nd Troop Bengal Irregular Horse Artillery—1 syce, 1 horse, wounded.

3rd Company 1st Battalion Bombay Artillery—1 bearer killed, 1 gunner, 1 trumpeter, 1 private, 1 driver, 2 horses, wounded.

3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry—1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 jemadar, 4 havildars, 1 farrier, 10 privates, 6 horses, killed; 2 lieutenants, 1 jemadar, 1 trumpeter, 5 privates, 4 horses, wounded.

1st Regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry—1 havildar, 11 privates, killed; 1 jemadar, 2 havildars, 12 privates, 16 horses, wounded; 9 horses missing.

Christie's Horse—2 havildars, 5 privates, 19 horses, killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 jemadar, 13 privates, 17 horses, wounded; 4 horses, missing.

Her Majesty's 40th Regiment of Foot—1 lieutenant, 2 corporals, 10 privates, wounded.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment of Foot—1 corporal, 3 privates, 1 tent lascar, 1 bheestie, wounded,

16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—2 privates, wounded.

42nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 private, wounded.

Total—1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 jemadar, 7 havildars, 1 farrier, 26 privates, 1 bearer, 25 horses, killed; 4 lieutenants, 3 jemadars, 2 havildars, 3 corporals, 1 gunner, 2 trumpeters, 47 privates, 1 tent lascar, 1 bheestie, 1 syce, 1 driver, 40 horses, wounded; 13 horses, missing.

Grand Total—104 officers and men, 65 horses, killed and wounded; 13 horses missing.

Officers killed.

Captain H. Bury, 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry.
Brevet Captain G. O. Reeves, 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry.

Officers wounded.

Brevet Captain G. S. Ravenscroft, 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry.
Lieutenant T. A. Mackenzie, 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry.
Lieutenant Meason, Her Majesty's 40th Regiment of Foot.
Lieutenant N. B. Chamberlain, Christie's Horse.

W. NOTT.

Return of Ordnance, Ammunition, &c., captured in Action with the Enemy, by the Field Force under the Command of Major-General Nott, on the 30th August,

Camp, Gonine, August 31, 1842.

2 field carriages with limbers (one broken by our shot and left on the field), 40,000 musket ball cartridges (as originally packed in the Honorable Company's magazines, destroyed on the enemy's encamping ground), 132 filled six-pounder cartridges (destroyed on the enemy's encamping ground), 4 sets of unserviceable harness, 4 horses, 2 brass six-pounders, 9 unserviceable six-pounder common case shot, 24 unserviceable six-pounder hammered round shot.

F. S. SOTHEBY.

No. 493.

Lieutenant-Colonel Powell, Adjutant-General of the Bombay Army, to Lieutenant-Colonel Melvill, Military Secretary to Government, Bombay.

Sir,

Poona, November 2, 1842.

I AM directed by the Commander-in-chief to transmit to you the inclosed official note from Captain C. Delamain, commanding the 3rd Regiment Light Cavalry dated Cabool, the 26th September last, reporting the particulars of the affair in which Captain Bury, and Brevet-Captain Reeves with sixteen men of that regiment were killed, which his Excellency begs you will submit for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

I have, &c.,

S. POWELL.

No. 494.

Captain Delamain to the Adjutant General of the Army.

(Extract.)

Cabool, September 26, 1842.

BEING temporarily removed from the Bombay Presidency, it the more becomes my painful duty to report to you with the least possible delay, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, the death of Captain Bury, and also of Brevet-Captain Reeves of the regiment at present under my command, who, together with sixteen native officers non-commissioned officers and troopers were killed in an encounter with the enemy under Sirdar Shumsoodeen Khan on the 28th ultimo.

The cavalry first turned out on an alarm of grass-cutters being cut up, and having proceeded about four miles, the enemy appearing in small bodies, a troop was dispatched under Captain Bury to cut up some fifteen men making for the hills, which having effected, he rejoined the main body. The enemy now showed to the amount of 5,000 or 6,000 horse and foot; when it became necessary to retire, which was conducted in the most orderly manner at a walk for about a mile. The enemy had now, however, closed in, in great numbers, to within fifty or sixty yards, and pouring in a very heavy fire, it became necessary to make an effort to drive him to a greater distance. I, therefore, ordered the squadrons (two in open column) to front, and directed Captain Bury to lead his to the charge. This was done in the best spirit by all, and they closed with the enemy; but being met on the rise of the hill by a tremendous fire from matchlockmen, in addition to the horse opposed to

them, they were, I regret to say, hurled back in disorder, carrying the remainder with them. It is, however, to the credit of the men, that at the distance of three or four hundred yards, they rallied being still under a heavy fire, and the retreat was conducted in the best order. Captain Bury was cut down whilst gallantly leading the charge; Captain Reeves and many men being shot in the same advance. In addition to the above, I am sorry to have to add that Brevet-Captain Ravensoroft and Lieutenant Mackenzie were severely wounded; the former in the first attack, Lieutenant Mackenzie in the second—they are both doing well. Eight men, including Soobadar Major, wounded. Six horses killed.

No. 495.

General Orders by the Governor-General of India.

Simla, September 30, 1842.

THE Governor-General announces to the army and to the people of India, the occupation of Ghuznee by Major-General Nott, on the 6th of September, and its entire destruction by the Candahar division of the army.

Major-General Nott had the satisfaction of releasing in the neighbourhood of Ghuznee three hundred and twenty-seven Sepoys of the 17th Native Infantry, from the slavery to which they had been reduced by the Affghans.

The Governor-General likewise announces the complete defeat of Mahomed Akbar Khan at the head of 16,000 men at Tezeen, on the 13th of September, by Major-General Pollock, and the occupation of Cabool by the troops under that General, on the 16th of September.

The British flag now waves in triumph from the highest point of the Bala Hissar.

Thus have all past disasters been retrieved and avenged on every scene on which they were sustained; and repeated victories in the field, and the capture of the cities and citadels of Ghuznee and Cabool, have advanced the glory, and established the accustomed superiority, of the British arms.

The Governor-General has derived much satisfaction from the report made by Major-General Pollock, of the admirable conduct of the troops of His Highness the Maharajah Shere Sing, acting in co-operation with the British army.

The Governor-General rejoices in this new proof of the cordial good understanding which prevails between the British Government and that of Lahore.

The report of Major-General Pollock leads the Governor-General to expect that, long before this day, all the British prisoners taken by the Affghans will have been brought into the General's camp. Those who had been left near Cabool were already at liberty.

The Governor-General, in the name of the Government and of all the people of India, offers to Major-General Pollock and Major-General Nott, and all the officers and troops under their respective commands, his grateful and heartfelt acknowledgments of the important services they have performed.

The Governor-General directs that the recent successes obtained by the armies in Affghanistan be fully made known to all the troops at all stations of the army, and that at all those stations a salute of 21 guns be fired for the capture of Ghuznee, and a similar salute for the capture of Cabool.

By order, &c.

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 496.

Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Ghuznee, September* 8, 1842.

MY dispatch of the 31st ultimo will have informed you of my having defeated the Affghan army commanded by Shumsoodeen.

On the morning of the 5th instant, I moved on Ghuznee. I found the

city full of men, and a range of mountains running north-east of the fortress covered by heavy bodies of cavalry and infantry; the gardens and ravines near the town were also occupied. The enemy had received a considerable reinforcement from Cabool, under Sultan Jan.

I directed Major Sanders, of the Bengal Engineers, to reconnoitre the works, under escort of the 16th Regiment Native Infantry, and a party of irregular cavalry. This brought on some smart skirmishing, in which our sepoys behaved to admiration. Captain White, of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, commanding the light companies of the army, was pushed forward, accompanied by Anderson's troop of Horse Artillery, to support the reconnoitring party, and I at once determined on carrying the enemy's mountain positions before encamping my force. The troops ascended the heights in gallant style, driving the enemy before them until every point was gained.

The village of Bullal is situated about 600 yards from the walls of Ghuznee, upon the spur of the mountain to the north-east, and observing it to be a desirable spot for preparing a heavy battery to be placed 300 paces in advance, I ordered it to be occupied by two regiments of infantry and some light guns, and retired the columns into camp.

The engineer officers, sappers and miners, and infantry working parties were employed under the directions of Major Sanders, during the night of the 5th, in erecting a battery for four 18-pounders; these guns were moved from camp before daylight on the morning of the 6th; but, before they had reached the position assigned them, it was ascertained that the enemy had evacuated the fortress.

I directed the city of Ghuznee, with its citadel, and the whole of its works, to be destroyed. I forward the engineer's report.

In these operations our loss has been much less than might have been expected from the numbers and positions of the enemy, and the fact of the troops having been necessitated to move under the range of the guns of the fortress.

I inclose a list of the killed and wounded.

The Exertions of Major Sanders of the engineers, were as usual most zealous, and my thanks are due to him and the department under his charge.

I beg to notice the following officers: Brigadier Wymer; Major Hibbert, commanding Her Majesty's 40th Regiment; Captain Evans, in temporary charge of the 16th Regiment Native Infantry; Captain White, Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, commanding the light companies of the force; Major Sotheby, and officers of the Artillery.

I have every reason to be satisfied with my staff, Captain Polwhele, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Waterfield, Aide-de-camp; Captain Ripley; and Lieutenant Kay, Deputy Judge-Advocate-General.

I continue to receive the greatest assistance from Major Leech.

I have, &c.

W. NOTT.

P. S.—I have recovered about 327 of the sepoys of the 27th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, who had been sold into slavery, and dispersed in villages 40 miles round Ghuznee.

No. 497.

Memorandum by Major Sanders.

Camp, Rozeh, near Ghuznee, September 9, 1842.

ON the morning of the 5th September 1842, General Nott moved his camp to take up a position before Ghuznee. An advanced party was ordered to protect a reconnoissance of the works undertaken by the engineer department. On the approach of this party to the hills north of the city, it was opposed in force, but was immediately supported by the General, and, thus reinforced, cleared the hill of the enemy, and took possession of the village of Bullal, within 400 yards of the city.

The General immediately directed this important point with the heights

near the village to be maintained, and they were occupied by two Regiments of Native Infantry and two 9-pounder guns.

While these operations were going on, the camp was established at Rozeh, 2½ miles from the city. The guards required for the protection and general duties of the camp absorbed so many men that but few were available for the duties of a siege. The General, therefore, determined not to invest the place in form, and directed the Engineer to concentrate the resources at his disposal in one spot, where protection might be most conveniently afforded to the siege operations.

With advertence to these instructions, the Engineer proposed to establish a battery on the ridge of the hill north of the town, in advance of the village of Bullal, and distant about 350 yards from the nearest point of the walls. From this battery it was expected that the four 18-pounder guns would lay open the thin flank wall connecting the citadel on the west with the town wall, in a few hours. The defences of the citadel could be swept from the same point by the light artillery: and the lines of loop-holed wall which would bear on the advance of the storming party were all viewed in enfilade from the site selected for the battery. The advance of the party to the assault would have been greatly facilitated by the existence of a thick dam of earth across the ditch, immediately opposite the point marked out for the breach.

It was further proposed that the principal assault should be supported by two other attacks; one an attempt to blow in the water-gate (both the others having been strongly built up, and the causeways in front of them cut through) another to escalade a weak point near the Cabool gate, which would have been greatly aided by the fire of the artillery from the hill.

This project met the General's approval; and at dusk, on the evening of the 5th September, a working party composed of the Sappers, and of 160 men from the regiments occupying the hill, commenced work on the battery. By 4 A.M. on the 6th September, cover for the party had been secured across the ridge of the hill, and so much progress made in the execution of the work as to lead to reasonable expectation that the four 18-pounder guns and two 24-pounder howitzers would be established in position, and ready to open their fire during the day.

Early on the evening of the fifth, a brisk matchlock fire was kept up from the citadel on the hill, but this gradually slackened, and at 10 P.M. had entirely ceased. The enemy's infantry had been observed at dusk crossing the river near the water-gate, with the intention, it was supposed, of attacking the working party during the night; but towards the morning of the 6th, there were grounds for believing the fort was evacuated. At daylight this was ascertained to be the case by Lieutenant North of the Engineers, who took possession at that hour of the water-gate, without opposition, leaving Ensign Newton and 20 Sepoys of the 16th Native Infantry in charge of the gateway, and returning to the battery for further assistance. The whole of the working party was immediately moved into the town, of which and of the citadel of Ghuznee, they were in possession before sunrise.

EDWARD SANDERS.

No. 498.

Major Sanders to Major-General Nott.

Sir, *Camp, Rozeh, near Ghuznee, September* 9, 1842.

ON the occupation of the fortress of Ghuznee by the troops under your command, I received orders from you to take measures for the destruction of the citadel, to as great an extent as the means at command, and the time afforded by a halt of two days, would permit.

2. I have now the honor to report, that the engineer department attached to your force has been employed during the 7th and 8th instant on the work of demolition, and to state the progress effected.

3. Fourteen mines have been sprung in the walls of the citadel, all with good effect. The upper fort has been completely destroyed; the second line of

works extensively breached in two places; and the outer and lower walls have their revêtements blown down and greatly injured in three places.

4. In several spots remote from the mines, the walls, though they have not fallen, are so seriously shaken by the explosions that, unless immediate and energetic measures are adopted, on the departure of your force, for their repair and security, they must crumble down during the ensuing winter.

5. The gateways of the town and citadel, and the roofs of the principal buildings, have been fired and are still burning.

I have, &c.,
E. SANDERS.

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Field Force under the Command of Major-General Nott, in the Engagement with the Enemy before Ghuznee, on the 5th September, 1842.

2d Troop Bengal Irregular Horse Artillery—1 horse killed; 1 private, 1 syce, 5 horses, wounded.

1st Troop Bombay Horse Artillery—1 syce wounded,

3d Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry—1 horse killed; 1 horse wounded.

1st Regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry—1 private, 1 horse, killed; 1 jemadar, 5 privates, 7 horses, wounded.

Her Majesty's 40th Regiment of Foot—1 private killed; 3 privates wounded.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment of Foot—3 privates wounded.

2d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—4 privates wounded.

16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry— 1 private killed; 1 ensign, 1 havildar, 4 naicks, 11 privates, wounded.

27th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, doing duty with 16th Native Infantry—1 private wounded.

42d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—2 privates wounded.

43d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—4 privates wounded.

Total—3 privates, 3 horses, killed; 1 ensign, 1 jemadar, 1 havildar, 4 naicks, 34 privates, 2 syces, 13 horses, wounded.

Grand Total—46 officers and men, and 16 horses.

Officer Wounded,

Ensign Stannus, 16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.

Return of Ordnance Ammunition captured in the Fortress of Ghuznee, by the Force under the Command of Major-General Nott, on the 6th of September 1842.

Camp, Ghuznee, September 6, 1842.

40 dungaree bag cartridges, 100 blue lights, 35 boxes filled with musket ammunition, 25 boxes filled with gun ammunition, 15 empty ammunition boxes, 20 empty treasure boxes with straps, 25,000 musket ball cartridges (15,000 of these unserviceable), about 2000 gun and jingal ball cartridges, 6 field pieces, carriages, 1 garrison carriage, 6 maunds of charcoal, 5 buff hides, 7 jingals or wall pieces, 9 unserviceable tin lanterns, 8 pigs of lead, 10 muskets without locks, 3 mounted brass light field pieces (three, six, and eight-pounders), 1 mounted heavy sixty-eight pounder, 3 mounted and 1 dismounted iron light field-pieces (two, six, and eight-pounders), 10 jars of country ordnance powder (about 150lbs. each), 1 piece of cotton rope, 1 bag of saltpetre, 60 six-pounder English round shot, 550 round shot of sorts, 300 one and two pounder jingal round shot, 12 gun sponges of sorts, 5 jezails.

F. S. SOTHEBY.

No. 499.

Major-General Pollock, to Mr. Maddock,

Sir, *Camp, near Cabool, September* 17, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, a copy of my despatch of date the 14th instant, to the address of Major-General Lumley, Adjutant-General of the army.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 500.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley..

Sir, *Camp, Bootkhak, Sept.* 14, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that I marched from Seh Baba on the 11th instant, and arrived at Tezeen the same day, where I was joined by Major-General McCaskill, with the 2nd division. On the 12th I halted, in consequence of the cattle of the 2nd division having suffered from the effects of fatigue caused by their forced march: this halt the enemy imagined to be the result of hesitation, and, in the afternoon, attacked the picquets on the left flank, and became so daring, that I considered it necessary to send Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, with 240 men of Her Majesty's 9th foot, to drive them back; some sharp fighting took place, and the enemy was driven up the neighbouring hills, from the crests of which they kept up a heavy fire. Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, however, with a small party, crept up one end of a hill, unperceived by the enemy, who were hotly engaged in their front, and lay concealed until joined by a few more of his men, when, rushing on the flank of the astounded Affghans, he inflicted a severe lesson, pouring in a destructive fire upon them, as they fled down the hill. A chieftain was found among the slain, who, it is supposed, was the brother of Khodabux Khan. The enemy remained inoffensive on our left flank, in consequence of this very well planned and gallant affair of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor's, and withdrew to the right, where they commenced a furious attack upon a picquet, consisting of eighty men of the 60th regiment of Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Montgomery, who sustained the assault with great resolution until reinforcements reached him, when the enemy were beaten off; in this attack the picquet had four killed; Lieutenant Montgomery and seventeen men were wounded. The enemy came so close that frequent recourse was had to the bayonet. Their attempts on the picquets continued through the night, but were invariably unsuccessful.

The valley of Tezeen, where we were encamped, is completely encircled by lofty hills; and on the morning of the 13th, it was perceived that the Affghans had occupied in great force every height not already crowned by our troops: I commenced my march towards the mouth of the Tezeen Pass, where I left two guns, two squadrons of Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, a party of the 1st Light Cavalry, and 3rd Irregular Cavalry. The enemy's horse appeared in the valley, with the intention of falling upon the baggage; but it gives me very great pleasure to state, that the Dragoons and Native Cavalry (regular and irregular) made a most brilliant charge, and with such effect, that the whole body of the enemy's force was completely routed, and a number of them cut up.

The pass of Tezeen affords great advantages to an enemy occupying the heights; and, on the present occasion Mahomed Akbar neglected nothing to render its natural difficulties as formidable as numbers could make it. Our troops mounted the heights, and the Affghans, contrary to their general custom, advanced to meet them, and a desperate struggle ensued; indeed, their defence was so obstinate that the British bayonet, in many instances, alone decided the contest. The light company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, led by Captain Lushington, who, I regret to say, was wounded in the head, ascending the hills on the left of the pass under a heavy cross fire, charged and overthrew their opponents, leaving several horses and their riders, supposed to be chiefs, dead on the hill;

the slaughter was considerable, and the flight continued during the greater part of the day, the enemy appearing resolved that we should not ascend the Huft Kotul: one spirit seemed to pervade all, and a determination to conquer overcame the obstinate resistance of the enemy, who were at length forced from their numerous and strong positions, and our troops mounted the Huft Kotul, giving three cheers when they reached the summit. Here, Lieutenant Cunningham, with a party of sappers, pressed the enemy so hard, that they left in their precipitation a twenty-four pounder howitzer and limber, carrying off the draft bullocks. Having heard that another gun had been seen, and concluding that it could not have gone very far, I detached a squadron of Dragoons under Captain Tritton, and two horse artillery guns under Major Delafosse, in pursuit: the gun (a twelve-pounder howitzer) with bullocks sufficient for the two guns, was soon captured. The Dragoons again got among the enemy, and succeeded in cutting up many of them. Captain Broadfoot, with the sappers, advanced, and, with the Dragoons, happened to fall in with another party of the enemy, of whom upwards of twenty were killed. I have ascertained there were about 16,000 men in the field opposed to me, a considerable portion of whom was cavalry; Mahomed Akbar Khan, Mahomed Shah Khan, Ameenoollah, and many other chiefs with their followers were present, all of whom I have reason to believe have taken to flight. We have gained a complete victory, and our enemies have suffered severely, having several hundreds killed, losing their guns and three standards, one of which was taken from the enemy's horse by the 1st Light Cavalry. Although many attempts were made at the baggage, none were successful, chiefly owing to the judicious and admirable arrangements of Lieutenant-Colonel Richmond, commanding the rear-guard, and for which he deserves the greatest credit.

The Lahore contingent, under the able direction of Captain Lawrence, has invariably given the most cheerful assistance, dragging the guns, occupying the heights, and covering the rear-guard. While ascending the Huft Kotul and at Tezeen, their long jezails told effectively in keeping the ground.

Major Skinner, Her Majesty's 31st Foot, had been detached with a strong party on the night of the 12th, for the purpose of dislodging a body of the enemy on the heights in front of the camp: this duty was performed with great gallantry the next morning, and his operations contributed much to frustrate the attempts of the enemy on our right flank. As the Major's movements were for some time separate from those of the main column, I deem it expedient to annex his report.

The enemy being completely dispersed, we pursued our march, and encamped at Khoord Cabool without further opposition. The troops on this, as on all former occasions where they have been engaged with the enemy, showed the most determined valor, and I feel that I cannot too highly praise their conduct; each regiment seemed to vie with the others in their endeavours to dislodge the enemy, which they most effectually accomplished. I have received from Major-General McCaskill, C. B., who on this occasion commanded the main column, every assistance, and from Major-General Sir R. Sale, G.C.B., commanding the advanced guard, the most zealous co-operation. The following officers have also given me every reason to be satisfied with their exertion:

Brigadier Monteath, C.B., commanding the Fourth Brigade; Brigadier Tulloch, commanding Second Brigade; and Brigadier White, commanding Cavalry Brigade; Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton, commanding Her Majesty's 31st Foot; Lieutenant-Colonel Richmond, commanding 33rd Native Infantry; and Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, K.H., commanding Her Majesty's 9th Foot; Major Skinner, Her Majesty's 31st Foot; Major Huish, commanding 26th Native Infantry; Major Delafosse, commanding Artillery; Major Crommelin, commanding 1st Light Cavalry; Major Lockwood, commanding Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons; Captain Napleton, commanding 60th Native Infantry; Captain Seaton, commanding 35th Regiment Light Infantry; Captain Ferris, commanding Jezailchees; Captain Wilkinson, commanding Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; Captain Broadfoot, commanding Sappers; Captain Tait, commanding 3rd Irregular Cavalry; and Captain Lawrence, commanding the Sikh Contingent; Captain Abbott, Chief Engineer; Captain Abbott, commanding Light Field Battery; Captain Alexander, commanding 3rd Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery; Captain Backhouse, commanding Mountain Train; and Lieutenant Becher, commanding the Sappers and Miners. The services of Mr. Mackeson,

commanding the Bildars, have always been conspicuous. Superintending-surgeon Stiven's care in providing for the conveyance and comfort of the wounded has met with my approbation. From Major Thompson, at the head of the Commissariat Department, I have received every assistance; likewise from Captain Lane, Commissary of Ordnance, whose exertions have been unremitting throughout. From the following officers of my personal and the General Staff I have on this, as on every other occasion, received the most effectual aid; Captain Macgregor and Lieutenant Pollock, Aides-de-Camp; Lieutenant Sir R. Shakespear, Military Secretary; Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Codrington, Assistant Quarter-Master-General; Captain Riddle, Pay-master; Captain Macadam, Deputy Judge-Advocate-General; Lieutenant Mayne, officiating Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General. The following Officers of Division and Brigade Staff have also effectively performed their respective duties:—Captain Havelock, Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-General; Brigade-Majors Havelock, Smith, Wade, Lugard, and Brevet Captain Fitzgerald, Artillery Division Staff. I must not omit the expression of my regret for the fate of Hyder Ali, the Native Commandant of the Jezailchees, a most gallant and enterprising soldier, who was killed while attempting to seize one of the enemy's standards.

I have the honor to forward reports from Lieutenant-Colonels Richmond and Taylor, and Major Skinner, with returns of killed and wounded, and of ordnance, ammunition, and stores captured.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

Return of Killed and wounded of the Troops under the Command of Major-General Pollock, C. B., in the Tezeen Valley, and on the Hoft Kotul, on the 12th and 13th September, 1842.

3rd Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery—1 rank and file wounded.

3rd Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery—1 rank and file wounded.

2nd Company 6th Battalion Artillery—1 rank and file wounded; 1 mule missing.

Mountain Train—1 native officer, 1 rank and file wounded; 1 mule killed, 1 mule wounded.

Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons—2 horses killed; 1 serjeant, 4 rank and file, 11 horses wounded.

1st Regiment Light Cavalry—5 horses killed; 5 rank and file wounded.

3rd Irregular Cavalry—2 rank and file, 7 horses, killed; 4 rank and file, 10 horses wounded.

Her Majesty's 9th Foot—2 serjeants, 1 drummer, 8 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 25 rank and file wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—1 rank and file, killed; 5 rank and file wounded.

Her Majesty's 31st Foot—2 rank and file killed; 7 rank and file wounded.

26th Regiment Native Infantry—3 rank and file killed; 11 rank and file wounded.

33rd Regiment (right wing)—7 rank and file wounded.

35th Light Infantry—3 rank and file killed; 1 European officer, 8 rank and file wounded.

60th Regiment Native Infantry (right wing)—5 rank and file killed; 2 European officers, 1 sergeant, 22 rank and file wounded.

Captain Ferris's Jezailchees—1 native officer, 1 rank and file killed; 2 native officers, 5 rank and file wounded.

Captain Broadfoot's Sappers—3 rank and file killed; 2 native officers, 2 sergeants, 9 rank and file wounded.

Total—1 native officer, 2 sergeants, 1 drummer, 28 rank and file, 14 horses, 1 mule, killed; 4 European officers, 5 native officers, 5 sergeants, 116 rank and file, 21 horses, 1 mule, wounded; 1 mule missing.

Total of all ranks killed 32, horses 35; wounded 130; horses 3.

Names of Officers Killed and Wounded.

Killed.

Hyder Ali, Commandant, Jezailchee Regiment.

Wounded.

Captain Lushington, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, severely
Captain Geils, 60th Native Infantry, slightly.
Lieutenant Norton, 35th Native Infantry, severely.
Lieutenant Montgomery, 60th Native Infantry, slightly.

G. PONSONBY.

Return of Ordnance, Ammunition, and Stores, captured on the line of march between Tezeen and Khoord Cabool, by the Force under the Command of Major-General Pollock.

Camp, Khoord Cabool, September 13, 1842.

ONE brass twelve pounder howitzer (No. 139, weight 6 cwt. 2 qr. 6 lbs., cast 1836, Hutcheson, horse artillery piece), 1 brass twenty-four pounder howitzer (No. 35, weight 8 cwt. 2 qr. 22 lbs., cast 1828, T. Timbulo, foot artillery piece), 1 twelve pounder howitzer sponge, 1 twenty-four pounder howitzer sponge, 55 filled port-fires, 4 common washers, 4 washers with hooks, 8 linch pins, 4 nine or twenty-four pounder howitzer ammunition boxes, 2 unserviceable store boxes, 51 unserviceable filled $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch fuzes, 99 unserviceable 2 inch spherical case fuzes, 1 fuze marker, 1 driving mallet spherical case fuze, 1 iron trail handspike, 3 skeins of slow match, 1 fuze setter, 1 portfire socket, 10 filled and set twenty-four pounder howitzer common shells, 9 filled and set twelve pounder howitzer common shells, 5 twelve-pounder spherical case shells, 6 twenty-four pounder howitzer canister, 8 twelve-pounder canister, 1 unserviceable nine-pounder carriage, 1 unserviceable twenty-four pounder howitzer carriage, 2 clip bands pole yoke, 1 unserviceable common handspike, 1 locking chain, 6 trace chains, 2 pole or trace chains, 1 priming wire, 5 bullock yokes, 7 unserviceable bullock yokes, 1 fuze holder, 1 carpenter's two feet rule, 1 adze, 2 gimblets of sorts.

N.B.—No tangent scales or elevating screws to either of the above pieces of ordnance.

H. DELAFOSSE.

No. 501

Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Camp, Khoord Cabool, Sept.* 13, 1842.

I HAVE to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., commanding the troops in Affghanistan, that, agreeably to his orders, I proceeded, at half-past five o'clock yesterday evening, with 250 men of Her Majesty's 9th, to the support of the guards in charge of the public cattle feeding on the left of the camp in the Tezeen valley, which were much pressed by the enemy. On clearing the left picquet, I was joined by Major Huish with a small party of the 26th Native Infantry. I threw forward a strong body of skirmishers, who quickly drove back those of the enemy on the plain, pursuing them to a range of low hills, where they made a stand till dislodged by our advance; further on, I found the enemy, in force from 500 to 600, had taken post along the crest and on the top of a range of steep hills running near a mile from the northward into the Tezeen valley; those towards the north were assailed by Captain Lushington, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, with the left support and skirmishers; whilst I directed the attack against their front and left flank,

which being turned, I ascended the heights between two ridges which concealed my approach till close to the summit, and within twenty yards of their main body, consisting of over 300 men. Collecting thirty to forty men, with Lieutenants Elmhirst, Lister, and Vigors, I ordered bayonets to be fixed, and the enemy to be charged, which was done with such resolution and effect, that the whole mass taken by surprise, was pushed headlong down the hills, nor did they rally till out of musket shot. Their loss must have been very severe, as I observed numbers lagging behind to carry off their killed and wounded. As it was getting dark, I deemed it imprudent to pursue the enemy further, ordered the halt to be sounded, and, after remaining in possession of their position for half an hour, retired without molestation. It affords me great gratification to bear testimony to the spirit and gallantry displayed by officers and men on this occasion, especially Major Huish, 26th Regiment of Native Infantry, Captain Lushington, and those concerned in the charge on the enemy.

I beg to transmit a return of the killed and wounded.

I have, &c.

A. B. TAYLOR.

No. 502.

Major Skinner to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Bootkhak, Sept.* 16, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Major-General commanding the army in Affghanistan, that I ascended the heights above the Tezeen valley, in front of our camp, with the detachment in the margin*, on the afternoon of the 12th instant, and occupied the ridge till daylight next morning. From a communication with Major-General Sir Robert Sale, G.C.B., I learnt that I was to take the high peaks to the right of my position, and, having driven the enemy from them, continue to operate among the lower hills to the head of the Huft Kotul, on the right flank of the advance guard of the army. These peaks were occupied in some force by the enemy, who was, however, easily driven from them and cleared away to the higher hills on my right. I ascended the first peak, which, although the way was steep, was not very difficult, in two small columns; the first, the companies of Her Majesty's 9th and 26th Native Infantry, under Captain Borton, of the 9th Foot; the second under Lieutenant Sayers, of the 31st, composed of the two companies of Her Majesty's 31st Foot and 33rd Native Infantry, covered by the Sappers and Jezailchees under Lieutenant Orr. I detached Lieutenant Sinclair, of the 13th Light Infantry, with the company of his regiment and one of the 35th Native Infantry, to the higher peak on the right hand, and supported him by Lieutenant Orr and the Sappers (after I had possession of the first height), who ascended by a steep ridge that connected them. Lieutenant Sinclair attained the summit of the hill without loss, driving the enemy away, and held it until the main column of advance came in sight, when he led his column on my right over the hills at the base of the higher mountains. The height I gained descends to the high road by a succession of small peaks, each connected by a narrow ridge; the enemy occupied, with small parties, each of these peaks, and was driven in succession from them. Captain Borton, at the head of a party of the 9th Foot, made a gallant charge upon a strongly posted party of the enemy, and drove them away; he showed a deal of boldness, however, and made repeated attempts to recover his ground, taking advantage of the necessarily slow advance of the supporting parties from the steep and difficult nature of the hills. After I gained all the peaks, and the enemy had fallen back, I continued parallel to the main column over the hills to some distance beyond the top of the Huft Kotul. Considering the great number that at one time opposed me, until the appearance of the main column drew them off, my loss was not great, while the enemy

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* One company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, 1 ditto 13th Light Infantry, 1 ditto 31st Foot, 1 ditto 26th Native Infantry, 1 ditto 35th Native Light Infantry, 1 ditto 33rd Native Infantry, 50 Broadfoot's Sappers, 50 Jezailchees.

suffered considerably. I beg leave to bring to the notice of the Major-General the very good conduct of the officers and men who were under my command.

I have, &c.,
THOMAS SKINNER.

No. 503

Lieutenant-Colonel Richmond to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Camp, Bootkhak, Sept.* 14, 1842.

MAJOR-GENERAL POLLOCK, C.B., commanding the troops, having intrusted me specially with the command of the rear guard of the army from Tezeen through the Huft Kotul Pass, on the 13th instant, and having placed at my disposal the troops detailed in the margin*, I have now the honor to report the operations of the day, for the Major-General's information. Having made the necessary disposition of my force to protect the baggage in the valley of Tezeen, and to secure the gorge of the pass, the different picquets were gradually withdrawn to strengthen the latter. Soon after, I observed a large body of the enemy collecting near the fort of Tezeen, south-east of my position, and directed Lieutenant Douglas, whose guns had been previously posted on a commanding point, to open on them; but the distance proving too great for shells, the fire was discontinued. The enemy, I suppose, encouraged by this, formed his cavalry in the valley, to the number of about 600 men, with the evident intention of moving towards my post. I instantly decided on anticipating him; and, as Captain Alexander's (horse artillery) three guns were still on the ground, I availed myself of his services by sending forward his guns within range of the enemy, supported by the front squadron of Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons under Captain Unett, one squadron of 1st Light Cavalry under Brevet Major Scott, and the detachment of 3rd Irregular Cavalry under Captain Tait, with orders to charge the enemy if the ground proved favorable, and an opportunity offered. This soon occurred, the guns having made good impression; and the instant I observed the cavalry advance, the other squadron of dragoons was hurried forward under Major Lockwood, as a support, thus insuring the success achieved by the spirited and gallant charge of their comrades in front, which completely dispersed the enemy, who left about fifty men on the field, and a standard, the latter taken by the 1st Light Cavalry, the bearer of which was cut down by Brevet Captain Goad.

Having accomplished all I wished, the troops returned to their original position in excellent order, covered by the very effective fire of the guns directed by Captain Alexander, and by a company of the 35th Regiment of Light Infantry, the latter ordered forward for the purpose.

As the enemy showed no disposition to molest us further, and the whole of the baggage having entered the pass, the horse-artillery and dragoons were permitted to commence their march; but, before the latter had filed off, the enemy brought two guns to bear upon our position, which obliged me to place the remainder of the cavalry under cover of the high ground in the vicinity: these guns fortunately did no harm, and were soon after either withdrawn by the enemy, or silenced by a fire of round shot from Lieutenant Douglas's 9-pounder, ably directed by that officer, and by Captain Lawrence, Political Agent, commanding the Sikh contingent, who handsomely volunteered his services on the occasion.

After allowing the main column and baggage to get well forward in the pass, I directed the remainder of the cavalry to enter, and followed with the infantry, the different parties of which gradually retired on the posts I had previously occupied, the enemy's infantry closing in and opening a heavy fire, which continued till we reached the top of the pass, a distance of three miles; and,

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* Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, 160; 1st Regiment Light Cavalry, 295; Detachment 3rd Irregular Cavalry, 60; Sikh Cavalry, 200; total sabres, 750. Two nine-pounders, No. 6 light field battery; picquets, Her Majesty's 9th and 31st Foot, 143; 4 companies 26th Regiment Native Infantry, 310; right wing, 33rd Native Infantry, 129; 35th Native Light Infantry, 294; piquets, 60th Native Infantry, 124; Sikh Infantry, 300; total bayonets, 1,300.

although I was compelled to hold my ground near the top of the pass for a long time, to admit of the guns and baggage passing over, I am happy to say that the enemy, though he pressed our several posts very warmly, did not then, or at any other time, obtain the slightest advantage, and at length desisted from molesting us, which enabled me to reform the troops and continue my march towards camp, where I arrived about 8 o'clock P.M. with all the stores and baggage except a few loads of grain; also some camels and bullocks unable to proceed, which were destroyed on the road, agreably to orders.

My best thanks are due to the officers and men engaged, both European and Native, for their cheerful endurance of fatigue under an intensely hot sun, and for their gallant bearing when in contact with the enemy; the whole seemed animated with one and the same spirit, which enabled them to overcome difficulties of no ordinary nature, highly creditable to British soldiers, and especially so to the Bengal Sepoys. I feel it also just to notice the useful assistance afforded by the men of the Sikh contingent under Captain Lawrence, who took their full share of duty in the valley of Tezeen, and in defending the different posts in the pass.

Accompanying I have the honor to forward a return of the killed and wounded, which I rejoice to observe is not so heavy as might have been expected from the nature of the operations.

I have, &c.
A. F. RICHMOND.

P. S. On reaching the top of Huft Kotul pass, it was reported to Captain Lawrence, commanding the Sikh contingent, that Sirdar Akbar Khan was present in the Tezeen valley when the troops charged his cavalry.

No. 504.

Major-General Nott to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Camp, Urghundee, Sept.* 16, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you, that Shumsoodeen, Sultan Jan, and other Affghan Chiefs, having assembled about 12,000 men, occupied a succession of strong mountains intercepting my march upon Beenee Badam and Mydan, on the 14th and 15th instant. Our troops dislodged them in gallant style, and their conduct afforded me the greatest satisfaction.

The artillery distinguished themselves; and I beg to mention the names of Captain Leslie, Bombay Horse Artillery; Captains Blood, Bombay Foot Artillery, and Anderson and Turner, of the Bengal Horse Artillery, and the 38th and * 43rd Bengal Native Infantry. I beg to bring under the favourable notice of Government, Captain White, of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, in command of the light companies of Her Majesty's 40th and 41st Regiments, and of the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, and 43rd Bengal Native Regiments, for the able manner in which he carried my orders into effect, and for the gallantry displayed by him and the companies under his command, in ascending the mountains and driving the enemy from their positions. I had every reason to be pleased with the conduct of all troops, European and Native. I forward a list of killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,
W. NOTT.

Return of Killed and Wounded of the Field Force under the command of Major-General Nott, in the Engagements with the Enemy, on the 14th and 15th of September, 1842.

2nd Troop Bengal Horse Artillery—2 horses wounded.

3rd Company 2nd Battalion Bengal Foot Artillery—2 magazine lascars wounded.

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* Note.—So in the original, but a name seems to be omitted.

1st Troop Bombay Horse Artillery—3 horses wounded.

3rd Company 1st Battalion Bombay Foot Artillery—1 private, 2 drivers, wounded.

3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry—1 private killed, 1 horse wounded.

1st Regiment Bengal Irregular Horse—1 naick, 4 privates, 8 horses, wounded.

Christie's Horse—1 private 10 horses wounded.

Her Majesty's 40th Regiment of Foot—1 drummer, 1 private killed; 1 lieutenant, 3 privates wounded.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment of Foot—1 private killed; 1 corporal, 1 private, wounded.

2nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 lieutenant, 1 private wounded.

16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 havildar, 11 privates, wounded.

38th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 havildar, 11 privates wounded.

42nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 havildar, 2 privates, wounded.

43rd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 lieutenant, 1 subadar, 1 havildar, 15 privates, wounded.

3rd Regiment Irregular Infantry—5 privates wounded.

Total of each—1 drummer, 3 privates, killed; 3 lieutenants, 1 subadar, 4 havildars, 2 corporals, 45 privates, 2 drivers, 2 magazine lascars, 21 horses, wounded.

Grand Total of killed and wounded—63 officers and men, 24 horses.

Officers Wounded.

Lieutenant E. Eagar, Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, severely.

Lieutenant Mainwaring, 2nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, slightly.

Lieutenant G. Holroyd, 43rd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, slightly.

W. NOTT.

No. 505.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, near Cabool, Sept.* 16, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, a copy of my dispatch to the address of Major-General Lumley, Adjutant-General of the army.

I have, &c.

GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 506.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Cabool, Sept.* 16, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that on the 14th instant, we marched from Khoord Cabool to Bootkhak. I took the precaution of sending parties to crown the heights of the Khoord Cabool pass, but we met with no opposition. On the 15th I moved on to Cabool, and encamped on the race course. This morning I proceeded to the Bala Hissar, with the following troops: a troop of horse artillery under Major Delafosse; a company of each regiment of infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor; the 3rd dragoons, under Major Lockwood; a troop of the 1st regiment light cavalry; a rissallah of the 3rd irregular cavalry, with the whole of the General and Division Staff. The object was to plant the British colours in the Bala Hissar, on the spot most conspicuous from the city. The Prince Futteh Jung, who joined my camp at Gundamuck, expressed a wish to go with the party, to which I assented. On our arrival at the spot selected, the colours were hoisted, the band of Her Majesty's 9th foot immediately struck up the

national anthem, "God save the Queen," and a royal salute was fired from the guns of the horse artillery, the whole of the troops present giving three cheers.

I left the colours in the Bala Hissar, to be hoisted daily as long as we remain. The infantry also remain under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, but they will be relieved on the arrival of Major-General Nott by a native regiment from his force. I expect Major-General Nott will reach Cabool to-morrow or the next day. Since our arrival here we have not been able to obtain any certain information of Mahomed Akbar. It appears, however, that Ameen-oollah has separated from him. Neither of them has ventured to return in the direction of Cabool.

The following prisoners have come into camp: Mrs. Trevor with eight children; Captain and Mrs. Anderson, with three children; Captain Troup, and Dr. Campbell. Unless some very unforeseen circumstances occur, I expect to obtain possession of the remainder of the prisoners in the course of eight or ten days, with the exception of Captain Bygrave, who, I regret to find, has been taken by Mahomed Akbar, and was with him during the action of the 13th instant.

I have, &c.
GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 507.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, *Simla, Oct.* 5, 1842.

I RECEIVED last night a private letter from Major-General Pollock, dated the 21st ultimo, of which I inclose an extract, by which you will perceive that all the European prisoners, except Captain Bygrave, are in our hands, and that Sir Robert Sale, at the head of a light force, was bringing them into Cabool, where they were expected to arrive on the 22nd.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 508.

Notification by the Governor-General of India.

Simla, Oct. 5, 1842.

SINCE the public notification of the 30th ult., the Governor-General has received the gratifying intelligence of the safety of all the European prisoners but one, in the following extract from a communication from Major-General Pollock, C.B., dated the 21st ultimo.

No. 509.

Major-General Pollock to the Governor-General of India.

(Extract) *Camp Cabool, Sept.* 21, 1842.

IT gives me the greatest gratification to be enabled to state, that the whole of the European prisoners are now quite free from the hands of Mahomed Akbar, except Captain Bygrave. I will make my official report on this subject whenever they reach my camp, which will no doubt be to-morrow. I sent a lightly equipped force, under Sir R. Sale, to meet them, and the whole of the party is with him, with the following exceptions, who have already reached my camp:—

Major Pottinger, and Captain Johnson, arrived this morning.
Mrs. Trevor and eight children.
Captain and Mrs. Anderson and three children.
Captain Troup and Dr, Campbell.
One European woman and four privates.

By order, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 510.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Cabool, Sept.* 22. 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that, having received intimation from Bameean, that the European officers and soldiers, prisoners there, had made arrangements by which they hoped to effect their own liberation, I, at the suggestion of Mohun Lall, with the concurrence of Khan Sheereen Khan, Chief of the Kuzzulbashes, sanctioned the speedy departure of 700 of his horse on the 15th instant, the day of our arrival here, to meet the party. Some difficulty occurring on the score of money, I advanced 10,000 rupees, which were delivered by Sir R. Shakespear, who accompanied the Kuzzilbashes. Being apprehensive that attempts would be made to intercept the prisoners, I detached Major-General Sir R. Sale, with the troops named in the margin,* on the 19th instant, to the Urghundee Pass; and the circumstance proved fortunate, as a delay of twenty-four hours would have enabled Sultan Jan, who was in pursuit, to overtake our people. I am happy to state, that the whole who were in confinement (as per subjoined roll), with the exception of Captain Bygrave, who is with Mahomed Akbar, arrived in my camp yesterday evening.

I cannot conclude without recording my opinion, that to Khan Sheereen Khan and Mohun Lall, may be attributed the safety of the prisoners; and, I have reason to believe the chief of the Kuzzilbashes to be a stedfast adherent to the British Government.

I have, &c.
GEORGE POLLOCK.

List of Prisoners released on the 21*st September*, 1842.

Major-General Shelton, H. M. 44th Foot.
Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, 27th Bengal N. I.
Major Griffiths, 37th Bengal N. I.
Captain Boyd, Commissariat,
,, Johnson, ditto S. S. F. 26th N. I.
,, Burnett, 54th N. I.
,, Souter, H. M. 44th Foot.
,, Waller, Bengal Horse Artillery.
,, Alston, 27th N. I.
,, Poett, 27th N. I.
,, Walsh, 52nd Madras N. I.
,, Drummond, 3rd Bengal L. C.
Lieutenant Eyre, Bengal Artillery.
,, Airey, H. M. 3rd Buffs.
,, Warburton, Bengal Artillery S. S. F.
,, Webb, 38th Madras N. I. S. S. F.
,, Crawford, Bengal 3rd N. I. S. S. F.
,, Mein, H. M. 13th Light Infantry.
,, Harris, 27th Bengal N. I.
,, Melville, 54th Bengal N. I.
,, Evans, H. M. 44th Foot.
Ensign Haughton, 31st Bengal N. I.
Ensign Williams, 27th Bengal N. I.
,, Nicholson, 27th Bengal N. I.
Conductor Ryley, Ordnance Commissariat.
Surgeon Magrath.
Assistant Surgeons Berwick and Thomson.

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* Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, 1st Light Cavalry, Backhouse's Mountain Train, 2 companies of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, 4 companies of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Broadfoot's Sappers, Ferris's Jezailchees, 80 Sikh Horse, and 160 foot soldiers under Captain Lawrence.

Lady Macnaghten.
,, Sale.
Mrs. Sturt and one child.
,, Mainwaring and one child.
,, Boyd and three children.
,, Eyre and one child.
,, Waller and two children.
,, Ryley, wife of Conductor Ryley, and three children.
,, Bourne, wife of private Bourne, 13th L. I.
,, Wade, wife of Sergeant Wade.
Major Pottinger, Bombay Artillery.
Captain Lawrence, 11th Light Cavalry.
,, Mackenzie, 48th Madras N. I.
Mr. Fallon, and Mr. Blewitt, clerks, not in the service.

Her Majesty's 44th Foot—Sergeants Wedlock, Weir, and Fair; Corporals Sumpter and Bevan; Drummers Higgins, Lovell, and Branagan; Privates Burns, Cresham, Cronin, Driscoll, Deroney, Duffy, Mathews, M'Dade, Marron, M'Carthy, M'Cabe, Nowlan, Robson, Seyburne, Shean, Tongue, Wilson, Durant, Arch, Stott, Moore, Millar, Murphy, Marshall, Cox, Robinson, Brady, and M'Glynn; Boys, Grier and Milwood.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—Privates Binding, Murray, Magary, Monks, Maccullar, M'Connell, and Cuff.

Bengal Horse Artillery—Sergeants M'Nee and Cleland; Gunners, A. Hearn, Keane, and Dulton; Sergeant Wade, Baggage Sergeant to the Cabool mission.

G. PONSONBY.

No. 511.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp Cabool, September* 23, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward, to be laid before the Governor-General, the accompanying report forwarded to me by Major Pottinger. The return in safety of the prisoners may be attributed in a great measure to the negotiations of Mohun Lall, and the active co-operation of the Kuzzilbash chiefs, in addition to the judicious measures adopted by Major Pottinger; but I cannot advert to this subject without bringing to the notice of the Governor-General, the part taken by Lieutenant Sir Richmond Shakspear, who voluntarily accompanied the Kuzzilbash Horse, and urged them on with unusual expedition, and which proved to be most opportune, for had Sir R. Shakspear arrived with his party a few hours later, it is probable we should not have recovered the prisoners, as Sultan Jan arrived soon after the departure of the prisoners from Bameean, with 1000 horse, and would no doubt have followed them, had he not heard of the force sent to protect them.

I have, &c.
GEO. POLLOCK

No. 512.

Major Pottinger to Major-General Pollock.

Sir, *Camp, Cabool, September* 21, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report my arrival in your camp, and beg to lay before you the following statement of the measures we had recourse to at Bameean to effect our release.

On the 10th of this month, Syed Morteza Cashmery, an agent of Ali Reza Khan Kuzzilbash arrived at Bameean; he had received from Moonshee Mohun Lal verbal assurances that all those who would engage in effecting our release should be handsomely rewarded, and that a pension should be paid to himself, and to Saleh Mahomed Khan, who commanded the Affghan Regiment,

sent to escort the prisoners to Toorkistan), Syed Morteza brought urgent letters from the Kuzzilbash chiefs to their clansman Saleh Mahomed, and, having gained over his brother Mahomed Sadig Khan, paid him fifty out of 100 rupees which had been furnished by Mohun Lall, and carried him along with himself. They alighted at the dwelling of Mahomed Turymut Beg, the chief of the Bameean Tajiks, and Syed Morteza thence sent Mahomed Sedig to speak with Saleh Mahomed; the result was an interview between Syed Morteza and Saleh Mahomed, when the latter declared that he would only consent to treat with myself and the other English officers.

Saleh Mahomed then had an interview with me, and afterwards Captains Lawrence, Johnson and myself had a meeting with him and Syed Morteza, in which we agreed to give him a present of twenty thousand rupees and to continue to him the command of his regiment on his present salary of one thousand rupees a month; granting him a full pardon for all past offences, and that we should sign a paper to this effect. Having so far discovered the sentiments of Saleh Mahomed Khan, we brought him to Major-General Shelton, and laid before that officer and Colonel Palmer the plan; both these officers declined affixing their signature to any such paper, lest they should implicate themselves with Mahomed Akbar Khan; whereupon we consulted with Major Griffiths and the rest of the prisoners, and resolved to attempt the plan at all risks, and that if we found it were an attempt to overreach us, we should try to seize the weapons of the guard, and hold out in the fort till succour arrived.

As soon as this arrangement had been completed we sent off Syed Moarteza, chief of a tribe of the Hazarehs, to invite his aid, and he came in the next day, *i. e.* the 12th. Whereupon Nayb Zoolfeyar the Governor sent a message to say he was willing to join us, and I requested as a mark of his friendship he would send arms for our party, which, however, he did not. The Meer Akhom Ahmed Khan also received a letter ordering us to be marched into Turkistan, but Saleh Mahomed Khan refused to obey the order to start that day, as the men wanted pay. The 13th, I received a letter from Nayb Zoolfeyar offering service, and replied by requesting arms to be sent; as he did not send any, nor shew any friendly feeling, but was said to be consulting with Ahmed Khan to attack us, I gave an order to Deen Mahomed Khan, the former Governor of Bameean (on the part of Khan Shyman Khan) to assume the government, and employed men to frighten the Meer Akhom by telling him (as if from friendship) we had resolved to seize him, and promised the three companies a gratuity of four months' pay; these steps, joined to the arrival of Meer Qelb Ali of Besowut to join us had the desired effect; the governor sent his brother to proffer service, and the Meer Akhom fled, carrying off the Ghilzye firelock-men with him. On the 15th news of the British troops having advanced was received and the Nayb Zoolfeyar came in and personally visited us, on my saying I would go and see him if he did not come to me; however, I could not persuade him to give us arms, but as it appeared imprudent to turn him into an enemy, I directed Deen Mahomed Khan to hold the order I had given him in abeyance, till the conduct of Nayb Zoolfeyar might be further developed. On the 15th, I received a note from Meerza Shahjy informing me of the defeat of the Affghan troops at Jugdulluck and our advance from Ghuznee; also, that the Kuzzilbash tribes had risen in Cabool, which determined us to march the next day.

On the 16th we marched to Tepchy Bala and encamped with the castles in our front, so that we could occupy them if need be. On the morning of the 17th, I received a letter from Sir Richmond Shakespear informing me that he had reached Siri Cheseshmeh with 610 Kuzzilbash horse to our aid; we immediately crossed the Kaled Pass and marched to the castle of Meer Morad Beg, near the foot of the Hajykek Pass, where we were joined by Sir Richmond Shakespear with the Kuzzilbash horsemen, who had marched ninety miles from Cabool, over that mountainous country, in two marches.

The 18th, being supplied with seventy-seven horses by the Kuzzilbash and twelve by the Hazarehs, we managed to march to Geedendewar. At that place we learned that a body of horse and foot from the Shekharty and Ghourbend districts had marched on Kaled to intercept us.

On the 19th, with the same assistance as before, we marched to Thikaneh where we heard that the Pass of Sefeyd Khak was occupied by the Affghans, intending to check us; Sir R. Shakespear immediately wrote to request that the British officer who report also told us was advancing in that direction would

occupy the Pass, and to say we would, if opposed, hold out in some of the castles about, till relieved; on the morning of the 20th, we marched and found the cavalry of Major-General Sir R. Sale's detachment at Kowte Ashroo, and his infantry holding the heights, and I had the pleasure of joining his camp at Arghendeh, whence I proceeded with Sir R. Shakespear to Major-General Nott's camp and, remaining there during the night, joined your's this morning.

It would be unjust in me if I did not bear witness to the zeal of Syed Moorteza Shah, and mention that if Saleh Mahomed had not acceded to our terms he could with ease have carried us off, as, besides his own men, 350 Ghilzye Jezailchees were in the valley and the Walee of Khoolum had sent an officer with 2000 men (two standards) to Kahmerd to aid the Affghan party, and that he showed much courage as well as skill in the manner of conducting his proceedings, so that we effected the business without bloodshed.

I have given the Hazareh Chiefs, who joined us at first, remissions on their revenue, to the amount as specified opposite their names in the margin ;* and on our march back, I paid for the necessary supplies to the party, by orders on the revenue, to the amount of the supplies furnished. I would further beg to bring to your notice particularly the services of Myr Mohib, of Fowlady, Meer Mahomed Kerym of Bameean, and Myr Qelb Ali of Besowut, and trust that you will consider them worthy of receiving a dress of honor (Khilat), each as a mark of your satisfaction at their conduct.

To Syed Moorteza, to whose exertions we chiefly owe our release, I have made no direct promise, but have held out hopes to him of a reward of five thousand rupees, and a pension of one hundred rupees a-month, according to the hope held out to him by Moonshee Mohun Lall.

In concluding this, I venture to request your supporting the steps I have taken, and recommending them to Government ; and trust, that my assuming the powers of a political agent, under the circumstances of the case, may be pardoned, for I believe in no other way could the release of our captives have been achieved, though I could with ease have effected my own escape. With regard to the pension of a thousand rupees, the prisoners have agreed to pay the amount, if Government consider it too large ; but, considering that the man was then in receipt of that sum monthly, and that he may be obliged to flee the country if the Barukzyes regain power, I trust you will not consider it too large a sum to recommend the payment.

I have herewith the honor to transmit a list of the prisoners who were with us at Bameean, and who have now joined.

There are a small number of natives of this country, and Hindostanee servants, who were in the public service attached to the officers of the late Sir William Macnaghten's mission, and who have been reduced to utter destitution. As these men apply to me, I shall feel obliged by receiving orders, if I shall collect their claims, and lay them before you ; or if I shall refer them to some other officer, that their cases may be investigated.

I have omitted to state, that on the 29th and 30th August, the prisoners having agreed among themselves that they would raise a subscription for their release, and the party having selected Captain Lawrence, Captain Johnson and myself as their agents, we opened a negotiation with Saleh Mahomed Khan, by Captain Johnson and Captain Lawrence severally offering to engage themselves for the payment of a lac of rupees to Saleh Mahomed Khan, if he would agree to aid in our release ; and Captain Johnson explained to him, that if he, (Saleh Mahomed) would delay our march, so that when Major-General Nott's army reached Mydan, we might, by a forced march, join his camp. To both these proposals Saleh Mahomed Khan returned distinct refusals, and afterwards treated us with considerable harshness, giving orders that no one should go beyond the line of sentinels round our tents, threatening to kill us if any escaped, and in other ways showing himself displeased with our propositions.

I have, &c.,

ELDRED POTTINGER.

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* Myr Jelb Aly, 3,000 gerdamdewar; Seyd Myr Mahomed Rezeh, 500; Myr Wejef Aly, 500 fowlady; Myr Mahomed Noor, 500 ditto; Myr Mowhib, 3,000 day zingy; Myr Mohamed Kerym Bey and clan, 3,500 Baeeman ;Myr Aly Bey, Syghan. This one did not join, as he was not required. Myr Mahomed Ailla, 2,000 bosowut; Myr Hesen Naib, 400 bosowut; Myr Fyzallah Bey, 500 fowlady; Myr Zefer, 500 kaloo; Myr Morad 500 kaloo Myr Nejef Ali, 200 fowlady; Myr Syfallah Wekyl, 1,000 khargar.

No. 513.

Major-General Pollock, to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, * *Camp, Cabool, September* 27, 1842.

I HAVE much satisfaction in reporting, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, the arrival in camp this morning of Captain Bygrave, the only person who remained in the hands of Mahomed Akbar Khan. It appears that Captain Bygrave was allowed to join my camp by Mahomed Akbar, who has sent a letter to my address, a copy and translation of which shall be forwarded by the next opportunity.

I have, &c.

GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 514.

General Orders by the Governor-General of India.

Simla, Oct. 4, 1842.

THE Governor-General, earnestly desirous of evincing the gratitude of the Government of India towards the general officers, officers, and non-commissioned officers and privates engaged in the operations of the present campaign in Affghanistan, is pleased, after communicating with His Excellency the Commander-in-chief, to declare the following resolutions:

1. All the general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, serving under the command of Major-General Pollock, of Major-General Nott, and of Major-General England, between Attock and Ali Musjid, and in and above the Khyber Pass, and in and above the Bolan Pass, on the 8th of September, shall receive a donation of six months' batta, payable on the 1st of January, 1843.

2. In perpetual commemoration of their distinguished services, the 2nd and 16th Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry shall be hereafter regiments of grenadiers, and the 38th, 42nd and 43rd Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry shall be hereafter regiments of light infantry.

3. The regiment of Bengal irregular infantry, lately known as the 3rd Regiment of Infantry, in the service of Shah Shooja, shall, in consideration of the valour, discipline, and fortitude manifested by that regiment on many occasions, and especially in the defence of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, continue embodied under its present commandant, Captain J. H. Craigie, and be brought on the strength of the Bengal army as an extra regiment, and be denominated the "regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzye." The future establishment of the regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and other details consequent upon this resolution, will be made known in a separate order.

4. Major-General Nott will communicate to the Governor-General the designations of every corps engaged in the several actions with the enemy in the vicinity of Candahar, between the 1st of January and the 10th of August, 1842, specifying the particular actions in which such corps were engaged; and the Major-General will state which of such corps are in his judgment entitled to bear hereafter the word "Candahar" upon their standards or colours and appointments, in commemoration of their services.

To such corps of the Indian army as the Major-General may name, the honor of so bearing the word "Candahar," will be immediately accorded by the Governor-General.

5. The several corps of the Indian army which on the 6th of September occupied Ghuznee, and the several corps which on the 16th of September and the following days occupied Cabool, will hereafter bear upon their standards or colours and appointments, the word "Ghuznee" and "Cabool" respectively, with the figures "1842" underwritten.

The several corps under Major-General Nott, which reached Cabool subsequently to the 16th of September, will be equally entitled with the troops pre-

viously occupying that city to the honor of bearing the word "Cabool" with the figures "1842" undewritten, upon their standards, or colours and appointments.

6. Major-General Pollock will communicate to the Governor-General the designations of the corps under his command, which were engaged in the operations preceding the occupation of Cabool, but did not advance to that city, and will name such of those corps as he may deem entitled to bear the word "Cabool," with the figures "1842" underwritten, upon their standards or colours and appointments, as having contributed to the capture of that city by their previous service in this campaign; and to such corps, being on the Indian army, as the Major-General may so name, the honor of so bearing the word "Cabool," will be immediately accorded by the Governor-General.

7. To every general officer, officer, non-commissioned officer and private, present on the occasions above-mentioned in action with the enemy in the vicinity of Candahar, will be presented a silver medal inscribed

Candahar,
1842.

and to every general officer, officer, non-commissioned officer and private, present with the army under Major-General Nott, in the operations leading to the capture of Ghuznee, and the occupation of Cabool, will be presented a similar silver medal inscribed

Ghuznee,
Cabool,
1842.

Where the same person shall be entitled to both distinctions, one medal only will be presented, and such medal will be inscribed

Candahar,
Ghuznee,
Cabool,
1842.

Major-General Nott will transmit to the Governor-General nominal lists of the several general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, so entitled respectively.

8. Major-General Pollock will transmit to the Governor-General, a nominal list of the general officers, officers, non-commissioned and privates, present in action with the enemy, in the several operations of his army leading to the occupation of Cabool, and to every person named in such list, a silver medal will be presented, inscribed

Cabool,
1842.

On the reverse of these several medals, will be inscribed the words

Victoria
Vindex.

9. To every officer, non-commissioned officer and private, present within Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and forming part of the garrison thereof during the late investment and blockade of that fort, will be presented a silver medal bearing a mural crown, with the superscription of "Kelat-i-Ghilzye," and on the reverse the word

Invicta,
1842.

Captain J. H. Craigie, late commandant of the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, will transmit to Major-General Nott, a nominal list of the officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, so present at Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and so entitled to the medal above granted, and to every person named in such list, when sanctioned by Major-General Nott, the medal will be given.

10. All the medals above-mentioned are to be worn suspended to a ribbon, similar to that which will be given with the Jellalabad medal, which will be henceforth the military ribbon of India.

11. The regimental colours of the regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, will be composed of the three colours of the military ribbon of India, and in the centre thereof will be inscribed the word "Kelat-i-Ghilzye."

12. The Governor-General will, after communication with, and in conjunction with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, represent to the authorities in England, the high services rendered by the officers of Her Majesty's and of

the Indian army, in the operations of the present campaign in Affghanistan, in order that they may be duly submitted to the gracious consideration of Her Majesty.

13. Medals similar to those presented to the general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of the Indian army will be prepared for the general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of Her Majesty's army having respectively similar claims to the honor of wearing such medals; but the authority to wear such medals depends upon Her Majesty's most gracious pleasure.

J. STUART.

No. 515.

General Orders by the Governor-General of India.

Simla, November 8, 1842.

THE Governor-General has received a letter from Major-General Pollock, C.B., dated Jellalabad, 26th October 1842, with reference to the General Order of the 4th ultimo, from which the following is an extract:—

"In the 6th paragraph I am directed to communicate the designations of corps under my command, which were engaged in the operations preceding the occupation of Cabool, but did not advance to that city, and to name such of those corps as I may deem entitled to bear the word "Cabool," with the figures "1842," underwritten upon their standards, or colours, and appointments.

"In reply to this paragraph I beg to state, that I consider the services of all the regiments and detachments attached to the army under my command, have been such as to entitle them to this honorary distinction, and I have, therefore, noted the designation of each as follows:

Engineers.	Nos. 4 and 5 companies of sappers and miners.
Artillery.	3rd troop 1st brigade horse artillery.
	3rd ditto 2nd ditto ditto.
	2nd company 2nd battalion foot artillery.
	2nd ditto 6th ditto ditto.
	4th ditto 6th ditto ditto.
	No. 6 light field battery.
	Captain Backhouse's mountain train.
Cavalry.	Her Majesty's 3rd regiment of light dragoons.
	1st regiment of light cavalry.
	10th ditto ditto.
	One squadron, 5th light cavalry (Captain Oldfield.)
	3rd regiment irregular cavalry (Captain Tait.)
Infantry.	Her Majesty's 9th regiment of foot.
	Ditto 13th ditto ditto.
	Ditto 31st ditto ditto.
	6th regiment native infantry.
	26th ditto ditto.
	30th ditto ditto.
	33rd ditto ditto.
	35th ditto ditto.
	53rd ditto ditto.
	60th ditto ditto.
	64th ditto ditto.
	Captain Broadfoot's regiment of sappers and miners.
	Captain Ferris' regiment of Jezailchees."

The Governor-General, in compliance with the above recommendation, accords to all such regiments, corps and detachments in the above list as are in the service of the Government of India, the honor of bearing the word "Cabool," with the figures "1842," underwritten upon their standards, or colours, and appointments.

By order, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 516.

General Orders by the Governor-General of India.

Camp, Ferozepore, Dec. 13, 1842.

The Governor-General has received the following Roll from Major-General Nott:

Actions fought in the Vicinity of Candahar between the 1st January, 1842 *and the* 10*th of August,* 1842.

Names of Places.		*Troops.*
Kalee Shuck,.....	12th Jan. 1842....	Two Troops Anderson's Horse Artillery, Captain Blood's Bombay Battery, (9-pounders); detachment 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry; Her Majesty's 40th Foot; 2nd and 16th Regiments of Grenadiers; 38th and a wing of the 42nd Regiment Light Infantry.
Kunje Kuk, Panjwaie, and Tiloo Khan.....	7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th March, 1842.	Two Troops Anderson's Horse Artillery; Blood's Bombay Battery (9-pounders); Detachment 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry; Her Majesty's 40th Foot; 16th Regiment of Grenadiers; 38th, 42nd, and 43rd Regiments of Light Infantry.
Defence of the city of Candahar, when attacked by a large body of Affghans	10th March, 1842...	2nd Regiment of Grenadiers, and 4th Company 2nd Battalion of Bengal Foot Artillery.
Baba Wullie.....	25th March, 1842.	One Troop Anderson's Horse Artillery; Detachment 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry; Her Majesty's 40th Foot; 2nd and 16th Regiments of Grenadiers, and the 38th Regiment of Light Infantry.
Candahar Cantonment..	29th May, 1842.	One Troop Anderson's Horse Artillery; Her Majesty's 41st Foot; and the 42nd and 43rd Regiments of Light Infantry.

W. NOTT.

I am of opinion that the regiments and detachments noted in this Roll, are entitled to have "Candahar" upon their colours.

W. NOTT.

The Governor-General in pursuance with the General Order published at Simla, on the 4th of October, and in conformity with the opinion above expressed by Major-General Nott, declares, that all such of the above-mentioned corps as are in the service of the Government of India, are entitled to bear the word "Candahar," with the figures "1842," underwritten upon their colours and appointments.

No. 517.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, near Cabool, September* 28, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that I have detached Major-General Mc Caskill, K.H., with the following troops:—

Two 18-pounders, and detail of Artillery.	Christie's Horse.
Captain Blood's Light Field Battery.	Her Majesty's 9th Foot
Mountain Train.	Her Majesty's 41st Foot
Two squadrons Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons.	26th Native Infantry.
	42nd ,, ,,
	43rd ,, ,,
One squadron 1st Light Cavalry.	Broadfoot's Sappers.

2. In consequence of want of carriage, I shall not be able to leave this till about the 10th proximo, and as I had received intelligence that a party of the enemy were endeavouring to collect followers in the vicinity of Charekar, I have deemed it advisable to dislodge them at once. The detachment will be back before I can march, and if the enemy were not dispersed, they would, in all probability, increase considerably in numbers, and prove extremely inconvenient to the force on our leaving this to return to the provinces.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 518.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Cabool, October* 1, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward a copy of a letter from Major-General McCaskill, K.H. commanding the force which I detached under his command, for the purpose of dispersing the enemy collected in the vicinity of Charekar, as stated in my letter of the 28th instant.

The success of the Major-General's operations against Istalif, is most gratifying, that place being considered by the Affghans as totally inaccessible to our troops.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 519.

Major-General McCaskill to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Camp, Istalif, September* 30, 1842.

I HAVE the satisfaction to acquaint you, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., that the troops under my command yesterday made themselves masters of the strong and populous town of Istalif, totally defeating the numerous levies collected for its defence, under the infamous Ameer Oollah Khan Loghuree, Kaojie Ameer Kotwal, Hazin Khan (an assassin of Sir Alexander Burnes) Hazir Alee Khan, Khuleefa Ibrahim, and many other chiefs of Cabool and Kohistan.

The Major-General is aware that the force detailed in the margin* was placed at my disposal for operations in these valleys, on the 25th. The two brigades formed a junction near Khowja Rawash on the 26th; moved to an encampment near Zimuree on the 27th, and pitched their tents within four miles of this place on the 28th. The same evening I reconnoitred the enemy's position. It is impossible to conceive ground naturally stronger. The town of Istalif, consisting of masses of houses and forts, is built on the slope of a mountain, in the rear of which are yet loftier eminences, shutting in a defile which leads to Toorkistan, and in no way can this place of abode of 15,000 people be approached but by surmounting ranges of hills separated by deep ravines, or traversing, by narrow roads, its gardens, vineyards, and orchards, fenced in with strong enclosure walls; the whole of them, with the mountain side and tops of the houses, were occupied by Jezailchees; and the strongest proof is afforded that the enemy, after this disposition, considered the place as unassailable, by their having retained within the town, the wives and children not only of the inhabitants, but of thousands of refugees from Cabool.

The observations which I was enabled to make under a sharp jezail fire, and the report of Major Pottinger, induced me to determine to assault, the next morning, the right of the enemy's extensive position, as it was there that I could hope to bring the artillery most effectively into battery. Arrangements were made with this view. The troops were formed into two columns of attack and reserve; Brigadier Tulloch's brigade and the mountain train composed the right; Brigadier Stacy's and Captain Blood's battery, and the 18-pounders the left; these were supported by the third column, under Major Simmons, Her Majesty's 41st, consisting of a wing of his regiment and the cavalry under Major Lockwood: Captain Christie's corps protected the baggage.

The troops moved soon after daylight, and traversing the plain in perfect order, passed nearly from the left to the right of the enemy's position. Our light troops and guns repressed the occasional attacks of their jezailchees from the gardens, who were numerous and most audacious; but when the column arrived in front of the village Ismillah, I resolved to make a combined attack on this point; Brigadier Tulloch's brigade assailed its left, and Brigadier Stacy, making a long detour, attacked the right.

I cannot express in adequate terms my admiration of the style in which the former colnmn, covered by skirmishers, rushed upon the gardens, filled with bold and skilful marksmen. Her Majesty's 9th Foot, the 26th Native Infantry, and Captain Broadfoot's Sappers, vied with each other in steady courage; and their rapid unhesitating advance soon left the enemy no resource but flight. Very shortly after this assault, the three light companies of Her Majesty's 41st, the 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry, covering their own column, got into action, and, on their side, stormed the village and vineyards with distinguished gallantry. The combination was steadily persevered in, and though I had few opportunities of using the artillery with effect, I had soon the gratification of seeing the enclosures, forts, heights, suburbs and town successively won by the two columns. The enemy were driven from them, and pursued with a rapidity which left no time to rally, and a singular spectacle was then presented in the escape up the mountain side of the women and children from the place, to which no interruption was offered; but, as detached parties of the beaten Affghans still occupied some very lofty heights, the mountain train ascended them by a dizzy pathway, and dispersed the fugitives by its effective fire. Our reserve was now established on the lower heights, and the whole of the place, filled with property of every description, much of it plundered from our army in 1841, was in the hands of our force; two guns, brass field pieces, were also taken, and one of them was seized with such promptitude, that its captor, Lieutenant Elmhirst, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, turned its fire upon the fugitives

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* Artillery.—Captain Backhouse's mountain train, Captain Blood's battery of 9-pounders (Bombay), two 18-pounders.——Cavalry.—Head Quarters and two squadrons of Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, 1st squadron 1st Light Cavalry, Captain Christie's (late S. S. 2nd Regiment) corps of cavalry.——Infantry.—Brigadier Tulloch's Brigade (with the addition of Captain Broadfoot's Sappers and Miners, and the exception of the 60th Native Infantry), Brigadier Stacy's brigade.

with some effect. I directed the town to be set on fire in several places, after taking out various supplies which might be useful to our troops, and the work of demolition is still proceeding under the direction of Major Sanders, of the Engineers. Our loss has been trifling, for the advance of our officers and men was too rapid and decisive to allow of the sharp fire of the enemy telling much upon them; and, deceived by the direction of the reconnoissance of the 28th, the Affghans had expected the attack on their left, and posted their guns and the *élite* of their force in that quarter.

I have now the pleasing task of expressing the amount of my obligation for their exertions in the field, to Brigadiers Tulloch and Stacy, commanding brigades and columns; to Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, K.H., Her Majesty's 9th Foot; Major Huish, of the 26th Native Infantry; and Captain Broadfoot, of the Sappers, commanding corps on the right, which bore the brunt of the action; to Major Simmons, Her Majesty's 41st Foot, commanding the reserve; to Captain Backhouse, commanding the mountain train, and Captain Blood, commanding the battery of 9-pounders; this last was ably aided by Lieutenant Terry. I have received valuable assistance throughout our operations from Major Pottinger, C.B., and Major Sanders, Engineers; and yesterday from Captain Mackenzie and Lieutenant Airey, Her Majesty's 3rd Buffs, and Lieutenant Webb, 30th regiment Madras Native Infantry, temporarily attached to me; and, since we marched from Cabool, as on former occasions, from my own staff, departmental and personal, viz., Captain Havelock, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant Mayne, Deputy Assistant Quarter-master-General; Lieutenant Pollock, Artillery, Aide-de-Camp to the Major-General, who volunteered his services with me; and Lieutenant Bethune, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, my own Aide-de-Camp. Regarding the last-mentioned officer, I take the opportunity of rectifying an oversight on my part. I ought specially to have reported to Major-General Pollock, Lieutenant Bethune's valuable services in the recent affair at the Huft Kotul, in which I was intrusted with the command of the main column. Brigadier Tulloch reports, in very strong terms, the good conduct on the present occasion, of Captain Smith, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, his Brigade-Major. I inclose a return of the killed and wounded, and of the two guns captured.

I have, &c.,
JOHN McCASKILL.

Return of Killed and Wounded of the Troops under the Command of Major-General McCaskill, K.H.

Camp, Istalif, September 30, 1842.

Mountain Train—1 European officer wounded.

3rd Company 1st Battalion Bombay Artillery—2 rank and file wounded.

Christie's Irregular Cavalry—2 horses killed, 2 horses wounded.

Her Majesty's 9th Regiment Foot—1 rank and file killed; 1 officer, 1 serjeant, 13 rank and file wounded.

26th Regiment Native Infantry—1 rank and file killed; 1 European officer, 3 havildars, 8 rank and file, wounded.

Broadfoot's Sappers—2 rank and file killed; 1 European officer, 6 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment—1 officer, 1 rank and file, killed; 4 rank and file wounded.

42nd Regiment Native Infantry—4 rank and file wounded.

Total—1 officer, 5 rank and file, 2 horses, killed; 4 European and Native officers, 4 serjeants and havildars, 37 rank and file, 3 horses, wounded.

NAMES OF OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED.

Lieutenant Evans, Her Majesty's 41st Foot, killed.
Lieutenant Richardson, Horse Artillery, slightly wounded.
Lieutenant and Adjutant Spencer, 26th Native Infantry, slightly wounded.

Lieutenant Lister, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, slightly wounded.
Captain Broadfoot, Sappers, slightly wounded.
Lieutenant and Adjutant Orr's charger wounded.

H. HAVELOCK, *Captain.*

Return of Ordnance captured from the Enemy on the 29th September, 1842.

Camp, Istalif, September 30, 1842.

Two brass 6-pounder field pieces, of native manufacture.

J. B. BACKHOUSE, *Captain.*

No. 520.

Major-General McCaskill to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Camp, Khwaja Rowash, October* 6, 1842.

THE troops entrusted to my charge for a special service in the Kohistan, having pitched their tents at this place, previously to returning to their respective encampments, I take this opportunity of requesting you to solicit the attention of Major-General Pollock, C.B., to some points, which, in the hurry of our active operations, I had neglected to dwell upon. I have already intimated, that Brigadier Stacy's report of the part borne by his brigade in the capture of Istaliff, on the 29th ultimo, did not reach me till the 2nd instant. It will ever be matter of regret to me, if this accidental delay should prevent the merits of some of the officers and troops under me, being prominently brought to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, and his Excellency the Commander-in-chief. The brunt of the action certainly fell on the Infantry corps, and Sappers, of Brigadier Tulloch's brigade; but the credit of turning the enemy's extreme right,—of allowing him no respite or breathing time on that line;—of aiding in completing the capture of the town, when its possession was hotly disputed from behind walls, and from the tops of houses, from court yards, and in winding streets built on steep declivities, is due to the regiment under Brigadier Stacy. My commendations have been especially earned by Major G. Browne and Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, for the share they took in these gallant efforts, and for the exemplary humanity displayed by the men towards the unfortunate families of the vanquished. That corps was zealously emulated, and supported, by the 42nd Native Infantry under Major Clarkson, and the 43rd under Major Nash.

In addition to the services of Major Sanders, as Field Engineer, I ought to have remarked on the distinguished gallantry with which he accompanied the heads of columns in the advance of Brigadier Tulloch, against the gardens and town. Neither must I leave, without record, the marked intrepidity of Lieutenant Mayne, Deputy Assistant-Quarter-master-General, in pointing out the path of the same column amidst the hottest of the fire, and in aiding in following up the victory. I have before mentioned, that the light companies of Her Majesty's 41st, and the 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry, covered the manœuvres of their own brigade. This onset was led very bravely by Lieutenant Evans, who was afterwards killed in the town (and was succeeded in command by Lieutenant Madden), and by Lieutenant Woollen, 42nd Native Infantry, and Captain Macpherson, 43rd Native Infantry.

I have, &c.,

JOHN Mc CASKILL.

No. 521.

The Governor-General to Major-General Pollock.

General, *Simla, October* 12, 1842.

ON the 7th instant, I was informed that a letter had been received here, from an officer on the staff of your army, to the effect that you intended to commence your movement towards the Indus, on the 8th.

On the 10th instant, letters were received here, to the effect that two brigades of your army had been detached to the Kohistan, and were expected to be absent eight days.

Neither the Commander-in-Chief, nor myself, have received any dispatch from you, intimating this intention of detaching two brigades to the Kohistan, or mentioning the day on which your movement towards the Indus would commence.

In your letter to me, dated the 21st ultimo, you stated, that you could not then fix a date for your return, as you did not know how soon you might get camels. You mentioned, however, that you hoped to get more than 1,000 camels; and the force from Candahar is understood to have been fully supplied with carriage.

I conclude that the movement of two brigades to the Kohistan has for its object the dispersion of some assemblage of the enemy in that quarter, and, at the same time perhaps, the affording of opportunities of escape to some of the Native soldiers and followers who may be there.

I trust that you will not have engaged in any enterprise of which the effect can be to delay your return one day.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 522.

Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, near Quetta, September* 12, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that having arranged that the troops now here should descend the Bolan Pass, and move on Sukkur in three columns, I have despatched the leading column, consisting as per margin*, on its destination, this morning, accordingly.

2. I have somewhat anticipated the intended moment of this march, owing to the very favorable reports I have received of the season in the low country,—owing also to the favorable influence of such a movement on the proceedings of the Ameers of Sinde, who are still collecting forces, for no very intelligible or well-explained purpose; and I have further been influenced in thus removing a portion of the troops from this unhealthy locality, by the report and request of the chief medical officer to that effect.

3. I do not propose, however, that the second column should march until the end of this month, and I shall follow with the last troops, during the first week in October, withdrawing, as I pass, the various garrisons in Cutchee, &c., agreeably to the instructions of his Lordship the Governor-General, conveyed to me by Major-General Nott.

4. I have no reason to suppose that the troops will meet with any interruption in their march to the Indus, beyond the usual efforts of depredation on the baggage; but I am of opinion that the misfortunes which

* Six guns Bengal Artillery (three of which are serviceable). One rissalah 1st Irregular Cavalry; 12th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry; 2nd Regiment Irregular Infantry; Light Comp. 21st Native Infantry; Detachment of Sappers; all the sick of the Bengal Native Infantry; Ordnance Stores, &c.

the tribes below fully expected us to have encountered in the passage of the Kojuck mountains, were to have been a very general signal for strife against all the British remaining in these countries.

5. I have not permitted any ordnance, or other serviceable stores, to be destroyed, and have, hitherto, been tolerably successful in hiring carriage to aid in conveying the public property towards Sukkur.

6. His Highness, Prince Timour, having expressed a wish to leave Quetta, and to accompany the column which marched this morning, I did not fail to instruct the officer in its command, to pay the Prince every attention in his power.

I have, &c.,
R. ENGLAND.

No. 523.

Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, at Quetta, September* 23, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, and in continuation of my letter of the 12th instant, that I have dispatched the second column of troops and stores from hence, as per margin*, *en route* to Sukkur.

2. Although I still hear of the efforts of the Ameers of Sinde, to induce the Beloochees and others to molest us in the operation of our retreat, I feel every confidence that, with due precaution, we shall accomplish this service without any very serious impediment.

3. I propose to make the final movement from this place, on or about the 1st proximo, and I am much influenced in marching at an early date from this ground, by the sickness which prevails here; for although I have sent forward all the European and native sick soldiers of the Bengal army, who accompanied me from Candahar, there is a large proportion of officers and men still at Quetta under medical treatment, and fresh cases continue, though not of a severe nature, daily to occur.

4. The means of conveying so many invalids has been a matter of some embarrassment; but to render myself somewhat independent of the caprice of the Brahooe contractors, in the essential matter of "carriage," I have reserved nearly the whole of our Government camels for the use of the rear column, and have kept the troops which compose it, as little encumbered with baggage and stores as possible, the better to protect the divisions already *en route*, the officers in command of which, are instructed to fall back on each other, or on me, or to halt, if necessary, and as circumstances may require. But there is every reason to hope and to suppose, if any plans are matured for our interruption, or if any attacks are intended by the tribes through whose countries we are about to pass, that such would fall on that part of the force which thus remains in the rear, to conclude the final evacuation of their territories.

I have, &c.,
R. ENGLAND.

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* Two 9-pounders Bombay artillery, one 24-pound howitzer ditto, two guns late Bolan Rangers, one rissallah 1st Irregular Cavalry, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, 1st Regiment late Shah's Infantry, Light Company 8th Bombay Native Infantry, Detachment Sappers, sick and invalids of Her Majesty's 40th and 41st Regiments; Ordnance Stores.

No. 524.

Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, near Sir-i-ab, October* 1, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that the third and final column of troops, as per margin *, left Quetta this morning, *en route* to Sukkur.

2. The country in this vicinity appears tranquil, and no event of importance has occurred, since my dispatch of the 23rd ultimo.

I have, &c.,
R. ENGLAND.

No. 525.

Major-General Sir Charles Napier, Commanding the Forces in Sinde and Beloochistan, to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Sukkur, October* 12, 1842.

I LOSE no time in forwarding the enclosed dispatch from Major-General England, which has this moment reached me. I hope I may be allowed to offer my congratulations to the Governor-General, on the successful termination of so arduous and difficult an operation.

I have, &c.,
C. NAPIER.

No. 526.

Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, near Dadur, October* 10, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that the troops destined to descend to the Indus by the Bolan Pass, finally evacuated Quetta on the 1st instant, and have accomplished their march through that defile without much difficulty.

2. In order to facilitate the movement of this large body, which, with the acquisition of the garrison of Quetta, consisted of more than seven battalions, with details of cavalry, eighteen pieces of artillery, and an increased retinue of invalids, and of stores, I divided it into three columns of route, retaining the last in as light a form of equipment as possible, in the hope and supposition that, if the tribes, through whose country we should pass, were inclined to attack us, they would prefer to make their chief efforts on the last departing division; and I, therefore, sent the greater portion of the sick and public stores with the leading divisions accordingly.

3. It has proved that this conjecture was right, because the two preceding divisions have been wholly unmolested in their progress through the pass, whereas, on the morning of the 3rd, I found the Kakurs posted, in some numbers, on the steep ground which commands the upper extremity of the narrow zig-zag near Sir-i-bolan.

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* Head Quarter Staff, Captain Cooper's troop of Horse Artillery, Poona Auxiliary Horse 6th Regiment Native Infantry, 20th Ditto, 5th Regiment Irregular Infantry, detail Madras Sappers and Miners.

4. These insurgents, however, had only time to deliver a few rounds on the column, when their attention was fully engaged by the flanking parties which covered our left, and which I now reinforced by a strong detachment of the 6th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, and by nearly the whole of the 5th Regiment of Irregular Infantry, under Major Woodhouse and Captain Macdonnel, respectively.

5. I had every reason to be satisfied with the handsome manner in which our troops ascended these stupendous heights, and cleared them of the enemy; and Major Woodhouse speaks very highly of the conduct of a party of Brahooe Horse which accompanied him in this affair.

6. On this occasion, also, Major Outram gave me his able assistance, as well as in flanking the lower extremity of the Bolan Pass near Kundye, where I had good reason to expect again to meet some hostile tribes; but the total disappointment of the Kakurs on the 3rd, and the effectual flanking arrangements made, on all occasions, by our troops, seem to have prevented any renewal of interruption.

7. I beg leave to inclose a list of the casualties, which have occurred during their passage of the Bolan defile.

8. As I now consider the chief difficulties of this march to have terminated, I trust, I may be permitted to bring to the notice of his Lordship, the Governor-General, the general good conduct of the troops I have had the honor to command, during these prolonged and laborious operations; and I venture to submit the names of Major Waddington, Commanding Engineer; Major Wyllie, Major of Brigade; Major Boyd, Acting Assistant Quartermaster-General; Captain Davidson, Deputy Commissary-General; and Surgeon Wight, in chief medical charge; and to claim his Lordship's favourable estimate of the exertions of these officers in their several departments and capacities; and it is with the utmost satisfaction, I am enabled to assure his Lordship that, owing to the discipline which has been exacted, these British columns, in emerging from the Bolan Pass, will leave, amongst the peaceable inhabitants of the countries they have quitted, a well-merited character for forbearance and humanity; whilst, in the deliberate and systematic order of their march, during which, every enemy has been beaten off, and no stores lost or captured, the power of our arms has been alike equally and imperiously made manifest.

9. The garrison of Sebee will be withdrawn to-morrow, and that of Dadur on the 12th or 13th, when I propose to resume my progress to the Indus.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

Return of Casualties in Skirmishes with the Enemy, since the march of the Head-quarters from Quetta, on the 1st, to its arrival at Dadur, on the 9th instant.

Camp, Dadur, October 10, 1842.

Poona Auxiliary Horse—2 horses wounded.

6th Regiment Native Infantry—1 private wounded.

20th Regiment Native Infantry—1 assistant-surgeon killed; 2 privates, 1 bheestie, wounded, 4 dooly bearers missing.

5th Irregular Infantry (late Shah's)—1 private, killed; 1 subadar, 5 privates, 1 lascar, wounded.

Total—1 assistant-surgeon, 1 private, killed; 1 subadar, 8 privates, 1 bheestie, 1 lascar, wounded; 4 dooly bearers missing; 2 horses wounded.

Grand Total—2 killed; 11 wounded; 4 missing; 2 horses wounded.

Assistant-Surgeon J. Brickwell killed.

The Brahooe Chief, Mahomed Khan, slightly wounded, and 1 horse killed.

H. WYLLIE, *Major.*

REMARKS.

1 private dangerously wounded; 3 privates, 1 bheestie, 1 lascar, severely wounded; 1 subadar, 4 privates, slightly wounded.

Total Wounded—11 men, and 2 horses severely.

No. 527.

General Orders by the Governor-General of India.

Simla, October 20, 1842.

THE Governor-General has much satisfaction in announcing the successful termination of the arduous and difficult operation confided to Major-General England, of withdrawing, through the Kojuck and Bolan Passes, into the valley of the Indus, a portion of the force lately stationed at Candahar, and all the scattered garrisons of the intermediate places between the eastern face of the Kojuck mountains and the plains of Cutchee.

This operation, less brilliant in its circumstances than that entrusted to Major-General Pollock and Major-General Nott, was yet one which demanded the greatest prudence in the making of every previous arrangement for securing the safe descent of the several columns, and which called into exercise many of the higher qualities which must contribute to form the character of an accomplished General.

The Governor-General could not but regard with some anxiety, the progress of this movement, requiring so much of delicate management in its execution; and it is a subject of extreme satisfaction to him, that the same complete success should have attended this, which has, during the present campaign, attended every other part of the combined operations of the armies beyond the Indus.

The Governor-General requests, that Major-General Sir Charles Napier will express to Major-General England, and to all the officers, and troops, which were under his command, the entire satisfaction with which their whole conduct has been viewed on this occasion.

The Governor-General also requests, that Major-General Sir Charles Napier will communicate to Major Outram, and the other Political Officers, his thanks, for the zeal and ability they have manifested in the collection of the means of carriage and supply, and in their various transactions with the native chiefs and tribes, tending to facilitate and secure the descent of the several columns of the army.

By Order, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 528.

Notification by the Governor-General of India.

Simla, October 25, 1842.

THE advance of the British armies to Ghuznee and Cabool, having led to the restoration to freedom of the British prisoners in the hands of the Affghans, Dost Mahomed Khan, his wives and family, and the wife and family of Mahomed Akbar Khan, and many Affghan chiefs, remain in the absolute power of the British Government, without having any means of procuring their liberation.

To this condition of disgrace and danger has Mahomed Akbar Khan reduced his father, and his wife, and his family, and the chiefs, his countrymen, by making war upon women, and preferring the continuance of their captivity and suffering, for objects connected only with his own safety, to the general exchange of prisoners, which was offered by the British Government, and the consequent restoration to liberty of those, whose honour and whose happiness should have been most dear to him.

But the British Government is desirous of terminating, at the earliest period, all the evils which have arisen out of the Affghan war; and the Governor-General, enabled by the recovery of the British prisoners, who were in the hands of the enemy, to follow the course most in accordance with clemency and humanity, declares that when the British army return-

ing from Affghanistan, shall have passed the Indus, all the Affghans, now in the power of the British Government, shall be permitted to return to their country.

The Affghan chiefs who are thus released, will, before they pass the Sutlej, present themselves at the Durbar of the Governor-General, in his camp at Ferozepore.

The wives of Dost Mahomed Khan and Mahomed Akbar Khan, and all the ladies of the family and household, will be conducted with all respect to the frontiers of Affghanistan.

By Order, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 529.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

(Extract.) *Camp, Khoord Cabool, October* 13, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, my arrival at Khoord Cabool, in progress to Hindostan. I left Cabool, yesterday morning, with the 1st and 2nd divisions, and the troops under Major-General Nott, as per margin,* for Bootkakh, having detached Major-General Sir R. Sale, with the 1st and 2nd brigades, the mountain train, 1st Light Cavalry, 3rd Irregular Cavalry, and Christie's Horse, over the Gospund Durrah Pass, for the purpose of turning that of the Khoord Cabool; in consequence of which movement we marched through the principal defile without a shot being fired. Previous to my departure from Cabool, I destroyed with gunpowder the grand bazaar of that city, called the Chahar Chuttah, built in the reign of Arungzebe, by the celebrated Ali Murdan Khan, and which may be considered to have been the most frequented part of Cabool, and known as the grand emporium of this part of Central Asia. The remains of the late Envoy and Minister had been exposed to public insult in this bazaar, and my motive in effecting its destruction, has been to impress upon the Affghans, that their atrocious conduct towards a British functionary has not been suffered to pass with impunity. A mosque also at one end of the bazaar, and another near the cantonment, filled with venetians, otherwise ornamented with European materials, and designated as the Feringhee Mosque, to commemorate the events of last year, has likewise been destroyed.

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* 1st Division—Four guns 3rd troop 1st brigade, horse artillery, No. 6 light field battery, two 18-pounders and detail E. artillery, mountain train, Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, four rissalahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry, one squadron 1st Light Cavalry, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 26th Native Infantry, 35th Light Infantry, 5th company Sappers and Miners, Broadfoot's Sappers, Jezailchees, Bildars, Sikh contingent.

2nd Division—Two guns 3rd troop 2nd brigade Horse Artillery, Captain Blood's battery of 9-pounders, two squadrons 1st Light Cavalry, Her Majesty's 31st Foot, 2nd Regiment Native Infantry, 16th ditto (so in original), wing 33rd Native Infantry, wing 60th ditto.

General Nott's Force—One troop Bombay Horse Artillery, one troop (late) Shah Shooja's force, detachment Foot Artillery, 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry, detachment 1st Irregular Cavalry, detachment 1st Irregular Cavalry (so in original), Christie's Horse, detachment Sappers and Miners, detachment Madras Sappers and Miners, Her Majesty's 40th Foot, 16th Native Infantry (so in original), 38th Native Infantry, 3rd (late) Shah Shooja's force, Her Majesty's 41st foot, 2nd Native Infantry, 42nd Native Infantry, 43rd Native Infantry.

No. 530.

Major-General Pollock to the Governor-General.

(Extract.) *Jugdulluck, October* 16, 1842.

IT is very gratifying to be able to state, that we have met with no opposition since we left Cabool, except what must always be expected where the whole population is armed, and we have, consequently, had small parties of thieves occasionally firing on the rear guards. During each night that we have encamped, not a shot has been fired, and on the line of march, not a man is to be seen on the hills.

No. 531.

Captain Lawrence, Assistant Agent to Governor-General, to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Oosman Khan's Fort, October* 21, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock commanding, that according to his instructions I brought the Lahore contingent yesterday morning to the village of Urguy, within three miles of the town of Kujjur; where, having pitched my camp, I at once proceeded to Kujjur, which town, with its adjoining forts, we found evacuated, the inhabitants flying from the latter as the troops approached.

We burned the town of Kujjur, the village of Urguj, and eight forts, including two belonging to Muzuffer Khan, the Chief of Khogianies, and one of Munzon Khan Barukzyes.

The fort of Mirza Aga Jan, and also two small forts adjoining the village of Urguj have been spared, the latter being occupied by our dawk people and some old Syeds.

Not a shot has been fired; but, had there been a determined enemy to oppose us, we should, from the nature of the ground and the loose discipline of the Lahore troops, have experienced some trouble.

Captain Trower and Lieutenant Mackeson, of the 33rd Native Infantry, permitted to accompany me, have proved very usefnl.

Unless I receive orders to the contrary during the day I will burn this fort.

I have, &c.,
H. M. LAWRENCE.

No. 532.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, October* 23, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, a copy of a letter which I yesterday addressed to the Adjutant-General of the Army, reporting my arrival at this place. I have also the honor to forward a copy of a letter from me to the same address, transmitting a dispatch from Major-General Nott.

I have made preparations for the destruction of the fortifications here, and trust to be enabled to march in progress to Peshawur on the 25th instant. I will write again on this subject, directly I have heard from Major-General Nott, whose arrival here is still uncertain.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 533.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Jellalabad, October* 22, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, my arrival here this morning, with the first division of the troops. Major-General M'Caskill will arrive to-morrow, and Major-General Nott on the day following.

I withdrew, from Gundamuck, the detachment which had been left for the purpose of keeping open the communication; the wing of the 33rd Native Infantry has joined the head-quarters of the regiment, which is with the 2nd division; and the wing of the 60th, joined by that left at Gundamuck, is attached to the 1st division, as are also the squadrons of the 5th and 10th Light Cavalry.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 534.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Camp, Jellalabad, October* 23, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to forward a dispatch from Major-General Nott, detailing his progress over the Huft Kotul, with a return of casualties. I have understood that the column under Major-General M'Caskill has experienced some loss, but I have not as yet received a report from that officer.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 535.

Major-General Nott to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Camp, Giant's Tomb, October* 15, 1842.

I BEG to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., that the rear-guard of the force, under my command, was yesterday attacked by large bodies of the enemy in the Huft Kotul Pass. I sent 200 sepoys, and a wing of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, and two companies of Her Majesty's 41st, under command of Major Hibbert, to the assistance of Captain Leeson, of the 42nd Regiment Native Infantry, who had charge of the rear. Our sepoys defeated and dispersed the enemy. Captain Leeson speaks in high terms of the gallantry of the officers and sepoys under his command.

Major Hibbert, and the wing of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, and the two companies of Her Majesty's 41st, under Captain Blackburne, behaved with their accustomed gallantry; my thanks are due to all the troops engaged. I enclose a list of killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,
W. NOTT.

Return of Killed and Wounded during the attacks on the Rear Guard of Major-General Nott's Force, on the evening of the 15*th and Morning of the* 16*th October*, 1842.

1st Troop Bombay Horse Artillery—1 private, 2 horses, killed; 2 privates, 1 horse keeper, 5 horses, wounded.

Christie's Horse—1 horse killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 private, 5 horses wounded.

Her Majesty's 40th Regiment—1 private wounded.

38th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—2 privates wounded.

3rd Regiment Irregular Infantry—1 havildar, 3 privates, wounded.

2nd Brigade, 42nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—9 privates killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 assistant-surgeon, 3 havildars, 4 naicks, 23 privates, wounded.

43rd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—2 privates killed; 1 naick, 2 privates, wounded.

1st Regiment of Irregular Cavalry (Haldane's)—2 privates wounded.

Total—12 privates, 3 horses, killed; 2 lieutenants, 1 assistant surgeon, 4 havildars, 5 naicks, 36 privates, 1 horse-keeper, 10 horses, wounded.

Grand Total of killed and wounded—61 officers and men, and 13 horses.

OFFICERS WOUNDED.

Lieutenant and Brevet Captain W. Jervis, 42nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.

Lieutenant N. B. Chamberlain, Christie's Horse.

Assistant-Surgeon J. H. Serrel, 42nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.

N.B.—1 havildar, 1 naick, and 1 sepoy, of the 27th Native Infantry, doing duty with 42nd Native Infantry, are included in the above.

W. NOTT, *Major-General.*

No. 536.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.

Sir, *Camp, Ali Boghan, October* 27, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, my departure from Jellalabad, with the whole of the troops, excepting General Nott's division, after destroying the fortifications of that city.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 537.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.) *Simla, October* 19, 1842.

MR. CLERK, the Envoy to the Maharajah Shere Sing, brought to me, yesterday, the Faquee Azeezoodeen, who has been Minister of Lahore for thirty-four years.

2. The inclosed letter addressed by me to Major-General Pollock, shows the result of our short conference.

3. It may be inconvenient that the Lahore Government should not have made up their minds sooner, upon the points adverted to in that letter, for, it is not impossible that, in obedience to his present instructions, Major-General Pollock may have destroyed the new fortifications of Jellalabad, on withdrawing his troops, before the letter can reach him.

4. As there is not the least prospect of the early formation of any Government in Affghanistan, with which we could hold amicable intercourse, the arrangement agreed to is most advantageous to us in all respects.

No. 538.

The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.

General, *Simla, October* 18, 1842.

THE Faqueer Azeezoodeen having personally assured me, on the part of the Maharajah Shere Sing, that the Maharajah will never recognize any Government in Cabool which shall not have been previously recognized by the Government of India, I have informed the Faqueer that, upon the retirement of the British army, Jellalabad shall be given up to the Sikh troops in its present state; that is, without any injury being done to the fortifications: and you will, accordingly, so give up that place to the Sikh army, when its occupation shall be no longer necessary to you.

I have assured the Faqueer, that the British Government will not interfere in any manner in the future government of Jellalabad, or in the management of the territory dependent upon it; the Faqueer promising, on the part of the Maharajah, that no person shall be employed in the government or management thereof, who shall be deemed and declared by the British Government to be its enemy.

I have informed the Faqueer that if, upon your evacuating Jellalabad, there should be any stores in the place, which you do not require for the use of your army, you will dispose of them to the Sikh army, for such fair price as may be agreed upon, and this you are authorized to do.

You are authorized to dispose of any Affghan guns, or other military stores, in the same manner as stores of grain.

You will not act upon the instructions given in this letter, unless you should receive from the Maharajah Shere Sing a letter, reciting the substance of this letter, and informing you, who, on his Highness's part, is authorized to receive Jellalabad from you, and to agree for the purchase of the stores.

I have, &c.,
ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 539.

Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.

Sir, *Simla, October* 18, 1842.

I AM directed by the Governor-General to transmit, for your information, and communication to his Highness Maharajah Shere Sing, the accompanying copy of a letter this day addressed by the Governor-General to Major-General Pollock.

2. In communicating this letter to the Maharajah, I am desired to request that you will acquaint his Highness, that the Governor-General has acquiesced in the arrangement mentioned therein, under the impression that the interests of the British Government and those of the Maharajah, with respect to Affghanistan, are the same.

I have, &c.,
T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 540.

Major-General Pollock to the Governor-General of India.

My Lord, *Camp, Jellalabad, October* 23, 1842.

I HAVE had the honor to receive your Lordship's letter dated 12th instant.

With reference to the 1st paragraph, I can safely assure your Lordship, that I never, from my first arrival at Cabool, expected to leave that place so early as the 8th instant; and I believe I may, with very great

truth assert, that I never gave any one reason to believe, that I could march at so early a period. My first expectation was, that I should not be able to move till the 15th. I afterwards hoped to move on the 10th instant, and as soon as I saw a fair prospect of my being able to do so, I expressed such an expectation in my letter to your Lordship, but could not even then speak confidently. Even on the 10th instant, in writing to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, I could not say more than I hoped that I might be able to report my departure on the 12th instant.

Camels and bullocks came in on the afternoon of the 11th, but not so many as were required; I was, however, determined to make no further delay.

I beg to say that until I wrote to your Lordship, it was impossible for me to fix a probable day for my departure, though I knew many officers in camp had fixed their own day, on which I was to move, without any reference to my real intentions or expectations.

A report of the movement of the two brigades was forwarded. The report was delayed a day, but their moving forward after their junction, depended on information I might receive of Ameenoollah, who had collected a body of men at Istaliff. There were several objects contemplated in sending the brigades, but the principal one was to disperse the force collected under Ameenoollah; secondly, by appearing in force, in Kohistan, it was hoped the native prisoners would be released; and, thirdly, it was not at all improbable, that the advance of such a force might have induced the Ghoorbund Chiefs to secure the person of Mahomed Akbar. A number of native prisoners were released, and the dispersion of Ameenoollah's retainers prevented their following us on our return towards the provinces.

If, after this explanation, your Lordship still considers me guilty of neglect, in not reporting, I can assure your Lordship, that it has been my constant and earnest desire, to keep your Lordship correctly informed on all subjects; and if I have erred, I may with truth say, I have done so very unintentionally.

Your Lordship appears to have anticipated the object I had in view, in detaching the brigades.

There may appear to be some contradiction to my assertion, that the enemy were prevented following us, when your Lordship peruses the reports of Generals Nott and Mc Caskill, but I am still of opinion (and my opinion is formed from information I have received from good sources) that the only enemy we have had to contend with, has been the brigands of the country, who, even in times of peace, are always to be found where there is prospect of plunder. I have crowned the heights the whole distance, and have had a strong rear-guard. I have not only met with no opposition, but we have scarcely seen an inhabitant. Most certainly there has not been any organized resistance.

I beg to add, with reference to your Lordship's last paragraph, that when I detached the two brigades, their absence was limited to twelve days. I was aware that I could not march before that time, and during their absence, I was making every exertion to complete the commissariat supplies, &c.

I have reason to believe, that the operations in Kohistan produced a most beneficial effect. Istaliff was considered the strongest place in that province, and the inhabitants so little expected our success, that not a woman or child had left the town. It was not my original plan to enter Kohistan at all, but from the information I received, I thought that the object of my advance would not be complete unless a severe example were made, a notorious enemy of the British Government having been allowed to congregate a considerable force, within three or four marches of the capital.

I have, &c.,
G. POLLOCK.

No. 541.

Major-General M'Caskill to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Camp, Jumrood, November* 4, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to acquaint you, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., that the force placed under my immediate command finally broke up from Dhakka on the morning of the 2d instant. It reached Lundi Khana before 10 A.M., and in the course of that day and night a troop of horse artillery, and the whole of the cannon and carriages of the park, with the exception of the Jellalabad gun, were laboriously brought up to the level ground at the head of the pass by the troops of the 2d brigade. Those regiments moved down cautiously and without opposition the next morning to Ali Musjid, and the 3d brigade was directed to follow their movement, marching at daylight.

I regret to add, that it was overtaken by night in the defiles leading to that place, and that its rear guard met with a serious disaster, the particulars of which are communicated in the accompanying report from Brigadier Wild.

Captain Lane, Commissary of Ordnance, had received from me an ample escort, with sappers and bildars, on the morning of the 3rd, in consequence of the confident expectation which he entertained of getting the Jellalabad gun up the acclivity of Lundi Khana. He reports to me, however, that he was finally compelled to leave it on the road, having first requested the artillery officers of Major-General Nott's division to take charge of it, which he considers to have been assented to. His party was attacked by a large body of Afredees near Ghurree Lala Beg; but he saved his detachment from serious loss by judiciously throwing it into a fort, and making a spirited defence. Lieutenant Corsar, under my instructions, sent out parties of his corps this morning, with great activity and promptitude, into the pass, and recovered the howitzer and both carriages which had been captured by the enemy, and I am not without hopes of regaining the second gun.

The bodies of the officers who fell have also been brought in.

I have the honor to forward the return of killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,

JOHN M'CASKILL.

No. 542.

Brigadier Wild to Captain Havelock.

Sir, *Camp, Ali Musjid, November* 3, 1842.

FOR the information of Major-General Mc Caskill, K.H., I have the honor to acquaint you, that I marched with my weak brigade agreeably to orders this morning at daybreak. On reaching the place where the big gun had been left by the 2nd brigade yesterday, I used my utmost exertions to get it on; and on finding that I had not succeeded till 10 A.M. in getting it on above half a mile, it being then not above one-third of the way up from the fort of Lundi Khana; and foreseeing the evil consequences of being benighted in proceeding (agreeable to orders also,) to Ali Musjid to-day, I ordered Captain Lane to have it blown up, and moved on with the artillery and train left behind by Captain Alexander, with as much celerity as I could. When I saw the baggage fairly coming up to the top of Lundi Khana, I proceeded to join the advance, composed of the advanced guard, the two troops of the 5th Cavalry, and the artillery under Lieutenants Smith and Christie, and the remaining bulk of the 64th Regiment under Colonel Moseley, consisting of about 90 rank and file. On arriving there, I found they had been engaged. Some bullocks that were being carried off by the Afredees were recovered by Captain Oldfield, on

whom a heavy fire was opened from a hill, by which he had one trooper and three horses wounded, and one killed. I immediately sent up crowning parties, and two shells being also thrown up, the enemy quickly fled. I then proceeded, followed by the baggage; and, though fired upon from the hill, on the left, on the way to Ghurree Lala Beg, by keeping the baggage well to the right over the plain, no harm was done. I made two or three more short halts to allow the baggage to close well up. I then passed on to the head of the column, and entered the pass. Everything going on as well as could be wished. To afford additional protection to the rear, I directed Lieutenant Christie, with his two mountain guns, to remain with the rear guard; and everything continued to go on well till darkness came on, when a rush was made by a large number of Afredees from under the cover of the dark bushes in the pass, firing, throwing stones, and rushing in with their knives on the mountain train; and I deeply grieve to say, that it appears to have been carried off; Lieutenant Christie to have been killed, and Ensign Nicholson, of the 30th, with the rear guard, also killed. Lieutenant Ross, of the same corps, also with the rear guard, after cutting down one Afredee, was knocked off his horse by a stone thrown at him by another, and I fear he is severely injured. The baggage, as far as I can ascertain, has all arrived in camp safe; but there have been numbers of killed and wounded in the rear guard, whose numbers have not yet been ascertained. As soon as I can do so, I shall submit a correct report of the whole; but I cannot attribute the misfortune of to-day to any other cause than having been benighted in the pass, owing to the delay the big gun occasioned, and also to the extreme weakness of my brigade, which in no part of the column afforded a sufficient strength; but this I have repeatedly reported. The exhausted state of men and cattle, who, in addition to very hard work, had (the former,) nothing to eat or drink to-day, till they reached the river at this place; and the latter, who had no food either yesterday or to-day, nor water till they arrived here, renders them very unfit for work to-morrow.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 543.

Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.

Sir, *Chumkunnee, November* 9, 1842.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, the arrival of Major-General Nott, with the troops under his command, at Jumrood, on the 6th instant, and to inclose his dispatches, with a return of casualties.

I had directed the Major-General, after bringing away the guns left for the protection of the garrison, to destroy the fort of Ali Musjid; the Engineer's report of which I have now the pleasure to forward.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 544.

Major-General Nott to Captain Ponsonby.

Sir, *Camp, near Peshawur, November* 8, 1842.

I HAVE to acquaint you, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., that the rear-guard of my force, under the command of Major Browne, of Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, was attacked by the enemy, on marching to and from Ali Musjid. The arrangements made by Major Browne, assisted by Major Simmonds, of Her Majesty's 41st

REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

COLONIAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE;

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

APPENDIX AND INDEX.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
11 *July* 1861.

Martis, 5° die Martii, 1861.

Ordered, THAT a Select Committee be appointed on Colonial Military Expenditure, to Inquire and Report whether any and what Alterations may be advantageously adopted in regard to the Defence of the British Dependencies, and the Proportions of Cost of such Defence as now defrayed from Imperial and Colonial Funds respectively.

Mercurii, 13° die Martii, 1861.

Committee nominated of—

General Peel.
Mr. Ellice.
Sir George Grey.
Lord Stanley.
Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Childers.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Thomas George Baring.
Mr. Adderley.
Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Marsh.
Mr. FitzGerald.
Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Arthur Mills.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, THAT Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

Jovis, 11° die Julii, 1861.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to report their Observations, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to the House.

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REPORT.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed on COLONIAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE, to inquire and Report whether any and what Alterations may be advantageously adopted in regard to the DEFENCE of the BRITISH DEPENDENCIES, and the proportions of Cost of such Defence as now defrayed from IMPERIAL and COLONIAL FUNDS respectively:——HAVE considered the Matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following REPORT:

1. THE dependencies of the British Empire (exclusive of India, to which your Committee have not extended their investigations) may be divided for the purposes of this inquiry into two classes:—

1st. Those which may properly be called "Colonies." To this class belong the North American and South African Colonies, the West Indies, Ceylon, Mauritius, New Zealand, and the Australian Colonies, with the exception of Western Australia.

2d. Military garrisons, naval stations, convict depôts, and dependencies maintained chiefly for objects of Imperial policy. To this class belong Malta, Gibraltar, and the Ionian Islands, Hong Kong, Labuan, Bermuda, the Bahamas, St. Helena, and the Falklands, Western Australia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and the Gold Coast.

Throughout their inquiry, your Committee have deemed it essential to keep in view the distinction to be drawn between these two classes.

2. In order to enable your Committee to form a correct opinion as to any alterations which it may be their duty to recommend in the military administration of the Dependencies to which their inquiries have extended, they have deemed it necessary, in the first instance, accurately to ascertain the details of the system which at present exists, and the proportions of cost actually incurred by the Imperial Government and the Dependencies respectively in their military defence. With this view they have examined witnesses connected with various public departments at home, and others who have held positions of official responsibility in various Colonies. They have also taken some evidence as to the actual condition, cost and objects of colonial fortifications.

3. It appears that the forces stationed in the British Dependencies, and the cost incurred in their defence, have fluctuated according to the circumstances affecting them at different times. In order to arrive at a fair estimate of the average annual expenditure incurred, and of the number of troops employed, your Committee have obtained returns for the year ending 31 March 1860, the most recent period during which no disturbing causes existed, involving an exceptional increase of force. Returns, Appendix.

4. The actual amount of Imperial expenditure (including cost of barracks, fortifications, transport, proportion of non-effective services, and of recruiting and departmental expenses at home) incurred in the defence of the dependencies (distinguishing the two classes above referred to), also the number and distribution of troops borne on the strength of the British army, and employed in their defence for the year ending 31 March 1860, will appear from the following

following table, compiled from returns furnished by various departments of the Government:—

DEPENDENCIES.	Number of Troops borne on the Strength of the Imperial Army.					Imperial Military Expenditure.
	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Totals.	
Colonies Proper.						£.
North American Colonies:						
Canada	1,039	1,137	248	8	2,432	206,264
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	1,612	- -	177	92	1,881*	149,495
Newfoundland	- -	237	1	1	239	20,807
British Columbia	- -	- -	- -	138	138	37,000
Australian Colonies:						
New South Wales	507	- -	106	32	645	43,039
Victoria	618	- -	- -	6	624	36,557
South Australia	93	- -	- -	7	100	6,836
Tasmania	324	- -	- -	2	326	35,119
New Zealand	1,166	- -	45	41	1,252	104,852
South African Colonies: Cape of Good Hope, Natal, and British Kaffaria	3,409	1,042	176	239	4,866	456,658
Ceylon	846	1,356	135	7	2,344	110,268
Mauritius	1,449	- -	133	48	1,630	145,658
West Indies:						
Jamaica	534	802	94	3	1,433	118,285
Honduras	- -	329	24	2	355	30,621
Windward and Leeward, comprising Barbados, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana	1,145	1,104	136	7	2,392	213,793
Total	12,742	6,007	1,275	633	20,657	1,715,246
Military Garrisons, Naval Stations, Convict Depôts, and Dependencies maintained chiefly for Objects of Imperial Policy.						
Mediterranean:						
Malta	5,008	637	779	304	6,728	483,173
Gibraltar	4,537	- -	1,079	309	5,925	420,695
Ionian Islands	3,601	- -	487	206	4,294	280,061
Hong Kong	- -	- -	- -	- -	733	57,300†
St. Helena	- -	418	77	2	497	38,354
Bermuda	878	- -	159	91	1,128	87,587
Bahamas	- -	386	11	1	398	32,280
Falklands	- -	37	- -	- -	37	2,117
Western Australia	88	- -	- -	86	174	25,946
Labuan	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	7,329‡
West African Settlements:						
Sierra Leone	- -	356	- -	- -	356	27,302
Gambia	- -	334	- -	- -	334	27,910
Gold Coast	- -	306	- -	- -	306	19,781
Total	14,112	2,474	2,592	999	20,910	1,509,835
Gross Total	26,854	8,481	3,867	1,632	41,567	3,225,081§

* About 1,300 of these troops were stationed in the garrison of Halifax, costing about 100,000 *l.*

† In the case of Hong Kong, the ordinary strength and cost of the garrison is given, exclusive of any excess occasioned by wars with China, also exclusive of cost of transport.

‡ The force at Labuan consists of 126 native Indian troops, the cost being repaid to the Indian Government from the Imperial treasury.

§ Total of Imperial Expenditure, given in Return 5	£. 3,130,781
Add,—British Columbia	37,000
Hong Kong	57,300
	£. 3,225,081

It

It should be noted that of the total Imperial expenditure charged against the "Colonies proper," 264,521 *l.* is due to their proportion of the dead weight, recruiting, and departmental expenses at home; and 202,924 *l.* is the proportion of the same expenses charged against the second class of dependencies above enumerated.

5. It appears from returns laid before your Committee that, beyond the expenses defrayed from the Imperial Exchequer, the undermentioned dependencies contributed during the year ending 31 March 1860, the further sums specified in the following return towards their military defence (that is to say);

	£.	
St. Helena	482	For maintenance of local forces.
Sierra Leone	562	
Gambia	423	
Gold Coast	234	
Cape of Good Hope	56,176	
Canada	13,393	
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	198	
New South Wales	33,806	For pay and allowances to British troops, and for various military purposes.
Victoria	72,110	
South Australia	7,172	
Ceylon	97,198	
Mauritius	25,354	
Malta	6,200	
Jamaica	1,637	For construction of works, barracks, &c. including the cost of constructing works described as "sea defences" in Demerara.
Windward and Leeward Islands, with Guiana	29,279	
Ionian Islands	25,000	For general purposes of defence, in pursuance of a convention executed under the Treaty of Paris.
TOTAL	£. 369,224	

Of the above sums, the following amounts were passed to the credit of Her Majesty's Exchequer in the books of the War Office, by the following dependencies:

	£.	s.	d.	
New South Wales	14,711	15	7	Army Estimates, 1860–1, p. 146.
Ionian Islands	18,449	15	4	
Mauritius	10,000	–	–	
Malta	6,200	–	–	
Ceylon	23,954	–	4	
	£. 73,315	11	3	

And the residue was expended within the dependencies for various military purposes.

6. In connexion with this portion of their inquiry your Committee think it necessary to state that some of the appropriations in aid of military expenditure made by Colonial Legislatures, have not been properly brought to account at home. Large sums appear to have been received from the Colonial Governments by Imperial officers for strictly military purposes, as to which no accounts have been rendered to the War Office or the Treasury; and in the opinion of your Committee it is desirable that all monies so received should appear in the Home accounts; and that there should be appended to the Army Estimates, statements showing the sums so received during the last financial year in each Colony, as well as the total military charge for that Colony defrayed from the Imperial votes. Mr. Anderson, 1159-60, 1197, 3709, 3716. Captain Clarke, 1886, *et seq.*

7. It appears to your Committee that a want of system has prevailed in adjusting and sanctioning, by proper regulations, local contributions paid in aid of the ordinary pay and allowance of officers and soldiers on various foreign stations. Your Committee are of opinion that all rates of colonial allowances drawn by officers and soldiers serving in the colonies should be fixed by specific warrants, under the authority of the Secretary of State for War.

Duke of Newcastle, 2482.

8. Your Committee deem it expedient, as bearing on the general subject-matter of their inquiry, to state that from recent returns it appears that more than 10,000 volunteers and militia have been embodied in British North America; a nearly equal number of volunteers in the Australian Colonies; 1,500 in New Zealand; and 1,200 at the Cape of Good Hope; and that these numbers have probably been since considerably increased.

Returns, Appendix.

9. Taking into consideration the facts disclosed by the evidence laid before them, your Committee are of opinion that no uniform rule as to the cost or mode of their military defence can be laid down which shall be applicable alike to communities so various as those which compose the British Colonial Empire; but, following the classification adopted at the commencement of their Report, it appears to your Committee that, as to the second class of dependencies above defined, the responsibility and main cost of their defence properly devolves on the Imperial Government.

Mr. Gladstone, 3780–81, 3792. Mr. Lowe, 3335, 3370–71, 3407.

10. With respect to the dependencies properly called "Colonies," and to which any recommendations hereinafter to be made as to the mode or cost of Colonial defence exclusively relate, the practical application of such recommendations, both as to time and place, must necessarily be left to the discretion of Her Majesty's Government, having regard to the local resources of each dependency, to its dangers from external attack, and to the general exigencies of the empire. With this reservation, it appears to your Committee that the responsibility and cost of the military defence of such dependencies ought mainly to devolve upon themselves.

Your Committee further submit the following general suggestions as arising from the evidence laid before them:

Lord Herbert, 3558, 3563–5. Mr. Godley, 2084, *et seq.*

11. That it is inexpedient that the proportions of cost of Colonial defence to be borne by the Imperial and Colonial Governments respectively should be the subject of negotiations with the various dependencies, but that evidence has been given tending to show that the mode of proceeding adopted by Lord Grey in 1851, in announcing to the Australian Colonies the terms on which alone Imperial troops could be sent there, may be gradually applied to other dependencies.

Mr. Lowe, 3333. Duke of Newcastle, 3058 (Tasmania).

12. That in the case of the Australian Colonies, comprised in the first class, the number of Imperial Troops, as shown in the above table, ought to be reduced.

Earl Grey, 2637–8. Mr. Lowe, 3343–4.

13. That with respect to New Zealand, while it may not be right, under all circumstances, to withhold from the settlers in that Colony assistance in protecting themselves against the attacks of native tribes, so long as the Imperial Government retains a control over native policy; their principal reliance ought to be on their own resources.

Mr. Owen, 1687, 1720, *et seq.* Sir J. Burgoyne, 1373. Lord Herbert, 3639.

14. That with respect to the South African Colonies, and all those similarly circumstanced dependencies which contain large European populations, their security against warlike tribes or domestic disturbances should be provided for, as far as possible, by means of local efforts and local organization; and that the main object of any system adopted by this country should be to encourage such efforts, not merely with a view to diminish Imperial expenditure, but for the still more important purpose of stimulating the spirit of self-reliance in Colonial communities.

Duke of Newcastle, 3141 *et seq.*

15. That the settlers in South Africa should be called upon to contribute a larger sum than they do at present towards the military expenditure of those colonies.

Mr. Merivale, 2402 *et seq.*

16. That the expense of the troops in Ceylon should be in a greater degree borne by the Colonial Treasury.

Sir C. Elliot, 1008, 1059, 1062. Admiral Erskine, 3206 *et seq.*

17. With respect to the West Indies, it appears that about 4,200 troops (consisting of European and coloured regiments, in nearly equal proportions), are now maintained there, mainly for the purpose of securing those colonies against internal disorder; that the defence in time of war of these possessions of the British Crown, as well as of other distant colonies, must be principally naval, and that it is for many reasons inexpedient that the duty of a local police should

should be performed by scattered detachments of Imperial troops, at the cost of this country; it is therefore, in the opinion of your Committee, desirable that, due regard being had to the peculiar circumstances of these colonies, the force now maintained in them should be gradually reduced.

18. Your Committee are further of opinion that the multiplication of fortified places and the erection of fortifications in distant colonial possessions, such as Mauritius, on a scale requiring for their defence a far greater number of men than could be spared for them in the event of war, involve a useless expenditure, and fail to provide an efficient protection for places, the defence of which mainly depends on superiority at sea. Earl Grey, 2565.

19. In conclusion, your Committee submit that the tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile power; and that it is therefore desirable to concentrate the troops required for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of the Empire. Lord Herbert, 3552. Earl Grey, 2616.

11 *July* 1861.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Lunæ, 18° *die Martii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Ellice.	Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Arthur Mills.	Lord Stanley.
Sir George Grey.	General Peel.
Mr. Roebuck.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Marsh.	Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Adderley.	

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS called to the Chair.

Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned to 18th April, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 18° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Ellice.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Baxter.	Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Mr. FitzGerald.
Mr. Marsh.	Mr. Childers.
Sir James Fergusson.	

Mr. *T. F. Elliot*, examined.

[Adjourned to Monday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 22° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Mr. Baxter.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Marsh.	Mr. Childers.
Mr. Ellice.	Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Adderley.	General Peel.

Mr. *T. F. Elliot*, further examined.

[Adjourned to Thursday, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 25° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Ellice.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. Childers.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.

Mr. *H. W. S. Whiffin*, Mr. *Thomas Carter*, and Rear-Admiral Sir *Charles Elliot*, examined.

[Adjourned to Monday, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 29° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Baxter.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Childers.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Mr. Marsh.

Mr. *William George Anderson*, examined.

Mr. *William Henry Sharpe Whiffin*, further examined.

General Sir *John F. Burgoyne* and *Robert William Keate*, examined.

[Adjourned to Thursday, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 2° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Sir George Grey.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Roebuck.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Marsh.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Childers.

Mr. *Charles Mostyn Owen*, Captain *Andrew Clarke*, and Mr. *John Robert Godley*, examined.

[Adjourned to Monday, at One o'clock.

Lunæ, 6° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Childers.	Mr. Baxter.
Lord Stanley.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Marsh.	Sir James Fergusson.

Mr. *Herman Merivale*, examined.

Resolved, That the Chairman do move the House, that a Message be sent to the Lords to request that their Lordships will give leave to the Earl Grey to attend to be examined as a Witness before this Committee.

[Adjourned to Thursday, at Two o'clock.

Jovis, 9° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. FitzGerald.
Mr. Marsh.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Roebuck.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. Baxter.
Lord Stanley.	

Earl *Grey*, examined.

Resolved, That the Chairman do move the House, that a Message be sent to the Lords to request that their Lordships will give leave to the Duke of Newcastle to attend to be examined as a Witness before this Committee.

[Adjourned to Monday, at One o'clock.

Lunæ, 13° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Lord Stanley.	Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Marsh.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
General Peel.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Childers.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Adderley.

Sir *Stuart Donaldson* and Mr. *Walter Brodie*, examined.

Jovis, 16° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue	Mr. FitzGerald.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Ellice.	Lord Stanley.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. Childers.

The Duke of *Newcastle*, examined.

[Adjourned to Monday, 27th, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 27° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Baxter.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Adderley.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Marsh.	

Rear-Admiral *Erskine*, The Right Hon. *Robert Lowe*, a Member of the House, and Sir *Charles Clifford*, examined.

Resolved, That the Chairman do move the House that a message be sent to the Lords to request their Lordships will give leave to Lord Herbert to attend to be examined as a Witness before this Committee.

[Adjourned to Thursday, at One o'clock.

Jovis, 30° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Baxter.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Marsh.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Childers.
Mr. Adderley.	Sir James Fergusson.

Lord *Herbert*, examined.

Sir *Charles Clifford*, further examined.

[Adjourned to Thursday, at Twelve o'clock.

Jovis, 6° die Junii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Roebuck.	Mr. Ellice.
Lord Stanley.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. Adderley.
Sir James Fergusson.	

Mr. *William George Anderson* and Mr. *Wm. H. S. Whiffin,* further examined.

Right Honourable *W. E. Gladstone,* a Member of the House, and Mr. *Philip Wodehouse,* examined.

[Adjourned to Monday, 17th, at Twelve o'clock, to consider Resolutions to be proposed by Chairman.

Veneris, 21° die Junii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS in the Chair.

Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Ellice.
Sir James Fergusson.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Sir George Grey.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Childers.	Mr. FitzGerald.

Resolutions proposed for the consideration of the Committee by the Chairman were read, as follows:—

"1. THAT the Committee have limited their inquiry to the dependencies administered through the Colonial Department.

"2. That the average amount of force maintained as garrisons in the dependencies, and borne on the strength of the Imperial Army from 1851 to 1861 inclusive, has been 42,689; and that while the force stationed in particular dependencies fluctuates greatly according to the prospects of tranquillity or disturbance in each dependency respectively at different times, the gross totals for the years above-mentioned show a general approximate uniformity.

"3. That from returns which have been laid before the Committee, it may be estimated that the average annual expenditure incurred in the military defence of the dependencies, including cost of barracks, fortifications, transport, and proportion of non-effective services, and of recruiting and departmental expenses at home, has been in round numbers 3,500,000*l.* a year.

"4. That there are, at the present time, 34 dependencies in which troops are stationed; 17 of which by giving extra pay and allowances, by maintenance of local forces, or construction of barracks, contribute some portion of the cost incurred in their defence; and that the average annual amount contributed by all those dependencies appears, from recent returns, to have been in round numbers 350,000*l.*, or about one-tenth of our colonial military expenditure; but that as to the assessment on the dependencies of payments in aid of their defence, and the terms on which arms and military stores are issued to them, no fixed rule exists.

"5. That a force of more than 10,000 volunteers and militia, capable of large increase, has been enrolled in British North America, a nearly equal number in the Australian Colonies, including Tasmania, 1,500 in New Zealand, and 1,200 at the Cape (exclusive of the mounted police); and as an evidence of the power of these Colonies to provide for their self-defence, it appears that, during the late war with Russia, Nova Scotia offered to raise a large militia force for the defence of the Colony, and when troops were withdrawn to New Zealand from the Australian Colonies their duties were undertaken by the volunteers,

volunteers, and that during the mutiny in India, the defence of Cape Town was almost entirely left to its inhabitants.

"6. That with respect to those dependencies which are maintained as military garrisons, convict depôts, or for other exclusively Imperial purposes, it is the opinion of the Committee that the main cost of their defence ought, of right, so long as such dependencies are retained, to devolve on the Imperial Treasury.

"7. That it appears from the concurrent testimony of Sir John Burgoyne, Admiral Erskine, and Admiral Elliot, that our Colonial military stations generally (with the exception of those in the Mediterranean) require a considerable increase of their existing fortifications and garrisons in order to protect them against hostile expeditions; and that even supposing such increase to be provided, their security from external attacks still depends entirely on the maintenance of our naval supremacy; that under these circumstances the multiplication of fortified places requiring for their defence troops, which in time of war can be ill spared from home, is a costly and comparatively inefficient method of protecting distant stations which are not of primary Imperial importance.

"8. That, in the opinion of the Committee, it is inexpedient that the proportions of cost of Colonial defence to be borne by the Imperial and Colonial Governments respectively should be the subject of negotiations with the various dependencies, but that evidence has been given tending to show that the policy successfully adopted by Lord Grey in 1851, in announcing to the free Australian Colonies the terms on which alone the Imperial troops could be sent there, may be gradually extended to other dependencies possessing representative institutions, which, by their increasing power and resources, appear to be as capable of undertaking in great measure their own defence as they are of providing for their own internal Government.

"9. That the practical application of the policy alluded to in the foregoing resolution must necessarily be left to the discretion of Her Majesty's Government, having regard to the local resources of each dependency, to its dangers from external attack, and to the general exigencies of the empire, but that from evidence which has been laid before the Committee there are grounds for believing that a similar rule may advantageously be applied to the Peace Establishments of the North American Colonies, also to the Cape Colony, and New Zealand, so soon as the entire regulation of native policy shall be vested in the Colonial Governments; and to Tasmania when the financial questions arising out of the abolition ef the convict system shall have been adjusted.

"10. That about 4,500 troops are now maintained in the West Indies, mainly, if not entirely, for the purpose of securing those Colonies against domestic disturbance; and that, in the opinion of the Committee, it is not expedient that the duty of a local police should be performed by Imperial troops, and at the cost of the mother country.

"11. That in the case of those distant dependencies which contain large European populations, their security against warlike tribes or domestic disturbances can best be attained by means of local efforts and local organization; and that the main object of any system adopted by this country should be to encourage such efforts, not merely with a view to diminish the cost now occasioned by the transport of troops, and the desertions therefrom, but for the still more important purpose of stimulating the spirit of self-reliance in the more advanced Colonial communities.

"12. That the tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile power; and that in order to meet this tendency it is desirable to concentrate our troops for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible, and to trust mainly to our naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of our Empire."

Resolutions proposed for the consideration of the Committee by Lord Stanley, were read, as follows:—

"1. That the different circumstances of the various Colonies, as regards exposure to external attack, danger from native races, and the relative wealth or poverty of their respective populations, preclude the adoption of any uniform rule for all in reference to the amounts to be contributed by them severally towards the expense of their military defence.

"2. That, in the case of the North American Colonies, only the Imperial ports of Kingston, Halifax, and Quebec should be ordinarily held by Imperial troops.

"3. That the number of troops at present maintained in the West Indies, being about 4,500, appears excessive. No contributions can be expected from the West Indian Colonies; but it is not expedient that the duty of a local police should be performed by Imperial troops, and at the cost of the mother country.

"4. That the circumstances of the South African settlements render necessary the maintenance there of a considerable European force, but that the present number of 5,000 appears needlessly large; and, considering the growing wealth and prosperity of the Cape Colony, it may be expected to contribute more freely than at present to its own defence.

"5. That in Australia, exclusive of New Zealand and Western Australia, no Imperial troops should be maintained at the cost of the mother country, beyond a guard of honour for the respective Governors.

"6. That, in Ceylon and Mauritius, the rate of contribution may be fixed, for the present, at about one-half the cost of the defence of those Colonies.

"7. That the present state of New Zealand being exceptional, no opinion can be given as to the amount of force which may hereafter be required there; but settlers in that Colony are entitled to Imperial assistance in protecting themselves against the attacks of native tribes.

"8. That the West African settlements, Bermuda, St. Helena, the Falklands, Labuan, and Hong Kong, must be considered as ports maintained for Imperial purposes, and to be defended principally at the cost of the Imperial treasury.

"9. That the Mediterranean garrisons do not come within the scope of this inquiry.

"10. That Vancouver's Island and British Columbia have been too recently colonised to admit of any considerable contribution being expected from them at present.

"11. That the multiplication of fortified places, requiring for their defence troops, which, in time of war, can be ill spared from home, is a costly and comparatively inefficient method of protecting distant stations which are not of primary Imperial importance.

"12. That it is not expedient that the British Government should bind itself, under any circumstances, by engagements with Colonial Legislatures, to maintain a specific amount of force in any colony."

Resolutions proposed for the consideration of the Committee by Mr. Adderley, were read, as follows:—

"That the relations between this Country and her Colonies cannot be in a sound and healthy state, unless they develope in every part of the Empire the self-reliant habits essential to free communities, and adequate resources for the defence of the whole.

"That every part of the Empire which has representative Government should provide the requirements for its own safety.

"That the Mother Country is bound to aid her Colonies in wars,
especially in those which may be the consequence of her own policy:

"And may expect, in return, the co-operation of her Colonies,
especially in wars which concern themselves.

"That placing in Colonies small garrisons of troops, raised and paid by England, and more likely to be withdrawn than strengthened in periods of danger, is a waste of our strength and means at home, a discouragement to our colonial fellow-subjects from taking their part in the defence of the Empire, a diminution of the aggregate national power, and a fallacious security to the localities so garrisoned.

"That it is the duty of Her Majesty's Executive to encourage her colonial subjects who enjoy representative Government to undertake the primary responsibility and charge of their own defence; and gradually to return to the old colonial system of this country, during the continuance of which British troops were never employed in Colonies for any purpose but that of aid against foreign enemies in time of war.

"That in the following instances, these principles are now departed from:

"1. The large force kept on the Kaffir frontier, entirely at the cost of this country.

"2. The police service of regiments sent to the West Indies.

"3. The entire defence of Tasmania, at Imperial expense.

"4. The small capitation per soldier paid for the employment of British troops by New Zealand.

"5. The distinction between our treatment of Ceylon and India.

"6. The maintenance of garrisons in North America, inadequate for defence, and preventing adequate defence being made; and which may embroil us with the Colonists themselves, or their neighbours.

"That

"That the result of inducing Colonists to undertake their own garrisons in North America, Australasia, and South Africa, and police duties in the West Indies, would be to make available more than 20,000 men, either to strengthen Imperial garrisons, or to serve in such Colonies as might desire to pay for their service, or to increase the reserved force maintained in the United Kingdom. The British Exchequer would be relieved of the cost of constant transport; and of several barracks and fortifications; and of extra colonial pay; and of the wear and tear which is said to aggravate military expenditure abroad; and this relief would be obtained without reducing the Imperial Army, and with great addition to the national strength throughout the world."

Resolution proposed for the consideration of the Committee by Mr. Childers, read, as follows:—

"That great irregularities have taken place in properly bringing to account in the Imperial Exchequer, the appropriations in aid of military expenditure made by Colonial Legislatures; that large sums appear to have been received from the Colonial Governments by Imperial officers for strictly military purposes, as to which no accounts have been rendered to the War Office or the Treasury; and that in the opinion of the Committee it is desirable that all monies so received should appear in the Home Accounts; and that there should be appended to the Army Estimates, statements showing the sums so expended during the last financial year in each Colony, as well as the total military charge for that Colony defrayed from the Imperial votes."

Committee deliberated.

The Chairman was requested to draw up a Draft Report for the consideration of the Committee.

[Adjourned to 8th July, at Twelve o'clock.

Lunæ, 8° *die Julii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS, in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Marsh.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Sir George Grey.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Fitzgerald.
Mr. Childers.	Lord Robert Cecil.

Draft Report proposed by the Chairman, read 1°, as follows:

"1. THE dependencies of the British Empire (exclusive of India, to which your Committee have not extended their investigations) may be divided for the purposes of this inquiry into two classes:—

"1st. Those which may properly be called 'Colonies,' the defence of which is undertaken mainly for their own protection (though they may in some instances contain within their boundaries posts which are held for Imperial purposes). To this class belong the North American and South African Colonies, the West Indies, the Eastern Colonies of Ceylon, Mauritius and Labaun, also New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand.

"2d. Those of which the defence is undertaken exclusively for Imperial purposes, whether as military or naval stations, convict depôts, or for other objects of Imperial policy. To this class belong the three Mediterranean Dependencies, Malta, Gibraltar, and the Ionian Islands, Hong Kong, Bermuda, the Bahamas, St. Helena, and the Falklands, Western Australia, and the three West African Settlements of Sierra Leone, Gambia, and the Gold Coast.

"Throughout their inquiry, your Committee have deemed it essential to keep in view the distinction to be drawn between these two classes.

"2. In order to enable your Committee to form a correct opinion as to any alterations which it may be their duty to recommend in the military administration of the Dependencies to which their inquiries have extended, they have deemed it necessary, in the first instance, accurately to ascertain the details of the system which at present exists, and the proportions of cost actually incurred by the Imperial Government and the Imperial Dependencies respectively in their military defence. With this view they have examined witnesses connected with various public departments at home, and others who have held positions of official responsibility in various Colonies. They have also taken evidence as to the actual condition and cost of our colonial fortifications.

"3. From evidence laid before your Committee, it appears that the forces stationed in those outlying portions of our empire to which their inquiry has extended, and the costs incurred in their defence, have fluctuated in number and amount according to the circumstances affecting each dependency at different times; and in order to arrive at a fair estimate of the average annual expenditure incurred, and of the number of troops

employed, your Committee have obtained returns for the year ending 31 March 1860, the most recent period during which no disturbing causes existed, involving an abnormal increase of force in our foreign possessions.

"4. The actual amount of Imperial expenditure (including cost of barracks, fortifications, transport, proportion of non-effective services, and of recruiting and departmental expences at home) incurred in the defence of the dependencies (distinguishing colonies proper and dependencies maintained for Imperial purposes), also the number and distribution of troops borne on the strength of the British army, and employed in their defence for the year ending 31 March 1860, will appear from the following table, compiled from returns furnished by various departments of the Government:—

DEPENDENCIES.	Number of Troops borne on the Strength of the Imperial Army.					Imperial Military Expenditure.
	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	TOTALS.	
COLONIES PROPER.						£.
North American Colonies:						
Canada	1,039	1,137	248	8	2,432	206,264
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	1,612	-	177	92	1,881*	149,495
Newfoundland	-	237	1	1	239	20,807
British Columbia	-	-	-	138	138	37,000
Australian Colonies:						
New South Wales	507	-	106	32	645	43,039
Victoria	618	-	-	6	624	36,557
South Australia	93	-	-	7	100	6,836
Tasmania	324	-	-	2	326	35,113
New Zealand	1,166	-	45	41	1,252	104,852
South African Colonies:						
Cape of Good Hope, Natal, and British Kaffraria	3,409	1,042	176	239	4,866	456,658
Eastern Colonies:						
Ceylon	846	1,356	135	7	2,344	110,268
Mauritius	1,449	-	133	48	1,630	145,658
West Indies:						
Jamaica	534	802	94	3	1,433	118,285
Honduras	-	329	24	2	355	30,621
Windward and Leeward, comprising Barbados, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana	1,145	1,104	136	7	2,392	213,793
TOTAL	12,742	6,007	1,275	633	20,657	1,715,246
IMPERIAL GARRISONS, CONVICT SETTLEMENTS, &c.						
Mediterranean:						
Malta	5,008	637	779	304	6,728	483,173
Gibraltar	4,537	-	1,079	309	5,925	420,695
Ionian Islands	3,601	-	487	206	4,294	280,061
Hong Kong	-	-	-	-	733	57,300†
St. Helena	-	418	77	2	497	38,354
Bermuda	878	-	159	91	1,128	87,587
Bahamas	-	386	11	1	398	32,280
Falklands	-	37	-	-	37	2,117
Western Australia	88	-	-	86	174	25,946
Labuan	-	-	-	-	-	7,329‡
West African Settlements:						
Sierra Leone	-	356	-	-	356	27,302
Gambia	-	334	-	-	334	27,910
Gold Coast	-	306	-	-	306	19,781
TOTAL	14,112	2,474	2,592	999	20,910	1,509,835
GROSS TOTAL	26,854	8,481	3,867	1,632	41,567	3,225,081

"* About 1,300 of these troops were stationed in the Imperial garrisons of Halifax.

"† In the case of Hong Kong, the ordinary strength and cost of the garrison is given, exclusive of any excess occasioned by wars with China, also exclusive of cost of transport.

"‡ The force at Labuan consists of 126 native Indian troops, the cost being repaid to the Indian Government from the Imperial treasury."

"5. It

"5. It has been further proved by returns laid before your Committee, that during the year ending 31st March 1860, appropriations in aid of their military defence were made by the under-mentioned dependencies for the purposes and in the proportions following; that is to say, by—

	£.	
Malta	6,200	For maintenance of local forces.
St. Helena	482	
Sierra Leone	562	
Gambia	423	
Gold Coast	234	
Cape of Good Hope	56,176	
Canada	13,393	
Nova Scotia and New Brunswiek	198	
New South Wales	33,806	For pay and allowances of troops, and various military purposes.
Victoria	72,110	
South Australia	7,172	
Ceylon	97,198	
Mauritius	25,354	
Jamaica	1,637	For construction of works, barracks, &c. including 15,000 *l.* for 'sea defences' in Demerara.
Windward and Leeward Islands	29,279	
Ionian Islands	25,000	For general purposes of defence, in pursuance of a convention executed under the Treaty of Paris.
TOTAL	£. 369,224	

"6. It further appears, that of the above sum of 369,224 *l.*, designated in Return No.16 as 'Colonial Expenditure,' the following amounts were paid into the Imperial Exchequer by the following dependencies:—

	£.
Mauritius	5,000
Ceylon	24,000
Malta	6,200
Ionian Islands	25,000
	£. 60,200

And that the residue of the said sum of 369,224 *l.* (that is to say, 309,024 *l.*) was expended within the dependencies for various military purposes.

"7. In connexion with this portion of their inquiry, your Committee think it necessary to state, that great irregularities have taken place in properly bringing to account in the Imperial Exchequer the appropriations in aid of military expenditure made by Colonial Legislatures; that large sums appear to have been received from the Colonial Governments by Imperial officers for strictly military purposes, as to which no accounts have been rendered to the War Office or the Treasury; and that, in the opinion of your Committee, it is desirable that all monies so received should appear in the Home accounts; and that there should be appended to the Army Estimates statements showing the sums so expended during the last financial year in each Colony, as well as the total military charge for that Colony defrayed from the Imperial votes.

"8. Your Committee have deemed it expedient, as bearing on the general subject-matter of their inquiry, to ascertain the extent and progress of the Volunteer movement in the various Colonies; and from recent returns it appears that more than 10,000 volunteers and militia, capable of large increase, have been enrolled in British North America; a nearly equal number in the Australian Colonies, including Tasmania; 1,500 in New Zealand; and 1,200 (exclusive of the Mounted Police) at the Cape of Good Hope; making altogether a force of nearly 23,000 Colonial Volunteers.

"9. Taking into consideration the facts disclosed by the evidence laid before them, your Committee are of opinion that no uniform rule as to the cost or mode of their military defence can be laid down which shall be applicable alike to communities so various as those which compose the Colonial empire of Great Britain; but, following the classification adopted at the commencement of their Report, it appears to your Committee that the dependencies secondly above enumerated, comprising military and naval stations, convict depôts, and the settlements for the suppression of the slave trade, are maintained for purposes which are exclusively Imperial; and that the responsibility and cost of their defence ought therefore to devolve on the Imperial Treasury. The same principle applies to the exceptional case of the Ionian Islands, which Great Britain is bound by treaties to defend, though entitled by the same treaties to a certain fixed subsidy from the local revenues of those islands in aid of that defence.

"10. With

"10. With respect to those dependencies to which the designation of "Colonies" properly belongs, and to which any recommendations hereinafter to be made as to the mode or cost of Colonial defence exclusively relate, the practical application of such recommendations, both as to time and place, must necessarily be left to the discretion of Her Majesty's Government, having regard to the local resources of each dependency, to its dangers from external attack, and to the general exigencies of the empire. With this reservation, it appears to your Committee that the responsibility and cost of the defence of such dependencies from perils not arising from the results of Imperial policy ought mainly to devolve upon themselves.

"Your Committee further submit the following general suggestions as arising from the evidence laid before them:

"11. That it is inexpedient that the proportions of cost of Colonial defence to be borne by the Imperial and Colonial Governments respectively should be the subject of negotiations with the various dependencies, but that evidence has been given tending to show that the policy successfully adopted by Lord Grey in 1851, in announcing to the free Australian Colonies the terms on which alone Imperial troops could be sent there, may be gradually extended to other dependencies possessing representative institutions, which, by their increasing power and resources, appear to be as capable of undertaking in great measure their own defence as they are of providing for their own internal government. And your Committee are of opinion that this policy ought to be applied to Tasmania as soon as the financial questions arising out of the abolition of the convict system shall have been finally adjusted.

"12. That in the case of the Australian Colonies generally, exclusive of Western Australia (which, as a convict settlement, requires the presence of a small number of troops), the maintenance of any Imperial troops, beyond perhaps a small body of artillery, appears to be unnecessary.

"13. That the present state of New Zealand being exceptional, no opinion can be given as to the amount of force which may be hereafter required there; but while it may not be possible, under all circumstances, to withhold from the settlers in that Colony asisstance in protecting themselves against the attacks of native tribes, so long as the Imperial Government retains a control over native policy, their principal reliance ought to be on their own resources.

"14. That with respect to the South African Colonies, the same principle may be held generally to apply; and that in the case of all those distant dependenencies which contain large European populations, their security against warlike tribes or domestic disturbances can best be attained by means of local efforts and local organization; and that the main object of any system adopted by this country should be to encourage such efforts, not merely with a view to diminish the cost now occasioned by the transport of troops, and the desertions therefrom, but for the still more important purposes of stimulating the spirit of self-reliance in Colonial communities.

"15. With respect to the West Indies, it appears that about 4,500 troops are now maintained there, mainly for the purpose of securing those colonies against internal disorder; that the defence in time of war of these possessions of the British Crown, as well as of other distant colonies, must be principally naval, and that it is for many reasons inexpedient that the duty of a local police should be performed by scattered detachments of Imperial troops, at the cost of the mother country; it is therefore, in the opinion of your Committee, desirable that, due regard being had to the peculiar circumstances of these Colonies, the force now maintained in them should be gradually reduced.

"16. Your Committee are further of opinion, that the multiplication of fortified places not of primary Imperial importance, and the erection of fortifications in distant colonial, possessions, such as Mauritius, on a scale requiring for their defence a far greater number of men than could be spared for them in the event of war, involves a useless expenditure, and fails to provide an efficient protection for places, the defence of which mainly depends on superiority at sea.

"17. In conclusion, your Committee submit that the tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile power; and that in order to meet this tendency, it is desirable to concentrate our troops for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible, and to trust mainly to our naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of our Empire."

Question, "That the Draft Report proposed by the Chairman be now read 2°, paragraph by paragraph," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 1 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 2 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 3 read, and amendments made.—Amendment proposed, after the word "times," in line 4, to insert the words, "although there is no appearance of any tendency to

to a sustained process of reduction" (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question put, "That those words be there inserted." The Committee divided:

Aye, 1.	Noes, 11.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Baring.
	Mr. Baxter.
	Lord Robert Cecil.
	Mr. Childers.
	Mr. Ellice.
	Sir James Fergusson.
	Mr. FitzGerald.
	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
	Sir George Grey.
	Mr. Marsh.
	Lord Stanley.

Further amendment made.

Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of proposed Report" put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 4 read, amendments made.—Amendment proposed, that the following words be added at the end of the paragraph: "It should be noted that of the total Imperial expenditure charged against the Colonies proper, 264,521 *l.* is due to their proportion of the dead weight, recruiting and departmental expenses at home; and 202,924 *l.* is the proportion of the same expenses charged against the second class of dependencies above enumerated." (Mr. *Childers*).—Question, "That those words be there added," put, and agreed to.—Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 5, read.—Amendment proposed after the first word, "It," to leave out to the word "following" for the purpose of inserting the words "appears from Returns laid before your Committee, that beyond the expenses defrayed from the Imperial Exchequer, the under-mentioned dependencies contributed during the year ending 31 March 1860, the further sums, specified in the following Return, towards their military defence" (Mr. *Ellice*).—Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph" put, and negatived.—Question, "That those words be there inserted," put, and agreed to; words added; Further Amendments made.—Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 6 read, and negatived.

Paragraph 7 read, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 8 read, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 9 read, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 10 read, amendments made.—Amendment proposed, to leave out the words, "local resources" in line 5" (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph." The Committee divided:

Ayes, 11.	Noe, 1.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Adderley.
Mr. Baxter.	
Lord Robert Cecil.	
Mr. Childers.	
Mr. Ellice.	
Sir James Fergusson.	
Mr. FitzGerald.	
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	
Sir George Grey.	
Mr. Marsh.	
Lord Stanley.	

Amendment proposed, to leave out the words, "dangers of external attack" in line 6 (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph." The Committee divided:

Ayes, 10.	Noes, 2.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Adderley.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Childers.	
Mr. Ellice.	
Sir James Fergusson.	
Mr. FitzGerald.	
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	
Sir George Grey.	
Mr. Marsh.	
Lord Stanley.	

Amendment proposed, after the word "dependencies," in line 8, to insert the words "and to the results of Imperiol policy" (Mr. *Fortescue*).—Question put, "That those words be there inserted." The Committee divided.

Ayes, 5.	Noes, 6.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Adderley.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Mr. Childers.
Sir George Grey.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Marsh.	Mr. FitzGerald.
	Lord Stanley.

Amendment proposed, after the word "dependencies" to insert the words "against external attack, ought to be partly borne by Great Britain, but against internal disturbances, ought to be borne by themselves" (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question put, "That those words be there inserted." The Committee divided:

Ayes, 3.	Noes, 8.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Marsh.	Mr. Baxter.
Lord Stanley.	Lord Robert Cecil.
	Mr. Childers.
	Sir James Fergusson.
	Mr. FitzGerald.
	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
	Sir George Grey.

Amendment proposed, to leave out all the words from the word "dependencies" to the word "ought" in line 8 (Mr. *Childers*).—Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph." The Committee divided:

Ayes, 4.	Noes, 7.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Adderley.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Childers.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	Mr. FitzGerald.
	Sir George Grey.
	Mr. Marsh.
	Lord Stanley.

Words omitted.—Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of the proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 11 read, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 12 read.—Amendments made.—Amendment proposed to leave out all the words from the word "the," in line 3, to the end of the paragraph, for the purpose of adding the words "number of Imperial troops, as shown in the above table, ought to be reduced" (Mr. *Baxter*).—Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph," put, and negatived.—Question, "That those words be there added," put, and agreed to.—Amendment proposed, at the end of the paragraph, as amended, to add the words "as such troops ought never to be employed in suppression of local disturbances" (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question put, "That those words be there added." The Committee divided:

Ayes, 2.	Noes, 10.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Marsh.	Mr. Baxter.
	Lord Robert Cecil.
	Mr. Childers.
	Mr. Ellice.
	Sir James Fergusson.
	Mr. FitzGerald.
	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
	Sir George Grey.
	Lord Stanley.

Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 13 read.—Amendments made.—Amendment proposed to leave out the words, "so long as the Imperial Government retains a control over native policy" (Lord *Robert Cecil*).—

Cecil).—Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph."—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 7.	Noes, 5.
Mr. Childers.	Lord Robert Cecil.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. FitzGerald.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Marsh.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Ellice.	
Lord Stanley.	

Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 14 read, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 15 read, and amendments made.—Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "mainly," in line 2 (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question put, "That the word proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph."—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 9.	Noes, 3.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Adderley.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Childers.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Ellice.	
Sir James Fergusson.	
Mr. FitzGerald.	
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	
Sir George Grey.	
Mr. Marsh.	

Amendment proposed, after the word "be," in the last line, to insert the words "largely but" (Lord *Stanley*).—Question put, "That those words be there inserted."—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 4.	Noes, 8.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Childers.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Ellice.
Lord Stanley.	Sir James Fergusson.
	Mr. FitzGerald.
	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
	Sir George Grey.
	Mr. Marsh.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "reduced" for the purpose of inserting the word "removed," instead thereof (Mr. *Adderley*).—Question put, "That the word proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph."—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 11.	Noe, 1.
Mr. F. G. Baring.	Mr. Adderley.
Mr. Baxter.	
Lord Robert Cecil.	
Mr. Childers.	
Mr. Ellice.	
Sir James Fergusson.	
Mr. FitzGerald.	
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	
Sir George Grey.	
Mr. Marsh.	
Lord Stanley.	

Question, "That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of proposed Report," put, and agreed to.

Paragraph 16, read, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 17, read, amended, and agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the following paragraph be added to the proposed report, "That the settlers in South Africa should be called upon to contribute a larger sum than they do at present towards the Military Expenditure of those Colonies" (Mr. *Baxter*).—Question put, and agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the following paragraph be added to the proposed report, "That the expense of the troops in Ceylon should be in a greater degree borne by the Colonial Treasury" (Mr. *Childers*).—Question put.—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 6.	Noes, 4.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Childers.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Ellice.	Lord Stanley.
Sir James Fergusson.	
Mr. Marsh.	

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the following paragraph be added to the proposed report, "It appears to your Committee that a want of system has prevailed in adjusting and sanctioning by proper regulations local contributions, paid in aid of the ordinary pay and allowance of officers and soldiers on various foreign stations; your Committee are of opinion that all rates of Colonial allowances drawn by officers and soldiers serving in the Colonies, should be fixed by specific warrants, under authority of the Secretary of State for War" (Mr. *Ellice*).—Question put, and agreed to.

Question, "That this Report, as amended, be the Report of the Committee to the House," put, and agreed to.

Question, "That the Minutes of Evidence taken before this Committee (with Appendix), be reported to the House," put, and agreed to.

Ordered, to Report.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Jovis, 18° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Sir James Fergusson.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Arthur Mills.	Mr. Thomas George Baring.
Mr. Ellice.	Mr. Childers.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Fitzgerald.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Roebuck.

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

T. F. Elliot, Esq., called in; and Examined.

T. F. Elliot, Esq.

18 April 1861.

1. *Chairman.*] YOU are Assistant Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, I believe?—Yes.

2. You have been connected with the department for 30 years?—Yes.

3. Were you a member of the Departmental Commission, to which the business of preparing a scheme for the guidance of the Government with respect to the colonial military expenditure was committed in 1859?—Yes.

4. Your attention has therefore been particularly called to the subject?—It has.

5. In order to limit and define the area of our inquiry, I will ask you what is the total number of dependencies, excluding those of the Mediterranean, which are administered through the Colonial Department, calculating separately each dependency the Governor of which communicates directly with the Secretary of State?—There are about 34 such Colonies, excluding the Mediterranean possessions.

6. Are there any of those dependencies in which no Imperial troops are stationed, and in the defence of which no Imperial expense is incurred; if so, be so good as to name them?—I do not think there is more than one of them in which there is not some Imperial force or other; that is Prince Edward Island, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

7. There remain therefore 33 dependencies?—Thirty-three dependencies in which Great Britain furnishes military assistance.

8. State in how many and in which of those dependencies any contribution is made from colonial sources towards the cost of that defence?—There are 11 which contribute more or less to the Imperial expenses on military objects; there are six others which, although they do not contribute towards Imperial expenses, furnish local forces for their own defence.

9. Then there are 17 altogether which, in one form or other, contribute something towards their own defence?—Yes.

10. But it may be taken that from the rest no contribution is made towards the cost of their defence, and that cost is defrayed from Imperial funds?—Yes.

11. From the returns embodied in the Departmental Report on Colonial Defences of 1859, and presented to Parliament, it appears that (excluding the Mediterranean garrisons) the total Imperial cost for the year ending 31st March 1858, was 2,549,019 *l.*, and the total of the Colonial contributions 353,016 *l.*?—Yes.

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12. In that estimate of Imperial cost, and in the estimates which are presented annually, the West India Regiments and the Colonial Corps are included, are they not, as borne on the strength of the Imperial army?—They are paid by Great Britain, and the troops are under the Mutiny Act.

13. I believe that the Colonial Corps include what are called the Cape Rifles, Newfoundland Companies, the Ceylon Rifles, the Cape Mounted Rifles, St. Helena Regiment, and the African Artillery?—Yes.

14. I believe there are three West India black regiments?—There are.

15. Do you put in a return forming a portion of a return ordered by the House of Commons on the 21st March last?—I do.

16. I believe that return is as yet incomplete, and does not contain the cost of transport of troops to and from the Colonies?—It does not contain that item yet. I understand that they are engaged in the Admiralty, in preparing the information, but that it has not yet been received at the War Office.

17. As yet, that return comprises only the North American Colonies, the Australian Colonies, and the Cape of Good Hope?—Those Colonies and New Zealand.

18. You also put in a return relating to the same Colonies, and giving the same figures, but distinguishing the direct and indirect Imperial military expenditure in the Colonies to which it relates?—I put in a return which makes that distinction, but my chief object in offering it is to let the Committee have the convenience of seeing the expenditure divided under the several geographical groups of Colonies. I believe it will save the Committee some trouble in their examination.

19. Taking the Colonies in the order of groups, I will first call your attention to the North American Colonies. I observe that the aggregate Imperial military expenditure in respect of those Colonies, for the year ending March 31st, 1859, exclusive of transport to and from the Colonies, is stated in the return which has been laid before the Committee, as amounting to 378,441 *l.*, and the aggregate of Colonial contribution during the same period for the same purpose to 35,268 *l.*?—Yes.

20. And the total number of troops, including infantry, artillery, engineers, and staff in those Colonies during the same period, is stated in the return at 5,523?—Yes.

21. What is the total number of militia-men and volunteers in those Colonies, as far as you have cognisance of it in your department?—Five thousand five hundred and eighty-four at that date, 1858.

22. Can you tell us what is the present distribution of the Imperial troops in British North America?—The total strength in each Colony stands as follows: Canada, 3,118; Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, 2,196; Newfoundland, 209; total, 5,523.

23. Can you tell us the substance of the arrangements with the North American Colonies on the question of military defence propounded by Lord Grey in 1851, and subsequently by the Duke of Newcastle and Sir George Grey in 1854, and by Mr. Labouchere in 1856?—Lord Grey informed the Government of Canada in 1851, that the time was come when they must expect a less amount of exertion on the part of this country to contribute towards her military defences. He said that the troops would be reduced, and, perhaps, ultimately consist of little more than garrisons for the principal forts in Canada, and that if they wanted any further force, they must provide it from their own local population and resources.

24. Have you Lord Grey's Despatch upon the subject with you?—Yes, I put it in.

25. Now tell us whether in that Despatch, or any subsequent Despatch, any particular places were specified by the Government to be the places which the Imperial Government would undertake to defend?—Lord Grey said, and it was repeated afterwards, that the forces would be reduced chiefly to the garrisons of Quebec and Kingston.

26. What was the date of that Despatch of Lord Grey?—It is dated 15th of March 1851. It was laid before Parliament by command in April 1851, in a paper on Military Expenditure in Canada.

27. Were there not subsequent Despatches on the same subject from the Duke of Newcastle, Sir George Grey, and Mr. Labouchere?—Yes; and they adopted Lord Grey's views.

28. They

28. They were in 1854 and 1856, I believe?—They were written in 1854, at the time of the Crimean War.

29. Were there any answers to these Despatches?—There were; the Colonists, to the best of my recollection, cheerfully acquiesced in this country's withdrawing those troops, as their services were wanted elsewhere; they showed their desire to assist this country, and co-operate with her.

30. How far have the arrangements propounded in those Despatches been actually carried out?—In spirit, I think, they have been quite carried out. Perhaps this would be the proper time to ask the Committee to spare a single moment to hear how the troops are really distributed in Canada. I take rank and file as shown in the available returns; out of 1,968 on the 1st January 1861, 1,754 were divided between Quebec and Kingston, and the head-quarters at Montreal, rather less than 100 were at Toronto, the seat of Government, and another body of nearly 100 were at the Red River settlement; but orders have been given for their recal, and they will rejoin the main body in Canada. I must also request leave to add, that within the last few weeks the Commander-in-Chief has made arrangements for still further concentrating the troops in Canada, and for recalling the few small outposts that still remain.

31. Mr. *Fitzgerald.*] In that return are the Canadian Rifles included?—They are included; so that in fact you have only one ordinary regiment of the line in Canada, you have besides that, the Canada Rifles 1,100 strong, but they are a localised force, and therefore cost this country nothing for reliefs or transport.

32. Mr. *Roebuck.*] But they are paid by this country?—Yes.

33. You mentioned the Red River settlement; is that included in Canada as far as regards military expenditure?—The force there is a detachment from the regiment in Canada, which has been spared for duty at the Red River.

34. I want to know merely whether troops sent to Canada were supposed to be sent also to defend the Red River settlement?—I have no means of giving any information on that point.

35. However they are sent from Canada to the Red River settlement?—Yes, they have been for a year or two at the Red River settlement, and are now about to be withdrawn, and not replaced.

36. *Chairman.*] What are the fortified places in Canada now?—Quebec, Kingston and some batteries at Montreal; I think that completes the list.

37. Have you anything to add to your evidence as to the execution of Lord Grey's arrangements?—Besides that concentration of the troops I have just described, I may mention that there has been a large progressive reduction in all the North American Provinces, thus carrying out the spirit of Lord Grey's measures. The force in Canada has been reduced in 15 years, before the present return for 1858, from 8,000 to 3,000; but since 1848, which is the last return I have before Lord Grey's Despatch, it has been reduced from 6,000 to 3,000. In the whole of North America the force has been reduced from 9,500 in 1848 to 5,500 in 1858.

38. I believe the Canada Militia and Public Defence Commissioners presented a report in 1854, recommending the formation of a volunteer force of 4,000 men, and a Militia Act regulating that force was assented to on the 19th May; is that so?—Yes.

39. I observe, that in the return it appears that New Brunswick and Newfoundland have contributed nothing towards theirmilitary defences; has that always been the case during your experience, and is it the case now?—Yes, it has always been the case.

39.* There is a small sum of 92*l.* mentioned as being contributed by Nova Scotia; to what purpose has that been applied?—I think it is a payment to a staff officer of militia, which had been embodied in former days, and a charge for cleaning and repairing arms; it is some trifling item of that kind; of course it is not an item which could have supplied any efficient military force.

40. Our early American Colonies provided, did they not, for the cost of their own defences, without the assistance of this country?—They did if you are alluding to a period of more than 100 years ago.

41. Up to what period?—Canada was conquered by force of arms by an expedition sent by Great Britain more than 100 years ago, and from that day

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to this you have maintained there an English garrison at the expense of this country, thereby establishing a usage of a century.

42. What are the arrangements for the cost of the defences of British Columbia?—As yet, the only land force supplied to British Columbia has been a body of Royal Engineers, and the colonial contribution towards them is provided for as yet in the estimate for British Columbia annually submitted to Parliament in the Colonial Estimates.

43. A certain number of engineers, I believe, were sent out there, across the Isthmus of Panama?—Yes, those are the engineers to whom I allude.

44. Have you any knowledge what the expense of forwarding those men by the Isthmus of Panama to British Columbia was?—In the year ending March 1860, Parliament voted in the Colonial Estimates 26,000 *l.* for the stores and freight for those Engineers, and 11,000 *l.* for the so-called colonial contribution towards their pay, the intention being, that as soon as the Colony is old enough, it shall defray that portion of the expense.

45. Mr. *Ellice.*] The Colony has hitherto not defrayed any part of the expenses?—In point of fact, it has defrayed no part.

46. How much do you say the whole expense has been?—In the first year, ending March 1860, 37,000 *l.*; in the year ending March 1861, for pay, 12,200 *l.*; and in the third year we have now submitted to Parliament an estimate, ending 31st March 1862, for pay, 12,200 *l.* The total is about 61,000 *l.*

47. Where are those troops employed?—In British Columbia.

48. Not in Vancouver's Island?—Not in Vancouver's Island.

49. You cannot state for what object they were sent there particularly?—Yes; it was announced, that wherever England extended the sway of her sceptre, there she pledged the defence of her sword; and therefore, that some sort of military force ought to be sent out. The Royal Engineers were sent, under the idea that from their acquirements they would be useful in road-making.

50. Does the Colonial Office send out a military force to make roads for settlers?—Whenever they work at road-making, they are paid for the purpose; and I believe that, to the soldiers, the employment on that condition is very acceptable.

51. My question is, whether the Colonial Office have employed those troops solely for the purpose of making roads in the Colonies?—They were sent, as I understand, in order to supply an Imperial force to that Colony; that was the first object: the particular kind of troops were selected under the idea that they might also answer a collateral purpose.

52. I find no return of the number of troops sent out. Will you supply in your evidence the number of officers and men?—The number was 150.

53. I see that in Canada we have a large medical staff, one deputy inspector of hospitals, five staff surgeons, and six assistants, besides purveyors. Is that staff independent of and beyond the surgeons attached to the different corps?—On the details of the forces, the Colonial Office possesses no special information. A witness from the War Office would be able to give a far more satisfactory answer.

54. Mr. *Fortescue.*] When you gave the number of militiamen and volunteers, you gave them for 1858, did you not?—For 1858; because that happens to be the year for which the return was printed, which is in the hands of the Committee.

55. Are you able to give the numbers according to the latest information?—I will endeavour to do so presently.

56. What were the circumstances under which that detachment of Canadian Rifles was sent to the Red River?—I am afraid to say from memory.

57. Are you aware whether the Hudson's Bay Company has contributed to the maintenance of those troops?—They may have done so.

58. Are you not aware that the Hudson's Bay Company, at whose request those troops were sent to the Red River, offered to provide, and has provided, barracks and rations?—If ever those facts have been under my eye, it is so long since that I am afraid to give an answer upon it.

59. Mr. *Marsh.*] I think you say that there are no other military forces in British Columbia, except these engineers?—Confining my answer to British Columbia, there are none.

60. There

60. There is a large number of marines there, is there not?—There is a force of marines, not in Columbia, but in the neighbouring island, St. Juan.

61. Not on Vancouver's Island?—Those marines, I consider, are stationed in the Colony of Vancouver's Island; they are close to its shore.

62. Are the expenses of these engineers put in the Army Estimates?—Their regular pay, I understand, is borne on the Army Estimates; all extra pay is provided for in the Colonial estimate.

63. When they make roads for the Colonies, do they receive any extra pay from the Colony for that?—They do.

64. And that does not diminish their regular pay in the Army Estimates?—No; that is not the practice.

65. It does not save anything to the Home Government?—No.

66. Mr. *Childers.*] Has it ever been proposed by any of the North American Colonies to increase the numbers of the artillery and engineers, with a view to a reduction of the number of the line?—Not to my knowledge.

67. Mr. *Baxter.*] Have any of the Despatches from Lord Grey, the Duke of Newcastle, or Mr. Labouchere, urged upon the Governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, the propriety of embodying their militia, and expending money from the Colonial Treasury upon the defences of their positions?—They were advised, in case they thought it desirable to have a larger force than was supplied from home, to furnish it for themselves from their local resources. Besides that, I ought to add, that in surrendering to the Government of Canada extensive lands, which belonged to the military department of this country, there was a sort of understanding that they would perhaps take measures to make their militia more efficient; they have not, however, done much in that direction; the lands have not been so productive as they expected, and they say they have not had much money to expend upon the object.

68. Is there a single regiment of militia embodied in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick or Newfoundland?—Not at the time of this return, in 1858.

69. Whereas, in Canada, there is a force of militia of upwards of 5,000 men?—Upwards of 5,000 men.

70. Did the Governments of those three Colonies express any disinclination to expend money from the Colonial Treasury upon the defences?—They have always told us that they have not sufficient money to spare; these are, many of them, comparatively small communities, their revenues are limited, and they have heavy debts; the small province of Nova Scotia owes, I believe, nearly a million; they say they have no surplus revenue to expend upon training a militia.

71. Has it ever been proposed to them to reduce the British Imperial force in their provinces?—There has been practically a progressive reduction of Imperial forces in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland.

72. I think you say, that previous to the reductions in Canada, the Colonial ministers had consulted the Government of Canada in regard to those reductions, and stated their intention of making reductions; has any similar correspondence taken place between the Colonial Office and the Governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland?—The Governments of those Lower Provinces, as we call them, were informed in 1854, that owing to the exigencies of the Imperial service elsewhere, the forces must be reduced, and that if they thought what remained, insufficient, they must depend upon themselves.

73. Can you give us the respective population of Canada, on the one hand, and of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, on the other?—The population of Canada in 1858 was, 2,700,000; the aggregate population of the other North American provinces may be stated at about 700,000.

74. That being the proportion, there are, notwithstanding, 3,000 troops in Canada, and 2,300 in the other Colonies?—That is the fact, and I think it exceedingly natural; the Lower Provinces include the great harbour of Halifax, one of the most important positions in a strategical point of view in North America; Great Britain, with a view to national objects, thinks proper to keep a large garrison in the poor province of Nova Scotia.

75. Is not Quebec also most important in a strategical point of view?—Yes, and Quebec is adequately garrisoned.

76. Is not the great disproportion between the numbers in the Lower Provinces and the coast provided for by the fact, that Canadahas a militia force embodied, whereas

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whereas there is no local corps in the provinces?—I must answer that question to the best of my knowledge and judgment. I do not think that the existence of the Canadian militia has the smallest influence in determining the comparative force we keep in these provinces. We keep a large force at Halifax because it suits our own Imperial purposes. Nova Scotia does not want it, and would not pay towards it.

77. Will you state how many of these men are stationed at Halifax?—The whole force in Nova Scotia itself is in garrison at Halifax, amounting to 1,300 men; in the provinces of New Brunswick you have, in round numbers, 260 British soldiers; in the island of Newfoundland, rather less than 200. The whole remainder of the 1,350 is the garrison of the great naval station of Halifax.

78. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Was not that Despatch of Lord Grey's a general Despatch to all the Governors of all our North American Colonies?—It was addressed to Canada, but the principle of it was soon applied to the other provinces.

79. Mr. *Adderley.*] Can you state whether there is any intention of further reducing the British troops in North America?—Not that I have heard.

80. According to the best of your belief, we have now arrived at the extent of reduction intended by the Government?—I have no means of judging what the Government will do hereafter in the way of reduction; it is no part of my province to hear of it until the decision is taken. That question would be settled between the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Commander in Chief, and the Secretary of State for War.

81. You are not aware of that reduction to which you have alluded being still in progress?—I am not aware of its being still in progress.

82. Are all the British troops in North America now in garrison?—So far as I have explained in my previous answers, where I have mentioned the distribution.

83. In Quebec, Kingston, and Montreal?—Together with those troops in outposts, which I have mentioned in detail in my previous answers.

84. Mr. *Roebuck.*] There may be small outposts?—There are two or three small ones, which are now under orders to join the main body.

85. Mr. *Adderley.*] When Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland stated their inability to raise a militia, was any answer sent to that statement?—I do not remember any important answer of substance. I suppose the letters received some acknowledgment, but no practical measure has been adopted on the subject by the Imperial Government.

86. You say that the garrison is kept up at Halifax for imperial purposes. Will you state the nature of those imperial purposes?—I think that Halifax occupies a very commanding position in the part of the world where it is situated, and that probably Great Britain may be supposed to attach importance to its garrison there, for the same reasons that it does to its garrisons in the Mediterranean or at Bermuda, or any other places of general strategical importance.

87. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You mean that it is a very important naval station in that part of the world?—Yes.

88. Mr. *Adderley.*] Are there any British troops remaining in New Brunswick and Newfoundland?—At the last returns there were about 260 British troops in New Brunswick, and about 188 in Newfoundland.

89. Where are those troops stationed?—In New Brunswick, 140 are stationed at Fredericton, the capital, and 115 at St. John's, the great port of the province. I am giving the numbers by the last return which I possess, 1st January 1861.

90. That is the number left as a garrison at those two places?—Yes.

91. Can you tell as a matter of fact whether the present arrangements which you have just described for the defence of the British dependencies in America is an alteration from the original arrangement, or was the arrangement for the defence of those Colonies always the same as it is now?—I suppose it must have been different by an inspection of the number of troops at present in those Colonies; formerly they were very much larger than they are now.

92. To what time do you allude?—Beginning with 1858, the year of the return before the Committee, I have looked to the amount of force 5 years, 10 years, and 15 years previously, and if it is wished I will read over the numbers at those intervals.

93. I was

93. I was talking of the earlier arrangements between this country and the American Colonies of the last century. Were they the same as those you have now described?—I have not particularly looked into the nature of those arrangements; but there were two great wars on the continent of North America, and Great Britain supplied a large force for carrying on the operations, and the garrisons which have been mentioned before have, with greater or less strength, been maintained there at Imperial expense for a century.

94. Can you state the year in which British troops were first sent to America?—My opinion is that the practice of always having Imperial troops there must have originated with the great operations of war carried on by this country on the continent of North America; Wolfe's expedition to Canada, and afterwards the War of Independence.

95. Before that period the British dependencies of America maintained the cost of their own defences?—Yes.

96. Are you aware of their having maintained their defences, not only against native tribes, but also against the armies of the great powers of Europe?—The Colonies on the North American continent in those days, whether they were British or French, were very poor settlements compared with our modern Colonies, and they fought it out between themselves.

97. Did they only fight between themselves?—No; we had great expeditions from Europe which captured large French settlements, and led to very important results.

98. What do you mean by expeditions from Europe?—We took Louisburg, and we took Quebec.

99. Had the English colonial forces, before those actions, not fought with European armies by themselves, without any assistance from us?—I do not know what the question may allude to; there may have been such cases.

100. Did they also conduct wars against the Indian tribes by their own forces?—Yes, certainly.

101. Without any assistance from England?—Without any assistance from England.

102. And at a time when, as you say, they were very poor Colonies?—I said they were very poor compared with the great settlements which now exist as Colonies.

103. As compared with New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia?—As compared with the North American group of British Colonies, or as compared with the great Australian group of British Colonies.

104. At that time, I believe, England had commercial laws for her own benefit against those Colonies?—Yes, laws of trade which were supposed to be specially favourable to the home interest, as distinguished from the other.

105. Mr. *Fitzgerald.*] As a matter of fact, are the garrisons in which the bodies of troops now in Canada are quartered, connected by railway?—Yes.

106. As regards British Columbia, roads are intended to be beneficial in a Colony for military purposes as well as for the benefit of the settlers?—Yes, they will be beneficial for both.

107. In such Colonies as British Columbia, it would be difficult to collect the revenue of the Colony, unless easy access could be had to the distant parts of it?—Yes.

108. Were not troops sent out to British Columbia, on its first formation, in order to retain possession of it to this country, and these troops employed in making roads in the Colony rather for the benefit of Imperial authority than for the benefit of the settlers?—It was doubtless for the interest of this country that the Colony should prosper, and soon return a revenue of its own; and I have no doubt that any labour of the troops in constructing roads much promoted that end.

109. Mr. *Baxter.*] Is it the case that every man in the British North American Provinces under the age of 60 was enrolled as a militiaman?—That is so, but it is so nominal that it would be misleading to place any dependence upon a return based upon that fact.

110. Have any militia regiments ever been embodied in the Lower Provinces?—Yes. In some former answers which I gave about militia in the Lower Provinces, I was alluding to 1858, the year for which printed returns are on the table, but in the year 1860 they took steps to embody the militia. In Nova Scotia much spirit was displayed on the subject, and 2,350 men have been enrolled, and a

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sum of 2,000 *l.* was voted by the Legislature to encourage the movement. In New Brunswick, where also much spirit was shown, I see that in August 1860, 1,257 enrolled militiamen were inspected and well reported of. I ought to explain that they have no law in these North American Provinces for the regulation of a volunteer force; they therefore give the name of volunteer militia to those who voluntarily came forward to be trained as militiamen.

111. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Do you know whether there was any militia during the war with America, in the Lower Provinces?—I do not remember whether there was; the course of war did not run in that direction. In Canada, the militia distinguished themselves by their gallantry.

112. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] In recent years have the Imperial troops ever been used against the native Indians in Canada?—No occasion has arisen to call for such service.

113. Mr. *Marsh.*] With reference to British Columbia, you tell us that engineers were sent out in preference to troops of the line, because they might be useful in making roads; are you aware that the pay of engineers is much higher than that of the line?—It is.

114. Is that difference paid by the Colony, or by the Home Government?—The Home Government pays the ordinary pay of the engineers.

115. Common troops would have been as good as the others?—As a mere defence.

116. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Can you tell us whether the number of engineers sent out was more than 20?—Yes, a large body of men; as many as 150.

117. Mr. *Childers.*] You say that you do not know the political intentions of the Government as regards reduction; has any circular been sent to the North American Governments, suggesting any further reduction, or has their opinion been invited upon the subject?—No.

118. As far as the Colonial Office is concerned you are not aware that the Governors have been invited to express an opinion upon that?—I am not aware of it.

119. Mr. *Baxter.*] Has the Colonial Office ever proposed to the Government of Canada that the Canadian Rifle Regiment should be paid by the Colony?—No.

120. Mr. *Adderley.*] Has any alteration been made since the Despatch of Lord Grey of 1851, in the rate or mode of paying troops in North America?—Not since the date of Lord Grey's Despatch that I know of: those details do not come under my official cognizance but would be better known to the War Department. It may be right to mention that the Canadian Rifle Regiment has a rate of pay of its own; it is composed of old soldiers who have served a long time, and therefore are less likely to desert than an ordinary soldier of the line.

121. Does the whole of that payment come from the Imperial Treasury?—Yes.

122. Are there no Colonial allowances to troops in North America?—None.

123. Who pays for the barracks and the stores?—This country.

124. Entirely?—Yes.

125. And who pays for transport of the troops to and fro?—That is paid by this country.

126. *Chairman.*] Are the barracks in British North America the property of the Colonial Government or of the Imperial Government?—There was rather an elaborate arrangement on that subject; the Imperial Government handed over to the Province the great mass of its military lands and buildings, but there was a proviso that for certain selected barracks the Provincial Governments should bear the expense of repairs; a certain class of barracks was to be selected for that purpose, and designated by the letter B; for various reasons that selection has never been, in fact, made; so that we depend on the spirit, and not on the letter of the arrangement.

127. Mr. *Ellice.*] Did that transfer include the fortifications?—No, only the lands and buildings.

128. *Chairman.*] The fortifications are the property of the Imperial Governments as before?—Yes.

129. Mr. *Fortescue.*] It is the case, is it not, that the volunteer movement is in active progress in the Lower Provinces?—Actively in progress.

130. With great spirit?—With great spirit.

131. The

131. The volunteers being in fact drawn from the ranks of the enrolled militia?—Yes.

132. Do you recollect certain proposals that were made not long ago, upon the recommendation of Sir William Williams, to the Governments of the Lower Provinces, as to an increase of their means of defence?—When Sir Fenwick Williams assumed the command in North America, he thought he observed certain military positions at some of which new works or forts, and at others an increase of force in the Lower Provinces, would be advantageous; the War Office desired that those views might be communicated to the Provincial Governments, with an announcement that if they liked to bear one portion of the expense, this country would be willing to bear the other. They replied that they were much obliged for the suggestion, but that they were not disposed to build a new fort, and had not money enough to spare to pay for additional troops.

133. They declined to incur any expense for those purposes?—Yes.

134. Do you recollect that, some years ago, when the Lower Provinces appeared to be threatened by the United States, the Legislature of Nova Scotia voted a sum of 100,000 *l.* for their defences?—That was the case; they also offered to undertake their own defence in 1854, the time of the Crimean War.

135. *Chairman.*] I wish to direct your attention to the Australian group of Colonies, including Tasmania. Will you inform the Committee what was the aggregate amount of Imperial military expenditure, exclusive of transport to and from the Colony, in respect of those Colonies, during the year ending 31st March 1859?—£. 136,831.

136. What was the total amount of colonial contributions made by those Colonies during the same period?—£. 75,459.

137. What are the number of troops in those Colonies?—The whole number of troops in those Colonies was 1801.

138. Can you state the number of volunteers in those Colonies at the present time, according to your last return?—We have no actual return from New South Wales of the number of volunteers, but we have a despatch from the Governor saying that steps were being taken to organise an efficient volunteer force, both artillery and rifles. In Victoria there are 4,750 volunteers, and in South Australia 1,698; in Tasmania, 1,500. That makes a total of 7,948 volunteers in Australia.

139. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Excluding New South Wales?—Excluding New South Wales, from which we have got no return, and when that arrives, it will, of course, add to the total. From Queensland, also, we have as yet no separate return.

140. *Chairman.*] What are the names of the Australian Colonies?—New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Western Australia, and Tasmania.

141. There are no troops in Queensland, I believe?—A despatch has arrived within the last day or two, saying that a small party of troops has gone to Queensland; the government of Queensland have expressed their readiness to receive troops on the same footing as troops are received by the other Australian Colonies.

142. Are there any fortifications in Australia?—There are some batteries at Sydney, and they have lately been busy in erecting batteries in others of the Australian Colonies.

143. Are those barracks and fortifications in the Australian Colonies the property of the Colonial Government or of the Imperial Government?—They are the property of the Colonial Government, for they are built with their money.

144. Have you any other information to give in regard to the volunteers?—It may be right to mention that the Imperial Government sent them a supply of arms, some few of which were sent gratuitously, and the others were paid for by the colonists.

145. Is there any rule in the Government departments as to which of the Colonies shall pay for their arms?—I do not think that there is any fixed rule.

146. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Do they ever pay?—Yes, in Australia.

147. Mr. *Childers.*] Victoria, I believe, has sent already 100,000 *l.*?—In a single

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a single year it has voted for the purchase of arms nearly 50,000 *l.* The Australian Colonies are as liberal as they are rich.

148. *Chairman.*] Is there any other information you have to give in respect to the volunteers in the Australian Colonies?—No.

149. Arrangements were, I believe, commenced by Lord Grey, and have been carried out by other Governments, under which certain Colonies in Australia were ordered to contribute towards the cost of their defence. Can you give us any information as to those arrangements?—Yes, Lord Grey intimated to the Australian Colonies that only the very moderate force which they then possessed seemed to be the right number for the Imperial Government to furnish, and that if they wished to have more they would have to pay for them.

150. Can you give us the date of that despatch?—It was laid before Parliament on the 17th March 1851, in No. 123. Lord Grey's views on this subject were embodied in a series of despatches, the last of them, which recapitulated the previous despatches, was dated the 21st November 1849.

151. Am I right in supposing that the substance of those proposals made by Lord Grey was, that a certain number of troops would be sent to each of those Colonies, and no more at the imperial expense?—Yes.

152. And that if they required more, they must pay for them?—Yes.

153. Have those arrangements been acted upon?—Yes, they have been extensively acted upon, and, as the papers on the table show, large contributions are derived from the Australian Colonies.

154. Under those arrangements, I think there are four companies at Sydney?—Yes, four at Sydney.

155. How many at Melbourne?—The same number.

156. I observe that Tasmania was not included in that arrangement, and contributes nothing towards its defences. Are you aware from official information on what ground that is exempted from any contribution?—Tasmania has been exempted on account of the large proportion which still remains there of population of convict origin.

157. Are you aware of extra allowances to the troops in the Australian Colonies?—I am.

158. Do you know in what Colonies extra allowances are given to the troops?—In all the Australian Colonies. In Tasmania and Western Australia the Imperial Government pays the extra allowances; they consist of 5 *s.* a day to the officers, and a free ration to the troops; meaning by a free ration that the troops are fed without being subjected to a stoppage of 3 ½ *d.* a day, as is the case in this country.

159. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Does the 5 *s.* a day apply to all officers?—To all commissioned officers. In New South Wales, Victoria, and Southern Australia, the officers have likewise 5 *s.* a day: as regards rations, the usual stoppage is made by the Imperial Government; but it is repaid to the troops by the Colonial Treasury, which grants them extra pay besides.

160. How much besides?—In Victoria a soldier, in 1859, had his Imperial pay doubled; in New South Wales and Southern Australia he received 6 *d.* a day from the Colonial Government, including, however, the repayment to him of his stoppages. But those Colonial allowances may vary from time to time; I give the latest information.

161. *Chairman.*] Are you aware of any rule by which the question of whether troops shall or shall not have extra allowances is regulated, except the willingness of the Colonies, or otherwise, to give them?—I do not think that the granting of the extra allowances has depended merely upon the disposition of the Colonies; they have been granted on account of the living being unusually dear. The practice began, I believe, after the discovery of gold so much increased the cost of living. The proof of this is, that in two or three Australian Colonies the extra allowances are not paid by the Colonies, but by the Imperial Government.

162. I observe that not only in the Australian Colonies, but in Ceylon and Mauritius, the troops receive large extra allowances, whereas in others, the West Indies, for instance, they get none?—That is the case, except that there are some small allowances to officers in British Guiana.

163. Does that depend, in your opinion, entirely upon the question whether in one Colony living is dearer than in another?—Perhaps not, strictly; but still I think

I think that led to the practice. The practice of giving allowances in Ceylon arose from its being close to India, and in India the troops were allowed more pay, because it was thought a much dearer country.

164. Is Ceylon a dearer country than British Guiana?—I do not know how that is; but in British Guiana there are certain allowances to the troops, although they are small.

165. Very small, I believe?—Small allowances are granted to the officers at the expense of the Colonial Government.

166. Mr. *Roebuck*.] Is not that paid by the Colonial Government, when they are able to pay?—I think that the great resources of the large Australian Colonies have made them very liberal; but I do also think that those are Colonies in which both officers and men really need a higher rate of pay than elsewhere.

167. I wanted to know the circumstances out of which the pay by the Colonies originated; whether, when they were not called upon to pay, it was because they were very poor?—The Colonies that are poor are Colonies where living is not dear. What has made some of the Colonies very rich has made them also very dear to live in.

168. Is there not an extra allowance at the Cape?—That has been granted recently.

169. There is no gold discovery there?—No.

170. Is living dear at the Cape?—No. It may be right to add that the allowances are paid there by the Imperial and not by the Colonial Government; but the Imperial Government has pressed upon the Colony that it ought to pay, and by late advices we learn that the Legislature has voted 10,000*l*. for that purpose. The War Office, however, tell us that this is far from sufficient, and that the allowances really amount to upwards of 30,000*l*.

171. The Cape is a very flourishing Colony?—The Cape is a very flourishing Colony.

172. Now, I will direct your attention to Ceylon; is living there very dear?—The extra allowances at Ceylon have existed from a very early period indeed, and this island borrowed the custom from the neighbouring country of Hindostan, where, in those days, living was very dear.

173. *Chairman*.] Are you aware that Sir William Denison has addressed more than one despatch to the Imperial Government, with a view of impressing upon them the importance of carrying out further the arrangement made by Lord Grey, in reference to the Colonial contributions towards their own defences?—Yes; Sir William Denison has been an advocate of the plan of contributing some fixed proportion of the whole expense.

174. I think that those despatches have gone the length of advising the Secretary of State to extend the principle of Colonial contribution towards defences to the Colonies, generally?—I think he has expressed that opinion; the despatches are in the hands of the Committee.

175. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Can you state exactly what Lord Grey's scheme for the military system of the Australian Colonies was?—I think it has been correctly stated already; his plan was, that there should be a certain maximum force which should be there on Imperial account, and paid for out of Imperial funds; and that if the Colony wanted a greater number of troops they should pay for their charge.

176. Is not this the state of things, that at Sydney and Melbourne four companies of troops are allotted, under Lord Grey's scheme, to the Colonies for Imperial purposes, and that a certain number of troops are stationed there beyond that Imperial quota upon a different footing?—Yes.

177. As to the imperial quota of four companies, I believe it is the case that the Imperial Government pays the ordinary expenses, whilst the Colonial Government contributes the Colonial allowances?—Yes.

178. With respect to the troops beyond that number it is the case, is it not, that the Colonial Government pays both Imperial and Colonial expenses?—Yes.

179. The Government of New South Wales also pays the whole expense of a company of Artillery?—It has paid the whole expense of a company of Artillery, until a very recent date, when that company has been sent for service to another Colony.

180. A further part of the arrangement, I believe, has reference to the forts

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and barracks, and military buildings?—The Colonies bear the whole expense of such works and buildings.

181. The existing works were handed over, were they not, to the Colony, and the Colony was in future to provide for their repair, and for the construction of new ones?—Yes.

182. Can you state more fully than you did just now, the nature of Sir William Denison's proposal with respect to the Australian Colonies?—What struck me as the leading feature of his view is, that they should bear a fixed proportion of the expense, which he took, for clearness' sake, at one-half.

183. Was not the idea of an equal division of the expenditure rather essential to his scheme, with respect to the Australian Colonies?—I think it was essential that it should be a fixed proportion.

184. Mr. *Roebuck*.] Are not these the words of his despatch: "The principle suggested by me, in former despatches, that the expense of the movement and maintenance of the troops, required for the defence of the Colony should be shared equally between the mother country and the Colony, appears to me to be one which would meet every difficulty, and obviate every chance of disagreement between the Colony and the mother country"?—That is Sir William Denison's proposal, stated on his own authority.

185. Mr. *Fortescue*.] I think that in the expenditure which, according to that scheme, was to be halved between the mother country and the Colony, the transport of troops was to be included?—I believe he included everything spent on the troops employed in the Colony.

186. Did not Sir William Denison point to other cases in the Australian Colonies, in which the principle of half-and-half contribution between the mother country and the Colony had been adopted with success and satisfaction?—Yes.

187. Such, for instance, as the mail postal service?—Yes.

188. Are you aware that another service is likely soon to be conducted in Australia upon the same principle, the division of expenses, namely, the Naval Survey of the coast of Australia?—Yes.

189. You said, in answer to a former question, that Queensland had expressed her readiness to receive a small body of troops upon the same terms as the other Colonies; is it not the fact that she has repeatedly asked for a body of troops, although a very small body?—That is true. And they said that in receiving the troops they would cheerfully pay the allowances paid by the other Colonies.

190. Are you aware that in Queensland the volunteer spirit is very active?—Yes; I see that such is reported to be the case.

191. You are aware, probably, that the Government of Queensland has asked for this small body, I think one company, of troops for Sydney, to form a nucleus, as it were, of a military force, and to assist in the training of her Volunteers?—Yes.

192. Are you aware that Queensland provides, at her own expense, a police force for internal purposes?—Yes.

193. Called the Native Border Police?—Yes.

194. For the purpose of protecting her settlers against the aborigines?—Yes.

195. Mr. *Marsh*.] Do you know the cost of the police force in Queensland?—I do not exactly.

196. Is it about 15,000*l*. a year?—I find it reported at as much as 17,000*l*.

197. Is there anything of the sort on a similar scale in New South Wales?—There is a police force there.

198. You have been asked with reference to barracks and other buildings in the Australian Colonies; are you aware of the arrangements by which the Government transferred the old barracks in Sydney, upon condition that they built them entirely new?—Yes.

199. And that that condition was fulfilled?—Yes.

200. Are all the barracks in New South Wales situated at Sydney?—I have not those details before me.

201. Of course there is a large seaboard to be protected?—Yes, there is an extensive seaboard.

202. Your opinion is, that extra pay was allowed in consequence of the high price of living there?—Yes.

203. Would

203. Would that be felt by a soldier who is provided at the public expense with lodging, rations, and clothing?—I suppose no soldier is content with his rations; but it would not affect him so much as it would a man who was dependent for everything upon his own resources.

204. Do you not think that the real reason is, that labour is in such request that it would be hard upon them to be paid at a much lower rate than others around them?—That consideration also must have weighed. The necessity of checking desertion must have weighed materially in the question of extra allowances.

205. Mr. *Childers.*] When Lord Grey made his proposals with respect to the force to be maintained in Australia at the Imperial expense, the gold fields had not been discovered?—They had not.

206. Has any change been made since their discovery?—A larger number of troops are paid now at Imperial expense than was contemplated when Lord Grey wrote his despatch in 1849.

207. Have any other changes been made in that arrangement?—I do not know.

208. Do you remember the time when the Colony of Victoria, where the largest number of troops is stationed, paid the entire expense of those troops?—There was a period when they paid all the expenses.

209. They also paid, I believe, the expense of the staff?—Yes.

210. Can you tell the circumstances under which that arrangement began, and how it ceased?—If I remember right, it was when the head-quarter staff came into the Colony of Victoria that the Imperial Government found the Colonial Government willing to consent to pay the whole expense of the staff, although its services must, in fact, have extended over the whole of the Australian Colonies.

211. It was more convenient, was it not, for Imperial purposes that they should be stationed at Melbourne, which might be considered the centre of the whole group, and where there was the greater population?—It was considered more convenient that the head-quarter staff should be there.

212. The head-quarter staff had been at Sydney, where its expense had been borne by the Imperial Government. They then induced the Colony to receive them at Melbourne, and made an arrangement under which the Colony bore the expense of the head-quarter staff?—They made such an arrangement.

213. And, at the same time, induced the Colony to bear the entire military expenditure?—Victoria agreed to pay the whole military expenditure at that time.

214. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you recollect the circumstances under which the troops were sent to Melbourne?—They were sent for in connexion with the riots at the Gold Fields.

215. For the purpose of suppressing internal disturbances?—Yes.

216. And it was thought right; and they were willing to incur the whole expenses of every kind?—That was the reason on which the measure was justified.

217. Are you not aware that those exceptional circumstances having ceased, the Colony of Victoria has of late been brought within Lord Grey's arrangement?—Yes, and put upon the same footing as regards the troops, but not until quite recently so far as regards the head-quarter staff.

218. Mr. *Childers.*] Lord Grey's proposition being, that a certain number of troops should be, under any circumstances, paid for by the Imperial Government, what justified the Colonial Office in asking the Colony to bear the entire cost?—I might do injustice to the case if I were to give an answer upon matters which are beyond my province and authority.

219. At the present time, Lord Grey's proposition, varied as to numbers, is in force?—Yes.

220. How has the money contributed by the Colonies been paid over?—In the Army Estimates, and in papers laid before Parliament, called "Naval and Military Accounts," I have from time to time seen entries, that large contributions are brought to public credit.

221. Do you think that the whole of the contributions have been so brought to credit?—That is a question of finance, to which it is not my business to attend.

222. Have not all the arrangements between the Colonies and the Home

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Government, as to bringing those monies to account, passed through the Colonial Office?—Not the details of the mode of transferring the money from one account to the other. If a Governor, for instance, is wished by the Treasury to pay over certain money to the Treasury-chest, it would be the place of the Colonial Office to be the channel for sending out that order; but as to how the money is brought to account in this country, that is a thing which is altogether beyond our knowledge.

223. Did any instructions go from the Colonial Office to the Governors how they should pay these contributions?—I am not at this moment able to say.

224. Could you, if necessary, produce the despatches?—Yes.

225. Mr. *Roebuck*.] You could tell us the actual sum contributed by the Colony, and the date at which it was contributed?—Yes.

226. Mr. *Childers*.] And the channel through which it was brought to account?—I must here request the Committee to attend to a distinction; possibly they may wish to see that this money has been brought to public credit here; if that is their desire, it would be far better to put the question to some gentleman of the Financial Departments; it lies beyond our business, and the information must be sought from the Treasury or the War Department.

227. Mr. *Roebuck*.] Certain of the steps come under your cognizance?—We should forward any letter addressed to us by the Treasury or the War Office.

228. The actual sum contributed by the Colony comes to your knowledge?—We could give that fact from the Appropriation Acts.

229. You tell the Treasury that such a sum is contributed by the Colony?—The Treasury receives the information.

230. All those steps are within your cognizance, and can be communicated to us by you?—Yes.

231. Mr. *Childers*.] Are you confident that the contributions from the Colonies are paid into the Commissariat chest there, or are they paid direct to the military?—I cannot say.

232. Do you remember the circumstances out of which the first objection of the Colony to bear its entire military expenditure arose?—No, I do not.

233. After the Colony had consented to pay the Imperial and Colonial expenses of the troops, and of the entire staff, do you know of a despatch being sent from the Colonial Office, calling upon the Colony to bear the expense of the transport?—If there be such a despatch, I can produce it; the papers will speak for themselves.

234. It is not within your recollection, that the Colony objected to the conduct of the Home Government in attempting to extort this additional charge?—The details of the correspondence to which these questions refer do not fall within my cognizance.

235. Has any proposition been made by any of the other Governors except Sir William Denison, as to the division of the expenditure?—Other Governors have applied for troops, and said that they are willing to receive them on the same terms as New South Wales.

236. Sir William Denison has been the Governor of the second Colony in importance, so far as military expenditure is concerned?—He has been the Governor of the great Colony of New South Wales.

237. Did not Sir Henry Barkly and the previous Governors of Victoria make recommendations as to the standing arrangement for the division of the military expenditure between the Home Government and the Colony?—If they have made such recommendations, they can be produced.

238. You have no recollection of them?—No.

239. Has any recommendation come from the Colony for reducing the military expenses by the substitution of the artillery forces for troops of the line?—Not to my knowledge, but there is no objection to produce any despatches which it may be wished to see.

240. Has it been suggested in the Colony that the cost might be reduced, by leaving to the Colony the whole of its internal defence, but sending a certain number of Artillery for defence against external enemies?—I will endeavour to ascertain whether there is any such proposition.

241. Has not a Commission been appointed in Victoria, comprising military and naval officers, to prepare complete plans for the defence of the Colony?—Yes.

242. Have

242. Have they made valuable reports?—Yes; they have reached the Colonial Office, and have been communicated to the War Office.

243. Has any decisions been arrived at by the War Office upon them?—I have not seen any.

244. Did not that Commission recommend steps which would save a large expense?—I did not study the recommendations, because they involved chiefly questions of a purely military character, and were referred to the War Office.

245. Then what time were those reports received?—In 1859 and in 1860. A collection of papers is in course of being made in the Colonial Office, containing all the latest Despatches from the Governors, and, as soon as ready, they will be placed before the Committee.

246 Is not the general character of the recommendation of that Commission, that the Colony of Victoria is disposed to incur a large expense towards its defences?—Undoubtedly.

247. Have they not sent over already 100,000 *l.* for the purchase of arms?—They have sent very large sums; I do not know the aggregate amount, but in one year they voted a sum of more than 48,000 *l.* for this purpose.

248. And have they not undertaken the whole of the works?—Yes.

249. Was it not one of their suggestions to substitute a small force of artillery for troops of the line?—I dare say that is a part of their recommendations.

250. Would not such a substitution be economical to the Home Government?—That is a military question upon which I am not competent to speak.

251. Do you remember the date when the volunteer force commenced to be raised in Victoria; was it not about the year 1853?—I do not know as to Victoria; there was a small volunteer force in New South Wales, in 1854.

252. Many years before the subject was brought to bear in this country?—Yes.

253. Has not that force been increased from 1,000 to 5,000 men?—The existing volunteer movement is quite a new one.

254. Has not the object of the creation of that force been gradually to supply the internal protection for the Colony from Colonial sources?—I cannot interpret the motives and objects of the policy of the Colonial Government.

255. Have you not had despatches on the subject?—Yes, but I have not seen it stated in those despatches, that they intended to dispense with Imperial troops.

256. Do you know anything of the police force?—There is an efficient police force.

257. Is it not organised strictly upon military principles?—I believe it is very much like the Irish Constabulary.

258. Is it not the case, that the police form two regiments of military?—They are well armed and trained men.

259. And are trained in the same manner as soldiers?—So I understand.

260. So that, in addition to the number of soldiers given in returns, there is a much larger force ready to hand?—There is.

261. The entire expense of which force has been defrayed by the Colony?—Yes.

262. Do you see any difficulty in extending that system to other Colonies?—I do not know of any difficulty.

263. Mr. *Fitzgerald.*] Has the establishment of the Volunteer Riflemen been based very much upon the model of the Canadian Rifle Corps?—The Canadian Rifle Corps is virtually a regiment of the line.

264. And for very much the same objects?—The Australian Volunteers are for the defence of the country by the resident population.

265. Mr. *Childers.*] In fact, then, the proportion in which the military expenditure for the defence of the Colony is divided between the Imperial and the Colonial Treasury ought to be much greater on the Colonial side than is shown in your return?—Undoubtedly, if you include the police.

266. In your account of the expenditure of the local force, you only put down the Volunteers at 3,000 *l.*?—We put down the fact for the year in which the return is made.

267. You do not count in that the expenditure, amounting to something like 100,000 *l.* recently incurred?—No, because that is of later date.

268. Can you put in a return of a later date?—Yes, we are ready to produce the returns for any later period to which we possess them.

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269. I think you say the Colonial allowance was 5 *s.* a day to every officer?—Yes.

270. And that that is fixed by the Colony?—I did not say so; I do not know who fixed it.

271. Is it not the fact that they grant a lump sum, and pay it into the Commissariat?—That may be the *modus operandi*.

272. Is it not a resolution in the Appropriation Acts that a fixed sum shall be paid to the officer commanding, to be appropriated as Her Majesty may direct?—I believe so.

273. Is that appropriation by Her Majesty in any way shown in the Imperial military accounts?—I know nothing about the Army Estimates.

274. Is not the Colonial Office consulted with reference to that part of the Army Estimates which relates to the Colonies?—Not that I am aware of; the duty of the Colonial Office is to keep the War Office informed of all reports on military subjects received from the Governors; and the duty of the War Office is to prepare the Estimates.

275. If the Colonial Appropriation Act appropriated a sum to be paid over to Her Majesty, and to be distributed among the troops, would it not be the duty of the Governor to report that to the Colonial Office, and the duty of the Colonial Office to communicate it to the War Office?—I believe it would, but I do not suppose that this is the only or the principal channel through which the facts would come within the knowledge of the War Office; if liberal allowances are granted in a particular Colony to the Queen's troops, I take for granted that the General commanding would know the fact, and that he would report a circumstance so nearly affecting the welfare of the soldiers under his authority.

276. For the payment of a sum in gross, to be appropriated, the Colonial Office is in no way responsible?—My opinion is that the Colonial Office is in no way responsible for the custody, transfer, or accounts of public money, and it is important that this should be borne in mind in the questions which are put.

277. I want to know who is responsible for the arrangement under which the Imperial Government receives a contribution in gross from a Colony, if the Colonial Office knows nothing about it, and it does not appear in the Army Estimates?—That department is responsible to which the information is reported for the purpose of being acted upon. The Colonial Office of course receives regularly all important intelligence, such as the Appropriation Acts, for instance, of the Legislature, but unless its attention was especially drawn to the item, I do not know that it follows that the Colonial Office would search those Acts to see whether it should inform the War Department that certain troops received a benefit from it.

278. Was not that arrangement one which would receive consideration in the first instance from the Colonial Office?—Yes, but the parties most immediately interested are the Military Department. They attend to all that concerns the pay of the troops.

279. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is it not the case that the sum annually voted by the Parliament of Victoria as a contribution towards the expense of the troops is paid over by four quarterly payments to the military authorities on the spot, and not to the Government?—I believe it to be paid into what is called the Treasury Chest.

280. Are you not aware that those payments are made quarterly to the Military Authorities, that is, to the Commander in Chief on the spot?—My impression is that it is paid into the Treasury Chest.

281. Mr. *Childers.*] Sir William Denison, I think, recommended that the military expenditure should be equally divided between the Colonial and Home Governments?—He did.

282. Whom did he recommend should be responsible for fixing the expenditure necessary?—I do not see that his Despatch provides for that necessary work, and the truth is, that if we decided at this moment to divide the expense of the troops between the mother country and the Colonies, there would come a task of immense difficulty which would only be disposed of after discussion, and by compromise: the task of settling what items should compose the expenditure.

283. Did Sir William Denison attempt to solve that?—No, he only proposed that all the expenses should be divided.

284. Supposing the Colonists think that they ought to have 1,000 men, and the Home Government consider that 500 or 5,000 is the proper number, who would be the judges?—Sir William Denison proposed that there should be a certain maximum limit of force within which the money should be equally divided, but that if the Imperial Government, for any purpose of its own, thought proper to exceed that limit, the Colonists should not be liable to contribute towards the expenses of the force in excess.

285. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Every arrangement with respect to the amount of money to be paid, is made between the Colony and the Government?—Yes.

286. Every information that the Governor receives from the Colonial Legislature, he sends to the Colonial Office?—He sends the Appropriation Act, and every legislative proceeding.

287. So that you have been made cognisant of every step in the progress of those arrangements?—We know the result.

288. And therefore you can communicate it to this Committee?—Of course we can produce the Appropriation Acts, and I will produce those parts which contain military grants.

289. In Sir William Denison's contemplated scheme for Colonial defence, did he not include the consideration of the naval defences?—He touched upon that topic.

290. Was anything done with regard to that?—The Admiralty wrote a very elaborate letter, which is now printed for the House of Commons, in which they explained that they thought that the naval defences could not be made the subject of local contribution. If you have local contribution, you must have local claims, but a ship is an erratic body, and cannot with advantage be confined to a single spot, or prevented from combining with others. You cannot localize a navy. But although our Admiralty take the general view I have just mentioned, the Colony of Victoria, which is capable of carrying into effect its own views, thought that it would like to have an armed steamer for its own service; accordingly there is an armed steamer called the "Victoria," which is maintained at the charge of the Colony.

291. Is that ship officered by English officers?—Not as naval officers on full pay.

292. They are not Queen's officers?—They are not Queen's officers.

293. So far as their allowance is concerned, England has nothing to do with it?—England has nothing to do with it.

294. Mr. *Childers.*] As a matter of fact, that steamer was sent to New Zealand, I believe, and on Imperial duty there for a good many months?—That was done owing to the liberality and patriotism of the Colony of Victoria, which spontaneously put that steamer at the disposal of the Governor.

295. Has not the Colony of Victoria given extra pay to the Queen's ships?—Yes.

296. Then as far as regards the naval expenses, they do bear a proportion?—They grant an extra sum: in my previous answer I meant that they did not contribute anything towards the Imperial expenses of the navy.

297. Besides providing that steamer, you say that they contribute some portion of the expenditure upon the naval force in that Colony?—They grant some extra allowances.

298. Can you supply the Committee with the amount?—I will endeavour to learn what the allowances are; they are grants made by the liberality of the Colony in favour of these men; but whatever they are, they are not grants in abatement of the cost to this country of ships of war.

299. The expense of the pay of our officers is not any diminution of the expense borne by this country?—The remark alludes, I presume, to the extra pay of our military officers. It is true; and yet, if the Colonial Government did not grant it this Government must grant it.

300. If we do not do that with regard to the navy, the navy is worse off than the army?—That is so.

301. Is it not the fact, that in consequence of the low pay of the navy on the Australian coast, desertions were very numerous?—I believe so.

302. Mr. *Baxter.*] Was not the Government of Victoria at one time willing to bear the entire military expenditure, if the expense of transport was borne by the mother country?—Yes.

303. Was that offer refused by the Colonial Office?—I cannot say from memory how the case stood; no such offer was refused certainly.

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304. Can you put in the Despatches with reference to that subject?—Yes; the whole of the late Despatches are in the course of preparation, and I feel a reluctance to give answers upon these subjects when the Committee will soon have more accurate information than can be supplied to it from memory.

305. It appears that the Imperial expenditure for Victoria, in the year ending 31st March 1857, was about 47,000*l.*?—Yes, that is so.

306. Had this proposition of the Victoria Government been accepted, would not the greater proportion of that sum have been saved to this country?—I have not those Despatches sufficiently within my recollection to undertake to expound them; the Despatches themselves will be in the hands of the Committee in a short time.

307. Has any similar proposition been made by the Government of New South Wales?—None.

308. Can you say why Tasmania contributes nothing towards its own military expenditure?—Because a large number of convicts have been introduced into that Colony by the mother country, and many of them still remain; and therefore it was thought right that the mother country should defray the necessary military expenses.

309. How many convicts still remain there?—I cannot state accurately from memory; there are many thousands still; but it must be remembered that there are several times as many who have been convicts. The number of actual convicts is not the proper index of the extent of the population of convict origin.

310. Has the Colony of Tasmania been asked and refused to contribute any portion of the expenses?—No, it has not been asked.

311. You say that the garrison of Halifax is maintained there for Imperial purposes; would you say the same of the troops maintained by us in Australia?—I should say, within certain limits, that the troops are kept there for Imperial purposes. Those Colonies are part of the Empire, and it may reasonably be thought that the duty of the mother country is to provide for their defence against foreign countries.

312. Do you consider that Sydney is a port in Australia in the same light as Halifax, regarding defences on the part of the mother country?—I think that there are ports of the greatest possible importance in Australia, which it is the duty of this country to defend against foreign enemies if they present themselves; but I do not think that there happens to be a port occupying the sort of commanding position with reference to other countries which is occupied by Halifax.

313. Mr. *Childers*.] Is not Sydney the head-quarters of the naval station?—Yes.

314. Are there not Imperial stores there?—Yes.

315. Mr. *Adderley*.] Was the Colonial allowance in New South Wales, the first cause of extra pay being made to Imperial troops in Tasmania?—I cannot say from memory in which of these Colonies the practice originated.

316. Do you recollect a decision being come to in the Colonial Office, that extra pay ought not to be continued in Tasmania and New Zealand, which decision could not be carried out, because extra allowances were made in other parts of Australia?—The existence of the allowances in some of the other Australian Colonies would render it difficult to discontinue them.

317. Do you recollect that an attempt was made to discontinue the allowance, which was unsuccessful in consequence of the allowance being made in the other Australian Colonies?—I suppose the Governor represented that it was an inconsistency, and would be felt as a hardship.

318. Are you aware of any complaint being made by troops in other Colonies of their not getting an extra pay equal to that which was received in Colonies where allowances were made?—It has not come within my knowledge; that would be known if it be the fact to the Military Department.

319. Can you state when Lord Grey laid down the rule of four companies being the maximum for each Colony, on what ground that limit was laid down?—He stated various reasons why he thought that a small force ought to be sufficient for their wants.

320. Was it not a rough calculation which fixed the same limit for every Colony?—He took those which he found at Sydney as the number which happened to be there at the time, and he said that this country should be willing to pay for them. The Despatch is before the House of Commons.

321. Was

321. Was any opinion taken in the Colony itself as to the number of troops which would be required?—I find no inquiry of that sort among the Despatches laid before the House of Commons.

322. Large allowances are made in Ceylon, are there not?—There are.

323. Of course, in India, there is nothing of the kind?—There they have double pay. The expenses of the troops in India are paid by the Indian Government.

324. If Ceylon happened to be joined to India, probably it would partake of the same liability?—I suppose so.

325. Great efforts were made in the Colonies to raise a volunteer force subsequent to Lord Grey's letter?—Yes.

326. Is there any peculiarity in Australia which would account for greater efforts being made there than in all other Colonies?—I think that the existence of the Gold Fields gave them one great motive for wishing to have an adequate force for preserving order. I think also, that the very large population in a flourishing condition makes it easier for them to enter with spirit into the volunteer movements of the times.

327. You say that Western Australia does not pay the cost of troops, because it receives our convicts. Does not the first cost of the troops date from the time of England undertaking the whole defence of any Colony?—In Australia, yes.

328. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Would you not say that Lord Grey's view in proposing his arrangement to the Australian Colonies was something of this kind, that whilst these Colonies from their situation were not in his opinion exposed to any great danger from foreign enemies, yet that he thought the Governor of an important Imperial Colony should not be left entirely without the presence of a very small body of troops to act as the Governor's guard, and as a symbol of Imperial authority?—I think that this would have been a very reasonable view to go upon, and I dare say that it may have influenced Lord Grey, but I feel diffident of undertaking to interpret Lord Grey's opinions. His Lordship's own Despatch is in print, and is before the House of Commons.

329. Do you not recollect that Lord Grey uses an expression to this effect, in relation to the small Imperial quota which he was ready to supply "as a guard for the Governor"?—That expression shows that such was his view.

330. With reference to Sir William Denison's plan, do you recollect these words in Lord Stanley's Despatch, in answer to Sir William Denison's first Despatch on the subject: "It would seem difficult to adopt this rule unless your own further proposal were incorporated with it, that the Colony should possess, through the Vote of its Legislature, the responsibility of determining the amount of force which should be maintained in it, whether in peace or in war. Her Majesty's Government do not, as at present advised, see in what manner this suggestion could be adopted without compromising that independent action of the central authority of the empire. The Executive in this country, having full information as to its available force, and as to the different calls on that force in the various portions of the empire, can alone be in a position to decide what force is required, and what force can be spared for purposes of defence against foreign aggression on each particular point. If every Colony were to assert a voice in this matter, as on your proposal it would have to do, I do not see in what manner the general defensive arrangements of the empire could be conducted." Do you recollect also that Sir William Denison afterwards explained that he did not mean to acquire for the Colony the right of fixing the number of troops to be supplied by the mother country, but that he was quite willing to allow that right to the Imperial Government?—I recollect it perfectly. He met the difficulty by suggesting that there should be a certain maximum amount within which the Colony should be bound to contribute; that it should be in the discretion of the Imperial Government to send a greater or less number of troops, but that if they sent a greater number the Imperial Government should pay the whole cost of the surplus number.

331. Was not the main obstacle in the way of accepting Sir William Denison's proposal, the supposition that his proposal intended to bind the mother country to the supply of a certain number of troops?—Yes.

332. Sir William Denison has since explained that he did not mean to impose any such obligation upon the mother country?—He has.

333. Are you aware that a proposal was lately made to the Colony of Queens-

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land, giving them their choice whether they would have a very small body of Queen's troops detached from Sydney; or whether they would prefer that a local corps should be raised for Queensland purposes?—I am aware that the choice was offered.

334. Do you recollect the nature of the answer made by Sir G. Bowen, and the Executive Council?—They strongly deprecated the formation of a local force; they said that in their opinion great advantages accrued from the presence of Imperial troops, soldiers who shared all the adventures and vicissitudes of the British army, and who were ready to meet the Queen's enemies wherever they might appear. They thought that, independently of the military advantages, there were many political benefits to be derived from the sort of communication which the visit of troops of this kind keeps up with the mother country.

335. Mr. *Adderley.*] But you say that these troops were required as the Governor's guards, against whom?—I think that that word is used in the very common sense, not of a guard from any impending danger, but one given as a mark of honour and respect. I think that the presence of a small body of British troops at the seat of Government is viewed as an emblem of the connection with the mother country.

336. Mr. *Fitzgerald.*] Have any representations ever been made to the Colonial Office from persons at home, interested in the trade of Australia, urging that a sufficient military force should be stationed there for their protection?—It has not fallen under my notice.

337. Mr. *Childers.*] Would you be inclined to say that the guard for the Governor, spoken of by Lord Grey, was in the nature of a guard of honour, such as is supplied in this country at the residence of the Queen?—I think, as I said before, that it was meant partly as a mark of honour to the Governor, but that it was also considered that the presence of these Imperial troops was an emblem of the connection with the mother country, and of the interest which the parent state still takes in the Colony.

338. Do you think that the Colonists of New South Wales, or of Victoria, would look upon the presence of a guard at the residence of the Governor with any feelings different to those with which people look upon the guard at the residence of the Queen in this country?—I have no doubt that they always look upon the soldiers there as their friends.

339. Mr. *Fitzgerald.*] Did not the volunteers of Melbourne, during the New Zealand War, do all the military duty in the Colonies?—Yes.

340. *Chairman.*] I hold in my hand a minute of Sir William Denison's on the organization of the military force required for the defence of the Australian Colonies, enclosed in a Despatch from him, dated Sydney, 22d June 1860; "This regiment when once organized might be recruited in the Colony, and its strength might be increased or diminished according to the state of the political relations of the Empire without any difficulty either by adding to, or diminishing the number of men in such Company, or by increasing or reducing the number of companies; an arrangement such as this might be made to embrace the whole of the Australian Colonies; a regiment of Australian rifles consisting of two battalions would furnish a force which when supplemented with a few companies of Artillery, would be sufficient for the defence of all the Australian Colonies; for when the railroads now in contemplation are completed, facilities will be afforded for concentrating a very large proportion of the force either at Melbourne or Sydney, as may be required, and the means of moving men from Melbourne to Tasmania, or elsewhere, are always in readiness. The estimates appended to this minute will give a correct idea of the cost of a single battalion of such a regiment, and of the expense of a militia force of the same strength." Will you put in, if you please, those estimates which are not comprised in this Despatch?—Certainly.

341. Then he says: "From this it would appear that the actual cost of a battalion of eight companies of 80 men, including the existing Colonial allowance to officers and men, would be 38,925*l.* per annum?"—The Imperial Government would pay 14,291*l.*, leaving, in round numbers, 24,500*l.* to be provided by the Colony." I take it that the estimates alluded to in the footnote give the details of the gross estimates?—It will be found that such is the case.

342. Mr. *Childers.*] Have the other Australian Governors been consulted upon this proposition of Sir William Denison's?—Not that I am aware of. If

the

the proposition had been accepted, it would have been necessary to consult the other Australian Governors, in case the plan was extended beyond New South Wales.

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343. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that an attempt has been made, within the last two or three years, in Victoria, to recruit a Victoria contingent of 400 men, to be added to the strength of the 14th Regiment, and of the success which the experiment met with?—Such an experiment was made in 1859. An attempt was made to raise, for local service, 300 men, for four companies, to be attached to the regiment at the time in garrison at Victoria, but it was found difficult to recruit; only 123 effective men were enlisted; and as they went away with the 40th Regiment to New Zealand, the Imperial Government adopted them as British soldiers, and relieved the Colony from any further expense on their account.

344. I think Sir Henry Barkly reports that the experiment has been in effect a failure?—Yes; it was considered to have failed. The high rate of wages in Australia must make it very difficult to recruit.

Lunæ, 22° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Baring.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Mills.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Childers.	General Peel.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

T. F. Elliot, Esq., called in; and further Examined.

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345. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you wish to add to your evidence some facts with reference to the volunteer force in British North America?—Since I was last before the Committee, a further report has arrived from New Brunswick; I, therefore, beg to read an amended account of the numbers of volunteer militia in North America in 1860: Canada, 4,456; Nova Scotia, 2,350; New Brunswick, 1,850; Newfoundland, 350; Prince Edward Island, 1,000; making a total of 10,006.

346. Are they embodied?—Those that I now mention are embodied and trained. The new report from New Brunswick mentions that 11 are companies of artillery, trained to light gun drill, and that there are about 30 companies of riflemen, consisting of not less than 1,400 trained to the use of the weapon. England furnished 3,000 rifles and 140,000 rounds of ammunition to the province of New Brunswick; to Nova Scotia also, 3,000 rifles; none to Canada.

347. Mr. *Adderley.*] What do you say as to the artillery?—I do not find a record of the gift of any artillery to any of those provinces.

348. *Chairman.*] Do you wish to add something to your evidence with reference to the volunteer force of the Australian Colonies?—Yes; from that group of Colonies also further information has come to hand since I was last before the Committee. I mentioned that a volunteer corps was expected to be formed in New South Wales, and we now know that it has been formed; I propose, therefore, to read an amended return of volunteers in Australia. New South Wales, 1,696; Victoria, 4,750; South Australia, 1,538; and Tasmania, 1,500; total 9,484. Those are armed and trained volunteers. There has been a small reduction in the return from South Australia.

349. Are the arms, in the case of the Australian Colonies, provided by the Imperial Government?—In some cases arms have been given, in others they have been paid for by the Colonies. They have altogether had extensive supplies of arms from this country; and some of the Colonies, such as Victoria, have voted large sums of money for their purchase.

350. Now I will direct your attention to New Zealand. What was the total amount of Imperial military expenditure in respect of the Colony of New Zealand, for the year ending 31st March 1859?—£. 104,077.

351. The Colony contributed nothing, I think, to its defence?—Nothing.

352. And never has contributed anything?—It has never yet contributed anything.

353. That is exclusive of the cost of transport to and from the Colony?—Yes.

354. What was the number of troops of all arms, including infantry, artillery, engineers, and staff, during that period?—One thousand three hundred and ninety-seven.

355. Have you any returns, in your department, of any costs incurred either by the Federal Government of New Zealand, or either of the provincial governments

ments in respect of volunteers?—No, we have not; we know that volunteers have been formed, and of course have cost the provinces some money, but we have no details.

356. You have no official information with regard to that?—We have no official information upon that subject. I may, perhaps, be permitted to take this opportunity of saying that we have received a report that a regiment of militia has been formed and embodied in Auckland, and the number armed amounts to 1,515. We have not any return that I can find of the number of volunteers at Taranaki; of course, the Committee are aware that volunteers exist there, and have distinguished themselves in the field.

357. Can you give us any cost actually incurred in any of the provinces in New Zealand, in respect of either militia or volunteers?—I am not aware of any.

358. Sir *George Grey*.] You have not got the return of the actual cost incurred, but you have no doubt, I suppose, that some cost has been incurred by the Local Government in respect of the militia and volunteers?—I do not doubt it.

359. What you mean is that you have no official return of the actual amount so incurred?—That is what I mean.

360. *Chairman*.] Can you give the Committee any information with respect to the distribution of Imperial troops in the Colony of New Zealand for the period to which this last return relates?—I will give the distribution on the 1st January 1859; Auckland, 392; Taranaki, 210; Wellington, 111; Wanganui, 189; Napier, 149: the total is 1,051. This return is of rank and file, and differs therefore slightly from the Committee's other return, which includes staff, and officers of all ranks.

361. What fortifications of any importance, if any, are there in New Zealand?—I do not know of any fortifications of importance.

362. In answer to my previous question you were going to give some further information, with regard to the number and distribution of troops in other years; perhaps you will give the information now?—Yes; the distribution on the next 1st January, namely, that of 1860, so nearly agrees with the one of 1859, that perhaps I need hardly trouble the Committee by reading it over.

363. Mr. *Adderley*.] Was the number the same?—The number was the same as in 1859, and the distribution almost the same. The latest return that I have seen was dated August 1860; at that time hostilities had commenced in New Zealand; the distribution, therefore, is very different, and the amount of force had largely increased. It is as follows: "Auckland, 201; Taranaki, 1,490; Wellington, 22; Wanganui, 187; and Napier, 115.

364. *Chairman*.] Can you say what the regiment was that was sent out as a reinforcement on the occasion of the late war, and from what quarter of the world it was taken?—From the Australian colonies.

365. Sir *George Grey*.] Does the increase which you have now referred to represent the addition of one regiment?—It does.

366. *Chairman*.] Then there was another regiment, was there not, which was brought to New Zealand?—Since that time, other regiments have been brought to New Zealand; one, I think, from China.

367. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Do you remember when the last grant was made to New Zealand by this country for the purposes of the civil government?—It is a long time ago.

368. Are you aware that Sir George Grey, during the greater part of his government, was assisted by the confidence of the Imperial Parliament for the purposes of the civil government of New Zealand?—Yes.

369. Are you aware of any arrangement made or proposed for the military system of New Zealand within the last year or two?—For some years a correspondence has been going on between the Imperial and the Colonial Government upon the question whether they should contribute, and to what amount, towards Imperial troops. The first proposition made from home was, that they should pay for barracks; that was in the year 1853. Much discussion ensued, and in the course of time the idea was broached that they should pay at a rate per head for the soldiers, to cover the expenses. They reluctantly offered at last to pay as much as 5*l.* a head. Last year the Government wrote to say that it would accept this payment of 5*l.*, not to be considered as exclusively appropriated to barracks, but to form a general contribution towards the expenses of the troops in New Zealand. A despatch has recently arrived con-

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veying the assent of the New Zealand Government to this proposal; but I must further explain that the Imperial Government, in agreeing to the sum of 5*l.* per head, demanded that it should be paid in arrear for the two or three years during which the discussion had continued. The New Zealand Government also agreed to that point. The benefit of the contribution of 5*l.* per head will therefore commence from 1858.

370. Sir *G. Grey.*] And referring to all the troops in the Colony, whatever their number might be?—Whatever the number might be in the Colony.

371. Mr. *Marsh.*] I think you told us you had just got an account of the volunteer force in New South Wales?—Yes.

372. Are you not aware that there was a volunteer corps there so long ago as 1854?—There was; but I presume that it had fallen into disuse, because the Governor lately spoke of the intention of forming a volunteer corps as a new measure.

373. I think you told us, with regard to New Zealand, that there were no forts there?—I am not aware of any forts of importance; there may be batteries.

374. Then these troops are not for external defence, but to protect the people against the natives?—That is a matter of inference and open to discussion, for we have British troops in many places where there are not forts.

375. Mr. *Baxter.*] Are there many forts in Australia?—Very few, but there are batteries, for example, at Sydney, and they are building forts also at Port Phillip; all those works being constructed at the expense of the Australian Colonies.

376. There are new batteries at Sydney and Port Phillip?—Yes.

377. But they are manned by troops paid by the Imperial Government?—They are manned by Imperial troops paid in the relative proportions by the Imperial Government and the Colonies, which were explained in the last day's evidence.

378. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is the company of artillery at Sydney paid entirely by the Colony?—One company of artillery there was paid entirely by the Colony; but it has gone away to New Zealand, and its charge is again assumed by the Imperial Government.

379. Mr. *Marsh.*] You said that there were forts being constructed in Australia?—Yes.

380. Does the Home Government find the ordnance for those forts?—The War Department will, doubtless, in some cases, furnish the guns; but the Colony of Victoria has voted very large sums to pay for ordnance for its own use.

381. Mr. *Adderley.*] You say that after six years' correspondence the New Zealand Government have assented to pay 5*l.* a head for the troops sent to them from England?—Yes.

382. Can you state what proportion of the whole expense per head that is?—Undoubtedly, a very small proportion.

383. Taking the year which you have already alluded to, and which will be a favourable year to the Colony for the calculation, am I wrong in saying that the proporton is as five to 80?—That is about the proportion; the whole rate per man of the entire military strength of New Zealand is nearly 80*l.* a head.

384. Then the proposition which it took six years to induce the Colony of New Zealand to consent to was, that, for all the Imperial troops of New Zealand, the English taxpayers should pay 75-80 of the cost, plus the cost of transport?—That is the bare fact; but it is necessary to add that New Zealand had never paid anything at all before; that she then for the first time commenced paying; and that she received notice that the arrangement would be liable to further revision; and that likewise, in respect of this sum of 5*l.*, she has agreed to pay the arrears of the three or four years during which the correspondence lasted.

385. At the same rate?—At the same rate.

386. Is that, then, what we may consider the permanent arrangement between the Colonial Office and the New Zealand Government?—No; the Colonial Government were distinctly told that the arrangement would be liable to revision. I must ask leave to add a material fact, which had escaped me in my previous answer: that whereas in New Zealand, and many other Colonies in that part of the world, the Imperial troops receive extra allowances, this has occasioned

occasioned a communication to the New Zealand Government, inviting them to pay from their own local funds the whole amount of these extra allowances, in like manner as is done in neighbouring Colonies.

387. Do the New Zealand Colonies in their answers express their willingness to take upon themselves this further claim?—There has not been time to receive their answer; but the meaning of the communication I believe to be this, that their agreement before was to give a certain sum in abatement of the regular and ordinary Imperial charge, but that the extra allowance being something beyond these extra charges, occasioned by the peculiar circumstances of the Colony, it is thought fair to ask the Colonial Government to provide separately for that expense.

388. Can you state how long extra pay has been given to the troops in New Zealand?—I cannot state it it exactly, but for a considerable time.

389. Do you know at all the origin of the extra pay?—Extra pay has been gradually growing up throughout the Australian group; the discovery of the gold first led to it in Australia.

390. Then the fact is, that the Australian gold colonies undertaking to give extra allowances to the British troops out of their own purse, necessitated the giving of extra pay from the Imperial treasury to troops in other colonies?—I do not think that is quite the case: because extra pay has been allowed in such a colony as the Cape, for example, where there is no question of gold, and where they are too far from Australia to be necessarily affected by the practice there.

391. Was not the extra pay given subsequently to the discovery of the gold in Australia?—Yes.

392. Mr. *Ellice.*] Upon what principle is the extra pay regulated; is it regulated by the division of the colonies, and the sanction of the military authorities here, or is it sanctioned by the Secretary of State for War?—Undoubtedly, extra pay has never been given to the troops without the knowledge and sanction of the Secretary of State for War; whether the report came to him direct, or whether the intelligence first reached the Colonial Secretary, who communicated with the Secretary for War, I cannot undertake to say.

393. The process, I take it, would be this, that either the Colonial authorities, or the military authorities in England would communicate any proposition with respect to pay to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in this country, and of the Secretary of State for the Colonies approved of it, he would communicate his approbation to the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of War ultimately would have the power to decide upon the case?—Yes, the opinion of the Secretary of State for War would be that which would be deemed the most material in such a case.

394. Are any instances within your recollection in which such correspondence has arisen in the Colonies, and been transmitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Secretary of State for War?—There has been frequent correspondence on the subject between the Departments of War and of the Colonies.

395. Sir *George Grey.*] Am I to understand you to state that this extra pay, these extra allowances in New Zealand have been paid from the Imperial funds?—They have.

396. Was that extra pay received by the troops in 1859, during the period to which the return upon which we have been examining you refers?—I believe it to have been then in force.

397. These extra allowances, then, are included in the 104,777*l.* for that year?—That is certainly the case, unless I am mistaken as to the date of the origin of these extra allowances. They have lately, as regards all the Colonies, formed the subject of inquiry by a Committee at the War Department, and the Secretary of State for War, after considering the report of the Committee, intimated to the Secretary of State for the Colonies the course which he wished to be pursued; and, of course, the Colonial Minister issued the instructions which the Secretary of State for War thought proper.

398. Is it then the fact that, in addition to the 5*l.* a head which the Colony agreed to pay, a further demand has been made upon the Colony which would be a reduction from the gross sum appearing now to be chargeable to the funds of this country for the troops in New Zealand?—Yes.

399. Is the extra pay in New Zealand at the same rate as in Australia?—The extra pay in New Zealand is at the same rate as in Tasmania and Western

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Australia, those three being Colonies in which it is paid directly by the Imperial Government; the rate is 5 *s.* a day to the officers, and free rations to the troops; that is to say, a surrender of the usual stoppage of 3 ½ *d.* a day.

400. Is it the same rate as in the other Australian Colonies in which the pay comes from the Colonial Exchequer?—No, the extra rate is larger in the other Colonies.

401. Mr. *Ellice.*] Is the pay given to the officers and troops while they are in service in the field, or is it given generally?—It is given generally.

402. Mr. *Fortescue.*] The Colony of New Zealand, I believe, is about 20 years old?—Yes.

403. From the time of its foundation, there came a period of several years, I believe, during which this country contributed largely to the civil expenditure of New Zealand?—There was such a period.

404. After that there came, I think, a period of a few years, during which New Zealand bore the whole of its civil charges, and this country bore the whole of its military charges?—Yes.

405. The first step, then, has lately been taken towards obtaining from New Zealand, contribution towards its military expenditure?—Yes.

406. That is the step which you have just now described?—It is.

407. Is not that rate of 5*l.* per head, intended to represent, roughly of course, the cost of military works and buildings of all kinds?—That was the principle upon which the sum was calculated, when it was originally proposed; but, as after all, years might occur when the military works would fall short of the rate of 5*l.* per head, this may have been the reason why the Government thought it better to call it in general terms, a contribution towards the military expenses of the Colony, without specifying either barracks, or works, or troops.

408. But the idea was, that the first contribution which the Colony should be called upon to make for its military expenses, should be one for the purpose of defraying the cost of military lodgings and military works?—Yes, the original idea.

409. Mr. *Marsh.*] I think you told us that some of the civil charges was for that purpose?—For the provision of barracks; the rate of 5*l.* seems to me by the present returns to have been even more than enough.

410. You told us, I think, that the civil charges were originally paid in New Zealand?—Yes, there was a contribution from England towards them.

411. That was the case I believe in Australia, for a certain time?—Yes, it was.

412. Now about the extra pay; was there ever any extra pay in Australia or New Zealand, or any of these Colonies until the gold discovery?—No.

413. Mr. *Childers.*] The number of troops kept in New Zealand is much larger than would be required for the external defence of New Zealand, is it not?—There is only a regiment of the line, and some artillery and engineers.

414. But in proportion to the population, that is a considerable force as compared with the population of the other Colonies?—Perhaps it may be so if you look at population alone, but if you look at the fact that this population is dispersed amongst four or five settlements, each of them possessed of considerable wealth, I do not think, according to the custom in other Colonies, that the presence of a single regiment of the line in New Zealand was at all disproportionate.

415. Had it not been for the presence of large bodies of natives, whose attachment is only doubtful, you would not have kept so large a military force in New Zealand?—That goes beyond my province.

416. Do you mean that if New Zealand had been without natives, like other Australian Colonies, you would have required all that force for the external defence of the Colony?—It is a military question; but looking to the past, which is all I can judge by, as I am no soldier, I do not believe that the Secretary of State for War could have sent less than a regiment for the four or five settlements in New Zealand.

417. But I am asking you if it would be so irrespective of the native question?—I believe if our Government supplied troops at all, they would not have consented to send less than one regiment for those islands; but I must repeat that

that I feel that I am no authority; I merely mention my inference from seeing what has been the practice elsewhere.

418. Has the Government of New Zealand represented to the Colonial Office that any proportion of the military expenditure connected with New Zealand, originates in the relations with the natives with which the responsible ministers there has nothing to do?—At the time of the discussion as to whether they should contribute to the troops, and to what amount, they naturally used a variety of arguments to explain why they were unwilling to contribute; I dare say they relied on the foregoing as one of those arguments. But in order that I may not be misconceived in the previous answer, I hope that I may point out one distinction; I never questioned that the presence of a large body of warlike natives must be a material element in the military arrangements of any country; but what I said was, that only a single regiment of the line was in New Zealand, and I was obliged to state that from past practice in the Colonies this seemed to me no more than there would have been in the same Colony if there had been no natives.

419. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that a very small number of troops were, as the colonists of New Zealand conceive, left in the Colony before this disturbance, and that that was the subject of repeated remonstrances from the Government of New Zealand?—Yes, they did complain.

420. Are you aware that until the last two years there had been two regiments instead of one in New Zealand?—There was only one regiment both on the 1st January 1859, and 1st January 1860.

421. Are you aware that until within two or three years there were two regiments, and not one only in New Zealand?—Yes.

422. And that one was removed during the late war?—Yes.

423. That removal having taken place against the earnest remonstrances of the Government of New Zealand?—Yes.

424. Mr. *Adderley.*] Was that regiment removed in course of a regular reduction of troops in New Zealand?—It was removed in consequence of the exigencies of the Indian mutiny.

425. But was the cause of its not being replaced, the progressive reduction that was going on?—There was progressive reduction in North America, but in Australia there has been no reduction, the forces have been stationary for many years.

426. Then while the progressive reduction in North America which you have described was going on, there was no corresponding reduction going on in Australia and New Zealand?—There has been no corresponding reduction in Australia; I have just mentioned that there was a casual reduction in New Zealand.

427. Was that regiment, which was removed, not replaced as a part of the system of progressive reduction?—I do not believe that this could have been the reason, because no progressive reduction was at that time going on in the neighbouring colonies.

428. Mr. *Fortescue.*] But it is the case, is it not, that within the last few years the garrison of New Zealand has been reduced from two regiments to one?—It is.

429. And until the breaking out of the present disturbances there was no intention of replacing the regiment which had been removed?—There was no such intention that I ever heard of.

430. Mr. *Childers.*] In what year was that regiment removed?—In the year of the war of the Indian mutiny, in 1858.

431. Sir *George Grey.*] Was the regiment which was removed from New Zealand to India at the time of the Indian mutiny, replaced in New Zealand before the disturbances broke out there; or was the garrison suffered to remain at one regiment?—It was not replaced, and the garrison was suffered to remain at one regiment.

432. Mr. *Adderley.*] Can you state whether its not being replaced was in consequence of an intention on the part of the Home Government, permanently to reduce the numbers of Imperial troops in New Zealand?—That lies beyond my province.

433. You are not aware that at that time a progressive reduction of the troops was going on in New Zealand, similar to that which you have described in North America?—No; but the general question of reduction touches an important

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matter of fact which I wish to lay before the Committee. When Lord Grey was Minister, he wished to reduce the expenses of the troops in the Colonies: in North America, he effected his object by reducing the number of troops; in Australia he effected it in a different manner; he said that if they wished to have soldiers they might have some if they liked to pay for them; they did pay for them, and therefore the number of troops in Australia was not reduced.

434. Was that reduction of troops in New Zealand a process of reduction of the troops generally, or was it casual?—After the regiment was removed for the Indian mutiny, it was not replaced, and remained for some years without being replaced; from which I infer that the Government intended to save the expense of it.

435. If New Zealand is to pay $\frac{5}{80}$ of the cost of the troops sent from England, it will pay much less than Australia does?—Yes.

436. If New Zealand is to pay 5 out of 80 of the cost per head of the troops in New Zealand, will it not pay a much less proportion than Australia?—It will pay a far less proportion than those Australian Colonies which have contributed, but some of them make no contribution.

437. Is it not the fact, that during the New Zealand rebellion artillery were ordered from Sydney to New Zealand?—Yes.

438. Was that order, in the first instance, complied with?—The artillery was sent, and I never understood that it was delayed. The Government of New South Wales would have been dissatisfied if, after they had paid money for the introduction of these troops, they had gone elsewhere without reimbursement; but the Imperial Government has repaid the money.

439. Did the Governor reply to that order, that he could not press the Colony for their consent to send artillery from Sydney to New Zealand, unless the Home Government would refund the cost of their transport out, for that he represented that this portion of the military force was considered by the Sydney Legislature to be in a different position to that of the regiment of the line stationed there, and to be, to a certain extent, under the orders of the Local Government?—The Governor answered that he did not hesitate to suggest to the General to act at once; and that while he communicated, both to the Council and to the Legislature, the steps that would be taken, he did so in terms which he took care should not raise the question of the right of the General commanding to dispose of the military force in the Colonies according to the best of his judgment when any case of urgency might arise.

440. Sir *George Grey*.] Was the sole question raised of a financial character, a matter of payment between the Colony and this country?—The Governor put it upon that footing, and the matter was therefore settled by the Home Government's immediately assuming to itself the charge of all that had been spent by the Colony on the artillery; so that the affair has been concluded to the satisfaction of all parties.

441. And in the meantime the troops went to New Zealand?—The troops went to New Zealand.

442. Mr. *Adderley*.] On a previous occasion, did the Governor hesitate to send the same artillery to India, because the Colonial authorities considered that branch of the service under the command of the Local Government, to some extent?—On that previous occasion the Governor thought it better not to press the question.

443. Mr. *Childers*.] Is not the real reason this: that the Colony agreed to pay the original cost of the transport of that artillery company from England?—Yes.

444. Is not the difficulty that if, after they were there, they were subject to be removed, the Colony would not get fair consideration for what it had paid in the first instance?—The Colony would have a just grievance, unless the money which it had spent on the introduction of these troops were repaid.

445. Did not Sir William Denison use these words: "If the Colony is to pay for the passage of troops from England, which troops are liable to be recalled, either in small detachments, or altogether, at the will of the military authorities in England, just grounds of complaint will be given to the Colony"?—Those words occur in the Despatch.

446. Mr. *Adderley*.] Have the military and militia in New Zealand been found to work well together?—I know no more than appears from the ordinary sources of information.

447. Do those ordinary sources of information show that there are some considerable jealousies between the two, so as, in some cases, to render it impossible for them to work together?—I am very loath to give any answer which would seem as if I gave a shadow of opinion of my own upon the subject. They have since been engaged together in important engagements against the enemy, aud they have gained important successes together; and if there was a time when there were jealousies, I hope they are past.

448. Has the Colony expressed any dissatisfaction?—I can only speak to what I have seen in the despatches. I have not seen any complaint by the Governor of the conduct of the Queen's troops.

449. Do the Colonists appear to have been satisfied?—As I said before, speaking from the ordinary sources of information, there has been a good deal of difference of opinion, and I can offer no judgment of my own. But I should hope, as they have been successful together, that the mutual feeling is much better than it was at the first commencement of the war.

450. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Do you know of any unsuccessful military operation in which there was not dissatisfaction?—It seems natural that it should be so.

451. Does your own experience in the Colonial Office extend so far back as the formation of the Colony of New Zealand?—Yes.

452. Can you tell the Committee whether those that first went out to found the Colony of Wellington did so with the full approbation of the Home Government?—No.

453. They wanted to found an independent State, did they not?—They did.

454. And the Home Government stepped in, and refused to allow them to do so?—They did.

455. Do you remember the grounds on which they refused to do so?—The Home Government explained that the plan was wholly illegal. The authors of it had a scheme for making the members of their society liable to the punishment of death; but the Home Government said that if they imposed the punishment of death, those who inflicted it would be liable to be hung themselves. The Home Government said it was not competent to a body of the Queen's subjects to go and found a new Colony in another part of the world, which would have the rights of a separate State.

456. The founders of the Colony were prepared at first to deal with the natives themselves?—They must have been prepared, for they went at their own risk.

457. They looked for no assistance from the Home Government?—No, they went solely at their own risk.

458. But the Home Government took from them their independence, and forced its Colony upon them?—The Home Government told them that it was not competent to them to set themselves up as a separate nation.

459. And since that time they have looked to the Home Government for their defences?—Yes. If they had been a separate nation, of course they would have cost our nation nothing.

460. *Chairman.*] I think you alluded to a Despatch from the Secretary of State, in which same future arrangements were spoken of with reference to the regiments?—I alluded to the contribution.

461. Has there been any despatch upon that subject, with reference to the Colony of New Zealand, which has not been laid before Parliament, a despatch bearing upon the subject, and propounding another arrangement for the future?—There have been some Despatches about the contribution.

462. Mr. *Adderley.*] Can you state the number of troops in New Zealand now?—I think the War Office would be better able to furnish that information.

463. *Chairman.*] Am I correct in supposing generally, with regard to these Colonial allowances, that the system has arisen from the liberality of some Colonies granting allowances to troops, which has led to the necessity of the Imperial Government granting similar allowances to others, in order to avoid jealousies. Am I correct in that view of the matter, as far as your official knowledge goes?—I strongly doubt that fact. I have been afraid to offer the evidence to the Committee lest my memory should deceive me; but I think it will be found on investigation that the idea of extra allowances originated with the Queen's Government. I have an impression that when living became so exceedingly dear, the officer in command of the troops thought that the forces ought

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ought to have some extra allowance. If that be so, the Imperial Government would be merely acting on its own judgment in giving these allowances where the local funds do not contribute.

464. Mr. *Childers.*] As a matter of fact, in Colonies where the local funds do contribute, the Government has rarely expressed an opinion, I believe?—I suppose the Imperial Government are desirous that the troops should have the advantage of the liberality of the Colonial Government.

465. But they have not interfered?—They have not interfered; but it is within my knowledge that the authorities of the War Department have deliberated upon the question, whether in any of these places the allowances have been larger than have been necessary.

466. Mr. *Ellice.*] Could any officer having the command of any body of troops in the Colony receive any such allowance on behalf of the troops, without the direct authority of the Secretary at War?—Certainly not.

467. Mr. *Childers.*] But have they all, as a matter of fact, so received them in the Australian Colonies for many years?—Yes, with the knowledge and assent of their superior authorities at home.

468. Written assent?—That may be answered more certainly from the War Department. But I ought to add that these allowances have, I believe, varied in amount, and it is quite possible, therefore, that the principle being sanctioned, changes of amount may have taken place, and have been carried into effect before there was time for the formal sanction of them to arrive from England.

469. Mr. *Fortescue.*] They depend, do they not, in Australia, upon the annual votes of the Colonial Legislature?—Yes.

470. Mr. *Marsh.*] You have told us that some of the Colonies in Australia pay the entire cost for extra troops?—They do.

471. Does that entire cost include the pension which some of them may be entitled to afterwards?—No.

472. Does it include the cost of transport in every case?—No; generally it does not include the cost of transport.

473. Does it include the cost of the soldier whom the Government here has been paid for recruiting?—It does not.

474. Then the conclusion is, that although the Colonies of Australia pay for these troops, the Home Government is still at some considerable expense for them?—The Home Government is still at the expense of all those charges, which in the paper which has been laid before the Committee, I have ventured to class as indirect charges.

475. This is not the case with the Indian Government, I believe, the Indian Government pays the full cost in every way?—The Indian Government does; but it is a matter of extreme difficulty to settle what is the fair rate to charge the Indian Government, either in respect to pensions, or charges for recruiting, and depôts at home. To show what a difficult subject this must be, I may mention that, after a full discussion by the most competent authorities, they were of opinion that the rate which ought to be charged to the Indian Government for pensions, would be at the rate of about 4 *l.* per man. If, on the contrary, you take the rateable proportion by comparing the whole of the British army with the whole dead weight, the charge for pensions comes to nearly 14 *l.* per man, and that is the rate of charge against the Colonies which appears in the return now in the hands of the Committee.

476. General *Peel.*] The pay of all the troops in the Colony was originally charged in the Army Estimates?—Yes.

477. Then any payment from the Colony is a payment into the Treasury, and is not paid to the Secretary of State for War?—Certainly no payment whatever is made direct from the Colonial Government to the War Department. I should suppose that what takes place must be something like this: that some of the money granted by the Colonial Government goes at once to the military authorities there, and is touched by the officers and soldiers, and that the balance is paid into the military chest, and is brought to account in the British Treasury at home. The Army Estimates over here contain a statement of money received through the Treasury.

478. I will put it in another way: the regiments of the Colonies are included in the number of men voted by Parliament as forming the British establishment?—They are.

479. Those

479. Those in India are not?—No.

480. Mr. *Ellice.*] Under Vote 11 there is no vote for troops in some of the Colonies?—I can say nothing about the details of the Army Estimates.

481. *Chairman.*] Now I will direct your attention to the South African Colonies: I find from the return presented to the Committee, that the total Imperial military expenditure in respect of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, during the year ending 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport, is stated at 479,599 *l.*?—That is correct.

482. I find also, that the total amount of Colonial contribution from the same Colony, is stated in the same return at 40,467 *l.*?—That is so; the gross total, therefore, is 520,066 *l.*

483. In the same return I find the total number of Imperial forces, including men of all arms and the staff, during the same period, is stated at 6,351?—That is so.

484. Is the German Legion included in that enumeration?—Yes.

485. What is the number of the German Legion now?—It was assumed for calculation, in that retuin for 1858, at 1,053.

486. Do you know whether the German Legion is now on full pay?—By a letter recently received, we learn that some of the German Legion have received full pay up to the 31st March 1861.

487. Do you know whether there has ever been a time when the German Legion was not on full pay?—There has been no time, so far as we know, when some of the German Legion have not been on full pay, but their numbers have been largely reduced in the last year.

488. You stated the total number of force in the Colony during the year for which the return was made, at 6,351: can you inform us of what that force consisted?—There were four European regiments of the line; there were also the Cape Mounted Rifles, a corps paid by Great Britain, numbering about 800, and artillery and engineers.

489. Do you include in those four European regiments the German Legion?—No, but it is included in the grand total in the return before the Committee.

490. What is the number of the German Legion, as given in that return?—One thousand and fifty-three.

491. *Chairman.*] I think that in one of the returns put in, it appears that there are 433 mounted police at the Cape: is that the only force in the Colony which is maintained at the cost of the Colony?—It is.

492. I suppose, under the title of Cape of Good Hope, Natal and British Kaffraria are included?—They are.

493. Can you give us the distribution of the forces in the South African Colonies?—The distribution of rank and file on the 1st January 1857, was as follows: Albany 981, Fort Beaufort 360, King William's Town 1,537, the Western District 81, and Natal 454; to those would have to be added the German Legion and the general staff.

494. Sir *George Grey.*] Where is the German Legion stationed?—In British Kaffraria.

495. *Chairman.*] Is the whole of the German Legion stationed there?—The whole of the German Legion supposed to be present in the Colony in the year of the return; some of them had gone to India.

496. Is Cape Town included in the Western District?—Yes.

497. I observe that, in your memorandum appended to the Report of 1859, you state that the force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, in 1859, is upwards of 10,000; and that, exclusive of all home charges and the cost of transport, the military expenditure of that year was about two-thirds of a million sterling: is that correct?—It is correct.

498. You stated also that the imports and exports of the Cape of Good Hope represented respectively 1-22d and 1-25th of those of all the other British Colonies, and that that Colony absorbed more than one-fifth of the whole force allotted to the Colonies, and costs more than one-fourth of the whole direct military expenditure. Are you aware of any material changes in that respect since that time?—The force has certainly been much reduced.

499. Can you say how long the German Legion has been at the Cape?—It arrived at the Cape about the beginning of 1857.

500. Can you state what has been the total cost of that force to this country since it was ordered to the Cape?—The German Legion left this country in the

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the latter portion of 1856, and reached the Cape of Good Hope in the beginning of 1857; the number of men was about 2,300, with a few hundred women. For the year ending 31st March 1858, the sum of money voted by Parliament was 92,792*l.*; for the year ending 31st March 1859, 30,947*l.*; for the year ending March 1860, 18,133*l.*; for the year ending March 1861, the same sum of 18,133*l.* There was provided for in the army accounts of 1860, as excess of expenditure, in the year ending 31st March 1859, a sum of 7,537*l.* The total of those figures is about 167,544*l.* This is exclusive of the cost of transport, estimated at about 31,000*l.*

501. Sir *George Grey.*] Did that first year's expenditure include the cost of transport?—It did not; I have just given an estimate of it at 12*l.* a head, for the soldiers and their wives.

502. General *Peel.*] Can you state the conditions under which that Legion went to the Cape of Good Hope?—There was a letter written from the Colonial Department to the Treasury on the 4th of February 1859, which entered very fully into all the motives that led to sending out the German Legion, and into all the subsequent transactions in the Colony. If it should be the pleasure of the Committee I could hand in a copy of that letter, which would give a narrative of all the circumstance up to that date.

503. Mr. *Adderley.*] Does this item which you have given us for 1858, 1859, and 1860, for the first time cease to appear in the Estimates of this year?—The last vote taken was for the year ending March 1861.

504. There is no such item in the estimates for this year?—There is no such item in the estimates for the year ending March 1862.

505. Mr. *Baxter.*] Have you seen the last despatches from the Cape, which stated that all the German Legion would be finally disposed of on the 1st of April in this year?—I have.

506. After the 1st of April in this year, there will be no further sum chargeable on their account?—No.

507. General *Peel.*] Then they are not on full pay at this moment?—The last despatch stated that by the 31st of March 1861 they would all have ceased to be on full pay.

508. *Chairman.*] Can you give us any official information at all about the gross cost to this country of the Kafir wars?—I am sorry to say that no exact figure can be attained; I have looked carefully back to the old debates upon the Kafir wars, and I have seen very round numbers stated roughly, but I have never seen any clear account published; sometimes speakers state that the Kafir war cost one million, and sometimes two millions, but one figure may be worth mentioning: in a very elaborate speech which was made by Sir William Molesworth in Parliament in 1852, he calculated that the expense to this country of the Cape, on an average of three years ending 1850, had been about half a million a year; I have made similar calculations, and I find we have spent, as nearly as possible, half a million a year in the years just over; and that is without a Kafir war.

509. Can you give the Committee any information as to the extent of the frontier line of our South African Colonies?—It is very difficult to say, because, for practical purposes, we ought not to take the whole frontier line of the Colony, but only the frontier line of those parts where the Kafirs are numerous and warlike; the frontier line of defence is that about Kaffraria.

510. My question is, what, in round numbers, is the whole of the frontier line of our South African Colonies?—The inland frontier line of the Cape Colony must be 1000 miles, but it is only along a very limited portion of it that it is contiguous with powerful Native tribes.

511. Sir *George Grey.*] You gave the amount of force at the Cape of Good Hope in 1859, as 6,351, including the 1,000 the German Legion, which has since ceased to exist as a military force; can you state what the present military force is at the Cape?—The total rank and file on the 1st of January 1861, was 4,107.

512. Would that be liable to be reduced by the number of the German Legion then under arms, and which ceased to exist as a military body on the 31st of March 1861?—No, I do not think that it would be reduced, because I quote from the usual military monthly returns, and these do not include the German Legion.

513. Mr. *Fortescue.*] That number includes the Colony of Natal?—It does.

514. Sir

514. Sir *George Grey*.] Then there has been considerable reduction in the military force at the Cape since 1859?—Yes.

515. The aggregate amount of force in the return before us is 6,351; do you know what the aggregate amount was on the 1st of January 1861?—The amount of rank and file was about 4,000.

516. You cannot compare the total amount of the force now with what it was in 1859?—I have not the means of making the comparison quite accurately, because the latest return I have with me is only of rank and file.

517. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Can you compare the total force now with the force as given in the report of the departmental committee?—There has been a very large diminution since the departmental report in 1859.

518. Can you give us, roughly, the extent of the diminution?—In the year ending March 1858 the whole strength was returned at 10,759; in the year ending March 1859 the same description of force is returned at 6,351: that is a reduction of upwards of 4,000 men.

519. Sir *George Grey*.] I understood you to say that the 6,351 included about 1,000 men of the German Legion, who are not borne on the military strength of the country?—Yes, so that the total force has been further reduced by the amount of the German Legion.

520. Are you aware of any further reduction?—I am not.

521. Mr. *Adderley*.] To what species of force was the 40,000 contributed by the Colony?—To the Cape Mounted Police.

522. Where is that stationed?—In the frontier districts.

523. It is a frontier police to all intents and purposes?—Yes.

524. Is any force from England employed in the same service?—A large part of the force sent from England is employed on the frontier.

525. It appears that a very small part of the troops are employed in Cape Town?—Very small.

526. You say that upon the whole western district, including Cape Town, there are only 81?—Only 81.

527. So that, in fact, the half million spent by the Imperial Treasury is spent upon 6,000 troops in South Africa, who are almost entirely employed as a frontier police against the native tribes?—It is a force to prevent the incursions of the Kafirs.

528. Is there any reason why the Cape should not pay more that one-tenth of the expense of the police stationed along their own frontier?—That is a question which I, myself, proposed at another time and in another place; but I am not qualified to answer it.

529. Has there been any correspondence between the Home Government and the Cape Government, with reference to the reduction of the number of the Imperial troops employed as a frontier police in South Africa?—I believe the propriety of a reduction of military expenditure has been much enjoined, and we see by the facts just elicited, that the amount of force has been considerably reduced in the last three or four years; in recent despatches, I have seen suggestions of the Governor, for some additional reduction of expenditure.

530. For the Imperial troops in South Africa, the Colony does not pay one farthing, does it?—Nothing.

531. Of any sort or kind?—It pays nothing, except that quite recently they have voted a sum of 10,000*l.* towards the extra allowances to the Queen's troops, which have been so much noticed by the Committee in its examination.

532. When did they make that offer?—We learn it by some of the latest accounts.

533. Was there not extra pay before that?—Yes, which this country pays; the grant from the Colony will be in abatement of the cost to the Imperial Treasury of the extra pay.

534. With that exception, this body of troops, that costs nearly half a million a year, is employed on the frontiers of South Africa entirely at the cost of the Imperial Treasury?—It is.

535. Who determines the number of troops required in South Africa? Is it done by application from the Colony, or is it settled without any such application, upon the judgment of the authorities at home?—I apprehend that the amount of force sent into the Colony, depends upon the judgment of Her

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Majesty's Government; and I presume that Her Majesty's Ministers at the head of the department concerned determine that amongst themselves.

536. The Colonial Government is not consulted as to the number of troops required for the Colony?—It is not consulted, except where there is a question of contribution.

537. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you mean that the Government at home sends out a number of troops without any communication with the local Government as to the number required, and as to the circumstances of the Colony?—I did not say that.

538. Mr. *Adderley.*] Irrespective of any Kafir rebellion, or danger of foreign forces, is the permanent establishment of troops in South Africa determined by the home authorities, or are the troops applied for by the Colonial authorities?—We have not periodically and annually a statement from any Colony that they want a certain number of troops; but before the Army Estimates are framed, I suppose the Government considers all the intelligence in its possession and determines the force required.

539. Without any intimation from the Colony from year to year?—Without any precise, or any annual, intimation of a particular number of troops. Of course, it is the duty of the Government to take advantage of all the general information which it receives.

540. In no instance does the Colonial Government state the number of troops required by the Colony?—I have not seen that it is the custom of the Colonies to make specific requisitions from time to time for the number of troops they require.

541. I suppose it is done in the way you stated the other day, that four companies were sent to an Australian Colony?—Yes; that was a judgment formed on the state of things at the time.

542. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] You alluded to some despatches received from the Cape a few days ago?—Yes.

543. In those, was not the distribution of the force fully entered into?—It was.

544. And suggestions made for a reduction?—Yes.

545. That would be essential information received from the Colony, as to the amount of force?—Precisely so; what I meant to say was, that the Government is daily in receipt of information from all parts of the world, and I suppose that when it makes up its mind what force it requires, it uses all the information it has received.

546. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Has not the Governor been in the habit of constantly reporting the condition of the Kafir tribes upon the frontier, and the amount of danger which from time to time he has apprehended from them?—He has.

547. Has it not been on the ground of the apprehension of danger from formidable native tribes beyond the frontier, that the Governor has constantly pressed for the presence of a certain number of troops?—Yes.

548. You would not say, then, that he has asked for those troops for the purposes of police?—No, I should say it was to prevent incursions of the Kafirs.

549. As the means of defence against formidable foreign enemies?—Against native tribes living beyond the British territory.

550. Do you understand that the greater part of the military force is required for defence against British subjects or against foreigners?—For defence against warlike natives, who are not British subjects.

551. Is it not the case, that in the western part of the Colony, where there are no formidable native tribes either within or without the frontier, the military force has been very small indeed?—It is.

552. Are you aware, that during the Indian mutiny, almost the entire defence of Cape Town was assumed by its inhabitants?—Yes.

553. Has there been of late years, any formidable danger apprehended from the native tribes upon the English frontier?—Yes; more than once, considerable apprehensions have been expressed of disturbances from the Kafirs.

554. There have been more than once, I believe, urgent representations from the Governor of the Cape, of danger impending from the native tribes beyond the frontier?—There have.

555. Mr. *Adderley.*] In the earlier Colonies of America, were troops ever sent out

out to contend for them with native tribes?—No, they were not; the war was carried on in a manner which would not be regarded with much favour in modern days.

556. Do you suppose that troops are sent from England to Cape Town in consequence of the feeling of the English against the mode in which the Colony itself would put down the natives?—I believe that if you left the Colonists to themselves they would carry on the war in a manner with which England would wish to interfere; and if so, the Colonists might say that in that case England ought to defend them.

557. You allude to the old commando system of the Dutch settlers?—Yes.

558. That was superseded by England undertaking the control of the Kafir tribes by Imperial troops?—Yes.

559. Since England has assumed that function has the commando system ceased?—I am not aware of its being kept alive.

560. Was it effectual or not against the Kafir tribes when it was in full force?—That is a matter of opinion on which a great deal of discussion has existed.

561. Did it succeed in keeping the Kafirs in check?—The Colonists had the best of it.

562. There were no Kafir wars of any duration?—There were Kafir wars, but we did not pay for them.

563. Nor did they last so long, nor were they so frequent?—I am hardly sufficiently well acquainted with the history of the Cape at that time to answer. I think, probably, that when the defence was left in the hands of the Colonists they had small but constant hostilities.

564. The undertaking of Kafir wars by British troops led to an enormous expenditure of English money?—It did.

565. Mr. *Childers.*] The Government of the Cape is not, I believe, what is called a responsible Government?—It is not.

566. The Governor's advisers are not the representatives of the people?—They are not.

567. Lord *R. Cecil.*] Has the Cape Colony ever asked for a responsible Government?—I do not think they have ever strongly applied for it.

568. Is it not the case that the frontiers have been altered in recent years?—Yes, enlarged.

569. And also diminished?—We have enlarged our territory on the whole.

570. Have we not also diminished that territory by ceding the Orange River territory?—We have.

571. Have not complaints been made by the Colony that probably that had had a strategical effect in weakening the frontier of the Colony?—I do not know.

572. Is it not within your knowledge that the Governor has so complained?—I believe that the present Governor of the Cape, Sir George Grey, is very favourable to an extensive British territory, and to the policy of what is called federation in South Africa.

573. He has stated his opinion, has he not, that such a policy would lead to a diminution of Imperial expenditure?—I know he has advocated the policy, and I dare say he has used that argument.

574. Has any danger been apprehended within the last two or three years from the different Dutch republics?—There has been some uneasiness on the subject.

575. That republic took its rise, I believe, in consequence of the English policy on the subject of slavery?—Yes, the Dutch boers emigrated from the Cape Colony on account of their dislike of the English policy on the subject of slavery.

576. You say, I think, that the only danger exists on the side of Kaffraria from native tribes; does not Moshesh lie outside the territory of Kaffraria?—Certainly, what I meant to say was, that the whole length of the frontier ought not to be considered as requiring defence, but I did not mean that only Kaffraria, in its strict sense, was a point needing protection.

577. Mr. *Fortescue.*] The northern frontier of the Colony is, I believe, generally desert and uninhabited?—Yes.

578. On the north eastern and eastern frontiers, you have the great tribes of the Basoutos and Kafirs?—Yes.

579. Mr. *Baxter.*] In any of these despatches, have the Colonies been asked

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to contribute a larger proportion to the expenditure than 40,000 *l.*?—The only correspondence I have seen, has been upon the subject of extra allowances.

580. Has there not been a correspondence between the Government at home and the Government at the Cape with regard to the diminution of the forces?—Yes.

581. Was no reference made in that correspondence to the smallness of the contribution by the Cape, and that if it were not increased the military force would be reduced?—I do not remember seeing that topic used.

582. In point of fact, the Government of the Cape has never been urged by the Imperial Government to contribute a larger proportion towards their own military expenditure?—I think probably not, but the Government at home is obliged to make its applications with reference to the prospect of success, and if it were perfectly certain to meet with a refusal it would hardly make a fruitless application.

583. Do you say that these Colonies who have no British troops defending Cape Town would be disinclined to make a larger contribution than 40,000 *l.*?—I am not competent to speak for the people of the Cape of Good Hope, but I believe there would be a great deal of difficulty in getting any larger contribution from them.

584. Mr. *Adderley*.] Did not Lord Grey say that if they did not comply, the troops would be withdrawn?—That was in the case of New South Wales. Lord Grey was communicating with a Colony which had an earnest desire for troops, and an abundant revenue.

585. But when Lord Grey proposed a reduction of troops, and that they should pay a larger proportion, did he not say if they did not comply troops would be withdrawn?—He did.

586. *Chairman*.] Have you any knowledge of the state of feeling or of the opinions of the South African Colonists, any more than any Member of the Committee?—I have not.

587. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Although the Cape of Good Hope does not possess the system of responsible Government, it possesses a popular legislature, does it not?—It possesses a representative legislature.

588. By which alone any votes of money can be granted?—Yes.

589. Mr. *Baxter*.] Are you quite sure no representation has been made upon the subject of contribution by the Government at home, or do you only at present not recollect any such passages in the despatches from the Colonial Office?—I speak from recollection, but a confident recollection.

590. Mr. *Adderley*.] Besides the expense borne by England of the transport of troops is not an annual vote made by Parliament for the civilisation of the Kafir tribes?—There is.

591. Is that continued?—It is.

592. What does it amount to?—The votes for the civilisation of the Kafir tribes from the beginning up to this time have been 222,000 *l.* The sums voted or proposed to be voted have been as follows: for the year ending 31st March 1856, 40,000 *l.*; 1857, 40,000 *l.*; 1858, 40,000 *l.*; 1859, 20,000 *l.*; 1860, 40,000 *l.*; 1861, 27,000 *l.*; 1862, 15,000 *l.*, producing a total of 222,000 *l.*

593. Lord *Robert Cecil*.] You have spoken of the military expenditure as that of a peace establishment; but of late, I believe, the expenditure of the Cape has not been regarded as that of a peace establishment, but of a military establishment to ward off a Kafir war?—It has.

594. Mr. *Fortescue*.] When did the last Kafir war come to an end?—The war which began in 1851 ceased in March 1853.

595. That was the last of several sanguinary and expensive wars?—It was.

596. Which cost this country a great deal of blood and money?—Yes.

597. Within the few years that have elapsed since the termination of the war, have there not been frequent apprehensions of its renewal?—Frequent apprehensions to that effect have been expressed in the Colony.

598. Great excitement has on several occasions, I believe, prevailed among the Kafir tribes?—Yes.

599. That danger then, at all events, has been warded off by the system pursued?—So it appears.

600. Sir *George Grey*.] Do you know the amount of force sent from the Cape to India during the Indian Mutiny?—Between August 1857 and October 1858, the Governor of the Cape dispatched to India 7,026 officers and men of

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the Queen's Army, besides 1,058 of the German Legion, making a total of 8,084.

601. Mr. *Marsh.*] You say that the Dutch emigrated in consequence of our views upon the question of slavery. Had our views with regard to the protection of the aborigines anything to do with the Dutch emigration?—They may possibly have been discontented with our views upon that subject; but I think that greater influence is attributed to our policy upon the slavery question.

602. The other may have had something to do with it?—Very probably.

603. We have heard something of the commando system. The Colonists, I believe, used to go and attack the Kafirs in an irregular way?—They did.

604. That was prevented by the Home Government?—Yes.

605. Was that in consequence of the views taken by the Aborigines Protection Society?—I cannot undertake to say what were the motives for the policy adopted by the Government.

606. Was it after certain views had been stated by the Aborigines Protection Society?—It was after that date.

607. Do you consider that the troops sent to the Cape are provided in order to protect the Kafirs as well as to protect the Colonists from the Kafirs?—The policy alluded to, admits of being described in those terms.

608. To protect the Kafirs as well as the Colonists?—I would rather say it is meant to protect the Colonists without putting them under the necessity of resorting to any barbarous mode of warfare against the Kafirs.

609. Has the commando system of late been in existence in a milder form, in the way of cattle stealing by Europeans?—I do not know of any instances.

610. Are you aware of a despatch in which the Governor states that in some instances the Europeans had rather the best of the bargain?—I have forgotten the despatch, if I ever saw it.

611. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Must that be an isolated case?—Most certainly; cattle stealing is not a general practice on the part of the Europeans.

612. Mr. *Childers.*] Do you know, in round numbers, the Colonial revenue of the Cape?—The Colonial revenue of the Cape in 1858, was 463,000*l.*

613. Is that the latest account that you have?—There may be later accounts in the Colonial Office; I have read the latest that I have with me.

614. That includes all the local revenues?—That includes all the local revenue.

615. *Chairman.*] Taking the Colonies in the order in which they are given in the return, and also in the departmental report, I come next to Bermuda, and I find that the Imperial expenditure for Bermuda, exclusive of transport, during the year ending the 31st March 1859, was 79,973 *l.*?—That is correct.

616. I believe there is no contribution from colonial resources?—There is no contribution from colonial resources.

617. There never has been any, I presume?—There never has been any.

618. The total number of troops, including infantry, artillery, engineers, and staff, for the same time, is given in the return at 1,201?—Yes.

619. What is the population of Bermuda, distinguishing the Europeans, the troops, and the convicts?—In 1858, the population of Bermuda consisted of 4,569 whites, 6,413 coloured people, and 1,000 convicts; making a total of 11,982.

620. For how many years has Bermuda been a convict settlement?—The first convicts went out in 1823.

621. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you not consider Bermuda rather as an important naval and military station, than as a Colony?—I do.

622. When you say it is a convict settlement, is it not the case that the convicts were sent out, not to settle there after their punishment had expired, but as they are sent to Portsmouth, Chatham, and Gibraltar, to execute public works going on for the fortification of Bermuda?—Yes.

623. Mr. *Marsh.*] Supposing that there was no Bermuda, do you not think that we should keep a greater number of ships there to protect our vast commerce with America and the West Indies?—I do not know whether in time of peace we should do so, but in time of war the possession of Bermuda would be equivalent to a powerful fleet.

624. *Chairman.*] Bermuda is the head-quarters of the North American and West Indian naval stations?—It is the place to which the admiral goes in the cold season.

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625. Halifax is the head quarters of the station, is it not?—The admiral spends a part of the year at Halifax and a part at Bermuda.

626. Sir *George Grey*.] Is there not a dockyard at Bermuda?—There is.

627. *Chairman*.] There are very extensive fortifications there, are there not?—There are.

628. And they have been at various times altered?—Works have been in progress for many years, and they are still in progress.

629. In fact, it is not a colony at all?—It is, in our modern sense, because we have the habit now of giving the name of Colony to every dependency abroad.

630. Lord *Robert Cecil*.] In the Estimates do you make that distinction between a military and a colonial dependency?—No, we do not make any distinction.

631. They all appear under the head of "Colony"?—They do.

632. Do you not think that that gives a general impression that our colonial expenditure is larger than, properly speaking, it is?—It would give that impression if it were not that so few, if any, military posts appear in the Civil Estimates; the Mediterranean garrisons do not appear in the Civil Estimates at all.

633. Sir *George Grey*.] How is the civil expenditure of Bermuda defrayed?—Almost entirely by the Colony; but there is a small annual grant for the salary of the Governor and Secretary and one or two other functionaries.

634. What is the revenue of Bermuda?—£. 9,800.

635. *Chairman*.] The next Colony in the Return is the Bahamas, and I find that the total cost for the Imperial troops for the year ending 31 March 1859, exclusive of transport, was 33,003*l*.?—Yes.

636. Of course there is no contribution from the Colony itself?—There is not.

637. And the total number of troops in the Bahamas at the same time, I find, was 449, including the staff?—That is correct.

638. What did they consist of?—With the exception of a very small party of artillery, these troops consist of a detachment of a West India regiment, of which the head quarters are at Jamaica; they are black troops.

639. In the memorandum appended to the departmental report, you allude to certain works which were then in contemplation at the Bahamas: have those works been carried out?—They have not. I submitted that although the situation of these islands was important, it was important on the water, and not on the land.

640. It is stated in your memorandum that it was proposed to expend 85,000 *l*. on the works at New Providence, in the Bahamas?—It was.

641. And you state in your memorandum that the object of that expenditure was to plant 120 guns, and to detain at a remote place a company of artillery, and a whole regiment of infantry, in order to watch over a narrow basin obstructed by a bar?—I made that statement. I acknowledge that it seemed to me that the expenditure was quite disproportionate to the object.

642. That has been abandoned?—It has.

643. Perhaps it will be convenient now to ask you a question arising out of your memorandum. You state, I observe, and it is in speaking of these fortifications at the Bahamas, that the Government offices are at the present moment full of such projects. Perhaps you will mention now one or more of such projects as those you allude to there for fortifications?—When the Italian war broke out in Europe the Colonial Governments were asked what their resources were for defence; that, I believe, produced a great deal of excitement among them; and they were very fertile in projects of military expenditure. I may mention one very large scheme of expenditure in fortifications: it was at the Island of Mauritius, I believe, that the cost of those works would approach 300,000 *l*.

644. There was also, I believe, a project for constructing barracks at the Cape?—Yes. The Cape also projected the erection of very extensive batteries; and it seemed to me that it could in no possible way add to the strength of Great Britain in a European war to erect works which would lock up a large force of artillery and four regiments of the line at the furthest extremity of South Africa.

645. Lord *Robert Cecil*.] Could they not be maintained by Colonial volunteers?—If

—If they were competent for the service of large guns. My opinion was founded upon the report of competent military authorities, who said that this amount of Imperial force would be requisite. The only Colonial force at that time were the Mounted Police.

646. Mr. *Marsh.*] Is the military possession of the Bahamas of great consequence in time of war?—They do not contain any very good harbours for large ships of war.

647. Mr. *Fortescue.*] They may come under the same class of dependencies as the West India Islands?—Yes.

648. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Except as a strategical station, have they any importance?—No importance in any other point of view; but although of no great use to large vessels of war, they might be inconvenient to us as stations for privateers if they belonged to another country.

649. Sir *George Grey.*] Are you aware of a recent occurrence on which a ship with slaves on board touched there, and insisted on obtaining provisions, in consequence of which some ships of war were ordered there?—I have heard something of it.

650. *Chairman.*] The next dependency in the return is St. Helena; and I observe that the total cost is given; the return for the year ending 31st March 1859, is given as 35,447*l.*, exclusive of transport?—That is the amount of Imperial cost.

651. I observe that the amount of Colonial contribution is 453*l.*?—That is so.

652. Can you tell the Committee to what purpose that is applied?—It is for the local militia.

653. Sir *George Grey.*] What does the force of 426 infantry consist of?—The force consists of the St. Helena Regiment; it is a corps recruited in England, chiefly from volunteers from regiments of the line, to serve at St. Helena for a limited time.

654. The corps is stationary?—It is stationary; the men only serve there for a limited time. Men of that class are averse to being indefinitely shut up in small and remote islands; they have no objection to go to St. Helena for a few years, but recruits could not be obtained except upon the condition that they were at the end of that time to serve in the army elsewhere.

655. They are transferred to some other regiment?—Yes.

656. *Chairman.*] Are the St. Helena corps on the same footing as the West India regiments?—The officers at St. Helena are borne on the strength of the army.

657. Sir *George Grey.*] As a regiment there is no expense for transport?—The regiment is not moved bodily: the individual soldiers have to be sent out and taken away.

658. You consider that St. Helena is a military dependency and is not a colony, in the sense of being a place for the settlement of Englishmen?—I do.

659. It stands on the same footing as the Mediterranean stations?—The importance of St. Helena is that it lies in the direct homeward track of all ships returning by way of the Cape of Good Hope.

660. You consider that one of the objects is to protect the course of our trade?—It is.

661. Mr. *Marsh.*] One of the objects of the Cape Colony, you consider, is to protect our trade?—That is one of the objects of the Cape, among many others.

662. *Chairman.*] The Falkland Islands appear next in the return. The total Imperial military expenditure given for the Falkland Islands for the year ending 21st March 1859, exclusive of transport, is 1,744*l.*?—Yes.

663. There is no Colonial contribution?—There is not.

664. The total number of troops is stated to be 37?—Yes.

665. Is there a local corps?—They form what is called a garrison company; they are soldiers, I believe, who go specially to serve their time at the Falklands and be discharged there. The force consists of one officer and of a force of about 36 married men, selected for good conduct, and of not less than 15 years' service.

666. They are Englishmen, of course?—They are.

667. Mr. *Adderley.*] What do you consider the importance of that position?—Several years ago, but within my recollection, the Falklands were occupied

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chiefly at the instance of the Board of Admiralty of that time; and the Colonial Board of Land and Emigration, of which I was then a member, rather deprecated the occupation of those islands, thinking it might entail useless expense.

668. In what year was that?—In 1841. The Admiralty thought that as so large a trade came home by the way of Cape Horn (and since that time the gold fields have been discovered), it might be important to have a small British establishment there, to prevent its being turned to bad uses by other parties.

669. It is a naval station in the line of trade?—Yes.

670. *Chairman.*] Jamaica is the next dependency appearing in the return. The total military expenditure, excluding transport, for the year ending 31st March 1859, is given at 113,949*l.*?—Yes.

671. And the total Colonial contribution is given at 182*l.*?—Yes.

672. In the return it is stated that 182*l.* is spent in the custody of arms and stores?—Yes, belonging to the local militia.

673. It is no contribution towards the pay of troops?—Certainly not.

674. The number of men of all ranks is stated in the return at 1,568, including the staff?—Yes.

675. What does the force consist of?—The infantry consists of one British regiment of the line, and some West India regiments or parts of West India regiments; there are about 180 of them distributed between Kingstown, Port Royal, and Spanish Town; about 240 are in camp, and at the last return 500 at Newcastle; that is, doubtless, the British regiment at the healthy station; and 16 men detached.

676. Can you state where the West India regiments are now recruited?—Chiefly in the West India Islands. Formerly the West India regiments were recruited exclusively from liberated Africans, that is to say, negroes captured in slave vessels taken to Sierra Leone. After their release, becoming at the disposal of the Crown, those men were made into soldiers, and I am told that they were exceedingly docile and obedient, and particularly trustworthy in the West Indies. The slaves generally belonged to tribes different from the African tribes who furnish the creole negroes. When the slave trade was much reduced, there were no longer any liberated Africans from whom to recruit, and then the regiments were recruited in the islands themselves.

677. Sir *George Grey.*] How long is it since no contribution was made by Jamaica towards the Colonial military expenditure; some years ago did not Jamaica pay a considerable proportion of the military expenses?—That is the case. They used to grant what was called island subsistence, and to provide barracks.

678. Was it not a considerable sum which Jamaica contributed towards the military expenses?—Yes; Jamaica contributed towards the maintenance of the Imperial troops for, I should think, fully a century.

679. And a considerable sum?—A considerable sum.

680. Can you inform the Committee when that ceased?—In 1845, but a British regiment was at the same time withdrawn with the express purpose of not suffering any increase of expense to this country by the change.

681. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Jamaica has been for several years in a state of very great financial depression, has she not?—She has.

682. From which she is only now beginning to recover?—Yes.

683. *Chairman.*] Have you any means of knowing that Jamaica is beginning to recover from her financial depression?—I know it only from the general tenor of the reports.

684. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you consider that that financial depression was the cause of their ceasing to make contribution?—I do.

685. *Chairman.*] Honduras is the next Colony stated in the return; I find that the total Imperial expenditure upon the troops, for the year ending 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport, is given at 29,609*l.*?—It is.

686. Honduras, I believe, contributes nothing?—Nothing.

687. And never has done?—And never has done.

688. What is the total number of troops in Honduras?—The total number of rank and file of all arms and ranks is 413, including the staff.

689. Where is the infantry?—There are 230 at Honduras and about 100 at the Bay Islands.

690. Are they black troops?—Yes.

691. I believe the Governor of Jamaica is also Governor of Honduras, is he not?—

not?—Yes; he corresponds with Honduras and forwards to the Colonial Department the reports of the superintendent of that settlement.

692. Mr. *Marsh.*] Could the black troops be depended upon to defend the Colony against an European power?—In the case of all these garrisons, the object is rather mixed; in case either of war or of serious disturbances the troops would be available.

693. Against any European power they would not be so valuable?—I understand that they are obedient men and brave troops.

694. Is Honduras a colony now or only a settlement?—We still call it only a settlement.

695. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think that the black troops could be relied upon in case of a revolt of blacks?—Of revolt, in the ordinary sense, there is no danger. The blacks, both civil and military, are very loyal. In case of commotions, I believe that the black troops could be relied upon. This has been fully discussed, and we have received able reports on both sides within the last few months. These men contract the feeling of soldiers, and become attached to their officers, if well managed.

696. *Chairman.*] Are there any returns in your department, or have any been presented to Parliament recently, giving, for a series of years, the percentage of military mortality in the West Indies?—I believe that the War Department have valuable returns on the subject.

697. The Windward and Leeward Islands, including British Guiana, appear next in the return. The total Imperial military expenditure for the year ending 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport, is given at 196,300 *l.*?—Yes.

698. And the total Colonial contribution is given in the return at 32,481 *l.*?—Yes.

699. Can you state to what purpose that contribution is applied?—Yes, a large portion of it consists of an annual expenditure in the Colony of British Guiana, on what they call sea defences; I believe they are embankments to protect the forts and barracks from the sea.

700. I observe in the return, that there are stated to be militia and volunteers; does any portion of that expenditure of 32,481 *l.* apply to the cost of militia and volunteers?—A small portion.

701. Have you any information as to the numbers in the Windward and Leeward Islands?—We have a return of about 530 militia and volunteers in British Guiana, and we have reason to believe that there are some small numbers of militia in some of the islands.

702. Will you give us the distribution of the troops in the Windward and Leeward Islands?—On the 1st January 1859 there were at Barbadoes, 1,176; St. Lucia, 181; Trinidad, 295; Antigua, 100; Guiana, 435; giving a total of 2,187. They are chiefly black troops.

703. Have you any returns stating where the troops in British Guiana are, whether they are all at George Town or dispersed in the Colony?—In Demerara 348, and 87 in Berbice.

704. State in which of the Windward and Leeward Islands, if any, there are fortifications?—That is a question that could be best answered by the War Department.

705. Do you know whether those fortifications are the property of the Colonial or of the Imperial Government?—In the West Indies they are the property of the Imperial Government, and were built at the expense of Great Britain.

706. Sir *George Grey.*] I see, in these returns, for the year ending 31st March 1859, that there is a sum of 10,746 *l.* for barracks in the Windward and Leeward Islands. I presume that is not an annually recurring sum?—That must have been an exceptional year, because, by the return for the year ending March 1858, contained in the Departmental Report, the total amount for barracks and forts, both included in the previous year, was not above 5,000 *l.*

707. Mr. *Adderley.*] Is there any extra pay in these islands?—There are some small allowances to commissioned officers in Guiana, but there is no extra pay to the troops generally.

708. Mr. *Baring.*] Is there anything in the Army Estimates this year for barracks in the Windward and Leeward Islands?—Only a very trifling sum.

709. Sir *George Grey.*] I observe that in the same year a sum is entered of 5,562 *l.*

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5,562 *l.* for barracks in Jamaica; that, I presume, stands upon the same footing as the sum charged for barracks in the Windward and Leeward Islands?—It must have been for a special service.

710. Mr. *Adderley.*] Are these payments to commissioned officers made by the Colony, or by the Home Government?—By the Colony.

711. Can you state from which of these islands the Colonial contribution of 32,000 *l.* chiefly comes?—Chiefly from British Guiana.

712. Does any portion of that come from Barbadoes?—No.

713. *Chairman.*] Is there any correspondence between the Colonial Department and the Government of British Guiana on the subject of Imperial expenditure?—No material correspondence that I know of.

714. The next dependency in the return is Ceylon. It appears that the total Imperial military expenditure in Ceylon for the year ending 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport, was 119,728 *l.*?—Yes.

715. And the Colonial contribution is stated at 85,851 *l.*?—Yes.

716. What was the total number of Imperial troops in Ceylon during the same period, including the staff?—2,470.

717. What is the position of the force?—At the last return I have seen, the force was composed of one regiment of the line, and of the Ceylon regiment, which is about 1,100 strong.

718. Sir *George Grey.*] I see that the sum of 85,851 *l.* is put down as the total Colonial military expenditure for Ceylon; there is a memorandum also that the sum of 24,000 *l.* is received annually from Ceylon in aid of the total military expenditure; is that included in the 85,851 *l.* or is it in addition to it?—It is included in it: by an arrangement made in 1837, Ceylon contributes a fixed sum of 24,000 *l.* a year towards the British military expenditure; the Colony also pays certain local allowances to the troops, and incurs an outlay for rations and likewise for forts and buildings, of which the effect has been to raise its expenditure, in the year under the notice of the Committee, to 85,000 *l.*

719. Mr. *Adderley.*] If Ceylon were annexed to India, it would, according to our relations with India, have to pay the whole of its expenses?—It would.

720. Sir *George Grey.*] That is, the Indian revenue would have to pay; you do not mean that the expense would be charged exclusively on the revenues of Ceylon?—No, I do not mean that; the Indian Government would have to provide the revenue from whatever source it thought proper.

721-2. Mr. *Adderley.*] I presume that if Ceylon were a part of the Indian Empire it would bear its full share of the taxes of the country?—If it were annexed to the Indian Empire it would, of course, pay its proper share of taxation towards the expenses of the Indian Government; and it is the case that whilst it is a dependency of Great Britain it contributes the large sum I have mentioned, but does not defray its whole military expenditure.

723. Probably it pays less than half the sum that it would have to pay as a portion of the Indian Empire?—It pays less than one-half of the whole military expenditure under the present arrangements.

724. Mr. *Baring.*] Are you aware whether the different presidencies in India, such as Burmah and Singapore, pay their actual proportion of the whole military expenditure?—I have no official information on the subject, but I suppose that those smaller governments cannot pay in proportion.

725. The contribution paid by Ceylon towards the military expenditure of the Indian Empire would depend upon the arrangements which might be made by the Indian Government?—It would.

726. *Chairman.*] It appears by the return that the total Imperial military expenditure for Mauritius for the year ending the 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport was 72,247 *l.*?—Yes.

727. And the total Colonial expenditure towards its defences is given at 22,642 *l.*?—Yes.

728. What is the total number of troops?—959, including the staff.

729. That must have been for one British regiment?—Yes.

730. Sir *George Grey.*] Besides artillery and engineers?—Besides artillery and engineers.

731. *Chairman.*] The return states that at Labuan there are no Queen's troops, but that the cost repaid to the late East India Company for the force maintained at Labuan was 6,897 *l.*?—Yes.

732. Sir

732. Sir *George Grey.*] Is that an annual payment?—Yes, the expense continues, although for a lesser amount; there used to be between 130 and 140 sepoys, but they are now reduced to 100.

733. *Chairman.*] Labuan contributes nothing to its expenditure, I believe?—Nothing.

734. For Sierra Leone the total Imperial military expenditure for the year ending 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport, is given at 26,158 *l.*?—Yes.

735. What was the total colonial contribution?—£. 385; the force amounted to 372.

736. Sir *George Grey.*] Is that, with the exception of the staff, wholly a black force?—It is wholly a black force.

737. Does that always stay at Sierra Leone, or is it exchanged with the black force in the West Indies?—It is exchanged with the black force; in fact, it consists of detachments of West India regiments.

738. *Chairman.*] For Gambia the total Imperial military expenditure for the year ending 31st March 1859, exclusive of transport, is given at 26,729 *l.*, and the colonial contribution 160 *l.*, the strength being 360?—Yes; and the force is composed in the same manner as that at Sierra Leone.

739. For the Gold Coast the total military expenditure in the same year was 16,348 *l.*, the local military expenditure 330 *l.*, and the strength 298?—Yes; but at the Gold Coast there is a force called the Gold Coast Corps, which is recruited on the spot, but officered by Englishmen.

740. Sir *George Grey.*] Is that a stationary force?—It is.

741. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is that a force of artillery?—Yes.

742. Mr. *Adderley.*] I observe a decrease in all the items of expenditure relating to Sierra Leone, Gambia, and the Gold Coast, since 1858: what is the cause of that decrease?—I do not know.

Jovis, 25° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Adderley.
Mr. T. G. Baring.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Childers.
Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Sir George Grey.
Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Mills.

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. *Henry William Sharp Whiffin*, called in; and Examined.

Mr. *H. W. S. Whiffin.*

25 April 1861.

743. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are Assistant Accountant General in the War Department?—Yes.

744. The finance of that department is brought specially under your supervision?—It has been during the last six months only.

745. How long have you been connected with the department?—With the service generally, about 20 years.

746. Before that, you were in the Ordnance Department, I believe?—Down to the year 1856.

747. Returns have been put in before this Committee, purporting to show the amount of Colonial contributions towards the military expenditure in the Colonies, for the year ending 31st March 1859. Can you give the Committee some information as to the mode in which those sums, and in what proportion, have been brought into the credit of the Imperial Exchequer. With regard to the North American Colonies, which stand at the head of the return, can you tell us whether any proportion of the sums given in that return, as the amount of Colonial contribution, has found its way in any form into the Imperial Exchequer?—The contribution from Canada does not pass through the War Office accounts.

748. No portion of it?—No portion of it.

749. Has any proportion of that sum in respect of the other North American Colonies found its way into the Imperial Exchequer?—There is no contribution by these Colonies, so far as I am aware of; I believe there is none that is paid to the credit of the Army service by the North American Colonies.

750. Have you any official information as regards the application of that sum which is given in the return as under the head of Colonial contribution, in regard to the North American Colonies?—None whatever. I do not know anything with reference thereto in connexion with the North American Colonies.

751. With respect to that item given in the return as Colonial contribution, in respect of the Australian colonies, I observe that there are sums which are given in the return in respect of the Colony of New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia. Can you give the Committee any information, or put in any return, which will show what proportion of those sums has been brought to the credit of the Imperial Government?—I am not able to identify the actual sums shown in the return, but I can give information with reference to a contribution paid by the Colony, as it appears in the Army Accounts. The arrangement, so far as New South Wales is concerned, I believe to be this: that the Colony issues 6*d.* a day to the men, and the men are entitled to Imperial pay also. The sum which appears to the credit of the Estimates is an advance made by the Colony to regimental paymasters. With reference to Victoria, the Colony provides the actual expenditure on account of pay and allowances of all the troops in excess of four companies, and they also give an allowance to the staff; the staff allowances are paid to the officers individually, and do not pass through the Imperial Exchequer. With reference to Victoria, a large sum is voted by the Colonial Parliament, and that is paid over to the officer

officer commanding the Queen's troops, and is divided among the officers on the station, but never finds its way into the Imperial Exchequer. The Colony of South Australia pays for all above one company.

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752. In the return for the Cape of Good Hope I find a sum of 40,467*l.* under the head of Colonial Military Expenditure?—No part of that, so far as I am aware, for the year 1858-59, was credited to the Imperial Government at the date at which this account was made up, and, therefore, that sum must be the expenditure of the Colony with reference to the military expenditure which does not pass through the Army Accounts.

753. Under the same head I find a sum of 453*l.* with reference to St. Helena?—The same observation will apply to that.

754. For Jamaica, I find a sum of 182*l.*?—No portion of that is credited to the Imperial Exchequer.

755. Does the same remark apply to the Windward and Leeward Islands?—No portion of that, so far as I am aware, is credited to the Imperial Exchequer.

756. Or British Guiana?—That does not appear in this return; it is included in the Windward and Leeward Islands.

757. With reference to Ceylon I find a sum of 85,851*l.*, can you inform the Committee whether any portion of that finds its way into the Imperial Exchequer?—The only portion of that which finds its way into the Imperial Exchequer, is a fixed contribution of 24,000*l.* per annum, which is given, I believe, by the Colony in aid of military expenditure, and in addition to that, the Colony grants to the officers, staff, regimental, and departmental, what is called a Colonial allowance, and that is granted in lieu of rations of provisions, fuel, light, lodgings, forage, and servants' allowances, and doubtless in consequence also of its proximity to India, where very liberal allowances are granted; it also covers the expense of lodging-money and servants allowances. The Imperial Government merely pays the ordinary regimental pay of the officers and men. The Colony of Ceylon also takes upon itself the commissariat portion of the duty; we have no commissariat establishment in Ceylon, the whole of that expense being defrayed out of the Colonial revenue, and that, doubtless, forms a part of the 85,851*l.* which appears in this return.

758. For Mauritius, I find the sum of 22,634*l.* put down as the Colonial military expenditure. What portion, if any, of that finds its way into the Imperial Exchequer?—Of that sum, 10,000*l.* per annum finds its way directly into the Imperial Exchequer. That is shown by a statement at the end of the Army Estimates; but in addition to the 10,000*l.* contributed by Mauritius for the military expenditure, the Colony in the same manner as Ceylon, pays what is called a Colonial allowance; it is not exactly on the same scale as the Ceylon allowance, but it is equally liberal; that never finds its way into the Imperial Exchequer. We know very little about it; that is, we have not the adjustment of it; we know that the allowance exists, and I believe the Secretary of State for War is referred to, but it is rather a question between the Colony and the officers.

759. For Sierra Leone, Gambia, and the Gold Coast, I find other items given. Does any portion of those find its way into the Imperial Exchequer?—The stations on the west coast of Africa do not contribute any sum in aid of the army expenditure; the amounts must be small items paid by the Colony, not strictly applicable to army service proper, or probably for stores supplied. The information which I give with reference to New South Wales is subject to correction, because it is only within the last day or two that I have had notice to attend this Committee, and therefore I have not been able to get very full information as regards New South Wales.

760. Should you be able to put in before this Committee a return for those Colonies which you have mentioned as making payments, showing what proportion, during the average of the last five years, has been paid into the Imperial Exchequer, in respect of the Colonial expenditure of those Colonies?—You will find in the Army Estimates, for the last five years, a statement showing the actual sum paid over to the Exchequer as contribution by each station; if necessary, I can give a statement showing the detail making up those items.

761. Does this return to which you have alluded in the Army Estimates, give at page 154, the total amount of the Colonial payments which have found

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their way into the Imperial Exchequer from the Colonies, to which that return alludes?—It gives the amount brought to account during the twelvemonth ended the 31st December previously. You will see a small item of 597*l.* from Victoria, but that dates back as far as the year 1854–5; it is an adjustment account, so that you must not be entirely guided by what you see in the estimates; you must not imagine that that is the amount contributed by the Colony for that year; it is the money brought to account during that year, and that amount was paid over to the Exchequer.

762. Would it be possible for you to procure and give in before this Committee a return, showing the actual average payments during a period of years, which have found their way into the Imperial Exchequer?—We can give the actual payments; you will not require an average.

763. Procure and put in before the Committee a return of that description for the last 10 years?—I will do so.

764. This return which has been put in, showing the expenditure incurred for the British dependencies, in the year ending March 31st, 1859, gives all the details in regard to all the Colonies. Can you supply us with a similar return for the year ending March 31st, 1860?—A return of that kind collected from every description of account we have, will take some time to prepare, but it may be done within the next two or three weeks.

765. Sir *George Grey.*] You say that, with regard to some Colonies, the figures which appear in this return, as the Colonial expenditure, are not brought to account at all in this country. Is it not the case that there is no contribution by these Colonies towards the Imperial expenditure, and that these figures represent simply Colonial expenditure?—I believe so; but I am also under the impression that at Demerara, for instance, in the Windward and Leeward Islands command, the Colony grants a certain allowance to the officers; of this, however, I am not quite certain.

766. Is not that extra allowance an addition to the pay voted in the estimates of this country?—Yes, if granted; and it is analogous to the contribution made by Victoria to the staff officers; it does not find its way into the Imperial Exchequer, nor is it recognised as an Imperial transaction.

767. Is any portion of it applicable to a diminution of the sum granted by Parliament towards the pay of the men?—Inversely, I think it may be; if the Colony did not make that contribution it would be a justification for the officers requiring a more liberal allowance, and therefore, negatively, it is a benefit to the Imperial Exchequer,

768. You mean, if the colony did not pay, a claim might arise on the part of the officers and men, that the Imperial Government should give them extra pay?—Yes.

769. Is there any sum voted in the estimates towards that allowance?—Yes; in some of our Australian Colonies we grant an allowance of 5*s.* a day to the officers, on account of the dearness of provisions. That arose about the time of the gold discoveries.

770. Is there any extra allowance provided by the Colony in those cases, over and above the 5*s.* a day?—It is an allowance in those Colonies when no provision is made from Colonial revenues; for instance, New Zealand, Tasmania, and Western Australia.

771. I am speaking of those Colonies to which reference was made just now, in which contributions are made, no portion of which comes to the Imperial Exchequer. I ask whether those contributions are applicable in diminution of any portion of the sum voted in our estimates?—I cannot give a general answer to that question. If you ask with reference to any particular Colony, I will endeavour to explain it.

772. For the North American Colonies, I find a sum of 35,170*l.*, and for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, 92*l.*, under the head of Colonial Expenditure: I want to know whether any portion of that is applicable to the reduction of the sum voted upon our estimates for the pay and allowances of the troops serving in the North American Colonies, or whether it is applicable to Colonial expenditure, quite independent of the provision made in our estimates?—So far as we are aware, it would not be any reduction of the army expenditure, because we have no knowledge of the amount paid by the Colony; this sum of 35,176*l.* must be for some Colonial expenses that we know nothing whatever of.

773. Where a Colonial contribution does find its way into the Imperial Exchequer,

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Exchequer, in what way is that brought into account: is the whole sum voted in the Army Estimates; and what is paid by the Colony in reduction, paid into the Exchequer, or are the Army Estimates voted minus that sum, which is paid by the Colony?—The whole amount of the contribution is paid over to the Exchequer, and forms no deduction of the Army Estimates, but is applicable to the general revenue of the country; it goes to Ways and Means. The mode of bringing the items to account varies at different stations; at Malta the amount contributed is paid to the Comptroller of the Treasury Chest, and it finds its way to the Commissioners of Audit; and then we are advised of it by the Lords of the Treasury, and ultimately it finds its way to the Exchequer.

774. Does any portion of it find its way to the War Department, so as to be applicable for the military expenditure of the empire; or does it find its way to the general Exchequer of the country?—The general Exchequer of the country.

775. Your system would, every year, show the exact sum received from the Colony?—Yes; and we have no power over that money, because the Appropriation Auditor would not allow us to credit that to one of our votes.

776. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] You have explained, with respect to these payments and contributions of the Colonial revenue, which appears at the end of the Army Estimates, that these come into the Exchequer?—Yes.

777. And are not in any way placed to the credit of the Army votes?—No, we have no knowledge of them whatever. Then, again, with reference to Victoria, where the Colonial Parliament vote a sum of between 7,000 *l.* and 8,000 *l.* a year, on account of staff expenses, that, instead of being brought into the Army Estimates, and being shown among the other portions of the contributions, is given over to the officer commanding Her Majesty's troops, and divided among the officers of the station, and never finds its way into the Army accounts at all.

778. Are any payments made out of the Colonial contributions, which are also voted in the Army Estimates; that is to say, are the allowances of troops in any Colony voted in the Army Estimates, and really paid by the Colony, so that there is a saving, in any case, upon the general Army Estimates by the payment of this, indirectly, by the Colony?—No, but a saving accrues to Imperial revenues, *e. g.* with reference to Ceylon and the Mauritius, if the Colony did not grant an allowance, we should have to find barrack accommodation and lodging-money, which the troops obtain on the other stations.

779. Would not that be a saving of the sum actually voted by Parliament, and enable Parliament to vote less money?—Yes.

780. What I want to know is whether there are any other sums voted by Parliament which are paid not by Parliament, but by the Colony?—Not that I am aware of, because we should be getting the money twice over.

781. When you say there is a saving upon the Army vote, you mean that if the Colony did not pay this money, the British taxpayers would be obliged to pay it?—Yes.

782. You do not mean that there is money voted which is paid by the Colony?—Take the Australian Colonies during the year 1859, there were two regiments there, we voted the full amount of pay and allowances to those regiments; that is included in the Army Estimates; but the contribution by the Colony is paid into the Exchequer.

783. So that the money that is voted is applied to the service for which it is voted?—Yes.

784. Mr. *Marsh.*] But it appears in the estimate that it cost the whole sum?—Yes: the full amount is voted by Parliament, and the amount which the Colony contributes, reverts to the Exchequer, otherwise we should get the money twice over.

785. It comes in another statement?—Yes.

786. Sir *George Grey.*] When you say that Parliament vote the pay and allowances to the troops in Australia, do you mean the Colonial allowances?—No; what we term allowances are the contingent allowances to the captains of companies, command money, allowances for forage, issues of fuel, light, and provisions; with reference to the men, good conduct pay, and other allowances.

787. Given universally?—Wherever they are, it is a part of their pay.

788. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] Do you think it would be an advantageous change in the system, that all contributions from the Colonies should be paid into the

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Exchequer, and that no contribution should be paid in the Colony?—I have been long of that opinion that it would be very desirable that the whole amount contributed by the Colony should be handed over to the Imperial Government, and that we should then make such arrangements as we might think necessary, with the officers and men at each of our stations.

789. We should then vote the gross expenditure in the Army Estimates, and the Exchequer would receive all contributions from the Colony, in aid of that Expenditure?—That would be a question of discretion with regard to the exchequer receiving it. My own view of it is, that the amount contributed by the Colony should be deducted from the Estimate; this is a question worthy of great consideration; formerly the deduction from the Estimates was made by what is called the appropriations in aid, the contributions were deducted from the aggregate vote; and it might be with propriety done now by deducting the actual amount paid by the Colony, we will say to the 31st December on each year, and when the Estimates are presented to Parliament for the total amount of keeping up our troops, there would be deducted from the gross amount the sum actually paid by the Colony for contribution for the previous year.

790. So that then you would have the actual sum, and there would be no uncertainty with regard to the contributions made?—Exactly, and then Parliament would see the actual sum paid by each Colony, and instead of going to Parliament for 12 or 14,000,000 *l.*, our Army Estimates might be reduced by the actual sums paid by the Colonies.

791. That of course depends upon the general principle of giving appropriations in aid of votes according to the Treasury Minute of May 1848; I believe it was decided that all credits made, whether by sale of stores, or any other credits should be paid entirely into the Exchequer in aid of the votes?—Yes, but that has not been insisted upon, because you will find that in the Army Estimates for many years past we do make deductions on the estimates. For instance, take the contributions for hospital expenses, and provisions, we do not deduct the gross amount of the hospital expenses, or the gross amount of provisions, but we vote the net amount for these services.

792. Carrying out the principle, that all payments in aid of votes should be paid direct into the Exchequer, would it not be right that the whole of the expenses of the army employed in India should be borne by the Army Estimates, and the whole of the payments made by the Government of India, or the Company rather, should be paid into the Exchequer?—Unquestionably; you would treat India as one of our own Colonies, and then we should apply to Parliament for the net allowances which we should require for the army proper, after deducting the several allowances made by the Colonies.

793. If the amounts paid by the Colonies into the Exchequer are to be uniform, the amount paid by India ought to be paid into the Exchequer, and the gross cost borne by the Army Estimates?—Yes.

794. That is not done?—No.

795. Therefore the system carried out in India is inconsistent with the rule that all the contributions should be paid into the Exchequer?—Yes; and in consequence of that there are numerous anomalies. There are cases in which we have to vote money and give it back the next day.

796. As an instance of that, will you explain what takes place at the Royal Academy at Woolwich?—At Woolwich and at Sandhurst also, but more particularly at Woolwich, you will find in the Estimates that the expenses are about 25,000*l.* per annum, and the friends of the gentleman cadets contribute within a few hundred pounds of that sum; therefore we go to Parliament and ask for 25,000*l.*, and 24,500*l.* of that we get back again, and the amount contributed is paid into the Exchequer.

797. Is not the effect of that, on the whole, to swell the apparent amount of the cost of the army in the Army Estimates?—Yes. With reference to this year's Estimates, for instance, the Army Estimates might actually be reduced by half a million.

798. Would you advocate, then, that the fixed payments should be paid in to the credit of the vote, or deducted from the votes?—All those fixed payments, for instance, the Colonial contributions, should be deducted after realisation, and the amount actually realised in the previous year shown.

799. Would

799. Would you deduct the actual receipts of the year before from the Estimates of the following year?—Of the following year.

800. And in that way the department would have no power, by under-estimating the receipts, to spend money of which Parliament was not cognizant?—Exactly; because it resolves itself then into a question of cash. We receive from Colonial resources a certain sum, which we should give credit for in our Estimates; and instead of, when we open our new year's account, debiting ourselves with the amount voted by Parliament, we should say, "Amount voted by Parliament, so much;" and then bring to our debit the contributions by the Colonies, actually brought to the credit of army services through the military accounts during the financial year. By this arrangement we should have no further control over the money than we have now.

801. Would there be any difficulty in carrying out that arrangement?—I should think not.

802. Mr. *Childers.*] Referring to that half million which you say would go in reduction of the army expenditure, is half of it the proceeds of the sale of stores?—Yes, a very large proportion of it: 224,000 *l.*

803. And under no possible system could that be allowed to go in reduction?—If you admit the principle of deductions on the estimates for Colonial contributions it could be extended to stores.

804. But it would be contrary to the Treasury Minute, and to all the principles upon which every department is governed?—At present it is contrary to the Treasury Minute.

805. So that you would not have to make a change with reference to the Army Estimates alone, but to the whole department?—It refers to the Navy Estimates also, but the Navy are not in the position in which we are, in reference to our receipts, we really bear upon our Estimates a very large sum for which we get no credit whatever.

806. Do you not also find that there is a sum of 30,000 *l.* contributed by men who purchase their discharge?—Yes.

807. That could not go in reduction, could it?—Upon the same principle; that is, if you take the amount actually realised, for we have to increase our Estimate for the succeeding year.

808. Then again there are tolls and rents?—For rents particularly we should take it, because we have to pay rents, in cases in which we have taken property for a term of years, and in those cases we have actually to pay the rents, and the party to whom we let the same repays us the amount which we have to pay over to the Exchequer.

809. But still if all these sums were to go in reduction, you would have to alter the principle upon which all these sums are treated?—It would be an alteration of the system.

810. Is it not merely a question of the contribution from the Colony, but the whole principle upon which that amount is obtained, would have to be changed?—It would alter the system.

811. Mr. *Marsh.*] With reference to Ceylon, does the Imperial Exchequer pay the expenses of the Ceylon rifles?—Yes.

812. Are you aware that the Ceylon Rifles are employed very often as police, and that they have relinquished the rifle, and taken to the weapon of the country?—I am not aware of it; we make provision for the pay.

813. Mr. *Fortescue.*] I want to ascertain exactly the component parts of the expenditure given in the last column but three of this return called "Total of the Colonial Expenditure." Am I right in supposing that the sums given in that column represent three classes of contribution; first of all they represent, do they not, contributions from Colonies in repayment of Imperial expenditure actually voted by Parliament?—With reference to the column headed "total of the Colonial Expenditure," that paper was made out in the Colonial Office; I am, therefore, not in a position to give any definite explanation of it.

814. As far as your knowledge goes, perhaps you will answer my question. It will comprise, will it not, first, contributions from Colonies in repayment of expenditure actually voted by Parliament, such as contributions from Ceylon, and the Mauritius, or contributions in aid of Imperial pay?—I should think so, but I am not in a position to give any positive information about it; I should only assume so by seeing that at Ceylon, for instance, there is a contribution

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of 85,000 *l.*; we know a portion of that, 24,000 *l.* is paid direct into the Imperial Exchequer; and we know also that the Colony makes a very liberal allowance to the officers.

815. If it is a correct return, it must, in the first place, include such contributions as I have mentioned?—Undoubtedly.

816. It must next include, must it not, Colonial allowances for the troops, such as you have described, and the cost of barracks and lodgings, and so on?—All those expenses.

817. Expenditure, which if not provided for by the Colony, would probably have to be provided by the Imperial Government, if the troops were left upon that station?—Yes.

818. And in the third place, it must necessarily include, must it not, Colonial expenditure for military objects, such as forts, and the cost of guns, and the cost of militia and volunteers, with which we have nothing to do in this country?—Yes it does, no doubt.

819. What are your means of knowledge of the expenditure incurred by the Colonies, in each of these three cases; in the first case, I suppose your means of knowledge are complete?—They are complete, to a certain extent. We will confine ourselves to Ceylon: all we know is, that we get from the Colony of Ceylon 24,000 *l.* in aid of the military expenditure; that is the full extent of our knowledge.

820. Is that a fixed yearly sum?—Yes.

821. Of the same nature as the contribution of the Ionian Islands?—Not exactly; the same as the Mauritius, I would say.

822. Now, with respect to the Colonial allowances; what is your means of knowledge of their amount and character?—We have no official knowledge; that is a question entirely between the Colony and the officers; all we know is, that in the Colony of Ceylon we grant no allowances to officers.

823. Do you mean that no department in the War Office has any official knowledge as a matter of course, of the amount and character of these Colonial allowances?—We might know incidentally, in fact we have got a table or statement showing the amount which each officer is entitled to, but whether that officer gets more or less, or whether he gets it at all, we do not know.

824. Then with respect to these Colonial allowances, there are no definite proposals made to the War Office from the Governors of the Colony through the Colonial Office or otherwise which have received the sanction of the Secretary of State for War, and then become the fixed Colonial allowances?—I believe not, but it would be in this way: supposing a class of officers entitled to an increased relative rank; for instance, we have put the officers in the army upon a classification as regards rank; we have been elevating certain officers as regards rank; that may bear upon the question of allowances, but the Colony may continue the allowance or not; the officer who has received the increase of rank might expect the increased allowance, but the Colony might resist that, and we should have no power to coerce the Colony to give the increased allowance.

825. In such a case as that does not the officer commanding in Ceylon, make a representation to the Governor, which together with the reply is sent home to the Colonial Office?—He would make a report that the officer was of such and such a rank, and would suggest that he would be entitled to such and such allowances, but the actual power of granting allowances would rest with the Colony.

826. I think, in the case of Ceylon, I recollect a correspondence with the Governor on the subject of the allowances. I take it that correspondence has been forwarded to the War Office?—Yes; it might be forwarded to the War Office, but we could only pass an opinion.

827. It is a matter with the Colonial Government?—Yes; because the payments of the allowances do not come through our hands at all; we know that the officers get the allowances, or are supposed to get them, but they are not treated as a matter of account.

828. With respect to the third class of expenditure, namely, the purely Colonial expenditure, undertaken by the Colonial authorities, for the purchase of arms and other things of that kind, I suppose your only information is derived from such despatches as are forwarded to you by the Colonial Office?—In many instances they would not communicate with us at all; for instance, as regards

regards the expenses of the volunteers and militia; as regards the militia, they might, but it is a question whether they would communicate with us with respect to the volunteers, although that is put down here as a part of the military expenditure.

829. There is a great deal of correspondence, is there not, between the War Office and the Colonial Office with respect to the supply of arms?—Yes, and as regards the supply of arms to the Colonies for civil purposes, the Colony actually pay the War Office for the arms issued, and that also would form a part of this Colonial expenditure.

830. Mr. *Childers.*] You say that where a Colony grants an allowance, the War Office has no official knowledge of it; there is no uniform system, and you know nothing more than the fact as far as your department is concerned?—So far as I am personally concerned, and my own knowledge goes; that is with reference to the Colonial allowances granted to officers.

831. Now with reference to the expenditure at Victoria, I think you said that the Colonial Government at the present time pay the Imperial pay and allowances of the troops above a certain number?—Yes, beyond four companies.

832. They also pay a certain allowance to the staff?—Yes.

833. They also pay, I believe, some of the contingencies which otherwise would be charged upon Vote No. 10?—I think I limited my observations to the effect of the two first.

834. Then we will have the two first. The Colony of Victoria has had more than four companies for the last 10 years?—Yes, I believe so.

835. During that time they have paid at least that excess upon the Imperial pay?—I have no knowledge of that, but I should assume that it is so.

836. So far as you are aware the Colony has paid the Imperial expenditure of all but four companies?—Whatever amount the Colony has paid, has duly appeared in the estimates to the credit of the Exchequer year by year.

837. In the present Estimates, and the Estimates of last year, there are votes for the entire payment of the allowances to the troops stationed in Victoria?—Yes, with respect to the 40th regiment you will find the full amount of pay and allowances; that is Imperial pay and Imperial allowances, voted in the Army Estimates.

838. Yet as a matter of fact, the Colony has paid the Imperial pay and allowances for all above four companies?—Yes.

839. Do we find any contribution from the Colony of Victoria in the statement?—The Colony is liable to it, but whether they have actually paid it or not, I am not aware. If it be paid, it would be included in the present year, to the credit of the Exchequer. If they have not, I assume that the amount is still outstanding to the debit of the Colony.

840. Is it not within your knowledge that the Colony has for the last 10 years uniformly paid it?—I believe they have paid it year by year.

841. And is it not also within your knowledge that as a matter of fact it does not appear in that statement?—There is no contribution this year.

842. Is it not a matter of fact that no such contribution answering to the amount of the Imperial pay of those companies in excess, has appeared for some years?—You will find in the previous year's Estimates, I think, a contribution of 14,000*l.*

843. In the Colony of Victoria?—No, in New South Wales.

844. I am speaking of the Colony of Victoria, of which I have some personal knowledge; is it not a matter of fact that no contribution has appeared for some years past?—I do not remember any contribution appearing.

845. Therefore, as a matter of fact, with respect to the Colony of Victoria, we have here appropriated the entire expenditure of Imperial pay, with reference to the regiment there; the Colony has paid it, and, it does not appear in that statement at the end of the Estimate?—I would not exactly say that; because, if the Colony have actually paid it, I cannot understand how it does not appear as an Exchequer receipt.

846. That is exactly what I cannot understand; but is it not a notorious fact that the Colony has paid it?—It may be to you, but it is not to me. You may have Colonial information which I do not possess; but if you have reason to believe that the Colony has paid it, I will get you the best information I can at some future time.

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847. With respect to the Colonial pay, I think you said that the Colonial allowance does not come from the Exchequer at all?—You are now speaking of the Colonial allowance to the staff officers, I presume.

848. The Colonial allowance to the regimental officers?—To officers generally. The amount voted by the Colony is limited to the officers of the staff.

849. Are you sure of that?—Yes, the 7,000 *l.*

850. Is only 7,000 *l.* voted by the Colony?—Last year there was a sum of 7,947 *l.* voted by the Colony of Victoria, on account of the pay and allowances of the head quarters staff at Melbourne.

851. But does not the Colony vote a great deal more?—Not that I am at present aware of.

852. Does not the Colony, as a matter of fact, more than double the pay of all the officers stationed there, and make that payment as a Colonial allowance?—If they do I have no knowledge of it, but, as before observed, my knowledge of the mode of dealing with the military expenditure in the Australian Colonies is but limited. If the Colony vote a sum for the pay and allowance of the regiment, it would be paid over direct to the officers and men, and would not appear in our account at all, but would be treated exactly in the same way as the 7,900 *l.* voted by the Colony for the staff officers.

853. There are certain stoppages made, are there not, from the pay of all the men?—I presume you allude to the ration stoppages. In certain Colonies we grant the provisions, and exact no stoppages.

854. With respect to the troops in Victoria, how does the matter stand as regards stoppages?—In Victoria the stoppage is exacted from the men.

855. Is it paid into the Exchequer?—Yes.

856. Will you show me, in the Estimates or anywhere, where credit is taken for the stoppage; how much is the amount of the stoppage?—Three pence halfpenny per day. It would be at page 85 of the Estimates for the present year.

857. Will you show me where that occurs?—Victoria is classed under New South Wales. I presume you will not find Victoria in the Estimates at all.

858. Do you mean to say that the stoppage of 4,500 *l.*, against 11,200 *l.* in New South Wales really includes the stoppage in Victoria?—I believe it does.

859. Then the War Office has not discovered that Victoria is a separate colony?—I will not say that, because we are well aware of the fact. It is not shown in Vote 10 of the Estimates.

860. Are you not aware that the stoppage is really not made at all?—I am not aware of it.

861. Are you not aware that the Colony, as a matter of fact, not only gives a Colonial allowance to the men, of 1 *s.* a day, but also that the stoppage is not made in any shape?—The best information that I have, is that the stoppage is paid by the men, as appears by the account.

862. Do you mean to say that we take a vote under Vote 10, for the provisions of the men in Victoria?—Yes; to the best of my knowledge, it is included in the amount for New South Wales.

863. Do you think that that sum, amounting to 6,700 *l.*, covers the cost of the provisions of a whole regiment?—I must get further information upon that point.

864. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] The Commissary General in Chief would be able to give that information?—Yes; it is a question which I cannot now answer.

865. Mr. *Childers.*] Is there not also a stoppage made for savings' banks; is there not a contribution made to the savings' banks by the men?—No; the men pay their money into the regimental savings' banks, and we grant them interest at the rate of 3 *l.* 15 *s.* per cent., but there is no deduction made from the men.

866. What becomes of that money in the Colony; is it paid through the Colonial Government in any way, where the Colony pays it?—I presume that is brought to the account in the same way as the money accruing in the savings' banks in other regiments.

867. There are also stoppages, I think, made for prison expenses from men who are in confinement?—Yes; the men in confinement are mulcted pay; they get no pay whatever.

868. Where

868. Where are those men confined in the Australian Colony?—That I do not know.

869. Do you know what becomes of the stoppage of their pay?—In the ordinary case the pay is never charged.

870. Do you know how the prison expenses are defrayed?—To the best of my knowledge they are defrayed in the same way as the other charges.

871. Out of the votes?—That I am not certain of.

872. Is there such a rule?—The fact is, I am not very well conversant with the Australian Colonies. I know less about them than any other. There is no vote taken for the military prisons.

873. Have you any knowledge how that is arranged; in what way the expense is defrayed?—None whatever; but I can get information upon that point.

874. With respect to the barrack expenses in the Colonies; is a vote taken for barrack expenses under Vote No. 7?—There is a sum taken for New South Wales, but none for Victoria.

875. And yet the greater part of the expense is in Victoria?—There is nothing, I find, in New South Wales for barrack expenses.

876. Do you know how that is arranged?—The whole of the barracks, I believe, were handed over to the Colony, and the Colony pays the whole of the expenses.

877. Are the barrackmasters Colonial?—Seeing that there is no vote for barrack expenditure, I should say they were Colonial officers. There is no provision made for barrack establishment in New South Wales; there is a barrack-serjeant for South Australia, and that is the only place where barrack expenditure is mentioned at all in the votes.

878. Is it not within your knowledge that there are very large barracks there?—I believe so; but that is a question entirely for the Inspector-General of Fortifications.

879. Has it been the uniform practice since troops were stationed in the Colonies to take a vote for the payment of those troops?—We vote the full pay and regimental allowances of every regiment in the service, excepting those in India.

880. Always?—Always.

881. Is no deduction made on the face of the Estimate?—No deduction is made on the face of the Estimate, because whatever the Colonies contribute goes into the Exchequer.

882. Have you looked back to the Estimates of past years?—I am now speaking of the present year.

883. Within the last three or four years?—I believe there has been a reduction in the last three or four years.

884. At the time of the Crimean war, was not a deduction made from the contribution of the Colonies for the Imperial pay of this regiment on the station?—I believe there was.

885. Has not that arrangement been altered now?—As I observed just now, the full amount is voted and the contribution by the Colony is paid into the Exchequer.

886. If the contribution by the Colony were paid into the Exchequer, it would make no difference practically?—Any contribution made by the Colony has been carried to the Exchequer; it has not been appropriated.

887. If, as a matter of fact, one particular Colony has been defraying a large amount of Imperial expenditure which is voted, and you do not find it in that statement, year after year, have you any reason to doubt whether yours is the correct information?—I can get information upon that point, but we have not appropriated the money to the credit of army funds; an error in the account may have occurred, but no misappropriation. You must bear in mind that, with reference to our expenditure, and with reference to bringing these items to account, we do not act upon our own responsibility. Over the War Office is placed an independent officer, whose duty is to see that all sums reported are accurately paid into the Exchequer; that is to say, not the contributions by the Colonies only, but all other extra receipts.

888. But is it not his duty to see that those Estimates are so framed as not to provide for more than is really required?—No; but if the full amount of

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allowances for the men were voted, then any contribution by Victoria would be credited to the Exchequer.

889. Do you happen to know the shape in which in the Colony the money is defrayed?—No; but I cannot help thinking that there must be some mistake in the arrangement; probably it has found its way into the Exchequer through some other source, or may be locally adjusted with the Treasury chest officers.

890. Is it not the case that the Appropriation Act of the Colony directs that the money shall be paid over in four quarterly instalments, to be defrayed in such manner as Her Majesty may by warrant direct?—That is the case with regard to the sum voted to the staff officers, and therefore I should assume it would be very likely the same. The contribution of the 7,900*l.* is given over to the officer commanding the forces, to be distributed as Her Majesty may direct.

891. You say that only extends to the 7,900*l.*?—No, I do not say that; I say my knowledge only extends to that.

892. You do not know whether it extends to any other contributions?—If you state it to be the case, I assume that it is so; because I know that in the Appropriation Act there is that clause with reference to the 7,900*l.* contributed for the staff.

893. Sir *George Grey.*] By whom is the statement on page 154, with reference to the Colonial expenditure, made out?—That statement is taken from the books, made out by the principal bookkeeper, and is the sum actually brought to the credit of Her Majesty's Exchequer during the year; and this sum was actually paid over to the Treasury.

894. Upon what authority does the bookkeeper make up this account; where does he get his information as to the sums paid into the Exchequer?—With reference to the Ionian Islands, Malta, and Ceylon, the sums are advised through the Comptroller of Army Expenditure, to the Treasury chest; and the Lords of the Treasury advise us that they have this money to our credit.

895. What I want to know is, whether this statement is made out from information received directly by the War Department or through some other channel?—With regard to the three places that I have mentioned, it is from information received from the Treasury; but with regard to the Mauritius, the contribution is paid at the station and is included in the local accounts of the military accountant forwarded to the War Office.

896. I want to know from what information the bookkeeper makes up this annual statement. How does he know what sums have been paid in from Victoria, or any other Colony?—From the accounts after they have undergone examination.

897. Who makes out the accounts?—The accounts are made up by the accountant himself on the spot.

898. Do you act upon the information of the Treasury, or do you deal with the accounts which come into your own hands?—With reference to these three stations, from the Treasury.

899. And with regard to the other station?—I have answered with respect to the three, but as regards the Mauritius I have endeavoured to explain that the amount is credited to army funds of the War Office accountant. Also as regards Victoria there is a sum remaining over from the year 1855.

900. We have heard that there is a sum voted annually by the Legislature of the Colony of Victoria towards the military expenditure, on account of the troops stationed there; I want to know how the War Department derives its information, whether that sum is paid into the Exchequer or not?—It appears that we have no information with reference to the transactions of this year; but in regard to last year there is a sum stated to be a contribution from New South Wales; but there may be an error in the station.

901. Supposing the sum appears in the Estimates of last year, as paid by Victoria, or New South Wales, how does the War Department ascertain that the sum has been paid into the Exchequer, so as to insert it in this annual statement; do they derive it from their own information, or from information received from the Treasury?—In reference to the three cases that I have alluded to, they derive it from the Treasury.

902. I am speaking of New South Wales exclusively?—There is an account of the advances made by the Colony, and they appear in the accounts of the regimental paymasters.

903. Then

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903. Then it comes to the War Department, without passing through the Treasury?—Yes, at least that portion which comes through the medium of the paymaster's accounts.

904. How does the War Department know it has been paid into the Exchequer?—Because we pay it in ourselves.

905. Mr. *Ellice.*] All these things are paid into what is called the Military Chest?—Yes.

906. And then by what authority are these allowances, which are applied to the military service, paid into the Treasury?—The amount is paid into the Comptroller of the Treasury chest, and included by him in his accounts with the Lords of the Treasury; and when the accounts are examined by the Commissioners of Audit, it is found that there are certain sums placed to the credit of the Imperial Government on account of army expenditure. They advise us that those sums are placed to our credit, and they are passed through the books, and by the War Office paid over to the Exchequer, and the detail of the credit finds its way into this statement.

907. These allowances having been paid into the Treasury chest, by what authority are they drawn out of the Treasury chest, and applied to the military service?—They are not applied to the military service in diminution of the final charge against Parliamentary grants.

908. You said that some of these go into the Exchequer and others come from the Exchequer, and others were applied to the Colony?—Yes; therefore the latter do not appear in the army accounts.

909. But still, this being Colonial expenditure applied to the payment of military service in this country, by what authority is that paid; is it by Queen's warrant or by the authority of the War Office, directed to the officers of the Colony, or by what authority is it paid?—The contributions made by the Colony on account of military expenditure, are, as I explained before, paid over to the Comptroller of the Treasury chest.

910. But you say that there are other sums beyond those which are paid over to the Exchequer which are applied by the Colony to military purposes?—Yes.

911. I wish to know, if you can tell me, by what authority those payments are made in the Colony?—A certain portion of these expenses, as in the case of Victoria, is paid over to the officer commanding Her Majesty's forces, to be distributed by him in the way Her Majesty's Government may think necessary.

912. Is it to be distributed by him according to the orders of the Secretary of War?—Not that I am aware of; the transaction does not go through the army accounts.

913. Sir *George Grey.*] What department of Her Majesty's Government directs the distribution of the sum to be paid over by the Commander in Chief in the Colony to the forces on the station?—I suppose the Commander in Chief at the station is the representative of Her Majesty's Government; and that that portion is divided amongst the officers on the spot.

914. You, as assistant in the Accountant General's department of the War Office, know nothing about it?—I do not; it is a question settled by the Colony.

915. Is it within your knowledge that any other Department has reported to the Secretary of State for War, the allowances so made by the Colony?—There is a letter from the Colony now, raising this very point, as to whether the accounts connected with this expenditure should be examined in the War Office, stating that hitherto they have always been examined in the Colony.

916. The question is whether these allowances are paid by the Colony to the Commander in Chief in the Colony, and by him distributed at his discretion among the troops without any sanction by the Government whatever?—Undoubtedly there is the sanction of the Government, but whether from the War Office, or the Colonial Office, or where, I do not know.

917. Mr. *Ellice.*] You cannot state whether that sanction is from the Secretary of War?—No.

918. Mr, *Fortescue.*] The officers do not receive these Colonial allowances under any direct authority or permission from the Secretary of State?—Not that I am aware of; we do not know whether they are received or not; for instance with respect to the 7,900 *l.* that I have alluded to, I believe the vote

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from the Victorian Government was 9,000 *l.* some little time ago, and when it was reduced, the officer commanding proposed a scheme reducing the rate payable to each officer.

919. I see under Vote 10 there are specified allowances to Tasmania, Western Australia, and New Zealand, on account of the high prices of provisions, to officers on leave; are those allowances of the same nature as the Colonial allowances, although defrayed by the Imperial Government?—Not exactly of the same nature; at these stations I have mentioned, it is a *bonâ fide* money allowance of 5*s.* and 3*s.* a day to the officers, on account of the high price of provisions.

920. Are those allowances of the same nature as the allowances in New South Wales and Victoria?—No, because those allowances include lodging money, and servants allowances, and so on.

921. Those allowances are over and above the Imperial pay and allowances, on account of the special services on the station?—Yes.

922. Are they not of the same nature, and allotted to the troops for the same reasons as the Colonial allowances are in New South Wales and Victoria?—Not exactly; because that in New South Wales and Victoria embraces a further allowance for lodging and servants allowance, and it also includes the allowance for the high price of provisions.

923. The heads of the allowance are not identical in the two cases?—No, because that to which you allude is limited to the dearness of provisions, and that is subject to periodical revision; it is only allowed from year to year, and in the event of the Colonies reverting to their normal condition of cheap prices, that allowance would be discontinued.

924. Mr. *Childers.*] Do you not take a vote for lodging and servants allowances for the whole army?—Yes; there is a vote taken, but lodging money is not taken in those Colonies where the Colony granted the local allowances.

925. Is not the vote uniform?—There is a lump sum taken of 35,000 *l.*

926. Mr. *Adderley.*] Upon what calculation is the extra pay made by the Imperial Treasury to the officers?—A Board of officers assemble, and they take evidence as to the price of provisions in the Colony (this is with reference to the Australian Colonies), and on the result of their deliberations, they report to the General that it is necessary to continue the allowance of 5*s.* a day. That report is sent home to the War Office, and the Secretary of State, after having obtained the sanction of the Treasury, approves the arrangement for another period. At the expiration of that period, another Board is asssembled, and so it goes on.

927. Does the rate of extra payment made to the officers differ in different Colonies?—Yes, at St. Helena it is only 3*s.* a day.

928. Does it differ in the same Colonies at different periods?—It has always been 5*s.* a day for all officers of all ranks in the Australian Colonies.

929. In each Colony there is a revision every year, is there not, of the rate of extra allowances made?—There is a periodical revision; I do not know whether it is every two years.

930. In every Colony?—Except St. Helena.

931. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you mean every Colony in which the Government pays the allowance?—Yes, except at St. Helena. I am not aware that any Board has been assembled there for some time. They have had 3*s.* a day there for many years past.

932. Do you know whether, in the revisions of extra payment made to the officers, the arrangement is made, not only upon the price of provisions in the Colony, but also with reference to the rate of Colonial allowance made by other Colonies?—The fact of some Colonies giving a contribution, for instance, the fact of Victoria giving a contribution coerces the Imperial Government into giving an allowance at other stations. That was found to be the case at Tasmania, where, upon taking evidence before the Board, it did not appear that there was any necessity for the extra allowances. They were abolished, and then an appeal was made on the plea that, as a liberal allowance was made in other parts of the Colony, it was but reasonable to extend it.

933. All that you can tell us about the Colonial expenditure is with reference to accounts kept between every officer and the Colonial Government?—We keep no accounts with the Colonial Government, but only with our own sub-accountants.

934. Nothing

934. Nothing comes into the account connected with the Colonial expenditure but Imperial payments on account of the Colonies, and then Colonial repayments of the sum voted by the Imperial Parliament for the pay of the troops or stores?—No.

935. Beyond that, you know nothing of Colonial expenditure?—No; it is entirely a question for the Colony, and we have no direct knowledge of payments made in and for the Colony.

936. Nor does anything come into your accounts with reference to the transport of troops?—That is within the province of the Admiralty, except that we take the inland transport; the expense of transporting troops and stores from port to port is borne by the Admiralty; but we take stores and troops up navigable rivers, for instance.

937. Mr. *Adderley.*] If your plan for voting net estimates in Parliament were carried out, the Estimates for this year would be reduced from 14,600,000 *l.*, so far as the Colonial regiments are concerned, by 72,000 *l.* only?—Yes.

938. That would be the only reduction in this year's Estimates by all Colonial repayments?—That would be the only reduction.

939. When you say that your plan for voting net estimates would reduce this year's Estimates by half a million, you are talking of repayments and reductions of another kind?—Taking the whole amount, as shown to be paid into the Exchequer, as extra receipts.

940. The whole difference this year by Colonial repayments would be to reduce 14,600,000 *l.* by 72,000 *l.*?—That is all.

941. And that would be cumulative deduction over many years?—No; this represents the sum brought to credit during the year ending the 31st December 1860.

942. Did you not give us to understand that that sum represents the cumulative deductions over several years?—I mentioned a small sum of 500 *l.*, with reference to Victoria, which applies to other years; but the others are annual contributions.

943. £.72,487, deducting 597 *l.* for New South Wales, consists of repayments within the year?—Yes, and the contributions for a year.

944. You say you have the means of checking these accounts of repayment, in the case of the Australian Colonies, in the War Office: you know what the whole repayment ought to be?—Yes.

945. And therefore you have the means of checking it?—Yes; we ought to know the amount which each Colony is liable for, and it ought to be our duty to see that it is paid by the Colony and brought to account.

946. You know the exact item upon which the failure of repayment occurs?—Unquestionably we ought to, but perhaps that requires inquiring into.

947. In the case of three Colonies the repayments are by fixed sums, and therefore there you have not the same detailed account?—We only bring to account the actual sum advised by the Treasury as the contribution for the year.

948. Take the instance of Ceylon, where the payment is, as you say, 24,000 *l.* a year. Would you have a detailed account of that sent in?—There is no account; we receive a letter from the Treasury to the effect that they have it, and hold it at our disposal, and we dispose of it by placing it in the Exchequer.

949. You say that you consider the allowances made by the Colony to the officers may be regarded in the light of a saving to the Imperial Exchequer. In the same way you would look at all Colonial expenditure as a saving to the Imperial Exchequer?—Not necessarily so, because we may be incurring out of that contribution an expense in the erection of forts and works for defence in the Colony, which, if we had to pay for out of our own funds, might be a matter of consideration. For Mauritius a sum is voted year by year for fortifications, but that may be only on the understanding that the Colony is to contribute a portion of it.

950. Mr. *Baxter.*] Can you say whether this sum of 72,000 *l.* represents the whole amount of the Colonial expenditure that directly passes into the Exchequer, or only the whole sum that passes through the books of the War Office?—The whole sum that passes through the books of the War Office.

951. Is it not possible that other sums may find their way into the Exchequer through other channels?—It is not improbable, and that should be inquired into.

952. I understood you to say that it was your duty to ascertain that the

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Colonial revenues were charged with those sums for which they were liable?—Yes.

953. I should like to know what steps you would take to ascertain what sums they are liable for?—The step taken would be by an examination of the accounts. I am not exactly aware of the course followed.

954. If you are not aware what sums are contributed by the Colony through other departments of the Government, how is it possible for you to ascertain whether the Colony has performed its duty in that respect?—We ought to be able to tell exactly the sum that each Colony is liable for, and it is our duty, also, to see whether that contribution is actually paid by the Colony. Whether that has been faithfully done I am not in a position to say.

955. In your opinion, there is some confusion in that respect?—Since the Russian war there has been some misapprehension respecting the army accounts. There has been a large accumulation of work; it is, however, now nearly cleared off. This may partly explain the anomalies which appear to exist in regard to bringing to account the amounts contributed by the Colonies; but the matter shall be carefully investigated.

956. Under the present arrangements would it be possible for the Colonies to have ceased to pay contributions which they had agreed to pay, and had paid in former years?—It is possible, but the omission would ultimately be detected.

957. There is no check in any department of the Government, War Office, Treasury, or Colonial Department, upon the Colonial contribution being properly accounted for?—I cannot answer that with reference to what check the Colonial Office and Treasury may have. We ought to ascertain in the War Office the actual sum that each Colony has to contribute, and we ought to see that that is brought to account. That will be done in future very carefully.

958. But it has not been hitherto done?—That I am not exactly in a position to answer; the accounts are being put upon an entire re-organisation, and it will take a long time to get them into a satisfactory working condition.

959. You say that other contributions may have been received by the Exchequer for the year ending 1860; is it no part of the duty of the War Office to ascertain whether those sums have been paid?—Unquestionably; but, as I have stated once or twice before, the transaction being an exceptional one, it may have been treated under a misapprehension, and the money may have passed to the credit of the Exchequer through other accounts, because there are other accounts at the stations. The Treasury may have taken possession of the contribution, and not advised us of it.

960. Mr. Elliot in some of his answers stated that certain sums were paid into the Treasury chest. Those sums would not be included in the 72,000 *l.* which appears here?—Yes, those sums have passed through the Treasury chest.

961. In what other mode may contributions have been paid by the Colonies and received into the Exchequer?—Through the Treasury chest account, which is examined by the Commissioners of Audit on behalf of the Lords of the Treasury.

962. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] The only information you can give as to payments by the Colonial Government is by reference to the credits which appear in the army accounts?—That is all.

963. Consequently you could only answer from the army accounts?—Yes.

964. You can answer in respect of them that all the payments from the Colony credited to the army service in those accounts are transferred to the Exchequer?—Yes, I can answer that.

965. You can give no further explanation with respect to the payments made by the Colonies, and which do not appear in those accounts?—I can only speak to the sums passed through the army accounts. The Treasury can give that information to a certain extent.

966. *Chairman.*] I understood you to say, with respect to these payments made in the Colonies, that you do not know by what department at home they are sanctioned, or whether they are sanctioned by any department at all?—I am only aware that there is an extra allowance to the officers and men.

967. Mr. *Childers.*] Under whose control is the military chest?—The Treasury chest is under the control of the Lords of the Treasury.

968. What is the name of the officer who has the local management of it?—He is the senior commissariat officer of the station.

969. Does

969. Does he not furnish accounts of the expenditure of the military chest? He does, but not to the War Office.

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970. Do you not receive a duplicate of those accounts?—No, not from the Treasury chest, but the same officer may act as our representative.

971. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] The War Office would have no control over that officer as regards the Treasury chest account?—No; he raises money by bills upon the Lords of the Treasury.

972. *Chairman.*] Will you put in a return, prepared by the Admiralty, of the cost of transport of troops to and from the Colonies, for the year ending the 31st March 1859?—Yes (*handing in the same*).

973. Will you ascertain whether a similar return cannot be produced for the year ending March 1859-60?—Yes; the Admiralty will furnish it.

974. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You gave an answer in the early part of your examination with respect to New South Wales; you said you might be mistaken?—Yes; my answer is subject to correction, because it is a point upon which I require further information.

975. Mr. *Childers.*] Where the paymaster of the regiment pays the Imperial pay, which is defrayed by the Colony, that is, where there are more troops than the Government is bound to furnish, his accounts go to the War Office?—The accounts of the entire regiment come to the War Office.

976. Irrespective of the source from which the money has come?—I believe the paymaster of the regiment would send the accounts of the entire regiment to the War Office.

977. Take the instance of the 40th Regiment. The Home Treasury would pay for four companies, and the Colony for the other companies; the accounts with reference to the eight companies would come together?—Yes.

978. You would be able to tell from them what contribution the Colony had made?—We ought to.

979. Do you believe that there is any check established between those accounts and the amount you find, from the Treasury, to have been paid into the Treasury chest?—I am afraid not; I believe there must be some misapprehension about the accounts with reference to Victoria.

980. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] Perhaps you will be able to look into that question, and give the Committee some further information upon another day?—Yes.

Mr. *Thomas Carter*, called in; and Examined.

981. *Chairman.*] ARE you a Clerk in the Adjutant General's Office?—I am.

Mr. *T. Carter.*

982. Can you put in a paper showing the strength of the infantry in the Colonies, according to the latest returns of the War Department, distinguishing the numbers in each case of local corps and regiments of the line?—Yes.

983. Have you a return showing the average number of desertions from regiments of the line in North America, New Zealand, Australia, and the Cape, during the last six years?—I have one from 1854 to 1859 inclusive.

984. Will you state the average number of desertions in the North American Colonies during those six years?—In Canada, the number was 137; in Nova Scotia, including Newfoundland and New Brunswick, 124; in New Zealand, 36; in Australia, 139; and at the Cape, 125.

985. Sir *George Grey.*] Do those figures represent the number of men who have deserted, and were not recovered, or do they include the men who have been recaptured?—Those figures do not include those who have re-joined; these are men who have been struck off the strength of the regiment, after being absent without leave for two months.

986. Mr. *Ellice.*] Can you give us a return also of any augmentations, or diminutions, that have been made during the last five years in the staff, both military and civil, in these Colonies?—Of the military portion we can.

987. Including the civil officers of the army, medical officers, and commissariat?—This information will be furnished by the War Office.

Rear Admiral Sir *Charles Elliot*, called in; and Examined.

988. *Chairman.*] WHAT Colonial appointments have you held?—I have been Governor of Bermuda and Trinidad.

Rear Admiral Sir *C. Elliot.*

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989. For what periods?—I went to Bermuda at the end of the year 1846, and I came away in the beginning of the year 1853.

990. When were you Governor of Trinidad?—I went from Bermuda to Trinidad, and came away from thence at the end of 1856.

991. Have you been in any other Colonies?—I have served in different parts of the world; originally I was protector of slaves in the Colony of Guiana, and I have seen a great deal of other foreign service. That is the only Colonial service I have held.

992. With reference to the government of Trinidad, what was your experience there in regard to the confidence to be placed in the black troops?—We had a company of black troops of the Second West India Regiment there. It was formerly, as you are aware, the custom to recruit the West India regiments on the coast of Guinea; latterly, that has not been so; and those regiments are now recruited principally in the Colonies.

993. What was the number of troops in Trinidad when you were there?—We had the flank companies of a regiment of infantry, the grenadier company of the Second West India Regiment, and a detachment of artillery.

994. Sir *George Grey.*] What proportion did the black troops bear to the white?—Rather less than half.

995. *Chairman.*] What was the whole number?—Speaking from memory, the European companies were generally weak. The numbers would be about 200 white to 80 black.

996. Where were the black regiments recruited when you were at Trinidad?—Principally in the West Indies. We did not get recruits from the coast of Guinea, which I thought a disadvantage, because the creoles who were recruited were not of the best class usually.

997. At the time you were there, should you have said that reliance could be placed upon the black troops, as against internal disaffection?—There is very little fear indeed of internal disaffection in the West Indian Colonies now. I may take the liberty of dividing them into two classes. In some of the Colonies there is a mixed population, Asiatic and creole. The creoles occasionally show fugitive reminiscences of their old condition, and sometimes sympathise with each other in cases of imaginary wrong to one of their own class rather perniciously for the public peace; but those feelings are rapidly giving way to the spread of intelligence. Freedom soon teaches men what is best for themselves. Sometimes there may have been a little squabble, rather than any formidable disorder.

998. Sir *George Grey.*] We want to know whether black troops are, in your opinion, efficient for the purpose for which they are required in Trinidad?—I have never been able to understand what was the object of a military occupation of these Colonies.

999. *Chairman.*] Let me ask you whether, in your opinion, the presence of troops there is of any use at all?—Yes, I think that some amount of European force is necessary; but I have for many years been of opinion that it is desirable to have a corps of constabulary, something in the nature of the Irish constabulary, instead of detachments of the regular army. Every year's experience confirms me in the view, that no point should be held in military strength, except for the maintenance of our maritime supremacy.

1000. Would you move those between the West India Islands?—I think there should be a head-quarter station at Barbadoes. A few effective men, armed with revolvers and rifles, would, I think, be enough for the security of the peace.

1001. Sir *George Grey.*] In fact, you would recommend an armed police, instead of a regular military force?—For the Windward and Leeward Colonies.

1002. Mr. *Elliee.*] Would you suggest that any part of that body of armed police should be composed of white men?—They should all be Europeans.

1003. What was the relative mortality, in your experience, as between coloured troops and white troops?—The proportion was very heavy against the whites. The coloured troops are not subject to the yellow fever, but they are to cholera.

1004. Would not the same difficulty occur with respect to armed police?—According to my idea, the armed police should consist of very small garrisons, and of a mixed nature. I think that two gun-boat steamers should be attached to them, under the orders of the senior naval officer on the station; and I think

that

that the windward part of the station should never be left without a man-of-war, a small frigate, or large sloop.

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1005. Sir *George Grey.*] The question of comparative mortality would be the same with white police as between white troops and coloured troops?—As the constabulary would probably receive higher pay, I should suppose that they would be of a higher standing, and therefore more careful of their health.

1006. Mr. *Ellice.*] In Trinidad, what number of constabulary would you consider sufficient?—I should suppose that the constabulary would be altogether independent of the ordinary police duties, and would be simply for countenance. I think that there should be a force of 150 men at Barbadoes, as a central station, 100 men at Guiana, and 75 at Trinidad, with easy means of concentration; and for that purpose there would be one gun-boat to windward and the other to leeward. For the Leeward Island station you would have 75 men, making up a total of 400. You would then easily enough concentrate a force, so as to prevent anything like a serious disturbance in the islands.

1007. Do you think it safe to maintain those Colonies without any works for external defence, in case of accident?—I hold the opinion that no portion of the Imperial military force should be stationed at any other points than those necessary to be held in effective strength for the maintenance of our maritime supremacy.

1008. You think the dispersion of the military forces of the empire full of danger?—All military and political authorities are, I believe, agreed in the mischief of the dispersion of the regular strength of the empire, and the multiplication of fixed works at the Imperial charge, in ineligible military positions. I consider, too, that there should always be present some means of transport, in rather an advanced state of readiness, at our great naval outports abroad.

1009. By whom do you propose that the police should be paid?—I think that the Crown should undertake the expense of transport, paying the force, and clothing them; the rations should be provided by the Colonists, and the lodging also. There would be no difficulty about barracks in the Colonies I have alluded to, because there is plenty of barrack-room; but I think that the barracks should be kept in order by the Colonists.

1010. Was there no police in Trinidad whilst you were there?—There was a local police.

1011. Would you keep that?—That is for ordinary police purposes. I mean this more in the nature of a *gendarmerie*. The local native police cannot always be steadily relied upon in any occasional trouble; sometimes they will take offence at some imaginary slight offered to one of their own class.

1012. *Chairman.*] Whilst you were at Trinidad, were the troops employed for police purposes?—Never.

1013. Mr. *Ellice.*] Would the change you suggest be acceptable to the Colonists themselves?—You are aware that in the Colonies to windward and leeward, excepting Barbadoes, Guiana, and Trinidad, there are no troops at all; they were withdrawn from Antigua whilst I was there. It is a question only of those three Colonies. At Guiana, if I remember right, there were no European troops whilst I was there. The Colonists would, no doubt, prefer troops.

1014. Sir *George Grey.*] How many years ago is it that you were there?—I left the West Indies in 1856.

1015. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You propose that the black regiments should be discontinued, that all the white troops should be withdrawn, and that, as a substitute for both, there should be raised a local European regiment, distributed through the West India Islands and the Colonies?—I would rather say a constabulary than a regiment; a regiment would involve some considerable depôt of military stores. I think that is dangerous in a position which is not naturally safe, and suitably defended. At Barbadoes, for instance, a frigate might go in and set the whole town on fire, with the mere purpose to destroy the military stores.

1016. You do not mean to dispense with the ordinary local police?—By no means. I am also the last person to undervalue the just claim of the proprietary and settlers in these Colonies to full protection and countenance by the presence of a suitable European Imperial force.

1017. You do not mean to suggest that the European corps should perform the ordinary duty of Irish constabulary?—I understand that to be police duty; I think

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I think it should be rather the duty performed by the *gendarmerie* in France; a duty of countenance, performed by Imperial force.

1018. You mean that there should be a local European corps, to perform in the West Indies the service which is now performed by the troops of the line, and by black regiments?—Differently armed and regulated, and differently moved, with a small staff of officers.

1019. But you propose that they should perform the same services?—Services of countenance.

1020. Mr. *Ellice.*] Would you recruit those men for life?—No; I think you might hold out to steady soldiers who had served three years the inducement that if they would volunteer to serve five years in the constabulary force in the West Indies, it should count for seven years in their time. I would also give some gratuity to every man of continued good character at the period of his discharge.

1021. Sir *George Grey.*] You would have a local stationary force?—No; I would have the head-quarters at Barbadoes, and move them about frequently.

1022. Under what authority would you put them?—Under the orders of the local Government.

1023. Would you put them under any military authority?—Yes; there should be an officer of the rank of a colonel in command.

1024. What would be the ordinary routine of their duties, if there is to be another police force in the island?—They would stand in the same position as the troops do now, except that they would move from Colony to Colony, especially when an epidemic broke out. Prompt dispersion of the force is the best mode of checking the progress of yellow fever.

1025. *Chairman.*] Which would be the principal stations of the police?—British Guiana, Trinidad, and Antigua.

1026. Mr. *Fortescue.*] What number of men do you suggest there should be?—I think that there should be 150 at Barbadoes, 100 at Guiana, 75 at Trinidad, and 75 to leeward, and then I think you would want a depôt of 50 men in England to keep it up.

1027. Sir *George Grey.*] How would it differ from the present system except that it would not be called a regiment of the line, and could not be moved to another part of the world?—I have heard it said by all military officers with whom I have talked upon the subject, that great mischief arises from distributing troops in small detachments.

1028. How would the constitution of that force differ from the constitution of the ordinary force of the line?—I am not competent to decide whether the organisation should be under a special Act of Parliament, or whether the force should be purely military.

1029. Is not your recommendation this, that there should be a local force called a police force, but subject to military discipline, commanded by a military officer, and performing the same duties as are now performed by the military?—Yes.

1030. And paid from the same sources, except that the rations would be paid by the Colony?—Yes; and in case of any of the mbeing called to Colonies not usually having stations, the charge for rations and lodging would for the time being fall upon the Colonies in which they were.

1031. Do you know anything of the Foreign Colonies in the West Indies, Martinique and Guadaloupe?—Yes.

1032. What number of troops are maintained there?—There were something like 3,000 there when I was there, and, I believe, Cayenne inclusive.

1033. Were any of those black troops?—None, I believe.

1034. They were all Europeans?—All Europeans.

1035. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Then it is your opinion that a corps of this kind, consisting of 400 or 500 men, would provide, as far as military protection goes, sufficiently for the defence of all the West Indian Colonies?—Not for the military defence; I know no position to windward which can be held with a view to military defence. The only great natural naval position which I know of to windward in the West Indies is Chaguaramas Bay, in Trinidad; that is a very noble harbour in all respects; easy of defence, beyond the limit of the hurricane range, and most importantly situated, close to the mouths of the Orinoco. It should also be added, that coal has lately been discovered in Trinidad. If we ever occupy

occupy any position in strength to windward, Chaguaramas Bay is the most eligible.

1036. Not including Jamaica?—Not including Jamaica; that is to leeward.

1037. Do you think it possible to keep the character and morals of this local force up to anything like the level of a regiment of Queen's troops?—I do, and that if they were more highly paid, you might, I think, expect rather higher conditions in that respect.

1038. Do you think that experience shows that a regiment of that kind permanently fixed in a tropical country can be kept up to the character and efficiency of a regiment of the line?—I by no means propose that they should be kept there permanently; I do not think that they should be there more than five years.

1039. Sir *George Grey.*] Each man?—Each man; I think that is quite long enough.

1040. Mr. *Fortescue.*] The regiment itself would not possess the character of a regiment of the British army?—It would be rather a *gendarmerie.*

1041. White West Indian police?—White constabulary.

1042. What is your idea as to officers?—I think they should be officers from the army, highly paid, as the officers of the *gendarmerie* in France are; they are officers of the army, and are usually men of great distinction.

1043. Would you limit them to a short time of service?—I think they should be frequently changed; five years is quite enough for one West Indian campaign.

1044 Are you aware what class of officers are generally procured for the Colonial West Indian regiments?—Whilst I was there I saw some persons of very honourable names in West Indian regiments, and I have been familiar with some very distinguished officers who had served in West Indian regiments.

1045. Sir *George Grey.*] You say you depend very much for the efficiency of this force upon their being more highly paid?—Yes.

1046. What amount of pay would you give them as compared with ordinary pay?—I have thought that at least one-third more should be given to all ranks.

1047. That would be paid from the Imperial Exchequer?—Yes.

1048. Would your plan be any saving of expense?—When I was last in the West Indies there were to windward, if I remember right, 2,000 men with rather an extensive staff. I think my scheme would be less expensive, and otherwise much less objectionable. It must be remembered, however, that this scheme supposes the constant presence of some naval strength on the windward part of the West India station.

1049. Would your plan involve a larger amount of naval force being kept on the windward and leeward station than was there when you were in the West Indies?—Although it is supposed that there should be two or three ships stationed there, I have known the station, in times of other calls for ships of war, without any naval force for several months.

1050. You do not think it would be safe to be without one?—I have no fears of any serious disturbance; I speak of Colonies in which there is a mixed population; there is not likely to be much sympathy between the Asiatic portion of the population and the creole.

1051. Have you made any calculations as to the comparative expense of the present plan, and that which you suggest?—I have not; but it seems clear to me that the force I contemplate would be less expensive than the force in the windward part of the West Indies when I was there. I do not exactly know what the present force consists of.

1052. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you consider that the garrisons at Guadaloupe and Martinique could hold those islands against a naval expedition from a foreign power, say from the English Navy, if there was a general war?—Certainly not; we could concentrate such a force in a short time as would make it necessary for them to abandon those positions.

1053. And yet those are larger garrisons than ours?—Yes.

1054. *A fortiori* the garrisons in our West India Islands are inadequate?—Avowedly so; there is no intention that they should be militarily occupied; they are not military positions.

1055. What is the use, then, of 200 soldiers in Trinidad?—For the purpose of countenance.

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1056. Explain what you mean by countenance?—When I was in Trinidad there were not above 700 men of English birth; there were some of creole and other origin, Spanish and French. These persons are chiefly large proprietors, living for the most part isolated amongst people of different races, and they would naturally desire to have something like a force in case of disturbances, upon which they could rely.

1057. In your opinion 200 troops are kept in Trinidad to preserve the settlers against internal danger?—That is the object.

1058. They would be useless against external attack?—There are no military defences at all.

1059. Their sole object is for the safety of the settlers against internal dangers?—Yes.

1060. Do you consider that the 80 black troops in Trinidad would be of any use against any such internal danger, as you say that is the only object of having troops there at all?—In the event of disturbance among the creole part of the population, I have no doubt that a company of a black regiment, recruited in Africa, would act with perfect vigour; it might want a strong hand to restrain them.

1061. In the case of internal disturbance, which you have stated to be the sole object of having any troops there at all, do you think that black troops, in Trinidad, as now recruited in the West Indies, not in Africa, would be troops upon whom you could rely for such a service?—I confess I do not like them so much being recruited in the West Indies, as if they were recruited on the coast of Guinea.

1062. Do you not consider that the sole defence from external attack of those islands is the British Navy?—I think that the whole fabric of the Colonies, and the foreign commerce of the country, must depend upon the maintenance of our maritime ascendancy.

1063. Must not those islands be at the mercy of any power which has command of the sea, in case of a general war?—Doubtless.

1064. Why do you say that the Crown should pay for the clothes, the transport, arms, and pay of this local force?—I am familiar with these Colonies, and I cannot but remember that, owing to a very large measure passed by the Imperial Parliament, which was most advantageous, no doubt, to all classes of the people, a complete social change was effected. Under these circumstances, I think that the West Indian proprietary are perfectly justified in counting on sufficient countenance and support by Imperial force at the charge of the Imperial Treasury, as respects payment, clothing, and transport. I think that the presence on the spot of such a force as I have suggested would be enough to prevent any disturbance.

1065. You think that the West Indian Colonists have a special claim upon England, owing to a former policy; that, at all events, would not attach to any other Colony not similarly situated?—There are Colonies which we possess which may be looked upon as great off-shoots of the empire, and which must be considered in a different light.

1066. The reasons which induced you to say that the Crown should pay for those troops are reasons special to the West Indies?—Quite.

1067. You allow that the Colonists are themselves most interested in the defence of their shores?—Quite so.

1068. If England withdrew all her troops from the West Indies, do you not believe that the Colonists would be able to defend themselves?—It is quite impossible to make any defence in the West Indian Islands in the case of organised forces going there; there are no positions to do so.

1069. Their sole defence is that of a large naval power, which they could not of course provide?—I apprehend that no foreign forces which might surprise one of our Colonies in the West Indies would remain there after our naval and military strength had collected to dislodge them.

1070. Is there any possible reason why Antigua should be safe without troops, and yet that Trinidad should require them?—There are no Asiatics there; it is a creole population altogether.

1071. In what respect does that contrast with the population of Trinidad?—At Trinidad the population is partly Asiatic.

1072. Do you think that Antigua is, for that reason, safe without troops?—I do not think that Antigua should be left entirely without European force.

1073. You

1073. You think that the reason for troops, they being exclusively for safety against internal dangers, applies to Antigua as well as to Trinidad?—Antigua and the whole Leeward group. If any troops were to be left in that part of the West Indies, I think that some should have been left at Antigua. It is to be remembered that there is a small dockyard at Antigua. I do not think that the Leeward Islands should be left without some European force.

1074. The sole object of troops being maintained in any of these Colonies being to defend settlers against internal dangers, do you not think that if England were to discontinue paying those troops, the Colonists would feel the necessity of raising troops to defend themselves?—The West Indian Colonies, to windward and leeward, are in no position to maintain defences.

1075. In what way are they unable to do so?—With the exception of Guiana they are all very poor. Guiana is saddled with a heavy debt, for which this country has given a guarantee, and Trinidad is in the same position.

1076. Do you think that the owners of property in the West Indies are not rich enough even to defend their own property?—I think they must rely, for the protection of that property, upon our naval protection, which would be very complete as against foreign enemies.

1077. From your knowledge of Trinidad, what would be the result supposing the Imperial Government said that they would no longer undertake to keep troops there?—I should not apprehend anything very serious, but still I think it is very desirable indeed that countenance should be given. You have a large amount of capital there, and if the Colonists thought that they were not in a secure position, there might be a considerable withdrawal of that capital from the Colony.

1078. When you say "countenance," you mean "defence"?—There is no military defence.

1079. You mean police security?—Yes, that is a better expression.

1080. From your knowledge of Trinidad, you think that the owners of property there would rather withdraw from the island than defend themselves?—I will not undertake to say that, but I think that it would be a harsher measure than it would be right for this great nation to take with regard to a population placed in such altered circumstances within the last 30 years by an Act of the Imperial Parliament. Some countenance is necessary on the part of the Imperial Government, in my opinion.

1081. *Chairman.*] You have served in British Guiana, have you not?—I have.

1082. Have you any means of knowing whether the answer you gave as to the inability of the Colonies to provide means of defence applies also to British Guiana?—Guiana I consider the most flourishing Colony of the British West Indies.

1083. Do you consider that Guiana would be unable to defray the cost of its own internal defences?—Guiana, I believe, does contribute something in the way of barrack accommodation.

1084. Mr. *Baxter.*] What would be the result if the small detachments of troops which are now in the Colonies were withdrawn, or if the British Government insisted upon the Colonies defraying their own expenses?—Great uneasiness was felt throughout the West Indies when the troops were withdrawn from St. Vincent and Grenada.

1085. What was the reason of that uneasiness?—They considered that it was a protection which they should not be deprived of.

1086. You say that these small detachments are no defence against a foreign power?—They are not so intended.

1087. Mr. *Adderley.*] Did the uneasiness which was felt by the Colonists appear to be well grounded?—I was not in the West Indies when the troops were removed, but I saw by the papers that there had been disturbances at Antigua afterwards, although they were not very serious, and that it was necessary to send a force down there.

1088. Sir *George Grey.*] What was the amount of the constabulary force in Trinidad when you were there?—There were, to the best of my recollection, 100 men, and 15 or 20 of them were mounted.

1089. Were there any Europeans?—A few, but they were principally creoles.

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1090. Did you consider that a sufficient constabulary force for the ordinary police duties?—Quite so.

1091. How was the expense of maintaining that force defrayed?—By the Colonists altogether; they were clothed, boarded, and paid for by the Colonists.

1092. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is it not your opinion that the population of Trinidad is one of a most heterogeneous character?—More so than any in the West Indies.

1093. There are, of course, people of English descent, French, and Spanish?—Yes.

1094. Are there also Africans?—Africans and Asiatics.

1095. And Indian coolies?—Yes.

1096. Are there any Chinese?—Yes, a small proportion.

1097. Do you consider that a very peculiar and exceptional state of things?—Quite so.

1098. Are not the inhabitants liable to excitement and to quarrel amongst themselves?—Not upon the same grounds of excitement. The creole population will sympathise with each other upon any supposed slight to their class, but they have not much sympathy with the coolies, supposing any trouble to fall upon them.

1099. I suppose there is far greater danger of occasional excitement in a population so constituted than there would be in an English Colony?—When I was at Trinidad, I sometimes asked myself that question, whether upon the whole there was less danger at Barbadoes, where the population is altogether creole, than in our Colony, where it was mixed. Upon the whole, I think that there would be more risk of serious general disturbance amongst a completely creole population of labourers than in a mixed community of Asiatic and creole labouring classes. They would pull more together in the case of some supposed slight offered to them. The Asiatics of Hindostan, on the other hand, might be disposed to resent any unintentional jar upon their prejudices. The Chinese would have no sympathy with creoles or coolies.

1100. Do you think that no means of preserving internal order amongst the heterogeneous population in the West India Colonies are necessary beyond what would be necessary in a small English Colony like New Brunswick or Tasmania, for example?—I take the standard of intelligence in Tasmania and New Brunswick to be different from the standard of intelligence in the West India Colonies.

1101. Then do you consider that in the West India Colonies something more is wanting than the mere ordinary police which is sufficient for an English community?—Certainly.

1102. Then you would say that such a force is intended not merely to protect the English settlers against the other races, but to preserve order amongst this heterogeneous population?—Yes.

1103. Do you think that without the presence of some such moderate force there would be a feeling of security to life and property?—I think not.

1104. Do you think that these West Indian Colonies are fit to be anything but dependencies of some great power?—I think not.

1105. Do you think that if they ceased to be dependencies of England they would naturally fall into a position of dependence upon some other power. Do you think that they are able to take care of themselves?—Having been once under the English flag, I think that they would never willingly subject themselves to any other power. If they ever fell into a position of dependency upon some other power, I think they would be glad to come back to us again as soon as our maritime ascendancy was asserted.

1106. *Chairman.*] Do you consider that any power would think them worth having?—Some of them have a value as coaling stations.

1107. Mr. *Baxter.*] What is the population of Trinidad?—There were about 80,000 people when I was there.

1108. Do you consider that 140 European soldiers are sufficient in that population to give the ample security to life and property just now referred to?—A very small force of European constabulary would, in my mind, be quite sufficient for the protection of life and property in Trinidad. The labouring classes of that island are well contented to live under the British flag, and I see no danger there of conspiracy against the Government, or against the employers of labour, by whom the people are justly and kindly treated.

1109. Do

1109. Do you consider that a force of 140 Europeans is sufficient for the security of life and property?—I think so, except in some occasional case of disturbance.

1110. In that rich island, do you think that there would be any serious objection on the part of the Colonists to pay for a force of that sort themselves?—I think that it would be more effectively managed if paid by the Crown.

1111. You think it would be more efficiently managed, but you do not think that the Colonists would object to pay a small sum necessary for keeping up such a force?—I think they would be greatly astonished if such a proposal were made to them. I think that they cannot be expected to do more than feed such a force of Europeans, and maintain their barrack accommodation.

1112. *Chairman.*] Bermuda is, I believe, the head-quarters of the North American station?—The Admiral commands on the North American station and the West Indian.

1113. Which is called the head-quarters?—In the summer months he remains at Halifax, and usually comes down to Bermuda about the middle of October.

1114. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You think that if the Imperial Government were to announce to Trinidad that for the future she would provide no description of military force for the purpose of preserving order amongst the various populations of that island, there would exist feelings of surprise and discontent?—Yes, and of uneasiness.

1115. Mr. *Baxter.*] Would those feelings be excited if instead of withdrawing the troops the Imperial Government insisted upon the Colony paying for them?—I think so; the Colonial revenues are all burdened.

1116. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you think that the Imperial Government might fairly call upon these Colonies for a contribution towards the expense of the military force?—I think they should keep their barracks always in order, and pay the expense of the rations. I disapprove of their furnishing rations in kind.

1117. Mr. *Adderley.*] When you say you do not think they would so effectually defend themselves as England defends them, do you not suppose, as a general rule, that people look sharper after their own defences than others do for them?—These Colonies are not in a situation to do so.

1118. The only reason why, in your opinion, they would defend themselves less effectually than others would is their poverty?—And from the want of defensive positions.

1119. The presence of British troops in a Colony like that brings a considerable amount of money into the Colony?—Yes.

1120. That may be another ground why this kind of defence is popular?—It may be.

1121. *Chairman.*] I believe the fortifications are very extensive in Bermuda?—Very.

1122. Sir *G. Grey.*] It is an important naval station?—I consider it a most important part of the fleet of this country.

1123. *Chairman.*] You have been to Halifax?—I have.

1124. Do you consider that an important station?—I do.

1125. Do you think the presence of British troops in the North American Colonies of the slightest value?—I have never been able to understand what is the object of a military occupation of the Canadas.

1126. Mr. *Adderley.*] Does that include Halifax?—No; Halifax is a very important part of the naval strength of this country.

1127. Do you think that Halifax would be defended by the Nova Scotians if England did not defend it?—The inhabitants of Nova Scotia are people of great spirit; and it is impossible to suppose that they would be content to live under any other flag but the English flag.

1128. Do you think that they would be less effectively defended by themselves?—I hold Nova Scotia to be one of the most important naval positions which this country has.

1129. Do you say of Nova Scotia as you said of Trinidad, that they would defend themselves less effectually than they are defended by others?—Putting out of the question the great Imperial interests that are concerned at Nova Scotia, I think it impossible to imagine that the people of Nova Scotia would

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be content to live under any other flag than the British flag, or such as they might choose for themselves.

1130. If England withdrew the garrison, or insisted upon the Colony paying for it, do you think they would leave Halifax undefended?—Yes; I do not suppose that they would defend Halifax. It is a great military position, and is defended, I understand, as such, with a view to sudden attack. They have no means of doing that.

1131. Sir *George Grey.*] Then you would not withdraw the Imperial military force from Halifax?—By no means.

1132. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You have no idea of troops being kept there, as they ought to be in the West Indian Colonies, for the purpose of merely preserving internal order?—They are maintained there for the purposes of the empire.

1133. You think the little Colony of Nova Scotia incapable of holding the great naval position of Halifax against a foreign enemy?—Yes.

1134. *Chairman.*] Do you consider that the object of maintaining such ports as Halifax is for the protection of the course of our trade?—Yes, viewed as a general rule, I think the most effective as well as the most economical defence of our outlying dependencies will be found to be identical with the best means of protecting the great courses of our foreign trade.

1135. Mr. *Adderley.*] What force should, in your opinion, be maintained in Halifax?—I have heard military officers of great experience say, that with 1,500 or 1,800 good troops it would be very difficult to take Halifax by surprise.

1136. Do you consider the present garrison of Halifax, 1,300 men, sufficient?—After the frequent conversations I have had with military men, I should have thought that a small garrison.

1137. *Chairman.*] You consider that money spent upon the Colonial defences, which is not spent either for protecting the course of our trade, or for keeping in order disaffected populations, is money comparatively thrown away, or is an expenditure for which you see no reason?—I think that no positions should be held in strength by the Imperial Government except such as are necessary for maintaining our maritime supremacy.

1138. Mr. *Baxter.*] What are the positions in the West Indies?—The great positions on the eastern shores of America, I think, are Halifax, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, and Jamaica.

1139. In your opinion, the British garrisons ought to be confined to Jamaica and Bermuda?—Yes, and Halifax.

1140. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you not see great danger in important positions being held by England with an inadequate garrison?—That has been the opinion all military men of great weight.

1141. What do you consider would be the result of an important place like Halifax being held by England with an inadequate garrison?—That is a question more for statesmen to answer than myself.

1142. You consider that great mischief may result from large depôts of arms and stores, and positions of considerable importance being held by England, and inadequately defended?—Quite so.

1143. Sir *George Grey.*] In your opinion, is Halifax inadequately garrisoned, taking into consideration the power of reinforcing it?—I consider that the possession by Her Majesty's Government of a sufficient tonnage of iron troop-ships, fitted and constructed in all respects in the most effective manner for speed, and capable of transporting 2,000 men each a distance of 7,000 miles within 21 days, is essential to any sound system for the protection of our outlying interests and dependencies. With means of this kind there would be no difficulty in reinforcing Halifax and our other great ports very rapidly and effectively. Very rapid means of maritime transport appear to me to be equally necessary on considerations of public security and of economy.

1144. Mr. *Baxter.*] How many men would it take to garrison Jamaica and Bermuda, in your opinion?—I think there are 2,000 Europeans above the yellow fever mark, and I suppose that that number would be sufficient at Jamaica.

1145. How many men are necessary for Bermuda?—I think, with the altered circumstances of naval warfare, there ought to be a different organisation for Bermuda. I have seen an American steamer of light draft come in, turning all the works several miles out of gun-shot. I think that you should have

Rear Admiral Sir C. *Elliot.*

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the means of moving men about more rapidly, and for that purpose I think that there should be a flotilla there.

1146. Mr. *Adderley.*] You consider that there should be a large naval force?—Yes; I think that there should be means of moving men and guns about more rapidly.

1147. Mr. *Baxter.*] What was the whole military force of Bermuda whilst you were there?—It consisted of about 1,300 or 1,400 men; a battalion of infantry, a company of artillery, and a company of sappers.

1148. Was that number enough to man the works?—No.

1149. If convicts were no longer sent to Bermuda, there would, I suppose, be a smaller force kept?—I should think the force there should always be kept in effective strength.

1150. Do you know that part of the military force is employed in guarding the convicts?—When I was there we did not put the troops over the convicts, but they were always in reserve, of course.

1151. Do you consider the works sufficient in themselves?—When I left Bermuda I considered the military works completed, and the naval works, I should have supposed, would have been in three or four years. I do not know in what state they are now.

1152. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you mean the naval dockyard?—Yes.

1153. For the purpose of repairing the ships?—Yes, for repairing ships, and for naval stores. I understood that the naval works were nearly completed, but I have not been there for some years.

Lunæ, 29° *die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Mills.	Mr. Childers.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. Fortescue.
Lord Stanley.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Baxter.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. *William George Anderson*, called in; and Examined.

Mr. *W. G. Anderson.*

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1154. *Chairman.*] WHAT office do you hold in the Treasury?—I am a Principal Clerk in the Treasury.

1155. Will you inform the Committee what is the date of the Treasury Minute by which appropriations in aid of military expenditure arising from the colonial funds are regulated?—The Minute is dated 2 May 1848.

1156. Previous to that what was the system adopted with regard to those payments?—The War Department and the Admiralty had large receipts arising from old stores, rents, military contributions, and various other sources which they abated from their estimates, and submitted to Parliament estimates of the net sums required for the various public services. Some departments had one mode of dealing with those receipts, other departments had another mode; sometimes the actual receipts for the past year were credited in the estimates, and in other cases the prospective receipts of the coming year. The Treasury in 1848, in consequence of a Resolution of the House of Commons, moved, I think, by Dr. Bowring, directed that all these extra receipts should be paid into the Exchequer, and that the gross sums required by the different departments should be voted.

1157. That practice has been carried out since the Treasury Minute of 1848?—Since 1848 that practice has been carried out with regard to those receipts. It was the commencement of the change, which was completed in 1854 by Mr. Gladstone, by which the gross revenues were directed to be paid in, and the gross charges were to be voted out upon estimates.

1158. Some perplexity has arisen by reason of the evidence given before us as to the mode of dealing with the receipts of the Colony of Victoria, can you give us any particular information with regard to that?—Those receipts for military contributions, so far as the Treasury has any knowledge of them, where they are fixed contributions, are paid into the Exchequer through the military accountants on the spot; but there have been different modes in which these contributions have been dealt with. I have only seen these accounts this morning, but it appears to me that there are three modes in which the Colonies pay these contributions; some by fixed contributions which pass into the Consolidated Fund, others, such as Victoria, by paying for a surplus number of troops beyond a fixed number allowed, and some pay Colonial allowances to the troops. In Victoria the regular pay and allowances of 400 soldiers, I believe, are pad out of Imperial funds; all beyond that number are paid for by the Colony.

1159. Can you give any information as to how this is done in the Colony of Victoria?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with the details of the subject to be able to state precisely what the practice is, but from the accounts which I have seen this morning at the War Office it appears to me that the subject is very much involved, and the Treasury has been in correspondence with the War Department

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Department and the Audit Office with a view to place the whole system on a different footing.

1160. Will you be prepared on a future day to produce before the Committee some clear explanation of the system which now exists, and the recommendations of your department as to how it should be conducted in future?—I will devote my attention to it. The Treasury called upon the War Department as far back as July last to furnish a statement of the mode in which the whole of this business is managed. They have not yet had from the War Department replies to that requisition, but as soon as they receive that statement I think they will be in a position to issue instructions as to the mode in which these contributions should be dealt with in future; but it will take some little time.

1161. Sir *George Grey.*] Have you seen the return which has been laid before the Committee, showing the force stationed in the British Dependencies and the expenditure incurred in respect of it, containing a column of colonial military expenditure?—I have seen the account.

1162. Would you be able on a future day to furnish us with a statement of the sums actually paid into the Imperial Exchequer from the Colony of Victoria on account of the military expenditure during the last five years, and showing also how that has been brought to account?—There would be no difficulty, with the assistance of the War Department, in preparing such a statement. A portion of the amount only is paid into the Exchequer; another portion paid by the Colony is distributed directly to the troops without passing through the Public Accounts.

1163. I am speaking now only of that portion of the expenditure which goes in diminution of the Imperial military expenditure, exclusive of that which is paid by the Colony in the shape of extra pay and allowances?—That can be furnished no doubt from the War Department. I will endeavour to ascertain that.

1164. Mr. *Childers.*] You say that in 1848 the practice commenced of taking a vote for the entire charge and bringing into the Exchequer any contribution from the Colony, the sale of all stores or any miscellaneous receipts of that kind?—Exactly. The change was made in consequence of a Resolution of the House of Commons.

1165. In 1848?—The Resolution, I believe, was passed before that time; but the first step was taken in 1848, when Sir Charles Wood was Chancellor of the Exchequer.

1166. Are you quite certain that in every year since 1848 the estimates have included all the Imperial charges for troops in the Colonies?—I cannot state that; the War Department alone can furnish that information.

1167. Does the Treasury exercise no check over the estimates of the War Department?—There is a general approval given by the Treasury to the estimates, but the details rest upon the responsibility of the department.

1168. If the war estimates omitted a provision for a particular regiment, on the ground that its expense was defrayed by a Colony, would it not be the duty of the Treasury to see that that was rectified?—The Treasury could not enter into the details.

1169. The Treasury lay down rules, but do not see that they are carried out?—The Commissioners of Audit, who have the revision of the expenditure of the department, would call the attention of the Treasury to such an omission as that.

1170. I am speaking of the estimates; there is not any practical supervision?—A very general supervision, but not a detailed supervision; they are framed upon the responsibility of the department.

1171. Then if, since 1848, any of the Imperial military expenditure has been defrayed by the Colonies, it would be right that that should appear in the estimate, and that the amount so paid in by the Colony should be paid into the Exchequer?—That is my opinion; not only as regards the charge which falls upon the Imperial funds, but an estimate should be prepared for the gross, whether paid by the Colony or out of Imperial funds.

1172. If they were defrayed by the Colony, it would be right that the Imperial pay should be voted in the Army Estimates?—Certainly, I should say so.

1173. Any deviation from that practice would be a violation of the Treasury Minute?—Certainly.

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1174. Does that extend to estimates for military contingencies, such as stores and provisions?—It extends to the whole of the estimates; every charge should appear in those estimates.

1175. There is an Imperial charge for stores and provisions for every regiment?—The stoppage for provisions would not be stated in the estimates.

1176. Wherever a regiment is stationed, we should see the charge for that under Number 10?—Not for the pay.

1177. And under Number 10 for the provisions and stores?—I do not think you would see the charge for each regiment; you might see the excess of cost for provisions in each Colony.

1178. No. 10 is the estimate for forage, provisions, barracks, lodging, &c.; where a regiment is stationed in any Colony, whether the provisions are paid for by the Colony or not, the estimate ought to include a vote for the regiment so stationed, ought it not?—That estimate ought, I think, to include the gross charge; but such has not hitherto been the practice.

1179. But the vote shows the different Colonies or stations separately?—Yes.

1180. So that, if from that estimate we find one Colony has been systematically omitted, there is reason to suspect that the matter has not been brought properly to account?—There would apparently be an error in the statement of the account. I presume in that case that the Colony has paid the charge directly, without its being passed through the Public Accounts.

1181. Supposing the Colony has paid the charge directly, to whom would it pay it?—No doubt to the functionary of the War Department.

1182. That functionary is usually the senior commissariat officer?—The paymaster of the regiment would be the proper person; the commissary is merely an intermediate agent.

1183. The commissary is the only person with whom they deal directly?—He raises the money and distributes it to the regimental paymasters.

1184. Therefore in the accounts of the Military chest or the Treasury chest in the Colony, any expenditure of that sort would appear?—It ought to appear there if the money is paid to the commissariat officer.

1185. Those accounts, if I understand right, go to the Treasury?—They go to the Audit Office.

1186. Not to the Treasury?—No.

1187. The accounts of the military chest, you say, are not examined in the Treasury?—They are examined by the Audit Office on behalf of the Treasury.

1188. But the Treasury is responsible for that examination?—The Treasury have the whole control over the funds of the Treasury chest.

1189. If anything in those accounts appeared inconsistent with the Treasury Minute of May 1848, it would be the duty of the Audit Office and of the Treasury to call attention to that discrepancy?—It would be the duty of the Audit Office to inform the Treasury, so that it might take steps to have the matter remedied, and I presume they have done so from the letter to which I refer, dated so far back as July 1860.

1190. Between 1848 and 1860, have no such representations been made by the Audit Office?—I have not seen any. It does not pass directly through my department, but it has come under my notice this morning that the last letter written on the subject is dated July last.

1191. With regard to Victoria, whenever the Home government pays the extra allowances you take a vote for it?—Yes, I believe that is the rule.

1192. Where the Home government does not pay those extra allowances, they do not?—They do not.

1193. If the Colony did not pay those allowances, they would of course, fall upon the Home government?—They would be voted upon the estimates.

1194. That being the case, the contribution from the Colony is a direct reduction of the charge which would fall upon the Home government?—Certainly.

1195. Ought not that, under the Minute of 1848, to have appeared in the estimates?—I think so.

1196. In your opinion, the practice of not entering those charges in the estimates and of not bringing them to account is, at any rate, in violation of the Minute of May 1848?—I think it is contrary to the spirit of that Minute which

which required that the gross sum should appear on both sides of our accounts, and that no fact should be suppressed.

1197. The result of not adhering to that rule has been great confusion?—I think that has been the result.

1198. In your opinion, it would be better in future, to include all sums defrayed by the Colonies, on account of Her Majesty's troops, in the estimates of expenditure, taking credit for them as contributions from the Colony?—I think that the estimates voted by Parliament should cover the whole of those charges, and that the amount repaid by the Colonies, should be paid into the Exchequer.

1199. Do you think it would be better to show in the estimates the amount contributed in past years, or the amount to be contributed in the year for which the estimate is voted?—I think the contributions should be omitted from the estimates altogether; but in the public accounts, the sums actually paid by the Colonies should appear.

1200. Would it not be well to show, in the paper at the end of the estimates, the contribution which will probably be made in reduction of the amount?—I would take a vote for the full amount; but the contribution should be stated at the foot of the estimates, so as to show the amount which reverts to the Exchequer.

1201. Do you know the exact mode in which the vote for military expenditure in Victoria has been taken?—It is shown in the printed estimates.

1202. Is it not a gross sum to be paid over quarterly to the senior officer, to be appropriated for the pay of the troops, in such a manner as Her Majesty may direct?—That is so.

1203. Was not that a distinct intimation that the expenditure of that sum should be the subject of a Royal warrant?—I think so.

1204. And it has been a very grave violation of the rule that that should not be accounted for?—I think it should have appeared according to the spirit of the Treasury Minute of May 1848, on both sides of the account.

1205. And the apparent intention of the vote itself?—Of the Colonial vote.

1206. Mr. *Baxter.*] Has your attention been called to the statement of the sums passed to the credit of the Exchequer in the books of the War Office, at p. 154 of the Army Estimates?—Yes, I have seen that statement; it is added to the annual estimates under the Minute of the 2d of May 1848, to which I have referred.

1207. Can you tell us whether this 72,487 *l.* represents the whole contributions from the Colonial revenues in aid of the military expenditure which has found its way into the Exchequer?—No doubt that is the full sum which has been paid into the Exchequer during the period to which that account refers, but other sums are contributed by the Colonies, which are paid directly to the men, which do not pass into the Exchequer.

1208. There is no additional sum which finds its way into the Exchequer of this country?—None.

1209. Whose duty is it to see that the contributions for which the Colonial revenues are liable are paid either directly into the Imperial Exchequer, or to persons connected with the Imperial Government on the spot?—It is the duty of the War Department to watch the collection of all those receipts.

1210. Under the superintendence of the Treasury?—No, it is part of the ordinary duty of the department; formerly these receipts never passed into the Exchequer at all; they were abated on the estimates, and the War Department acted just as a revenue department does in collecting the revenue which belongs to it.

1211. Do I understand that the Treasury simply receive whatever contributions the Colonies may choose to give, without having any means of ascertaining whether those contributions are in order or not?—It is the duty of the War Department to check that, and to see that all sums payable by the Colonies are paid over to the military chests in the Colonies; their accounts are audited, and if they omit to perform that duty the attention of the Treasury would be called to it by the Commissioners of Audit.

1212. Has the attention of the Treasury been frequently called to the state of these accounts, by the Commissioners of Audit?—There is a correspondence going on now between the Treasury, the Audit Office, and the War Department, on the subject of these colonial contributions.

1213. Did that begin in July last?—I cannot say when it began; but it terminated then; the last letter from the Treasury to the War Department,

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calling for information which has not yet been supplied, is dated in July. The delay has probably arisen from the necessity of referring to the Colonies for information.

1214. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you see any objection to the charge for the troops in Australia, which is to be repaid by Australia, being entered upon the Estimates in the same way as the pay of the troops in India is entered?—I think that the Estimates should give the full charge, and that the full charge should be voted; all sums which are repaid by the Colonies, should go into the Exchequer.

1215. Do you see any objection to the mode in which the charge for the troops in India is voted upon the Estimates?—Very considerable difficulty arises with regard to that mode; at the present moment probably the Indian Department is in debt to the Government seven or eight hundreds thousand pounds for advances made in this country, on account of charges repayable by India; considerable embarrassment is caused by the delay which takes place in the repayment of these advances; I would rather see the full charges voted, and every repayment credited.

1216. Your proposal extends to a different mode to that adopted for India?—I think it will come to that, owing to the great embarrassment which the present system entails in regulating the Army Finances.

1217. Sir *George Grey.*] It has been assumed that, from Vote 10, to which reference has been made, which is for provisions, forage, fuel and light, including money allowances in lieu thereof, at the stations mentioned, Victoria has been omitted. Are you able to inform us whether the New South Wales command includes Victoria?—I believe Victoria is part of the New South Wales command, and would therefore be included in that Estimate.

1218. Are you also aware whether in the Estimates the vote is taken for the charge of the establishment of every regiment in the service, with the exception only of those which are marked, at p. 31 of the Estimates, as serving in India?—I believe that is the case; but I have no practical knowledge of the detailed preparation of these Estimates; that duty belongs to the War Department, and not to the Treasury.

1219. If that is so, would not that vote cover the pay and allowances of any regiment serving at Victoria?—Certainly.

1220. By whom was the statement at p. 154 of the Estimates proposed?—By the War Department.

1221. Exclusively?—Exclusively.

1222. Mr. *Childers.*] Would it not be more correct to say that New South Wales is included in Victoria?—It may be so; I am not in any way responsible for the preparation of the Estimates; it may be a wrong description.

1223. Mr. *Fortescue.*] In the annual paper just delivered by the Treasury, giving the state of the Treasury chest at end of the financial year 1860, only three colonies, I believe, are given as having paid any military contribution into the military chest; the Ionian Islands, Ceylon, the Mauritius, and perhaps Malta. I suppose that if any colony has paid a military contribution into the Treasury chest within that year, which ought to appear in that account?—There are four colonies which pay a fixed contribution, Ceylon, as well as Malta, the Ionian Islands, and the Mauritius; and it is those four only which pay the sums into the military chest. Any other contributions which are paid, are paid to the military authorities direct; that is, to the paymaster of the regiment; and those do not pass through the Treasury chest at all.

1224. I take it those are older military contributions, fixed by Colonial Acts?—They are of long standing, I believe.

1225. Then it appears that the military contribution of Victoria, which is not fixed by Colonial Act, but is annually voted, has never been treated in the same way as the fixed military contributions?—They are not paid, I believe, into the military chest; certain sums have reached the Exchequer, but through a different channel.

1226. Through what channel?—They have been paid to the paymaster of the regiment, returned in his accounts with the War Office, and the War Office have made the payment direct to the Exchequer here.

1227. Sir *George Grey.*] In the Estimates of last year there is an entry of a sum of between 15,000 *l.* and 20,000 *l.*, and with reference to it a statement corresponding with that at p. 154?—Yes.

1228. Would

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1228. Would that come from the Treasury?—It would be returned by the military officer in his accounts with the War Department, and the War Department here would transfer the fund to the Exchequer.

1229. Do you see any difficulty in adopting a uniform system in those accounts?—It appears to me that the whole system requires a change, and that there should be but one mode of dealing with the contributions, in whatever form they are made.

1230. Mr. *Childers.*] Are you sure that these moneys were paid direct to the paymasters?—I have seen seen a pay-list this morning from Victoria, in which certain sums were put down as paid by the Colony to the paymaster.

1231. Were they not paid by the Colony to the officer in charge of the military chest?—They may have passed through the military chest to the paymaster; but I believe the officer in charge of the military chest or the regimental paymaster accounted directly to the Colony for the expenditure of those sums.

1232. And omitted them from his accounts in the military chest?—And omitted them from the accounts rendered to the War Department and the Audit Office.

1233. The military chest includes a great many accounts which do not come into the Home accounts?—I think that every sum paid into the Treasury chest in the colony, ought to appear in the accounts rendered to the Home Government.

1234. The accounts of the military chest include transactions which do not come into the receipt and expenditure of the Exchequer?—Clearly.

1235. So that it does not follow that every sum which appears in the accounts of the military chest of the station, should come afterwards into the revenue and expenditure accounts laid before Parliament?—Not in the Exchequer account; very few charges appear in that.

1236. That being the case, why has the commissariat officer, in charge of the military chest, omitted from his accounts these payments by the Colony?—I apprehend, the reason is, that he has accounted for them directly to the colonial authorities; that he has considered himself as a sub-accountant for those payments to the colonial authorities, and has rendered them an account.

1237. Is not that in direct violation of the rules by which the military chest is governed?—I think it is wrong.

1238. Are not the commissariat officers instructed not to keep separate accounts?—I believe they are so instructed, and that explanations have been called for which form part of the correspondence to which I have referred.

1239. Who has audited those accounts of money received from the Colony?—The Colonial Auditor would be the person to examine them.

1240. How could he audit expenditure of money which has been paid over to the officer at the station, to be defrayed as Her Majesty may direct?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with the regulations by which those receipts and payments are governed to be able to answer the question.

1241. Would not the inevitable result of such a vote, and the money under it not being paid into the military chest, be, that the accounts could not be audited at all?—I should imagine that those sums paid out of the Colonial Treasury to the Treasury chest officer, would be accounted for by him to the Colony; I think that the rules of colonial audit would apply to that sum.

1242. But where the amount is directed to be paid over in four quarterly payments, would not the receipt be a sufficient voucher?—The receipt would be a sufficient voucher, for the sum advanced; but the detailed application of the money would necessarily be audited either by the colonial authorities or by the War Office, according to our rules of audit, applicable to Imperial funds; I think that in any change of system the latter course should be adopted.

1243. *Chairman.*] Will you prepare, if you please, a paper giving a clear explanation of the present system, and of the alterations suggested by the department, and produce it before this Committee?—I will endeavour to ascertain from the War Department all facts which bear upon this question, and we shall be prepared to state the view of the Treasury as to the mode in which they should be henceforth regulated.

1244. Mr. *Baxter.*] Have the audit office, in your opinion, any correct data upon which to form an opinion whether the contributions which have been paid are correct or not?—I think that the examination of the detailed expenditure

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of all the advances made by the Colonies should be conducted by the War Office; the Audit Office merely examines the Treasury chest account to see that all sums advanced out of the Treasury chest to any department having received grants from Parliament, are repaid out of such grants.

1245. The Audit Office, so far as I can see, affords no guarantee that all contributions due from the Colonies have actually been paid through the account of the War Office?—It is no part of the duty of the Audit Office to check that, but it is the duty of the War Department to see that all contributions out of colonial funds in aid of military expenditure are duly brought to account.

Mr. *Henry William Sharp Whiffin*, called in; and further Examined.

Mr. *H. W. S. Whiffen.*

1246. Sir *George Grey.*] YOU informed us the other day that you were employed in the War Department in the preparation of the Estimates?—The Estimates for the present year were prepared under my superintendence.

1247. You are conversant, I presume, with the particulars of Vote 10?—Yes.

1248. Are you able to inform us whether, as Victoria is not mentioned in the list of stations, it is really exeluded, or included under the head of New South Wales?—It is included under New South Wales. Several years ago Sydney was the headquarters of the Australian colonies; but about eight years ago, the headquarters were transferred to Victoria, and the term "New South Wales" is still kept up, although it embraces and includes both Victoria and Sydney.

1249. Is it the case, that in these Estimates, the whole charge of the regimental establishment of troops serving in Victoria is voted by Parliament, or is any reduction made on account of payments made by the Colony?—The whole amount is voted, and no deduction is made.

1250. Mr. *Childers.*] That is so for the present year?—It is.

1251. You cannot speak to what has been done in past years?—I cannot, but the officers and men at both stations receive Imperial pay, excepting, I believe, one company of Royal Artillery stationed in New South Wales.

General Sir *John F. Burgoyne*, called in; and Examined.

Gen. Sir *J. F. Burgoyne.*

1252. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are Inspector General of Fortifications?—I am.

1253. There are, I believe, deputy inspectors appointed who report to you?—There are.

1254. Will you state to the Committee what you consider the chief stations in a military point of view which it is important for us to maintain in strength, excluding the Mediterranean garrisons?—I think that the Mauritius and Bermuda are the two principal ones, and after those, perhaps Halifax. I know that the navy attach great importance to Halifax. Then there come, perhaps, in a secondary view, the Cape, Ceylon, Hong Kong, and St. Helena; and besides those, others are now rising into notice of some importance, particularly as coaling stations for steamers, such as Aden and Seychelles; and the Falkland Islands, I imagine, will be of importance in that respect.

1255. I believe there are now works at all those places?—There are, but many of them are quite incomplete and inefficient; most of them have great capabilities for defence, all of them, indeed, except the Cape and Halifax.

1256. I observe in reference to the works at Mauritius, that the total estimated cost of works there is 202,000 *l.*, the sum already expended as posted up to March 1860, is 119,450 *l.*, 15,000 *l.* is proposed for the present year, leaving 64,000 *l.* to be expended; can you inform the Committee whether, when that 64,000 *l.* has been expended, the works will be complete?—No, I think they will require a great addition; those Estimates were framed a great many years ago, and at a time when we were very much limited in our views, and military powers have augmented to such degree the modes of attackth, at hardly any of those total Estimates can now be relied upon.

1257. Can you give the Committee any idea of what should be the additional expenditure in order to complete those works at Mauritius, in the mode which you think desirable?—I could not tell you offhand; at the present moment we have under consideration some reports from Mauritius; the General there

there has taken a new view of the works, that is, he attaches more importance to the protection of the whole of the island than has been done before, and I think very judiciously so; that will alter the consideration of expense.

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1258. What is the ground upon which you consider the defence of the Mauritius important?—It is well known, I believe, that before it was taken by us in the French war, the loss we sustained from cruisers that came out from the Mauritius amounted to about seven millions of money; besides the indirect loss by delay in waiting for convoys, and having to act together in that way. The loss, therefore, was enormous, and with the introduction of steam would probably now be still more. Then again the Mauritius is under some degree of danger from the neighbourhood of the island of Bourbon, now held by the French, where they have a considerable body of troops. Mauritius has a very fine harbour, and is in the direct communication from the Cape to India, and has great reference also to the communications with Australia.

1259. By what soldiers are those works manned?—Entirely by Europeans; it is one of those colonies in which, I believe, it is found impracticable to collect a local force which, if it could be collected, would be of the greatest advantage.

1260. The cost of those works is, I presume, entirely defrayed by the Imperial Exchequer?—Entirely so.

1261. Including not only the cost of erecting them, but of defending them?—Entirely; I believe the island makes some contribution in money.

1262. I observe that the local revenue of the Mauritius, by the last returns, is given at nearly half a million; do you think that Mauritius might fairly be called upon to do something towards its own defence?—Wherever you call upon a colony, it should be directly for money, and not to pay any portion of the distinct expenses, because that creates confusion; for instance, a discussion arose some short time ago, about the removal of a company of artillery from Sydney to New Zealand because the Colony had paid part of the expenses of that company. I think that if the colony pays a given sum of money, upon some calculation to be agreed upon, it would be better than letting them share the expenses, as the Ionian Islands do, which pay 25,000*l.* a year.

1263. Looking at the resources of the Mauritius, do you think it fair that they should be called upon to pay more than they do now towards their own defences?—That is hardly within my attributes; but I should think they ought to pay; they have no other charges, I believe.

1264. Sir *George Grey.*] You have very clearly stated what, in your opinion, is the value of the Mauritius to this country; I should like to know what you consider to be the object of these forts; are they to enable the garrison to stand a regular siege, and if so, of what duration?—If we try to defend the whole island the works will chiefly consist of small batteries and forts round the coasts; the landing-places are limited in extent and number, and that appears to be the most practicable and the best mode of proceeding.

1265. What garrison would be requisite effectually to man the works in the event of an attack?—When you have available works, a very small garrison will make a respectable defence, unless the attack is very forcible indeed.

1266. What is the ordinary garrison there?—Not above 1,800 or 2,000.

1267. What proportion of that is artillery?—I am not aware; but I suppose they have three or four companies.

1268. Do you know the amount of force which they have in the Island of Bourbon?—One thousand five hundred regulars and 5,000 militia; they have a great advantage over us in respect of the militia.

1269. Is that island fortified?—It is not, with the exception of a few batteries about the coast; we know little about Bourbon.

1270. Would the object of the Mauritius forts be to enable the garrison to withstand an attack until assistance came?—By defending the island I hope we should be allowed to continue defences for Fort George, which is what we have been confined to hitherto.

1271. What sort of attack do you contemplate on the Mauritius?—The attack of a large squadron. We know that it has been proposed to France, as a principle of action, to divide the navy into squadrons of four line-of-battle ships, some frigates, and a number of transports with troops, and send them about to do as much mischief as they possibly can, either singly or combined; and, getting the start of us, they would have full play on the Mauritius.

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1272. Assuming that they would get the start of us, is it your object that these forts should enable the garrison to hold out until a squadron should be despatched from India, or the Cape, or from England, to intercept the proceedings of the attacking parties?—Until the British Navy had resumed its ascendancy in that quarter.

1273. You do not contemplate that the garrison would maintain a protracted siege without being relieved by a naval force?—Yes; the advantages are very great there. I think you would have a great chance if you defend the whole island.

1274. What garrison do you consider necessary to man those works?—There is an idea that the more works you have the more troops you want.

1275. What is your estimate of the number of troops necessary to defend the island?—About 6,000, when you have the works, and you will then have a powerful place in the Mauritius which would probably defy any enemy.

1276. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Supposing, in the present state of the Mauritius, that a foreign force succeeded in establishing itself there, and that afterwards our supremacy in those seas was restored by the arrival of an English fleet, do you think that we should have much difficulty in retaking the island?—I think we should have the greatest possible difficulty, because a foreign power would probably have the means of sending a strong garrison there; if they sent 10,000, or 12,000 men there it would be hopeless to think of taking it again.

1277. I said, in its present state?—Even in its present state.

1278. Supposing that, in the state in which you propose to put it by the erection of these fortifications, a foreign power succeeded in taking the island, would not the difficulty of retaking it be infinitely increased?—Undoubtedly it would.

1279. In that case the fortifications we had erected, would be turned against us?—That must be the case with all fortifications.

1280. Unless the fortifications were fully garrisoned, so as to secure them against any reasonable risk of such a fate, you think it would be better that they should not be there at all?—They may be capable of considerable defence even if not fully garrisoned. If you have a fort with 100 men in it, it is probably secure against a *coup de main*; forts have a great advantage.

1281. Supposing your proposed forts were erected, and it was not found possible to spare such a large force as 6,000 men for the defence of so small an island, would there not be great risk of the fortifications being taken and turned against us?—Certainly; if you have a small garrison there is greater risk of its being taken from you, but a small garrison would secure it against a moderate attacking force. As regards the expense of fortifications, I think we may fairly say, that 100,000 *l.* spent in fortifications, would be equivalent to the expense of maintaining only about 80 or 100 men constantly, and the fortifications would be worth, probably, 500 men.

1282. You are aware that the present garrison of the Mauritius consists of two regiments of the line, and a company or two of Royal Artillery; whereas you propose, as part of your plan, a garrison of 6,000 men?—As a war garrison; but even with 2,000, I should have great hopes of holding it.

1283. Are you aware what amount of works would be sufficient to secure the harbour of Fort Louis against the attack of a small squadron, or a single man-of-war?—It would take very little to defend the entrance against a floating attack.

1284. In its present condition?—It would be so easy to defend the entrance into the harbour against even steamers, that I should have no apprehension from a maritime attack.

1285. You consider Port Louis already secure against any ordinary maritime attack?—Yes; I should think so; it is a narrow entrance, and there would be no difficulty in preventing a ship going in.

1286. Your object is to prevent a military force being landed on some other part of the island and taking the town in the rear?—That is the object.

1287. Mr. *Ellice.*] Have you made any inquiries lately into the state of the fortifications there?—Yes, reports have been very lately received.

1288. What is the nature of the report generally with respect to expenditure required, either to improve the present fortifications or to build additional ones?—At

—At present they are employed upon a work called Fort George at the mouth of the harbour; the last report we have suggests some modifications in that work, which, probably, will be agreed to.

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1289. That work is already commenced?—Yes, to some considerable extent.

1290. Is not a sum of money asked for for that work in the estimates of this year?—Yes, chiefly for that work.

1291. You do not know what the whole sum required for that work will be?—No, I cannot tell you exactly what the whole sum will be; it is to be the last hold in the island.

1292. When those estimates were framed, and you desired that a sum of money might be asked for on account of the fortifications, did you also report to the Treasury what the whole amount required to finish the work would be?—Yes, the estimate which is before you is for Port Louis.

1293. So that we are involved in an expense, which is to result in the expenditure of 200,000 *l.* in the Mauritius?—Eventually we shall want a great deal more, probably, for the Mauritius.

1294. Mr. *Childers.*] Do you see your way in any way to reduce the annual charge for the troops in the Mauritius?—No; I am not aware of any mode in which they can be reduced.

1295. You know no way in which a smaller number of men might be kept there in time of peace?—Not a smaller number than 2,000; that is a great deal too small.

1296. There is no harbour, I think, to the Island of Bourbon?—There is no harbour.

1297. There is no foreign naval station near the Mauritius?—There is not; but we apprehend that in the Isle of Bourbon the French have great means for fitting out an armament of troops; they have stores, guns, and ammunition, and everything else that is necessary; if they sent a fleet out they could equip a force for the attack of the Mauritius.

1298. Could they refit a fleet at Bourbon?—No, I think not; there is nothing but open roadsteads.

1299. Of a dangerous character?—I am not aware; but I apprehend not.

1300. Bourbon could not in any way be the basis of naval operations against the Mauritius?—Except that the navy could go safely there and get a military force.

1301. Lord *Stanley.*] I presume all our calculations are based upon the assumption that England will be permanently in possession of the command of the sea?—Yes; all our colonies would be in a precarious state if it were not so.

1302. In assuming that an attack takes place upon the Mauritius or any other place, you assume that for the time, and for the time only, we have lost that command of the sea?—Precisely.

1303. And if a large invading force were to attack and occupy for a time Mauritius, or any other colony similarly situated, when the command of the sea returned to us that force would find itself entrapped, would it not?—Hardly entrapped, unless easily retaken.

1304. Would not that be a strong military argument against the probability of any such attack being made?—I think, if it was taken by an enemy they would prevent its being retaken by putting a large force on it, which we cannot afford.

1305. The force, whether large or small, would be cut off from all communication?—It would, as it was in the early part of the French war, but there is a common idea that a colony must depend upon the navy for its protection, and that is made use of as an argument against any preparations or precautions whatever. The navy cannot be every where in force, and there is no sea in which some other navy may not be in command for weeks, and perhaps months.

1306. Mr. *Adderley.*] You do not think it likely that England would lose the command of those seas?—I think probably we might for weeks and months together.

1307. There is no nation which has a naval force so near to the Mauritius as England?—Certainly not, but it is very difficult to follow up the movements of an enemy's fleet; you never know where they are going or what they are about.

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about. We all know that Lord Nelson once sailed to the West Indies in pursuit of a French fleet which was going quietly up the Mediterranean.

1308. You told us that the French had raised a militia in Bourbon, but that England could not do so in the Mauritius. Why is that?—It is partly because the population is chiefly French, and a very large proportion of it is Chinese. I have asked whether militia cannot be raised there, and I am told it is quite out of the question.

1309. Mr. *Fortescue.*] I believe there is also a large coolie population?—Yes, very large.

1310. Mr. *Adderley.*] Why do you suppose that the French depend upon the number of troops at Bourbon and not upon such works as you propose?—Because they have a large force of 6,000 or 7,000 men.

1311. Why should not they have the same reason for reducing their force which you recommend in the Mauritius?—I am not aware of the particular state of the island of Bourbon; if they have the same advantages as the Mauritius I would recommend them also to have works.

1312. *Chairman.*] I think you say that Halifax is one of the places which you think ought to be held in strength?—Yes.

1313. I observe that there is a vote for the construction of the citadel of Halifax, of which the estimated cost is 14,486 *l.*, but the amount annually voted is 26,200 *l.* Has anything been suggested since the original estimate was given?—No, that estimate is for a specific work; the citadel is a large fort which had rough ground in front of it, and that ground had to be filled in, so as to bring the surface under fire of your guns; those calculations were made 20 years ago, and they are not sufficient; 500 *l.* has been voted this year, and another 500 *l.* will probably be required, and that will complete the works.

1314. Do you know what the cost of works at Halifax has been?—There has been very little more than that citadel; that is the chief work.

1315. It has appeared in the Votes from year to year?—Yes; I think that there are some sea batteries to defend the harbour. Halifax would be a place very easily defended against any enemy, except the United States.

1316. Mr. *Adderley.*] You say that the defence would be easy because you reckon upon a large local force?—Yes.

1317. But without such a local force, do you consider that the garrison which is now kept there, 1,300 men, is sufficient for its defence?—No, that would not be sufficient.

1318. Do you consider that very far short of an adequate garrison?—Yes.

1319. Without some basis in the way of a local militia, you do not consider that the works can be held by 1,300 men?—I do not. At Halifax the people are all well disposed; they are all English, and have the same animus as we have here, and I have no doubt that a large local force might be raised. The defence of these colonies which have large British populations, may, I think, be made impregnable by a much less expensive system than that hitherto adopted, of having a few militia, namely, to organise the greater part of population like volunteers, without taking them away from their occupations. Out of those materials, you might make such a force as a navy crossing the sea, would never look at.

1320. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that, at the present moment the volunteer movement is in active progress, both in the North American and the Australian colonies?—I believe that they are organising a regular militia, with fine uniforms and bands, and all that sort of thing, which is very expensive, and they are brought together so much that they are taken away from their occupations. If you enrol a militia as they do in the United States, or give them some little exercise in the first elements, you may make a body of men to which it would be impossible to oppose any force coming across the sea.

1321. You are aware that a volunteer force is at present in the course of being drilled in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia?—I think they have about 4,000 or 5,000 men in Canada; but I should expect, according to my idea, to have 100,000.

1322. *Chairman.*] Are you aware of any means which the Imperial Government could take to obtain a larger force at any less expense than is incurred now?—No, it must rest with the colonists.

1323. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you wish to see this volunteer force left without any nucleus of Imperial troops?—I would have a nucleus to serve as a model; a small

small force is all that is necessary for such purpose. One regiment at each of the Australian Colonies would form an admirable basis for them to go upon.

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1324. You think that even the presence of a small Imperial force in the Colonies would make the local force far more available and efficient than they would otherwise be?—Certainly.

1325. Mr. *Baxter.*] Are you aware that up to a comparatively recent period there has been no volunteer force in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia?—I believe there was none in New Brunswick or Nova Scotia.

1326. In the circumstances that have obtained for many years past, do you think that there is much use in our keeping up a large garrison at Halifax?—Not unless you attach much importance to the country; they should find a force to protect themselves.

1327. You say you do not think it possible for a garrison at Halifax to defend itself unless supported by a local militia force?—No.

1328. And you are aware that there has been, up to a recent period, no such force in Nova Scotia?—I believe not; but I believe they have it in contemplation to raise one.

1329. Under those circumstances, what is the use of our garrisoning Halifax if it could not hold the citadel without the aid of a local force which does not exist?—They would resist any small attack.

1330. Those 1,300 men are not considered capable of defending Halifax against a naval attack?—Not by a considerable force landed; assuming that the people of the Colony were indifferent to the issue.

1331. Sir *George Grey.*] In the event of a war breaking out with the United States, do you suppose that the garrison could not be reinforced?—Certainly it could; if we had a war with the United States only we could throw a large force into all these Colonies.

1332. What was the garrison reduced to at the time of the Russian war?—I do not know, but I should think you might reduce them to a very great extent.

1333. Are you aware what the forces in the Mauritius were reduced to in order that the troops might be made available elsewhere?—I have no recollection; there was no chance of any attack in that quarter from the Russians.

1334. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that there are laws under which every able-bodied man is liable to be called out?—The liability is not enough; they should be enrolled.

1335. Do you not take for granted that if there was any appearance of danger a large local force would have been raised in a very short time?—Yes, I have no doubt that a large local force might be raised in a short time, and made very powerful; but the organization should take place at once.

1336. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you not think that the placing of an adequate garrison there would lead to the neglect of the Colony?—I think so; it has never been clearly defined what they should do for themselves.

1337. You have stated that the presence of a small body of English troops would be useful in forming other troops?—Yes.

1338. If Canada undertook its own defence, do you think that they would consider it necessary to send to England for such a basis?—I do not think they would; they would do it imperfectly and badly, probably, if it were left to themselves.

1339. *Chairman.*] What other fortified places do you think should be maintained?—Kingston and Quebec.

1340. Has anything been done lately at Kingston?—No; it is a small inclosure to prevent any sudden inroad; it is the harbour for the great Lake Ontario.

1341. At whose expense are those forts maintained?—By the Imperial Government. Kingston, Montreal and Quebec were retained when Lord Grey was Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the rest were given up to the colonies.

1342. Is Kingston now held in such strength as is satisfactory to you?—I think that, with the kind of warfare you would expect there, it is.

1343. What sort of warfare would you expect there?—The incursions of perhaps 50,000 or 60,000 or 100,000.

1344. From what quarter?—From the United States; it would be a warfare that would only last for a short time; a month or six weeks.

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1345. What is the number of the standing army in the United States?—They have but a very small standing army, but they make great use of their militia force; in the present warfare the militia force will come out in a short time favourably.

1346. In the event of a war with the United States, by what means would you propose to relieve Kingston, if the war broke out during the seven months that the St. Lawrence is closed?—There would be no communication during the winter months.

1347. If Kingston were then attacked by 100,000 men, what would become of their garrison?—It would be reduced.

1348. Lord *Stanley.*] It is the fact, is it not, that the northern route to the interior of Canada is closed during the whole of the winter months?—I think that is the case. I believe the St. Lawrence is not navigable during the winter months.

1349. And the only access is by Portland and through the State of Maine?—By Portland and Boston.

1350. *Chairman.*] The frontier line of our North American Colonies extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific?—Yes.

1351. Do you think that the force we have there is adequate to the defence of that frontier in any contingency?—Only by the goodwill of the population; supposing 100,000 men were in arms, it would not be worth the while of the United States to make the attempt.

1352. Mr. *Adderley.*] Is it not the fact, that Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton, were all conquered by the colonists, unaided by us?—They were.

1353. And were held in garrison?—A great many years ago.

1354. Do you see any reason why English colonial forces should not do now what English colonial forces did then?—A great many years ago the country was very wild, and the population very small, and the army on both sides, also, very small.

1355. But the colonial forces conquered those Colonies for us?—Yes, by numbers.

1356. It was in 1710, and those Colonies were not very populous then?—No, but I suppose the colonial troops were 10 to 1 in force to the regulars opposed to them.

1357. At that time the Colonies found troops for all forces, Indian forces, and foreign forces?—Yes.

1358. And for a great many years they held the principal places, and garrisoned them?—They did, but it was against a very small body of troops.

1359. In all the great positions at that time the English contributed nothing until the seven years' war?—No, so far as I recollect.

1360. Mr. *Ellice.*] Are the fortifications in Canada in perfect repair?—They would admit of great improvement, particularly at Quebec. During the summer months Quebec is our only communication; assuming that we could go up to Quebec without any impediment, that would be the basis of operations for the Colony.

1361. From the reports which you now have from Quebec, do you consider that those fortifications are in efficient order for the present system of military science?—Yes, as far as they go; but they are capable of great improvement.

1362. At what expenditure are they capable of being made good?—I cannot tell you off-hand, but there is one thing in fortifications which differs from many others; every 10,000 *l.* you spend puts you in a better position than you were in before, even if you do not continue the outlay. We make a plan of a fortification, particularly on the present system of detached works, and we make a plan for the whole mass of works; but every work you put up puts you in a better position than you were in before, even if you do nothing more. Then you may go on adding to a place like Quebec, and improving its position by one work after another.

1363. Do you suppose that the garrisons left in Canada are sufficient to garrison Kingston and Quebec?—I do not know how many troops there are, but I should imagine so.

1364. *Chairman.*] The total force, including the Canadian Rifles, is 3,000 men, and the number of troops between Kingston and Quebec, 1,800?—That is a very weak garrison.

1365. Sir *George Grey.*] Are we now incurring any expense on account of those

those fortifications?—No, very trifling indeed; just for small repairs and maintenance.

1366. There is nothing, I think, in the estimates of this year for fortifications in North America?—There is nothing but for the common repairs going on in keeping it up.

1367. Except in Nova Scotia?—No.

1368. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You said, in answer to a question just now, that Nova Scotia was captured for this country by the military forces of the Colonies, which have since become the United States of America?—Yes.

1369. The fact then is, that the country, which was then a Colony of this country, has since become a foreign power?—Yes.

1370. So that what at that time was a colonial ally of England has now become a foreign power, and liable to be an enemy?—Yes.

1371. With the addition that it has become 10 times as strong as a possible enemy to what it was then as a friend?—Yes, all our possessions there were taken by the colonists.

1372. So that the nation which was then an ally is now a foreigner, and liable to be an enemy?—Yes.

1373. You said just now that you thought that the presence of British troops in the Colonies had discouraged local efforts of defence; how would you propose to remedy that evil?—By having some definite understanding with the Colonies that they ought to supply their own defences.

1374. Do you mean by calling upon them to pay for the British troops quartered there, and in case they refused to pay for them, by withdrawing those troops?—No, I would rather they would furnish local forces, we giving them some support by our own; with regard to Nova Scotia they pay nothing at all, neither for barracks, fortifications, troops or anything.

1375. Are you prepared to withdraw, or diminish the garrison of Imperial troops in these provinces, unless the provinces consent to pay for them?—No; I should leave them to supply their own, but we should give them a certain number of troops as the basis of their defences.

1376. I understood you to say that by supplying them with Imperial troops, we had discouraged local efforts?—I do not think we positively discourage them; but they hold it as a maxim that their defence rests with the Imperial Government, and not with themselves.

1377. *Chairman.*] Have you seen the opinion expressed by Sir William Denison on the subject?—Yes.

1378. Do you agree with that opinion?—I agree with him almost entirely; I have had a great deal of communication with Sir William Denison, and a great deal of correspondence on the subject; I do not quite agree in some details of his works as applied to the defences of the Colony.

1379. Sir William Denison has expressed an opinion that it would be desirable that all Colonies which are capable of contributing towards their defences should be called upon to do so; do you concur in that opinion?—Yes, but I would not do it as he proposes. He proposes to do it by allotting some specific portion of the expense to the Colonies; I would rather you should make a calculation of whatever you think right, and then let them pay that in money.

1380. Mr. *Adderley.*] I understand you propose a fixed sum to be paid by the Colony?—Yes.

1381. As Ceylon pays 24,000 *l.* a year, so every Colony should pay a fixed sum; that is your proposition?—Yes; any sum that should be thought right by the Government.

1382. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that in the Colonies which we have been speaking of, possessing the representative institutions, a plan like Sir William Denison's cannot be carried out, except with the consent of the Colonies?—I suppose not.

1383. Then it must be a matter of agreement with the Colonial Government?—A matter of agreement, and a matter of interest to themselves; for instance, the Colony of Victoria is paying much more than any other; they seem prepared to pay for anything; for troops even.

1384. Mr. *Childers.*] You said, I think, that for seven months in the year there is no communication with Canada?—My general impression is, that the communication for certain months in the year is quite stopped.

1385. Have you been consulted as to the necessity of opening a communica-

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tion by railway from Halifax to Canada?—No, except generally on a proposed railway.

1386. But has not that idea been taken up in a military point of view by the Government?—Yes; and it has been very much encouraged.

1387. If such a railway were constructed from Halifax, joining the Grand Trunk Railway in Canada, communication would be open throughout the year?—Yes, if you could protect the frontier; but it would approach the frontier, and be very liable to inroads from the United States.

1388. As far as the climate is concerned, if the line were made, it would afford a communication throughout the year?—Yes.

1389. If such a communication were carried out, would it not tend to enable you to reduce the force stationed in Canada?—I think not; the British force in Canada would be always small; I should trust entirely to the local force in a country like Canada, but I think you ought always to have a small British force to act as an example for the troops, and to afford them a few officers and staff.

1390. Do you think there could be any reduction in the British forces in Canada if a larger number of artillery were sent out there?—No; I do not think that would make any difference: but as regards the description of the troops, I should mention one thing which, I think, would be of great importance to the Colonies, which is, that they should use engineers more than they do, for instance, at Victoria and Sydney, and places of that description.

1391. Mr. *Adderley.*] Are you aware when English troops were first sent from England to aid in the defences of the Colonies?—I should think almost from time immemorial.

1392. You do not know when the Mutiny Act was first extended to the Colonies?—No.

1393. Before those American Colonies, which are now the United States, became independent, had the system of sending English troops there begun?—I do not know.

1394. Mr. *Childers.*] Carrying on the question I was asking you, do you think that if a larger number of engineers were stationed in Canada, for instance, you could see a means of reducing the number of troops of the line?—There is always an objection to send engineers to Canada, because there is such a tendency to desert there; they are skilled workmen, and there is such an attraction offered in the United States for the employment of them, that the greater part of them desert. For that reason we have never sent engineers or sappers over to Canada; we have sent them to Nova Scotia, because that is rather more distant, and there is not the same inducement.

1395. *Chairman.*] You are aware, are you not, that engineers were sent to British Columbia, at a cost of 60,000 *l.* to this country?—There were a few engineers sent there to make a survey of the boundary; they were sent exclusively for that purpose, and some of them have deserted.

1396. Do you know what they have done there?—They were not sent away by us, but I imagine that they were engaged in laying out the survey of that frontier.

1397. You are not aware that the only thing they have done is to make huts for themselves within the last few years?—No.

1398. Mr. *Childers.*] Were you not consulted upon the propriety of sending these engineers?—Only so far as whether there was any objection, and whether they were proper men for the purpose.

1399. But you were not consulted as to the object of sending them?—Only as to its being for the purpose of making this survey.

1400. That was the object which was suggested to you when these men were sent?—Yes.

1401. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you allude to the sappers and miners who were sent out by Sir Edward Lytton under Colonel Moody?—They were not sent out under Colonel Moody; they were sent out under another officer who had charge of the survey.

1402. Then the Chairman and yourself have been alluding to different parties of sappers; are you aware that Sir Edward Lytton, when the British Colony of Columbia was founded, sent there a body of sappers under Colonel Moody?—I was aware that they were sent there; and they were sent expressly to mark out the boundaries in a very difficult country.

1403. Are

1403. Are you aware that, independently of that boundary survey, there has been a body of sappers who were sent out upon the first formation of the Colony, under the recommendation of Sir Edward Lytton?—I do not recollect, but I suppose it was so.

1404. Do you conceive that, if it were not for that difficulty as to deserters, there would be an advantage in making use of engineers in Canada?—I think in every Colony it would be a great advantage, because the engineers are perfect soldiers, and as soldiers they cost very little more than others, and they are all of them more or less skilled artisans, good workmen, for which they get the pay of about 1*s.* a day, upon the average; and in those Colonies they get, perhaps, 2*s.* a day, and they do the work that you would have to pay civilians for doing from 4*s.* to 10*s.* a day, and the difference between the 2*s.* a day and the 4*s.* or 10*s.* would go to the credit of their expenses as soldiers.

1405. Mr. *Ellice.*] And that difference is an inducement for the men to desert whenever they can find an opportunity?—Yes, in Canada they would, but not in Australia.

1406. Is not that temptation equally great in a thriving country like Australia?—I think not, because there you have the police, who can catch them. The moment they cross the frontier in Canada they laugh at you.

1407. Mr. *Childers.*] Would not that difficulty be still greater in British Columbia, where you have both a foreign country and mines?—They have some deserters, but not many; about one-twentieth of the men desert.

1408. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you know anything about the defences of the harbour of St. John, in New Brunswick?—No, nothing at all.

1409. Do you know anything about the estimate respecting the coal mines of Cape Breton and Pechin?—There has been application about the defences of these coal mines, and it was thought they ought to devolve upon the Colonies themselves.

1410. Would it be desirable, in an Imperial point of view, to secure the defences of these coal mines against the visits of an enemy's cruiser?—Yes, no doubt it would; indeed, they have gone part of the way towards it, for they have formed a corps of volunteers among the miners themselves. Mr. Cunard told me they had formed a very respectable corps of 200 or 300 young men, which is a proper thing for them to do; and if they require it, I think we might very reasonably give them a few guns to assist them.

1411. Are you aware that the works are so situated that they could be destroyed in a very short time by the guns of an enemy's ship?—The coal mines are very near the water, and they might destroy some of the outhouses and store rooms if they thought it worth their while.

1412. Mr. *Adderley.*] There are other people interested in their security besides the Imperial Government of England?—Oh, yes, it is a private concern, and probably a very profitable one to the proprietors.

1413. England might reckon upon this being defended, without undertaking the whole defence?—Yes.

1414. Can you state what stores and arms there are in North America?—No, I cannot.

1415. Do you know if there are any in Nova Scotia or New Brunswick?—I have no idea; of course, if they organize a local force they will require arms. In Victoria there is a great difficulty in procuring arms, and there is a gentleman here purchasing them for Victoria.

1416. How is the garrison of Calcutta supplied with arms?—They have their little armoury, I have no doubt. When there are Imperial troops they have their arms and provisions supplied.

1417. Can you state whether the arms at Halifax are supplied direct from England or through Canada?—From England direct.

1418. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do I understand you to say that these coal mines would be of little or no value in an Imperial point of view in those parts of the world?—They are of great value, because it is, I believe, the easiest way of getting coal. But there is a great deal of coal in Nova Scotia, and they may open mines anywhere.

1419. *Chairman.*] Upon the same grounds as you said the Colony ought to be called upon to defend itself in other matters, should you not say it ought to defend its coal mines?—Perhaps it comes within the general scope of defence

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which anyone who has charge of the defences in case of war would pay attention to; they would not make arrangements exclusively for that part.

1420. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Would it not be a great advantage in time of war for our fleet to have a good supply of coal?—Certainly.

1421. You cannot open coal mines at a moment's notice?—Undoubtedly it would be a great advantage to the Government to have coal mines there.

1422. *Chairman.*] And it would be a great advantage to the proprietors of the coal mines to sell their coal?—Yes, of course.

1423. You mentioned Bermuda as a place of importance to be maintained in strength; I observe that the sum of 4,500 *l.* was the expense for the defences of Bermuda, of which 1,000 *l.* appear for the first time in the Estimates of this year; is that for new works?—It is in consequence of the new guns made recently, and it requires the works to be adapted to them.

1424. There has been in Bermuda a variety of systems of fortifications, has there not?—There was, about a twelvemonth ago, a very elaborate report made out by a joint commission of army officers and navy officers, on the defences of Bermuda; that is very full, and the great object now is, to reduce it as much as possible, before the Government comes to a determination. They very properly made it as full as possible, but it may be reduced.

1425. I presume we have not come to the end of our expenses with respect to the fortifications of Bermuda?—Oh dear, no.

1426. I mean that this sum of 4,500 *l.* cannot be supposed to represent all that we have to spend?—Oh, no; that is merely altering the works which exist there, adapting them for new guns.

1427. Mr. *Ellice.*] Has there been any report with respect to the further fortifications which may be necessary for Bermuda?—We have full reports now, but we have to make out the estimates before we come to a decision as to what part of the report we shall adopt.

1428. But in any view of the case, the expense of those fortifications will be very considerable?—It will be, I dare say, 200,000 *l.* or 300,000 *l.*

1429. *Chairman.*] Do you know at all what we have expended in Bermuda; am I wrong in saying that we have expended 5,000,000 *l.* or 6,000,000 *l.* there?—Not a hundredth part of it in fortifications.

1430. Sir *George Grey.*] Is there any vote for the defences of Bermuda, except the 4,500 *l.* which appears in the Army Estimates?—No.

1431. Is there any expenditure going on in Bermuda, except for those new works?—Nothing, excepting the wear and tear of the existing works.

1432. Nothing as yet has been decided?—No; most of the Colonies are in a very unprovided state, and require new projects altogether.

1433. *Chairman.*] I understand that in your judgment, whatever may be the sum in the Estimates of the present year, the amount of 4,500 *l.* put down for the arms and defences of Bermuda, would be altogether inadequate for putting the defences on a proper footing?—Oh, quite.

1434. Sir *George Grey.*] I understand that sum to be merely for the specific object of adapting the defences to a new kind of gun, which is now brought into the service?—Exactly.

1435. Has there not been a large sum already laid out in the defences of Bermuda?—Not of late years; it has been already done by little driblets.

1436. In what state are the fortifications now, with a view to defence?—They are very small; Ireland Island, where the dockyard is, is enclosed in a fort.

1437. *Chairman.*] There was a project, was there not, originally—I do not know whether it was carried out—for the defences of Bermuda, to be a central station, which was to ramify out to the coast?—Merely a fortified barrack in the centre for a reserve force, but there are coast batteries besides.

1438. Were there originally, at Bermuda, small towers, like the Martello towers on our coast?—I dare say there were.

1439. Mr. *Adderley.*] Does not the cost of Bermuda appear less than it really is, from the fact of the convicts being employed upon the works?—The convicts are chiefly employed upon the navy works.

1440. The actual pay of the labour upon those works, does not appear in the Estimates?—Not of the convicts.

1441. Is Ireland Island adequately defended?—No, not at all.

1442. Sir

1442. Sir *George Grey.*] You have spoken of the works going on at the dockyard; would they appear in the Army Estimates or the Navy?—The works of defence in the Army Estimates entirely.

1443. Do you know on what works the convicts are chiefly employed?—They are chiefly employed on the naval works.

1444. Would the expense of the works which they perform appear in the Army or the Navy Estimates?—They would appear in the Navy Estimates, as far as regards naval works.

1445. Are you aware whether the whole expense of those works appears in the Navy Estimates, and the value of the convict labour appears in some other way, or is the value of the convict labour deducted from the estimated expense of the works?—I conclude that if they have convict labour, they estimate accordingly.

1446. Deduct the value of the convict labour?—Yes.

1447. That does not appear in the Army Estimates?—No.

1448. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Have you any idea of the amount of works which would be necessary to secure the dockyard of Bermuda against any ordinary attack, any moderate attack?—I could not say off hand; I should take it, it would require a couple of hundred thousand pounds for that purpose, for standing defences, by which you would be able to reduce the garrison.

1449. Sir *George Grey.*] Would you not look to a naval force as the principal defence of Bermuda?—No, and for the same reason as I gave for the others; that you cannot be sure that a naval force would be always at that station. Another mode proposed for naval co-operation is, for a provision of block ships, and floating batteries; these, however, could never be supplied; they would be too expensive, and would abstract from the previous naval resources of the country; and for defences for which shore batteries might be a perfect substitute.

1450. Mr. *Fortescue.*] At present an enemy's ship could shell and destroy the dockyard and stores at Bermuda without much difficulty?—Yes, it might; but this distant cannonading, I think, would hardly answer the purpose of an enemy, with the chance of the mischief they did; cannonading a dockyard is different to being actually in possession of it.

1451. Do you think Bermuda is safe at present from the visit, we will say of a single cruiser coming for the purpose of shelling the dockyard?—I should say a single cruiser would have a very poor chance; she would suffer more herself. Bermuda is surrounded by a reef of rocks, in the first place.

1452. Do you think an enemy's ship would not venture in?—It would be a desperate attempt except for a considerable force.

1453. Then the works which you propose would be for the purposes of defence againt a formidable naval expedition?—Yes, of a formidable character. I take it that a single small armed cruiser would be a good thing to go about to keep a single enemy's vessel off, which might do mischief, but not to have a large naval force.

1454. Are you aware of any means of executing such works in Bermuda, except by convict labour?—No; I suppose labour is very scarce there. But that is a place to which we should probably send two or three companies of sappers, which would be of great service to carry on the works.

1455. Could you execute such works by the labour of the troops without convicts?—A great deal of it; all the ordinary manual labour.

1456. *Chairman.*] What do you consider the grand object in an Imperial point of view of Bermuda to us?—It has a very fine harbour, and overlooks the whole coast of the United States within reach.

1457. You look on it as protecting the course of our trade?—Yes, and the cruisers from it would give security for all the passing trade.

1458. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that men-of-war can repair and refit in Bermuda?—They have got a dockyard there, and it is used a great deal; I do not know the capabilities of it, but they have a regular dockyard.

1459. *Chairman.*] You mentioned St. Helena as one of the places which you thought ought to be maintained; there is a sum of 20,000 *l.* for the improvement of the defences of St. Helena, of which 2,500 *l.* appears in the present year; can you give us any information as to the nature of those defences?—It is to defend the landing places. St. Helena is very difficult of access, and if

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those landing places are perfectly defended, with a few works and a small garrison, St. Helena becomes impregnable.

1460. With regard to the places which you have mentioned, the Mauritius, Halifax, Bermuda, and St. Helena, you have stated to the Committee what is actually necessary for this defence adequately; but if it were not possible to defend them so adequately as you think they ought to be defended, and you think there would be great danger in leaving them inadequately defended, would it not be better not to attempt to hold them at all than to hold them iusufficiently defended?—I think I would rather defend them as they are, than abandon them altogether, so that a single cruiser might come and take them.

1461. Are there not instances on record which prove the extreme danger of manning places with an inadequate garrison?—Certainly, it is very bad policy, especially in cases where a moderate force could defend them. But I cannot help thinking that such places as these would be quite worth the Imperial interest to defend thoroughly.

1462. With regard to other places which you mentioned in an answer to one of the earlier questions, do you think it is desirable that we should be maintaining the small force which we do at those places, unless we can very greatly increase it; I think you mentioned among others the Falkland Islands?—Yes.

1463. With reference to the Falklands, I think you said you considered them profitable as a coaling station?—Yes.

1464. And Aden?—I think Aden comes under a different arrangement altogether; it belongs to the East Indies.

1465. You mentioned also the Cape; what, in your opinion, is the value of the Cape in a military point of view?—Its only value is, that all the communication from India must pass within reach of the Cape; an enemy may have possession of the Cape, and their cruisers might be very detrimental to our intercourse and communication with India.

1466. Then in your view, the Cape is valuable as a means of protecting our trade?—Yes. Now the West India Islands may perhaps be hardly worth the expense of defending.

1467. Would you give them up?—I would give them up; the most valuable, Jamaica and Barbados, would defend themselves.

1468. Now with reference to the Cape for the purpose which you mentioned, namely, the protecting our trade, do you consider it very important that we should retain the very large Colony which we now possess in South Africa; is that of any importance to our trade?—Not at all; I do not see the importance of it as a possession.

1469. Then what is your view with regard to the expense at which the Cape ought to be maintained?—All that we require is Simon's Bay; that is the best naval station.

1470. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You are speaking of the Cape purely as a naval station?—Purely as a naval station; I know nothing of it as a Colony.

1471. You are not taking into account the existence of the Kaffirs, for instance?—No, I know nothing at all about that.

1472. Mr. *Adderley.*] It has been stated to us, that, out of the 5,000 troops which we sent to South Africa, there are only 81 in the whole of the western district, including Cape Town; should you consider 81 men a sufficient garrison for the whole of that district?—Certainly not; we ought to have 5,000 or 6,000 men there to keep it.

1473. Mr. *Baxter.*] Are you aware that a large proportion of our forces is on the frontiers?—Yes, holding it as a great Colony.

1474. You disapprove of that distribution of the force?—Unless they say they cannot hold Cape Town without occupying the upper country.

1475. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you believe that 81 men of the regular army is the garrison of Cape Town under ordinary circumstances?—I think it very likely; the people are very quiet there; the troops are up the country, for the warfare against the Kaffirs.

1476. Are you aware that, at the time alluded to by Mr. Adderley, the Indian mutiny was going on, and that a very strong volunteer force was raised at Cape Town and in the neighbourhood, and that every man that could be spared was withdrawn?—I think I saw a despatch from the Governor of the Cape about a twelvemonth

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twelvemonth ago. He said he was under no apprehensions, and that there was no difficulty in defending that colony against any foreign enemy.

1477. Do you mean the defence of Cape Town?—No, the whole colony. He was quite confident in the force he had there, which would be, I suppose, a local force; but it would be very desirable to have the matter organised.

1478. Do you mean that the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope is capable of defence against any foreign power, without the presence of any Imperial troops?—Of course, he expected a moderate force of Imperial troops with him.

1479. Sir *George Grey.*] Do we incur any expenses on account of fortifications in the Cape, or any of the Australian colonies?—There have been no expenses on the Cape, and very little in the Australian colonies.

1480. Is there any expense proposed in the Estimates of this year for any fortifications in the West Indies?—No, there is nothing there.

1481. *Chairman.*] I think it has been stated that there are no fortifications in any of the Australian colonies; are there any fortifications, to your knowledge?—There is none that we have ever made; there have been some made by the colonies themselves.

1482. There are works in Sydney Harbour, I believe?—In Sydney Harbour there are three or four forts, but the Government have not made them; and in Victoria the same.

1483. Mr. *Childers.*] Are the works in the colonies which pay for them, submitted for your approval?—They have been always hitherto; they have had reports made by the officers on the spot, and they have always hitherto been sent to the War Department for their opinion.

1484. In the case of the Colony of Victoria, I believe there is a defence commission?—There is.

1485. Which has made very large suggestions as to the defence of the colony against foreign aggressions?—Yes.

1486. Those suggestions, I suppose, have been submitted to you?—They have, and we have given an opinion upon them.

1487. Are the whole of those expenses proposed to be paid by the colony?—All the works are proposed to be paid for by the Colony of Victoria, and of Sydney.

1488. Those works involve, do they not, armaments by guns of the new construction?—They do.

1489. The colony is ready to pay the expenses of them?—The colony has an officer here now purchasing arms.

1490. Do you not think that under these circumstances, as they are prepared to pay the whole expenses, it would be well to encourage them in obtaining guns of the new construction?—Certainly.

1491. Even if the doing so would postpone, to a small extent, the supply of these guns to other places?—That depends upon which is most important.

1492. Is it not most important to encourage a colony which comes forward and says that they will pay for the whole?—Certainly; but as regards those guns, there was a difficulty in giving them the numbers they want, and it was proposed to give them a small proportion.

1493. Do you not think that is a policy which, if we wish to reduce our expenditure for colonial purposes, ought to be carried out?—Certainly.

1494. No Armstrong guns have been yet allowed to any colony, have there?—I think there have been some ordered for Victoria, four or six, or something of that kind.

1495. A commencement has been made in granting the colony guns of the newest construction?—Yes.

1496. With reference to the military force in the colonies, you mentioned that you thought the force of engineers and artillery might be increased there?—The force of engineers I mentioned particularly as being more economical, because they would furnish such useful labour.

1497. As a matter of fact, I believe some years ago, the engineer force was increased there?—There was once a question as to sending out a company of sappers and miners, but it was not persevered in; I think they are very wrong not to send a company, because it would cost them much less.

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1498. The colonies are anxious to get such a company, are they not?—They seem anxious to get everything in a good military condition.

1499. Have you seen the Estimates for the current year?—No, I have not.

1500. You are not aware, perhaps, that there is on the Estimates provision for a detachment of artillery, and a detachment of engineers?—I am very glad of it; I recommended a company of engineers long ago.

1501. If a small force of artillery and engineers were sent to the colonies, do you not think it might reduce the expenditure of troops of the line?—No, I think it quite independent of troops of the line. In a colony of that kind, I would have one regiment as a basis; it is bad to reduce your military force below one regiment, because you have the advantages of complete organization. I would have one regiment at each of those places.

1502. Do you mean a full regiment?—Yes, say a small one of 600 men.

1503. You do not think that by increasing the force of artillery and engineers, you could in any way diminish the cost of the troops of the line in the colony?—No, I would have one regiment as a basis, to teach the local people, and one company of engineers for working; you could not have a very large force of engineers, because you would be scattering them about over the country.

1504. If a Colony came forward very liberally, both as to arming its defences, and also as to militia and volunteers, do you not think the number of troops of the line might be considerably reduced, if you had the scientific corps increased?—There would be no great danger in reducing it, particularly after local bodies were formed, but I would not reduce them to less than one regiment.

1505. As a matter of fact there is very little more than one regiment in the whole of Australia, is there?—More than that, I think; I think there is one regiment at Sydney.

1506. Mr. *Marsh.*] Are the troops of the line now trained to be gunners?—The troops of the line are always trained to be gunners whenever there is an opportunity.

1507. As a matter of fact, are they pretty fair gunners generally?—Middling. They are not so good as seamen, for instance, and not so good as marines.

1508. Then, for the defence of a colony marines would be better than troops of the line to defend, for instance, the harbour of Sydney?—I do not think there is very much difference between marines and troops of the line on shore. I do not think there ought to be.

1509. Do you think the marines are more accustomed to gunnery?—I think they would be from their habits on board ship, but it would be very little.

1510. You were asked with regard to the Cape, and you said that there was an objection to holding it as so large a colony, but as a mere garrison for the protection of our trade?—For the protection of our trade.

1511. But supposing we had not all those possessions, it would be very possible, would it not, for another power to have a naval colony at Natal, or some other point on the coast?—There is no harbour.

1512. Is there no place but the Cape?—Only just at the Cape; there is no other harbour on that coast. At Natal there is great want of an harbour.

1513. Then there is no place capable of being the nucleus of a naval station, or anything of the sort?—No, nothing of the sort.

1514. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You said that those places, as to which you were examined, were inadequately garrisoned; you mean, I suppose, inadequately as against a formidable attack?—Yes.

1515. But you conceive them to be sufficiently garrisoned as against the attack of a cruiser or two?—Yes.

1516. Do you conceive that without some moderate garrisons they would be exposed to great danger, even from a cruiser or two?—Yes; without small garrisons, certainly.

1517. During the absence of the British fleet?—Yes.

1518. So that in that case, a power which was far weaker than ourselves at sea, might yet, during the temporary absence of the fleet, be capable of inflicting great damage upon us, in spite of our usual and permanent superiority?—Certainly.

1519. So that, by so far the neglect in having moderate garrisons in these stations,

stations, we should lose the advantage of our command of the sea?—You would, certainly, to a great degree.

1520. Mr. *Adderley.*] Can you state whether Ceylon is adequately garrisoned?—It is not; but being so near India, where there is always an immense force, I take it for granted, that if there was a war with any European power, say with France, a force of 3,000 or 4,000 men might easily be thrown into Ceylon from India.

1521. If Ceylon were annexed to India, you do not think that it would be less adequately garrisoned than it is now?—I suppose it would come to the same thing.

1522. Except that India would pay for it?—Yes.

1523. You look to India for the safety of Ceylon?—Yes; because from that quarter 3,000 or 4,000 troops may be detached without any difficulty.

Robert William Keate, Esq., called in; and Examined.

1524. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are Governor of Trinidad?—I am.

1525. What other Government appointments have you held?—I have been Governor of Grenada; and before that, I was at the Sanchal Islands.

1526. How long have you been at Trinidad?—Three years, and some few months.

1527. Can you tell us what number of troops there is there now?—Three companies of a white regiment, and one company of a black regiment, and there are a few artillerymen.

1528. Where are the head-quarters?—The detachment of white troops is drawn from the Jamaica command, but Trinidad is in itself in the command of the Windward and Leeward Islands.

1529. Where are the head-quarters of the black regiments?—Barbadoes, I think.

1530. Where are the black troops recruited now?—I believe they are still partly recruited from the coast from liberated Africans, and partly in the West Indies.

1531. What is your opinion of the black troops as regards their efficiency for the purpose for which they are intended?—I have never seen them except in small detachments, and then I have always found them very disorderly and turbulent.

1532. Have you known instances in which white troops have been called upon to act against black troops?—I have heard of that lately, since I have been away from Trinidad.

1533. Can you tell when the system was altered?—I cannot tell exactly.

1534. What do you consider to be the object of the presence of troops in Trinidad; is it for defence against external aggression or for the maintenance of peace and order in the island?—I should suppose for both objects; they are very useful in the maintenance of peace in the island.

1535. Are they, in fact, used for police purposes?—Not for ordinary police purposes; they have been used in support of the police on more than one occasion.

1536. Do you think that, under the present system, the black troops can be relied upon for the purposes for which they are now used?—I think that there is a total want of confidence in them among the inhabitants.

1537. If the alternative of the withdrawal from Trinidad, or part payment by the Colony were offered to the Colony, which do you think would be preferred?—Part payment, certainly.

1538. I observe that the revenues of Trinidad, by the latest returns, are about 140,000*l.* a year. Do you think that the Colony has power to pay any portion towards the cost of the troops?—I do.

1539. I do not know whether the statement I have just made, as to the revenues, is a correct statement. Has there been any more recent return than that?—I presume that some return has been received since the commencement of this year, but I have not seen it.

1540. Have you any knowledge at all of British Guiana?—Not at all.

1541. Or of any other of the West India Islands?—I have no knowledge of Jamaica. I have been in Bermuda and St. Vincent, but only for a few days.

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1542. Sir *George Grey*.] What military force was stationed in Granada when you were Lieutenant Governor of that island?—When I arrived there I think there was one company of white troops, one of black, and a few artillerymen; but they were withdrawn a short time afterwards; that I think was in 1854.

1543. Did any inconvenience arise from the withdrawal of those troops?—Not that I am aware of.

1544. Was there a constabulary force in Granada?—Yes.

1545. Is there any similar force in Trinidad?—Yes.

1546. Do you think that any serious inconvenience would arise from the withdrawal of the troops from Trinidad?—I think so, in consequence of the mixed nature of the population.

1547. What is the ordinary duty of the troops?—They have a few guards to take; there is a guard at the Commissariat, and at the barracks, and one at the Governor's residence.

1548. Do the black troops do precisely the same duty as the white?—I think they make use of the black troops as much as possible for sentry duty.

1549. Is the mortality different in the white troops and in the black?—No, I believe not.

1550. Have the troops been generally healthy?—Except during the time there was an epidemic of yellow fever; I believe that was in 1858.

1551. Did it attack the black troops?—No; they do not suffer at all from that kind of complaint.

1552. You say that the troops have sometimes been employed in support of the police; is that of frequent occurrence?—Once every year there is a great riot in the town during what is called the Carnival, and then they are obliged to show the troops. If the police are mixed up in the riot they get the worst of it, being small in number.

1553. If the troops were withdrawn, and the constabulary increased, do you think that they would be sufficient to maintain order?—Not if recruited in the island.

1554. Of what materials is the police force now composed?—The best among them are soldiers who have received their discharge; the rest are negroes from Barbadoes, and from Trinidad itself.

1555. Might not the force be composed of the same materials as at present?—It might be; but there is a difficulty even now in recruiting the force.

1556. Do you consider four companies of troops necessary?—No, I would not say that; some part of them might be withdrawn, looking upon them as a force to maintain internal order.

1557. Do you think three companies quite sufficient?—Yes, two companies of white troops, and one of black troops.

1558. What time would it take to bring a reinforcement from Barbadoes?—By steamer it would take, I suppose, 24 hours after the news was arrived that they were required.

1559. Mr. *Ellice*.] You say that the inhabitants have no confidence in the black troops?—I do.

1560. Then they would not willingly pay any contribution towards the expense of black troops?—I think not.

1561. Mr. *Childers*.] You say, also, that they are of no use?—I think that they are so turbulent and insubordinate, that they are of no use; they are a constant source of fear to us.

1562. If all the black troops were withdrawn, how many white troops would be necessary?—I consider that the present number of white troops would be sufficient.

1563. Mr. *Marsh*.] Do you think that the black troops would be of any use against a foreign enemy?—I have no means of judging.

1564. Mr. *Childers*.] Is it from your colony that they have gone to the Gambia?—I do not know.

1565. Mr. *Baxter*.] The principal use of the white troops being, as you say, to maintain order on the occasion of this annual riot, do you not think it fair that the colonists should pay a certain proportion towards the expense of maintaining those troops?—I think so; and I believe that they would be very ready to do it.

1566. Have

1566. Have they ever been asked by the Colonial Office to contribute any portion of the expense?—I believe that lately, since I have been away from the island, some correspondence has taken place on the subject.

1567. Can you state the nature of that correspondence to the Committee?—The only knowledge I have of it is from the newspapers.

1568. *Chairman.*] When was that?—In the early part of the present year, I think.

1569. Mr. *Baxter.*] Then there would be no indisposition on the part of the Colonists to pay a part of the expenses incurred by their own military defence?—I think not.

1570. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you say that there is a local force in Grenada?—Yes.

1571. By whom is it paid?—It is a volunteer militia; they have a police force also paid by the colony.

1572. Supposing the troops were withdrawn from Trinidad, do you see any reason why Trinidad should not be defended in the same way as Grenada?—Yes; it would not be very difficult, but very mischievous in consequence of the mixed nature of the population. The properties are held to a great extent by the French people, who keep up French sympathies.

1573. My question was whether, in your opinion, the colony would undertake themselves to suppress any disturbance?—I think that they would be ready and willing to increase the police force, or to pay any amount that was considered reasonable for a regular force, but I do not think that they could possibly raise a local force of any kind.

1574. What do you suppose, from your knowledge of Trinidad, would be the result of England withdrawing all its forces, or at all events, refusing to pay for them?—I think the first result would be an offer to pay a large proportion, and secondly that the withdrawal would lead to a total want of confidence, and also to the withdrawal of capital on the part of those who are now giving their efforts towards developing the resources of the island.

1575. You think that the resources of the owners of property in Trinidad are so small that they would rather leave Trinidad than defend it?—No; I think they would be ready to pay. I do not know whether they could take upon themselves the whole expense; that is, whether their revenue would be sufficient.

1576. Do you think that it would lead to an abandonment of the colony, or to the colony undertaking to defend themselves, either by troops hired from elsewhere, or from troops raised on the spot?—I think that the feeling would be very strong in favour of defending themselves as far as they possibly could, but it would also lead to the withdrawal of those persons from the island whose means would enable them to leave.

1577. Sir *George Grey.*] What is the whole civil expenditure of Trinidad?—It comes to about 160,000 *l.* a year.

1578. What is the revenue?—It is about the same, I believe.

1579. Do you know the cost of maintaining four companies there?—No, I have no knowledge of that.

1580. You think that the mixed nature of the population in Trinidad renders impossible the formation of a local force similar to that which exists in other Colonies where the population is not mixed?—I think so.

1581. But you think there is no indisposition on the part of the owners of property in the island, so far as their resources permit, to provide for their own defence?—Just so.

1582. And you think that that could best be provided for by a force not raised in the island?—I think so.

1583. Although paid for by the island?—Yes.

1584. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you think that any community like Trinidad can be treated like any ordinary British community?—Not at all.

1585. In Trinidad the British population is very small, I believe?—Very small.

1586. The population mainly foreign, and singularly heterogeneous?—Singularly so in all classes.

1587. You think that something more is necessary to maintain internal order and security in such a population than in a purely British community?—I think so; its proximity to the Republic of Venezuela is an important consideration;

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sideration; we get all the turbulent spirits from that republic whenever they change their government.

1588. There are also foreign Colonies in the neighbourhood of kindred race?—Yes, the two French Colonies of Martinique and Guadaloupe.

1589. Do you think that if Trinidad were left to her own defences, and her own devices, comparisons would be drawn in Trinidad between the state of things that would then exist there, and the condition of the neighbouring French Colony?—I think so.

1590. Sir *George Grey.*] Have you had any experience of black troops, except in single companies, in Trinidad?—I had a short experience of them in Grenada.

1591. To what do you attribute the misconduct of which you have spoken?—I think that the class of negroes from whom they are recruited are a particularly insubordinate race; their ideas of discipline of any kind are very small indeed.

1592. You have never seen a whole regiment together?—I have not.

1593 You do not know the state of discipline at head-quarters?—I do not; but I understand it is better than that which prevails in detached companies.

1594. Have you any knowledge of the military strength of the French islands you have alluded to?—No; I could not give the amount of strength.

1595. Do you think that the money spent by the troops in the Colony forms any ingredient in the desire of the colonists of Trinidad to keep troops there?—No, I think not in Trinidad; I think it was so in Grenada.

1596. Are the troops much dispersed in Trinidad?—The three companies of white troops are kept together in barracks about two miles from the town, and the black troops are quartered in the town itself.

1597. Mr. *Marsh.*] Does the French Government pay for the defence of its Colonies, or do the Colonies themselves?—I do not know.

1598. You say that there is a large military force in the French colonies?—I have heard so.

1599. Is Trinidad an important place for naval defences?—I should say so.

1600. What is the language of the population there generally?—It is a good deal of Spanish and a good deal of French *patois.*

1601. What would be the sympathies of the people of Trinidad?—I should think that the larger number of negroes are negroes coming from French colonies; the white population is chiefly French, a small body of English, and on the mountains there are a great many Spanish and Indians.

1602. Mr. *Fortescue.*] In Guadaloupe and Martinique the population is principally a native population, whilst at Trinidad it is mainly a foreign population?—A foreign population.

1603. Are you aware that Grenada and the other small West India Islands have got on apparently very satisfactorily lately, without the presence of any military force?—Yes.

1604. Do you think that that would be the case if our military forces were withdrawn altogether from the West India Islands?—No; I think that at Grenada they look at the fact of there being troops at Barbadoes in case of need.

1605. The policy of late years has, I think, been to concentrate the troops more than formerly?—Yes.

1606. You think that the presence of troops at a few points in the West Indies has a great effect upon the security of the whole?—I think so.

1607. In speaking of the black troops, did you mean to say that you suspected their fidelity in case of its being necessary to make use of them against the native population of Trinidad?—I think that they would be very unwilling to act against their own class.

1608. I understood you to say that the danger was that they were rather inclined to quarrel with the native population?—I think that their quarrels are chiefly with the police, in which they would be backed up by the native population.

1609. Mr. *Baxter.*] Is any contribution received from the West India Islands towards the military expenditure?—There is a small contribution from Trinidad; they find the barracks for the black troops.

1610. *Chairman.*] Do you know how long England has ceased to receive contributions

contributions from the West India Islands towards the expense of the troops?—No.

1611. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Have you ever heard of Trinidad paying for her own troops since she was conquered?—No, I should think she has not.

1612. *Chairman.*] Are you aware that the Dutch and Spanish colonies not only pay the expense of their own troops, but pay money also into the Exchequer?—I have heard that the colony of Cuba sends a large balance every year to Spain.

1613. Mr. *Baxter.*] From your knowledge of the West Indies, do you think that there would be any serious difficulty in the way of the Colonies paying the whole of their military expenditure?—I think that one great difficulty would be that those colonies in which detachments of troops are not stationed, but which depend upon a garrison in a neighbouring island, would be unwilling to pay anything for troops which were not stationed in their own island.

1614. These islands in which British troops were stationed would be willing to pay for them?—They would be willing to pay a portion of the expense.

1615. You say that if required you think that Trinidad should pay the whole expense?—I think it would rather pay the whole than be left without troops; but I think they would find it very difficult, and it would be very hard upon them.

1616. Mr. *Adderley.*] I suppose that the unwillingness to undertake the whole expense would depend very much upon the way in which the proposition was put to them?—I suppose so.

1617. If the alternative of withdrawing the troops were strongly placed before them, the probability is that that would govern the character of the answer?—I think they would state their willingness to pay, and would remonstrate against it.

1618. *Chairman.*] Looking to the prosperity and the wealth of Trinidad, do you consider it equitable that the Colony should pay a portion of the expenses?—I do.

Jovis, 2° die Maii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Mills.	Mr. Fortescue.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Baxter.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Childers.	Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Ellice.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. *Charles Moystyn Owen*, called in; and Examined.

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1619. *Chairman*] I BELIEVE you are now the Chief of the Oxford Constabulary Force?—Yes.

1620. I believe that some time ago you held official positions at the Cape Colony?—Yes.

1621. How many years were you at the Cape altogether?—Nearly 11.

1622. In what year did you first go there?—The end of 1841 or the beginning of 1842.

1623. When were you first employed in an official capacity?—I was employed in native levies in 1846, on the breaking out of the Kafir war.

1624. What was the nature of your employment then?—I commanded native levies.

1625. What number of native levies were you instrumental in raising?—First of all they were pressed, under the old commando system, and served for a few months, but afterwards they acted as volunteers, and then I raised altogether about 1,500, under Major Hogge.

1626. Where did those levies first serve?—On the frontier.

1627. On what part of the frontier?—On the Kafir frontier.

1628. On the north-east frontier?—On what we call the British Kaffraria frontier, beginning from the Fish River.

1629. How long were those levies so employed?—Till the end of the war, in 1847.

1630. Will you describe the nature of the service which you had to perform with those levies?—We served with the troops against the Kafirs.

1631. Did you serve with regular troops?—With regular troops, and sometimes alone; we were occasionally a week or two without them.

1632. Was that in making reprisals for the cattle stolen by the natives?—Yes.

1633. How long did that last?—Until, I think, the end of 1847.

1634. When that service was completed, what was the next employment which you were engaged in?—I was appointed by the then Governor, Sir Henry Pottinger, to raise and command the Kafir police, at the frontier.

1635. Was that police force composed exclusively of Kafirs?—The officers were Europeans.

1636. Of what materials were the volunteers of whom you spoke just now?—It is difficult to say, for they were of all sorts; the Hottentots predominated; there were what we call bastards, or half-castes of every description between that and a white man.

1637. Were there any white men?—The officers were white men; the blacks predominated.

1638. What was the nature of your employment in the second case you mention, as commanding the Kafir police?—I had a certain length of frontier to protect; the Kafirs would break through and steal cattle, and go back again, and I had posts along the line of frontier. I had 10 men in one place, 20 in another, and 40 in another; and when we heard of the Kafirs making incursions and stealing cattle, we took more, if possible, as a reprisal.

1639. Were

1639. Were you engaged against some of the natives of whom Sandella was chief?—He was the chief of the Ghikas, but there were other chiefs.

1640. How long did that second employment of yours last?—Somewhere about four years.

1641. You returned to England, I think, in 1850 or 1851?—In the beginning of 1851.

1642. In that year were you sent out by Lord Grey as Assistant Commissioner, with Major Hogg?—I was.

1643. What was the special duty which you were expected to discharge?—I was Assistant Commissioner to General Sir Harry Smith, who was Her Majesty's High Commissioner.

1644. What were your duties as Assistant Commissioner?—To assist Sir Harry Smith in making inquiries, and giving him advice.

1645. And in making treaties with the frontier tribes?—Settling boundary lines between the frontier tribes and differences between the Dutch and the Kafirs, or the Basouta Kafirs.

1646. Where were you stationed principally?—All along the Kafir frontier.

1647. On the Orange River Sovereignty?—On the Orange River Sovereignty for a considerable time, and also at Port Natal. I was three months, I think, in Port Natal.

1648. In the first instance you were to act with Major Hogg, and subsequently with Sir George Clark?—First with Major Hogg, until he died, and then a man of the country was appointed by General Cathcart; he was not confirmed from home; and then Sir George Clark was sent out in place of Major Hogg.

1649. Your duties as Commissioner were, I think, of a civil nature?—Yes.

1650. During the time you were engaged in those duties, were military operations being carried on in the Orange River Sovereignty?—Yes; General Cathcart made war with Moshesh.

1651. I observe from the Blue Books that, in December 1852, General Cathcart invaded the Orange River territory; were you in the territory at that time?—I marched up with those troops.

1652. At that time I think there was a considerable loss of the Queen's troops?—Yes.

1653. Especially of the 12th Lancers?—Yes; a good many of the 12th Lancers were lost.

1654. From your occupation there, then and at other times, do you think that the Queen's troops, that is, cavalry, are a proper force to employ in dealing with these frontier tribes?—It is a very rough country for Lancers, at any rate; they are very unsuitable for that country.

1655. Do you think that they were of much service?—No, I cannot say that they were.

1656. At what time did your occupation as Assistant Commissioner cease?—I came home in May 1854. My appointment was originally for two years, but I served three years.

1657. Have you formed any opinion as to the effect of our policy in regard to the withdrawal of our authority over the Orange River territory as regards the maintenance of peace on the frontiers; do you think that that was a step which led to satisfactory results?—Certainly; we should have had another war there if we had remained.

1658. Have you formed any opinion as to what would be the best kind of force, both with a view to efficiency and economy, for the protection of our North Eastern frontier?—The rifle brigade were very useful there; there are many good regiments which have served there, but the lance is a useless weapon as against a Kafir.

1659. There is a force called the Cape Mounted Rifles; do you think that they are a satisfactory force for the defence of the Colony?—They used to be, but there have been great alterations since I left; they were originally raised, I believe, as a corps of guides, and then they were composed of natives, little smart Hottentots, who knew the country well and could shoot well; now I believe they enlist scarcely any, if any, natives, and it has become an European regiment.

1660. From what you know of them now, do you think that they are a satisfactory force for the defence of the frontier?—That I cannot answer, because I have not been there since 1854; I can only speak from hearsay.

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1661. Can you form any opinion as to any particular kind of force that would be useful in defending the frontier?—A very useful force is Currie's Police; they are called police, but they are mounted and armed; they are, in fact, irregular soldiers; they are men of the country, who can ride well and shoot well, and Sir Walter Currie is their chief. I believe they are now called the Border police.

1662. Whatever force we had, do you think that we could reasonably rely upon the populations to be found in the Colony for mainly constituting that force?—Yes, but it would require some assistance. Sir Walter Currie has a difficulty already in recruiting, for I have sent out some men to him from this country, the Government paying their passage.

1663. Do you think that you could defend the frontier by a force mainly composed of men in the Colony?—For that purpose they are better than soldiers; but they must be backed by soldiers.

1664. I observe that Sir Harry Smith, speaking in 1847, the time that you were in the Colony, of an ineffectual attempt to capture Sandilla, says, "in this bit of a brush, 56,000*l.* was spent in waggon-hire alone." Do you think that that represents fairly a sample of the kind of cost which these frontier wars have occasioned us?—Waggon-hire is very high; an immense number of baggage waggons are employed in moving from place to place.

1665. Within your knowledge, is it the fact, that whenever a war has broken out, the cost of everything has enormously increased, and that therefore it is greatly to the interest of the people of the Colony that such wars should arise?—The price of everything has certainly greatly increased; it has doubled.

1666. Do you know what may be stated to be the extent of the land frontier line of our South African Colony, to the north?—From sea to sea, it is more than 1,000 miles.

1667. What portion of that frontier may be said to be bordered by warlike tribes?—All of it, more or less, except where there is a desert.

1668. You have been in Natal, and in the country between British Kaffraria and Natal?—Yes, I have passed over there.

1669. What tribes are principally located there?—Our old enemies, the Kafirs, driven back; amongst others, the Creli Kafirs.

1670. Are they a warlike race?—Yes.

1671. Do you think that we ought to be surprised at any time, if we are engaged in some trouble with them?—No, I should not be surprised, at any time.

1672. What is the presentposition of the Orange River Free State; is that united with Trans Vaal territory, or is it separate?—It is a united Government, and Moshesh's Government is separate from the Dutch.

1673. In that portion of our north-eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, there is the Orange River sovereignty. Is that united in its form of government with the Trans Vaal Republic, or is it entirely separate?—When I was there it was separate, but they have now joined the Trans Vaal.

1674. The Basonta is separate?—It is separate; but the boundary is so little defined, that it is almost impossible to separate them.

1675. Is the population of the Trans Vaal and of the Orange River Free State principally white?—Principally white.

1676. What is the population of the Moshesh's territory?—I cannot tell you what he has; he has a large population.

1677. Are they principally blacks?—Principally blacks. He has 50,000 fighting men at least.

1678. Do you know at all what the population of British Kaffraria is now?—I do not; it has been much increased since I left, by the German Legion and emigrants.

1679. What has become of the German Legion?—They have merged into the Colony; they have gone as servants, and so on, I understand; but I do not know it of my own knowledge.

1680. Sir *George Grey*.] How many British troops were there at the Cape Colony at the time you were organizing and commanding these 1,500 volunteers in 1846 and 1847?—I cannot tell exactly; there was a large force.

1681. Several regiments?—Several regiments. I should think, 4,000 or 5,000.

1682. Do you think that that could have been materially reduced, with safety

safety to the Colony, at that time?—There was war at that time; there were few enough.

1683. In 1852, when you went with General Cathcart on that expedition, what was the number of the British troops in the country?—Five thousand men or more.

1684. Could that force have been materially reduced, with safety to the Colony?—That I cannot say; there was war then also.

1685. How is Currie's police force paid?—By the Colony, when I was there; they received so much a day; I believe the pay of a private is 4*s.* 6*d.* a day, and he finds himself in clothing, his own arms and accoutrements, and a horse.

1686. Of what number did it consist?—I believe between 400 and 500.

1687. Do you think that it could be materially increased, so as to admit of any considerable reduction of the number of troops in the Colony?—It might be increased materially, I have no doubt, to advantage.

1688. Do you think that that increase would allow of a proportionate diminution of the British troops in the Colony?—I should think so, certainly; but I do not know how many troops there are in the Colony now; I left in 1854.

1689. That force did not exist then, I suppose?—Yes, it did; but not to the same extent that it does now. I think there were 200 then.

1690. Lord *Stanley.*] During the war of 1846 was much readiness shown by the European population, at the Cape, to volunteer against the Kafirs?—Not particularly; but I do not think they were backward when they were called upon.

1691. To what extent was a volunteer force organized?—The volunteer force that I belonged to was different to what you would call a volunteer force; a real volunteer would get no pay, but we were all paid.

1692. As I understand that the volunteers were Europeans?—Not those who served with me.

1693. Then they were paid at the expense of the Colonial Government, I presume?—No, they were paid at the expense of the Home Government, I believe; each man receives a bounty for enlisting for three years.

1694. They were, in fact, a part of the regular force?—They were enlisted to serve during the war, receiving a bounty of 3 *l.* each.

1695. Mr. *Marsh.*] Do you not think that irregular troops are better adapted for frontier warfare than troops of the line?—Certainly.

1696. Mr. *Adderley.*] How long were you engaged in the commando system?—I was under the commando system, I think, nine months the first time, and received pay all that time. I did not serve as a burgher. The Hottentots were pressed men, and I was a pressed man; but serving with the Hottentots, I received pay; if I had served with the white men, I should have received no pay.

1697. At that time there was a double force under the commando system; one which was not paid, and another which was paid?—Yes; the burghers got only their rations.

1698. Did you serve in both kinds of force?—No; I was pressed to serve with the burghers, and then I was transferred to the Hottentot volunteer force; I thought if I was going to be there at all, I might as well be paid.

1699. When you were transferred to the Hottentot force, what was the pay?—It was changed two or three times; I think at first I had only 7*s.* 6*d.* a day.

1700. As the officer in command?—Yes. Then I had 11*s.* 7*d.*, and then 15*s.*, and at last 1 *l.* a day.

1701. What pay did your men receive?—A man received 6*d.*, a corporal 9*d.*, and a sergeant 1*s.*

1702. Whilst the double system was in force, the burgher part of it was a volunteer unpaid force, except as to rations furnished by the Colonial Government?—I believe it was furnished by the Home Government, but I am not sure.

1703. The Hottentot levies under that commando system were wholly paid for by the Home Government?—I believe they were.

1704. Is this system which you are describing the old Dutch commando system?—Yes.

1705. Were the volunteers of 1847 the same as the native force under the commando system you are now describing?—Yes, just the same; they were the same

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same men, except that they had just served their time, and they were disbanded; but to induce them to come back again they gave them a bounty.

1706. Mr. *Roebuck.*] They were called volunteers, but they were pressed?—They were pressed men in the first instance; they were bound then to serve for nine months, and then they were disbanded; and to induce the men to volunteer again they received a bounty, and then were called volunteers; but they were in fact enlisted men.

1707. Do you say that the white men were pressed and called volunteers, and not paid; did they press men and not pay for them?—Yes.

1708. Mr. *Marsh.*] They did not press the black men?—Yes, they did, but they paid them.

1709. Mr. *Adderley.*] What is your opinion of the old Dutch commando system, as a defensive system against foreign depredation?—I do not think that the old Dutch system would answer now; it did in the old times.

1710. Why should it not answer now?—The Kafirs are more organized, and can shoot better, and are less afraid of the Dutchmen.

1711. Sir *George Grey.*] How have they become much better organized?—We have taught them by continual war with them.

1712. The instructions by the use of the regular troops has ended in making the Kafirs more formidable?—Yes.

1713. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Has not the white merchant supplied them with arms and ammunition?—They have got them somewhere.

1714. Is not that one means of making them formidable?—Yes, certainly.

1715. Mr. *Adderley.*] The present system of defending the frontier has made the frontier more difficult to defend?—Certainly.

1716. The old Dutch system, I believe, was perfectly efficient for its purpose?—I think it was, but the Kafir had only his assegais, and had neither ammunition nor a good gun.

1717. It was a cheap mode of defence?—It cost the Government nothing.

1718. What is your opinion of the cruelty of the system towards the natives?—I think it is the other way.

1719. You think that the present system has led to more bloodshed than the old commando system?—Certainly.

1720. So that if the old commando system was put down upon principles of philanthropy, you think that that was a mistake?—Certainly.

1721. What is your opinion of the value of regular troops in bush warfare?—I am not a soldier, and it would ill become me to say anything about soldiers.

1722. You have been a commandant of volunteer levies?—Yes.

1723. Then can you not express an opinion as to the use of regular troops?—I think that when a man has a heavy load on his back, and is buckled tight up, he cannot march very well.

1724. Will you describe the nature of the country?—It is very rough; it is very bushy.

1725. What is the nature of the bush?—There are many kinds of bush; some of it is from three to ten feet high.

1726. What is the nature of the wood?—There is a great deal of thorn.

1727. Is it a thorn bush that cavalry can penetrate?—No.

1728. Is it a thorn bush that English infantry can penetrate?—If they are properly dressed and accustomed to it, Englishmen can go where any other men can; but soldiers buckled up, and just come from England, cannot get about through the bush.

1729. I believe it is the most impenetrable thorn bush in the world?—It is very thick.

1730. You say that the Cape Mounted Rifles were formed of natives; smart Hottentots. Was that in your opinion a good sort of force for bush warfare?—Yes.

1731. Now that they are formed of Europeans do you say that they are more or less useful for bush warfare?—I should think less useful.

1732. Have you any doubt about it?—I have not seen them since the alteration.

1733. Now, you say that in bush warfare this volunteer force should be backed by regular soldiers; what do you mean by that?—They would require something to fall back upon.

1734. You

1734. You think that there should be a corps of reserve out of the bush?—The Hottentots fight very well if all goes the right way.

1735. You say that the baggage carriage has been very expensive; did it come to your knowledge whilst you were in the Colony, that large fortunes were being made by contractors who supplied the British troops?—No, I do not know of any large fortunes; some people got a great deal of money, no doubt, but they speculated and lost it again.

1736. Do you know men who have made themselves rich by contracting to supply British troops?—I have no doubt some have done so.

1737. Do you think that Kafir wars are likely to cease?—No, I should think not.

1738. The cause of the wars is generally depredations upon cattle feeding upon the borders, I believe?—Yes.

1739. As the Colony increases the cause of wars would increase also, would it not?—We keep advancing all the time; the Kafir says, "You steal my land, and I steal your cattle."

1740. The larger the amount of property exposed to depredation the greater the chance of war?—I do not know; if there is a thick population and fewer cattle there will be less chance of war.

1741. Do you think that the fact of the Colony making these wars and not paying for them is a fact which is likely to check wars?— That I cannot say.

1742. Mr. *Forteseue.*] Do I understand you to give your opinion, that for the last 20 years all throughout the Kafir wars of recent times, it would have been better if no Imperial troops had been sent to Cape Colony?—Certainly not, we could not have done without some troops.

1743. I think you say that the system of leaving the colonists to fight the natives themselves, which is called the commando system, would have been a far better system?—I am talking of the old times, before we taught the Kafir how to fight.

1744. Do you think that it would have been better if we had not taught them to fight by the introduction of Imperial troops?—I do not think that the Imperial troops taught them to fight, under the old commando system; directly there was any difference between the colonists and the blacks, the missionary stepped in, or some philanthropist got up a tale here, and then we sent out troops to take care of the Kafir, and we pampered him.

1745. Not to crush him, but to protect him?—To protect him, that was the beginning of it, and then we took such care of him that he made himself strong enough to fight us.

1746. Do you mean to say that, no matter what the nature of their fighting was, the Kafir must in the course of years have learned the use of arms, and learned to fight better, or do you mean that the introduction of Imperial troops taught them to fight?—They learned to fight better in the course of years, and in continual wars.

1747. You do not mean, then, that the system of allowing the colonist to fight without troops would have been a better system than that of pitting them against the Kafirs by the aid of Imperial troops?—I was not in the Colony at that time, and I can only speak from hearsay. Before the Kafirs were armed with guns, the colonists could master them, as I always understood and believe.

1748. You say that the system of allowing the colonists to fight the natives and master them was a merciful system?—Yes.

1749. Is that your opinion?—Yes.

1750. You think that it was not a sanguinary system on either side?—No, I do not think that they were cruel to the Kafirs, more than was necessary.

1751. You think that no atrocities were committed by the colonists upon the Kafirs, or by the Kafirs upon the colonists?—I do not say "no atrocities," but I think that there were comparatively very few.

1752. But that that system of individual warfare between the colonists and the Kafirs was a more merciful system than the system of warfare by means of regular troops?—Yes.

1753. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you think that there will be a constant recurrence of Kafir wars?—I should say so, but not at present, because the Kafirs have been starved the last three years; they destroyed their cattle.

1754. Do you consider it necessary to keep up a force of 6,300 British troops in

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in the Cape Colony?—I cannot say how many troops are necessary now, it is some years since I left the Colony.

1755. You stated that the chief use of British troops was to form a force for the native services to fall back upon?—No, I say they were necessary for that purpose.

1756. You have had a long experience in the Colony, what force do you think it necessary that we should keep up in that Colony for that purpose?—That I cannot tell; I left the Colony in 1854, and I do not know the present wants of the colony. When a war has broken out it requires a very great force.

1757. In the event of a large Imperial force being employed at the Cape, do you not think it fair that the colonists should contribute a considerable proportion of the expenses of that force?—If they can.

1758. Have you any doubt that they can?—I do not know what their money resources are.

1759. From your long residence at the Cape you must be aware of the fact, that there is a great deal of wealth in the Colony; do you not consider it fair that the Colony should contribute, at all events, some proportion of their military expenses?—Certainly.

1760. What proportion do you consider fair?—That I cannot say.

1761. Are you aware that at present they do not contribute 10 per cent.?—I know that they contribute very little, but I do not know what it is.

1762. Do you believe that there would be any great difficulty in getting them to contribute more largely?—There would be a great outcry amongst the colonists.

1763. Has that question ever been discussed in the Legislature?—I do not know.

1764. You are not aware whether any representations have been made by the Home Government to the Colony on that subject?—Yes; I think representations were made before I left the Colony.

1765. In what manner were representations made; were they made by Despatches from the Colonial Office?—I do not know.

1766. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that a system of defence has been pursued now for some years upon the frontier, which has prevented Kafir wars?—There has been no Kafir war.

1767. Are you aware that the Kafirs have been dislodged from their main stronghold, and driven further eastward?—They have been starved out; they killed all their cattle about three years ago.

1768. Are you not aware that they have been dislodged, and are not permitted to occupy their own stronghold?—Anatolas has been peopled by white men.

1769. I believe that a regular system of military posts has been organised at the frontier?—Yes.

1770. And that the white population has been largely increased on the frontier?—Yes.

1771. Do you think then that a Kafir war is as likely to arise now, as it was a few years ago?—No; I do not think anything of the military posts; I do not think that they will prevent wars, but I think that the Kafirs are now so poor that they are not able to fight.

1772. Do you recommend the withdrawal of the troops?—No; but I do not think that cooping up the troops in a fort will prevent a Kafir war.

1773. You are speaking of it as a mode of defence?—Yes.

1774. Do you think that the causes which are, and have been, at work tend to make a Kafir war less likely?—I do not know what means are at work now. I have not paid any attention to the Cape for some time.

1775. In fact, you know very little about the Cape since 1854?—No.

1776. What you tell us is from hearsay?—Yes, I left in 1854, and I have not concerned myself about it since.

1777. Have not Kafir wars caused an immense destruction of colonial property?—Yes.

1778. Setting that against the gains to be made by individuals from the expenditure of the war, which way do you think that the interest of the colonists lies?—Some of them have lost everything, and have become so poor that they have had nothing to begin with again.

1779. Sitting

1779. Setting one of those considerations against the other, which way do you think that the interest of the colonists in the eastern district of the Cape lies; is it their interest to make war, or to prevent war?—It is not to their interest to have wars; it is the merchants', who never see anything of the war, but who bring the produce and make a profit by it.

1780. Do you not think that the larger proportion of the colonial population is deeply interested in preventing Kafir wars?—Yes.

1781. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Is it for the benefit of the Colony to have a Kafir war?—No; it brings a great deal of money into the Colony, no doubt; but a man who has his house burnt down and his cattle taken away is the loser, whilst the man at a distance is the gainer.

1782. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you think that the colonists, generally, or their representatives in the Colonial Parliament, wish to make or prevent Kafir wars?—To prevent Kafir wars.

1783. Are you aware by whose authority the wars in 1846 and 1847 were engaged in?—In 1846 it was upon the authority of Sir Peregrine Maitland, who was then Governor.

1784. And not upon the authority of any colonial power?—No.

1785. They were not engaged in it by the Colonial Parliament?—There was no Colonial Parliament at that time.

1786. Or by the colonial representatives?—There were none then.

1787. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you mean that Sir Peregrine Maitland made an aggressive war, or that he acted in defence of the Colony?—It was in consequence of the attack of the Kafirs.

1788. I do not understand you to say that, during those wars, the British troops should have been withdrawn from the Colony?—No.

1789. When you say that the British troops are necessary, as supports to the irregularly formed levies, you do not mean, I presume, that troops were not actually engaged, even in the bush?—Some of the regiments were very actively engaged.

1790. I believe that the first battalion of the Rifle Brigade was there several years?—Yes.

1791. Did it not render as efficient service as any irregular troops could have done?—It did.

1792. Mr. *Adderley.*] When you say that the British troops could not be dispensed with, you mean unless some equivalent were found?—Unless some equivalent were found.

1793. Did you find any difficulty in raising 1,500 volunteers?—No.

1794. Do you think that there would be any difficulty in raising double the number?—No, but at a price; of course, if you want more men you must offer larger bounty.

1795. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you say that those were paid by the Home Government?—I do not know who paid for them.

1796. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Supposing the British troops had been withdrawn, could you have found a sufficient body of troops in the Colony to supply their place?—Certainly not at the moment.

1797. Any conclusion therefore that might possibly be drawn from your answers does not go to show that we could withdraw entirely the support of British troops from the Colony?—No, I do not mean to say that at all.

1798. Mr. *Adderley.*] When you say that you could not have found volunteers at the moment, you mean that it would have taken time to find them?—We had to strip the Colony, in a great measure, to get as many as we did; we left few men to till the land, or scarcely any.

1799. At all events, you say that the old commando system was efficient against Kafirs till you fought them by Imperial troops?—I believe so.

1800. *Chairman.*] Do you think that if the force which could be raised in the Colony itself were partly supported by British troops, the Colony might be rendered secure if the defence were mainly entrusted to volunteers raised in the Colony?—It is so long since I left the Colony that it is difficult for me to say that: I do not know in what state they are now on the frontier.

1801. Since 1854 I suppose you have been in frequent communication with the Colony?—I see friends from there, and I hear from there occasionally. I know most of the people there.

1802. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you believe that if the commando system had been

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been continued, and no Imperial troops had been engaged in Kafir wars, the Kafirs would be at this time armed only with assegais, and that they would not have had guns?—They might have had a few, but the British settlers, I presume, would have taken care that they did not get many.

1803. How are they supplied with guns and ammunition?—They buy them.

1804. They buy them from whom?—From the English traders, no doubt.

1805. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Does the existence of an army in the Colony facilitate the transaction of commercial proceedings of that sort?—The merchants import them.

1806. Would the existence of the army facilitate barters between the merchant and the Kafirs?—I do not think so.

1807. Then how could the introduction of a British army assist the Kafirs in the art of war?—They fight with them.

1808. You say that the existence of the British army there enables the Kafirs to learn the art of war?—Yes.

1809. I suppose it was a desire on the part of the Kafir to attack the colonists which led to the fighting?—Yes.

1810. And therefore it was not the British army which led to the fighting?—The Kafirs commenced the fighting.

1811. If there had been no British army there to fight them, they would have subdued the Colony?—I cannot say that.

1812. You think that the Colony might have defended itself?—It could in old times, I believe.

1813. I am talking of times when the blacks became so powerful that they attacked the colonists?—Then the Colony would not have been able to protect itself.

1814. Mr. *Adderley.*] You think that the task of self-defence being left to the settlers, they would have seen that the Kafirs were not well armed?—Yes.

1815. Mr. *Marsh.*] Would the old commando system be sufficient?—In old times, but not now.

1816. Supposing there had been no interference on the part of the Home Government, do you think that the commando system would have been sufficient?—I am led to believe so.

1817. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Therefore the introduction of the British army aided the Kafirs?—I do not say so.

1818. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you think that Sir Peregrine Maitland, at the time you have spoken of, would have been justified in doing nothing, but leaving the colonists to defend themselves?—Certainly not; the Kafirs would have taken the whole frontier.

1819. Mr. *Marsh.*] The commando system has been put down for many years?—In a great measure it has been; they would not let them make reprisals.

1820. If they had been allowed to make war as they had previously done, you seem to think that that would have been sufficient for the protection of the Colony?—Yes.

1821. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Did not the old commando system allow them to shoot down the Kafirs whenever they met them?—I never heard that, except when they were thieving.

1822. But the men were allowed to determine whether they were thieving or not?—No, I do not think that; they went out under their commandant, who was responsible, or their field cornet, who was responsible to the commandant.

1823. They determined whether there was any thieving going on?—Yes.

1824. And when there was thieving going on, they shot every one they met?—Some of them.

1825. That was the way in which they kept down the Kafirs?—Yes.

1826. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You say that the troops were sent out to protect the Kafirs; against whom?—Against the burghers.

1827. If the commando system was a merciful system, why did the Kafirs require protection?—I do not know; the missionaries were of a different opinion; the same with the Hottentots; they nursed up the Hottentots till they rebelled in 1857; they have never been ill used.

1828. *Chairman.*] You say the Kafirs are starved out?—Yes.

1829. Do you think that, so far as the system goes which is pursued now, there

there is anything in the system which affords any guarantee against a Kafir war breaking out at any time?—No.

1830. Mr. *Adderley.*] You say you think that the Imperial warfare has led to more bloodshed than the old commando system?—I think there was less bloodshed then than since there has been regular warfare.

1831. Do you think that the plan of starving the Kafirs out is more merciful?—They starved themselves; they destroyed the cattle.

1832. Mr. *Marsh.*] Do you think that more Kafirs have been killed in consequence of the commando system being put down?—Yes, a great many more.

1833. *Chairman.*] In a report which was presented to the Duke of Newcastle by Sir George Clark, at the time you were with him on the frontier, speaking of the object of your co-operation with him, he uses these words: "Mr. Owen's presence there I considered to be desirable, in order to watch and suppress intrigues which some of the speculators in the southern districts have before employed to involve the British authorities in military expeditions, and by recurring to which at the present time they would attain both the usual profits accruing to them from such undertakings, and create a necessity for the consequence of British protection over the scene of their unscrupulous transactions." Do you think that that is a correct statement of the nature of your functions as assistant Commissioner on the frontier?—Yes.

1834. Mr. *Marsh.*] I understood you to say that the frontier people were the only losers by the Kafir war?—As far as I know.

1835. Have the people on the frontier any political influence in the state of affairs at the Cape?—Yes.

1836. Much?—They send their representatives.

1837. Do they bear any proportion to the representatives from the large towns of other parts of the Colony?—I believe not, they do not attend regularly, because it is too far off.

1838. Their political influence is not so great as it ought to be for the position they have?—I do not like to answer that question, because I am not sufficiently acquainted with the circumstances since I left.

1839. *Chairman.*] You say that the first colonists have had an interest in wars for various reasons, whilst those on the frontier have an interest in peace?—Yes.

1840. Mr. *Baring.*] Supposing all parties to be influenced by their own personal interests?—That is how I understood it to be put.

1841. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Is it for the interest of the Colony, as a body, that there should be a war?—No; I think it is desirable that there should be peace.

1842. Mr. *Marsh.*] The frontier colonists suffer from the war, whilst others do not?—The frontier colonists suffer, and the others do not.

1843. Mr. *Adderley.*] To say they do not suffer, is a weak expression; do they not greatly enrich themselves?—Some of them.

1844. Are they not the stronger influence in the Parliament and in the towns?—I think they are the stronger.

1845. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Have you ever heard of the Governor of the Cape being allowed by Parliament, or by the population, to engage in hostilities with the Kafirs?—There has been no Parliament until within the last few years.

1846. Does not the movement of the troops depend upon the discretion of the Governor?—It does.

Captain *Andrew Clarke,* called in; and Examined.

1847. *Chairman.*] YOU are, I believe, an officer in Royal Engineers?—I am.

1848. You were for some time in New Zealand?—Yes.

1849. You were also Sir William Denison's private secretary in Tasmania?—Yes.

1850. And Surveyor General at Victoria?—Yes.

1851. You were, I believe, a member of the Cabinet of Victoria?—Yes.

1852. What was your office?—Surveyor General and Chief Commissioner of Crown Lands.

1853. Has your attention been called to the correspondence which has passed between the Imperial Government and the Colonial Government on the subject of military expenditure in Victoria?—Yes; the general subject I have had to consider.

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1854. Can you give the Committee any information as to the opinions or feelings of the colonists with regard to their proportion of the contribution?—There has been a considerable change of feeling from the year 1852 down to the present time; for during that period the subject has assumed several aspects. Of course, when the gold fields were discovered, in 1851, the difficulty of securing order and obedience to the laws, together with the enormous influx of an undesirable population from the adjacent penal colonies, was so great, that the first object of the local Government was to obtain, in aid of police, a military force from this country. Upon the thorough establishment of order, and the formation of a local police by the colonists, and regarding the large expenditure that was being incurred for military purposes, rendered no longer necessary, not only for these reasons, but from the entire change of policy in 1854–55, in the collection of the revenue from the gold fields; and at the same time, the existence of a strong feeling with reference to the Russian war, I may say a feeling of patriotism, the anxiety to keep the troops ceased. That has increased, and, as a whole, the colonists have not been very anxious for the presence of a very large military force; and with this change has the local Parliament diminished from time to time the Votes in payment of the Royal troops, whose numbers have been reduced in proportion.

1855. Are you aware of any correspondence which has passed between the Colony of Victoria and the Imperial Government upon the subject of the transport of the troops, by which the Colony has expressed its willingness to pay the cost of obtaining for itself a much larger amount of defence if the Imperial Government will pay the cost of a certain number of troops?—As far as my memory serves me upon that point, shortly before the death of Sir Charles Hotham, a Despatch fell into the hands of his advisers, in which the Home Government insisted upon the transport of the military to the Colony being paid by the local Government.

1856. Sir *George Grey*.] Has that Despatch which you are now speaking of been published?—That I do not know.

1857. What is the date of it?—I should fancy 1854 or 1855; but, however, it referred to two previous Despatches on the same subject, insisting on the payment by the Colony of the transport of the troops. The local Government of the day resisted this, on the ground that it was not a part of the original contract between them and the Home Government that the transport of troops should be paid by them.

1858. You are speaking of a contract which they had entered into at a previous time; what contract are you referring to?—Perhaps "contract" is too strong a term to use. I should say, perhaps, the condition upon which, in the earlier part of 1851 or 1852, the colonists requested a military force, by which it was arranged that the transport of the troops should be paid by the Imperial Government.

1859. *Chairman*.] Was it a part of that proposed arrangement, that all except the cost of transport should be paid by the Colony?—Of all troops that were sent there for the purposes of internal defence. Of course there was an Imperial guard under the terms of Lord Grey's Despatch, which the Home Government was supposed to pay for, but which, as far as I can ascertain, they never did pay for.

1860. What has been the upshot of that?—I believe the result of that proposal has been that the Imperial Government now pays the transport.

1861. Sir William Denison suggested in some Despatch "That in accordance with the practice adopted with respect to the postal service and the Australian survey, the cost of defending the Australian Colonies," speaking of the Colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, "should be shared in equal proportions by the Imperial Government and the Colonial Government"?—Yes.

1862. From your experience and knowledge of the state of public opinion, and feeling in these colonies, what is your opinion as to that arrangement?—My opinion of the arrangement is this, that only the Imperial pay should be borne by the mother country; and that all other expenses such as allowances, rations, forage, barracks, and so on, should be borne entirely by the Colonial Government, which would, instead of one-half, involve an expenditure of more than two-thirds upon the part of the Colonies, and one-third on the part of the Home Government. It is a modification of Sir William Denison's plan, and it would

would place the Home Government in a better position; but it is still very undesirable to leave the military subject to the discretion of a local Legislature.

1863. Sir *George Grey.*] When did you leave Victoria?—In 1858.

1864. What was the number of British troops there then?—Nominally, 700; but it was never kept up to that strength.

1865. What proportion of that was paid for by the Colony, and what by this country?—At the time I left, the whole of the expense of every soldier was borne by the Colonial Government; nothing was paid for by the mother country, except the Imperial pay and allowances of the head quarters staff, and which was the staff for the whole Australian and New Zealand command.

1866. Was that in accordance with the contract to which you have referred?—No, it was far beyond the contract. The Colonial Government at that time, never enforced the contract. Four companies were supposed to be paid for from Imperial funds.

1867. And the Colony was to pay for everything above four companies?—Yes, and at that time there must have been seven companies.

1868. Was that the ordinary amount of force of the Colony, or had it been reduced from particular circumstances?—There had been a larger force there before, but that was due to the temporary excitement at the close of 1854.

1869. For how long a period have the Colony paid the whole cost of the British troops in the Colony?—As far as my memory serves me, from 1851, until the last two or three years. I should fancy that for about five or six years the entire cost has been paid by the Colony.

1870. Then the only cost incurred by this country on account of these troops was the cost of transport?—As far as I can trace it during the period I name.

1871. Mr. *Childers.*] Originally the Colony of Victoria was a subordinate part of New South Wales?—Yes.

1872. And at that time the whole force stationed there was a detachment; it was hardly a company?—Hardly a company in number.

1873. Then when Victoria was separated from New South Wales in 1850 and 1851, she became a distinct Colony?—Yes.

1874. Then in the same or the following year, the gold fields were discovered, and she rapidly went ahead of the original Colony?—Yes.

1875. Upon that it became necessary to give her as much protection as was given to New South Wales?—Yes.

1876. And upon that it was decided that four companies should be stationed at Victoria, as four companies were stationed at Sydney?—Yes.

1877. Under the original terms of Lord Grey's Despatch of 1849, the pay of those companies was to be defrayed by the Home Government?—The pay and contingencies.

1878. And only the allowances were to be made by the Colony?—Only the allowances.

1879. The Colony was very desirous to receive a larger force, was it not?—Yes.

1880. That was before the Crimean war broke out, and also before the disturbances in the gold fields?—Yes, in September 1853.

1881. The disturbances, I think, were the subsequent year?—Yes, in December 1854.

1882. But that desire to have an additional force arose from the anxiety of the Colony to be in a good state of internal as well as external defence?—Yes.

1883. She offered to defray, if the additional force was sent to her, the whole of the military expenditure within the Colony?—Within the Colony, minus the Imperial Guard.

1884. Except the expenses of the Imperial Guard?—Yes.

1885. A good deal of correspondence took place between the Home Government and the Colonies upon the matter?—Yes.

1886. And it ended in the Colony defraying all the charge except that of one company?—Theoretically, but practically they paid that too. I will give you one instance: in 1856 the 40th Regiment consisted, on paper, of 37 officers, 122 non-commissioned officers, 21 drummers, and 999 privates. I find that the whole charge for their Imperial pay, adding to it the staff for the whole of Australia, is upwards of 35,000 *l.*; good conduct allowances and other allowances for the 40th Regiment, borne on the Imperial Estimates of that year, were all paid for by the Colony, and increased this to 59,082 *l.* There were also con-

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tingencies, which were for rations and forage, amounting to 44,000 *l.* more; and there were the military commissariat, barrack master, and other items; that is to say, the whole military cost for the Colony amounted to 147,519 *l.* I find in the year 1855, the previous year, it was 181,000 *l.* to pay the whole force of the Colony; and in the year 1854 there was a supplemental vote very much increasing that; making it about 226,000 *l.* in that year.

1887. Mr. *Baring.*] From what document did you draw that statement?—From the votes under the Appropriation Act of the Local Parliament, and the Abstract of the Revenue and Expenditure furnished by the Colonial Treasury at the end of each year.

1888. That is drawn from the accounts, not the Estimates?—That is drawn from the account.

1889. Mr. *Childers.*] Then the practice of calling upon the Home Government to pay for one company dropped in one of those years, but which perhaps you do not remember?—It dropped, but the question was raised again in March 1857.

1890. It was while the Colony was defraying its entire expenses that the Crimean war broke out?—Yes.

1891. And then they began to look to the possibility of relieving the Home Government of the necessity of keeping so many troops there?—Yes.

1892. And simultaneously there was the organization of the volunteer force?—Yes.

1893. That was in 1853?—The latter end of 1853 the agitation on the part of the Colony was commenced, and during 1854 the first volunteer regiment was enrolled.

1894. In 1854 and 1855, part of the troops which had been in Victoria were withdrawn, and the Colony approached more to its normal state with respect to the number of troops; it commenced to organize a very large volunteer force, which has been most successful, and it reduced, to a considerable extent, its military expenses, did it not?—Yes, very considerably.

1895. And after that it defrayed the whole charge of its military expenditure, until the year 1858?—Yes.

1896. In the year 1856 a question arose as to the additional demands of the Home Government for the payment of the transport?—Yes.

1897. And the result of the raising of that question was, that the Colonial Government felt less disposed to defray so large an amount of military expenditure?—Yes.

1898. There was also a less favourable state of the local revenues?—Yes.

1899. Was it not a matter of complaint of the Colony, that she did not get credit at home for her large expenditure for military purposes?—If she got the credit, we could not trace it.

1900. For instance, I believe you had looked up the accounts of the year 1856?—I looked up the accounts of the year 1856.

1901. Will you state how much the Colony voted in that year for military expenditure?—In 1855, 181,700 *l.*, for that year 1856.

1902. Would you be so good as to read some of the items of military expenditure in 1856?—In 1856 it was 147,000 *l.*; and in 1855, 181,000 *l.*

1903. I am speaking of 1856?—In 1856 there was the whole of the Imperial pay.

1904. How much was that?—The actual Imperial pay would be 28,950 *l.*; that was what was voted for pay only.

1905. The whole of the Imperial contingencies?—The whole of the Imperial contingencies; good conduct pay, and also the ration allowances, and forage allowances.

1906. The whole of these charges in that year, taking that as an example, were defrayed by the Colony?—The whole of those charges were borne by the Colonial Government.

1907. So that in that year the Imperial Government had no occasion to spend anything in the Colony of Victoria, except the Imperial pay of the staff?—Nothing, for which I am aware.

1908. Mr. *Baring.*] Have you looked in the Army Estimates to see whether there was any sum deducted from Vote No. 2, in respect of "wanting to complete"?—No, except a small charge for sappers and miners; and it was that which drew my attention to it, seeing credit taken for that, and no credit taken for

for the other regiments in the Colonies, which were being paid for by the Colonies.

1909. I do not know whether you are aware, that at the end of Vote No. 2 of the Army Estimates, a sum is sometimes taken under the designation of "wanting to complete;" that is to say, the whole number of the men are estimated for, and a deduction made in the Estimates for a certain portion of those men?—Yes; for instance, take 1858.

1910. Mr. *Childers.*] Have you the Imperial Estimates of 1856, before you?—No, I have not.

1911. Mr. *Baring.*] I want to ask you whether when you say that the pay and allowances of these troops are taken in the Army Estimates of the year, you have adverted to the possibility of the money not being taken in the Army Estimates of the year, in consequence of the deductions made in the gross estimates under the designation of "wanting to complete"?—No, because I cannot trace it; the only sum I can find is a sum total of 1,225 *l.*, taken from the Army Estimates, for a small detachment of Imperial troops; this is a charge for engineers in Australia, but I do not see anything deducted for the regiments of the line who had been paid from Colonial revenues.

1912. Mr. *Childers.*] In that statement it appears as if there had been entire provision for the regiments which are stationed in Australia?—Yes.

1913. Mr. *Baring.*] That is, in the detailed statement, the total charge for the regiments would appear; but you are probably aware that the total charge for the regiments which are expected home from India, for instance, in the course of the year, appears in the detailed statement, whereas at the end of the vote, a sum is deducted under the term "wanting to complete," in order to meet a portion of the charge for the year that is gone?—I believe that is so.

1914. Therefore, I want to call your attention to the fact that that must not be taken to prove that the money was actually voted?—No, but no credit was taken for it.

1915. What you mean is that you do not see any credit to Victoria, in respect of the sums paid by Victoria?—No, nor the deductions from the Estimates.

1916. Although it is possible that the deductions might have been made under some general heading not specified?—Truly.

1917. Mr. *Childers.*] Then with respect to the year 1856, putting aside the estimates, the Colony defrayed its entire charges?—The Colony defrayed its entire charges.

1918. Looking at the accounts of the Treasury-chest, and of the sums paid into the Exchequer for that year, is there any credit taken similar to the amount defrayed by the Colony?—Yes, because we find the contributions of the Colonial Revenue in the military expenditure; we know that in that year, the Colonies expended the sum of 140,000 *l.*, and the Colony of Victoria 3,618 *l.*; that is the only sum that I can find here.

1919. That is the only sum which appears to have been paid into the Exchequer?—Yes.

1920. Although very large sums appear to have been voted for the Imperial pay of those troops?—Appear to have been voted.

1921. Looking into the accounts of the Treasury-chest of that year, do you find any contributions?—No, none whatever.

1922. Although large sums have been voted by the Colony also in the year 1855?—Yes.

1923. So that in the year 1856, nothing appears to have been brought to account, either for 1855 or 1856?—No.

1924. Whether that may be explained or not, which is a totally different question, did not facts such as these cause considerable surprise in the Colony?—Yes.

1925. And they were much remarked upon, were they not, in connexion with the large amount which the Colony was asked to vote for the Imperial military expenditure?—Yes.

1926. Do you know in what manner the Colonial Government paid over to the military authorities the sums contributed by the Colony towards military expenditure?—Well, the exact machinery I hardly know. At that time I fancy the Commissariat or the paymaster, I am not quite certain which, upon the estimate of the current expenditure, submitted certain amounts to the

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Treasury; and then the Paymaster or the Commissariat issued a requisition to the Treasury for the amount he would require, from month to month.

1927. At that time, I think, there were two regiments there?—At some portion of the time there were two regiments.

1928. Do you think there were separate requisitions from the paymaster and the Commissariat, or was there but one requisition from the Commissariat?—I fancy it was from the Commissariat.

1929. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you mean that the ordinary pay and allowances for the 40th Regiment, for instance, during the year you have spoken of, were paid direct by some colonial officer to the paymaster of the regiment?—They were drawn direct from the Colonial Treasury, through the Commissariat.

1930. In what way were the extra colonial allowances paid?—In the same way.

1931. Was there any distinction made between them and the other payments made to the paymaster by the Colony?—That is a part I cannot tell you; but there were separate votes, and therefore I should say there was.

1932. You had nothing to do, probably, with that department of the Colonial Government which is concerned in these payments?—No.

1933. You do not know what receipt was given by the paymaster for these sums?—Except that they were separate items in both cases, I forget.

1934. Mr. *Childers.*] Can you recall to your memory how you yourself drew the expenses of the military engineer force, which was under your control during part of that time?—My own impression is that I signed for the Imperial pay; because we only receive the Imperial pay from the Military Vote, and that by a requisition upon the Commissariat.

1935. You think that the Commissariat drew the amount, which afterwards came through your hands to the sappers and miners employed under your charge?—Yes.

1936. Mr. *Baring.*] Who was the Commissariat officer then in charge of the accounts?—Mr. Bower, I think.

1937. Mr. *Childers.*] This state of things lasted, I think, until the year 1857 or 1858?—Until 1857, of my own knowledge.

1938. Was there not some alteration in that year, or about that time, in the form of the vote given by the Colonial Parliamnt?—Yes; the officer commanding the troops was made directly responsible for the distribution of the money voted by the Colonial Legislature.

1939. Sir *George Grey.*] Was that for ordinary pay and allowances as well as the extra colonial pay and allowances?—Whatever was paid; 1857, I think, was the first year in which there was a difference made between the payment of the four companies and the Imperial Guard, and the six companies in addition. They were voted separately; that is to say, pay and allowance to four companies, the Imperial pay being defrayed by the Home Government, and the whole charge of the six companies being borne by the local Government. The sum was taken out of the general vote, and directed by the Appropriation Act to be paid to the military authority, that is, the officer commanding the troops.

1940. Mr. *Childers.*] Were not the pay and allowances to be distributed to the troops in such manner as to Her Majesty may seem fit?—I believe those are the words in the Act of 1858.

1941. Sir *George Grey.*] Have you the Appropriation Act before you?—I have not.

1942. Mr. *Childers.*] From that time the Colony has only defrayed the Colonial allowances of four companies, and the Imperial pay and allowances of everything above four companies?—All above four companies.

1943. She has defrayed the contingenies of the entire force?—She has defrayed the contingencies all through.

1944. And the ration stoppage of the men is entirely paid by the Colony?—Entirely paid by the Colony.

1945. The forage, and lodging, and rent, and servants' allowances, I believe, are paid by the Colony; do you remember whether the lodging money is?—The lodging-money is, but the servants' allowance is paid by the individual officer.

1946. That is the arrangement at the present time?—That is the arrangement.

1947. Have

1947. Have you had occasion to refer to the Votes of the Legislature for the last two or three years?—I have seen the Votes.

1948. And they are based upon that principle, are they not?—They are based upon that principle.

1949. In the last year's Votes there was provision for Colonial allowance for 400 men, and Colonial allowance and Imperial pay for only 300?—Yes.

1950. This year there is provision for Colonial allowance for only 400 men?—Yes, and 300 also.

1951. Is the Vote for the 300 on the Estimates of this year?—Yes.

1952. Could you refer to the Estimates?—Yes.

1953. And the Appropriation Act?—Yes.

1954. Is it your opinion that the proposal which has been made to divide the expense of the troops in the Colony equally between the Home Government and the Colony, but leaving to the discretion of the Colony the amount of troops which it should receive, is a wise one?—With regard to the question of leaving the amount of forces in the Colony to the Colonial Government, I do not think that is a wise discretion to leave it to them. I do think that the Home Government itself ought to use its own discretion only with regard to the nature and number of the forces.

1955. Then it is your opinion that everything to do with the management and the number of the troops in the Colony should be as much as possible withdrawn from the Colonial Legislature?—Altogether. The Colonial Legislature, or the Colonial Government, should be in no way responsible for the troops in the Colony, the Governor himself being the only responsible officer.

1956. Do you think that a standing proportion of the expense should be paid by the Colony?—The proportion to be paid by the Colony should be for a certain number of men, and that fixed under the provisions of an Act for five years, so as to remove the discussion during that time of the military expenditure from the local Parliament.

1957. Would that be consistent with your view, that the Colony should have nothing to say as to the amount of troops to be kept there?—No; I think the first thing to determine is the amount of troops for purely Imperial purposes, distinctly laying down this principle, that the Colonial Government is in no instance to look to military force to back its police and its own strength for internal order; but that it should be kept entirely in case of actual warfare with a foreign power.

1958. Do you think it would be possible that an amount could be arrived at which the Colony should agree to pay for a limited number of years?—Yes; because, in my opinion, the amount that the Home Government would ask the Australian Colonies especially to pay under the other system would be rather less in amount than they are paying now. I think the Colony would be too glad to receive a proposal of that kind, instead of the one which now gives them a large expenditure with a very insufficient and scattered force.

1959. At the present time, 30,000*l.* a year is being annually paid by the Colony?—Yes.

1960. Do you think there would be any great difficulty in persuading the Colony to agree to pay 20,000 *l.* or 30,000 *l.* a year, provided the Home Government undertook that a certain force should be supplied?—I do not think there would be any difficulty, more especially at the present time, in the Colonies.

1961. The only condition to be made with the local Legislature being as to the minimum of force?—With respect to the minimum of force.

1962. With respect to the amount of force which is kept now in the Australian Colonies, do you see any means of reducing the expenditure?—If you go upon the principle which I start with, that the military and naval force of the Colony is only for defence against external attacks, and not the internal police of the country, your Imperial force should be only looked upon as a secondary force to your naval; that is to say, the forts and garrisons, more especially the forts in the harbours, should be supplied by a force from this country, and the present various means of employing soldiers there should be at once abandoned. By granting that you would then have arrived at a fair and fixed amount of money, which this country and the Colonies themselves have to provide.

1963. Take for instance the Colony of Victoria, she pays the entire expense of erecting forts?—All military works of every kind.

1964. Do you think she would pay the entire military expenses of a police character

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character within the Colony, provided these forts should be properly garrisoned by the Home Government?—Yes, by the Home Government.

1965. Do you think that that could be done by a force of artillery at a very much less charge than the cost of keeping up a regiment?—A very much less charge.

1966. Was that question ever discussed in the Colony of Victoria?—No, I do not know that it was discussed publicly.

1967. Has it been discussed in the Colony of New South Wales?—The Colony of New South Wales at present pays for a company of artillery, and I fancy it must have been discussed in connexion with them, but if it has, it has escaped my memory.

1968. But it is an opinion that you have formed from personal observation?—I had that opinion long ago, and impressed it upon the Colonial Government.

1969. Did the Colonial Government support that opinion?—Yes, and they have now ratified it; they have applied again for artillery for Victoria.

1970. And also for a small body of engineers?—And also for a small body of engineers.

1971. Do you think that in spite of the high rate of wages the public spirit of the Colony would enable the Colony cheerfully to defray all its other military expenses, provided that force of artillery were supplied?—Yes, I think so, because I see that the money voted for arms alone is 77,000 *l.*, and for works 81,000 *l.*, within the last year. And they propose to organize a force of 4,440, of whom a great portion is artillery, with a certain proportion of infantry; but I know the feeling is that there should be some Queen's artillery, together with a locally organized force.

1972. A militia force?—No, the volunteer movement is sufficiently strong there to enrol the number now given, and keep them well together.

1973. A local force?—A local force.

1974. That is the recommendation of the present Commission?—Yes, that is a recommendation adopted by the present Government.

1975. That there should be a force of 4,400 men?—Yes, of whom 820 should be Queen's troops.

1976. Is it your opinion that the Queen's troops could be considerably reduced in force, if the artillery were sent out?—I think three or four batteries of artillery would be much more advantageous.

1977. And would entail less expense?—It would entail less expense.

1978. Sir *George Grey.*] What would be the strength of three or four batteries of artillery?—I hardly know the strength of a garrison battery of artillery; I think there are 126 or 128 officers and men.

1979. That would be the whole number kept in the Colony?—In each battery; it would on the whole be about 400.

1980. In fact, what you recommend would be an increase of the number which the Imperial Government has thought it necessary to keep in Victoria, which is only four companies, or about 300 men only?—No. I could by that means release the whole regiment of infantry, confining the number of Queen's troops to the force of artillery.

1981. But in Victoria, would not the cost to the Imperial Government be thereby increased; because instead of paying only four companies, with an aggregate of 300 men, it would pay for three batteries of artillery, which would be 400 men?—Yes; but I get rid of other things which cost considerably.

1982. To the Imperial Government?—To the Imperial Government.

1983. In point of fact, would not you recommend an increase of expense to the Imperial Government, above the expense they are now liable for in the contract with the Colony, they paying now only for four companies?—No, certainly not. I do not think, practically, it would be so.

1984. Is the pay of an artillery-man less than that of a regular soldier?—No.

1985. Is it higher?—Yes, but we have other advantages from them.

1986. I thought the Imperial Government, according to your statement, only paid the expenses of four companies, with an aggregate of 300 men?—No, 400 men are what the Government pay for.

1987. One hundred in each company?—Nominally so.

1988. You stated just now that the Colony paid for four out of seven hundred, and this country paid for three?—No; this country pays for four out of seven.

1989. Then,

1989. Then, in point of fact, the pay of an artilleryman being higher than a regular infantry soldier, the cost of the artillery would be higher?—Yes, taking Imperial pay only; but taking the whole brigade of artillery allotted to Australia, you would reduce regiments, and consequently the cost. I am not speaking of Victoria alone.

1990. Mr. *Childers.*] You say that if, in the Australian Colonies generally, you could substitute a smaller force of artillery for the line, it would entail a very much less amount of military expenditure upon the Home Government: and you illustrate it by the fact, that you could then keep 400 instead of 800 in Victoria?—In Victoria, and throughout Australia the remainder.

1991. Mr. *Baxter.*] How many are there now in Australia?—Most of them are in New Zealand.

1992. You advocate the permanent withdrawal of all the troops of the line, and the substitution of an artillery force?—In the Australian Colonies; and I think the same would apply to Canada.

1993. Sir *George Grey.*] When you say 400 artillerymen would be a substitute for 800 infantry, is it not the case that the Imperial Government thought four companies sufficient, and that the others have been kept by the Colony to support the police?—The Imperial Government thought that was sufficient when the population was 120,000; the population is now about half a million.

1994. Are those soldiers employed exclusively for the purpose of defending the Colony against external attack, or have they been employed in support of the police in keeping internal order?—Up to a certain time, which I have before explained, they were employed to aid the police.

1995. Up to what time?—1855 and 1856; but since then they have been confined to their military duties only.

1996. Why would the Colony be desirous of retaining and paying for a large force when the Imperial Government thought four companies enough?—Since 1856 they have been retained merely for Imperial purposes.

1997. Thinking the number larger than necessary, why did the Colony retain them when they have been deriving no benefit from them?—They have retained them, taking them as the nucleus of a military force in the event of the probability of a war; but year from year, since 1856, their numbers, and consequently provision for them from Colonial funds, have been reduced.

1998. Then is it the case that the Colony would not have felt secure, unless the military force had been retained there?—No doubt about it; they do not feel secure without the nucleus of a small force there; although I may mention that they are now, I believe, without a single soldier in New South Wales, and very few in Victoria and Tasmania, because they have sent their soldiers to New Zealand, and the work is recently done by a volunteer force; but they still feel that the British soldier is the cheapest military protection they can have, because they have to pay the English soldier 2 *s.* 6 *d.* a day, and could only procure a substitute at an expense of 6 *s.* or 10 *s.*

1999. Mr. *Childers.*] During the panic of the Eastern war, the Colonies were most anxious to retain their troops?—Yes.

2000. And when the mother country required these troops for New Zealand, they cheerfully paid the whole of their pay and allowances while they were away?—Yes.

2001. And put the whole of their duties upon the volunteers?—Yes.

2002. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Were there any troops in Victoria when the gold field riots broke out?—Yes, there was part of the 40th Regiment, and part of the 12th.

2003. At that time?—Yes.

2004. Were they paid by the Home Government?—By the Colonial Government altogether. At the time of the riots in the gold fields that was the case. In that year, or the previous one, there might have been credit given for the company of the 11th Regiment; for I do not think that company were withdrawn at that time, and the pay might have been borne by the Home Government.

2005. Was not the original grant, for the purpose of charging the Colony with the pay of the troops, at the time when they were intended for police purposes, to keep order in the gold fields?—The address of the Legislative Council, on which the 12th Regiment was sent out there, did not represent that it was for the purpose of internal police, but in consequence of the threatened

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Eastern war. Before that time it was auxiliary to the police, but after that time it was as against a foreign enemy.

2006. Originally, was not a distinction made in the mode of sharing the expense of the troops in Victoria and New South Wales, because in Victoria they were supposed to be mainly required for police purposes?—I think that the same principle applies to New South Wales and Victoria.

2007. Do you remember when Lord Grey's plan was carried out in New South Wales?—Yes.

2008. Why was not that plan carried out at the same time in Victoria?—I believe it was; there were four companies in Sydney and one in Melbourne.

2009 Are you aware that Lord Grey's plan has been applied to Victoria as well as to New South Wales?—The plan applied to Victoria for many years was not entirely Lord Grey's plan.

2010. You are aware that Lord Grey's plan was applied to both Colonies alike?—I do not think that it was applied in its integrity to New South Wales.

2011. Are you not aware that it was originally devised for New South Wales, and was first applied to New South Wales?—In its details it has been modified.

2012. Is it not the case, that since fears of internal commotion at the gold fields have ceased at Victoria, the system of charging the whole expense of the troops upon the Colony has also ceased?—Yes, in consequence of the remonstrances of the colonists themselves in 1857.

2013. Within the last few years, the reason that has induced the colonists of Victoria to wish for a larger force than the Imperial quota of four companies has been, not the fear of internal commotion, but of external danger?—Yes.

2014. Threatenings of general war?—Yes.

2015. Some allusion has been made to what is called Sir William Denison's plan; are you not aware that he has explained that he did not intend to bind the Home Government to the supply of any definite number of troops, but that he only required for the Colony the right of refusing to accept any number of troops beyond a maximum fixed by themselves?—I have not seen that Despatch.

2016. You say it was part of Sir William Denison's plan that the Home Government should be bound by agreement with the Colony to supply, under all circumstances, a definite number of troops?—Yes.

2017. Are you aware that Sir William Denison has explained that that is not part of his plan?—I am not.

2018. Mr. *Marsh.*] Are there any troops in Victoria except at Melbourne?—I believe they are all now at Melbourne.

2019. The other places on the coast are undefended?—Quite so, the only place liable to attack would be Portland.

2020. Is Port Fairy liable to attack?—It is difficult of approach.

2021. The other places must depend upon a naval defence?—Yes, and I believe they have now volunteer forces.

2022. Do you think that the artillery duties could be performed by marines?—By marine artillery.

2023. Or by ordinary marines?—I cannot say positively but I should presume so.

2024. Are you aware that the marines are trained gunners?—Yes, they are all trained to garrison gun drill; the artillerymen would be trained to field work besides.

2025. Sir *George Grey.*] Would there be any saving of expenditure?—I should fancy that Marines and artillerymen would be maintained at about the same expense.

2026. If you have a permanent force of Marines in the Colony they must be sent out; would not the transport of Marines cost the same as troops of the line?—No, because you might reduce the number considerably.

2027. Assuming the numbers to be the same?—Not when you are relieving a regiment; you must relieve your troops at some time or other.

2028. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you think that the entire expense of the artillerymen should be borne by the Imperial Government?—The estimate of the expenses of the whole of the force in the Australian Colonies is now I believe more than 125,000 *l.*; a brigade of artillerymen would be about 35,000 *l.*, and I propose

propose that those should be distributed through the Australian Colonies where you have had three regiments of the line.

2029. Do you propose that the whole expense should be borne by the Imperial Government?—The Imperial pay only; all other charges by the Colonies.

2030. Have you formed any estimate of the expense that that would involve?—It would be a considerable reduction on the present plan, and much more efficient.

2031. Would it allow a certain number of troops for Tasmania?—Yes, it would allow a garrison for Tasmania also.

2032. You are aware that there is no contribution from Tasmania towards the military expenditure?—None.

2033. Mr. *Marsh.*] Do you not think that fewer Marines would be needed in consequence of their being more easily moved about by steam than soldiers?—I believe that Marines and artillerymen are about the same in that respect.

2034. Is not some requisition required for moving soldiers, whereas the captain of a ship may do what he likes with Marines?—No, the Marines would be extra to the force ordinarily on board.

2035. He would have full command over the Marines?—No, he would only have control over them when borne on the books of his squadron or ship.

2036. Mr. *Adderley.*] I observe that you have called the four companies furnished by the Home Government the Imperial guard?—That is the term I think that Lord Grey gives them in his Despatch.

2037. Is that the term by which they are known in the Colony?—Not generally.

2038. Does it imply that the Colony look upon them as a guard of honour to the Governor?—No, but as a symbol of the integrity of the empire.

2039. What do you consider to be the real value to the Colony of those four companies?—I think that it is the nucleus of the local military forces.

2040. Will you state in what way they are useful as a nucleus of local forces?—As disciplined troops setting an example to volunteers, and as furnishing a model force.

2041. Do you think it impossible for the Colony to raise a model force upon which to drill volunteer forces?—No doubt, but it would be at an extravagant price as compared with the cost of English soldiers. The local police force is as highly disciplined as any in the world, but each man receives about 12 *s.* 6 *d.* a day.

2042. The Imperial troops are valuable, because they are paid for by the mother country?—Yes, because by paying for that force you do not withdraw the same number of men from the ordinary avocations of the industry of the Colony.

2043. During the six years in which Victoria paid the whole military cost, except transport, what was the nature of the complaints made. Was it that they thought it a breach of faith on the part of the Government, or that it was a burthensome tax?—At the end of the Eastern war, and with the anxiety for public works, which demanded the distribution of the revenue in another direction, as regards this large sum of 200,000 *l.*, they were anxious to economise in every direction, and they did not believe that the force was any longer required in support of order.

2044. What was the difference in the expenditure in 1856, owing to the British Government not paying for the four companies?—I should think hardly 10,000 *l.*

2045. What was the whole military expenditure in that year?—One hundred and seventy-seven thousand pounds.

2046. Can you state what, in that year, was the revenue and expenditure of the Colony?—In round numbers about 3,000,000 *l.*

2047. Is it understood in Victoria, according to the arrangement to which you have referred, that the troops placed there and paid by the Imperial Government, may be moved by the Imperial Government in case of war?—Certainly.

2048. In case of general war those troops might be withdrawn?—Yes; the colonists could not oppose it in any shape or way.

2049. You say that the Colony having a representative Parliament, that is a reason for their not being called upon to state the number of troops they want?

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—With this view simply, that the local Government should in no way consider the Imperial troops as supporting their police. I think that the local Government should be responsible for the policy they carry out, and by local means should keep their own Colony in order, and not look to the Queen's troops as assisting their police.

2050. Would not the effect of their having a representative Legislature enable them better to state their requirements of troops?—No doubt; but the question is, whether you ought to accede to that proposal or not.

2051. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You mean that if the policy of the Government, or 'arliament, should produce discontent amongst the population of Victoria, equiring to be kept in check by forcible means, the local Government should rovide and pay for those means of repression?—Yes.

2052. And that they should not receive any assistance for that purpose?—Exactly.

2053. But that, on the other hand, if the Colony is involved in danger, from xternal enemies, and war is produced by the policy of the mother country, hey may then look to the mother country for assistance?—That is exactly the istinction I draw.

2054. And that the Colony may be called upon to pay a part of those xpenses?—Yes.

2055. But that, on the other hand, the mother country should be called upon o pay her share?—Yes; for in addition to the fact that to the policy of the nother country must the responsibility for war be ever due, England has her irect interests in the security of her Colonies, especially "those of purely 3ritish origin, founded and exclusively settled by English, under which conitions the Australian group more peculiarly comes." For from this very ntimate connexion, the chief buildings, the treasure in the banks, the merhandize in the stores of the city of Melbourne, are all to a very great extent he investments of English capitalists, so that its bombardment would be almost s severely felt in this country as it would be on the spot. Whilst the capture r destruction of the merchant ships anchored in its ports, with their cargoes, mounting on a yearly average to more than a million tons, being almost solely he property of English shipowners and merchants, would be the source of reater disasters and loss to individuals here than in the Colony. Though this s not likely to occur in any of her Colonies, as long as England retains her aval supremacy, yet the military force stationed in them should be of such a haracter as to assist the efforts of her fleets; and this would be best done by rtillery occupying the forts and batteries of her Colonial ports, leaving to the olonists themselves all other measures for defence.

2056. And as a nucleus for the advanced efforts of the Colony herself?—'hat would result from it.

2057. You are aware of the nature of the two systems on the subject of ilitary expenditure called by the names of Lord Grey's, and Sir William)enison's?—I am.

2058. What is your opinion with respect to the merits of those systems?—think that, under certain modifications, Sir William Denison's is the best ystem, with this exception, that I should leave to the local Legislature no voice n the matter, except that of furnishing the pay and allowances of the troops, 'hich the Imperial Government decided should be stationed in the Colony.

2059. Are you not aware that Sir William Denison's plan is, that the whole xpense of every kind, including the cost of transport of the troops allotted to he Colony, and accepted by the Colony should be divided in equal shares etween the home Government and the Colonial Government?—I am.

2060. What is your opinion of that proposal?—That involves at once the ecessity of obtaining from year to year the sanction of the local Legislature, 'hich would bring before the local Parliament the question of military expendiure. It is only those who have seen the effects of that upon the Colony, and lso upon the troops themselves, who can form a correct opinion how unesirable is such a course.

2061. Might not some such arrangement be come to, once for all, or for a eries of years?—Yes, I think it may be come to in this country without any eference to the Colony until the scheme is sent out for adoption or rejection. am not applying that remark to colonies which are essentially military, or to ich colonies as have not adopted free institutions.

John Robert Godley, Esq., called in; and Examined.

2062. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are Assistant Under Secretary of State for War?—I am.

2063. Were you a member of the Departmental Committee, to whom was committed the task of preparing a scheme on the military defences in the Colonies in the year 1859?—Yes.

2064. Are you responsible for the report of that Committee?—I am.

2065. You have also, I believe, written for private circulation, a paper containing remarks on Mr. Elliot's Memorandum, appended to the Committee's Report? Will you put that in?—Yes, with Lord Herbert's sanction. [*The document was handed in.*]

Vide Appendix.

2066. Those papers, I think, express your opinions upon the subject?—Yes.

2067. I wish to ask you for some explanations on some passages in those papers. Do you not see a difficulty in carrying out the system of a uniform rate of contribution as applied to such differently circumstanced communities as our Colonies?—For my own part, I think it a fair practical compromise; but if anyone thinks otherwise, and proposes a plan for apportioning the joint contribution in a different way, I should make no objection; certainly, it does not form an essential or even an important part of my plan. I wish to say, however, that the plan is not mine; it was proposed to the Colonial Office several years ago by one of the ablest and most experienced of our Colonial Governors, a man who was not at all a *doctrinaire*, but a working soldier, and one as little likely as anybody to be carried away by a specious theory. I would add, also, that the plan adopted with the old American Colonies, of making the Colonies pay for the whole of their expenditure was equally uniform with that which I propose, and that all the objections to uniformity of joint contribution apply equally to it.

2068. Who is the Governor to whom you refer?—Sir William Denison.

2069. What do you consider the leading and essential principle of your plan for the defence of the Colonies?—Colonial responsibility and management, and, as a rule, the contribution of the Imperial Government, if any, in the shape of money only. This was the system pursued with the old American Colonies; Parliament having been in the habit of voting sums of money to compensate them for any disproportionate expenditure incurred by them in the common cause.

2070. Do you think that, if Great Britain left it to the Colonies to defend themselves, there would be great danger of the defence being neglected?—If we judge either by our knowledge of human nature, or by history, we shall come, I think, to a different conclusion. Englishmen have never shown themselves slow in defending themselves, and as a matter of fact, the old American Colonies, to whom the responsibility of defending themselves was entirely left, did successfully defend themselves, so that there was not one of them conquered during the period during which that system was pursued.

2071. Are not the Colonies to be considered as military posts, essential to the interests of the empire, and which, therefore, the empire cannot afford to risk the loss of?—I have already said that I think the plan of throwing the responsibility of defending themselves on the colonists, is the most effectual way of defending them, and that they are less effectually defended by our garrisons, which are uniformly inadequate, whilst the fact of their presence renders the colonists unprepared to defend themselves. A remarkable confirmation of this is to be found in the proceedings of the South Carolinians, at the present time. I feel quite sure that, if they had been in the habit of trusting to a federal garrison to defend them, they would not have taken half such vigorous, or effectual measures of self-defence, as they have done.

2072. You insist much on the contrast afforded by the system pursued with the old American Colonies; do you not think their circumstances were so different from those of the present day, as to prevent the analogy from being a correct one?—No; I think the analogy is complete as regards the present question.

2073. Did they not treat the Indians more unjustly and aggressively than would be tolerated in England now; and were not wars more frequent then?—I do not think that there is any evidence of their dealing with the Indians more

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cruelly or aggressively than was not only tolerated, but was the custom at that time; on the contrary, their treatment of them was rather exceptionally fair and just, and they dealt with them more effectually, certainly. The consequence was, that I find only one record of an Indian war in the history of New England, for the first half-century after the New England Colony was founded.

2074. Do you not think a nucleus of British soldiers an important element in the defence of the Colonies, to train, and drill and encourage the militia?—Very possibly; and if the Colonists think so, my plan provides that they should be able to carry such a plan into effect, provided England could spare the troops.

2075. Do you not think that the withdrawal of the troops would cause great irritation and excitement, and perhaps run the risk of causing a separation of the Colony from the mother country?—I think that there would be much loud talking and violent writing, because the Colonists, having long been accustomed to have us pay the whole expense, would naturally feel it a hardship to have to pay their share, but I do not think it would involve the slightest risk of a separation.

2076. How do you think that any change could be effected practically in the present system?—In the same way in which Lord Grey effected the change in the plan of defending the Australian Colonies, which in that case produced no permanent discontent.

2077. Do you think that the Colonies generally would acquiesce in such an arrangement?—They would, of course, have to acquiesce, if the same plan which Lord Grey pursued was pursued generally; and I think after a little time they would consider it as the old colonists did, a matter of pride and privilege to defend themselves.

2078. Mr. *Ellice.*] You are acquainted with the Colony of North America?—Yes.

2079. You know the state of the defences in Canada?—No, I do not.

2080. Do you believe that if the English Government were to withdraw the garrisons from the forts of Quebec and Kingston, the inhabitants of Canada would undertake the defence of them?—I think they would.

2081. Do you know anything of the expense of stores and artillery required for the defence of those forts?—No, I do not.

2082. Generally speaking, do you think that the inhabitants of Canada, if the garrisons were withdrawn, would undertake the defence of the large forts now in existence in Canada?—I do not know whether they would undertake the defence of those particular forts, but I think they would take steps for effectually defending the province against foreign aggression.

2083. But if they did not undertake the defence of those forts, is it your opinion that they should be abandoned by this country?—Yes.

2084. *Chairman.*] Do you think, if negotiations were opened with the different Colonies to obtain their consent, the result would be likely to be satisfactory?—No, quite the contrary.

2085. Will they not strongly protest against the change which would involve throwing upon them the responsibility and cost of their own defence?—Most Colonies undoubtedly would, and probably refuse to negotiate on the subject at all.

2086. If it is not to be done by negociation, in what way, practically, would you have the overtures made by the Imperial Government to the Colonies, with a view to carry out any arrangement?—I have always said I would do what Lord Grey did in dealing with the Australian Colonies, that is, propose the conditions on which the Imperial Government would give assistance, and say, that if they were not accepted, the troops would be withdrawn. I may add, that a similar intimation has since been made to the Government of New Zealand.

2087. Mr. *Ellice.*] And do you think that the Colonies of North America were in the same relative condition with respect to the military defences with the Colonies of Australia and New Zealand?—There are various differences between them, undoubtedly; but I do not know exactly to what differences you refer.

2088. Have not the North American Colonies, especially Canada, an immense length of frontier to defend against a thickly populated country in the immediate neighbourhood?—Yes; but, on the other hand, they have much greater resources of a military kind from their superior population.

2089. Against

2089. Against what danger have the Australian and New Zealand Colonies to defend themselves?—The danger of an attack by a hostile expedition from a nation with which they might be at war, say France, or America, or Russia.

2090. Have not the North American Colonies to defend themselves against the same danger of an attack by land on an extended frontier?—Yes.

2691. *Chairman.*] Do you not think that, in the case of war, there are some Colonies which would afford valuable stations for coaling and refitting our ships, such as the Bahamas; is it not worth while to retain such places as the Bahamas, for instance?—It appears to me, that if those points are essential to the interests of the empire, the better plan would be, if we were stronger at sea, to occupy them when war broke out; if we were not stronger at sea, our garrisons would be ineffectual in defending them; the plan now is, to scatter garrisons over the world, on the chance that they may be wanted; I should propose keeping the troops at home, and sending them to the places where hey were wanted when war broke out; the Bahamas happen to be a case peculiarly in point; I find that we spend about 40,000*l.* a year upon their defences; so that, since the peace of 1814, we have spent nearly two millions of money in defending the Bahamas, and during all that time, we have never had a force there that could have resisted the crews of two frigates.

2092. I see that in one of your papers, you say that no British Colony, left to defend itself, has ever been conquered; and that, on the other hand, no Colony, of which the defence was entrusted to the mother country, has ever successfully resisted a hostile expedition. Is that actually the case?—As far as I recollect, it is.

2093. Do you think that the presence of the British flag on these stations all over the world adds to the prestige, and consequently to the power of England?—I believe it adds very much to our weakness. I have never seen a foreign criticism upon the power and troops of England, without observing that the writer considered the necessity of protecting Colonies all over the world as the main element of our weakness.

2094. Do you not think that the circumstances of the West Indies, are such as to call for special assistance from the mother country?—I do not think they are such as to call for the necessity of our paying for their police, any more than we are called upon to pay for making their roads, or paying their civil officers.

2095. Is there any rule in the War Department, as to granting, gratuitously or otherwise, stores to the Colonies?—I believe there is no rule.

2096. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] That is a question which the director of stores would probably be able to answer?—I think I know as much about it as he does.

2097. *Chairman.*] As you know something about it, do you think you could procure for the Committee any information upon the subject, or can you inform us, in order to ascertain the point, whether in some instances stores are given gratuitously, in others payment being exacted for them, without any rule being laid down on the subject?—I believe so, but you can no doubt obtain full information if Lord Herbert chooses to give it.

2098. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you advocate the entire withdrawal of British troops from the Colonies of this country?—Not necessarily; I should leave that for the colonists themselves to settle.

2099. Provided the Colonies are willing to defray the larger proportion, if not the whole, of the expenditure, you would not object to British troops being scattered over the world, as they are at present?—I should not think it a good plan; but if we could spare the troops I should acquiesce in it, in deference to the general principle of letting the colonists settle for themselves what is the best way of defending themselves.

2100. Why do you not think it a good plan?—Because I think it would be better for them to arm and train their own people; but that is more a military question, and is not one upon which my opinion is worth having.

2101. Your main object is to diminish the Imperial expenditure in respect to the military defences of the Colonies?—No; my main object is to throw upon the colonists the habit and responsibility of self-defence; it is a secondary but very important object to diminish the Imperial expenditure.

2102. Have not the Australian Colonies acted very liberally in their negociations upon the subject of contributions?—Most remarkably so; I think they have paid more than their full share.

2103. Then your former remarks with reference to the difficulty of treating

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by negociation do not apply to the Australian Colonies?—No. I do not think it would be a good plan to adopt it in any case; I do not think that you could make exceptions, but I feel sure that the Australian Colonies would object to no such plan; in fact, my plan originated with themselves; it originated with the ministers of Sir W. Denison.

2104. In point of fact, no such difficulties as those to which you have adverted have occurred in regard to the Australian Colonies?—Not at all.

2105. *Chairman.*] Do I understand you to draw a distinction between negociation and that mode of action which you suggested on the part of the Imperial Government?—Yes.

2106. Do you characterise the communication which passed between Lord Grey and the Government of the Australian Colonies as negociation?—No.

2107. Mr. *Fortescue.*] It is the case, is it not, that a dependency of the empire has no control over its foreign policy, but that all its relations with foreign powers are settled for it by the mother country?—Yes.

2108. Does not that fact appear to you to be one of the most important in discussing this question, as giving a dependency a strong claim upon the mother country for protection against those dangers which are produced by her policy?—Certainly; it is the only one that makes it a question at all.

2109. Then are we to understand you fully to admit that amount of claim?—I fully admit it as a claim to the protection of the mother country.

2110. You think that a dependency has a claim to the advantages, as it must submit to the disadvantages, of its dependent position?—Certainly.

2111. Then admitting that claim on the part of the colonists, and the corresponding duties on the part of the mother country, is it your meaning that the mother country should afford her proper amount of protection to a Colony, not by the supply of Imperial troops but by a contribution of Imperial money towards the expenses of a local force?—Not necessarily or always, but as a rule; if the colonists require the presence of troops, I have already explained I would let them have them.

2112. Do you think that the local forces raised in our numerous colonies, many of which are very small, many inhabited by foreign and mixed races, can ever be brought up to anything like the efficiency of Imperial troops?—Certainly not; by which I mean that undisciplined militia will not be so good as Imperial troops; but if they chose, I have no doubt they could raise, train, and drill, at a certain expense, as good troops as we have; it is a mere question of money. I do not think it would be a good plan for them to do so.

2113. Do you think it possible, at all events in the smaller dependencies of the empire, that local forces should be created which should attain to anything like the efficiency and *esprit de corps* of the British regiments?—I think it highly improbable that they ever should do so; but I do not think it impossible. I repeat, I should consider it an exceedingly inexpedient plan, for the smaller colonies at any rate, to attempt.

2114. Then you confine your proposal to the larger Colonies?—Not at all; I should leave it to the Colonies themselves to settle the details of their responsibility and management. I simply propose to acquiesce in their arrangements.

2115. These local forces would, of course, be confined to the Colonies in which they were raised?—That would depend upon the Colonies themselves. In the times of the old Colonies of North America they were not so confined, but made war on the king's enemies in other parts of the world, West Indies as well as in other parts of America.

2116. Do you think it would be a good bargain for the Imperial Government to contribute sums of money towards the expense of local forces throughout the Colonies, which you admit must be inferior to the Imperial troops, and which, at all events, as a general rule, must be confined to their own Colony, and could not admit of being moved and handled by the Imperial Government for the general purposes of the empire?—I should consider it a very good bargain, under the conditions I have stated repeatedly, both in this examination and in the papers I have put in. I am sure the saving of money would be very large, and I think the colony would be better defended.

2117. Do you think that the entire withdrawal of the presence of British soldiers from any part of the Colonial Empire would not mainly tend to check and lessen the Imperial feeling in our different Colonies?—I do not think so.

2118. Are

2118. Are you aware that in many cases the Colonists themselves entirely differ with you upon that point?—My only surprise is that all do not differ from me; people generally do differ from every one who asks them to pay.

2119. Are you aware that when the question has been put to the Australian Colonies whether they preferred to raise a local force, or to pay for a certain quota of Imperial troops, they have given reasons, entirely irrespective of the party who is to pay, in favour of the presence of a small body of Imperial troops rather than of an attempt to raise a local corps?—I am quite aware of it, and my plan provides that they should be able to do so if they like.

2120. You said just now that Englishmen are never slow to defend themselves; has it escaped your notice that a considerable proportion of our dependencies are inhabited mainly, not by Englishmen, but by people of foreign races, either European or aboriginal, and do you think that one uniform scheme can equally apply to dependencies of such different origin?—I have not proposed that it should; in those places which are not properly colonies, but only garrisons, I have proposed that the whole expense should be defrayed from the Imperial Exchequer. I allude to such places as Malta, Bermuda, and others.

2121. Would you be prepared to withdraw the Imperial garrison from such a Colony as the Mauritius, in case the Colony of Mauritius declined to accede to the proposed scheme?—The Mauritius is another doubtful case upon which a military opinion would be more useful than mine; but my own opinion is, that it would be better to trust to occupying the Mauritius when war broke out, than to keeping a garrison in peace time in case it should be wanted, because I feel sure (as the question implies) that the population of Mauritius are not inclined to defend themselves. It would, therefore, be merely in that case a question of economy with me whether it would be better to garrison it now, or to take it afterwards; at any rate, the best military authorities tell us that the garrison and the fortifications we now maintain there are inadequate; so we have the expense without the security.

2122. Supposing the dependencies of the empire, finding themselves left without that amount of protection from the mother country to which they consider themselves equally entitled in all the dangers that may be created by the policy of the mother country, should be prepared to place themselves under the protection of some other power, do you think that in that case the mother country would be fairly in a position to refuse her consent to that course?—I do not think it would ever be expedient or desirable for the mother country to retain her dominion over any Colony that deliberately wished to withdraw itself from it.

2123. But in the case I suppose, would not the inclination to transfer themselves from this country to another, have been directly produced by the policy of the mother country herself?—I think the motive does not signify at all, if any Colony deliberately, and after proper means of consideration were given, desired to separate itself from this country, I do not think it would be desirable to retain its allegiance by force. I do not of course speak of garrisons, such as Malta or Bermuda.

2124. Although that inclination not now existing would, in the case supposed, have been produced by our own policy?—By whatever motive it might have been produced. I must guard myself, however, from being supposed to admit that it would be the effect of the plan I am proposing.

2125. Do you not think that most of our Colonies are, in the very nature of things, dependencies, and if not dependencies upon this Crown must be upon another?—I can hardly answer that question as you put it; I do not think that all are, but I think some are.

2126. Do you think that the small Colonies could ever answer as independent communities, or must they become the dependencies of some other power if they are not retained as ours?—I think that there are very few of them that any other power would take on condition of having to defend them. The Mauritius is almost the only exception I know.

2127. Are two of our Colonies, at least, in the peculiar position of being liable to great and sudden danger, not from foreign forces, but from formidable native tribes within their borders or within their frontier, New Zealand and the Cape?—Yes.

2128. Would you not look at the case of these two Colonies as a peculiar one?—In that respect they are peculiar.

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2129. Are you prepared to advise that the defence of such Colonies should be looked upon as a matter of internal police, or of protection against foreign danger?—I think that at the Cape it might be looked upon as protection against foreign danger, but in New Zealand as matter of police. In New Zealand the tribes in theory are, and practically might be made to be, subjects of Her Majesty; att he Cape the Kafirs are foreign nations; but I do not admit, practically, the effect of your question.

2130. Are you not aware that the tribes of New Zealand are, to a great degree, semi-independent?—They are; but they need not be.

2131. Do you think it possible to treat those dangers as a matter exclusively of colonial arrangement, just as you treat protection against the danger of internal disturbances in an ordinary English community?—I have already drawn a distinction between New Zealand and the Cape. In New Zealand they say, "Give the colonists the power exclusively, and without interference from home of dealing with the native question." There I think the responsibility and expense of dealing with the natives may be entirely left to them.

2132. Do you think that the duty of keeping order amongst the foreign and mixed communities which constitute many of our Colonies, such as the West India Islands and the Mauritius, could be treated simply as a matter of police in a homogeneous English community?—I think it should be so treated, upon condition that the Colony is not interfered with in its management of such races from home.

2133. Mr. *Adderley*.] You say that the relation of a Colony to foreign powers, depending upon the mother country, gives that Colony a claim upon the mother country?—It is the only thing which gives them any claim.

2134. I presume you do not mean that it gives them a claim to the entire protection of the mother country?—Of course not.

2135. It gives them only a qualified claim?—A claim to such protection as the mother country may think it right and fair to afford.

2136. In answer to a question just now, you stated that Canada was more exposed to danger than Australia. Do you think that that fact gives Canada a larger claim to the protection of the mother country than Australia?—No.

2137. You do not think that the greater exposure to danger is a ground upon which the claim might be calculated?—No; I think that is one of the necessary incidents to every community of its geographical position, and an evil that it must bear with, and cannot expect some one else to bear. In the case of Canada, if the danger is greater, the means of resisting it are greater too.

2138. The greater exposure to danger does not, in your opinion, increase the claim of the Colony upon the mother country?—I have already answered that.

2139. Would not the present plan of Colonial defence, undertaken by England, require us to increase very much the fortifications and garrisons of the various parts of the Colonies, if it is to be carried out effectually?—Undoubtedly.

2140. Then you think that, to make the present plan of Colonial defence complete, a very large expense must be incurred?—Yes.

2141. It would be a part of that plan to increase the dispersion of British troops in distant parts of the world?—I do not say that; it would increase the force of the garrisons.

2142. And it would increase the number of British troops dispersed through the world in distant places?—Yes.

2143. What would be the effect of that dispersion upon the resources of England, in case of a general war?—Of course it would weaken it.

2144. Would it not amount to England, having a large portion of her forces locked up in distant parts of the world, and her own resources for any general war proportionately diminished?—Yes.

2145. In your opinion, did the plan of scattering troops, during the Russian war, in garrisons of distant Colonies, lead to England being obliged to levy foreign mercenaries to supply the requirements of her own army?—It led to a diminution of her military powers, and that was one way in which she endeavoured to supply it.

2146. Do you think, that if the garrisons of England in Colonial forts at that time could have been made available, they would have rendered foreign legions needless?—I cannot answer that question.

2147. They

2147. They would have gone so far towards it?—To that extent they would have strengthened the British army.

2148. Can you state what number of troops England had in South Africa when the Indian mutiny broke out?—I do not know exactly, but, speaking roughly, and from recollection, I think it was about 13,000 of all arms and ranks, but that may be exactly ascertained.

2149. Upon the news of the Indian mutiny arriving at the Cape, does it appear that the troops, at that time in South Africa, were made available towards its suppression?—I do not remember the dates exactly; a considerable number of troops were sent.

2150. You have stated that, under the Colonial system of England in the last century, the colonies of America undertook their own defence, both internal and external?—Yes.

2151. Do you see any reason why the Colonies of England, at the present moment, should not act exactly in the same manner?—Absolutely none; all the same arguments which apply to the Colonies now, applied to the Colonies then.

2152. There is no reason to suppose that English colonists now are degenerated in spirit from the English colonists of the last century?—No.

2153. Have American colonists kept in check all attacks upon them by the American Indians?—Yes.

2154. And also sometimes from the regular armies of France?—Yes.

2155. Are you aware that during the Spanish succession war the English colonists added Nova Scotia and Newfoundland to the possessions of the English Crown?—Yes.

2156. Are you aware that in the subsequent Austrian succession war of 1745 the colonial troops reduced the great fortress of Louisbourg?—Yes.

2157. Are you aware that in the seven years' war the French regular army attacked the Virginian settlement, and that the Virginian militia alone repulsed them?—Yes.

2158. Can you state when English troops were first sent to the assistance of Colonial forces in America?—The first time I recollect to have observed that was in the expedition that took New York in 1654. I have given these instances at large in the paper which has been put in, and I would rather refer to that than speak from recollection.

2159. Can you say when it became the habit of England to send troops there?—When Braddock went to America in 1757; I think that was the commencement of the system of keeping standing armies in America; and, just at that time, the provisions of the Mutiny Act were extended to America.

2160. Which of those considerations tended most, in your opinion, to the ultimate separation of those Colonies from England?—Neither of them otherwise than indirectly; but I do not think that the English Government would ever have attempted to infringe upon the rights of the Colony, or to tax them without their consent, unless they had had a standing army in the Colony; and, therefore, indirectly, the presence of a standing army there was the cause of the American war; besides which, the necessity of billeting and providing transport for the troops was felt as a grievance by the colonists.

2161. Do you think that the colonists, before the introduction of the Mutiny Act, being still entitled to the defence of their own Colony, any discontent was produced which led to the final separation of the Colonies?—Absolutely none; there is not the remotest particle of evidence of it. They considered it a privilege to provide for their own defence, and considered the presence of a British army a grievance.

2162. What was the feeling of the colonists towards England, when the war first broke out?—That of enthusiastic loyalty.

2163. Can you state at all with regard to the Colony with which you are personally acquainted, New Zealand, whether the action of the troops there recently in connexion with the local force, has been satisfactory?—Very much the reverse, as my own accounts lead me to believe. I was going to ask leave just now in answer to a question that was put to me, to read an extract from a letter which I have received from Mr. Fitzgerald, who is superintendent of Canterbury, and was prime minister of the Colony at one time.

2164. Will you read that extract?—It is to this effect: "Government formally declines our offer to volunteer to the Taranaki war. The Queen's

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army is hanging like an incubus on the Colony, doing nothing itself, and preventing any one else." That is the opinion of a very intelligent colonist.

2165. Do you believe that that Colony would be both willing and able to develope volunteer forces to a large extent?—I am quite sure it is able, but I do not say that it is willing, unless we make it imperative.

2166. *Chairman.*] Do you know whether the force in the province of Canterbury has been paid for out of the funds of the province, or entirely by private efforts?—I am not quite certain; I think it has been armed by the province, but I am not sure that it has been so paid.

2167. Mr. *Adderley.*] Supposing the evidence to be true, which we have heard from the two Governors of the West India Islands, that the British troops in those islands are utterly valueless against external attack, and can only be of any use in preserving internal peace both against the population, and against the doubtful fidelity of the black troops, would your views upon colonial policy lead you to recommend the entire withdrawal of the British troops from those islands?—Certainly.

2168. Do you see the necessity for retaining troops in any one of them, in Jamaica, for instance?—No.

2169. When you said that if the West Indian Islands ceased to be dependent upon England, they would probably become dependent upon some other powers; I conclude that that opinion was given upon the assumption that other powers had gained the command of the seas?—I did not say that they would be dependencies upon other powers.

2170. Do you think that they would?—I think that the West India Islands would be likely, under any circumstances, to prefer connexion with the English to connexion with any other power, nor do I believe that even if their connexion with England terminated, they would attach themselves to another power.

2171. Do you think that any power could hold the West India Islands against us without the command of the seas if we chose to take them?—I am quite sure they could not.

2172. Have you stated your views as to the value in an Imperial point of view of the garrison of Halifax?—I have not; but the observations I have made generally apply to Nova Scotia as well as to other places. The Nova Scotians are perfectly well able to defend Halifax just as New England with a smaller population was able to defend Boston.

2173. We have it in evidence that Halifax, as a strong post upon the American coast, is important to Imperial interests. Supposing we retained Bermuda, and effectually garrisoned her, would it not sufficiently answer these Imperial purposes?—That is hardly a question I can answer; that is a question for naval and military men; but I think that Bermuda could not defend itself, and I think Nova Scotia could.

2174. I see in Mr. Elliot's portion of the report, in which you have taken a share, that one reason assigned for England contributing towards the expenses of the defence of Ceylon is, that there are large works going on in Ceylon for railways and other purposes, and that if money was defrayed to pay their defences they would have less for their public works. To your mind, does that seem a good reason why the military expenditure in the defence of Ceylon should fall upon this country?—No; that is equivalent to saying that we ought to contribute towards the railways.

2175. I have an extract from a speech which Sir George Grey, the Governor of the Cape, made in the City of London, before his recent return to that Colony, in which he expresses his opinion that the Colony sufficiently contributes towards the military expenditure of England in its defence, by purchasing commodities from England, which by the taxation on the export brings money into the English Exchequer. Is that a view of the subject which you consider reasonable?—I think it might as well be said that they contributed to the expense of the French army, because when they purchase commodities from France they pay taxes in France.

2176. In fact nothing would satisfy your view of Colonial policy, short of the Colonies themselves undertaking the first responsibility of their own defence, and we contributing such a quota towards their external defences as may be reasonable on the ground that they are involved in England's foreign policy?—That is what I propose.

2177. Is

2177. Is there not some consideration the other way for England, in the way that England is involved in warfare by Colonial interests and relations?—Undoubtedly, and that should never be forgotten. Within the last 20 years we have been three or four times on the verge of war with America, upon purely Colonial questions in which this country was not interested. I refer to the Maine boundary question, the fisheries of Newfoundland, and many others.

2178. Should you not say that, in the long run, England incurs as many liabilities by her Colonial relations as the Colonies do by their implication in English foreign policy?—No, I should think not.

2179. In the case of the Cape, where you say you think that the Kafirs may be looked upon to a certain extent as foreign enemies, the expense of all the wars which have been created by the relation of the Cape with the mother country has fallen upon the English Exchequer?—Yes.

2180. Many millions have been so spent?—Yes.

2181. To what extent should you say that the proper claim of the Cape upon England for protection goes towards England defraying the expense of such wars?—I cannot say to what extent. I should be sorry to bind myself to any particular proportion of contribution. I have already said that I think half and half is a fair rough compromise, but I do not adhere to that very particularly. It is quite impossible upon any system to make a theory of joint contribution. You must have a practical compromise, and in the case of the Cape, I should be satisfied to make such a practical compromise.

2182. Do you see any difference in the question as it relates to the Kafir frontier, and as it relates to the garrisoning of Cape Town?—Yes, there is a difference, of course.

2183. Do you think that England is more properly liable to the expense of garrisoning Cape Town than to the expense of defending the frontier?—So far as the Colony has more the means of procuring or avoiding war in one case than in the other.

2184. Do you see any danger in England undertaking, as she does, with the exception of one force, the whole defence of the frontier of the Cape, leading to extravagance in such wars?—Yes.

2185. Do you see, also, any danger in the way of its keeping up the recurrence of such wars?—I think so.

2186. Mr. *Fortescue*.] With respect to Mr. Fitzgerald's letter, do you think that the people of the Northern Islands, who are exposed to those native dangers from which Mr. Fitzgerald is free, would agree with him that the presence of an Imperial force is a mere incubus?—I dare say they would not; many of them would be glad to have the Imperial troops do everything. I am only quoting the opinion of Mr. Fitzgerald as a spectator.

2187. Mr. Fitzgerald does not mean to say that he does not wish the authority of the Queen to be asserted, and the colonists to be protected in some way from native dangers?—Certainly not; but he means to say that it would be better done if left to the colonists themselves.

2188. But those who are really exposed to the dangers in question, you think would not agree with him?—Very likely not; I cannot say to what extent that opinion is held; but I know that all the colonists are dissatisfied with the way the war has been carried on.

2189. You said just now that we have been several times on the brink of war with the United States, arising out of purely colonial relations; is it not the case that, upon those occasions, the policy to be pursued was entirely a question for the Imperial Government?—It was wholly for the Imperial Government; but it was a question that had reference solely to colonial interests.

2190. But whether it was worth while to carry on such a controversy, or to maintain such a claim as might result in war with the United States, was entirely a matter within the discretion of the Imperial Government?—Of course.

2191. Do I understand you to say that, in allotting a certain amount of Imperial protection to the Colonies, the actual danger to which any Colony is exposed ought not to be any element in the calculation?—I do not think you could estimate that with any precision, especially as the means the Colony might possess of resisting danger would have in that case to be considered too.

2192. So that you would contribute the same amount of protection, and no more

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more, to the Cape, with its formidable native tribes, and to Victoria, where there are none?—I have already explained, that I do not consider the rate of contribution on the part of the Imperial Government essential or even important; and therefore if it is considered better to allow a varying rate, I should be quite satisfied with it; but, as I said before, the essential principle, in my opinion, is that the Colony should be responsible primarily, and that the assistance of the Imperial Government should be only given in the shape of a contribution. Upon the question upon what principles or in what ratio that contribution should be given, I think that half and half is a fair compromise; but I should be quite satisfied with any other ratio of contribution that might be considered more fair.

2193. You say that that is not to vary with the danger to which a particular Colony is exposed?—My opinion is that it should not; but I do not consider that question as at all an essential or important one.

2194. You think, for instance, that the existence upon the frontier of Canada of a first-class foreign power, with which Canada is liable to be involved in war, not by her own act, but by the policy of the Home Government, should be no element in calculating the amount of assistance to be afforded to Canada?—My opinion is that it should not. I have already explained why I think Canada would be better defended without our assistance, as given at present.

2195. Do you think that there is no difference between the date of things now existing in America, and the condition of things in those times, to which allusion has been made, when that great foreign power in the United States was a dependency?—On the contrary, I think that you had then, as an immediate neighbour, a far more formidable power, viz., the French; and on the other side a more formidable naval and military power, the Spaniards; so that in fact, I think that the danger to our New England Colonies from foreign aggression, was infinitely greater than the danger of Canada from foreign aggression by the United States.

2196. Was not the French power in America at that time insignificant?—On the contrary, it was most formidable.

2197. Was it anything to be compared with the power of the United States?—Certainly; it far exceeded it for aggressive purposes, although not for defensive purposes.

2198. With respect to the practical steps which you would advise should be taken, do I understand you to mean that the Imperial Government is to make up its mind as to the amount of assistance which it will afford to the several Colonies, to say to each of those Colonies that that is the determination, and to abide by that determination irrespective of the effect that may be thereby produced upon the feelings of attachment of the Colonists?—Yes, as Lord Grey did with the Australian Colonies, and with the most complete success.

2199. Do you think that the case you have just alluded to affords at all a parallel to what would be the consequence of such an announcement throughout the various Colonies of the Empire?—I have already explained what I think the consequences would be.

2200. But whatever the consequences may be with respect to the feelings, or the allegiance of the Colonies, that is the course which you think the Imperial Government ought to take?—Yes, as the only practical course.

2201. Mr. *Adderley*.] Can you draw any such distinction between the case of India, and that of other dependencies, as would justify our requiring India to pay its own military expenses, whilst we pay those of other Colonies?—No; I think there is none.

Lunæ, 6° die Maii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Mills.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Adderley.	Sir James Fergusson
Mr. Baring.	Mr. Fortescue.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Marsh.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Childers.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Herman Merivale, Esq., called in; and Examined.

H. Merivale, Esq. 6 May 1861.

2202. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are Under Secretary of State for India?—Yes.

2203. And you were for many years Under Secretary of State for the Colonies?—About 12 years.

2204. Beginning, I think, in 1846?—From October 1847 to March 1861, I fulfilled the office, that is, of Under Secretary of State for that time, although at first with the title of Assistant.

2205. During that period, how many Chief Secretaries of State were there?—There were seven who acted as such in one year, I recollect; but I cannot recollect the whole number.

2206. I think that the departments of Secretary of State for the Colonies and Secretary of State for War were separated in 1854?—Yes.

2207. So far as your official observation goes, can you tell us whether that separation produced satisfactory results?—I think that upon the whole the results were satisfactory as regards the Colonial Department.

2208. You think that the conveniences overbalanced the inconveniences?—I think so.

2209. In a letter, dated March 14th 1859, which has been laid before Parliament, and which was addressed to yourself from the War Department, setting forth the difficulty and embarrassment occasioned to that department by the absence of any fixed and recognised principle for the guidance of the Secretary of State, in determining the numerous questions of military expenditure which are continually arising in most of the Colonies, I find the following passage: "The general principle to be borne in view in negotiating with Colonial Governments on this subject would be, as General Peel conceives; 1st, that England should assist in the defence of her Colonies against aggression on the part of foreign civilised nations, and (in a less proportion) of formidable native tribes; but in a case, except where such Colonies are mere garrisons kept up for Imperial purposes, should she assume the whole of such defence; on the contrary, she should insist, as a condition of her aid, that the Colony should also contribute its share, by maintaining at its own expense, a local force, or, if circumstances appear to make that impossible, by paying part of the expense of the Imperial garrison; and second, that military expenditure, for purposes of internal police, should be defrayed from local funds, there being no grounds for drawing any distinction between a colony and an independent nation in this respect; and the preservation of internal peace and order being properly thrown upon local authorities, both because it depends upon their own legislation and management, and because the local population is mainly, if not exclusively, interested in it;" do you concur in that opinion expressed by General Peel?—Not the whole of it.

2210. Will you state how far you concur with that or differ from it?—I differ from it in this, that I think the Colonies are of such entirely different classes, that I feel it impossible, in my own mind, to apply any uniform rule to the question of what proportion of their defences the mother country ought to contribute, and therefore I could not assent to the words, "in no case." I think that there are cases in which England had better assume the whole of the

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defence, and that no such condition as that mentioned, however useful in particular cases, could be made a universal rule.

2211. Will you mention some of those cases to which you allude, in which you think it would be desirable that Great Britain should assume the whole of those defences?—I think that where the colony is not necessarily a mere garrison, but a position kept up for Imperial purposes, such, for instance, as the Colonies on the West Coast of Africa, there is no sufficient object in calling upon the Colonies to aid. Again, in such cases as that of the West Indies, where from circumstances the colonies are poor, it is a doubtful question whether anything would be gained in calling upon them to contribute to the inconsiderable extent to which they could contribute. And in the case of the North American Colonies, where the object in maintaining a force is a political and not a colonial object, it is an extremely doubtful question whether you should call for contribution from the Colony, or to what extent, although I am not prepared to say that you should not do so.

2212. Do you include the whole of the West Indies when you give it as your opinion that we cannot expect any aid from them towards their defences?—I do not say that we cannot expect it; but that although there are some of them in circumstances to contribute, yet, what you would get, might hardly be worth the nation's while, considering the questions that you must raise. To treat one Colony in one way and one in another is always a difficult matter where they are under the same general circumstances.

2213. Evidence has been given before us in reference to the Colony of Trinidad, and opinions have been expressed by parties conversant with that Colony, to the effect that it is able, and if the alternative of withdrawing the troops were submitted to it, would be willing to undertake a portion of the cost of its defence; do you think it desirable that steps should be taken to procure some aid from that Colony?—I think you may take such steps with regard to Trinidad, because Trinidad has no representative assembly; but that will not help you towards any satisfactory solution of the general question, it being the only Crown Colony left in the West Indies.

2214. Do you think that, without running any risks, you might attempt to obtain a contribution from British Guiana towards its defence?—Yes, I think you might attempt it, but you have a *quasi* representative body to deal with, which would not yield the point without a struggle.

2215. Do you not think that the Imperial Government might obtain a contribution from Colonies where there is no representative Government?—No doubt; you can take it.

2216. What do you say with regard to Jamaica; I assume that Jamaica would be very unwilling, and would, perhaps, refuse to make any contribution towards its defences; but do you think it would be at all worth while for the Imperial Government to make any attempt to get contributions from Jamaica?—I do not much think it would.

2217. You mentioned the West African dependencies as a class of dependencies, with regard to which you thought the question of the apportionment of military expenditure did not apply?—I did.

2218. You also mentioned, I think, the North American Colonies, as an instance of a group with regard to which you think it questionable whether it would be worth our while to endeavour to extract any contribution from the colonists themselves?—Yes.

2219. I observe, from a return which has been presented to Parliament, that although some contribution is received from Canada in some form, there is no contribution from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, or Newfoundland?—There is none from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; Newfoundland, I think, contributes a small sum.

2220. Do you not think that Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, are so far *in pari passu*, that the same rule that applies to one would apply to the other, if they had equal means?—No, I think that they are very differently circumstanced.

2221-2. In what respect should you make any great distinction between New Brunswick and Newfoundland on the one hand, and Canada on the other?—The circumstances are very different. In Newfoundland you have the very disagreeable task of watching the execution of treaties. In Nova Scotia you have a comparatively poor and small Colony, with one of the most important military

military stations which you possess, and the question is, whether you could raise from that people any sum which would bear a proportion to the cost of maintaining Halifax. If you could organize the North American Colonies into a federation, a different question would arise, but that is a political question. Taking the Colony as it is, Nova Scotia could do next to nothing. Canada is a great country, and all our relations with Canada are those of one great country with another. No ordinary colonial principles could apply.

2223. By the latest returns, I observe that the local revenue of Nova Scotia amounts to very nearly 300,000 *l.* a year. Do you not think that with so large a revenue, it is fair to expect that Nova Scotia should do something towards its own expenses?—I feel it difficult to answer that question, because I cannot give any definite meaning to the word "fair." If you ask whether it is expedient, I think it very doubtful. There is nothing unreasonable in it in the abstract.

2224. Considering the resources of Nova Scotia, as indicated by such a revenue as that, do you not think it reasonable to suppose that Nova Scotia is rich enough to afford something towards its own defences?—That it can contribute something, there is no question; the question is whether it is sufficient to make it worth our while to open the question.

2225. I believe Nova Scotia has considerable resources in coal?—It has resources, I have no doubt; but I am not aware that they are very considerable.

2226. The opinion which you express in regard to Nova Scotia, you give also as applied to New Brunswick and Newfoundland?—There are no troops to speak of in New Brunswick; I believe it has hardly so much as a company.

2227. During the time that you were in the Colonial Department, did any correspondence take place between that department and the North American Colonies, on the subject of a railway from Halifax to Quebec?—Yes, two or three times such a correspondence did take place. Lord Grey, in communication with some of the authorities in the North American Colonies, originated the idea of the railway, which should go from Halifax to Quebec, entirely skirting the sea-board of New Brunswick, and that, considering it of importance in a military sense, he was willing that this country should contribute. The Colony on the whole preferred a line going more inland, and there was a good deal of discussion as to whether any Imperial guarantee or other assistance could apply to the line, which, avoiding the coast, ran inland. There was a good deal of correspondence, which ended in nothing.

2228. Lord *Stanley*.] One was a military line, and the other a commercial line, and the people of the Colony preferred the commercial line?—That is just it.

2229. Mr. *Childers*.] Did the Colonial Office drop it, or the Colony?—There were some parties in the Colony who understood, or professed to understand, that the guarantee would apply to the line if it was carried further inland. I remember that view was not agreed to at the Colonial Office, and thus the matter came to an end.

2230. *Chairman*.] Do you recollect any proposal in that correspondence, which took the form of the Colonies collectively taking upon themselves the cost of their defence, if the Home Government would give them an Imperial guarantee for the construction of the line?—I do not recollect it.

2231. I understand that the different North American Colonies were not agreed as to the mode in which this should be carried out, and therefore that nothing came of it?—I do not recollect any difference between the Colonies; it was rather a difference of opinion between the Government here and Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; to Canada the matter was indifferent, I believe.

2232. At present, I believe, that for seven months in the year the only access to the interior of Canada is through the state of Maine and by Portland?—As I thought; but I observed in the newspapers, in speaking of the fugitive slave Anderson, some statement that there is a tolerable snow road from Quebec to the St. John's.

2233. Lord *Stanley*.] Not a railway?—No.

2234. *Chairman*.] Some evidence has been given as to an arrangement made for sending engineers to British Columbia; I think in 1857; can you tell the Committee what the substance of that arrangement was, so far as the expenditure to be incurred is concerned?—To the best of my recollection, this country agreed to pay indefinitely, but subject to the power of calling on the Colony at

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any time when this country thought that it had sufficient funds to undertake the charge. I do not recollect anything more definite than that.

2235. We have no troops, I think, in the island of Vancouver?—I do not know how that is now.

2236. I think it is in evidence, that in the North American Colonies altogether we have something over 5,500 troops, irrespective of the fortifications at Halifax; what should you say is the object of our keeping troops there?—I have always considered, but that is a question much more for a politician than for an official person, that the object was for fear of the United States, and for no other reason.

2237. Would the value of those troops rise in the contingency of an aggressive act on the part of the United States, when there might be a divided allegiance on the part of our North American colonists, and as available to support the cause of order; is that the view in which you suppose they are useful?—That would be my view, but it is only the view of an individual. If all Canada were against us, and we were engaged in war, we might, probably, let Canada go; if all Canada were with us, we should not want the troops; but if, as probably would be the case, there was a great division of sentiment amongst the population, a military force would be an encouragement to the loyal side, and a preventive against invasion. But this is merely a speculative opinion,.

2238. We have had evidence given before us as to a scheme propounded by Lord Grey in 1851, in respect to the mode in which the defence of the Australian Colonies should be arranged. It was considered in a series of despatches between the Colonial Office and the Government of the Australian Colonies in reference to the proportion of expenditure to be borne by the Colony?—I do not remember the details of that correspondence.

2239. Perhaps you recollect that there was an arrangement, the substance of which was that those Colonies were to have a certain number of troops paid for by the Imperial Government, but that if they wanted more they should pay for them themselves?—I dare say that was so; that arrangement certainly has been made.

2240. Have you a sufficient recollection of that arrangement to form any opinion as to whether it was a satisfactory arrangement or not, or whether it has worked well in regard to the Australian Colonies, or whether they are satisfied with that arrangement?—I should say that on the whole it has worked well; that is, with less friction than most arrangements of that kind.

2241. And with satisfaction to the Colony; it has not produced disaffection?—I never heard that it had.

2242. Do you think that there are any special reasons in the case of the North American Colonies which would lead them to resent such a proposal as that made to the Australian Colonies?—I do not know whether the word "resent" is applicable to such a case; but I think that there are reasons which, in their opinion, would render it a far less fit arrangement to apply to them.

2243. Will you state what those reasons are?—The Australian Colonies have no permanent apprehension or idea of a foreign power or invasion; it is not a contingency often thought of in those Colonies. In the political horizon of Canada, however, it is always present; they are always thinking of their relations to the United States and the position in which they would be in the case of a difficulty between us and the United States. They consider (according to such evidence as I have seen) that the business of this country is to take care of them in the event of political complications of which they are not in any way the cause, and of which they expect they will be the victims.

2244. Lord *Stanley*.] You mean in the event of a difference arising between Canada and the United States, the Canadians would feel that that was not a quarrel in which they were the principals, but that they were drawn into it in consequence of their connexion with the mother country?—Yes, and I may illustrate what I believe their feeling to be by this: that two years ago, when it became a question whether we should not be involved in difficulties with America, in consequence of the boundaries in Vancouver's Island, many Canadians said, "This is no concern of ours at all."

2245. At the same time they would be the first attacked?—Canada would be the first battle-field, in their opinion.

2246. Mr.

2246. Mr. *Fortescue.*] In Australia, there has been a considerable panic about European wars?—That was so just at the time of the Russian war, but it is not a permanent feeling, so far as I can judge.

2247. It is far less real than the Canadian feeling?—It is far less real than the Canadian feeling. I suppose that the Australians are well aware that their real defence would be a naval and not a military defence.

2248. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] They have shown considerable apprehension, in a naval point of view?—Yes; they apprehended that their trade would be interrupted during the Russian war.

2249. *Chairman.*] The Australian Colonies, I think, applied for an increase of our naval power in the Colony?—Yes; they have been constantly applying for more vessels to be placed at the disposal of the Government, and also against French aggression in the Pacific.

2250. I think you were Professor of Political Economy in the University of Oxford?—Yes.

2251. As professor, you delivered a series of lectures on colonization?—Yes.

2252. I have a scheme of your lectures in my hand, and I observe in the 21st lecture, after stating that our total colonial expenditure then was about 1,400,000*l.* a year, and that about three-quarters of that was applied to military establishments, you go on to use this expression, that there are many who reject with contemptuous displeasure the suggestions of those who consider these burthensome, and the general scale of colonial expenditure as extravagant; do you not think that now our colonial expenditure is much increased, the importance of considering the question is at least as great as it was then?—I dare say it is; but in those days the civil expenditure contributed by this country to the Colonies was considerable. There was also a portion of the military expenditure which maintained troops in Canada to keep down the Canadians. To the best of my recollection, that was what was on my mind 20 years ago when those lectures were given.

2253. In another portion of the book, you say, "Every soldier in the French Colony costs, according to M. Say, twice as much as if he remained at home, and I believe the proportion is rather higher in our own service." Has subsequent observation led you to believe that that is correct?—Yes, the maintenance of soldiers in the Colonies, generally speaking, is expensive.

2254. After describing the colonial policy of other countries, such as France, Spain, and Holland, you say, "We have seen in our review of past history that there have been colonies, although rarely, which have yielded a revenue to the mother country. There have been more which in time of peace have cost the Sovereign State nothing, their own revenue being amply sufficient to defray the expense of governing and protecting them. And I think that even the warmest friend of foreign dominion, must feel that there is some serious defect in the principles of our colonial government, when so far from realising either of these conditions, our settlements occasion us a constant and heavy expense, which seems rather to increase than diminish, and appears to bear more and more on our financial support instead of hastening towards the period of emancipation from it." Do you still hold the opinions which are expressed in that lecture?—So far as they relate to civil expenditure, entirely; so far as they relate to military expenditure, confining it to what was then incurred, namely, such expenditure for police purposes, and by way of keeping the people in order. The military expense for foreign objects I have always considered a different matter.

2255. With regard to the Colonies which you spoke of just now, the West Indian group of Colonies, is it not the fact that our military expenditure there is mainly, if not entirely, for the purpose of maintaining order among the population, and not for the purposes of defence against aggressive war?—I believe it is the only group of Colonies of which that may be said.

2256. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] For the purpose of maintaining order amongst those whom we have emancipated?—They were emancipated 20 years ago.

2257. Against the will of the Colony?—No doubt.

2258. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is there not this distinction in the case of the West India Colonies and some others, that they are most heterogeneous communities, and in a great degree of foreign origin?—No doubt.

2259. Do you think that the task of keeping order in such communities, can be treated precisely as the ordinary duties of police would be in a purely

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English community?—It is a question of considerable difficulty; certainly, there is a general feeling in the West India Islands, among the higher classes, well founded or not, that they are not altogether safe; that although all appearances are peaceful and quiet, and have been so for a long time, they are not secure from that extraordinary revulsion of feeling which sometimes takes place amongst imperfectly educated, and particularly coloured races. How far that feeling is well founded, it is beyond my judgment to say; but it is a very prevailing feeling, and it is a feeling which is very much satisfied by the presence of a few red coats.

2260. Do they keep the peace better than police?—The knowledge of their presence is no doubt a damper to anything like tumultuous disposition.

2261. So that there is a real difference between a purely English community like New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and mixed or foreign communities like the West Indies?—Undoubtedly there is a great difference.

2262. Lord *Stanley*.] As I understand your evidence, you consider that every large group of Colonies must be dealt with on different principles, and that it is impossible to apply a uniform rule to all, when in the one case you have to deal with communities of purely English descent, and in another case with mixed races; in one case, with communities having powerful neighbours, and in another case with communities having no neighbours from whom danger is to be apprehended?—According to my view there are three or four different purposes for which we maintain and pay troops in the Colonies; by way of insurance against foreign aggression; of insurance against internal disturbance; of insurance against danger from native tribes in the one or two Colonies in which these are powerful and warlike. Those purposes appear to be very distinct. There are few cases in which they all apply, several in which only one applies; and consequently, with these differences, I am unable to frame any general rule as to how the Colonies should be dealt with.

2263. Take the group of Colonies in which the least danger is to be apprehended, the Australian Colonies; there is no native population which can be formidable, and there is no external enemy within a considerable distance?—I believe that in the Australian Colonies there is not much for the payment of troops by us, except reasons which may be termed of sentiment and parade.

2264. You lay down the principle that troops, if maintained for police purposes, should be at the cost of the Colony?—I should not be desirous of maintaining them at all in such Colonies as the Australian for police purposes. But, if maintained, I believe that any arrangement making the Colonies pay any proportion of the cost would be attended with some serious practical difficulties.

2265. What would be the practical difficulty of withdrawing the forces?—None at all; but if you keep them there, and the Colonists pay them, the question of command would arise very soon.

2266. In the event of the Imperial Government threatening to withdraw the troops, and the Colonial Government desiring to maintain them, it would, I presume, be made a stipulation, that the command should remain as before?—No doubt; but stipulations are of very little consequence in matters like these. Whenever there was a change in the Government of Mother country or Colony, the whole question would be sure to be brought up again, as if there were no stipulation.

2267. I find on the average of five years, from 1853 to 1857 inclusive, the force maintained in the Australian Colonies, not including New Zealand, was about 2,500; do you not think that that force would admit of reduction?—I have no reason to doubt it, unless it be an advantage to be able to send troops to New Zealand on an emergency, like that which has lately happened.

2268. I find, also, that the force in New Zealand, on an average of the same years, was 1,430; considering the presence of powerful native tribes, you would, probably, not think that excessive?—Not if you are to have troops there for that special purpose; but that is a very large question.

2269. In the case of those Colonies to which you referred, the settlements on the West Coast of Africa, I think that the Imperial Government still continues to pay a portion of their civil expenditure?—Yes, it does, I believe.

2270. Before any attempt is made to call upon them to pay for their military expenditure, you would, probably, think that they should be called upon to pay the whole of their civil expenditure?—I think so; but at Sierra Leone, I believe we do not spend anything of importance; at Gambia we do.

2271. Looking

2271. Looking at the return from which I quoted before, I find that the force maintained in the West Indies, on an average of those five years, exceeds 4,000?—Yes.

2272. That force, I understand, is maintained almost exclusively for police purposes?—I consider it is; you must, however, admit foreign purposes into the calculation to some extent.

2273. Having reference to that object of keeping the peace, do you think that a garrison of nearly 1,700 men in Jamaica, is not an excessive garrison?—From any experience we have had, it is certainly beyond what is required; there has been no disturbance of consequence in Jamaica, to my remembrance, since I have been connected with the Colonial Office.

2274. Do you think any danger is to be apprehended to the peace of the Colony, if that force of 4,000 men in the West Indies were materially reduced?—I should be sorry to answer the question. I probably should not myself apprehend it; but I know that many would; and I know that in communities so excitable, and so strangely heterogeneous as these, a great fire is kindled by a very small spark.

2275. In the West Indies, I think, also a small part of the civil expenditure is paid by the Home Government?—I think the salaries of some of the Governors only.

2276. Passing on to the Cape, I find in the same five years, an average force maintained of 7,000 men?—Yes.

2277. And, apparently, at the expense of the Home Government?—Yes.

2278. Perhaps you can state, whether steps have not been taken for reducing that force materially?—I cannot speak within the last 12 months; but there has been a constant effort on the part of the Colonial Office to diminish the number of troops, and they have been as constantly increased again upon some apprehension arising.

2279. Has there been any attempt to call upon the Colony to contribute towards its defences?—It has been done in the most eloquent manner, and constantly repeated.

2280. Without any result?—Without any result in my time. I hear that Sir George Grey has succeeded in inducing them to expend something in militia; but I am not aware of the fact.

2281. We may take it, that, at the Cape, the principal object of maintaining so large a force, is to guard against the danger of a Kaffir war?—I suppose the whole, except the trifling garrison which we maintain at Cape Town.

2282. The danger of aggression from without is hardly to be considered?—I should think not.

2283. Do you think, practically, there would be any difficulty in announcing to the Colony, that it was intended largely to reduce their garrison, and that whatever measures were necessary for their own defence, they must be prepared to take?—It has been announced over and over again.

2284. Has not that announcement been followed by action?—It has been followed by diminishing the force; but that force has been increased again upon apprehension arising. There has been a continual succession of diminution and expansion at the Cape, ever since I had anything to do with it.

2285. In consequence of the demands of the successive Governors?—And upon the opinion entertained here as to the reasonableness of the demand. They are generally anxious for more troops; the statesmen here are anxious to keep the number down.

2286. In the case of the North American Colonies, I think you say that it would not be reasonable to consider the people of Nova Scotia responsible for the maintenance of an Imperial garrison like that of Halifax?—I think not.

2287. The same remark would apply more or less, would it not, to such places as Kingston and Quebec?—I consider the case between Canada and this country, as raising a different question from that between this country and Nova Scotia. As a matter between nations, for England and Canada are nations, I have already stated why the Canadians consider we ought to help them against the possible consequences of our own policy.

2288. You do not consider that that help would be sufficiently offered, if it were given when the time of its being required came?—That is a military question upon which I would rather not give an opinion; but I think the senti-

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ment respecting such help would be quite different; I think that the feeling that there is a force present is an encouragement, as far as it goes, to that portion of the population which prefers union with England to any other connexion. If the force were absent, probably that opinion would be to some extent shaken.

2289. If the entire Imperial force were withdrawn, I presume the Colony would say, "If we are left to protect ourselves, we claim to be the regulators of our own foreign policy"?—No doubt they might.

2290. *Chairman.*] The second paragraph in that letter of the 14th of March, which is the foundation of this departmental report, is, "That military expenditure, for purposes of internal police, should be defrayed from local funds, there being no grounds for drawing any distinction between a Colony and an independent nation in this respect; and the preservation of internal peace and order being properly thrown upon local authorities, both because it depends upon their own legislation and management, and because the local population is mainly, if not exclusively, interested in it." Do you think that, stated as it is in that paragraph, that is a sound principle?—It is a principle against which I know no abstract argument; but I cannot help saying that it does not appear to me a very practical one; the instance of the West Indies we have been discussing is quite within the principle, of course.

2291. Mr. *Childers.*] You would not apply the principle where England had made the materials for the disorder which she is required to redress?—That is what I mean.

2292. *Chairman.*] You would not apply it altogether to the West Indies, but would you apply that principle to the Cape?—I should not have thought of applying it to the peculiar case of danger from natives.

2293. You would not consider it as having reference to Colonies harassed by warlike native tribes?—I should not have read that paragraph as having anything to do with New Zealand and the Cape.

2294. I think I understood you to say, that with regard to the Cape, there has been no progressive reduction of the force there, and that it has oscillated from time to time?—Yes.

2295. With regard to the present state of things at the Cape, do you think that we may be said to be obtaining any insurance, as far as your judgment goes, against future wars, in the system we are now pursuing there?—Yes, I think you are, to some extent; but at the same time, I have great doubts whether it is a very effective or complete insurance. It is a very expensive one certainly.

2296. I presume that one main object of maintaining a force at the Cape of Good Hope is, that it is on the highway to our communications with India, and in the course of our trade in that part of the world; but that that is no reason, politically speaking, why we should keep a large Colony there?—Formerly, no doubt; but I fancy that the increase of the trade at the Cape, and more especially the production of wool, which has been very great of late years, make it now a profitable Colony.

2297. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] You think that the profit is likely to increase, and the expenses to diminish?—I do not see any chance of the cost decreasing.

2298. *Chairman.*] Some evidence has been given before this Committee by a gentleman who was 11 years in the South African Colonies, employed both in civil and military capacities, who in answer to questions put to him, has stated that he thinks the present system of warfare with regular Queen's troops, more cruel to the native tribes, than the old system, called the commando system; and in answer to a question in which he was asked whether, if the old commando system was put down upon the principles of philanthropy, that was a mistake, he said, "Certainly." Do you agree with him in that opinion?—I really could not answer the question, I have not knowledge enough of the details of the border warfare. The general opinion has been the other way; but upon what it is founded, I could not say.

2299. Do you know what has been done in the system of placing military posts along the frontier?—After the last Kafir war the military authorities, I think, came to the conclusion that the best mode of using the force they had was by distributing it between posts situated within comparatively easy distance of each other. Most of these are not under the Cape Government, properly so called, but in British Caffraria.

2300. Some

2300. Some evidence has been given before us, in regard to the conflicting interests of the colonists themselves, at the Cape of Good Hope, as regards peace or war, and the opinion has been expressed that in consequence of the immense rise of prices produced by the Kafir war, the western colonists were rather interested in having such wars. From what you know should you say that that is a correct view?—It is a question on which authorities have differed very much. Sir George Clerk, who went out as Commissioner to negotiate the withdrawal from the Orange River Territory, entertained that opinion; he thought that the wars were promoted, to a great extent, by the pecuniary advantages to the borderers. Sir George Grey appeared to be of a different opinion. I can only form mine upon the balance of opinions; and I do think that they have an interest in such wars.

2301. Do you think that the presence of an Imperial force in a Colony harassed by warlike tribes, tends rather to promote or to prevent wars?—Mine is an opinion which is worth but little on such a subject; but I am inclined to think that it tends to make them more sanguinary, and certainly far more expensive when they occur, but less frequent.

2302. Am I right, generally, in supposing that instead of having a progressive reduction in the Imperial Military Expenditure through the Colonial Empire, it would be more true to say that that expenditure has depended upon the breaking out or not of a native war; and that it has been an oscillatory expenditure, sometimes more and sometimes less?—If you limit that to two Colonies, New Zealand and the Cape.

2303. They are the Colonies in which the largest expenditure has been incurred?—Yes, according to the returns.

2304. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is it not the case that in recent times at the Cape and in New Zealand the Home Government has retained, through the Governor, the general control over native affairs, and has not left the colonists to deal with the natives as they pleased?—At the Cape the executive has never passed out of the hands of the Home Government; there is a Legislature, but the executive is responsible to the Home Government alone; in New Zealand what is called responsible government is established; and there, in theory, the Governor has always been considered as having a separate jurisdiction with regard to the natives, for which he was responsible to the Home Government; but as the Governor has had no money to carry on that separate jurisdiction beyond what might be voted by the Legislature, except 7,000 *l.* secured by the Civil List, he was almost as dependent as he could be upon his responsible advisers in that matter.

2305. But the policy pursued towards those native tribes has not been anything like so much under the control of the local government as ordinary matters of internal administration are?—Not so much, certainly; but in the last resort, it seems to me the Assembly have the best of it, and can do what they please.

2306. Nominally, the policy to be pursued with the native tribes has been in the hands of Her Majesty's Government?—Yes.

2307. Although, in reality, you think that that has been very doubtful?—Very.

2308. Do you think that if the policy had been pursued of leaving to the colonists at the Cape and in New Zealand to contend with the native tribes, and deal with them as they pleased, those two Colonies would have reached in the same time the point of progress which they have now reached?—With regard to the Cape, it is difficult to say. I have no doubt that New Zealand is far more populous, wealthy, and prosperous than she would have been if the colonists had been left to take care of themselves against the native tribes.

2309. New Zealand is a Colony about 20 years old, I believe?—Yes.

2310. And I think there was, for some years, a period during which the Home Government assisted the Local Government in its civil expenditure?—There was.

2311. Then came a period, I think, during which the Home Government made no contribution towards the civil expenditure of the Colony, but maintained the whole of its military expenditure?—Yes.

2312. Are you aware that the first step has been made towards calling upon the Colony to defray a proportion of her military expenditure?—The question is, will they do it?

2313. Have you any knowledge, from your familiarity with colonial history,

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of the effects of the contrary policy pursued in former days towards the North American Colonies, according to which they were left to treat the native tribes as they pleased, and to defend themselves against the native tribes as they pleased?—Yes, I have always thought that a very remarkable part of colonial history. Undoubtedly the progress of the English Colonies in North America, when this country did nothing towards defending them, was extremely slow, from the circumstance that every man had to be a soldier as well as a settler. There is a work just published by Mr. Palfrey, "The History of New England," which brings the facts of that subject more before us than was ever done before. He shows why the population in New England did not increase in 20 years to more than 24,000; he puts it down mainly to that cause.

2314. Were great atrocities committed during that period by the natives upon the settlers, and by the settlers upon the natives?—There were such, but I do not think that that is a marked feature in New England history.

2315. Do you think it would be possible for a government, under the pressure of public opinion, and with the full knowledge that the public now has of all that happens, to allow colonists to deal with native tribes as they then dealt with them, or to suffer evils from native tribes that they then suffered?—I think that in this country, there would be great difficulty in overcoming the prevailing feeling upon the subject; how far, if once the thing was done, that feeling would run in a new channel, is a speculative question entirely.

2316. At all events, if that policy had been pursued of late years, the condition of the settlers in such a Colony as New Zealand, would have been far more insecure and more liable to outrage and atrocities than has been the case?—Undoubtedly. New Zealand, in my view, has always been a very fair parallel to New England in former days; there have been the same difficulties to contend with; both have been difficult countries to clear; there have been similar dangers to apprehend from the natives; and their practical distance from England, considering the means of locomotion possessed in the 17th century, not very different: and therefore I think the comparison may fairly be drawn between New Zealand and New England. Now I find that in New Zealand we have 70,000 English people after 20 years of colonization,

2317. That, I believe, has been attained at the cost of a very small amount of comparative suffering on either side?—Certainly; until the present war, there has been no difficulty at all worth speaking of between Europeans and natives. I mean since 1845.

2318. Is it not the fact that in the present war there have been hardly any instances of murder and massacre or suffering endured by native settlers and their families?—I am not familiar with the details of that war. I have heard of such cases, but I believe they are very uncommon.

2319. There is this distinction, is there not, between New Zealand and New England, that in the one case, the natives may be induced or compelled to fall back on a country practically without limit, and in the other case two races are cooped up within the limits of an island?—No doubt there is that difference.

2320. *Chairman.*] Have you known any instances in which the white race has been successful in preventing the extermination, gradual or rapid, of native races?—Yes, I have. The Spaniards succeeded in that. They have maintained, in great numerical force, the people as they conquered. But these were races somewhat farther advanced than those we have to deal with. The population of the great South American republics is now chiefly Indian.

2321. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] The Australians did not try, I think, to keep their native races alive?—Perhaps not; but it may be said that they were very untameable.

2322. *Chairman.*] Do you think that the various attempts which have been made in North America by a system of presents, and by an expenditure on roads, and various other matters of that kind, with a view of civilising the natives, have been attended with advantageous results?—In North America, with none that I am aware of, except in the case of two or three tribes who are remarkably intelligent, the Cherokees and neighbouring tribes, who appear to have become somewhat civilised. At the Cape, Sir George Grey and others seem to think that a great deal has been done.

2323. Would it be true to say, that the native tribes have been rather poisoned by contact with whites?—The general case has been that they have disappeared, or have remained only in very small and degraded remnants.

2324. Lord

2324. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] The New Zealand races may be said to have been benefited to a certain extent, as well as to have suffered, by contact with Europeans?—I do not feel that I have materials for knowing how far that is a general fact; individual natives have become agricultural and wealthy, no doubt.

2325. Mr. *Marsh.*] The New Zealanders have increased in population, I believe?—It is said that they have decreased.

2326. Was there not a sort of irregular colonisation of New Zealand, commencing earlier than 20 years back?—Yes; but it was confined, I think, to the extreme north.

2327. Was there not a very serious war about five years after the regular colonisation in 1845?—In 1845, there was a serious war.

2328. In 1840 it was first colonised, I think?—I do not recollect the date.

2329. You say, that the Spaniards have saved the native races in some instances?—Yes.

2330. They went in very small numbers, did they not, and amalgamated with the natives?—The white population of South America is considerable, and although amalgamation took place to a certain extent, the great masses of the Indians in South America are of pure blood.

2331. There is no instance, I believe, of the English race amalgamating with other races?—I believe not.

2332. You say that in Australia the native population is so inconsiderable that there is no occasion to maintain troops there to protect the settlers?—None, I think.

2333. Are you aware that in Queensland there is a native police to protect the settlers?—I had not heard of it in Queensland in particular. There has been such a police in frontier districts of New South Wales.

2334. Are you aware that the cost of defending Queensland is now 15,000 *l.* a year?—I was not aware of it.

2335. Mr. *Childers.*] I think you say that you think the troops, which were stated by Lord Stanley to average 2,500 for the last five years in Australia, might be reduced?—I am not aware of any specific reason to the contrary.

2336. Has not that number been reduced one-half?—I cannot answer that; this return before me for 1858 gives, I think, about 2,500, but that includes Western Australia and Tasmania.

2337. Do you think that such a force as 1,200 or 1,500 is an excessive force?—There is a kind of force which you may call sentiment or parade force: what is sufficient for that is a matter of fancy. There should be also a nucleus for assisting the formation of native troops or militia.

2338. You admit that there ought to be a naval protection?—Yes.

2339. In connexion with that must there not be forts to defend the harbours?—I presume so.

2340. And men to garrison those forts?—It seems so, but they might be garrisoned by the local militia, for aught I know.

2341. Would you think it reasonable to call upon the colonists to bear the expense of garrisoning those forts which are to protect them against a foreign enemy connected with our own foreign policy?—With naval protection, I do not see that it would be unreasonable; there being no special foreign danger occasioned by our policy which menaces them. Distant dependencies must run the ordinary contingencies, which all communities run.

2342. Do you know anything of New Caledonia?—I know that the French have large establishments there.

2343. Do you know that they keep as many as 6,000 or 7,000 men and six or seven ships of war?—I was not aware of that.

2344. Do you think that that force does not require some counteracting force in its neighbourhood?—It may be so; but I should not imagine that the troops would be the cause of much danger to Australia.

2345. Do you know in round numbers what the Australian trade is?—I do not.

2346. Do you know that it is as much as 40 millions?—I was not aware of that.

2347. Are you aware that almost the whole of that property, when at sea and in the harbours, is British property?—Very probably.

2348. And that the interest which the colonists have in it whilst it is on

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board ship is very small indeed?—I hardly think that that follows from the fact of its being their property.

2349. Whilst it is in the harbours and at sea, is it not actually British property?—I dare say it is.

2350. Entirely insured at home, and by far the greater part of it held at home?—Probably.

2351. Do you think that if the troops in Australia were altogether withdrawn, British merchants would complain very much that their property was not protected?—Commerce is naturally sensitive, and no doubt they would complain.

2352. Would they not complain if one fourth part of their traffic was unprotected on the South American coast?—We have no military force on the South American coast.

2353. Is there not a considerable force of ships of war?—Certainly.

2354. Would not the commercial world complain if so large a trade as is carried on with Australia received a smaller amount of protection than South America?—The protection of our foreign commerce is wholly naval. I do not see that the necessity of naval protection in South America implies that of a mixed military and naval protection in Australia.

2355. We cannot put any forts on the coast of South America to support our navy?—No; but we have a large foreign commerce notwithstanding. If it is meant that the mixed military and naval power now maintained in Australia, ought to be the same in cost as the simply naval power required to insure an equivalent amount of trade in foreign states, of course that deserves consideration.

2356. With respect to New Zealand, you say you think it doubtful whether the policy with the natives was in the hands of the Home Government; the important part of that question is the land question, is it not?—Yes.

2357. Is it not the fact that the Home Government have scrupulously guarded themselves against any interference on the part of the local Legislature?—To this extent, that they have kept in the Governor's hand the power of receiving the sales from the natives; no native can sell to anyone but the Governor; but the Home Government have not kept in their hands the funds to make the purchases, and consequently every individual purchase becomes a compromise between the Governor and his responsible advisers. The settlers cannot be kept in order unless they get land, and they cannot get land unless three authorities concur, the natives, the Governor, and the Legislature.

2358. Has any important question arisen between the Home Government and the local Government as to the funds for purchasing?—Not to my recollection, any important questions, but various questions of detail have arisen. About three years ago a question of some importance was raised as to the mode in which the 7,000*l.* reserved to the Governor was to be supplemented.

2359. Has the Home Government as yet objected to the course of the Colonial Government that it did not put into its hands sufficient funds for native purchases?—Now and then I believe he has done so.

2360. On the other hand has not the local Legislature complained that all their proposed legislation with respect to the native land question has been rejected by the Home Government?—Yes, there have been many such complaints.

2361. If that is the case, is it not rather more than doubtful that the native policy is in the hands of the local government?—I think the great question always raised was as to the impolicy of dividing the duties and the responsibility.

2362. You say that the policy of calling upon the colony to pay anything towards the maintenance of a local force in New Zealand would be attended with great practical difficulties?—I should have added, if the call succeeded; the arrangements under which they should be made to pay a large proportion of the expenses for the troops there would be attended with great difficulty.

2363. For the last eight or nine years I believe they have paid two-thirds or three-fourths of their whole expenses?—Not so much as that.

2364. New South Wales and Victoria, at any rate, have done so?—Yes, that is correct as to those two colonies.

2365. Do you think that there would be any difficulty in arranging with the colony to pay for the whole of their protection against internal danger and to pay the whole of the additional charge which devolves upon the Home Government

ment in consequence of the high price of living there, provided the Government found the marine for external defences?—I do not think that any line can be drawn between the cost of the two purposes; but I have no doubt that it would be not at all difficult to invent various rough methods (Sir William Denison's is not a bad one) for apportioning that cost. But then, where the colony defrays the expenses of the troops, it will naturally wish to command those troops, and if you want to send a part of them to another colony, they may say, "No; we pay for them, and we want to keep them." I have seen symptoms of that difficulty beginning under the Australian arrangement.

2366. Suppose the Home Government undertook the garrisoning of forts for the defence of the harbour, and undertook the expense of the naval power which it provided, and the colony undertook the additional cost arising from the high price of living, and bore the entire charge of their internal defences, do you think that that arrangement would be difficult to carry out?—It seems to me a reasonable division and not a difficult one, subject to what I said, that if you divide the expense you will be urged to divide the control.

2367. Is not such a division as I mention, the one practically proposed by New South Wales and Victoria?—Yes, and acted upon, but for a short time only, namely, two years.

2368. Mr. *Marsh.*] Supposing that there were no colony in Australia, and we had the same commerce there as we have now, do you not think it would be desirable to have forts as we have at Hong Kong for the protection of our commerce, supposing we could get them?—It seems to me that it would be difficult.

2369. If we had the same amount of commerce, although it was not a British colony, do you not think it would be desirable to have forts?—If you suppose it to be inhabited by an inferior race like the Chinese, the forts would be useful; but if inhabited by European colonists not fellow-subjects with ourselves, I should think the forts would be useless.

2370. Would it not be desirable to have forts, for the protection of our shipping?—No, I think not necessarily so.

2371. Mr. *Childers.*] Do we not keep Bermuda for that purpose?—Bermuda is, I believe, thought of use to check the United States, and is also a convict station.

2372. Mr. *Ellice.*] Do you not think that the discovery of steam, and the employment of steam in our navy, very much facilitates the defence of colonies by us, as compared with former times?—Undoubtedly; and of attack.

2373. Do you think that the system of fortifications which was necessary in those times for the defence of our distant colonies, is equally necessary now?—That is a military question, and I am not a military man.

2374. Mr. *Baxter.*] I understand you to say that efforts have been made by the Colonial Office, to induce the colony at the Cape to pay a portion of its military expenditure?—Yes.

2375. In what way have those efforts been made?—In despatches from the Secretary of State to the Governor.

2376. Are you aware of the Governor having brought the contents of those despatches before the colonial legislature?—I think that Sir George Grey has done so repeatedly.

2377. Do I understand you to say that the colony has refused to contribute any portion of that expenditure?—No, it has never refused, but it has done very little. I believe that more is done now than was done formerly.

2378. When you say more is done now, am I not right in assuming that the Cape colonists do not contribute a single farthing towards the Imperial expenditure for the troops in that colony?—I believe that now they contribute 30,000 *l.* for the border police.

2379. Considering the enormous expenditure to which this country is put in protecting the frontier of the Cape, and the immense advantage which the Cape colonists have derived from the expenditure for military purposes, do you think that a fair and just arrangement?—I think not; but, as I said before, I am not sure whether you can make them pay. No doubt, in our view, it is unjust that they do not pay more. We can withdraw the troops, but in what other way we are to make them contribute I cannot at all find out.

2380. Has the Colonial Office threatened to withdraw the troops if they do not

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not contribute something towards the expenditure?—To the best of my recollection, repeatedly.

2381. Can you inform us by what Secretary of State such a despatch was sent out?—I cannot from recollection.

2382. You are not confident, as I understand, that any Secretary of State has ever threatened to withdraw troops unless part of the expenditure was borne by the colony?—That is my impression; I cannot say more.

2383. Do you know any reason why the Cape colonists should not bear their proportion of the military expenditure?—I do not think that their ability to pay is as great as is supposed; but I see no reason why they should not pay something.

2384. You are not aware that men have made large fortunes out of the wars?—No doubt individuals may have done so, but I do not think that they are a wealthy community.

2385. As compared with Nova Scotia, what would you say of them?—They are no doubt more wealthy than Nova Scotia.

2386. As such, you think it fair that they should be called upon to pay some portion of their own military expenditure?—No doubt.

2387. Do you think that the Imperial Government should insist upon their doing so?—There would be no injustice in the case.

2388. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you think that the necessity for troops at the Cape is likely to diminish at any early period?—Yes, I am inclined to think it is; but it is a question which I must be understood to answer with uncertainty; I think that the force of that powerful combination which threatened our Eastern Frontier is a great deal broken, and that this is the result of many causes, but more especially intestine disturbances among themselves.

2389. You think that those internal quarrels would have produced the same result if we had not kept so large a force there?—I think it possible.

2390. Do you think that in the event of an amalgamation of the North American Colonies, the necessity of maintaining so large a force there would be lessened?—I think that if the North American Colonies do federate or amalgamate, it will in all probability be under such conditions as will render the slight tie that still subsists between them and us somewhat slighter, and in that case the probability is that it will not be deemed necessary to maintain troops there any longer. I do not think that you can well maintain in that country a few troops, if you maintain any.

2391. Your reason for thinking that the number of troops might be lessened, is your opinion that their connexion with the mother country would be rendered more slight, and not that the necessity for troops as a nucleus force against the United States for instance would be diminished?—The military reasons would remain the same.

2392. Mr. *Fortescue.*] On the supposition that their foreign policy would still remain not their own, but that of England?—If you act on that supposition, you must maintain troops there still.

2393. Are you aware that the number of troops now at the Cape is about one-half what it was in the year 1858, to which the return now before the Committee refers?—I am not aware of the number now.

2394. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] With respect to New Zealand, have you contemplated any mode of getting out of the dilemma of which you speak; would you concentrate the power?—I think it is a great question whether, if we had not the power over native affairs, we ought to maintain the troops; still, I am inclined myself to think that, even if you keep the troops, to leave the responsible government the whole of the control, taking away the distinction between the governor alone and the governor *plus* the responsible advisers, might be the best way out of it.

2395. If you allowed the colonists to deal with the natives, and to defend themselves as they pleased, do you think that they would act with the same moderation and forbearance, as the existing Government does?—Perhaps not.

2396. There would be, probably, cases of cruelty, and something like an internecine war between the two races?—I do not know that it would go so far as that. I should fear that two armed races standing in constant juxta position with each other, would every now and then be brought into conflict.

2397. And those conflicts necessarily of a very bloody character?—Not, perhaps, necessarily; but, of course, subject to the chance of being so.

2398. And

2398. And whatever there is now of a civilising tendency amongst the natives would be checked?—Yes.

2399. Do you not think that the feeling in England would be one of regret at the breaking down of the great experiment of civilization?—There would be that feeling, no doubt, with many; with many others a feeling of satisfaction at the saving of expenditure.

2400. The balance would be, on the one hand, the notion of having saved the money, and on the other, a regret at the loss of the races?—I do not go quite so far as to anticipate the loss of the race; but others may think so.

2401. If we continue the system, it must be for the gratification of our own sentiments of philanthropy and humanity?—Undoubtedly.

2402. Can you tell us upon what principle Ceylon receives aid and India does not?—I know of no principle in the matter; it is practice only, I believe.

2403. The Cingalese are as rich as the Hindoos, are they not?—I do not know that they are not.

2404. The Government is despotic?—It is Crown Government.

2405. It is therefore perfectly easy for us to withdraw our troops?—Yes.

2406. And you know no reason why we should not?—In India one part of the country pays for the other; whether Ceylon is in the category of the rich provinces of India which can pay their own way, or the poor provinces which cannot, I would not undertake to say; but I should rather think that Ceylon is comparatively rich; it is something like Java, although not equal to it.

2407. Supposing the troops were withdrawn from the Cape, do you think that the Kafirs would ever advance into the colony, or are the colonists competent to defend themselves?—If the Kafirs are what they were three or four years ago, I should say there was danger; my belief is, that they are a great deal broken down; but still, with such chiefs as Moshesh, and a few others, civilization at the Cape is by no means safe from a violent check.

2408. And the result will be a general emigration of the colonists?—I do not think that they would emigrate; I think they would hold their own, but after much trouble.

2409. Mr. *Adderley*.] You say, that if we called upon the colonists to contribute to a large extent men and money for their defence, as English subjects are called upon, the fear would be that they would claim the right to command those forces?—I spoke with reference to Australia, and not as a general proposition. The state of things in North America is so entirely different, and they must depend so much upon us if it came to the improbable event of a war between us and the United States, to defend them.

2410. I did not collect from your evidence that you had any other fear of the result of calling upon the colonists to contribute men and money than the difficulty of England retaining the command of the troops for which the colonists paid?—I spoke of the Australian colonies only, in saying that.

2411. In Australia, are you afraid that under those circumstances the colonists, having the absolute control of the troops in the colony, would act upon any policy foreign to that of England?—I am not afraid of that; I spoke merely of the practical evil of their interference with the command. I am told that in Victoria this difficulty has already arisen with regard to the control of that part of the forces for which they contributed, and which were sent the other day to New Zealand.

2412. In that instance to which you refer, the difficulty was immediately resolved into a financial question between the colony and the Home Government, which should pay for the transport of the troops?—I dare say it was so.

2413. You say that insurance against various kinds of danger, is the reason for keeping up those forces. Is that a conclusive reason for inflicting the cost of that insurance upon England?—It is not a conclusive reason; there are hardly any conclusive reasons in politics.

2414. Upon what principle, in any case, do you think that the insurance against colonial dangers can be inflicted wholly upon the English tax-payer?—I think it is not unfrequently expedient for this country to bear the whole cost of a force maintained in a colony; as a matter of justice or injustice, I have no opinion upon the subject.

2415. I understood you to limit that opinion, as to the Government assuming the whole expenditure, to the maintenance of the garrisons on the coast of Africa?

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Africa?—I was speaking of the second paragraph in this letter, beginning, "The general principle to be borne in view in negociating with the Colonial Governments on this subject." I did not think that paragraph of universal application.

2416. Do I understand you to say that in the West India Islands, England should assume the whole cost of the defences?—I said it may be doubted whether our troops are of much use there; but I do not think that there will be much advantage in trying to get the West Indian Colonists to contribute any material portion of the cost.

2417. Was your recommendation, that England should assume the whole of the defence in certain cases, with reference to the West Coast of Africa, made upon the same principle, as you say that England assumes the entire expense of a garrison like Gibraltar?— Yes, I consider them as posts only.

2418. Looking upon the West African posts as held by England solely for her own purposes?—Yes.

2419. You have mentioned the poverty of the West Indian islands as one reason why England should assume the whole expense of the defences?—Yes.

2420. On the score of their poverty, do you recommend that England should aid them in any of their civil expenditure?—Certainly not; unless there was a necessity for it.

2421. The plea of poverty on the part of the West India islands extends only to military aid?—I said that I do not think that what you could get out of them would be worth your while, considering that you have to deal with free legislatures. You would have to enter inter into all these discussions with impoverished bodies; and although there is much to be said in favour of it in principle, I doubt its being worth the nation's while.

2422. Do you consider that they are so poor that they cannot maintain their own internal defences?—No, I think they could do it.

2423. Then is it a claim *ad miseracordiam*, or in what sense is their poverty a plea for our maintaining the defences?—I think they are not so poor, that if pressed they might not find means to maintain their defences; but you must treat with legislatures not very manageable, and I doubt that being worth your while; I do not say that it cannot be done.

2424. You are aware that in some instances, Antigua for instance, it has been done?—The troops were withdrawn there; that you may do, no doubt.

2425. We have had before us the evidence of two West Indian ex-Governors to the effect that the small bodies of troops maintained in any of these islands are wholly valueless as a defence against external attack, and that their only use is for the maintainance of peace internally; supposing that evidence to be true, do you say that England should still maintain a force which is only valuable as against internal disturbances?—Certainly, if it is, on the whole, expedient for England to do so. That is the question. In Antigua, from which island the troops were removed, a rather serious disturbance broke out three years ago; the police were wholly ineffective to put it down, and the Governor sent to the Island of St. John for troops, so that we had Danish troops to keep the peace in an English island.

2426. Are you aware that, in consequence of the troops being withdrawn, they have since organised an efficient internal police?—I know they had a police, but they are rather afraid of an armed police, because they think that they must be blacks.

2427. Do you see the expediency of retaining black troops in the island, the cost of which is to be defrayed by England?—Yes, when men are put into uniform they change very much in character, and may be employed even in a riot amongst the blacks, particularly as they are not recruited in this particular island.

2428. With regard to the West Indies, you say that you draw a distinction between Trinidad and British Guiana, because we might withdraw troops from one as a Crown colony but not from the other as having a representative legislature?—Yes.

2429. That means that one colony would struggle against the new policy more than the other?—You could withdraw troops from both, but in Trinidad you might impose a tax to defray the expense of troops as a substitute for those that were withdrawn. In Guiana the Crown could not do that.

2430. Do

2430. Do you think the Crown more responsible in maintaining peace in a crown colony than a colony which has a representative assembly?—Certainly.

2431. The existence of a legislative assembly imposes upon the colony the practical liability of self-defence?—As a political maxim, yes.

2432. With regard to the value of these garrisons, I understand you to say that New Caledonia is strongly garrisoned by France?—I am so informed.

2433. Do you consider that, if England were at war with France, the large garrisons in New Caledonia would deprive England of the command of the seas?—That is not a very easy question to answer; in former wars, generally speaking, a strong garrison in a foreign colony was of very little use against a British force with command of the sea; but this is a difficult island for troops to make way in.

2434. Is it not, in your opinion, probable that the garrison would be prisoners of war if we had the command of the sea?—I think it very probable.

2435. Do you think that the 1,800 troops in Australia are looked upon by the commercial world as in any way conducing to their safety?—I should think only to a small extent.

2436. You say that in Newfoundland we have to watch the execution of treaties?—Yes.

2437. Do you mean by that answer that when England enters into treaties on behalf of any colony, that imposes upon her alone the whole cost of maintaining that treaty?—No, but the case of Newfoundland is a very peculiar one; frequent altercations arise between the inhabitants of the coast and the sailors in foreign vessels. That is totally different from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

2438. Was not that treaty entered into quite as much for the interest of Newfoundland as England?—No; the stipulations to which I refer were for the interest of France. They have liberty to fish on coasts not their own. We maintain the execution of the treaty, because we consider England bound to prevent the French from suffering from the colonists, and the colonists from suffering from the French intruders, which they would be in danger of.

2439. In New Brunswick, you speak of the troops being looked upon as in the nature of a guard of honour?—So far as I remember, they are very little more.

2440. Do you consider that it is for the interest of England to maintain guards of honour in the colonies?—It does not appear to me a question of much importance, but I think it is worth our while.

2441. Do you consider that the guards of honour are looked upon by the colonists as an undertaking on the part of England to defend the colonies?—I should be inclined to think that they were looked upon as a sort of pledge.

2442. In that way, do they not deter the colonists from undertaking their own defences?—Perhaps.

2443. You have talked of the troops in Australia being maintained by England, not for her own interests, but rather for sentiment and parade?—Partly I said; but I think they are still partly there to keep the peace; for instance, during the goldfield riots the troops were called out, and were useful as a police; that is the only instance I know of.

2444. With regard to Nova Scotia, do you think that that colony could not undertake to maintain the garrison at Halifax?—Yes.

2445. Is it, nevertheless, your opinion, that Halifax is garrisoned for Imperial purposes?—That is a military question, which I would rather not answer.

2446. Supposing it were the general opinion of the highest military authorities, that all that England wants in that direction, as an important post, might be managed by rendering Bermuda impregnable, should you think it worth while for England to spend a large sum of money in rendering Halifax also completely defensible?—No.

2447. When you say that Nova Scotia could not maintain Halifax, would the maintenance of Halifax by Nova Scotia, be a more wonderful effort than the maintenance of Boston, New York, and other large places by the American Colonies?—Halifax, according to this return, costs us about 200,000 *l.* a year, besides the incidental expenditure of maintaining the fortifications; I do not think that Nova Scotia could pay that.

2448. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] What is the revenue of Nova Scotia?—I think it is under 300,000 *l.*

2449. Mr. *Adderley.*] Halifax is of no more use to us than those large towns were in the last century?—Halifax, as far as we are concerned, is a post for

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the protection of our commerce, and is a kind of insurance against an American war. There were no United States in the time of the old American colonies.

2450. Do you think that the commerce between England and the early colonies was not so much open to attack as the commerce between England and America now is?—No, I should think not; there was no danger, except from France, and France could be kept in order, probably, better by measures taken on this side of the water.

2451. You think that danger from the United States now is much greater than from France and Spain in former times, and that there are reasons for the maintenance of posts now which did not exist then?—I think that the conditions of the problem are altered altogether.

2452. Although England had the monopoly of the commerce with those colonies?—Yes.

2453. And therefore was repeatedly exposed to the attacks of France and Spain?—The attacks of France; Spain could do but little.

2454. When you were asked about the object of maintaining troops in Canada, you said it was from fear of the United States, but you afterwards added, if Canada were against us, we should probably let her go; and if Canada were with us, we should not want troops; does not that rather militate against the proposition that England should maintain troops there?—Not according to my opinion, because I said that a middle course was far more probable; that part of Canada would be with us, and part against us, and that in that event the maintenance of the troops there would be useful to the loyal.

2455. You alluded to the fear of a rupture with America, in connexion with the Vancouver boundary?—Yes.

2456. Did you allude to that as an instance of English foreign policy involving a colony in war?—There is usually a party in Canada not very friendly to the English connexion, and anxious to exaggerate the mischief of foreign wars in which Great Britain might involve them. When answered that these wars concern themselves, "Well, but" say the objectors, "here is a war about Vancouver's Island, and when they are quarrelling about that, Canada will be the first battle field." They put that as the strongest case, to show that, whatever danger Canada incurs from the United States is incurred for English and not Canadian objects.

2457. Was it not much more a Canadian object which led England to occupy Vancouver's Island?—On the contrary, I look upon the occupation of Vancouver's Island as simply an Imperial object, with which the interest of Canada is not implicated. I cannot see the slightest interest that Canada had in the question.

2458. If wars had arisen out of the dispute about the Vancouver boundaries, should you have said that those were wars arising from British policy?—No, I think British colonial policy, in the common sense, would have had a great deal to do with it, but not Canadian policy.

2459. They would have had a sort of idea that, if they were disconnected from England, they would not be wholly free from troubles?—No doubt.

2460. When you spoke of the difficulty of keeping troops in the colonies, the colonies paying for them, which difficulty you say would exist in the division of command, is there any such difficulty in India, where we keep troops, India paying for them?—No, because they have no representative institutions.

2461. Then there is no difficulty in the case of Ceylon?—None whatever.

2462. Or of any Crown colony?—Or of any Crown colony.

2463. It chiefly attaches to colonies where there is a responsible government?—Where there are representative institutions; of course still more so where there is a responsible government.

2464. *Chairman.*] You have been asked whether Ceylon might not be treated on the same footing as the Indian territories. Can you tell me, with regard to that portion of the Indian territory called the Strait Settlements, whether they pay their own expenses?—The accounts are so mixed up that it is not very easy to disentangle them. My impression is that they do not quite pay their civil and military expenses. They pay their civil expenses, but they are aided by the Indian Government in respect of their military.

2465. Mr. *Childers.*] With respect to the Straits Settlements, is it not the fact that we purposely abstain from collecting all the revenue we might collect in order to make it a free port?—I believe that is so.

2466. You were asked about the expenditure in Australia some years ago, in

in the internal defences. Is it within your knowledge, that the principal difficulty, so far as the local government was concerned, was with reference to the Americans?—I have been informed so.

2467. And that since the Americans have almost entirely left the colony those difficulties had come to an end?—They have not been repeated.

2468. With respect to New Zealand, you said that the local Legislature, if it had the management of the native question, would not be likely to treat it with the same moderation and forbearance as it receives from the hands of the Home Government?—If I did say so, I must qualify it; for my general answer was, that on the whole, even if you do not withdraw the troops, still the responsible Government had better be trusted with the whole executive than with part of it.

2469. Your advice would be to put the native question entirely in the hands of the local Government?—On the whole, I think it would be better, but I repeat that I say so with considerable doubt.

2470. The New Zealand Legislature, so far, I believe, shows it is able and moderate in its conduct?—I am so little acquainted with the events of the last two years that I do not know how to answer that; so long as I was concerned in the correspondence with New Zealand it was so.

2471. Is there any colonial legislature which stands higher than New Zealand?—There is no colonial legislature under anything like the same circumstances, unless it be that of the Cape.

2472. Looking at the colonial legislature, do you think that there is anything inhuman or unsafe, in leaving them to deal with the native tribes?—I cannot disguise from myself that there would be dangers; the only question is, whether they are so great as to render unadvisable the change of police which I have suggested.

2473. Do you think that those dangers would arise from possible cruelties, or inhuman conduct, on the part of the colonists, in the mode in which they would carry on their warfare?—I think that possible.

2474. Even supposing that they were to act so inhumanly as some people think they would, do you think that irregular warfare is necessarily more cruel than regular warfare?—I should think it is on the whole. I believe the great cause of cruelty to be fear, and I think, if you remove the troops, the settlers would be more afraid of the natives than they are now, and therefore there would be a danger of that fear leading to excesses.

2475. Whether it led to greater cruelties or not, do you not think that in almost all instances, the matter would be sooner settled than by the system of regular warfare?—No, I think not; I think it is doubtful whether regular wars with the natives, are not on the whole more sanguinary; but I think bloody disputes would be more frequent.

2476. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] You think that the colonists would exact fearful vengeance for any injury inflicted upon themselves?—I have no doubt of it.

2477. *Chairman.*] You have spoken of the capacity of Ceylon to defend itself, and of the equity of calling upon Ceylon to defend itself. I find that the revenue of Ceylon is about 70,000 *l.* more than the revenue of the Cape; the revenue of the Cape being about half a million. Out of that revenue of half a million, I find that the Cape of Good Hope only contributes about 40,000 *l.* a year to its defences. Do you not think it fair that the Cape of Good Hope should contribute more than that?—I think it perfectly fair that they should contribute all they can; but I take it that the civil government is more expensive than that of Ceylon.

2478. Mr. *Childers.*] Is the expense of the government of the Cape increased by the circumstance that Natal is administered through the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope?—No, I think not.

2479. The chief officer at Natal is entirely subordinate, is he not, to the Governor of the Cape?—He is termed so, but in fact he is only under very general directions from the Governor of the Cape.

2480. *Chairman.*] The administration of British Caffraria and Natal is under the Governor of the Cape, as Governor in Chief?—Yes, but he is absolute in British Caffraria; in the domestic affairs of Natal his power is but nominal.

2481. Mr. *Fortescue.*] There is a popular assembly, is there not, in Natal?—A Mixed Council.

2482. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Which has refused votes for civilizing the natives?—I am not aware of that.

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2483. *Chairman.*] What they call the border police is the same, I believe, as has been described by another witness as Currie's Police?—Yes.

2484. The Cape Mounted Police is the only force paid out of the funds of the colony?—I believe so.

2485. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Did not the emancipation of the slaves impoverish the Cape at the time it took place?—I should think not to any extent.

2486. *Chairman.*] The cost of transport forms a large item in military expenditure; do you think that the practice of forming local corps might be adopted with advantage?—With advantage in some respects, disadvantage in others. It is said that a local corps is not so good in point of discipline. And there is convenience in so extended an empire in having an army which you can move here and there as you please.

2487. We understand that in the case of the Canada Rifles the desertions are much less frequent than in regiments of the Line?—I do not remember hearing that, but it seems very probable.

2488. If the alternative were between leaving the system, as regards our colonial military armament, precisely as it is, and the adoption of the plan suggested by the departmental report, would your judgment be in favour of leaving it precisely as it is?—Yes.

2489. But do you think that there is a possible intermediate course between leaving it precisely as it is and adopting the suggestions of that report?—I think that many things may be done with advantage and economy in different colonies, but I do not think that any general middle course can be struck between the one and the other.

2490. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think that the system as it is has accomplished an adequate defence for the colonies?—That is a very general question, and is also a military one.

2491. *Chairman.*] Do you think that in many places it is desirable to maintain less force?—With the exception of what I have said concerning New Zealand and the Cape, I have no material alterations to suggest.

2492. Assuming that the difficulties and embarrassments stated by General Peel in that letter of the 14th of March 1859, exist, do you not think it desirable that there should be some rule bywhich the department should be governed?—If you had attained to such a rule, I think it would save a great deal of departmental trouble, no doubt.

2493. Do you not think that it would be attended, if you could attain it, with general advantages, politically speaking?—No, I do not think that, because I can hardly realise it to myself; the colonies are placed in such different circumstances, according to my view, that I cannot conceive the nature of such an arrangement.

2494. I am speaking of the possibility of some rule by which our dealings with different groups might be regulated; and I am supposing that each Secretary of State might find a rule practised; for instance, a rule was laid down by Mr. Huskisson, that a Colonial Governor should not remain in one position longer than six years; if some other general rules were laid down, do you not think that it would be a great advantage?—You would have so many different rules.

2495. Then you think that the matter must be left to the discretion of the Secretary of State for the time being to manage as he best can?—I think so; it is very possible that you might adopt a more regular system with regard to Australia than that which exists; I do not see much else that is to be done except withdrawing troops; that is another thing.

2496. Do you think that there are any circumstances in the condition of other colonies; for instance, North America, or South Africa, which render it impossible to adopt a similar rule with regard to them, to that laid down by Lord Grey, namely, that the Home Government would only allow each colony a certain number of troops, and that if that arrangement were not accepted, the troops would be withdrawn?—Not impossible, of course; but I have already stated my view of the respective difficulty in the different colonies, and I do not think you could draw any conclusion from one to the other.

2497. With regard to the West Indies, I suppose you think the possible consequences of a conformity with that rule about military expenditure, would lead to disaffection; do you think that it would be any great calamity if, in consequence of that controversy, we lost those colonies?—

2498. Mr. *Adderley*.] Why do you say that only part of the troops may be withdrawn?—You may withdraw them all; I was answering the supposition of making them pay part of the cost.

2499. Mr. *Baring*.] You draw a distinction between the two courses; one to withdraw the troops without correspondence, and the other to maintain troops there with a correspondence?—Yes, and in the latter I express a doubt whether it is worth the country's while.

2500. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Something has been said about the withdrawal of troops from Antigua, and some other West Indian Islands. Was not that a withdrawal, not from the West India Islands as a whole, but merely from one to the other?—I forget whether it was attended with a diminution of the whole force.

2501. The absence of troops from Antigua, when they are present at Barbadoes and Jamaica, might have a different result to the entire withdrawal of troops from the West Indian group?—Of course.

2502. Mr. *Adderley*.] Has there been a concentration of troops in the West Indies?—Yes, about seven years ago. I think the troops are now posted in Jamaica, Barbadoes, Trinidad, and Guiana.

2503. Mr. *Fortescue*.] With respect to New Zealand, do you not think that the Maories are more formidable than the Indians of New England?—No, I do not think so; and the Puritan settlers were not so well armed as our New Zealand settlers are.

2504. Then you do not agree with Sir George Grey in that respect?—He ought to know better than I do; but, speaking historically, I should say that the New England Indians were very formidable enemies.

2505. Do I gather from your evidence, that the system of withdrawing troops, supposing that were possible, from New Zealand, and leaving the colonists and natives to fight it out, would, on the one hand, not lead to those considerable wars of which we have had two instances; but, on the other hand, might be expected to lead to a constant state of alarm and exasperation between the two races?—That is the inclination of my opinion; but, I should add, I think that would have been the danger a few years ago much more than now, because the settlers are increasing so much in numbers. I think that the Maories must be put down in the course of a few years.

2506. Would not the effect of the change alluded to, as desirable in the administration of affairs in New Zealand, be to hand over one race to the control of a popular assembly representing the other race, and to which the native race has no means of admission?—Undoubtedly, but I was not comparing the case of England, or an English Governor governing New Zealand absolutely, with what takes place now. What I said was this: a divided government has been established in New Zealand. The Governor nominally manages native affairs by himself. He manages general affairs by his responsible advisers. And he is forced to go to his Legislature for funds for all purposes. I think this division so highly inconvenient, that it would be better on the whole, notwithstanding obvious objections, to have unity of government through responsible advisers. It is a different question whether it would not be better that England should have the absolute government of New Zealand altogether for native purposes.

2507. Are you prepared to advise that the Home Government should part with that degree of power which it still possesses in the Governor's veto, and to hand over the native races to the settlers?—I am glad I have not to decide the question; but if I were forced to decide it, I think I should so decide it.

2508. Do you consider that such a course would be in accordance with the spirit of the times and the notions under which we acquired the sovereignty of New Zealand?—I think it would be quite as much in accordance with the spirit of the treaty of Waitangi, as responsible government and free institutions are at all.

2509. Has there ever been a case yet in our Colonial history in which the Crown has suffered one race to be absolutely governed by the representatives of another?—Perhaps not in modern times; but responsible government has only existed anywhere some 10 or 12 years. If you go back to the old times of the English colonists, they never thought of making a distinction between native and other affairs.

2510. Would it not be handing over the natives to the government of a popular assembly elected by Europeans?—It would, and that is what was done in North America up to the seven years' war.

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2511. *Chairman.*] Do you think that having conceded responsible government to certain colonies we can, whether desirable or not, make an exception in regard to one department of affairs?—I have said I think it would be the source of constant difficulty, probably more disadvantageous than placing the natives under the uncontrolled management of the settlers would be.

2512. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you not think that there would be not only exasperation of feeling and liability to conflicts, but the ordinary danger of unfair legislation?—You can always prevent unfair legislation by the Crown disallowing in the last resort.

2513. Do I understand you to mean that, as we have already lost the power of fulfilling the terms of the treaty of Waitangi, you think we had better give up the nominal power which we still profess to retain?—With regard to the literal fulfilment of the treaty of Waitangi, I do not see that giving increased power to the responsible executive over native affairs would alter our position; with regard to its spirit, the danger began when free institutions were given to New Zealand.

2514. Do you not think that the native tribes may, to a great extent, be looked upon as independent of us, rather than as British subjects?—I should be sorry to think that; I do not think so.

2515. Have they ever fallen practically into the condition of British subjects?—I think they have, just as much as the natives of the outlying districts of our Indian empire.

2516–17. Are you prepared to hand over to the Colonial authorities the whole native policy, unless you can at the same time call upon them to supply the whole cost of any military operations to which that policy may lead?—Yes, I think so; I quite admit it is a choice of evils; but supposing that we are compelled to keep the troops there and to pay them, I still think, on the whole, the Colony would be better managed if there were no limit as regards native affairs.

2518. *Chairman.*] Do you not think that in cases of this kind, if the Imperial Government chooses to retain the power, the responsibility of defending a Colony may be said in certain instances to attach; but that if it parts with that power to the colonial legislature, the responsibility may be said to fall upon the colonial legislature?—As a general proposition.

2519. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] The power could not be wholly given up, unless the Governor's veto be withdrawn?—The Governor's veto is hardly exercised at all, except under the advice of his responsible council.

2520. Mr. *Adderley.*] You see some danger in the general proposition of one country making wars, and another country paying for them?—Yes, I feel it is a choice of evils.

2521. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You do not see your way to laying down any uniform system as a guide for the Imperial Government, in dealing with the military expenditure of the various colonies?—I do not.

2522. Do you think that the want of such an uniform system has been felt as a serious evil?—No, I think it is an evil of administration, but nothing more.

2523. You consider that it is an evil, the amount of which has been considerably exaggerated?—Yes; I have seen much stronger representations of it than I felt I could agree with.

2524. *Chairman.*] Apart from the question of uniform system, do I understand you to say that there are no remedies, or alterations in the present system which would be advantageous if carried out. Are you satisfied with the present system?—I do not consider it a system. If you apply that question to particular Colonies, no doubt improvements might be made.

2525. Without laying down any system, supposing that the Secretary of State could now do with regard to other Colonies that which Lord Grey did with regard to the Australian Colonies in 1851, do you not think that it would be desirable?—When Lord Grey did that, responsible Government had not begun. We then did comparatively as we liked with the revenues and executive administration of the Australian Colonies. Lord Grey was not fettered with that difficulty in laying down his principle, which would exist now.

2526. There are Colonies, I apprehend, now in much the same position as the Australian Colonies were then?—I think no Colonies of any consequence.

Jovis, 9° die Maii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Mills.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Fortescue.	Lord Stanley.
Sir James Fergusson.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable *Henry George* Earl *Grey* (attending by permission of the House of Lords); Examined.

The Right Hon. Earl *Grey*.

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2527. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE your Lordship was Secretary of State for the Colonies, from 1846 to 1852?—Yes.

2528. In a book published by you, in 1853, entitled "The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration," I find a statement of the view which your Lordship then entertained, as regarded the principles by which the relations of Great Britain with the Colonies, in reference to military defence, should be regulated. May I ask whether, since 1853, you have seen any reason materially to alter the opinions you then expressed on that subject?—No; I see no reason to alter those opinions.

2529. In the introductory chapter to that book I find this passage: "Our military expenditure, on account of the Colonies, is certainly very heavy, including the charges for the pay of the troops stationed in them, the cost of barracks and ordnance works, that of transport, and the large proportion of the dead weight of the army which is fairly chargeable to the Colonies. This expenditure, I think, ought to be very largely reduced; and the Colonies, now that they are relieved from all that is onerous to them, in connexion with the mother country, should be required to contribute much more than they have hitherto done to their own protection. This would, in point of fact, be only a return to what was formerly the practice of this country." On the next page I find also this passage: "I believe it was not until the time of the great Revolutionary War with France, that nearly the whole burthen of the defence of the Colonies was undertaken by this country; but for the last 50 or 60 years this has been so generally done, and the charges of this kind borne by the Colonies have been so few and inconsiderable, that a sudden change of system could not have been safely effected. The importance of returning to a sounder system was not, however, lost sight of; and we endeavoured to establish, and by degrees to act upon, the principle that Colonies can only look to the mother country for military support in any dangers to which they may be exposed from a powerful foreign enemy; that Her Majesty's troops are not to be expected to undertake the duties of police, to maintain the internal tranquillity of the Colonies, and that the Colonies ought to undertake to provide for the expense of barracks for such of Her Majesty's troops as may be stationed in them for their protection." May I ask whether that substantially conveys your opinion upon the subject?—Yes; including in the term "foreign enemy," savage tribes that are within the Colony.

2530. Am I to take it that those remarks apply generally to our military stations?—Undoubtedly, a different rule must be applied to those stations which

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are maintained as garrisons for the general purposes of the empire, and merely as garrisons; I refer to such places as Gibraltar and Malta.

2531. Would it be a correct inference to draw from the passages I have quoted, and from the general tenor of your expressed opinion upon the subject, that the main ground upon which, in your opinion, the claim of those Colonies, not classed as military stations, to Imperial aid in their defence, is in the risk they run in being involved in wars of England with other powers?—I should hardly say that; I think that the very notion of a Colonial relation between this country and our possessions implies protection on the one side and obedience on the other, within certain limits. I cannot conceive how you can hold colonies without acknowledging the obligation within certain limits to protect them.

2532. Reference has been made by witnesses who have given evidence before this Committee to the arrangements originated by your lordship for the military defence of the Australian Colonies, which were contained in various despatches between 1846 and 1850. Those despatches have been laid before this Committee, and the arrangements therein referred to are said to have rendered the defence of those Colonies more efficacious and more economical, and to have been carried out to the mutual satisfaction of Great Britain and those Colonies. Could you mention any other colonies in respect to which you think similar arrangements might now be judiciously carried out?—I am hardly sufficiently acquainted with the actual state of our different Colonies now, to be able to express any decided opinion as to the measures which should be adopted with regard to reducing the expense incurred for their defence. It is to be remarked, that for a very long series of years this country has acted on the principle of taking their defence entirely upon herself, and the introduction of a different principle requires great caution, and to be proceeded with gradually. It was carried into effect, as far as I thought it could safely and properly be so during the time I held the Seals of the Colonial Department. I really have not the means, and I do not think any one out of office can have the means, of judging whether, since that period, the same policy has been acted upon so much as it ought to have been. My impression certainly was, that a gradual course of reduction of Colonial military expenditure ought to take place.

2533. So far as you are aware, have the arrangements originated by you, in reference to the defence of the Australian Colonies, led to any dissatisfaction or disaffection in those Colonies?—Not that I am aware of; but the Australian Colonies are certainly a very peculiar case; they are infinitely less exposed to the attacks of any foreign enemy, than any other portion of the British dominions, and there are no native tribes from whom the slightest danger can be apprehended. The only doubt with regard to them which, upon hastily looking over the returns before the Committee, occurs to me is with regard to Tasmania; in the first instance Tasmania was allowed a larger proportion of assistance than other Colonies, from the fact that there were a considerable number of convicts still there, but now convicts have ceased to be sent there for a good many years, and although it is true that there are a great many persons still in Tasmania who went out originally as convicts, yet on the other hand, Tasmania has the advantage of roads and other public works of very large value indeed, which have been entirely constructed for her at the cost of the mother country by the labour of those convicts. I think the time therefore has now come, when she ought to be placed on the same footing as the other Australian Colonies. That is the only point with regard to those Colonies which occurred to me on looking over the returns which have been laid before the Committee.

2534. Considering the amount of local revenue of Tasmania now, and the fact also that its prosperity has been mainly promoted by the commissariat expenditure of late years, do you think it reasonable to expect that Tasmania should do something now towards its military defence?—I think it ought to do as much as the other Australian Colonies.

2535. Despatches have been put in before the Committee, addressed by you to Lord Elgin in 1851 with reference to the arrangements for the defence of the North American Colonies. Before you left the Colonial Office had those arrangements been carried out?—They had not, and I should infer from what I observe in the papers laid before the Committee, that they have hardly since been what I should consider, completely carried into effect; at one time the garrison of

Canada

Canada seems to have been reduced almost as much probably as it could be, namely, to a single regiment of the line and the Canadian Rifles. But I observe that since the termination of the Russian war there have been three regiments of the line stationed there, in addition to the rifles; such at least is the purport of the orders given by Lord Taunton, then Mr. Labouchere. So far as I can judge from the returns, that arrangement still continues, but I do not know upon what grounds that change was made from the previous arrangement of having only one regiment in addition to the Canadian Rifles.

2536. Sir *George Grey*.] Have you seen the return which has been printed this morning?—I have not. I now see it appears by that return that the infantry of the line in Canada, is reduced to one regiment.

2537. *Chairman*.] In your Despatch to Lord Elgin dated 14 March 1851, the substantial proposals, I think, were that the garrisons should be reduced to two or three fortified posts of importance, probably only Quebec and Kingston, and also that the barracks and other buildings should be handed over to the Canadian Parliament. I think those were the principal points of your Despatch?—Yes.

2538. Do you know whether those arrangements have been substantially carried out?—That is a point upon which the Committee can get much more accurate information from those now in office than from myself.

2539. During the time you were in office were any proposals made by the North American Colonies in reference to a scheme for a communication between New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Canada, that is to say, a communication upon the Atlantic seaboard through those Colonies, which had some reference to arrangements for the defence of the provinces?—There were some communications upon that subject, they had reference originally to the military defences, but in the last year, I think, of Lord John Russell's administration, it was thought desirable in looking at the whole subject, to consider those two questions of railway communication and military defence together; and in pursuance of that certain Despatches, going very fully into the whole subject, were written by myself, and they were laid before Parliament; so that the whole information upon that subject is before Parliament.

2540. Can you say whether that scheme was a scheme which, in your opinion, would have been an advantageous one, under any circumstances, to have carried out?—Of course it was the opinion of that Government that it was desirable, or they would not have proposed it, both to the colonists and to Parliament.

2541. It appears from returns presented to the Committee that the Colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, do not now contribute anything towards their military expense. Do you think that they might be fairly called upon to do anything towards that object?—I am not acquainted very minutely with the present circumstances of those Colonies, nor do I know the reasons upon which the Government have abstained from pressing them for any contribution to their own defence; but I am not aware of any reason, supposing their means to be sufficient, why they should not so contribute. Undoubtedly, Nova Scotia used to be rather a poor Colony, but I do not know why she should not make some contribution, at all events, to her own defence.

2542. I believe Nova Scotia has now a local revenue of about 300,000 *l*. a year. Do you think that the question of the amounts of the revenues of these Colonies is an important question in considering whether they ought or not to be called upon to contribute?—I think that the amount of revenue is one important consideration; but it is necessary to look also to various other matters, the manner in which that revenue is raised, with what degree of pressure upon the population, what other sources of revenue could be found, and various other questions connected with the social condition of the Colony, require to be looked at before a fair judgment can be formed as to what contribution should be made.

2543. Do you think that there are any Imperial grounds connected with these Colonies, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which would place them on a different footing to Canada?—I think that the fortress of Halifax stands upon different grounds from most other North American Colonies. It is rather to be looked at as a place of the same character as Malta or Gibraltar, of which the

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possession is of importance, with a view to our general naval power, in order to have stations where our fleet, in case of emergency, can refit or obtain supplies.

2544. It appears that there is a military force in Newfoundland, called, I think, the Newfoundland Defencibles, and some evidence has been given before this Committee to the effect that it is desirable to have such a force there with a view to the disputes that have arisen with France on the Fisheries question. Do you think that such a force as that is of any importance to us, looking to Imperial interests, in watching our interests there?—I cannot conceive its being of the slightest use with reference to any of the disputes on the Fisheries question.

2545. I believe that the corps called the Canada Rifles are formed upon different principles from those upon which regiments of the line are formed. Are there any reasons why, in your opinion, the Canada Rifles are a more advantageous force in Canada than regiments of the line?—I think that the original formation of the Canada Rifles was projected by myself as long ago as 1839, when I was Secretary at War, and the main object of that particular description of force in Canada was to guard against the great evil of desertion. The extremely high rate of wages in North America, and the large bounties given for enlisting into the army of the United States, offered a great temptation to our soldiers to desert, and it was thought that by composing a force of older soldiers having early claims to pension, great security would be obtained against desertion. Unfortunately, changes were made in the original plan of the composition of the corps, which I believe materially diminished its efficiency.

2546. Do you think that artillery might be, in any case, advantageously substituted for infantry in the defence of the North American Colonies?—I think that that is more a military question than a question for myself to answer. There can be no doubt that artillery is, under certain circumstances, exceedingly useful.

2547. There were, I believe, enrolled pensioners stationed in the North American Colonies during the time you were in office?—There were.

2548. Do you think that a good system?—I think that the system was a very useful one in many respects.

2549. I believe they have been sent to New Zealand?—A corps was formed there; their time of service has expired, and I am not aware whether they are now kept up.

2550. Have you formed any opinion as to the mode in which our Imperial interests can best be protected in British Columbia?—I have not looked closely at that subject; I have always thought it exceedingly impolitic to go to great expense in forming a new establishment in Columbia.

2551. Evidence has been given before this Committee as to the class of defence necessary in some of the Colonies, particularly the West Indies, for protection against domestic disturbances; and it is stated that the troops have been useful in preventing domestic disturbance, rather than in watching against foreign aggression; do you think that the measure of liability of these Colonies to contribute towards their own defences is to depend upon the wealth or poverty of the Colony, or upon other considerations principally?—I think that the case of the West Indian Colonies is a very peculiar one. In the first place, it is to be remarked that the establishment of slavery in those Colonies was the act of this country, and that, therefore, the inconveniences that still exist from that institution having existed so long in those Colonies, ought fairly to be borne in part by the mother country. Then the change not only from slavery, but from a system of monopoly to a system of free trade, was necessarily attended at first with considerable pressure upon those Colonies. That is another reason for treating them with considerable indulgence. I know that at the time I left the Colonial Office the opinions I obtained from persons best acquainted with them were, that the negroes had made comparatively little progress in civilisation, and are of so excitable a disposition, and are so easily moved, that we shall not be safe against some great outbreak, without a certain amount of military force kept there for a certain number of years. The late Sir William Reed, a person of the soundest judgment, expressed that opinion very strongly: he said he thought that the black regiments might be trusted to a considerable extent, but that it never would do to leave those Colonies without a certain amount of white force to fall back upon in case of emergency.

2552. Evidence has been given before the Committee by a gentleman who is now

now Governor of Trinidad, to the effect that recently the white troops were called out to act against the black troops; in your experience, have you ever heard of such a case as that?—I saw in the report of the evidence some account of insubordination on the part of the West Indian Regiments. I am afraid that those regiments have deteriorated since there has been a difficulty in recruiting them from Africa; the men who can be induced to enlist in the West Indies are less trustworthy than those that were obtained from slave ships; that means of supply has failed to a great extent. At the same time it is of great importance to keep up a proportion of black troops in the West Indies, because there are some posts which ought to be held, and some duties to be performed which are very deadly to white soldiers. In Jamaica, the white troops used to be kept constantly in the healthy higher grounds, ready to come down at the shortest notice; but all the active service in the unhealthy ground below was performed by black troops. Before that course was adopted the mortality in Jamaica was very dreadful; a calculation was once made by Colonel Tulloch, that a man incurred more danger from passing one year in Jamaica, than fighting, if I remember right, in three such battles as that of Waterloo.

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2553. Are you aware where the highest per centage of military mortality was in those colonies?—As far as I recollect, the highest per centage of military mortality before 1837 and 1838, when attention was so much directed to it, was on the coast of Africa, and in Jamaica.

2554. Evidence has been given before us to the effect, that if the question were put to the colony of Trinidad, for instance, whether they would contribute towards their defences, or allow the white troops to be withdrawn, they would contribute rather than have them withdrawn; but it was stated at the same time, that Trinidad, being a Colony not possessing representative institutions, the question as to what they should do, would not be the expression of the wishes of the people. How far do you think that the existence or the absence of representative institutions in a colony, affects the question, as far as the Imperial expenditure is concerned?—I think it affects it a good deal in this respect, that the existence of representative institutions generally, implies a state of society very different to that in which representative institutions are impracticable. In Trinidad, I think it would be improper that any question should be put by the Government to the Colony. I do not know any means that the Colony has of answering the question. It is the business of the home Government to form its own judgment as to what is right, and to carry its decision into effect.

2555. With Colonies not possessing representative institutions, do I understand your Lordship to say that the proper course would be for the Government simply to announce its decision?—I think so, certainly; I think they should take the responsibility, and determine what is best both for the mother country and the Colony, and act upon their own judgment.

2556. I do not know whether you have seen some recent correspondence which has passed between Sir William Denison and the Secretary of State on the subject of Colonial defences?—No, I have not seen it.

2557. In the Colonies in which there are warlike native tribes, as, for instance, New Zealand and the Cape of Good Hope, do you think that the responsibility of the British Government in respect of the defences of those Colonies is affected by the question whether they were Colonies founded upon the encouragement of the Imperial Government, or do you think that an extra liability for the purposes of defence would attach to the Imperial Government by reason of the settlers being attacked by warlike tribes?—The only two cases of Colonies of that kind, so far as I know, are those you have mentioned, and in both I think the Government, and especially the House of Commons, must be taken to have decidedly encouraged colonisation, more particularly to the Cape; because the whole scheme of forming a settlement in the most exposed part of the Cape territory was originally brought forward by the Government, was sanctioned by the House of Commons, and was recommended, particularly by those gentlemen in the House of Commons who were then the great advocates for economy. Mr. Hume was one of the principal promoters of the original settlement of Albany.

2558. Do you allude to the settlement formed in 1819?—Yes.

2559. Looking back to the Acts of the Imperial Parliament on that occasion, you think that a certain measure of responsibility must attach to the Imperial Government in reference to the defence of the Colony?—I think a great responsibility; the Imperial Government not only founded that Colony, but did so in a

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manner of all others most calculated to increase the danger, and to diminish the power of the settlers to defend themselves; it did not place them in well-formed communities able to support each other, but by giving very large grants of land, and placing single farm-houses over an extensive district, it placed persons ignorant of the state of the country in a situation in which they were utterly incapable of defending themselves, and in which, without the support of the home Government, they must have perished.

2560. Mr. *Roebuck*.] Did not the Government, at the same time, take all the responsibility in defending the Colony?—I think, decidedly, and in the case of the Cape especially; great mistakes were committed, I conceive, in the mode of establishing those Colonies, which deprived the settlers of the power of defending themselves, and that made it more imperative upon the Imperial Government to undertake that task. I may contrast the manner in which those Colonies were formed with the original settlements of North America. We all know that those were very compact, that the territory was gradually conquered, and that the settlers were consequently capable of protecting themselves; but partly from the fact of its not being a wooded country, and partly from the circumstance that the warlike character of the Kafirs was not properly understood, the home Government made very large grants of land which rendered it impossible for the settlers to form communities capable of self-defence.

2561. *Chairman*.] With regard to those territories which may since have been added to our colonial dominion, or annexed to the Colonies; for instance, in the case of the extension of our South African territories; do you think that our responsibility to defend those territories applies equally to the territory so added as to the territories which were originally formed on the first foundation of the Colony?—I think so; because I think all those added territories are the natural result of the steps which were first taken; indeed, it was hardly possible when you had once began colonisation in that part of the world upon the principles you adopted, that you could check its extension over a wider territory.

2562. Then the abandonment of the Orange River Territory was the only means, probably, by which we could get rid of the liability we had then incurred?—The question of the abandonment of the Orange River settlement is one which raises a great many other considerations, and is one of extreme difficulty. I should rather not enter upon that at present.

2563. Do you think that, generally speaking, both with regard to the Cape and other Colonies similarly situated, the presence in strength of Imperial troops has tended in the case of Colonies harassed by warlike tribes to promote or prevent wars in those Colonies?—I think that it has tended to check them, and to render them infinitely less destructive than they would have been. In the absence of Imperial troops, I am persuaded that both in New Zealand and at the Cape a war of extermination would be carried on by the Europeans and the native races against each other; it would, probably, end ultimately in the destruction of the native races, because the civilised man would be the more powerful in the end, but a frightful amount of suffering to both parties would be endured in the mean time, and I do not think that, as a Christian nation, we should be justified in incurring the responsibility of allowing such things to take place.

2564. Mr. Owen, who went out as assistant Commissioner, in the first instance, with Major Hogg, and was afterwards with Sir George Clarke in 1851, has given evidence before this Committee. He was asked this question, "You think that the present system has led to more bloodshed than the old commands system?" He says, "Certainly." The next question is, "So that if the old commands system was put down, upon principles of philanthropy, do you think that that was a mistake?" and his answer is "Certainly." I think I understand you to differ from Mr. Owen in that?—Mr. Owen's opinion in that examination is not given with a clearness which would enable me distinctly to say, whether I differ with him or not; and I think it is not convenient that I should give an opinion with respect to Mr. Owen's views, which I have not heard from himself, and upon which I have not had an opportunity of entering into an explanation with him. I think, if I were discussing the matter with Mr. Owen, I should find probably very little difference of opinion between him and myself upon it.

2565. Sir John Burgoyne has given evidence to the effect, that the very large expenditure going on for the fortification of the Mauritius ought to be, and must be

be largely increased. Will you favour the Committee with your opinion upon the subject?—I totally disapprove of the whole policy of large expenditure upon fortifications in the Colonies. The experience we have had of the past seems to me to lead to the conclusion, that almost the whole of the money we have spent upon Colonial fortifications has been so much absolutely wasted; and that with respect to some of those fortifications, erected at great expense, the wisest thing we could now do would be to blow them up again.

2566. Mr. *Roebuck*.] Would you include Quebec amongst that number?—No, I should not; I think Quebec is a useful fortress, and also Halifax; but I think, that multiplying fortifications which, if sufficiently garrisoned, shut up men who are far more wanted elsewhere, and which, if not properly manned, may be taken and held against ourselves, is the most impolitic measure we can have recourse to.

2567. Lord *Stanley*.] As I understand, you are in favour of concentrating a colonial garrison at one important place, and not scattering them widely?—Quite so; and with regard to the Mauritius, I understood formerly, that all that was intended was to have a small citadel which a small garrison might hold for a short time until relieved, never contemplating that we could defend the Mauritius for any length of time if we were not in possession of the dominion of the sea. To spend money upon the Mauritius so as to be able to defend it against an enemy superior to us upon the sea, seems to me a great waste of money. I may also observe upon that point, that a very great change has taken place of late years in the value of these colonial fortifications. Sir John Burgoyne says, and says very truly, that the capture of the Mauritius in the last war was an object of great importance to us, because it was used as a refuge for privateers which inflicted infinite damage upon our trade, and that the value of the prizes captured by ships sailing from the Mauritius during the early part of the revolutionary war was very large indeed. If we were to contemplate another war of that kind, it would no doubt be of great importance to prevent a harbour so well placed as the Mauritius for intercepting our commerce, from falling into the hands of an enemy. But circumstances have much changed: in the first place, by the agreement of all European nations, privateering has entirely been done away with; and not only is privateering done away with, but the point is now conceded that the neutral flag should protect all the property which it covers; and the consequence of that is, the moment war breaks out the flags of the belligerent powers will be almost abolished from the sea, and all trade will be carried on under neutral flags. We cannot expect that we shall have, as in olden times, enormous convoys of British merchantmen sailing at an immense expense under the protection of powerful fleets, when by the recent alteration in the law of nations, the same cargoes may be brought in Bremen or other neutral ships at peace charges. We must be prepared when another war takes place, to see the whole commerce of the country carried on under a neutral flag, and therefore it is not of the same importance as it was formerly, to take possession of every place which can be a retreat for privateers, and hold it against an enemy.

2568. *Chairman*.] You are doubtless aware that there have been projects for considerable works at the Bahamas?—I cannot myself understand the object of spending a single shilling on the Bahamas; I think it desirable to have one station in those seas where a fleet can obtain supplies, and be refitted after an action; but, with the possession of Bermuda, I cannot understand what we want with another station; and, upon the principle of not dividing your establishments, I should deprecate in the strongest manner a separate establishment at the Bahamas.

2569. Lord *Stanley*.] With regard to the garrisons at present maintained in the West Indies, I see by the last returns that the number of troops rather exceeds 4,000, of which 2,400 are maintained in the Windward and Leeward Islands; do you think that that number, or anything like that number of troops is required at present for the maintenance of internal tranquillity?—It seems to me a very large number; but, without considering the information which has been now obtained by the Government, and upon which they have come to the decision that that force is necessary, I should be sorry to express an opinion. I can only say that I think the force in the West Indies should be reduced to the minimum found to be sufficient, and that as much as possible should be done by naval force for the defence of those Colonies, by the frequent visits of ships of war to the different islands.

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2570. I suppose we may take it, as matter of general information, that there is no wide-spread disaffection and no insurrectionary movement in those Colonies?—Certainly. I think the only thing to be feared is some temporary excitement, which might lead to acts of violence which there ought to be means of suppressing.

2571. You think that there may occasionally be a riot amongst the black population?—Yes; and it is possible that the feeling of colour might break out again of animosity between them and the white settlers; it is possible, but I think that every year it becomes less likely.

2572. The Colonies set down in the return as the Windward and Leeward Colonies, that is the West Indies, excluding Jamaica, Honduras, and the Bahamas, are at the distance I think, of not more than four to five days' steam at the utmost?—I think not.

2573. Within that period of time, nearly the whole of the garrison of 2,400 men would be available at any spot?—I should think so; it is very unlikely that there would be any disturbance which a single company would not be able to deal with.

2574. Mr. *Fortescue*.] Provided you have the proper means of conveyance?—Yes.

2575. Sir *George Grey*.] Are you aware that of the force of 2,400, only 1,224 are infantry of the line, 120 artillery, and the rest consist of the Colonial Corps?—I was not aware of that.

2576. Lord *Stanley*.] With regard to the black troops quartered in the West Indies, are they maintained to your knowledge at the expense of the Imperial Government or of the Colony?—They are just as much Imperial troops as the white troops.

2577. With regard to the Cape of Good Hope, I observe that the present force maintained there, including Natal, is 4,800; do you think that that force is capable of further reduction?—I should think not; so far as I can judge of the corps, I should say that that is a very small force to keep there, and I think it would be very bad policy, and extremely bad economy, to reduce that force. It seems to me that at the Cape the object ought to be to maintain so commanding a force that no insurrection is likely to take place until measures of civilisation of the Kafirs can have time to work. I believe that if the plans of Sir George Grey, acted upon formerly in New Zealand, and which he is now acting upon, as I understand, at the Cape, are steadily pursued, we may, in the course of a very few years, see a great improvement in the Kafir population, and they may be, to a very great extent, civilized; and therefore the danger may become very much less. But whilst that process is going on, it would be exceedingly impolitic not to have so commanding a force there as to convince every Kafir chief of the absolute madness of any attempt to resist British authority. I think there is this further advantage in keeping a force at the Cape, that it is a station peculiarly well adapted for our troops to be maintained at in readiness for any emergency which may arise in any part of the world; since we have such a command of steam power, we could at any time send to the Cape and bring troops from thence to India or England in three months. In the meantime, it is a perfectly healthy station for troops; it is a station valuable for discipline, because there are duties to be performed by the troops which are useful in forming them, and in preparing them for war; and therefore I cannot put down as Colonial expenditure the whole cost of the force maintained at the Cape. We must have, somewhere, a considerable reserve of regular troops beyond those actually wanted for service during peace, and I think that some of the troops kept for this purpose are far better placed at the Cape, and are far more useful than they would be in country quarters in England or in Ireland.

2578. *Chairman*.] From the returns which have been put in, it appears that the Cape maintains only a police force, consisting of 400 men, as against a colonial expenditure of rather more than half a million. Do you think that the Colony might be called upon to do more for its own defence than it does now?—There, again, I do not think it is good policy to make undue pressure upon the resources of the Colony. The Cape is in a state of rapid improvement; the production of wool is increasing there very fast; it has natural advantages for various descriptions of products, and great efforts are making by the colonists at this moment to develop those resources, and improve the Colony. They are making railways; they are going to make a breakwater in Table Bay, and various

various other works of that kind are projected, and are only kept back by the difficulty of finding capital for carrying them on. I think it is much wiser for this country, with the view to the ultimate reduction of expense, not to press unduly upon the Cape Colony at the present moment, but to give them every facility for pursuing the policy on which they are entering, so that the Colony may in the course of a few years become so rich and prosperous, as to stand in little need of our assistance. It would be very bad policy to check the progress which is now making, for the sake of a few thousand pounds more or less of direct contribution to the military expenditure; especially because, as I have said before, I cannot regard the whole of that expenditure as incurred for colonial purposes. I regard the force that is kept there as a reserve force for the general purposes of the empire, stationed at a point the most convenient for keeping such a reserve with a view to any emergency, either of an Indian or an European war. Perhaps I ought to guard this opinion by qualifying it in one respect. I do not think that the large expenditure now incurred at the Cape for military purposes ought to continue, unless the Government retain complete authority in its own hands, of regulating the policy which is to be pursued towards the native tribes. It seems to me that it is the greatest blunder that can be committed that you should on the one hand tell the colonists that you will be responsible for the cost of war, and take upon yourselves the burthen of defending them, and that on the other hand they should have the power of regulating the policy which may make a war necessary or unnecessary. We have committed a fatal mistake in that respect in New Zealand, which I hope will not be repeated at the Cape.

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2579. Do you think that we could carry further at the Cape the policy of recruiting our forces locally from Hottentots and other native levies?—I think not; I think that since the desertion to the enemy of the Hottentot Mounted Rifles in the Kafir war in 1851, it would be inexpedient to trust, to any great extent, to coloured levies at present. I am very favourable to the principle of having, within certain limits, coloured troops. I think that military discipline is a powerful instrument of civilization with regard to native tribes, but at the same time the recollection of that unfortunate event is still so fresh in the minds of the Cape population that I should be apprehensive of any very large extension of coloured levies; at all events, unless there is a considerable white force kept up at the same time.

2580. Evidence has been given as to the existence of a force called Currie's Police, which is a force maintained by the Colony; have you any knowledge as to the efficiency or otherwise of that force?—I know only what I have heard from the evidence. I have no doubt that it is absolutely necessary to have a local force; English soldiers would not have the necessary knowledge of the country.

2581. Lord *Stanley.*] In the event of large contributions towards their own defences being required from the Colonies at the Cape or New Zealand, do you think it better that those contributions should be in the form of local troops and local militia or volunteers, or any arrangement of that kind, or that they should pay a certain pecuniary contribution towards the maintenance of the Imperial troops?—I think that must depend a good deal upon the circumstances of the Colony; it very frequently is extremely unadvisable to require them to do it by local troops raised under their control, because labour is so excessively valuable in those colonies that an equal force provided by the Colony may probably cost much more than a force sent from England, including the expense of transport.

2582. Taking the case of another Colony, do you see any reason why, in Ceylon, which is geographically almost a part of India, the same rule should not apply as in India, that a dependency shall contribute the whole funds required for its defence?—I think it very desirable that Ceylon should, as soon as possible, pay the whole of its expenses, but in Ceylon they have had great difficulties to contend with. You are aware that in 1846 and 1847 Ceylon was in great distress; many of the coffee planters were ruined, and the change of our commercial policy affected Ceylon, in common with many of our other Colonies, very seriously. It has got over that now, and I believe it is much more prosperous in consequence of the change than it would have been without it; but still I think that we should not too hastily adopt the principle of requiring complete payment of her military expenses; whenever she can do it, she ought to do it.

2583. I do not ask whether we ought to adopt the rule this year or next year;

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year; but, looking at Ceylon as a permanent portion of the British empire, I ask whether that island must not and ought not to be ultimately put upon the same footing as India?—I see no reason why it should not, but we can only make these changes gradually and cautiously.

2584. Sir *George Grey.*] Is it the fact that any particular portion of a presidency is required to pay the whole cost of its defence?—I think that Ceylon would object to be put under the same system as India, and have a heavy land tax imposed upon it.

2585. Is not the whole revenue of India liable for the military force of India?—Yes.

2586. And local payment is not the principle adopted?—Certainly not; but Ceylon, I think, must be kept distinct from India; at least, it would be very inconvenient, when they have been maintained upon such different principles so many years, to unite them together now.

2587. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Should you be inclined to say that such small communities as Ceylon, the West India Islands, or Mauritius, are, in the nature of things, dependencies of a power upon which they will depend, and that they can hardly be called upon to perform all the duties of nations?—To a certain extent, I think, that is true, but I do not see anything in Ceylon to prevent its ultimately paying its own military expenses.

2588. Is there not this difference between Ceylon and the colonies possessing representative institutions, that in the case of Ceylon the Home Government, by its influence over the council, can, in fact, obtain such contribution as she may think right to ask, whereas, in the case of a colony with representative government, it becomes necessary for the Home Government to enter into negotiations for the purpose of obtaining the consent of the colonial government?—I do not think that the Government ought ever to enter into what would strictly be called negotiation; it ought to come to a determination as to what proportion the colony ought to contribute, and make that determination known to the colony. If the colony possesses representative institutions, it must be considered capable of judging for itself how far it could be without that limited protection, if withdrawn; but in the case of Ceylon, no judgment of that kind can be expected from the colony, and the question ought never to be put to it.

2589. In the case of Ceylon, England can obtain the contribution; but to a representative institution, she can only say, "We allot you such a number of troops and no more, and any others you require you must pay for"?—Yes.

2590. It comes to that, does it not?—Very much so, I think.

2591. Mr. *Marsh.*] I believe there is a large fleet generally at the naval station at Trincomalee?—I think that the station there is not much used.

2592. The fleet there would be available for the protection of the Indian commerce?—For the protection of the whole commerce of the empire.

2593. That is paid for by the Home Government?—I should think so; I have not referred to the Navy Estimates. I believe that the establishment at Trincomalee is a very small one.

2594. In your opinion, it is better to keep one garrison in the West Indies than to have a number of small ones; do you not think that a garrison of marines is preferable to one of common soldiers?—I do not see any advantage in that.

2595. Do you think that as many marines would be necessary to perform the duties which common infantry would perform?—I think there is a great objection to multiplying too much the demands upon our marines; it is not a force which is capable of indefinite extension, and much inconvenience might arise therefore from multiplying demands upon them.

2596. With reference to the Cape being a central station for Queen's troops, do you know whether, at the time of the Indian Mutiny, many troops were removed from the Cape?—I believe a considerable number.

2597. As regards the necessity for protecting our commerce, might not a difficulty in some cases be experienced in defining what is strictly a garrison for the protection of our commerce, and what is necessary only for the protection of a Colony, as, for instance, in the case of Halifax; that station protects Nova Scotia, and is also a great naval station for the protection of our commerce generally. Would not that remark apply to other stations?—Undoubtedly; but those are cases which the Government must form its own judgment upon after consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case.

2598. In

2598. In such a case it would be fair that the Home Government should pay a portion of the expenses?—Yes, I think so.

2599. With reference to your Lordship's statement that the proportion to be paid by the Colony towards the military expenditure would depend upon the revenue, allow me to ask whether it must not also depend upon the taxation of the Colony; one Colony might have a large revenue and another a small one, and yet the Colony with a large revenue might be more heavily taxed than the other?—I have already said, that in judging of the ability of a Colony to contribute towards its own defences, you must consider, not merely the amount of its revenue, but the sources of that revenue, the general wealth or poverty of the inhabitants, and the demands also upon their resources in other ways.

2600. Mr. *Adderley.*] You say that you consider the general colonial relations to imply protection on the one side, and obedience on the other. Is that more so with regard to a Colony than between the Government and subjects at home?—The fact of belonging to one empire implies that all the subjects of that empire owe obedience to the Imperial authority, and have a right to look to the Imperial authority for protection; in an extended empire like this, where portions of that empire are at a great distance from the seat of Government, it is convenient, or rather it it is absolutely necessary that, in some respects, the management of local affairs should be transferred to local authorities, and that at the same time a portion of the duty of self-protection should be transferred.

2601. Is there anything in that colonial relation to exempt colonial subjects from furnishing men and money for their own defences?—Nothing at all.

2602. When you said that you had carried out the principle, which you laid down in your despatch with regard to Australia, as far as it could be safely carried out, whilst you were Colonial Secretary, allow me to ask, did you not in 1851 express your opinion to Lord Elgin that the same principle should be carout in Canada?—I did; and to a certain extent it was.

2603. Your Lordship has referred to the North American colonies of the last century; was it not the principle of the defence of those colonies, as contrasted with the principle of defence of our present colonies, that those colonies undertook the primary responsibility of their own defence, England contributing; whereas, now England undertakes the primary responsibility and calls upon the colony to contribute?—I do not know whether that is quite a correct way of describing it.

2604. Until the Seven Years' War took place, was not the only way in which England contributed to the defence of the colonies by refunding to them part of the expense they had incurred?—At that time the whole state of the world was so different to what it is now, that you can hardly draw any comparison between the two; the colonies were not attacked upon their own ground by the great armies of civilized powers; it was not till later that attacks of that kind could be made upon them; their principal danger was from Indian tribes or from irregular forces of the French monarchy, whilst the regular armies of France and England were in Europe, the colonial forces of both powers were kept in America to a great extent.

2605. Your Lordship is aware that Canada was entirely defended by regular troops, whilst the English colonists were fighting with the militia?—I think that if you look at the number of French troops, you will find that they were very small indeed; we had a few regular troops in New York, I believe, and in some other places, I think, but they were very few.

2606. Is it your Lordship's impression that the Indians with whom those colonies had to fight were less formidable than the Maories in New Zealand or the Kafirs in South Africa?—Infinitely less; that comparison between the Indians of North America and the Maories of New Zealand has been well stated by Sir George Grey; he points out that the Maories have considerable skill in war; many of their fortifications could not be better designed by our own officers, and they have shown great power in adapting their measures to the resources of the country. Nothing is more striking in the history of the wars of North America, on the part of the Indians, than the want of any skill beyond that of each man fighting for himself. There was nothing like combined exertion, and nothing like fortifications which we had any difficulty in taking.

2607. Your Lordship will recollect the large number of Indians trained and drilled by French officers?—That is a different case altogether.

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2608. In a former answer, your Lordship referred to the first conflicts with the Indians in the early part of the 18th century?—I was speaking of the conflicts with the Indians on the part of the settlers. When the attacks were directed by the French, it was another case; but even then the Indians were very inferior to the Maories; and that is the opinion of Sir George Grey, who has studied the question.

2609. The evidence of Mr. Owen was to the effect that the natives of South Africa were not formidable until they were trained by conflicts with English troops?—That is one of the great misfortunes of conflicts with these uncivilized tribes; every war in which we are engaged teaches them something more, and that is one great argument for maintaining a considerable force there to prevent the outbreak of a war. When a rebellion breaks out which you are not strong enough to put down at once they soon acquire in the struggle more knowledge of war, and thus it will take a much larger force to suppress an insurrection, which had been allowed to establish itself, than would have sufficed to prevent its taking place.

2610. Your Lordship has expressed the opinion that Nova Scotia could not be called upon to maintain its own defences on account of its poverty. Is your Lordship aware that the population and wealth of Nova Scotia alone is at least double the population and wealth of the New England Colonies when they took Louisburg and Cape Breton?—I have not made the comparison; but, no doubt, Nova Scotia is a colony which, as compared with others, has not such great natural resources; until within the last few years those resources have not been so much developed.

2611. When you say that Halifax is of the same character as Malta and Gibraltar, do you mean that, supposing Bermuda was rendered as nearly as possible impregnable, and we could not afford to render both Bermuda and Halifax impregnable, that Bermuda, so fortified, would render unnecessary the maintenance of Halifax?—I think, considering what a fine harbour Halifax is, it would be extremely impolitic not to have that so well defended as to be an available refuge for a fleet in time of danger.

2612. Your Lordship has expressed the opinion, that the first settlement of New Zealand, and of Albany, entailed upon the Government the liability of defending those places; did not some of the Colonies, founded in the last century by the Government, defend themselves; for instance, South Carolina?—No doubt; but I think the circumstances were different altogether.

2613. Would not the same reasons which you give for the liability of the Imperial Government to defend the new Colonies have applied in the case of South Carolina?—I consider that they had a great claim upon the mother country, but the mother country was not anything like so powerful as it is now, and could not make the exertions which it can now; and the dangers to the Colonies were not so great in some respects; they had not such formidable natives to deal with.

2914. Had not the Colonies this disadvantage, that there was no system of cheap emigration from England, nor had they such a population in England to draw from, and, therefore, that their resources were very inferior to those of the Colonies of the present day?—That might be the case.

2615. Your Lordship has expressed your opinion that it is desirable to concentrate our troops, to a certain extent, in the Colonies; would you extend that opinion, so far as to say it would be better to keep the troops altogether at home, and send them out to defend any particular parts in time of war?—I do not think that, in any case, the whole of our reserve of troops should be quartered at home. As I have already stated, I think that the Cape has certain peculiar advantages for maintaining a considerable portion of our reserve.

2616. We know that your Lordship considers the Cape a special case; but with reference to the North American Colonies and the West Indies, and other Colonies, do you think it better to keep the troops at home, and send them to those places when they are wanted than to scatter garrisons in time of peace through the Colonies upon the chance of their being wanted in time of war?—As I understand, the policy acted upon with Colonies of that kind is to maintain, not a force sufficient to protect them in time of war, but only to prevent disturbances in time of peace.

2617. In North America, I believe, there are now only sufficient troops to maintain the principal garrison?—If you have fortifications at Kingston, Quebec, and

and Halifax, there must be garrisons to take care of them, and the troops cost very little more there than they would at home.

2618. Does your Lordship look at the garrisons of Quebec and Kingston as capable of holding those places?—Not for any length of time unless relieved; but this holds good of all fortifications.

2619. Then in what sense does your Lordship look upon them as occupying those garrisons in time of peace?—For the mere protection of the works; it is absolutely necessary to have some sentries to prevent people doing damage to the fortifications.

2620. Do you think that the colonists could not find a sufficient number of men for that purpose?—The Imperial Government must, I conceive, keep up a certain amount of regular army, and I think that a portion of that army is better quartered in those fortifications than at home.

2621. Does not your Lordship think that garrisons being placed at those stations by England deters the colonists from providing the garrisons themselves?—I see no appearance of that; Canada did make considerable efforts in raising and disciplining a militia, and Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have hitherto declined doing so, I believe, for the simple reason that they apprehend no danger at present.

2622. You will remember that in 1812, when the war took place, and in 1840, the rebellion, although Canada raised militia, she did not pay one farthing towards raising or organising those troops?—I believe that the system followed during the great war from 1793 to 1815 was a very extravagant one; we were borrowing large sums of money every year, and we did not seem to care how much was spent. But it is further to be remembered that the danger of Canada, during that war with the United States, was entirely brought upon her by our most impolitic conduct towards the United States.

2623. Does your Lordship see any reason why, during the Seven Years' War, Massachusetts raised 25,000 men, and paid them, and that, in 1812, Canada should allow us to raise and pay every soldier engaged in that war?—I think that the difference was, that in the one case Massachusetts felt that the quarrel was a great deal her own, and that, in 1812, Canada justly felt that that was a quarrel wantonly provoked by this country, and that Canada was only suffering from her connexion with us.

2624. Your Lordship thinks, that where the war is created by our Colonial relations, the Colony ought to bear the expense of the war?—I would rather not lay down any abstract rules beforehand; when the case arises, we must act according to the various circumstances that exist.

2625. We have the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne, that the fortification of our Colonies is in its very commencement. Does your Lordship contemplate the possibility of inducing the House of Commons to undertake the enormous expense of such fortifications?—The House of Commons has shown so very lavish a disposition, in respect of fortifications, that it is impossible for me to conjecture to what degree of extravagance in this line it may be induced to agree.

2626. Why do you think that there will be a change in the system of warfare?—In the last century, the possession of Colonies, of which the trade was to be monopolized by the mother country, was believed to be a source of wealth to a nation. Hence, to wrest from each other their colonial possessions was regarded by European nations as an object of great importance; and it was considered almost a sufficient object for a war, to capture one or two sugar Colonies. But it is now generally understood that monopolizing the trade of Colonies is contrary to the true interest of both parties, and that nothing, therefore, is gained by conquering Colonies for this purpose. Since the great war of the French Revolution, quite a system of war has also been adopted; those wars, and the military genius of Napoleon, taught all nations that, in a struggle of that kind, instead of wasting your strength in attacking the outlying distant possessions of your enemy, your efforts should be directed to the main seat of its power. The consequence is, that future wars will probably be shorter and much more decisive, and that the whole struggle will be at home, or in the immediate vicinity.

2627. Your Lordship has expressed an opinion, to the effect that the Cape is a good depôt for troops. When the Indian mutiny broke out there was a force

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at the Cape amounting, I believe, to nearly 13,000 English troops. Do you recollect whether they were readily sent forward to the assistance of the Government in India?—I read the correspondence at the time, and my impression was, that Sir George Grey had made great efforts to send all the troops he could spare, and that he did send a very large number.

2628. *Chairman.*] I understood you to say, that in modern warfare the danger would rather lie at home, of hostile aggression?—I think so.

2629. By the last returns we have, I see that, exclusive of the troops employed in the China war, there are 44,581 in our dependencies, and that the Indian Army Commission has recommended that there should be not less than 70,000 in India. Do you think that that large drain upon our resources is attended with some danger?—I have no doubt that the demand for such a large British force in India is a serious drain upon our resources, but I do not see how it is to be avoided whilst we maintain our Indian Empire.

2630. Mr. *Adderley.*] Your Lordship has expressed the opinion that a large force should be maintained at the Cape, from fear of brutal warfare. I have made an extract from Mr. Montgomery Martin's account of the proceedings of the French troops in the wars between Canada and the Indians, in which I find that the French reinforcements sent from Europe, in February 1690, massacred the Indians, that they cut up the prisoners in pieces and made soups for the Indian allies who accompanied them. Does your Lordship anticipate that Dutch or British settlers in any part of the world could be guilty of any atrocities such as those?—That is a question which I cannot answer. I do not think that it in the least applies to the principle I have endeavoured to lay down. In those days a very different opinion was entertained with regard to what are the rights and claims of humanity, and I am sure that no British Government would now permit cruelties to be practised by British troops towards native tribes, and that no British officer would allow it. On the other hand, if you leave settlers to carry on a war of that kind, they suffer so much, and their passions get so excited, that they adopt the principle of shooting a black man as they would shoot a wolf. We have seen too much of that in Australia, where there is very little to fear from native tribes; there have been dreadful atrocities there, even to the extent of poisoning a whole tribe.

2631. There would be the danger of such atrocities on the part of settlers in the immediate neighbourhood of the natives; but would there be any such danger if the colonists formed a force of their own?—It is utterly impossible for the colonists to collect a regular organised force. I believe that a force of the kind which they could form, would be driven to adopt the system of indiscriminate destruction. The natives would be much less afraid of them, and that would lead to violence which would produce retaliation; and we see that when it is left to a struggle between settlers and natives, it is a process of extermination, by the settlers, of the natives. That has been the practice in the settlements of North America, and it is now going on in California; and where there is not some military authority to prevent it, it will always be the case.

2632. How can you account for the Dutch Islands, Java, and Sumatra, maintaining peace and tranquillity at their own expense, and yet sending in a surplus of tribute to the Dutch Government, the Spanish Settlements doing the same, and yet that there should not be a single settlement of England able even to find men or money for its internal defences?—In the first place, I should like to ascertain whether the fact is so, for I do not believe it; it appears on the face of the return, but that return does not include a great many things. With regard to the Dutch Colonies, I see that they put down a large revenue derived by Holland; but they do not put down the enormous indirect payment of Holland to those Colonies, to create that revenue by maintaining a commercial monoply in favour of a particular company, which practically levies an immense tax upon Holland. If you put that on the other side, which you ought to do, it would very much alter the balance of the account.

2633. Mr. *Fortescue.*] With regard to the Dutch Colonies, I find in the Dutch Budget for 1858, that out of a total of Colonial receipts, of 9,800,000*l.* 5,300,000*l.* come under the head of "Profit of Sale of Colonial Produce." Does not that strongly confirm the opinion you gave just now, that the apparent tribute paid by Java to the mother country is probably not revenue, but profit derived from what is practically

practically the great commercial monoply in the hands of the Government?—Yes, and I think that Holland probably loses far more by that monoply than she gains by the apparent surplus; and I believe, also, that Spain loses infinitely more than she gains by her apparent tribute.

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2634. With respect to the Cape, do you say that the introduction of responsible government would make a difference in the responsibility as to the cost of their military defences, which ought to rest upon the Colony?—I think it would make a very great difference; it appears to me, that in this, as in all other cases, responsibility and power should go together. If we are to take the burden of war, we should have power so to direct policy that war may not be necessary. We have a striking example of that in New Zealand at this moment. I am convinced that this calamitous war in New Zealand arose from a mistake that was committed in altering the form of Government in that Colony, when we remained responsible for maintaining peace between the settlers and the natives. It is quite clear, from all Sir George Grey's despatches, that the natives were willing to submit to what they considered the impartial government of the Queen; but they felt that the revenue was derived, in a very large proportion, from them, and that it was unjust that they should be governed by the settlers, and the introduction of what was called responsible Government in 1854 in New Zealand, produced a feeling of general discontent among them. It is impossible to read the papers without seeing that what was called the native king movement arose from that, because when they were under the Imperial authority of the Governor, acting with permanent civil servants, the interests of the natives were considered quite as much as those of the settlers in all the measures of the Executive Government; but the moment you altered that, and the Governor was practically deprived of all authority, and the settlers became superior in the management of the executive and administrative affairs, the natives immediately perceived the consequence of that in the daily management of the Government. In cases of patronage, and various things of that kind, instances have come under my own attention, having been casually brought before me, in which they felt themselves much aggrieved by the conduct of the settlers; and the consequence of that was a rooted dislike to the state of things that then prevailed, and a determination to check it, and an attempt to form some kind of native authority to govern the parts of the island which were not occupied by British settlers. It has been perfectly clear, for several years back, that that state of things must lead ultimately to a collision. I have never, for the last five years, doubted that a New Zealand war was impending, and it was brought on by circumstances in which it is difficult to say upon which side the right may be; I think it is on the side of the settlers, but that is perfectly immaterial; it is quite clear that the dispute with respect to the purchase of land was only the occasion which led to the war breaking out, and was not the original cause of it. I do not think it wise or right, on the part of this country, to undertake to bear the enormous expense and burden of a New Zealand war, and to leave to the Colony the uncontrolled power of governing that country in such a manner as to produce collision with the natives; and I am sorry to learn that, in consequence of that war, no change has been made.

2635. You are aware that whilst responsible government has been established in New Zealand, and the whole revenue of the Colony, including the produce of the sale of waste lands, is placed at the disposal of the Colonial Parliament, that, nevertheless, the duty of purchasing land from the natives has been retained in the hands of the governor, and that the whole subject of the native policy has also been retained in the governor's hands. Do you think that it is practically possible to withdraw the subject of native policy from the control of the Colonial Parliament and the responsible minister?—I think not, and I think that the measure proposed last year in Parliament for creating a sort of native council would have led to still greater confusion than now exists. The whole subject of the natives is so indissolubly intertwined with the general administration of the Colony, and the interests of the two races meet in so many points, that the whole government must be arranged with a view to an impartial management of affairs with reference to both races; and the mistake, in my opinion was, not that there was not sufficient responsibility, but that in a state of society in which a greater amount of authority was required on the part of the Home Government, that system of responsible government was allowed to

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be established which deprived the Government at home of the authority which it ought to have exercised.

2636. Are you aware that the colonists take a view of the responsibility of the governor and of the Home Government, with respect to the native war, entirely opposite to that which you have stated?—I think it very possible, and I think it is perfectly clear that the present system is a bad one. You cannot divide the government; you must have one government for both races, and for the whole affairs of the Colony. I think, so long as the colonists expect us to have the burden of defending them, the Crown ought to have, through its officers, such an amount of authority as will insure the executive business of the Colony being transacted in such a manner as to guard against wars. I am confirmed in this, by observing that up to 1854 all the annual reports describe the best feeling existing among the natives with perfect confidence towards the Government, and the rapid progress of civilization; but that from the moment what is called responsible government came into operation, the native king movement arose out of that dissatisfaction which led to the present state of things.

2637. *Chairman.*] Your Lordship's view is, that responsibility should follow the power?—Certainly.

2638. And that if the Government of New Zealand claims to itself the power of dealing with this matter a corresponding degree of responsibility should follow?—They should not look for British troops to support a policy which they direct.

2639. Mr. *Fortescue.*] In the present state of things, supposing it to be impossible to retrace those steps that have been taken, should you be in favour of maintaining that small degree of Imperial power over native policy which is retained in the governor's hands, or would you be inclined to go farther and to hand over the entire control of native affairs to the colonial authorities, at the same time requiring them to contribute more largely than they have hitherto done, to the cost of hostilities which had grown out of their policy?—It is in vain to require them to contribute; I am persuaded that it is out of their power to contribute largely to the expenses. Any change of the kind you contemplate, it is impossible to give an opinion upon.

2640. Supposing it is practically impossible to obtain from New Zealand, in the present stage of its existence, any considerable contribution towards the cost of its defences, would you be inclined to maintain, and if possible, increase and strengthen, the degree of power over native policy, which the Imperial Government has reserved to itself?—Not only over the native policy, but over the general policy of the government of the island.

Lunæ, 13° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Mills.	Mr. Ellice.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Fortescue.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Marsh.
Mr. Baxter.	General Peel.
Mr. Childers.	Lord Stanley.
Lord Robert Cecil.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Sir *Stuart Donaldson*, called in; and Examined.

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2641. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you were for many years a Member of the Legislature of New South Wales?—Upwards of 11 years.

2642. During a part of that time, I think, you held high office?—I held the office of Colonial Secretary in the first responsible Ministry, and subsequently I was Colonial Treasurer and Vice-President of the Executive Council.

2643. Were you in office at Sydney at the time that Sir William Denison's despatch of 1857, proposing contributions by that Colony towards the cost of the defences, arrived?—I was then Colonial Treasurer, and member of the Ministry.

2644. At that time, what was the actual footing upon which the Colony was in regard to payments of its defences?—Prior to 1856, I think, the whole of the military expenditure had been borne by the mother country, and, I think, about 1855 or 1856, it was suggested from home, and, in fact, was resolved by the home Government, that the Colony of New South Wales, and, I believe, Victoria also, should only be allowed two companies for the entire defence of the Colony, to be paid for by the home Government; and it was suggested in despatches that the Colony must bear any further expense for military defence if they chose to have more than two companies. Sir William Denison, then Governor General, laid before his Executive Council, of which I was a member, a proposal to this effect, that the expense for the military protection of the Colony, so far as the employment of land forces was concerned, should be borne, one moiety by the home Government and one moiety by the Colony, the Colony reserving, I think I am correct in saying, the right to name the amount of military forces they require. That was the general purport of the despatch. That, I believe, was acceded to by the home Government, and carried into effect. At the same time, it was proposed by the Executive Government of New South Wales that the cost of erecting and arming forts to be built for the defence of Sydney harbour should be borne by the Colony, and that a company of artillery should be sent to the Colony, and paid entirely at the expense of the Colony. That we thought a very liberal proposal at the time, and it was acceded to; the company of artillery arrived in due course, and within my recollection, at the time I was in the Government, a sum exceeding 65,000 *l.* was disbursed by the Colony upon the forts, and a considerable further sum was in course of disbursement for the armament of those forts.

2645. The whole of the cost of the fortifications created for the defence of Sydney Harbour have been defrayed by the Colony?—The whole.

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2646. And the Colony has also contributed one-half of the pay to the crews of the men-of-war which arrived in the ports of New South Wales?—Not exactly; a colonial allowance was made by the Government of New South Wales, while the ships were in harbour, and I think the same was done in Victoria.

2647. A good deal of evidence has been given with regard to that extra pay. Can you tell us how that originated in the Australian Colonies?—It originated shortly after the gold discoveries in 1852; an increase of pay was given to all the civil servants of the government and as an example of that, I may mention that the salary of the Governor General was raised from 5,000 *l.* to 7,000 *l.* a year; there was a general increase in the salary of the civil servants of 25 to 50 per cent., and at that time it was suggested that as the soldiers received a colonial allowance, it seemed unjust that the Navy should not receive some additional pay, partly on account of the enormous expense to which every one was put by the increase in the value of food, and partly to equalise the colonial allowances between the Army and the Navy.

2648. Can you inform the Committee whether the Colony of Victoria adopted the same practice in regard to the system for payment of its defences as the Colony of New South Wales?—I believe very much the same; they paid for the erection of their fortifications, and also one-half of the military pay, and I believe the whole of the staff. The staff was removed, I believe, in 1854 from New South Wales to Victoria, and Victoria took upon itself the payment of the whole of the staff.

2649. Apart from any disputes or questions which may have arisen in consequence of the removal of troops, and the pay of those troops during the time they were removed to other Colonies, with respect to which some evidence has been given before this Committee, do you consider that the arrangement generally has been attended with satisfactory results to the Colony?—I think so.

2650. You do not think that it has produced any feeling of disaffection or alienation?—I am sure it has not; the only difference of opinion which has arisen since that arrangement was made, was by the extreme democratic party advocating the withdrawal of the troops altogether.

2651. No disaffection has arisen so far as the pecuniary arrangements have gone?—I believe not; it was in the power of the Legislature to have recalled that arrangement if they had chosen, but they have not recalled it; for one year I believe there was a refusal to vote the Naval Estimates, because it was thought that the service done to the colony of New South Wales by the Navy was very small; but the sum has since been re-voted, I believe.

2652. Do you think that the Australian Colonies may be taken as having the will as well as the power to make considerable contributions towards their defences?—I believe that New South Wales and Victoria have; but I think that throughout the Australian Colonies there is a strong feeling that the exterior defences should not be charged to them.

2653. Do you say that the claim of those Colonies in respect of their defences mainly rests upon the perils in which they may be involved by the conflicts of England with foreign powers?—Yes; I think that principle is very generally accepted in the Colonies, that as they are not free agents with regard to European complications, they ought not to be left in a state of undefence, in case some enemy of the mother country should take advantage of their defenceless situation and invade them or bombard their towns; and that so long as the mother country is liable to be involved in European wars, and so long as enemies from without may do damage to the Colonial interests, it is felt that England is bound to protect the Colonies at all events on the seaboard. The question of military defence is rather more complicated in its nature.

2654. With regard to any purposes of internal police, or matters not belonging to external aggression, the Colonies are, you think, both able and willing to undertake their own protection?—I should say so at Victoria and New South Wales; but, when speaking of Colonies in which there are powerful native tribes, that does not hold good for a moment.

2655. Have you any knowledge of Tasmania?—Yes; I have been nearly all over Tasmania.

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2656. It appears that hitherto Tasmania has not contributed anything towards its defences?—I believe not.

2657. Do you think that now Tasmania is in a position to be able to contribute something towards its defences?—I think that Tasmania stands in a different position to New South Wales and Victoria; it is an island not capable of extension, and has very recently been a convict station. New South Wales, no doubt, was at one time a penal settlement, but not so recently, and I think that reasons may be given why military defences should be continued for some time longer in Tasmania.

2658. I suppose that Tasmania has derived considerable pecuniary advantage from the commissariat expenditure?—No doubt; all convict colonies do so at first.

2659. Do you know what is the revenue of Tasmania?—I cannot say from memory.

2660. Some evidence has been given as to the temporary withdrawal of forces from New South Wales; have you any recollection of the circumstances connected with that?—That, I think, must have occurred since I left the Colony; at the outbreak of the New Zealand war, while I was in the Colony, at the time of the Indian Mutiny, 1858, there was a desire expressed by the Governor General to remove to India the company of artillery with their field guns, and to make a contribution, in fact, out of colonial funds by paying for 100 horses, but the Legislature, by a large majority, objected to the removal of that company; in the first place they had paid the whole of the pay for those men, and also the expense of their deportation, and there certainly was a kind of understanding that those particular soldiers were to remain in the Colony, and without them the forts, which we had built at our own expense, would have been altogether denuded of protection. We had not a drilled body of artillery in the Colony, and this company was brought out there to defend, as far as they possibly could, the fortifications, and afterwards to act as a kind of normal class, or as a nucleus for instructing such colonists as might become artillerymen to man the other forts. The Colony was of opinion, notwithstanding the great demand which the home Government then had for troops, that they could not afford, after having brought those men out, to part with them. In the same year the 77th Regiment was removed entirely to India without objection on the part of the Colony.

2661. So far as your knowledge goes of the state of feeling in New South Wales, has there been considerable apprehension in consequence of the strength of the French naval force in New Caledonia?—Yes; I think there is a strong feeling that so long as the French are allowed to acquire colonies so as to form a cordon round Australia, England should possess a constant naval force of considerable strength, so as to prevent the possibility of the French landing upon the coast or destroying our ships.

2662. Mr. *Ellice.*] Do you not think that the discovery and use now made of steam navigation would be of great advantage to this country, and a great impediment to other countries in all operations of that kind?—Undoubtedly.

2663. The French have no depôts for coals?—They have in New Caledonia; and, as long as they are allowed to do so, can draw any amount of coal from Australia.

2664. During the war their operations would be paralysed for want of coal?—To a great extent, except so far as regards the depôts which they may have formed.

2665. The circumstances under which you would have apprehended danger from foreign ships of war in former days are now very much altered?—To the extent that an English steam fleet should be more powerful than the French in those seas.

2666. Must it not always be more powerful from the advantage which the English have in maintaining depôts of coal everywhere?—Yes; there are coal mines in Australia which would supply our ships to any extent, but there is no reason why the French should not accumulate any amount of coals they please.

2667. Do you think it likely that the French would go to great expense in accumulating stores of coal with a distant view of hostilities?—Their Colonies extend from New Caledonia to Tahiti, and I think they would desire to keep a steam fleet there ready for action.

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2668. As we should have in the event of any such war a marked superiority in naval means, could we not take, and would it not be better to take, measures at once to arrest the naval power of France by destroying those depôts of coal, rather than by keeping a large fleet in Australia?—That is a military question which I would rather not enter into. We might, no doubt, take all their Colonies from them as we have done before, but the Australian Colonies would in the meantime, if there was not sufficient force to protect them, suffer in a short time from the outbreak of a war.

2669. Do you know anything of the present state of the French naval force in those seas?—From public report only.

2670. Is it considerable?—It is considerable; the last time I heard there were five powerful steam and sailing vessels at New Caledonia, and as many more at Tahiti.

2671. Is there a larger force than we have there?—Larger considerably than the force we have at the Australian stations. The objection we had to paying the batta to the naval force was, that we were frequently left for months together without a single ship in Sydney harbour.

2672. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Sydney, I believe, is not liable to bombardment?—It is within three miles of the sea; it was a disputed point whether the forts should be at the "Heads," or whether we should keep our defences near to the cove at Sydney, and the preponderance of evidence, backed by the opinion of Sir William Denison, an engineer of high rank, went to establish the propriety of defending the upper harbour, leaving the heads unprotected, although Colonel Gordon, also an officer of high rank, advised for fortifications, which were actually commenced at the heads; but it was found that to keep those forts up in sufficient strength to annihilate a fleet coming in would be so enormous that it could not be done, and it was also thought that ships, rushing in in the night, might get out of the way of the heads where the fortifications were, and bombard our town at leisure, and, therefore, the forts were put up in the harbour. By a cross fire it was found that they would command the anchorage for about four miles from the heads. That was the best plan. If forts had been built at the heads, it was found that a vessel might take shelter in what is called "Garden" Island, and bombard the town with success.

2673. *Chairman.*] Has your attention been called to a correspondence between Sir William Denison and the Colonial Office, on the subject of the military defence of New South Wales?—Only in a general way.

2674. I hold in my hands a minute of Sir William Denison on the organization of the military force required for the defence of the Australian Colonies, under date the 16th April, 1860, and in that it is suggested that some such arrangement as this should be made:—"That a regiment of Australian rifles, consisting of two battalions, would furnish a force which, when supplemented with a few companies of artillery, would be sufficient for the defence of all the Australian Colonies; for, when the railroads now in contemplation are completed, facilities will be afforded for concentrating a very large proportion of the force either at Melbourne or Sydney, as may be required, and the means of moving men from Melbourne to Tasmania, or elsewhere, are always in readiness." From your knowledge of the Colony, what is your opinion in regard to such a plan as that?—I should say that for the next 20 years it is perfectly chimerical; the railway between Sydney and Melbourne cannot by any possibility be finished in 20 years; nor even approach within 200 or 300 miles of completion; so that the idea of moving men from Victoria to Sydney by land, I consider quite utopian.

2675. Do you think that there is any other mode by which the defence of these Colonies might be combined; or must their defences be considered separately?—They must be considered separately; and no doubt the defence will lie in Her Majesty's navy.

2676. You look mainly to that as a source of defence?—I do.

2677. If the troops were withdrawn, do you think that the Australian Colonies would be in danger, if they were defended by a naval power?—I do not think there need be much apprehension from European powers seeking to invade or bombard the towns; but I think it desirable, considering the relationship between the Colony and the mother country, that the mother country should maintain a nucleus force in our principal colonies.

2678. You

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2678. You look upon that as a means of aiding in the formation of a local corps?—It would form a most material aid in the formation of local corps or in their organization, and in assisting in their drilling and enabling them to be brigaded with troops, who know how to go through brigade movements, and as a nucleus and centre, in case of being called into the field.

2679. Evidence has been given of volunteer movements in New South Wales; should you say, that in a short space of time we may hope that there may be the materials of defence so far as men are concerned, provided there is that nucleus which you speak of?—Yes. I have this morning received letters from two of the principal Colonies, New South Wales and Victoria, stating that in New South Wales there is an organised force of upwards of 1,500 men who may be considered as fit for action, and that there is in Victoria a force of between 4,000 and 5,000 men; and I think that if there were a nucleus of disciplined troops, they would be much assisted in time of war by the good feeling of the colonists themselves in the formation of a local corps.

2680. You think that, numerically speaking, we may look mainly to the colonists themselves for their defence, provided they have a nucleus of disciplined troops?—I think so, if properly aided by the naval force from without.

2681. Have you any knowledge of New Zealand?—I have, of course, heard a great deal of New Zealand for the last twenty years, but I have never been there.

2682. Mr. *Fortescue.*] When you say that you look to the local corps as an available means of defence, what species of corps do you mean? Do you mean volunteer corps, such as are now in formation in the Australian Colonies and in England, or do you mean militia, or a regular embodied local corps of the character of the Canadian Rifles?—I was at the time alluding more particularly to a volunteer force; no Militia Bill has been introduced into New South Wales, although it has been spoken of. I believe the time may come when a militia may succeed in both the Colonies, when the population becomes greater. There are a number of cases for which a local force will be necessary, arising from the peculiar political state of the country; the question becomes a nice one between the police duties of the military body and their military duties; I would not wish to confuse the two.

2683. What do you think of the possibility of forming a regular permanent local military corps raised in the Australian Colonies?—I think by-and-by it is possible, but not at this moment; there is not a sufficient number of people whose avocation would allow of it, or who have time to give to it.

2684. *Chairman.*] Although you do not think that, at the present time, there are materials for the formation of a colonial corps entirely for the defence of New South Wales, do you think we may reasonably look to the time shortly when even the number of Imperial troops now in the Colony may be reduced?—I think that the number now in the Colony is so small that you can hardly hope to reduce it; taking the year 1858 as a criterion, after the removal of the 77th Regiment to India, I do not think that you could reduce the number very much; and I think that if the Colony pays one-half, the home Government cannot complain. The staff has been done away with; but I think that a whole regiment in Victoria, and half a regiment in New South Wales, is not too much.

2685. Lord *Stanley.*] What guarantee is there for that arrangement by which the Colony is to pay one-half being retained?—Only the annual vote of the Legislature; but the good faith of the Colony must be taken to be good for something, and no doubt a desire to adhere to arrangements made by predecessors must be taken for something. The vote, however, must be given every year, or else the home Government will, no doubt, withdraw the troops. If the democratic party should become sufficiently powerful to refuse the supply, which is the pay of these men, it would amount to a declaration that they want no troops, and the Queen would then, I presume, withdraw them.

2686. General *Peel.*] You have said that there was an understanding entered into with the company of artillery that they were to remain in Sydney; who were the parties to that understanding?—I may have expressed myself unguardedly if I said that there was an understanding; I said that the local Governor, who arranged with the home Government for the transport of the company of artillery, gave the War Office to understand that those men would be perma-

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nently settled in the Colony, if it pleased the Government, and for that reason the men brought their families with them.

2687. The same company?—The same company.

2688. That, you say, was between the War Office and the Colony?—Between the local Governor and the Colonial Office here, which would, no doubt, correspond with the War Office; I am not sure what were the details of the correspondence. We wrote for a company of artillery, it was granted, and on the understanding that it was to remain; but it has been removed to New Zealand.

2689. Are you not aware, that no company is sent anywhere without being liable to be relieved?—No doubt; and that company of artillery has been removed with the consent of the Colony. The Colonial Legislature consented to their going, although they were paying them, and had also been at the expense of barracks which were built for them. When I said that there was an understanding, I meant that the intention of the Colonial Government was to get a company of artillery, which would form a nucleus for the defence of our forts, and be permanently established there.

2690. Mr. *Marsh.*] You say that the men looked forward to settling there?—Yes; and I know that great dissatisfaction was expressed when it was reported that they were to be removed to India.

2691. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that the Colonial Government has called upon the Home Government to refund the cost of transport from England to Sydney of the company of artillery, and that that application has been complied with?—Then it must be in consequence of the removal of the troops to New Zealand, contrary to the understanding with us.

2692. Mr. *Marsh.*] Are the troops in New South Wales all concentrated at Sydney?—There is a guard at Newcastle, which is 66 miles north of Sydney; some small portion of the troops may be at Paramatta, but I believe that the bulk is at Sydney.

2693. Are they an efficient protection for any of the other places?—No; I think there is only a corporal's guard at Newcastle.

2694. For the protection of the coast you must rely upon the naval protection?—Entirely.

2695. Do you know whether the French have a large convict establishment at New Caledonia?—I believe they have.

2696. You have been asked, whether they would not have difficulties with regard to coal; could they not burn wood and steam to Sydney?—They could do so; but I have not the least doubt that they have large depôts of coal at New Caledonia; they require it for their steam navy in those seas.

2697. With regard to Tasmania, I think you say that more troops are required there on account of its having recently ceased to be a convict establishment?—I said it might be thought so.

2698. Are you aware that there are still many bad characters in Tasmania?—Yes.

2699. Do you think it requisite to keep any extra troops there on that account?—My own opinion is, that it would not be necessary; I think that the police of the island would be sufficient to preserve order. When the Colony was a convict establishment, undoubtedly the Home Government was bound to find convict guards to the ships which took them out, and the depôts where the prisoners were kept, but now that transportation has ceased, I do not think that troops can be considered to act as police in any way, although a guard is sent to what is called Cockatoo Island.

2700. You do not think that extra troops are required in Van Diemen's Land?—No.

2701. Lord *Stanley,*] If Van Diemen's Land suffers some inconvenience from the aggregation of bad characters, has it not gained on the other hand in the making of roads, and the construction of public works?—Undoubtedly.

2702. Mr. *Marsh.*] Do you think that it has gained much by the construction of roads?—Much more than New South Wales; Van Diemen's Land, I believe, has always been kept, even since it ceased to be a convict establishment, in the most perfect state of repair, whilst in New South Wales the convict labour was confined to a very small portion of the land.

2703. Do you know that the colonists of Tasmania used to give 6*d.* a day to every convict who worked on the roads?—I do not know that.

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2704. You have been in South America?—Yes.

2705. You are aware that a considerable fleet is kept up there to protect our commerce?—I am.

2706. Supposing that the Colony of Australia were not in the hands of English settlers, and did not belong to England but to some foreign state, such as the South American States, do you think it would require more or less naval protection than it does now?—The question has two or three bearings; the naval protection on the coast of a foreign country, must be simply there as a defence of a floating commerce; the naval protection of a Colony in which there is enormous wealth on the shore which is British property, should be of a more extensive kind. If New South Wales were foreign to England, the land force would be much less; it is an undoubted fact that by far the larger amount of property on the shore and floating between the Colony and Great Britain is British property. It is the result of the employment of British capital.

2707. Is not that very much the case in South America?—Not on the shore. The very capital of our banks, amounting at this time to several millions of coin, may be said to be almost exclusively British property. That cannot be said to be the case in South America.

2708. Mr. *Childers.*] Do you think that the Colony, therefore, requires more protection?—It is entitled to more naval protection.

2709. Mr. *Marsh.*] On the ground that a very large portion of the property on the shore is strictly English property?—Yes.

2710. Whereas, in the other case, only ships and cargo would be English property?—Yes.

2711. Mr. *Childers.*] At the present time the arrangement with New South Wales is, that the Colonies shall pay the colonial allowances of the four companies there and of the artillery?—Yes.

2712. And the Imperial pay of the artillery also?—Yes.

2713. Has the Colony ever paid any part of the Imperial pay of the troops of the line?—Yes, they pay half the Imperial pay of the four companies which the Home Government sends.

2714. Has New South Wales any excess upon the number of troops allowed by the Home Government?—I think there has been a slight excess.

2715. There has been a company of artillery in excess?—Yes, no doubt, and the expense of their coming out was paid also by the Colony; the cost of erecting the barracks, and every other expense since they have been there.

2716. Is there any probability of the contribution being made part of a permanent act of the legislature of New South Wales?—I have some doubts of that; I think it will be continued by an annual vote of the parliament.

2717. You doubt the prudence of the Imperial Government applying to the Colonial legislature to make that a permanent provision?—I should doubt the legislature passing a bill to that effect. I do not think it necessary, because the course of the Home Government is so clear; if the payment agreed to be made is not made to the Imperial Government, they would have the right to withdraw the troops.

2718. You think there had better be an arrangement from year to year?—I think so.

2719. New South Wales bears no proportion of the colonial allowance to the staff, I think?—Only such portions as are resident at Sydney; I believe only a major of brigade.

2720. The head quarter staff?—It pays no portion, I believe, of the head quarter staff.

2721. Has New South Wales borne any portion of the charge for the navy on the coast?—Not of the Imperial pay.

2722. Has New South Wales any frigate of its own?—No.

2723. Nothing analogous to the "Victoria" at Victoria or Melbourne?—Nothing analogous to the "Victoria"* at Melbourne.

2724. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you think that British troops should only be kept in Tasmania for purposes of defence against an external enemy?—I think they should be kept there, for the same reason that they should be kept in New South Wales and Victoria, as a nucleus for the defence of the Colony, or to be used as a land force, where they may be called upon to act.

2725. Is there any reason, to your mind valid and sufficient, why that Colony should not pay a proportion of the military expenses?—I think that is involved

* N.B.—The "Victoria" is a local man-of-war brig, built and paid for by the Colony of Victoria.

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in the question of a rule being laid down for all Colonies to contribute to their internal defence? I do not think that any general rule would hold good, but that the circumstances of each Colony must be taken into consideration. I take it that there are many Colonies which are not able to contribute, and Tasmania is one of those.

2726. Do you think that Tasmania is not rich enough to pay any portion whatever of its military expenses?—I do not go so far as that. If it were left to them to say what troops they would have, they would in all probability say very few; and then it would become a question whether it was policy in the Imperial Government to denude the Colony altogether of troops. I question whether a negotiation of that sort would be worth entering into; it would be a kind of cheeseparing arrangement altogether, because they would afford to pay a small portion only.

2727. I do not speak of any rigid rule; but I ask you, do you not think it fair and proper, if there is no reason why Tasmania should require troops for internal purposes, that she should pay a certain proportion towards her defences?—It seems to be so, on the face of it; but I think that involves an important question, with reference to the Imperial policy.

2728. You are not prepared to say, that the Imperial Government ought to be governed by the willingness of the Colony to pay?—It should be governed by grand principles and conclusions of policy, with regard to its Colonies, as to what force it would maintain for the protection of those Colonies. Having determined that, I think if the Colony is able to pay it should contribute; but then other questions must be taken into consideration, arising from external circumstances of a peculiar kind; because, for instance, in the case of New Zealand, the recent war was occasioned by the proceedings of the Home Government; it would be impossible to lay down any general rule.

2729. You do not consider that Tasmania is unable or unwilling to pay?—I do not say that she is unwilling.

2730. You say, that the extreme democratic party in New South Wales are opposed to the maintenance of any troops at all?—Yes. There has been a small party in New South Wales and Victoria, whose cry has been, for some years past, to "cut the painter," as the vulgar phrase goes; or to separate the Colony from the mother country; and they would rather have no troops at all, as they would consider that a step in that direction.

2731. It is not because they object to pay any portion of the expenses, but because they advocate a separation?—I think so. There is a very small party with whom that has been the cry for some time past.

2732. The general sentiment is, that there should be a certain number of British troops there?—Yes; and that is evidenced by the most popular legislature always voting the money.

2733. Did you hear the evidence of Captain Clark?—I did not.

2734. He recommended the substitution of an artillery force?—I think that is a military question, upon which Captain Clark would be better able to form an opinion than myself.

2735. With reference to the naval defences of Sydney, you say you think that the French force in those seas is at present much superior to our own?—I believe it is.

2736. But you do not say that the people of Sydney are seriously frightened by the French settlement at New Caledonia?—Only when there has been a probability of a war with France; they were so far alarmed at the news at the commencement of the war in Italy, that they thought it possible that England and France might be ranged on opposite sides.

2737. You do not, I suppose, advocate the maintenance of a large force to watch the force in New Caledonia?—I think that the general policy of Great Britain should be to keep, in every sea in which she has possessions, a force to balance the force which the French may have in that sea.

2738. You think that the British force in the Australian seas ought to be there for that purpose?—For that purpose, as long as the French keep a large force in New Caledonia.

2739. In the event of a war between England and France, or any other European power, do you think that the few British soldiers in New South Wales and Victoria would be of the slightest value for external defences?—Perhaps not; but for a descent upon the coast they would be of great value.

2740. Which descent is not probable so long as we maintain our naval superiority?

superiority?—Which descent is not probable so long as we maintain our naval superiority.

2741. If our force in those seas was decidedly superior to the navies of other powers, you think that there would be no use in our keeping soldiers in the colony for external defence?—Save and except for other Imperial reasons, it would not be necessary.

2742. You advocate, to some extent, the retention of British troops in New South Wales and Victoria, simply as forming a local military force?—Partly for that purpose, and partly that there may be some value attached to the maintenance of a force for what you may call the dignity of the Government, or the maintenance of the power of the Executive; beyond that, I think that the naval force may be relied on.

2743. You think that the colony would be much better pleased by an increase in our naval force, than by our keeping a considerable military force there?—I do.

2744. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You are aware that, in South Australia and Queensland, the imperial quota of troops maintained at imperial cost is only a single company. Supposing the same imperial quota were assigned to Tasmania, do you think that the colony would be inclined to pay for any troops beyond that?—I do not.

2745. Supposing the imperial quota to Melbourne and Sydney were reduced to, we will say, two companies in each Colony, what course would, in your opinion, be taken by the Colonial Government?—It is difficult to say; when it was thought that four companies were sufficient, they were willing to pay their share of the four companies in Sydney and in Victoria. If the Home Government were to fix the quota, it is very hard to foresee what they would do. There is a willingness, on the part of the Colony, to fall in with the wishes of the Home Government. The 77th regiment was sent the instant it was demanded, and the only objection I have heard was to the removal of artillery, because the Colony had paid for their deportation. I take it, that there would be a strong feeling that the navy ought to be increased.

2746. Assuming that the Home Government were to say that they conceived that New South Wales was not exposed to any great foreign danger, and that the navy was the best protection for the Colony, and would be maintained at a fair strength, and that for those reasons the number of imperial troops maintained at imperial cost at Sydney would be reduced to what might be called a guard of honour for the Governor, say two companies, would that cause any dissatisfaction?—I think it would amongst a very respectable class of colonists.

2747. Do you think that the maintenance of even a small number of British troops in the Australian Colonies tends to maintain the feeling of imperial connexion?—I do.

2748. So that you would prefer the assistance of the mother country being given in the shape of imperial troops, however small the numbers, to that assistance being given in the shape of money, as a sort of rate in aid, towards a local force?—Most unquestionably; it is very important to have a few of Her Majesty's troops on the spot.

2749. Are you confirmed in that opinion by finding that the small party in the Colony which is opposed to imperial connexion thinks to promote its views by an entire withdrawal of imperial troops?—I am.

2750. You say that there is little or no danger of a descent by an enemy upon a port like Sydney, provided the mother country maintains the command of the sea. Would it not be quite possible that, whilst the mother country maintained the general command of the sea, her preponderance at any particular spot might be wanting for a certain time, but still long enough to enable an enemy to inflict great damage upon Sydney?—It was certainly thought, until the fortifications were put up, that even a Paul Jones in a single ship might have laid the city under contribution; but it is considered that if we had a moderate land force, and a sufficient military force, aided by this company of artillery, which we are willing to pay for, no sudden surprise could take place. Undoubtedly, an overwhelming force with a fleet, when our own Navy was away from the coast, might inflict great damage. The Colony, however, does not suppose that the Home Government would so far neglect its Colonies as to allow a fleet to come in there.

2751. To that extent you think it necessary by some means or other to possess the means of defence against an external enemy?—Yes, I do.

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2752. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] There is no danger, is there, on any other part of the coast, except the capital?—I do not think that any nation would attempt to land a force on any other point; there would be nothing to gain.

2753. You know the other capitals very well?—Yes.

2754. They are all easily defended by fortifications, are they not?—I think they are; there are local advantages which are capable of being so added to by fortifications that they would seem to be easily defensible.

2755. Adelaide is out of reach of bombardment, I believe?—Adelaide is several miles up a shallow river.

2756. And Launceston?—Launceston is 40 miles away from the sea.

2757. Melbourne, also, is accessible through a very small passage only?—No doubt; but Williamstown would be open to fire from Hodson's Bay.

2758. Mr. *Marsh.*] Could not Melbourne be bombarded from Williamstown?—Yes, with the new guns, I dare say; it is possible; it is two miles off

2759. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] There is a local volunteer corps, is there not?—Yes; there are some volunteers, and we relied upon the company of artillery to get up our local force of artillery.

2760. In case of any imminent danger, there would be the addition of the local force?—Yes; but the use of the local corps of artillery would be principally in the management of our great guns.

2761. For defending your fortifications, regulars, who are not artillerymen, are not of much use?—No.

2762. The use of regulars is principally for the purpose of forming a nucleus for a local corps of volunteers?—I think so.

2763. Mr. *Adderley.*] Is it not possible for New South Wales to form a nucleus for itself?—I have already stated that there are about 1,500 volunteers in New South Wales, but they are not of much use without regular troops to act with them.

2764. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you think it possible for New South Wales to improvise troops of the character of those of our best regiments of the line?—Certainly not.

2765. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think that in the course of time they would get a body of troops equal to our regiments of the line?—It is not in the nature of things that they should do so within the next 50 years, and then I think it doubtful; there is a great difficulty with the high price of labour, everyone is so independent.

2766. If they had to pay for the defence of their Colony, you think that they would still have to hire troops from England?—They would be very valuable at all times.

2767. Do you think that if they had to undertake the entire cost of their defence, they would still hire troops from England?—Not if separated from the mother country.

2768. If they had to pay the entire cost of their defences, you think that they would still have troops from England?—I cannot conceive such a thing as that, unless England threw off the colonies entirely. I have already said that there is a small party in the Colony which is desirous of getting rid of English troops, because they think that will tend to an entire separation of the Colony from the mother country.

2769. Are those men who have a taste for a reform in the government?—Yes, according to their own notions of reform.

2770. Is the amount of wages, which is considered such an impediment to recruiting, so much larger than in our manufacturing districts?—Undoubtedly; a shepherd in New South Wales gets, at this present time, from 35*l.* to 55*l.* a year, with a full ration of bread, flour, fire and lodging, tea and sugar, and as much meat as he can eat; 10 pounds of meat a week, each man. I pay that to many men at this moment.

2771. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware of an attempt that was made to recruit in Victoria 300 or 400 men for a regiment of the line?—I am not aware of that.

2772. And that it failed?—I am sure it would fail.

2773. Mr. *Adderley.*] As I understand, the wealth of the Colony is such that they would have no difficulty in hiring troops from England?—I think if that were rendered necessary by the mother country declining to defend her colonies, they would do so.

2774. *Chairman.*]

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2774. *Chairman.*] By a return which has been presented to this Committee, I observe that there were about 10,000 volunteers in the three Colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia. Do you know to what extent attendance is given at drill by those volunteers?—I recollect the volunteer movement in 1853 and 1854, and, as it may be supposed, the energy was greater at first than when the war ceased.

2775. How far may we take it that the numbers given here bear any proportion to those who give up a portion of their time to the defence of their country?—In times of profound peace, I believe that those numbers would be diminished.

2776. Do you think that this would be rather a paper return?—No; I think it is an actual return of the state of things at the moment. It was thought that the outbreak of hostilities in Europe would bring England into complications; but if profound peace were restored to Europe, and a complete feeling of safety came over the Colony, that return would diminish.

2777. Do you think we might infer that, in the case of an apprehension arising in the Colony, there would be as many as are stated in this return, 10,000, ready to defend the country?—They would be ready to take up arms upon an emergency. I think that the feeling is quite loyal and genuine, but in profound peace that feeling would slumber.

2778. In the event of the movement continuing, either in time of peace or in time of war, do you not think that there is reasonable ground to believe that there would be an increased number of individuals ready and willing to defend the Colony?—I think so.

2779. Mr. *Childers.*] Are you aware that the Australian Legislature empowers 10,000 to be admitted?—I am not aware of that, but I think I have heard of it.

2780. Are you aware that the discipline of those volunteers has been favourably reported of?—Yes, I believe so.

2781. And that the artillery practice is said to be the finest known?—I have heard that their artillery practice is very good.

2782. Have you any doubt that the success of the volunteer movement is mostly due to their being brigaded with regular troops?—I think very much so.

2783. Speaking of Tasmania, are you aware that the Colony has called upon the home Government for expenses due in respect of the convict establishment?—I have heard so.

2784. Until that claim has been in some way settled, do you think it likely that they will offer to pay any large contribution?—No; I think they will expect that old account to be settled.

2785. You think that question must be got rid of?—I think so, before you can treat Tasmania upon the same footing as New South Wales and Victoria.

2786. Mr. *Baxter.*] Have those claims been refused?—I believe they are matter of negotiation at present.

2787. Mr. *Marsh.*] You say that the separatist party in Australia is very small?—Very small.

2788. Was the question of separation ever mooted in the Legislative Assembly?—A motion was put on the paper in 1860, and there was immediately a counter motion that it should be burned by the common hangman, or something to that effect.

2789. That Legislature is ultra democratic?—Yes.

2790. Elected by universal suffrage?—By ballot. The Rev. Dr. Lang, who is well known, gave notice of the motion, and he said that his purpose was answered by having it put upon the paper of the Council. It was referred to the Speaker whether it should be put on the paper, but Captain Russell, a representative member, gave notice that it should be swept from the Council room and burned by the common hangman.

2791. You have no doubt that the feeling was exceedingly strong?—The feeling was exceedingly strong amongst respectable people.

2792. *Chairman.*] You think that there would be an increased volunteer movement in the case of any emergency, such as a foreign attack?—Yes; I think that the feeling evinced in 1853 and 1860 would be revived whenever any apprehension was felt.

2793. You consider that there should be a certain number of British troops

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there concentrated as an element in perfecting the organization of the materials in the Colony?—Not only that, but in case of an emergency to lead them, and form a rallying point.

2794. Would you, without desiring to diminish the force, certainly not to withdraw the force altogether, look forward to the time when they may entirely cease to be necessary?—I do not think that the force will ever cease to be necessary so long as the loyalty of the colonists is kept up by measures of conciliation originating from the mother country; it is only by taking steps which would alienate the good feeling of the respectable portion of the community that any strong party can arise desiring separation.

2795. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you not think that the presence of any troops in New South Wales inclines the Colony to lean upon England for its defence?—Not more than is necessary.

2796. The presence of troops there is looked upon as a pledge on the part of England to undertake the defence?—I think that she is bound to defend the Colonies from external aggression.

2797. *Chairman.*] Even if the Colony paid altogether for the troops, do you think it better that there should be a certain number of Imperial troops maintained there?—I do; I think that the duty of the mother country would be the same.

2798. Mr. *Adderley.*] You sympathise with the Colony in that respect, that it is considered a pledge on the part of England to undertake the defence of the Colonies, in case of emergency?—I think that undertaking would exist whether the troops were there or not. If we did not put the Home Government to one farthing expense, the same obligation would, in my opinion, exist.

2799. You would be then undertaking, practically, the defence of your own Colony?—We have shown that the defence does not exist in the troops, but in the naval force.

2800. As far as the English taxpayer pays for those troops, he would be defending New South Wales?—He would be defending his own property.

2801. Is that more so than the property in England may belong to New South Wales?—Possibly so. I should think it very odd if Newcastle and Plymouth were left to defend themselves.

2802. Does not Newcastle take its full share of paying for the troops?—No doubt; but if the policy of England is to hold Colonies, it is her duty to defend them.

2803. The taxpayers of Newcastle have no other country proposing to contribute towards her defences?—Perhaps not.

2804. Are not the Colonies in a different position to any other of the British dominions, from the fact of their having part of their expenses defrayed by the mother country?—No doubt; but they contribute much more liberally to the prosperity of England in proportion to their population.

2805. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You probably think that the taxpayers in Newcastle, and other parts in England, have control over the foreign policy of this country?—Certainly; which we have not; that is one of the causes of the difficulty, that we have no voice in the complications which may bring us under the influence of the quarrel. Newcastle returns Members to Parliament; the Colonies do not.

2806. So that the taxpayers of Sydney may find themselves involved in an European war by the action of the taxpayers of Newcastle?—Precisely; by the proceedings of the Home Government, over which they have no control.

2807. Mr. *Adderley.*] Besides that, you think that Newcastle derives a greater advantage from Australia than from the manufacturing districts in England?—Under the circumstances, peculiar to the Colonies, I say that one million of people in the Australian Colonies contribute very much more to the wealth and prosperity of England than any million of people in the mother country.

2808. Upon that ground you think they have a claim to be defended?—Partly on that ground, and partly from the property being so much British.

2809. *Chairman.*] You say that the defence of the Colonies must mainly depend upon the naval power?—Yes: we look mainly to the naval power.

2810. Do you think it reasonable that the Colonies should be expected to contribute to the cost of the ships of war in the Australian ports?—Not unless they have full control over the ships there, which is incompatible with the

control

control of the Home Government over the navy. Troops on shore are different, because the Governor General is Commander in Chief.

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2811. If they depend mainly upon the naval power, would they not rather contribute towards the cost of that than see it withdrawn?—That is a different question; but I think it is impossible for the Colony to have any control over the navy. The Imperial Government places its troops in the most commanding positions, with a view to the Imperial purposes. If you stationed a ship permanently as a block ship in Sydney harbour, they might be called upon to contribute; but so long as a ship is left under the entire control of the admiral on the station, who does not let her come into the harbour one day perhaps out of one hundred, it does not stand in the same position as soldiers do.

2812. Mr. *Adderley.*] You think that they ought to be called upon to pay for block ships?—If we took block ships, instead of erecting forts, we should pay for them.

2813. Of such a block ship the Colony would undertake the whole cost?—I think so, as they would of a fort.

2814. Mr. *Baring.*] A ship of that class would cease to be a portion of the Imperial force?—It would.

2815. *Chairman.*] In the case of foreign attack, I apprehend that the danger would be a common danger upon all the Australian Colonies?—Yes.

2816. Would not the most effectual mode of protecting them from those dangers be the stationing of a British naval strength in force in those waters, as a common means of defence of those Colonies, keeping the naval force of France, for instance, locked up in their own ports, as was done in the case of the Russian War?—That is a point upon which I could hardly express an opinion. If the argument is adduced, that the Colony should pay for a portion of the navy which defends them, it is manifest that that argument may go to the extent of saying that if you are at war with Russia, the Australian Colonies ought to pay for a portion of the fleet which blockades Cronstadt, and I cannot think that that proposition can be maintained. In a war like that the Imperial measures are taken with a great and grand object, and I do not think that any one would say that Australia ought to pay a portion of the expense of the blockade of Petropaulowski.

2817. Except that you think the presence of a strong British naval force in those waters is an essential ingredient?—Yes.

2818. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think it probable that such a Colony as New South Wales would volunteer contributions towards the expense of a general war in which England was engaged?—Possibly they might; but they have very small revenues, and it is not likely that they can do it. When a war costs something like 20 millions a year, it is not likely that a Colony, whose joint revenue is not above five millions a year, can afford to contribute much.

2819. *Chairman.*] Supposing in ordinary times that we kept such a force in the Australian waters as to maintain about 1000 men, and cost about 100,000 *l.* a year, and that the particular vessels should be changed as suited the Government and the convenience of the station, should you think it fair and right that the Colonies, all of which should derive protection from such a force, should contribute?—If kept exclusively as a Colonist force, it might be fair that they should contribute something; but a difficulty would arise as to the proportion that she should contribute. There is no federation of the Australian Colonies, and it is impossible to come to an arrangement amongst them.

2820. Your difficulty is the difficulty of apportioning the sum?—That is one great difficulty.

2821. Mr. *Baring.*] With respect to the payment of a naval force, I understand you to say that the Colonies would not wish to contribute, unless they actually saw the ships?—Yes; and that they should have some control over the ships.

2822. Would not an arrangement of that sort, if it were necessary for the Government at home to withdraw the force, give rise to considerable difficulty between the mother country and the Colony?—Yes; I think that is a difficulty. The Admiralty have a right to remove any fleet they may have, and the Colony find that a great objection to contributing, that they have no means of fixing any ships in the harbour or regulating the period of service which they shall afford.

2823. Any such arrangement for contribution, on the part of the Australian

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Colonies towards the naval defences, might occasion difficulties in the distribution of the general forces in England?—No doubt.

2824. Even in cases where it might occur, that the best defence of the Australian Colonies would be far away from the Australian Colonies?—Yes. It depends upon the country you are at war with.

2825. Mr. *Baxter.*] Has such a proposition ever been made to the Colony?—Not to my knowledge, nor would it be worth the grandeur of the Imperial Government to make such a proposition.

Mr. *Walter Brodie*, called in; and Examined.

Mr. *Walter Brodie.*

2826. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you were, for several years, a Member of the House of Representatives of New Zealand?—For four years.

2827. During what period?—From 1854 to 1858.

2828. What province were you an inhabitant of?—I was settled in the province of Auckland for nearly 20 years.

2829. In the year ending 31st March 1859, I find that the total Imperial strength of the troops in New Zealand, was 1,397, and the Imperial expenditure is given in the return as 112,358 *l.* Can you inform the Committee whether, during that time, there were any volunteer forces in New Zealand?—I believe not.

2830. There was no contribution, in any other way, from local funds, towards the expense of the Colony?—No; there was merely a police force, native and European, which was kept up at great expense.

2831. I suppose you are conversant with the details of the circumstances of the war now going on?—Yes.

2832. Under the most favourable circumstances, how soon do you think it likely that, with safety to the settlers, the force which is now there might be reduced?—I consider from what has lately taken place in the Colony, there must have been a great deal of bad management somewhere, or else one-half or one-fourth of the force would have been sufficient to quell disturbances in the first instance.

2833. Taking the force which is now there, and taking into consideration the present circumstances of the Colony, how long do you think it is likely before we can reasonably expect any diminution of the forces?—I am not aware of the number of troops there.

2834. The number of troops in New Zealand is stated to be 5,354?—If the natives of Waikatto were to rise in a body, the war would very likely continue for some years, in fact until the natives were annihilated.

2835. So far as your judgment goes, do you see your way to an early conclusion of the war?—We have looked forward for the last four mails hoping to hear something very decisive from the seat of war, but no satisfactory news has arrived.

2836. Have you formed any judgment yourself upon it?—After peace is proclaimed I should say it would require a force of 3,000 or 4,000 men in the Colony for two or three years.

2837. Reckoning the Imperial expenditure for 1,379 troops at 112,358 *l.*, we may reasonably expect then, that the force contemplated as necessary in the Colony for three or four years more, will involve an annual expenditure from Imperial sources of about one-half a million a year?—I should not have thought it would come to so much as that.

2838. The number of troops in 1859 being 1,400, and the expenditure in round numbers 112,400 *l.*, 5,000 troops for three or four years would cost surely as much as I have mentioned, namely, about half a million?—Of course it would.

2839. I suppose the Commissariat expenditure in New Zealand has been very large whenever war has been going on?—Very large indeed.

2840. In which of the provinces does the Commissariat expenditure mainly arise?—Up to within the last few months it has been in the province of Auckland; during the time the troops have been brought down to New Plymouth, the head station of the Commissariat Department has been removed there.

2841. I believe there are no troops in Middle Island?—Not any, and never have been. The native population in Middle Island is 3,000, and in the Northern Island it is 53,000; out of that 53,000 there are between 22,000 and 23,000 native adults capable of bearing arms.

2842. Lord

2842. Lord *Stanley.*] How do you explain the proportion of those bearing arms being so large with regard to the rest of the population?—I give those figures from the census taken by the Government in 1858; there were 22,000 native adults over 14 years of age, and 11,000 Europeans over 12 years of age. The European adults have, many of them, never had a musket in their hands, but all the aborigines are brought up to arms from childhood for war purposes.

2843. *Chairman.*] You are referring now to the Northern Island?—Exclusively.

2844. Lord *Stanley.*] You say that the total population in the Northern Island is 53,000?—Yes.

2845. One half of them, I presume, would be women?—No; some 20 years ago there was a great deal of infanticide, and the female children were often killed, the males being reserved for fighting.

2846. You give it as your deliberate opinion that out of those 53,000, there are upwards of 20,000 male adults capable of bearing arms?—So the return for 1858 states.

2847. Mr. *Baxter.*] Is the native population of that island decreasing?—Very much.

2848. That disproportion may partly arise from the families being so small?—I should think so; the native population is not half what I can recollect it once to be.

2849. *Chairman.*] Do you know what the European population of Middle Island is?—I should say, about 33,000 or 34,000.

2850. I believe, up to this time, the Middle Island, in consequence of the native population being so small, has had no interest in the native wars?—Very little indeed, excepting that they would prefer seeing peace than war.

2851. Do you know anything of any correspondence between the Home Government and the Colony on the subject of the proportion of payment?—I believe that the colonial minister, Mr. Stafford, agreed, on behalf of the New Zealand colony, to pay 5*l.* a-head for every soldier in the colony since 1854, which, I think, was rather unjust to the colonists, because it was creating a debt of 40,000*l.* or 50,000*l.* by a stroke of his pen; and when it is taken into consideration that we are not allowed to manage our own native affairs, I think it is unjust to call upon us to pay any sum either for arrears or the present war.

2852. Do you say that you are not allowed to manage your own affairs?—We have appealed to the Home Government, and we have been refused the management of the native affairs.

2853. You are alluding probably to the reservation in the Constitution Act with reference to lands?—Partly that.

2854. What else do you allude to?—To the Territorial Rights Bill which we sent home two years ago, after it had passed both houses of the Legislative Assembly, conferring great benefits on the natives; but it was not approved of by Lord Carnarvon. The answer, I think, of Lord Carnarvon was, that it was the intention of the Imperial Government to keep the sole control of native affairs in their own hands, and that they would be responsible for any disturbance with the natives, and pay the naval and military expenses.

2855. Are you aware what proportion that 5*l.* per man would bear to the whole military expenditure per man, in any given year, for the colony?—I have not the slightest idea.

2856. You say you think 5*l.* per man too much for the colony to pay?—I do not think that the colony in its present position, taking into consideration that it is the infant colony of the Crown, should be called upon at present to pay anything. Give us the complete management of the native and land affairs of the colony, and I think that, in the course of time, we shall not require a single soldier in the colony.

2857. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Can you answer for the Parliament of New Zealand in asserting, that if the partial or nominal control over native affairs now retained by the Home Government is given up, the colony would be prepared to pay the whole expense of the Imperial troops?—I think that they would in two or three years after peace is proclaimed, we having the whole and sole control of native affairs and their lands.

2858. The Colony then would be prepared to pay the whole expense of the troops?—I should say so; the Colony being allowed two or three companies.

2859. Do you represent, in so saying, the opinion of the New Zealand ministry

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or the majority of the New Zealand parliament?—I think I state the feeling of the majority of New Zealand colonists, especially in the North Island.

2860. Mr. *Baxter.*] Then in that respect the Colony of New Zealand would be prepared to act more liberally than the Australian Colonies?—We prefer peace with the natives, to war, with a great commissariat expenditure.

2861. Mr. *Fortescue.*] It is the case, is it not, that responsible government is established in New Zealand?—It is to a certain extent, but would be wholly so had we the whole control of the natives and their land affairs.

2862. What control over the revenue of the Colony does the Governor possess?—He has not much control over the revenue of the Colony.

2863. It is the case, is it not, that the revenue is at the disposal of the colonial parliament?—Yes.

2864. Do you think that the Imperial Government can do much without funds?—The Imperial Government obtain whatever funds they require for the imperial government.

2865. It depends upon the colonial parliament, does it not, whether the Governor can obtain any funds for native purposes?—Yes; I think the great fault with the colonists has been, that they have been over liberal with the natives; we are granting them now nearly 20,000*l.* a year for native purposes, when the natives themselves are the richest people and the largest landholders in the Colony. If they want money to build churches or schools, &c., why not allow the natives to sell their land by public auction, or to private parties, and so realise?

2866. Is it not the case that the natives contribute largely to the customs' revenue?—Very largely; but who placed them in such a position? the colonists, and not missionary enterprise.

2867. Is it not the case that the natives are in no way represented in the colonial parliament?—They certainly are not represented in one way; but I do not think that they could be better represented than they are now, because there are those in parliament who take as much interest in the native question as in the European question; the requirements of the natives are never forgotten.

2868. Is it not the case that it is not legally possible for any native to acquire a vote?—I think that a native can acquire a vote just the same as any European; in fact, I know that hundreds of them have voted.

2869. Are you aware that it has lately been decided that nothing but the possession of freehold property will confer a vote, and that no native tenure of land is recognised by your courts?—No.

2870. You are not aware, then, that it has been decided that no native under the present state of the law can acquire a vote?—I am not; why not grant him a title, and give him a vote?

2871. Are you aware that the proclamation of martial law, which was the regular commencement of the present war, was issued with the advice and consent of the Executive Council of New Zealand?—I am not aware that it was.

2872. You are not aware that the steps which led to the present war were taken in Executive Council, and by the advice and consent of the Executive Council?—The Governor did ask the Executive for their advice, but their advice was not given in the way in which it is generally understood to have been given; it was given more as friendly advice, the Executive having no control over the affairs of the natives.

2873. Then I presume you have not referred to the Blue Book, in which are to be found the formal proceedings of the Executive Council on which the proclamation of martial law was issued as an Act of the Executive Council?—I have that which you have above referred to.

2874. Mr. *Adderley.*] As I understand, you think that the control which the English Government retains over native affairs in New Zealand is the sole ground why England should pay for the troops in New Zealand?—Certainly.

2875. If that relation were altered, and the English Government no longer interfered in native affairs, you think that the reason for sending troops to New Zealand would no longer exist?—I think so.

2876. Supposing that course were adopted, what description of force do you think the New Zealand Government would organise?—They have now a force of between 4,000 and 5,000 militiamen and riflemen; the Province of Auckland alone, as appears by the last return, had 1,700 militia and riflemen in two battalions, and 600 cavalry.

2877. Are

2877. Are they a regularly organised and drilled force?—I believe so; in fact, I know that they are; they are under the command of two officers of the army.

2878. Which, in your opinion, would be the best kind of force to deal with the natives, a force such as you have just described, or a force consisting of regular troops of the English army?—I should say a force of militiamen and riflemen.

2879. You think they are better fitted for native war than troops of the regular army of England?—A great deal more so; they know the character of the natives so well that they would be much more willing to follow them into the woods than the military would be, which has already been proved in the present war.

2880. The 20,000*l.* a year now spent in the civilization of the natives of New Zealand would then be paid from the Colonial Exchequer?—From the Colonial Exchequer, as at present.

2881. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you not consider that it is the duty of the Colonial Government to provide the means of enforcing law and order?—Yes.

2882. Are you not aware that in the greater part of the native districts of the Northern Island nothing can be said to exist in the shape of administration or government?—There is very little European law, for the simple reason that there is no force to maintain order; it has been known to the Government that the natives have sold wines and spirits, but they have not had the military force to prevent it. There is, in fact, one law for the white man and another for the native; a chief can imprison a settler for debt, but a settler cannot imprison a chief without the consent of the Governor.

2883. How do you reconcile that statement with what you said just now, that upon the re-establishment of peace you would recommend the withdrawal of the military?—I think that we should be able to manage the natives by ourselves; they would have more confidence in us, and abide by our laws.

2884. You think that they would have more confidence in the Colonial Parliament, in which they are not represented, than they have in the representative of the Crown?—I think they would have; if we managed their affairs, we would give them a title to their lands.

2885. And you think they have?—I think so.

2886. Admitting that in a considerable part of the districts of New Zealand there are none of the appliances of Government, no courts, no magistrates, and no effective police, do you think it possible to introduce anything like government into those native districts without considerable funds, and must not those funds be supplied by the New Zealand Parliament?—Certainly.

2887. Is it your opinion, then, that the sums voted for native purposes by the New Zealand Parliament at present must be largely increased before the native districts can be brought under the general government of the island?—For the purposes you state?

2888. I am speaking of the ordinary purposes of government?—No doubt the expenses would be a great deal more; but when the public knew that we managed our own native affairs, immigration would flow rapidly in, and cause an increase of revenue to meet the extra expenses.

2889. Would it not be necessary to pay magistrates and establish courts to assist the police force, and, in fact, to introduce all the ordinary appliances of Government, if the native districts of New Zealand are not to remain in their same independent position?—A very large sum of money is now spent in supporting a native and European police force.

2890. Is it not the fact, that whatever may now be expended, the native districts of New Zealand are left, in point of fact, without government?—A great many of them.

2891. If, then, law and order, and a recognised government, are to be introduced into the native districts, is it not essential that the Colonial Parliament should provide larger funds than it does now for the purpose?—Yes.

2892. Mr. *Adderley.*] I suppose that the establishment of an effective native government would not necessitate the interference of the English Government?—I do not think that there could well be a native government and an European government in the same Colony.

2893. Mr. *Marsh.*] Supposing that there had not been any troops in New Zealand, and the settlers had been allowed to fight it out in their own way, would the war have been over by this time?—We should never have had a war had

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had we managed the native affairs; the war of 1845 and 1846 was caused by the act of Captain Hobson, and the settlers lost 60,000*l.* or 70,000*l.* by Kororareka being burnt down.

2894. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Then you think that if from the first the settlers of New Zealand had been allowed to deal with the natives according to their pleasure, and the natives on the other hand had been allowed to defend themselves as best they could against the settlers, both races would have been in a more prosperous condition than they are now?—I think so.

2895. And that New Zealand would have advanced in 20 years to its present point of progress?—Well, I think it would, as every war throws the Colony back many years.

2896. Mr. *Adderley.*] How do you think that the settlers would have dealt with the natives?—I think there would have been a far better understanding with the natives than there is with the Imperial Government. The whole cause of this war is in the land question. I was present when the Treaty of Waitangi was brought down for the natives to sign, and the question was put to the natives, through the interpreter, Mr. Clarke, "The Queen wishes to have the pre-emptive right of the sale of your lands; will you allow her to have it?" "Yes," they said, "but supposing anyone will give us more than you, will you allow us to sell it to the white man?" Captain Hobson hesitated a little time, but seeing that the natives were determined, he said that they would, but that was never put into the treaty. The present bitter feeling on the part of the natives is, that they are not allowed to sell it to whom they like, the Crown having acknowledged them to be the owners of the soil.

2897. Mr. *Fortescue.*] I believe you have been for many years a strong advocate of the system of free sale from the natives?—I have, for the benefit of the native and the Colony generally.

2898. You are aware, I suppose, that whenever the government has collected the opinions of those gentlemen in New Zealand who are best acquainted with the affairs of New Zealand, the great preponderance of opinion has been against your opinion?—I believe there has been a majority, but that majority has been produced by the accession of a number of colonists recently arrived.

2899. Are you not aware that the Governor, within the last two years, has taken the opinions of a great many persons, missionaries and others, who have been long settled in the Colony, upon that point?—I am.

2900. And that the great majority of opinions has been against the system of free purchase?—The Governor has been so advised, but I consider that the advice of bishops and missionaries was the worst advice he could obtain in the Colony, which you must be well aware of by the last four or five mails from that Colony.

2901. Are you aware that before the treaty of Waitangi great abuses took place in the sale of land obtained by individual settlers from the natives?—I do not know of any abuse; I know when parties went from New South Wales and bought scores of thousands of acres of land at a very small price, for guns and other articles of merchandise, and when the native said he wanted so and so, he had it in return for his land.

2902. You are aware, I suppose, that the right of pre-emption was reserved to the Crown for the purpose of protecting the natives from undue influences on the part of individual settlers?—I cannot say that I am.

2903. That is notorious, is it not?—I do not think so; I do not know of any case of bloodshed previous to the treaty of Waitangi, which emanated from the sale of the lands.

2904. Were there not sales which had taken place before the establishment of the Government which would not bear investigation and were disallowed?—A great many people who had large claims did not come down from Sydney and put in those claims within the limited period allowed, but the natives, previous to the treaty, had as much right to sell their lands as any one else, or why have the Government granted titles to the early settlers?

2905. *Chairman.*] Do you know anything of Tasmania?—Not much.

2906. Do you know enough of it to form an opinion as to whether it is able to contribute anything towards its defences?—I should say that Tasmania is in a more healthy position than New Zealand, the native population of New Zealand being so very great, whilst the native population of Tasmania consists, I believe, of only six or seven tribes, and they cost the Imperial Government something like 800*l.* or 1,000*l.* a year.

2907. Is

2907. Is Tasmania, in your opinion, able to contribute something?—I should think it ought to. It has been, of course, a penal settlement for many years, and there are a great many freed convicts in the island at the present time; but a great deal of money has been made in the island out of the commissariat expenditure.

2908. Has not a great deal of money been made in Auckland out of the same source?—Not in proportion. I believe that at one time the commissariat expenditure in Tasmania was nearly 1,000*l.* a day.

2909. Do you not think that one great cause of the prosperity of Auckland results from the commissariat expenditure?—I do not think so; no doubt it has been a great advantage.

2910. If Auckland were the seat of Government, would it possess so many advantages as some other provinces?—Auckland is the best position for the seat of Government, because it is in the centre of the native population, and has easy communication between the east and west coasts.

2911. From your experience, do you say that the wars have been economically carried on, or otherwise?—Looking at what little has been done during the last year, I should say that the wars have been very expensively carried on, and with but little judgment.

2912. In what way?—I may mention that some four or five months ago we had a report that there was to be a fight, and General Gold went into the field with about 1,600 men, and 70 or 80 teams of ammunition and stores; upon halting near a bush, he was fired upon, and the troops were withdrawn, and the whole expedition was abandoned; it was afterwards discovered that there were only 30 or 40 natives there to oppose him and his 1,600 men.

2913. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think that the Colony, if left to itself, would conduct the wars more economically?—Yes; I do not think they would ever go to war.

2914. *Chairman.*] Do you think that the Colonies are, more or less, likely to involve themselves in war when they know that the home Government pays the bill?—We would rather have no wars than the heaviest commissariat expenditure. In war, a few are benefited; but in peace all thrive, and the Colony flourishes.

2915. Mr. *Marsh.*] I understand you to say that the new colonists are in favour of the old system of land purchase?—Yes.

2916. I need hardly ask you which of the colonists are likely to be the best judges?—The older colonists.

2917. Do you think that in political matters missionaries, however excellent they may be, are the best judges?—Certainly not, quite the contrary; and I think that has been clearly proved in the present war.

2918. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you not think that they are good judges of what the natives wish?—Not more than some of the old settlers; they are good judges when their own interests are at stake.

2919. Are you aware that the home Government have been, over and over again, assured by the highest authorities, that it is the decided wish of the natives to maintain the system of Government land-purchase, and that the contrary view, so much advocated by yourself, has always appeared at least to be held by a small majority of the settlers in New Zealand?—I believe that the information sought by the Governor has been obtained from men of high standing, such as Bishop Selwyn, and others; but I do not consider that they are the proper parties to appeal to. Bishop Selwyn himself states, in one of his letters, that New Zealand was taken possession of for the whole and sole benefit of the natives, and so long as Bishop Selwyn adheres to that opinion I do not think that he is a proper person to give an opinion upon a subject like that.

2920. Has the Colonial ministry recommended to the Home Government the abandonment of the Crown right of pre-emption?—Not perhaps in those words, but in words to the same effect they have. When the Territorial Rights Bill was sent home, it was considered that it would be of great advantage to the natives; but it was not approved of. Lord Carnarvon stated, that so long as the Imperial Government paid the navy and military expenses, they would not allow it to go out of their hands.

2921. That Bill, I believe, did not put an end to the Crown's rights over native land?—No, the Government might go on purchasing as usual.

2922. It only enabled the Government to issue Crown titles for land to natives, which Crown titles, when once possessed by a native, would entitle him to sell to

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any buyer?—Yes; certain lands, I think, were reserved to the children of the natives.

2923. On the whole, you give it as your opinion, speaking, as you suppose, for the colonists of New Zealand, that if the colonists had the power of dealing as they pleased with the natives for land, the Colonial Parliament will then be prepared to undertake the whole expenditure of any forces which may be necessary to keep the natives in order?—I should say they would, if we are allowed two or three companies.

2924. The Colony being allowed two or three companies as an Imperial quota in the same way as is done in the Australian Colonies?—Yes, allowing an extra number of companies, according to our native population.

2925. You believe that in saying so you were giving the opinion of the New Zealand Assembly?—I think I am giving the opinion of experienced colonists, especially of the North Island.

2926. Mr. *Baring*.] I understood you to say, that in your opinion the war was carried on at too great an expense?—At too great an expense from the instance I mentioned.

2927. That was simply the fact of an expedition not having succeeded?—Not having succeeded; they were frightened back by a few guns having been fired at them.

2928. That is your opinion of the military proceedings?—That is the general opi nion of the Colony.

2929. Are you a military man?—No.

2930. Have you any military knowledge which you can bring to bear upon the subject of that military expedition?—Certainly not, because I am not a military man.

2931. Have you any suggestions to make in regard to the civil part of the expense?—No; I think that to take out 1,600 men, on the day I referred to, and to do nothing, was a very expensive way of going to work.

2932. Have you any suggestions to make about the expense, except giving your opinion as to the success of that expedition?—I have not.

2933. *Chairman*.] Have you anything to say about stores which are sent out to the Colony?—If the colonists were expected to pay a proportion of the transport, and I think that great alteration ought to be made; only three or four months ago two ships were taken up for Auckland, the "African" and the "Mersey," and the Government sent down to take up 600 or 800 tons freight in those ships, for military stores; there were a great number of wooden forms, and chairs and tables, sent out in those ships, the freight of which alone came to more than those things could be made for in Auckland. If a letter had been sent to Auckland the previous month overland, they could have been made before the "African" and the "Mersey" could have reached Auckland. The charges that were altogether paid must have been something enormous, according to the value of the furniture.

2934. Mr. *Baring*.] How many tons measurement would that be?—I do not know.

2935. Mr. *Marsh*.] The tonnage would be very great, in proportion to the size?—Very great.

2936. General *Peel*.] Was it what is called barrack furniture?—I do not know; I went down to see the stores, but they were blocked up.

2937. How do you know that they consisted of chairs and tables?—I was told of it by my own agent, and if you refer to papers in the War Office you will find what I say is perfectly correct.

2938. When was it?—I think it was in January of this year, or the latter end of December 1860.

2939. Mr. *Baring*.] Have you any other suggestion to make as to the expense connected with the New Zealand expedition?—No; I did not expect to be examined here to-day. I think that they will have to resort to starving the natives out; there is no knowing when the war may terminate; it all depends upon the tribes in the interior.

2940. My question applied simply to the expense?—I think that the Commissariat officer out there is a very careful man; I think he is rather too much so in some things, as he is getting his supplies from Sydney in place of the colonists, and perhaps at not less expense. Under the present circumstances of the war, I should have thought he would have assisted the colonists so long as imposition was not attempted.

Jovis, 16° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Mills.	Mr. Fitzgerald.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Fortescue.
Mr. Baring.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Marsh.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Mr. Roebuck.
Mr. Childers.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Ellice.	

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

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2941. *Chairman.*] YOU are Secretary of State for the Colonies?—Yes.

2942. I believe in 1853 you were Secretary of State for War, and also Secretary of State for the Colonies?—Yes.

2943. Having held office before and after the separation of the two departments, should you say that any practical inconvenience has resulted from that separation, so far as the arrangements for the defence of the Colonies are concerned?—I should be unwilling to say that no practical inconvenience had been felt. I think that a great deal was felt at first; but, as generally happens in these matters, things have adjusted themselves to the altered state of circumstances, and I think that the inconvenience to the department is now more than counterbalanced by the advantages to the public generally.

2944. Has your attention been called to the Report of the Departmental Committee on Colonial Defences, which was presented to Parliament last year?—Yes, or rather to the Reports.

2945. In the letter which in fact forms the subject-matter of the reference to that Committee, this principle is laid down by General Peel, "That England should assist in the defence of her Colonies against aggression on the part of foreign civilized nations, and (in less proportion) of formidable native tribes, but in no case, except where such Colonies are mere garrisons kept up for Imperial purposes, should assume the whole of such defence." Do you concur substantially in that opinion of General Peel?—No, I cannot say that I do; I think it is a theory which looks extremely well on paper, but I do not think that it is one which will bear minute examination, or which can be carried into practice.

2946. In the paragraph which follows, General Peel says that he thinks, "that, as a condition of Her Majesty's aid, the Colony should contribute its share by maintaining, at its own expense, a local force, or, if circumstances appear to make that impossible, by paying part of the imperial garrison;" should you say that that is generally correct?—It is not an easy question to answer in a single sentence, because I differ from the position which is assumed throughout that letter, namely, that one rigid rule can be applied to the whole of the Colonies of the empire. I think that to be an entire fallacy, and therefore I cannot answer it generally. No doubt Colonies ought to contribute in some form or other, generally speaking, to their defence. As regards the question of local force, that is a matter which must be decided according to the exigencies and the circumstances of the different Colonies; I believe a local force is good in some, and very far from good in many others.

2947. Supposing a Colony had the power, financially speaking, of aiding in its own defence, do you think that then it would be safe to lay down the principle that some attempt ought to be made by the Imperial Government to induce such a Colony to make some efforts?—I should say, certainly, that Colonies, properly so called, (and by that, of course, I mean to exclude all Im-

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perial garrisons, unless under certain other peculiar circumstances, such as, we will say, exist upon the coast of Africa), ought to contribute, in some form or other, to their own defence.

2948. It appears from a despatch which has been laid before the Committee, addressed in 1851 by Lord Grey to Lord Elgin, then Governor General of British North America, which despatch conveyed instructions concerning the military arrangements in Canada, that the Imperial garrisons in that Colony were to be reduced to two or three posts considered of importance, Quebec and Kingston being particularly specified; and that the cost of maintaining the barracks and canals then in charge of the Ordnance Department were to be made over to the Canadian Parliament. Can you say whether those arrangements have been since carried out?—Certainly, in the spirit, and almost in the letter, they were carried out by me at the close of the time of my holding the two offices of Secretary of State for the Colonies and Secretary of State for War together. At that time there were four regiments of the line and the Canadian Rifles in Canada. The exigencies of the country being very great, I thought it a good opportunity for carrying into effect those arrangements, having been in private communication with Lord Elgin for some time previous to the breaking out of the war as to the best mode of carrying them out, and inducing the Canadian Government to make their militia an efficient force, which it was not at that time in any sense. When I quitted the Colonial Office, and went to the War Office, the arrangements were still incomplete, but they were completed by Sir George Grey a few months afterwards; those arrangements being, that three out of the four regiments should be withdrawn, leaving only one regiment of the line and the Canadian Rifles holding the posts of Quebec and Kingston. At the same time the detachments were withdrawn from nearly all, if not all, the outposts, and the whole of the Ordnance lands were handed over, after having been roughly valued, to the Canadian Government, upon the distinct understanding that, as a return for that valuable property, they were to maintain a militia force, and to train it annually with a view to the defence of the Colony.

2949. I presume that those instructions of yours were conveyed in the Despatch which has been laid before the Committee, dated August 1854, and addressed to Lieutenant General Rowan, commanding the forces?—I think so; I will not say that that Despatch contains all that was done, because a great deal of the preliminary arrangement passed in private correspondence; but I believe that the official completion of the arrangements was almost entirely carried out by Sir George Grey, and not by myself. As I said before, all the arrangements, so far as official form is concerned, were incomplete when I left the Colonial Office.

2950. I am right, am I not, in saying that the substance of the arrangements which were then carried out was, that two regiments of infantry and three companies of artillery were in that year withdrawn from Canada?—Yes.

2951. And that the force in the Colony was directed to be reduced to one regiment of infantry, two companies of artillery, and the Canadian Rifles?—That was so.

2952. In a Despatch which has also been laid before this Committee, dated May 2d, 1856, addressed by Mr. Labouchere to Sir Edmund Head, I find the following passage: "Orders have been given that five regiments should be directed to be stationed in British North America, of which three are allotted to Canada. That would appear at first sight to be a considerable increase, instead of a reduction; are you aware on what ground that increase was made?—Not being in office at the time, of course I am unable to speak positively; but I have always imagined that one of two causes must have brought that arrangement about, and that it had nothing to do with the defence of the Colony. I should say that it either arose out of anticipated differences at that moment with the United States, consequent upon the dispute with that country upon the recruitment question, or that it was a matter of convenience, with a view to the location of regiments which were withdrawn from the Crimea, and for which there were neither barracks, nor other adequate accommodation in this country. I have only given the answer as wishing to imply that I look upon it as one of the instances in which the increase was occasioned more by motives

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of imperial policy than either at the demand or from the requirements of the Colony.

2953. Sir *George Grey*.] Mr. Labouchere, I think, states, that the amount of forces to be kept in any Colony may vary occasionally for military or political reasons?—Quite so; in my answer I said I imagined that the measure had been adopted as a matter of imperial policy, and not with a view to any demands on the part of the Colony.

2954. I think Mr. Labouchere also stated, that, although the amount of troops in Canada might be more or less at a particular time, the Government still placed their main dependence upon the well-proved loyalty of Her Majesty's Canadian subjects?—Yes; a confidence which I have every reason to believe was perfectly well founded at that time, and is certainly so at this moment.

2955. *Chairman*.] From returns which have been laid before this Committee, it appears that, besides an imperial force now stationed in Canada of 3,118, including the Canadian Rifles, there are now 4,456 militiamen and volunteers in Canada. Are you aware whether those returns represent the actual numbers of the militia who would be available in case of emergency, or are those returns to be regarded merely as paper returns?—I am not able distinctly to answer that question, for I was surprised myself when, looking over that paper this morning, I perceived the strength of the militia so small as is represented; there can be no doubt that, in the event of a war, a much larger body than that would speedily be available. Whether the figures given in the return represent the number of militiamen who answered to the call, and came out during the short training they had last year, I am unable to say, but I rather imagine that that must be the case. As regards the preliminary part of your question, I may be excused for remarking that you have stated the number of imperial forces as considerably higher than that at which it now stands. The return which you have quoted was, I think, for the year 1858 or 1859, prior to the withdrawal of the second regiment of the line, which took place upon the accession of the present Government to office, or almost immediately afterwards. The force at the present moment of all arms in Canada amounts only to 2,220. I may be excused for remarking upon the paper from which I have quoted as distinct from that which was quoted by yourself, that it has a very important bearing upon the inquiry in this Committee, inasmuch as most material changes have taken place, not merely in Canada, but in other Colonies. In the Cape of Good Hope the force is reduced in the present year to rather less than one-half of that which appears in the return for the year 1857.

2956. In reply to Question 76, Mr. Elliot stated, that the existence of a Canadian militia had not the smallest influence in determining the force to be kept there: will you inform the Committee what, in your view, are the Imperial purposes for which we keep a force in Canada?—The defence of the Colony against foreign aggression is one of them.

2957. The frontier line between British North America and the United States extends, I think, to something like 3,000 miles, does it not?—Yes.

2958. Should you think that force adequate for the protection in any way of the North American Provinces in the event of aggression?—Certainly not, by many thousands; but of course it is not necessary with a view to the defence of any country, to keep up in time of peace such a force as would be adequate to resist aggression in time of war; it is necessary, however, as I conceive, to hold certain military posts, and to form a nucleus for troops, and for the extension of a force which we may think it necessary to pour into the country in time of war.

2959. In the event of invasion, it would be necessary to increase that force?—Very greatly, either by the addition of imperial troops, or by the organization of large bodies of militiamen, or in all probability by both.

2960. It appears from the returns laid before this Committee, that the total cost of our defences in respect of the Colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Newfoundland for the year ending 31st March 1859, was about 170,000*l.*, and it appears from another paper laid before the Committee, that, with the exception of a sum of 92*l.* given in the return, those Colonies do not contribute anything towards their military defences; I wish to ask you whether you think, looking at their prosperity and their general resources, they are able to do anything towards their own protection?—Undoubtedly they are able to do some-

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thing towards their own protection. I should not speak of their prosperity as very striking; on the contrary, I should speak of the lower provinces of North America as poor Colonies; their revenue is not large, and the people, although thriving, are not rich; but if your question applies to whether the Colonies should bear any proportion of the expenditure you have quoted, assuming the figures to be correct of 170,000*l.*, I should reply, that I do not think they should be called upon to defray any portion, or any large portion of that sum, for this reason, that the whole of that force, with the exception of a very few men, is concentrated at Halifax. In New Brunswick I think there is a force which does not exceed 100 or 150 men. In Prince Edward Island there is not a single man, and the whole of the remainder, amounting to about 1,800 men, are quartered in Halifax, which I look upon unquestionably as an imperial garrison, and to which it would be manifestly unjust to expect the Colony of Nova Scotia to contribute, or at any rate contribute largely.

2961. The Colony of Nova Scotia, as appears by the last returns I have seen, has a revenue of about 300,000*l.* a year; do you think that the imperial importance of Halifax is a sufficient reason why that Colony should be entirely defended at the cost of this country?—I have not said entirely; but I think it is a reason why a very small proportion of the charge should be allotted to the Colony. I look upon it much as if you were to say that because Portsmouth is in the county of Hampshire, Hampshire should be called upon to pay for the expense of the garrison at Portsmouth. Halifax is not kept up for the benefit of Nova Scotia; but, rightly or wrongly, according to the particular views which men may entertain, it is kept up for imperial purposes. It is an important military post; it is still more important as a naval station, inasmuch as by its natural capabilities it is certainly one of the finest, and in all probability the finest harbour in the world.

2962. There is a small force mentioned in the Army Estimates for Newfoundland, which appears to be borne upon the strength of the imperial army, called the Newfoundland Fencibles; for what purpose is that maintained, is it against possible aggression, or for the maintenance of order?—I should say it was for mixed purposes; no doubt principally for the maintenance of order in the Colony; but that rather involves a further statement, which is, that when there is disorder in the Colony, it generally arises out of quarrels between the English settlers and the French fishermen, and therefore it is desirable to have a certain force at command in the event of any disturbances of that sort. I should think undoubtedly that it is a mixed purpose, partly Colonial and partly imperial; but considering our obligations by a series of treaties with the French, by which they are allowed to exercise important rights upon our shores, the exercise of which rights is of course exceedingly distasteful to the inhabitants of Newfoundland, and is to be maintained by us in consequence of the obligation of treaties, I should say, that the object of keeping any forces there is more imperial than local.

2963. I presume that such a force as that would have no reference to the possibility of difficulties with France in reference to the fishery question?—Not with France as a nation; but with French fishermen, riots in fact, or disturbances which are likely to arise from the animosity which inevitably springs from an impression which exists there, that by the treaty with this country the French exercise rights to which they, the settlers, are alone entitled.

2964. In 1849 a report was presented to Parliament of a survey for a military road or railroad connecting the British American Provinces, which, I think, had previously been the subject of inquiry by Lord Durham, Sir Robert Peel, Mr. Gladstone, and Lord Grey. Was that scheme brought under your consideration when you were in office in 1854?—Yes, it was, several times.

2965. Am I right in supposing that the only access by railway into the heart of Canada during the seven months that the St. Lawrence is closed, is through the State of Maine, by way of Portland?—That is correct.

2966. Do you think that in practice inconveniences may arise from that state of things in an Imperial point of view?—Certainly it is desirable for the development of the resources of the provinces and for Imperial purposes that an independent railway should be made, but of course that, like all great railway schemes, is a question of money.

2967. Did that proposal at any time assume the form of any arrangement by which the Colonies were to take upon themselves the cost of their defences on the understanding that they should have some assistance towards the cost of constructing

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constructing their railways?—I do not recollect any proposal by which the Colonies were to take upon themselves their own defences. I recollect that there were various proposals which never came to anything like an agreement, by which the Colonies were to do certain things and to bear certain expenses, and the Imperial Government was to guarantee a loan for carrying out those railways. That has been a matter of frequent discussion. I do not say that no proposal has been made as to the self defence of the Colony, but it was not so during my time, nor do I recollect that it was so with any other Secretary of State.

2968. Do you think that a federal union of the North American Provinces would tend to facilitate the arrangements for the more efficient and economical defence of those provinces?—That is a very important political question, and I am rather disinclined to answer it in any sense which should imply, on my part, before a Committee of this character, the advocacy of a federal union. The Committee are perfectly well aware that various schemes have been proposed, some for a federal union, some for a legislative union, and it is a question which has been much discussed, and in which opposing interests in Canada and the Lower Provinces are materially involved; and I would rather not answer the question except to this extent, that of course any plan which threw the Government of all those countries into an united power would facilitate arrangements for the construction of railways. It would obviate the necessity of mutual financial arrangements which at present are inevitable in the various Colonies through which the line must pass.

2969. I do not know whether there are now any Imperial troops at the Red River Settlement?—At this moment there are, but there is only a small detachment of Canadian Rifles, which has been ordered to return to head quarters. The arrangements for their return are not yet completed, in consequence of the time of year not having arrived, and also of the short period during which they can be removed, by the way of Hudson's Bay from the Red River Settlement.

2970. Evidence has been given before the Committee as to a certain number of military engineers sent out to New Westminster in British Columbia; can you inform the Committee of the substance of the arrangements made in regard to those men as to the source from which the cost of sending them out and keeping them there was to be defrayed?—I believe that the arrangement made by Sir Edward Lytton was that, for a time not strictly limited, those men were to be paid out of Imperial funds, and they have been so paid up to the present time; but I consider that the arrangements were such, that it would be the duty of the Colonial Office to cease proposing a vote to Parliament as soon as the finances of the Colony will allow of this expense being paid from Colonial funds, because the men were sent very much more for Colonial than for Imperial purposes. The engineer force was selected under the impression that it would facilitate road-making and other operations of that kind in the Colony.

2971. It has been stated that a very large cost apparently, considering the number of men, was incurred; I think it has been said that about 60,000*l.* has been spent in respect of those engineers; they were sent out, I think, across the Isthmus?—They were.

2972. I suppose that must have increased the expense?—Off hand, I could not say; but I should think not. I should think the expense would be much about the same, unless it was difficult to make arrangements at the time for their conveyance northwards from the Isthmus.

2973. Do you know what has been the kind of employment of those men since they have been out there?—It has been a mixed military and civil engineering duty. I do not myself think that it has been a very fortunate experiment as regards the progress of road-making.

2974. I believe that, in a Despatch to Sir James Douglas, in September 1859, you stated that the regimental pay would be borne by Great Britain, but that you expressed the hope that the Colonial pay and allowances would be borne by the Colony?—Yes.

2675. What is the exact meaning of that Colonial pay and allowances? Is it to be assumed that in that as in other Colonies, the practice will be observed of giving increased pay?—Certainly, that was the object, and it is more necessary in that Colony than almost in any other, on account of the expense of living, and the extreme difficulty there is in obtaining supplies of all sorts.

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2976. As I understand, some arrangements have been entered into by the Imperial Government by which the cost of sending those troops out was hereafter to be defrayed by the Colony when the Colony might be able to do so; am I correct in that?—Without having the papers before me I should not like to be too positive, but I have no recollection of any such understanding. Looking at the time which has passed, and to the invariable result of all understandings of that sort, I could not hold out the smallest expectation of any reimbursement by the Colony of money already expended.

2977. Mr. *Ellice.*] Has any estimate been laid before you by the projectors of the railway by the coast round from Halifax to Quebec, to connect those Colonies, which would incline you to believe that there would be sufficient traffic on that railway to repay the capital that might be invested in it?—No estimate has been laid before me during the two years I have now been at the Colonial Office, but estimates were laid before me when I was there seven or eight years ago, and my impression at that time certainly was, that none of those lines could pay as independent lines, but could only pay as part of a greater scheme which was at that time the one most favourably entertained. From Rivière du Loup down to St. John's or Halifax, or any other southern terminus, I cannot imagine that any such line as that by itself could pay.

2978. Then if those lines are constructed, the projectors must depend upon Government assistance?—When you say Government assistance, it must either be from the Imperial Government or from the Colonial Government, or from the Companies possessing lines in Canada, which might think it worth their while to assist the formation of a line which should give it a British Port.

2979. According to any information you have received, have the lines hitherto constructed in Canada been remunerative to the capitalists who have invested their money?—I fear not, generally speaking.

2980. You would not be of opinion that these other lines would be remunerative to the capitalists engaged in them, unless assistance was given to them by the Colonial Treasury or the Treasury at home?—Not at present; I am not saying what might not be the case, when the resources of that great country are further developed.

2981. Sir *George Grey.*] With reference to the question of the North American Colonies contributing anything toward their defence, is it not the case that in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island every adult male is enrolled in the militia, and is liable to be embodied in case of attack?—Yes, that is so; and when I said they contributed nothing, I meant they contributed nothing to the expenditure of the regular force stationed there; not only is there a militia enrolled in all those Colonies, but the enrolment for the militia has been made use of without calling them out for the formation of a volunteer force. I am glad of the opportunity of being able to state that there is a very earnest spirit of volunteering in the whole of these Colonies, even in Newfoundland at this time. Last year there were four good companies formed; in Nova Scotia there were about 2,000 volunteers; a very excellent and well-drilled battalion in Halifax, besides companies in various other parts of the province; in New Brunswick there were a greater number of independent companies, and in New Brunswick the militia organization was availed of, that is to say, that all the volunteers were what they call volunteer militiamen, which is not the case in the other provinces. In Prince Edward Island there were also a considerable number of companies. By the return I see that there are 5,500 for Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, there being 4,456 in Canada. I should imagine, from what we have heard since, that although our returns may not give any number greater than 1,006 for the whole of British North America, in fact the number very considerably exceeds that at the present time, although we have not received any official information of it.

2982. *Chairman.*] You think it would not be at all an exaggerated expectation for us to form, that there would be at all events in the British North American Colonies 10,000 volunteers and militia ready and willing to submit themselves to discipline if required?—Ten thousand would not represent one-tenth of those who would come forward upon occasion. The Colonies themselves, although unwilling to pay large sums out of their comparatively small revenue for military purposes in time of peace, when they have roads and other works

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works to construct, which exhaust their available resources, whenever there has been any threat of war have invariably shown the best spirit and the greatest readiness to come forward and assist the Imperial Government. Nova Scotia, which, although possessing a revenue of 300,000 *l.* a year, is not only a poor Colony, but has a debt of 1,000,000 *l.* upon which to pay interest, besides railways to keep up and complete, and roads to make, voted upon one occasion 100,000 *l.* to assist New Brunswick, when it was expected that New Brunswick would be invaded.

2983. Do you not think that the facts you have been mentioning afford good ground for believing that so far as the *personnel* of a force is concerned, those Colonies have abundant materials for their defence, and that it is not a want of men from which they suffer?—Certainly; but at the same time those men may be available, in cases of great emergency, although where the rate of wages is so very high, they are not willing in time of peace to devote any large portion of their time to military defence.

2984. I apprehend in all cases of a volunteer force there is a certain amount of sacrifice even in this country?—Yes.

2985. It would be the case also in the Colonies?—Yes.

2986. Evidence has been given in respect to the local corps in various Colonies; do you think that in reference to the North American Colonies, both with a view to economy in saving the cost of transport, and also with a view to securing a force less likely to desert than regiments of the line, we might look within a reasonable time to these Colonies to provide entirely the *personnel* of their forces?—I cannot imagine that they can ever be in a position to provide by volunteers a force for those services for which Imperial troops are required in British North America. That force consists of a regiment of Canadian Rifles, which is a local force, and three regiments of the line, one being quartered in Canada, and two in Nova Scotia. I cannot conceive the state of things in which great forts like Quebec and Halifax can be maintained by a volunteer force. I think that a volunteer force may be called upon for the defence of the Colony, and that the spirit which has shown itself in raising 10,000 or 15,000 men would show itself to a greater extent in the event of an emergency; but I cannot anticipate that any volunteer efforts can supply the place of the present amount of Imperial troops.

2897. Mr. *Roebuck.*] In the present condition of North America, do you think that the defences of the Colony could be safely confided to the Colony?—Not exclusively. I should say it would be impossible to entrust the defence of the Colony to the volunteer forces, unaided by any Imperial troops; but as I have said before we must in all probability meet large efforts on the part of the Colony by corresponding assistance from home.

2988. Do you think that the difficulties are merely those belonging to an army, or do they not belong also to the political condition of the Colony?—Of course the political condition of the Colony must form an element in the consideration; but if I rightly understand the question to refer to the spirit of the people themselves, I do thoroughly believe it may be relied upon. If, on the contrary, you mean that in the present state of a neighbouring country, Canada might be the scene of hostile incursions by filibustering parties, which is not an uncommon consequence of the state of excitement existing there now, then no doubt for the purpose of meeting aggressions of that irregular kind, an organized regular force is better, and is more trustworthy than a volunteer force; when I say more trustworthy, I mean it is more under command.

2989. Have you ever considered the consequences of a confederation free from slavery, upon the political condition and the political opinions of Canada?—Yes, I have considered that very frequently.

2990. Under those changed circumstances, supposing they were to occur, do you think that we could in any degree, or in any large degree depend upon the Colony for its own defence?—Those are very speculative questions with regard to what may arise hereafter; all I can say is, that I believe that at the present moment, there is not a population more loyally disposed to the British Crown than the Canadian population; and when I speak of them, I speak not only of the English but quite as much of the French portion of the population.

2991. This Committee has reference to a future state of things, and what I wish

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wish to elicit from you is your belief as to the safety of any legislation which should confide the defence of the Colony in great part to the Colony, and therefore I ask your Grace whether under present circumstances, and in the possible future of that country, it would, in your opinion, be safe for us to legislate so as to confide that defence to themselves?—Those are all questions of degree. You have put your question in two different forms already, one referring to partial defence, and the other I think to exclusive defence.

2992. Largely?—Largely, I think you might; but I do not say entirely. I think one of the duties which devolve upon the mother country is the defence of a Colony. I do not know what advantage a Colony would find in its relative position, if the mother country did not protect it. Just on account of the peculiar position of Canada, I think the Imperial Government is bound to keep up a certain amount of force in time of peace, and a much larger force in the event of war with those parties who would be aggressive. Canada stands in a different position from any other Colony we have; take, for instance, Australia, upon which I understand some questions are to be put presently; the real defence of Australia must be by our fleet, but the fleet can do little to assist Canada, except it is by sending small vessels up the St. Lawrence, and nearly the whole assistance to be rendered by this country to Canada, must be of course by a land force.

2993. *Chairman.*] Assuming that Halifax, Quebec and Kingston are to be garrisoned in sufficient strength, would you mainly regard the presence of a portion of British troops in the North American Colonies, besides those garrisons, as available for the purpose of forming the nucleus for a force which might be recruited in the Colony, or do you think we can never look to the time when a force may be recruited within the Colonies for their own defence? Evidence has been given by colonists that they have regarded the presence of a certain number of British troops as available for improving the discipline of other forces to be organized in those Colonies?—I look upon a certain amount of Imperial military force as essential for all those purposes; and as regards the future, if I may combine the question now put with one put just now by another member of the Committee, I should say, so far as I can anticipate events, that I cannot imagine the time in which, if I had the honour still to be Secretary of State, I could advise for Imperial interests the maintenance of a lesser force than that now maintained in North America. I believe it is now reduced to its minimum. I could imagine various circumstances in which I should advise an increase of that force. The payment is another matter altogether; but that I have already expressed my opinion upon; I am now speaking only of the amount of force.

2994. Do you think that there are any circumstances in regard to the organization of the Canadian Rifles which would make it desirable that such a force should be increased, or do you think that we should increase our regiments of the line when necessary?—I think, as a general rule, a local force is not very desirable or so efficient as one which is periodically relieved from home. A local force becomes identified with the population; they lose a great deal of their military discipline, but in Canada there are special reasons for that particular force. The propinquity of the United States and the high rate of wages have caused desertion from the British army to a great extent; if a regiment goes over to North America with a number of recruits and unmarried men, it is very likely to have its ranks diminished by desertion very soon after it gets there. The formation of the Canadian Rifles is of a totally different character; it is formed of men who are allowed to quit a regiment which has been sent to Canada, generally speaking when the regiment leaves the colony, and are permitted to enlist in the Canadian Rifles, and the result is that they almost always do so, for the purpose of marrying and settling there; they are, generally speaking, the *élite* of the men, and I may mention that they are more decorated than any other five regiments in the service together; there is hardly a man amongst them who does not wear three, or four or five medals, and I should look upon it as an advantage if another regiment of Canadian Rifles could be formed; but then arises the question which has been so much discussed, namely, the payment. When I was in Canada last year, I privately asked several public men whether they did not think that another such regiment would be advantageous. They all said it would, and they would be glad to see it; but when I asked if they would like to pay for it, they with one voice said "no, certainly not."

2995. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Canada, at the present time, governs itself?—Yes.

2996. It excludes, if it pleases, as it has pleased, English goods by large duties; if they were to have a majority of the defences of their colony under their own control, in what way would they be distinguished from an independent State?—The distinction would be infinitesimal almost; the great distinction now is, the maintenance of Imperial garrisons.

2997. So that the colony now is simply a cost to this country?—I cannot allow that by any means; such an opinion would strike at the root of all colonial possessions in any part of the world. Without entering into the discussion, I must be excused if I do not, by my silence, admit the position that they have excluded English goods by their legislation; that their tariff is higher than, either for their own sakes or for English manufactures, would be desirable, I admit, but I do not think that it has been imposed for protection purposes, but on account of the financial position of the country.

2998. Mr. *Marsh.*] I think you say that there are volunteers in Newfoundland?—Yes.

2999. And that the troops are sometimes employed in putting down riots between English and French fishermen?—I do not say that they have been recently so employed, but I think that is a reason why it is not desirable to leave the colonies without a force of that description.

3000. Volunteers would be a bad kind of force to put down a riot of that description?—Certainly.

3001. And a very undesirable force?—Certainly.

3002. Do you know why troops were sent to the Red River?—In consequence of an apprehension entertained by the Hudsons' Bay Company that disturbances were likely to arise on the part of the Indians, and I think also some of our neighbours.

3003. Was it partly to protect the Indians?—To maintain order.

3004. What is the form of government at present in British Columbia; have they a free government?—They have not.

3005. Is it not to come into operation within two years or five years from the time of the passing of the British Columbia Bill?—There is no particular form of constitution which is to come into operation in two years, or any definite time; I am not certain whether you are not speaking of the Bill as originally proposed.

3006. When the Government is made free, do you think it probable that you will more easily get them to pay for those engineers than at present?—I should imagine that it would be much more difficult; at the present moment, if the funds are there, we can pay ourselves. In the second case, we should have to ask.

3007. Mr. *Roebuck.*] You have been asked whether the railway between Canada and Nova Scotia would be a paying railway. Is its being a paying railway or not a sufficient and sole reason for the making of that railway, in your opinion?—Certainly not; I have always thought that great political interests are involved, and it was this alone which induced me to take so much pains with the subject as I did seven or eight years ago. I never imagined that it was likely to be a paying line under existing circumstances.

3008. The remuneration ought not to be the sole consideration for making the railway?—I think not; but then if you are going upon any other principle the question is who is to find the money.

3009. Mr. *Adderley.*] I understood your Grace to say that the only remaining feature of dependence in Canada upon England is the distinction of Imperial garrisons?—I do not think I said the only one. What I intended to say was, that I thought the distinction between a colony and an independent country, if you withdraw all notion of defending it, would become infinitesimal.

3010. I understood you to say that the continuance of the cost of the defence of the colony upon the English tax payers is to keep up that remaining feature of dependence?—It is not a question of dependence, but a question of colonial empire. Of course, if it is considered that the continuance of our colonial empire is of no consequence, then there is no justification for the continuance of military support; but that is a large question into which I would rather not enter before this Committee. I believe that the retention of our colonial empire is of importance to us.

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3011. I presume that when you asked the question in Canada, as to the advisability of an increased force of Canadian rifles, and you found an unwillingness on the part of the Canadians to pay, that implied that your Grace was of opinion that they should pay more than they do?—I do not think it implied that opinion; my opinion was, that a second Canadian regiment was preferable to a regiment of the line. I do not expect that his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge would be willing to reduce the army to 99 regiments, but that if there was to be an additional regiment in Canada it would have to be paid, not by an increase to the Army Estimates of this country, but by the Colonial Legislature of Canada. My question applied to the superiority of the Canadian regiment over any regiment of the line for service in that country, and I was anxious to see a second regiment of the same kind. I collected therefore the opinions of people, and I found that they concurred with me, but when I said we cannot raise another regiment at the expense of England, are you ready to pay for it, they all said "No, our arrangements have been made with the English Government, you reduced our force to so and so, upon certain conditions; we have fulfilled those conditions, and we are not inclined to pay for another regiment."

3012. The only objection to another regiment, which they considered necessary, was to paying for it?—They did not consider it necessary, nor do I. I said that for service in Canada, I considered the Canadian rifle regiment is better suited than any which could be sent from this country. I could see no means of forming a second regiment, except by getting Canada to pay for it; to that they objected, saying it was not an expense calculated in the arrangements made in 1854.

3013. That reluctance to pay on the part of any Colony for that which they hoped England would pay for them, has been the great difficulty in accepting a local force in any of them?—No doubt; but I have already said I must not be supposed to be a general advocate for the raising of a local force. When I speak of the Canadian rifles, I speak of them as a special instance. I do not wish to see the Cape rifles or the Ceylon rifles abandoned; but I do not wish to see any great extension of that force.

3014. When you say that Novia Scotia voted a large sum to assist New Brunswick, does not that indicate that when danger is felt, and they have to trust to themselves, money will be forthcoming?—Certainly.

3015. When you say that the Colonies have always come forward readily when necessity arose, has it not invariably been at our expense that they have so come forward?—The very instance you have just been quoting, is an instance to the contrary.

3016. Does your Grace know of any other instance?—Certainly; in former days, in the last war with America, the provinces came forward; what was done afterwards as to payment I do not remember.

3017. Every farthing I believe was paid by this country?—I am inclined to think that was not the case, but without looking back, I could not be quite positive about it; I am sure they were always ready to find men.

3018. When you say that Colonial troops could never do what our troops do, as for instance, in holding Quebec and Kingston, and similar posts, do you think that the garrisons we have placed in those two posts, really hold them in any practical sense?—I think they would be able to hold them for a considerable time until it was possible to relieve them.

3019. Does your Grace think that 1,300 troops in the garrison at Halifax could hold that place in the first instance against any attack by a foreign enemy?—It is very presumptuous in me to express an opinion on military matters, but so far as I can judge, I should think they certainly could, aided as they would be by a considerable volunteer force, which is ready to give them assistance, although I adhere to the opinion that I expressed just now, that no volunteer force could hold such a place by themselves.

3020. You think that Nova Scotia is unable or unwilling either in men or money to furnish the garrison for the protection of Halifax?—If you are speaking of time of peace I should say so decidedly; if you are speaking of time of war, I have already said they would be ready to afford men, and the money would be matter for arrangement between the mother country and the colony. In time of peace they would be unwilling to supply volunteers for the maintenance of the garrison, because they would cease to be volunteers, and must

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must be converted into regular soldiers, instead of living by the large wages which they earn by their industrial pursuits at this moment.

3021. You said it would be as hard to inflict upon Nova Scotia the whole cost of keeping up the garrison of Halifax as it would be to inflict upon Hampshire the expense of keeping up Portsmouth. Keeping up that parallel does your Grace think it fair to impose upon Nova Scotia its share of the expense of the Imperial fort at Halifax, as Hampshire bears its full share of the cost of defence in England?—I think it might be perfectly fair. It is extremely difficult to argue those questions upon principles of business, and it is a very small ground to take. If you ask them for their contribution, which contribution is to be raised upon the principle of the amount of benefit which they derive, it would be so ludicrously small that it would be worth nothing to the estimates of this country, and I think it would be a very pettifogging and weak argument; it might reduce the expense by some few pounds, and it would not be worth while to ask a poor colony like Nova Scotia to contribute it. It would be a flea bite to the Imperial Government, and it would be the source of grumbling and discontent on the part of the Colony. I look upon Halifax as an Imperial post, quite as much as I do upon Gibraltar or Malta. Supposing Halifax, instead of being in a Colony, was a rock in the sea, I think that England would consider it worth its while to maintain it as an Imperial post.

3022. Mr. *Marsh.*] Just as we do at Bermuda?—Precisely.

3023. Mr. *Ellice.*] Is your Grace of opinion that possessing Bermuda and going to great expense, as we now are, in making it impregnable, it is necessary to have another fortress in that part of the world?—I consider the two to be so dissimilar that I cannot look upon the one as an equivalent for the other in any respect whatever. Halifax is a great naval station, but Bermuda is a very bad naval station; it is a military post which you keep up for military purposes, but the ships which can go into the harbour of Bermuda are only small ones; a first rate ship of the line can hardly get into Bermuda; even such a vessel as the "Nile" was obliged to lie off Bermuda last year for several days waiting for a quiet sea before it could go into the harbour. In Halifax all the navies in the world can be sheltered. In that magnificent harbour called the "Bedford Basin," you might fight a naval engagement, and in the other two harbours any number of vessels might ride in safety.

3024. You consider that a fair ground upon which Her Majesty's colonial subjects should be exempted from any contribution to this Imperial defence to which British tax payers are liable?—I think that Halifax is maintained for Imperial purposes, and I think that the troops which appear in the return under the head of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are, so far as Nova Scotia is concerned, almost, if not quite (I believe quite), confined to Halifax, and never go beyond the bounds of the garrison. It would be perfectly fair, no doubt, to call upon them to contribute something; it is an advantage to them that the military spend money there. The troops are ready in the event of any local disturbances, and in the event of any filibustering expeditions, there would be these troops to suppress them; and, therefore, if it became a question of mere fairness, I cannot deny that it would be perfectly fair that some portion should be contributed by Nova Scotia; but I doubt its being worth the while of this country to enter into a long, litigious, and unfriendly communication with them, their Legislature no doubt resisting, upon a point which would involve pounds, shillings and pence, to a very limited amount.

3025 Do you think that such an arrangement could not become to without a long and litigious correspondence?—Yes, I do think so; these colonies have Legislatures of their own, and they are as punctilious about their rights as the House of Commons of this country; it no longer rests with the Governor, Lord Mulgrave, or Sir Edmund Head, to put his hands into the colonial funds and pay a small sum towards the military expenditure, but he must go to his Parliament and ask for a vote, and I am sure they would refuse it.

3026. You consider it difficult to get a Legislature, or any individual person, to pay for that which other persons are disposed to pay for?—As a general rule, no doubt that is so, and for that reason I do not think that it is very desirable for the Secretary of State to enter into what are called negotiations with a colony upon the question of expense. It will come to very little in many cases, and to nothing in most, and would create a strong feeling of disaffection

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which is not worth purchasing at the price of the small amount you would get. I do not say, therefore, that you are to submit to the continuation of a large expenditure, but you must make use of the means within your own power, that is, you must reduce the military force to such an amount as you believe necessary.

3027. The withdrawal of troops would, of course, cut short all negotiations?—Of course it would, because you are then acting upon your own responsibility.

3028. In the last despatch from Prince Edward Island, we find that Mr. Dundas says, that in consequence of the troops being withdrawn, that colony is wholly defenceless. I understand your Grace to say, that there is now a considerable force of volunteers there; does your Grace attribute the raising of that force to the fact of the troops having been withdrawn?—Certainly not; because in Halifax, to which place the troops were taken, the spirit of volunteering is stronger than in Prince Edward Island.

3029. There is an expression of alarm on the part of Mr. Dundas, as to the defenceless state of Prince Edward Island: was not that the cause of the volunteers being raised?—Certainly not. The force for Prince Edward Island was withdrawn by me in 1854, and the reason was, that the Crown had corresponded for some time with the authorities of Prince Edward Island, in order to induce them to take the necessary measures for the suppression of desertion, which was very flagrant, in the island, and we found them so impracticable, because they were only too glad to get soldiers to desert, in order to increase the number of settlers, that the only resource we had was to withdraw all the troops. There was no attempt made to raise any force of volunteers until the spirit which arose in this country extended itself over the colonial possessions of the Empire, and then, but not till then, Prince Edward Island took it up with all the rest.

3030. In a despatch from Sir Edmund Head to your Grace, in August 1859, I find it stated that the Militia Act had been made permanent, but that he regretted to state that the state of the finances rendered necessary a reduction in the sums allowed for drilling the volunteer corps, and for establishing them. May not that reduction account for the smaller return of militia, which seemed rather to surprise your Grace?—If I am right in my conjecture, it would explain the smaller number called out. What Sir Edmund Head alluded to was, that in the previous year, a certain sum had been voted for a certain number of days' training, and that a lesser sum was voted in the year to which he referred, for a smaller number of days' training of the same force. It was an economical measure to meet the financial position of the colony.

3031. In a despatch from your Grace to Sir James Douglas in September, 1859, I find that you laid down the rule that regimental pay in British Columbia should be borne by Imperial funds; colonial pay and allowances by colonial funds?—Yes.

3032. In an answer given by your Grace to-day, you said that you hoped that those payments would cease as soon as the colony could pay more. Do you anticipate that the colony will pay altogether for the troops sent there by England?—Yes, for the engineers, I think it is quite possible. I said I was not without hopes that before long, the votes in our estimates would cease.

3033. Do you mean that the regimental pay, and also the extra pay, should be borne by the Colony?—Yes; but with the condition that the engineers remained there, because I am by no means certain that it would be found desirable to continue this service in the Colony. I think it possible that the force might with advantage to the Colony, and to the mother country, be withdrawn.

3034. Sir Alexander Bannerman, Governor of Newfoundland, states in one of his despatches, that if the fishery question were clearly defined, he thought that the ships of war upon the station would be needless, and that a cutter or two, for police purposes, during six months in the year only would be required; are steps being taken to define that fishery question, so as to permit the withdrawal of ships of war, and the reduction of the force on that station to a police cutter or two?—The negotiations with the French Government have been going on for a considerable time; when I left England, in July last, there was so little in my opinion remaining to be done, that I was induced to hold out to Sir Alexander Bannerman the expectations that within another post or two,

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two, the treaty might come out signed and ratified; subsequent negotiations have been protracted at Paris. So far as the English Government is concerned, every thing was brought to a close about this time last year, and it still hangs over in Paris; but I hope that in a short time definite arrangements may be made, in which case Sir Alexander Bannerman's expectations will be in the main carried out. He was not then, and is not now, aware of the stipulations of the treaty.

3035. Mr. *Fortescue.*] With respect to Nova Scotia, do you think that if in time of peace the announcement were made to them that every Imperial soldier was to be withdrawn, it would make any practical difference, or would induce them to raise a greater local force, or to offer a contribution towards the cost of maintaining Imperial troops?—I think it might produce just this difference,—that it would cause the whole volunteer spirit to cease; I am certain it would not induce them to contribute a single shilling towards the support of the force, even if they saw the ships in the harbour ready to sail, and to carry them all away to-morrow.

3036. You have no doubt that Nova Scotia for example, would make very great exertions in time of actual danger?—I have no doubt of it; I have no doubt that so long as the Imperial government shows a disposition to support them in time of peace, and to prevent war, that they would in time of war, behave generously and properly towards supporting the Imperial Government in their own defence, and in maintaining the general interest of the empire.

3037. One great distinction between Hampshire and Nova Scotia is, that Hampshire through her representative, directs the Imperial policy?—Certainly.

3038. While the taxpayers of Nova Scotia are liable to find themselves involved in a war in which they have had no voice, by the action of the taxpayers of Hampshire?—Certainly.

3039. Mr. *Baxter.*] I understand your Grace to say that you think at some time the military force in the North American Provinces may be reduced?—No, I do not anticipate the time.

3040. Do you think that the time will come when the military expenditure of that force will be reduced by a contribution on the part of the Colony?—I cannot myself foresee the time. You are right in drawing the distinction in my answer between the maintenance of a force, and who should pay for it. I say I do not see the possibility of diminishing it, I can more readily look forward to the time when it may bear a larger proportion. As a practical question, I cannot anticipate the time of diminution; it is quite possible that altered circumstances may produce it.

3041. You think that the time may possibly arrive?—I think it may, but it is a speculative question, because I think it would involve a great change of political relationship throughout North America.

3042. You do not think that it would produce any serious discontent in North America if we asked for a contribution to the Imperial military expenditure?—It would not produce any great discontent if you are prepared to submit to a negative. I cannot anticipate anything but a negative, and it is a very undignified position I think for the Imperial Government to stand in, that it should go begging to Nova Scotia to pay a certain small sum, and then be content with their saying "no," because you have no means of enforcing it.

3043. Is there any special reason why you should expect a negative from the North American Colonies, when such an answer has not been given by some other Colonies?—Where any answer in the affirmative has been given, it has been under favourable circumstances for making the proposition, and where they had objects of their own to meet, and where also they had a large surplus revenue, as in the case of the Australian Colonies.

3044. You anticipate a negative from Canada, in consequence of their revenue being small?—Not merely that, because a short time ago the revenue of Canada was very prosperous, and I think that the feeling was equally strong then. They have been accustomed to the maintenance of a much larger force at Imperial cost, and when that force was reduced, and certain arrangements were made with them, they considered that a bargain was entered into, and they are not now willing to re-open that bargain.

3045. Do you consider that any sufficient reason why Canada should refuse to contribute, at a time when her revenue is prosperous, seeing that the Australian

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Colonies have been willing and anxious to contribute. The situation of the Colonies is very different. They say "Of what use is this military force to us, except as a Colony of Great Britain? If we are involved in war, we must have British troops to defend us, because if we are involved in war, it must be by the act of the mother country; we cannot be so involved by any army except from the United States; it would not be a quarrel with us, it must be some such question as San Juan, or the recruitment dispute with reference to the army in the Crimea, which involves us in the war; we shall suffer enough then, and we are not inclined to pay in time of peace for the preservation of that relationship, which would bring upon us so much mischief by and by." That is the way in which they argue.

3046. Has there been any correspondence between the Colonial Office and the Colonial Government upon that subject?—Not since 1854. It was then that these arrangements were made, and by them the Imperial expenditure was much reduced. The Imperial expenditure for military purposes in British North America must have been at that time something like a million a year. Previous to 1854 there were four regiments of the line, and the Canadian rifles in Canada, and a large force of artillery, besides the force in the Lower Provinces, and it is easy to calculate that that must have entailed a very heavy expense upon this country. It was reduced with the understanding that the Colony was to do such and such things; and they consider that is an arrangement that ought to be binding, and they are not willing to re-open it.

3047. Do you approve of the Imperial Government undertaking the erection of new fortifications in Canada?—No. We have engaged to keep a certain force there; and if we built increased fortifications, it would involve an increased force.

3048. You think that the expense of any further fortifications should be borne by the Colony itself?—I should doubt the policy of erecting any further fortifications. It is an enormous line of frontier, and it is impossible to say where an attack would be made. Most of the towns are not naturally very defensible, and I think it is far better to leave their defence to the emergencies of war.

3049. Do you think that there is a strong desire in Canada for the maintenance of British troops in Canada?—If you withdraw the military force there now they would look upon it as an abandonment of them. I do not think there would be any very loud outcry; but it would materially alter their feelings, not on their own part so much, as in the apprehension that you were going to desert them.

3050. Do you think that that feeling would be altered if we asked them to pay one-half of the expense?—I have said that if you are to be content with a simple negative it would not; but if it is to be merely the commencement of a long wrangle with them, resulting in the same conclusion, it would produce a great deal of ill feeling.

3051. *Chairman.*] Since 1854, the time when the arrangement of which you spoke was made, it appears that the force in the North American Colonies has not been in a state of progressive reduction, but rather fluctuating?—I have already stated in answer to some questions in the early part of my examination, that that was done without any communication with the Colony, and for Imperial purposes. It was a convenience to us to send those troops there; they were not required by the Colony, and beyond the towns and villages in which they were placed, which no doubt derived advantages from the commissariat, I do not think that the Colony wished a single man. As regards the arrangements made with the Colony in 1854, the force at present there, and in British North America throughout, is the same that was stationed there as part of the bargain with the Colony in 1854.

3052. Do you think it correct to say that we have consulted our own Imperial convenience in regard to those arrangements, and that if we had not an Indian mutiny, or a Russian war on hand, it would be more convenient to us to keep a certain portion of our troops in Canada; but if on the other hand we had severe duties to perform in other parts of the world, we must send our troops there?—Frequently that has been the case, and looking at it as a question between the mother country and the Colony, it would not be fair to take the figures before you, and to charge the whole of the military force against the Colony,

Colony, as if it were sent there for Colonial purposes. The same answer applies to many troops sent to the Cape of Good Hope.

3053. Sanitary considerations would in some cases also operate?—Frequently; it is always the practice when a white regiment has been some time in the West Indies, to send it to British North America, or some more healthy climate.

3054. Some despatches have been laid before the Committee, addressed by Sir William Denison to the Government at home, in reference to carrying further the arrangement made by Lord Grey in 1851?—Yes.

3055. I observe that in these despatches, Sir William Denison suggests that in accordance with the practice adopted with respect to the naval survey of the Australian coast, the cost of the military defences of these colonies should be shared equally between the Imperial and the Colonial Government. Do you concur in that view?—I think that a great deal may be said in favour of the arrangement, but I doubt whether it is one which could be permanently adopted; and I should greatly doubt its being one which could be extensively carried out; that is to say, I doubt whether it would be applicable to many other colonies besides the Australian.

3056. The Australian Colonies, I understand, contribute very largely?—Two of them do, namely New South Wales and Victoria.

3057. It appears, however, that Tasmania contributes nothing towards its defences, and the reason which has been given to the Committee for its non-contribution is, that Tasmania having been recently a penal settlement, lies under special circumstances which exempt it from the ordinary rule. It appears that seven years ago transportation to Tasmania ceased. Would it be right to say that the ground upon which that exemption had been permitted to continue is, that in Tasmania there are still convicts who have not completed their sentence?—That has been the ground.

3058. Do you think that now, considering the large extent to which that Colony has been enriched by convict labour, and the commissariat expenditure, it is necessary to continue it?—I think that it cannot continue much longer. I think that the time is rapidly approaching when a change should be made, and that Tasmania should be put upon the same footing as the other Australian Colonies.

3059. Some evidence has been given with reference to a correspondence between the Colonial Office and the Colony of Victoria, in which I understand the Colony undertook to pay the whole cost of the military expenditure, if Great Britain would bear the cost of transport. Did any such correspondence take place during your tenure of office?—Not during my tenure of the Colonial Office, but I believe that such a proposal was made.

3060. Do you happen to know what the result of that correspondence was?—I do not; the danger of any such arrangement as that is, that it becomes practically a colonial local force, and you lose the power of removing it, which is so essential.

3061. Has the question occurred to you whether it would be possible at all; I think you say that Australia mainly depends upon the naval force?—Yes.

3062. Do you think it possible for any arrangement to be made by which these Colonies should contribute towards the cost of a naval force?—I think that the only mode in which it is possible to accept from them a contribution towards their naval defences would be in the shape of a money vote to the Admiralty. I think it undesirable that they should have Colonial ships, which would necessarily be much more under the local control of the government of the Colony, than under the Admiral on the stations; upon the whole, I look with great disfavour upon anything which could give these Colonies the power of ordering our ships about, or of interfering with the proper responsibility of the Admiral.

3063. You think that the power must be retained in the hands of the Imperial Government?—I think so; because it would be impossible, either at their expense or ours, to defend the Colony by ships retained, if we may say so, for the service of each colony; it must be done upon a larger scale. I have frequently had to state to the Colonists that in truth our Channel fleet constitutes a defence to Australia, because any large fleets which could attack that Colony must come from Europe, and therefore it is much better to deal with a fleet by a concentrated force than to keep ships scattered over the

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world, with a view of defending any part which it may not be the intention, perhaps, of the enemy to attack, and which, in these days of the electric telegraph, they would take care not to attack if ships were stationed there.

3064. From the correspondence which has passed between the Colonial Office and those Colonies, have you any reason to believe that there is any widespread apprehension of attack from the French forces in New Caledonia?—I can hardly say; there have been alarms at times in the Australian Colonies, and not unnaturally; from their peculiar position and their immense wealth they are very sensitive. At the time of the Russian war they were equally apprehensive, although there was no great reason for it.

3065. With reference to New Zealand, it appears that up to the present time New Zealand has not contributed anything towards the cost of its own military defence; but evidence has been given before this Committee of some proposed arrangement that the Colony should pay a certain sum per head per annum for the troops sent out?—Yes.

3066. Has that arrangement been concluded?—It has been, in fact, finally concluded; but I hardly know whether, under existing circumstances, it is possible to carry it out in its present form. It was a proposal made before the breaking out of the war, and it was concluded either immediately before or immediately after.

3067. I see, by a return which has been laid before the Committee, that the force now in New Zealand is stated at 5,354, borne upon the strength of the Imperial Army?—Yes.

3068. Taking the data which have been laid before the Committee as to the cost of the number of troops that were employed there in 1859 it would seem that, in round numbers, the probable cost during the current year would be about half a million. Do you see any means by which that expenditure can be reduced in any way, supposing that there is no sudden termination of hostilities, but that the war should continue?—I am afraid that it cannot be materially reduced. We are constantly in communication with the Governor with a view of keeping down the expenses, and compelling the colonists to pay as much as possible of the cost of the war; but we have the troops there, and some one must pay for them, and we know pretty well what generally happens with regard to any arrangements that are made in such wars.

3069. Do you think that in any future wars there is reasonable ground for believing that the arrangement which you speak of as not completed may be carried out, charging a per-centage?—They have agreed to it.

3070. I understood that the arrangement could not practically be carried out, in your opinion?—What I meant was that all those expenses were very much mixed up. The expenses of militia and volunteers, all of which ought to be paid by the Colony, and many other military charges become so involved in the balance of accounts, that I very much fear if the war continues we shall not derive much advantage from the arrangement. After all, it is but a small contribution.

3071. Would it be an extravagant calculation to assume that every British soldier in New Zealand costs this country about 100 *l.* a year?—I should think that that would be very little, if at all, over the mark.

3072. The contribution, then, would represent one-twentieth?—Yes, that is what the contribution amounts to.

3073. I observe, on reference to the Reports on the past and present state of the Colonial Possessions, that no reports have been received from New Zealand since 1854. Can you say whether there is any reason for that?—You speak of the Colonial Blue Books. I really cannot; I discovered the circumstance, and wrote to the Governor, calling his attention to it, and begged him to be more punctual in supplying us with the information.

3074. Sir *George Grey*.] The present garrison of New Zealand is 5,354, is not that four times the usual number of troops maintained there and rendered necessary by the war?—That amount of force is rendered necessary by the war; but I think you are hardly correct in saying that it is four times greater than is ordinarily maintained there; it is four times greater than the amount of force which was there a year ago, before the war broke out; but I believe it was then at a much lower point than it has usually been.

3075. Was not the garrison generally two regiments?—Yes; but there was only one there then.

3076. One

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3076. One was sent to India?—One was sent to India, and would not have been replaced if the war had not broken out.

3077. You do not consider that the present amount of force should be maintained there permanently?—Certainly not.

3078. Is it not the case that, excluding New Zealand, the force in Australia is much less now than it has been for the last 10 years?—Very much less.

3079. Mr. *Marsh.*] With reference to colonial war ships fitted out by the Colony, do you not think that they would be much more costly to the Colony than if they voted a contribution to the Admiralty?—No doubt, and much less effective.

3080. Do you not think that it would be much better to allow the Admiral to have complete command of all the shipping at the station, instead of placing it under the control of the Governor of the Colony?—I do not think he is subordinate to the Governor of the Colony; I agree that it is most essential that the Admiral alone should be the judge of where his ships should be; it is quite right that the Governor should have the power of making demands upon him, but it should rest upon the responsibility of the Admiral whether he complies with those demands.

3081. Then the Governor cannot order him about?—To the best of my belief, certainly not.

3082. Mr. *Fitzgerald.*] When you say the expense of a soldier in New Zealand is about 100*l.* a year, do you include in that the cost of transport?—No.

3083. You speak of the expense only which would fall upon the War Department?—Yes.

3084. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think that the remark which you made as to colonists not supporting any part of a naval force, would apply also to their keeping block ships in their harbours as part of the local fortifications?—If they are stationary block ships it is a totally different thing, and they would, I believe, be very desirable, because the natural means for building forts in the sea do not in all instances exist, and therefore block ships would be a much more efficient defence than any other.

3085. You think it better that England should keep her fleet in the Channel rather than scatter it over the world; do you not think that the same remark applies to the army?—In the first place you have not quite correctly quoted my statement. What I said was, that I conceived that a Channel fleet is in reality the best defence for the protection of the Australian Colonies, inasmuch as they could only be attacked by a large fleet, which must proceed from Europe, and that it is far better that we should have the means of intercepting that fleet before it proceeded to attack Australia, or any other of our dependencies. I said that would be preferable to sending two or three ships to one place, and two or three to another, more especially, as with the electric telegraph, so extended and so extending, it would be an inevitable consequence that an enemy's fleet would take care to avoid those colonies in which they knew that we had a sufficient force, and attack those where we had few or none. The question with reference to the army stands upon totally different grounds. You may keep your army in England, but if an attack is intended upon Australia or anywhere else, that army can be no defence whatever to the Colonies.

3086. As a question between concentration or dispersion, does not the remark equally apply to the army. Would not the military attacking force come from Europe, and would not England be equally able to intercept it, or to arrive at the same place with reinforcements?—We might intercept them with our fleet; but the transport of troops would hamper our operations, because although under some circumstances the transport of troops in time of war is an unavoidable duty, for the navy it is a dangerous one.

3087. Would it not be equally dangerous to the attacking party?—Much more so to the defending party.

3088. I take it then to be your Grace's opinion that although the concentration of the fleet is a good naval policy, yet the concentration of the army would not be a good military policy?—It is a question of degree; I say I do not think that the two stand upon the same footing. I am not an advocate for the dispersion of our troops; on the contrary, I would concentrate them as far as I possibly could, and I have always acted upon that policy. In 1854 I withdrew a great number of our troops from the West Indian Colonies, and concentrated them as far as the circumstances of the West Indian Islands would permit; but

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I think you may carry that to an extent which would leave the Colonies entirely at the mercy of an enemy.

3089. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Although you would concentrate a fleet in the Channel, I do not understand that you would do that to the exclusion of squadrons in all parts of the world?—Certainly not; I was putting it as an extreme case, that when the Australian Colonies asked for a gun-boat here and a corvette there; I said for their own sakes we were in the habit of refusing such applications because I looked upon the Channel Fleet as the best defence; but of course you must keep an Atlantic Fleet, a West Indian Fleet, and a North American Fleet, and others besides, for the defence of your Colonies and for the protection of your commerce.

3090. Mr. *Adderley.*] I asked whether the remark which you made with reference to the navy, did not equally apply to the army as far as it went?—In my opinion it does not; I think that the concentration of both is desirable, but that the concentration is much more possible in the case of the navy than it can be in the case of the army.

3091. I do not know whether your Grace can answer any question of detail as to the alarm felt of a possible attack of New Caledonia upon Australia. It has been stated in evidence already, that the French keep a force there of 5,000 troops, whereas in one of Sir William Denison's recent Despatches, that force is represented at 500. It has been stated also that there were several ships of war, whereas Sir William Denison says there is only one corvette. Which of those statements is correct?—I believe neither of them. I believe that Sir William Denison's statement was nearly true at the time he wrote. I believe that at the date of that Despatch of his, the French force amounted to 600 or 700 men, and probably only one corvette; but since that time the French have reinforced New Caledonia; and I am not able to say what it amounts to, but I believe it is not 5,000. I think that two not very strong regiments have been sent there, and that the naval force is now greater than one corvette. They have a considerable number of small vessels in those seas.

3092. In the recently printed papers from New Zealand, I find that Colonel Gore Browne quotes Mr. Labouchere's Despatch of 1859 in these words: "It is not unreasonable to infer that in the case of a necessity arising for the defence of the Colony against aggression, or for the preservation of public tranquillity, the Imperial Government does not require a guarantee for the repayment of war expenses, but that the question is tacitly to be left for future adjustment between the mother country and the Colony, according to particular cases." The Governor then proceeds to give his own opinion. I believe the finances of the Colony are quite unable to meet such a demand; war causes expenditure, and at the same time destroys the means of defraying it, so that the settlers, though ready and willing to incur loss, and submit to hardships of war, necessarily depend upon the mother country they aid in their difficulties. I would ask your Grace whether the case has yet been decided as to the contribution which you have told us is the share which the Colony is to bear of the expense of this war, and also whether you think that the general proposition is the basis of our arrangements with that Colony, that we are to undertake the defence generally in case of war?—The arrangement as to the contribution 5 *l.* per man was made irrespective of the amount of force to be stationed in New Zealand, although it was undoubtedly proposed at a time when it was much smaller than it is now. I apprehend that that contribution would continue, and that that is the only contribution to which we have any distinct claim. At the same time that arrangement was advisedly made a provisional one and it was quite understood by the Colony, that it was open to revision and reconsideration at any time by the Imperial Government. As regards the other general question I think I have answered that I do consider the relationship of the mother country to a Colony does entail upon the mother country the duty of defending that Colony. The question was put in general terms, and if I am to answer it in equally general terms, that is the only answer I can give.

3093. Do you think that applies to wars with native tribes?—Undoubtedly it does; unless you are to return to the old commando system, which I do not think this country would ever tolerate. If you give liberty to every man to carry his rifle and to shoot every native he sees carrying off, however small a portion of his property, that might perhaps obviate the necessity for sending regiments.

3094. It

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3094. It has been stated by a witness before this Committee that the natives of New Zealand are much better riflemen than the colonists, and also that if England had not undertaken the war with the native tribes, there would have been no war at all; does your Grace agree with that?—Certainly not; in the first place, I cannot conceive who can have stated that the natives are better riflemen than the English. I disbelieve the assertion because so far as we are in possession of any information the amount of ammunition which the natives fire away ineffectually is beyond all precedent, either in savage or civilized warfare. They are described as firing from the hip, or anywhere where they can place the gun. In answer to the other part of the question, I do not believe that this country has been the instigator of New Zealand wars; on the contrary, I believe that the Imperial policy has tended to avert them, and that every Secretary of State has done everything he could, and so has every successive government, to prevent the recurrence of a native war.

3095. I meant to say that the effect of the evidence appeared to be, that if the Colonists had to defend themselves they would have prevented the war?—I do not believe it.

3096. I learn from the debates in the New Zealand Parliament, that the members for the Southern Island have declared that they have no interest in the war, and they decline to contribute men or money. Do you think that that is a good system, that such a war should be fought by the men and at the expense of the taxpayers of England, whilst one-half of the Colony itself declines, on the score of having no interest, to contribute either men or money?—I do not think that is a good system; but it is the consequence of the measure which was adopted when a constitution was given to New Zealand, which divides the responsibility and interests of that Colony into several parts. It is almost an inevitable consequence that those disputes as to interest in a war should arise.

3097. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Does not the same thing arise in all representative governments, and might not Scotland say that she has no interest in the wars carried on by England?—I was alluding to the provinces of New Zealand; each of those provinces has local interests, and, being divided into different provinces, the separate interests are not amalgamated as in other Colonies.

3098. Is not the south a remarkable instance of that in America?—Certainly.

3099. Mr. *Adderley.*] Your Grace will allow that every resident in New Zealand has a greater interest in the war than an English taxpayer?—No doubt.

3100. *Chairman.*] Does not the difference partly arise from the fact of there being scarcely any native population in the Middle Island?—That is the ground of their assertion, no doubt.

3101. Mr. *Baxter.*] You have spoken of a proposition by Victoria to pay the military expenditure of troops in the Colony. Was any answer sent to that proposition?—It was before my time, and I really do not know.

3102. Do you know whether they made any conditions?—No doubt there were conditions; but I should not like to express off hand an opinion upon the subject.

3103. *Chairman.*] Would you not qualify the statement you made just now as to the responsibility of the parent State in reference to wars in which a Colony might be involved by reason of the aggressive acts of warlike tribes, by limiting it to those cases in which the parent State had given the first encouragement to emigrants to settle there?—If no steps are taken by the British Government to recognise British settlers, such as those in New Guinea, as British subjects they would have no claim, but if your question applies to New Zealand, I think that the Colony has as great a claim as any other, because, although the original colonists were not authorised by the Government of this country, subsequent events have identified the Government with the Colony.

3104. Mr. *Roebuck.*] May your opinion be stated in these terms, that the mother country, having assumed the Government of the Colony, takes upon itself all the responsibility of its defence?—Certainly.

3105. Mr. *Adderley.*] Does the fact of the Colony, having a representative Government, alter that relation?—Not in the slightest; in the event of war with hostile tribes, or with civilised nations, that may form an important element in the bargain which you make with them, when you give them responsible Government, as to the amount of troops, or who shall pay for them; but I do not think that it alters the relative positions of mother country and Colony.

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3106. Mr. *Roebuck*.] No responsibility given to a Colony gives it the responsibility of declaring war?—Certainly not.

3107. The power, therefore, of declaring war imposes upon the Government the responsibility of protecting the Colony from the cost of war?—Certainly.

3108. Mr. *Adderley*.] You would not say that England declared war with the Maories or the Kafirs?—Of course not; that is a technical difference.

3109. *Chairman*.] Are there not three classes of dangers to which Colonies are subjected, and against which the parent State is responsible for protecting them, namely, foreign aggression, domestic disturbance, and the aggression of warlike tribes; should you say that that is a correct statement of the classes of dangers to which Colonies are exposed, and against which the parent State is called upon to protect them?—No doubt it represents the different dangers to which a Colony is exposed, but as regards the claim upon the mother country, it is mostly, if not altogether, confined to the first and last of those three. Although, no doubt, Imperial troops would be used for the suppression of internal commotion in the event of there being any, I do not think that that is one of the duties which devolves upon the mother country.

3110. We have heard that the troops were sent from Nova Scotia to Sydney, to act in case of a riot?—The troops being there you could not confine them to barracks, and allow the mob to fight it out.

3111. Sir *George Grey*.] In this country, troops may of course be called upon to aid the police?—Quite so; but I believe every Secretary of State has resisted the position that troops are kept in the Colonies to do the duties of the police.

3112. *Chairman*.] It is a different thing to use the troops for such purposes, if they happen to be there, from sending them there for the purpose of suppressing such disturbances?—Certainly.

3113. Mr. *Marsh*.] You say there is some risk incurred in sending troops by transports in time of war; is it not more expensive in time of war, than under ordinary circumstances?—No doubt it is, but I do not know that I should attach great weight to that economical view of the question; my answer applied more to the question of efficiency than the question of expense.

3114. Mr. *Fortescue*.] As regards New Zealand, would you not be inclined to say that the more the local government is allowed to assume the control of the local policy towards the natives, the stronger is the claim of the Home Government to colonial contribution towards the cost of wars which may be the result of that policy?—Certainly.

3115. *Chairman*.] Although there has been a reduction at the Cape, in the strength of the Imperial army during the last six years, since the German legion was sent out, it appears that there are at present 4,788 British troops at the Cape?—Yes.

3116. Would you say that the main object of those troops is to afford security against the outbreak of another Kafir War, or what do you suppose is the main object of keeping so large a force there?—That no doubt is the main object; it is the peculiar position of that colony to be surrounded by warlike tribes, which, although weakened and more civilized and much better affected towards us than they were, are very powerful, and have exhibited a considerable amount of hostility.

3117. A portion of that force consists of the Cape Mounted Rifles which, I believe, is a force borne upon the strength of the British army; evidence has been given that that force is now recruited from a different element than formerly; have you any knowledge of the present constitution of that force, and whether it is of a satisfactory nature?—I do not think that its nature is very unsatisfactory, but I believe it is not quite so efficient as it was; those who understand the Colony best are of opinion that the mounted police force is in many respects better than the mounted rifles, the reason being, that the rifles are a regiment with an army organization; they have their commissariat, and if a detachment, however small, is ordered off, they must have all their commissariat arrangements or they would starve; whereas the mounted police force is constructed on a system of individuality, and if you order one of them off, he carries with him his provender and provisions, altogether independent of farther aid; they can maintain themselves in the post to which they are sent.

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3118. With the exception of that mounted police called, I think, Currie's Police, of about 400 men, there is no force maintained at the cost of the colony?—I believe that is so.

3119. The cost of the military defences of the Cape is borne by the Imperial Exchequer?—Yes.

3120. I think it has been stated that on the average of the last 10 years, with or without Kafir wars, the Imperial cost for defending the Cape Colony has amounted to something between half a million and three quarters of a million sterling per annum?—I should think about that.

3121. Do you see any means by which, consistently with what would be the interests of the Colony and of the empire, that cost can be reduced?—As regards the interest of the Colony, I hope that a state of things is arising which will enable us materially to reduce the amount of force still further; it has been reduced to a smaller amount than it has been for many years, but I think it may be reduced by the policy pursued out there of frontier defences, and by measures which have been taken, some at the expense of the British Government for civilizing the natives and preventing wars; I think that those measures have prevented another Kafir war within the last six or seven years, but it must always be borne in mind that an increase in the military force frequently takes place in that Colony as much for Imperial as for Colonial purposes. The Cape is an admirable station for troops; it is a very central and a very healthy station. In the event of an unquiet condition of the world it is a good place for a reserve of troops. If we had a sufficient force it would be the best point from which to send troops to New Zealand, and in short to a great many of our Colonies; I am not saying that a force ought always to be kept up for that purpose, but if you were able to reduce the force for colonial purposes, it may be desirable at times for Imperial interests to keep up a larger force there than you have now.

3122. For Imperial purposes, and looking at the value of the Cape as protecting the course of our trade and so on, it would not be necessary to maintain so large a South African Colony as we now have, unless there were other circumstances which altogether apart from Imperial considerations bind us to it?—Certainly not; most of our Colonies which are not limited by the sea have gradually extended, not only without the intention, but contrary to the intention of the Imperial Government. It is a process of growth which is uncontrollable.

3123. Do you think it possible that any contrivance of frontier posts, with a frontier line of about 1,000 miles, the greater portion of which is liable to incursions from Kafir tribes, can afford us any guarantee against the recurrence of a Kafir war?—I should say not absolutely against a Kafir war, but I think we may render it improbable by a good line of policy steadily adhered to.

3124. Are the frontier posts all along the line of the frontier of the Cape?—To a certain extent you may say they are all along the north-eastern frontier, but they are more thickly placed where the tribes are more hostile.

3125. We have had some rather conflicting evidence before us upon the question of whether it is the interest of a certain portion of the Cape colonists, the western colonists, to keep up the agitation, as far as they can, of Kafir wars for the sake of the pecuniary advantage they derive from the expenditure. From your official knowledge should you say that that has been the case?—I should say to a certain degree it has; but I think that the charge against the colonists has been exaggerated. In every community some men must reap large advantages from a war expenditure, and may be sufficiently selfish to wish it; but I do not think that that remark applies very strongly to the Colonies. With reference to New Zealand, I do not think that there is any desire there to provoke war; on the contrary, I think that their interests are as much opposed to war as ours.

3126. Do you think that the presence of an Imperial force in the Colony tends to make the colonists less circumspect in their conduct towards the natives?—No doubt, to a certain extent, that must be the tendency.

3127. Do you think that we are likely to follow the line of policy which was adopted as regards the Orange River sovereignty?—I do not; the tendency is all the other way I am sorry to say.

3128. In a military point of view, do you think that any inconvenience arises from the association of Natal with the Cape Colony, and from its being still

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governed by the Governor of the Cape Colony as Governor in Chief?—That government in chief is not so very material as you suppose; the power is no doubt greater than in the case of Canada with the Lower Provinces; but at the same time the Lieutenant Governor has, for all practical purposes, an independent government.

3129. Mr. *Fortescue.*] And he corresponds directly, does he not, with the Secretary of State?—Yes, and that is the broad distinction; where they are dependent governments they correspond through the Governor in Chief.

3130. Lord *Stanley.*] I think you spoke of the Cape as a half-way house to India. Do you consider that it has retained its importance in that respect since the improvement of steam navigation?—Certainly not; if I used the expression it was simply in reference to troops. I consider that, in our connexion with India, it is less important than it was half a century ago.

3131. At the time that the Cape was taken possession of, it was considered, was it not, that no vessel could go to India without touching there?—Yes.

3132. You spoke of the Cape as an advantageous station for a reserve of troops?—Yes.

3133. You did not mean that they would be more serviceable there than in any other part of the world for European service?—I only say that in a disturbed state of the world, when you may be expecting difficulties in New Zealand, or India, or anywhere else, that then it is a healthy good station at which to keep a reserve of troops, and that that has been the policy occasionally before. I think, therefore, that it is not right, whenever you find an increased force at the Cape, to lay that to the charge of a disturbed state of the Cape.

3134. As regards India, in which case your argument applies most strongly, is it the fact, taking into consideration the absence of any telegraphic communication between India and the Cape, that troops could be more readily made available from the Cape than from home by the overland route?—If you could insure the overland route under all circumstances, certainly not; but when the mutiny broke out it was of the first importance to us that we happened to have at that moment a force of 11,000 men at the Cape. It enabled Sir George Grey to send off to India a very considerable force which arrived, and was of the greatest possible value, before any troops could arrive from England.

3135. Mr. *Ellice.*] Is not the climate of the Cape very good for seasoning troops?—No doubt.

3136. Would it not be very advantageous to pass troops through the Cape to India instead of sending them direct from Europe?—If consistently with the arrangements at the Horse Guards such a system could be adopted, I believe it would be attended with considerable advantages.

3137. And with no danger of desertion?—None whatever, or very little.

3138. *Chairman.*] Do you think it possible to keep at the Cape, but at the charge of the Indian revenue, any portion of the 70,000 troops now considered necessary for garrisoning India?—Not being Secretary of State for India I would rather not express an opinion upon that. I think it is a matter well worthy of the consideration of the Indian Government.

3139. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you think that, although the cost would be defrayed by the Indian Government to the Cape, the same troops ought to be paid for by the English Government?—I consider that troops kept at the Cape, with a view to Imperial purposes, ought not to be charged to the Colony.

3140. Do you extend that opinion to all the troops now at the Cape, the expense of which is defrayed by us?—I do not say that now the Cape is increasing in wealth the Cape ought not to bear some portion of the cost. I consider that the force kept at the Cape is so very largely for colonial purposes that we have a strong claim upon the Cape, within reason of course, for assistance, stronger than we have upon Canada for a contribution towards the very limited amount of force kept there, as I maintain, for Imperial purposes.

3141. You consider it an unsatisfactory state of things that at this moment the transport of troops to the Cape, and their maintenance there, is entirely paid by England?—Yes; I think that the time has come when the Cape ought to make a contribution; and I have been in correspondence with the Governor of the Cape upon the subject for the reduction of the Imperial expense, and with a view to obtaining a contribution from the Cape towards the cost of the troops maintained there.

3142. You have given it as your opinion, that for native warfare the mounted police

police force, which is paid for by the colonists, is the best force?—For the preservation of the peace, but not in the event of a Kafir war; in that case regular troops must be provided. For the preservation of peace and the prevention of outrages, I consider the police far the most efficient.

3143. *Chairman.*] Supposing a large force, say 4,000 or 5,000 men, were still maintained at the Cape, do you think that some equitable arrangement might be made by which, whenever the troops were called out for colonial purposes, a proportion of their cost should be borne by the Colony?—I think that some arrangement of that kind would be very equitable.

3144. Mr. *FitzGerald.*] Is the mounted police a military force?—I do not know how they are dressed; they are a quasi military force, the great distinction being that they have not the same military organization as a regiment has; they provide their own horses, and they provide for themselves and their horses.

3145. Have they Her Majesty's commissions?—They have not.

3146. *Chairman.*] Do you not consider that there exists in the Colony the *personnel* for a force which might be employed in frontier wars?—They have volunteers lately raised; but I do not think that they would be able to raise any other local force, for the reason which I have stated exists in other Colonies, namely, that the demand for labour is so great that it is impossible to keep soldiers in the form of a local force.

3147. May I ask you, whether you think that Ceylon might not be advantageously placed on the same footing with the Indian Presidencies, and the forces paid out of their own revenues?—I am not prepared to say, that after a short time it may not be so. Ceylon has lately become exceedingly prosperous, and its revenue is rapidly increasing. In the Presidencies, the sphere is very much larger, and the richer districts counterbalance the poorer ones.

3148. Lord *Stanley.*] The prosperity of Ceylon, I think, dates within the last six or seven years?—Within less time than that, I think.

3149. *Chairman.*] Some evidence has been given about fortifications. I would ask you, whether you think that the works which, as appears from the Army Estimates, have been in progress in the Mauritius, are necessary?—I think that it is very desirable to have a well-considered plan of fortifications in the Mauritius, but I think that it is very easy indeed to overdo it. I am not in favour of a very extensive system of fortifications for the Mauritius. The Mauritius must in the long run depend upon the fleet; and although I think it important that we should have a certain amount of fortification to enable the troops we maintain there to hold their position until relieved by a fleet, still I should be sorry to see fortifications carried too far, because I should look upon them then rather as a source of danger than as a protection to the Colony.

3150. Have you seen Lord Grey's evidence upon the subject of fortifications?—I read it very hurriedly, the night before last.

3151. Some evidence was given also as to fortifications in the Bahamas. Do you think that the rate of expenditure on colonial fortifications is satisfactory, or do you think that we have been overdoing it?—I do not think that we have been; but I think that there is a tendency to do so. I do not see the advantage of fortifications in the Bahamas; when I say that, I mean, any extensive system of fortifications. I have myself been the instigator of a fortification, so to call it, which is for the protection of the coal-mines of Sydney, Cape Breton, which I look upon as very important; they are exposed to the attack of a privateer, which could, without landing, destroy the works, and deprive us of the use of coal during the first year of a war. At my suggestion, but at the expense, in the main, of the proprietors of that mine, a small battery is to be erected; it will be no expense to the mother country, beyond a grant of guns; but I thought it desirable. At the same time I should be sorry to see fortifications carried to such an extent as to require an increase of troops, without which increase they would be a source of danger rather than of safety.

3152. Mr. *Ellice.*] Do you not think that the application of steam to navigation makes it less necessary to provide our distant Colonies against any attack from without, it being more difficult for foreign vessels to reach those Colonies?—Certainly.

3153. Lord *Stanley.*] According to the last returns, the present force in the West Indies is 4,500 men?—Yes.

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3154. Will you state whether you consider that so large a force is necessary for their defence, and for what purpose it is maintained?—At the present moment it could not, I think, be greatly reduced; it has been much reduced at different times. Upon the breaking out of the Russian war I reduced the force considerably, and also concentrated the troops which were left there; and I should hope that before long a further concentration might be possible. I should consider it a more perfect system if the troops were confined to two posts, say Jamaica and Barbadoes; but I am not sure whether that course could be adopted, looking at the prevailing winds and the difficulties which encircle the Colonies, without a system of telegraphs. If our West Indian possessions could be united by an inter-insular telegraph, the concentration of the troops would be desirable.

3155. Would it not be a more economical and efficient mode, if you had an inter-insular telegraph, to keep steam-vessels at their stations, paying for their expense by reducing the troops to a proportionate extent?—Yes, I think that might be made an economical measure.

3156. By steam, the Bahamas might be reached from Barbadoes, in two days and a half?—Yes, I should think so.

3157. And from Antigua, in about the same space of time?—I should suppose so.

3158. No great mischief could take place before the troops arrived there?—Not if the police on the other islands were made efficient.

3159. I believe it is a recognised rule of colonial policy, that troops should not be used for local police?—Yes; but where you have small posts of troops in the West Indies the tendency is not to make the police so efficient as it should be.

3160. Mr. *Marsh.*] Would there not be great difficulty in laying down a telegraph cable on account of the cutting of the coral reefs?—I should think not.

3161. Mr. *Adderley.*] I see that the troops have been employed in Honduras against a Spanish attack?—Not against a Spanish attack. I am anxious to take this occasion to correct what I understand has been stated by some witnesses before this Committee, that so far as the West Indies are concerned troops are never wanted for any other purpose than for the suppression of disturbances. That is not the case, they have been wanted for other purposes, and the instance to which you refer is one; it was an attack by the Santa Cruz Indians, who having entered Belize, committed various outrages there, and upon the superintendent sending four English officers to demand satisfaction, those officers were ill-treated, and I believe escaped with their lives with some difficulty. Application was immediately made to the Governor of Jamaica, who sent off two vessels with 350 men on board. Those troops, therefore, in that instance were not called upon to suppress disturbances amongst the subjects of the colony, but to resist foreign aggression.

3162. Lord *Stanley.*] Amongst all the West Indian Islands have you not named the only one in which attacks from native tribes could be apprehended?—Yes; but by no means by others. The instance I am now about to give was also at Belize, but it might have occurred at any other. Last year the Filibuster Walker was about to make an attack somewhere, and troops were sent to Belize, and luckily arrived 24 hours before he appeared there, in consequence of which he went on and attacked another place. That attack might have been contemplated upon any other Colony. I do not know that Belize is the only one, because Guiana is to some extent in the same position.

3163. Mr. *Adderley.*] Are there not American settlements in that part also?—Yes.

3164. Does it not afford a contrast with our system that the American settlers have never any protection from federal troops, but defend themselves?—There may be American settlers, but they are not settled upon territory which the United States claim. They are American subjects exercising their calling in the territory of another power.

3165. It is the fact, is it not, that they not only defend themselves, but are rather aggressive?—I am not aware that they can be considered aggressive. Some of their proceedings are very questionable, but outrages have generally been committed by filibusters from the United States.

3166. Sir *George Grey.*] Are they not in the same situation as Englishmen settled in territories without the encouragement of the Government?—No doubt.

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3167. Mr. *Adderley*.] But they are able to defend themselves?—I have not heard that they have had to defend themselves.

3168. *Chairman*.] Evidence has been given before this Committee as to a change made in the system of recruiting the West India regiments: I wish to know whether you think that the present system is advantageous?—Decidedly not so advantageous; the regiments are not so good now as they were, but at the same time I am perfectly willing to say that my own impressions are favourable to the black troops, notwithstanding that there are different opinions. Some West Indian Governors believe that they are not to be trusted, but others who have had the greatest experience, lean to the opinion that they are perfectly trustworthy. There is no instance, that I am aware of, of anything like disaffection among them; nor have any of the quarrels taken the form of quarrels between black and white, or between one class of the population and another. They are very excitable as well as very simple people, and are liable to rows and disturbances which more steady soldiers might not be; but almost all the disturbances that have taken place have arisen out of quarrels about women, and matters of that kind. They are now dressed as Zouaves, and that dress is said, in one of the reports I have received, to be most effective with the female population, so that the rows are more frequent. Upon the whole I have great confidence in the black troops; a great deal depends upon the officers, as was the case with the sepoy regiments. If these men are well commanded they are good troops, but with the small number of officers we have, and the necessary absence of many from ill health, they are not efficiently commanded. There are so many officers away on leave, and others sick, and those who are not sick are so wearied with the duties that they have to perform, that they have not a fair chance. So far from considering them bad troops, I may mention that the matter is now under consideration between the Commander in Chief, the Secretary of State for War, and myself, whether we should not make an arrangement by which we should be enabled to increase the number of officers, thereby making these regiments more efficient.

3169. Mr. *Adderley*.] Do you not think that the last despatches from the Governor of Antigua show an unwillingness on the part of the Colony to raise volunteer forces?—I do not; there is a very great zeal throughout the whole of our colonies to form a volunteer corps. We have the most favourable reports from many of the West Indian Islands, and some of them support even yeomanry corps. I am not sure whether Antigua is not one of the islands in which a yeomanry force exists.

3170. The returns laid before the Committee of the force in the British dependencies from 1851 to 1861, exhibit considerable fluctuations, and not a progressive reduction; do you think that that is a correct statement?—The tendency for many years past has been reduction; but of course it must be taken into account that we have had new colonies starting up; New Zealand, for instance, is a modern Colony.

3171. Looking through the list, I observe that between 1851 and 1861 there has been in some a decrease, in some an increase, and in others decrease and progressive reduction?—I have not lately made that comparison; but speaking generally, I wish to draw the attention of the Committee to this fact, that the increase is in those which, although termed Colonies, are actually military stations, and that the decrease has been in those which are Colonies properly so called. I think that the public are frequently under a misapprehension upon that point. In the return now before me, I find that the present amount of military force in what are called Colonies, is stated at 44,581; but if you subtract from that number those troops which are in purely military stations, and those which are maintained at the expense of the colonies, you will find that the real force maintained at the expense of this country is very little more than 20,000. The whole amount of force being 44,581, there are at this moment in the Mediterranean garrisons 17,350; in Halifax, which I have already said is distinctly an imperial garrison, 1,819; in Bermuda, which stands in the same position, 1,071; at St. Helena, 756; and in the Mauritius, where the force is maintained almost exclusively for imperial purposes, 1,970. That gives a total of 22,986, and if you subtract that from 44,581 it is clear that we maintain in the Colonies, properly so called, a force of only 21,595. That includes three regiments sent to New Zealand for the special purpose of the war. I believe that that number of 21,595 in-

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cludes the Ceylon force, and other small forces not paid out of the Imperial Exchequer.

3172. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you consider the Ionian Islands an Imperial post?—Distinctly so; it is not even a Colony.

3173. *Chairman.*] Although we might consider a portion of the force at the Mauritius of the same nature as that maintained in the Mediterranean garrisons, should you think it right to subtract altogether the force at Halifax and the Mauritius from the Colonial force, seeing the troops are maintained there not exclusively as garrisons?—Some allowance should be made; but as to that there is a very good test. In New Brunswick, where troops are more especially required, on account of the character of the population of St. John's, the number of troops, I think, is 150; and in Halifax and the Mauritius all you would want for Colonial purposes, would be just some small force as a guard of honour to the Governor, and for the preservation of peace in the event of any local disturbance; probably a couple of hundreds of men would be more than sufficient.

3174. Looking at these returns, should you not say, distinguishing, if you please, the garrisons from colonies, that it would be more correct to say that there had been a fluctuation in the amount of force rather than a progressive reduction?—No doubt there has been an oscillation; but taking any dates within the last 20 years, omitting new colonies formed since, I think you will find that, upon the whole, a smaller force has been maintained in the colonies than formerly.

3175. Do you think it correct to say that the force which we keep in the Colonies is kept there, in a great measure, for colonial purposes, that is to say, that we find it necessary to maintain a standing army of some amount, and that as we have colonies in which some portion of that army can be placed, we consult our own convenience as to where we station the troops?—That is perfectly true, no doubt.

3176. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is it not the fact that the whole force in the Colonies in the present year is not greater than it was 30 years ago?—Speaking from memory, I should say decidedly so.

3177. Although in the mean time there has been an immense accession to our Colonial empire?—Immense.

3178. Mr. *Adderley.*] I understand you anticipate a great increase of our Colonial empire; do you think that our present system of undertaking the defence of our Colonies, as contradistinguished from the old system of leaving the colonists to defend themselves, has not thrown upon this country a proportionate increase of expenditure?—I have no apprehension of any extension of our Colonial empire, that is to say, the acquirement of any land not now belonging to us, in any other Colony than the Cape; civilization in the territories already belonging to us will no doubt go on; but I do not apprehend that any unavoidable extension, as far as it goes, need entail or ought to entail any increased military expenditure; any extension in the shape of acquisition of territory ought to be with a view of preventing, and not inducing war.

3179. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Has not our Colonial empire extended within the last 30 years, without a corresponding increase in our military force maintained in the Colonies?—Certainly it has.

Lunæ, 27° die Maii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Arthur Mills.	Mr. C. Fortescue.
Mr. Adderley.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Baxter.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Marsh.	Sir James Fergusson.

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Rear Admiral *Erskine*, called in; and Examined.

Rear Admiral *Erskine*.

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3180. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you command a division in the Channel Fleet?—I command a division in the Channel Fleet.

3181. What commands have you held on foreign stations at different times?—I have commanded two sloops of war and two line-of-battle ships in the West Indies for eight or nine years altogether, and I have had charge of the Australian station for three years; I have also commanded ships in the Mediterranean and Baltic.

3182. Did you ever turn your attention at all to the comparative cost of military and naval defences in our West Indian Colonies?—I have seen the returns which have been made from time to time, and I have contrasted the expenses per head of soldiers compared with those of a naval defence, and I think I can give pretty nearly the amount.

3183. Now, taking the West Indian Colonies, including the Leeward Islands, such as Guiana and Jamaica, can you give any evidence as to the cost per man in all or any of these Colonies?—I find that the cost per man in Jamaica, including barracks and all expenses, amounted to about 80*l.* per head; and in the Windward and Leeward Islands, 101*l.* per head. That includes Barbadoes, Granada, St. Vincent, &c.

3184. I think I understood you to say that you had gone into the subject with a view to compare the naval and military force?—Just so.

3185. Have you at all considered whether by any means the defence of the West Indian Colonies might be provided for more efficiently, as well as more economically, by a naval than by a military force?—As far as the external defences of the West Indian Colonies go, it appears to me that a naval defence is the only defence that is worth considering at present; because the troops, except in Jamaica, are so very much dispersed, that they could never form any efficient defence against such a number of troops as an enemy would bring to any particular point. There are no fortresses of any consequence; at least, there were not four years ago. I do not know what they may have done since then. There are no fortifications of consequence in the West Indies, with the exception of a few forts in Jamaica, and those would not be able to stand a regular siege.

3186. Do you know what the naval force at present is on the West Indian station?—It is impossible to say exactly what is on the West Indian station, because it is conjoined with the North American, but the two together are 223 guns and 2,895 men; but that includes the floating battery at Bermuda, which cannot be moved from it.

3187. Evidence has been given before this Committee of the fact that the troops in the West Indies are considered as employed more to avert the consequences of internal disturbance, than as against a foreign foe; now looking to the maintenance of the internal tranquillity of the Islands, and the general purposes of the defence, could you suggest any means by which our naval arrangements might be modified, or altered in any way so as to meet the necessities of the case, and dispense with a portion of the military force?—Supposing it were determined to adopt naval means alone, for the defence of the West Indies, I see no difficulty whatever in keeping a body of marines at any one barrack, which is now occupied by troops, which could be moved about by the command of the officer on the station.

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3188. What suggestion would you make as to where that force should be stationed?—At present I should suggest the most healthy situations, which I believe would be Barbadoes to windward, and Jamaica to leeward.

3189. Can you make any estimate of the cost per man on the West India station, assuming that the defences were mostly or entirely naval?—Yes, the naval expense may be considered pretty nearly the same upon all stations, because the provisions are generally supplied from England, with the exception of fresh provisions, and I find that calculating wages, provisions, freight, wear and tear of ship and engines, stores, including masts and rigging, and all increased ordnance stores, current departmental expenses, and share of non-effective services at home, the highest cost would be 106*l.* per man. But I find in to-day's paper that by a return of the estimated cost of the whole African squadron during the last year, the Admiralty have only calculated that 5,443 men have cost 458,423*l.*, which is not quite 85*l.* per man.

3190. Does that include the same items?—Wear and tear of ship &c., I presume, but they probably omitted the share of non-effective services, I am not sure; but if one says 100*l.* per man, or 106*l.*, I am sure it would be the maximum. I mean that if it were proposed to add 1,000 men and two 50-gun frigates, 106,000*l.* would be the amount you would have to add to the estimates.

3191. Have you considered what number of men you think necessary for the defence of the West Indian Colonies, on your system, supposing it was entirely a marine force?—I should not like to give an opinion upon the subject. It is such an extensive station that I should not like to say without much greater consideration; but, considering now that the total is about 4,000 men, I should think that two-thirds of a naval force would be far more efficient for the protection of the islands than the same number of troops stationary there.

3192. Do you think that with a view to the contingency of a foreign invasion, supposing such a contingency to be possible, the troops now stationed on these islands are of the slightest use whatever?—I should think not the slightest.

3193. You know Bermuda, I think?—Yes, I do.

3194. Are you aware of all the schemes which have been projected from time to time within recent years for an increase of the fortifications in Bermuda?—There was a very extensive increase proposed in the year 1857. A plan was given to me to read, because I was then in command of a 90-gun ship, and I was ordered to leave as many of my heavy guns as I could spare, for the purpose of forming the additional fortifications, and I think it included an addition of nearly 200 guns to the present fortifications. Every beach was proposed to be defended by strong batteries, and every entrance that a fishing boat could take, with the exception of one, was proposed to be shut up. There was a naval officer on that Commission, Admiral Mundy, who is now in the Mediterranean.

3195. Should you be of opinion that, if at any time, we were to lose our naval supremacy, Bermuda would be of the slightest use to us?—I cannot see what advantage it would be to retain Bermuda, except as a mere depôt for our ships which might be employed against the Coast of America.

3196. The value of Bermuda depends upon our maintaining our naval force?—I think so.

3197. Should you apply the same remark to Halifax?—Halifax has an harbour, certainly; but Halifax, from its proximity to the United States, of course, is put in a different category.

3198. Have you been in British Guiana at all?—Never.

3199. I think you said you had been on the Australian station?—Yes, I was there for three years.

3200. Can you tell me what is now the naval force on the Australian station?—The naval force on the Australian station, at present, is one ship of 21 guns, one of 15, and two of 17, altogether mounting 70 guns, and manned by 795 men. There are besides, three ships ordered home, but I believe at this moment they are kept, in consequence of the New Zealand war; they would amount to nearly 50 guns and 600 men.

3201. Have you made any comparative estimate of the present cost of the military defence of any of the Australian Colonies, and what you think might be the cost of defending them efficiently by a naval force?—Yes.

3202. Do you know what is the total cost per man incurred by the Colony, and that incurred by the Imperial Government, in New South Wales, for instance?—Yes; in New South Wales the total cost per man is 141 *l.*, of which the Colony pay 80 *l.*

3203. And in Victoria?—In Victoria the amount is as high as 157 *l.*, of which the Colony pay 106 *l.*

3204. Now supposing that these two Colonies, and the Australian Colonies generally, could be effectually defended by a naval force, have you made any estimate of what would be the cost per man of such naval force?—I should say about 106 *l.* per man; that is exactly the proportion which Victoria pays for a soldier to the Imperial Government; provisions used to be excessively cheap, and coals are not particularly expensive.

3205. Have you made any calculation of the comparative cost of any of the other Australian Colonies?—In Tasmania it is 127 *l.*, and the Colony pays nothing.

3206. Now, in the event of the Australian Colonies approving of such an arrangement, and the Imperial Government adopting it, do you think, looking at it as a naval officer, that there would be any difficulty in securing the defence of the Colonies against foreign aggression by a naval power?—Not in the least.

3207. What should you say would be the greatest danger to which these Colonies are exposed, so far as your knowledge goes?—The only possible danger would be from France, because she now possesses New Caledonia.

3208. What force has France there?—I am not aware, but I think she has 400 or 500 troops.

3209. You do not know how many guns?—I have tried to discover, but I have failed in discovering what amount of force she has there.

3210. But at all events you think that the main, in fact the only danger that the Australian Colonies have to apprehend from foreign aggression, would be from that source?—The only possible one I should think, from their great distance from any other nation.

3211. In the event of any dispute between this country and France, and that dispute spreading to our Colonial empire, in what way should you think it most probable that the colonists would be likely to be punished?—As every ship which leaves New South Wales or Victoria, now carries a very considerable quantity of gold, the object of course would be to cut off our gold ships.

3212. Do you think they would be much more likely to cut off our gold ships than to attack Sydney?—Clearly; I do not see what they could gain by attacking Sydney.

3213. You gave, I think, a general answer that you thought, that supposing we should have a sufficient naval force to protect the West Indian Islands, and the Australian Colonies, that the cost would not be more than two-thirds of that now incurred in their defence?—In some cases, I do not think it would be quite so much; for instance, at Bermuda, at present the estimated cost is 100,336 *l.* with 1,188 men as a garrison; in addition to that, one must add "The Terror," a floating battery, which is an immovable vessel, and can only move up and down in smooth waters; the whole of the expense would then be 106,700 *l.*; now, I should think Bermuda would be much more efficiently defended by five ships with 10 guns, and 100 men each, which would only cost 53,000 *l.*

3214. Then you think it may be said generally, that a seaman with his movable fortress costs about two-thirds of the cost of a soldier with his fixed fortress?—Not taking them in equal numbers; numerically, the men at Bermuda cost 84 *l.* a head, whereas I have taken 106 *l.* for the navy generally, although I believe it to be an over estimate.

3215. You think that the practical result would be, supposing adequate provisions were made for the defences, that the cost of a naval power would not be more than two-thirds of the cost of a military power?—I think not.

3216. Do you know whether the Cape is now used as a place of call for ships, as it used to be formerly?—Comparatively little.

3217. Have you any acquaintance with any of the Eastern Colonies, Ceylon or the Mauritius?—None whatever.

3218. Mr. *Marsh.*] Your calculation, I think, is 106 *l.* for each sailor; that includes coal and everything connected with the ship?—I can give you the items. *Vide* Appendix.

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3219. I want to know, with regard to your estimate for the soldiers, does that include the dead weight of the non-effective service attached to it?—It does.

3220. With regard to forts in Bermuda, how many soldiers would it take to defend them in case of foreign attack, the forts in contemplation and those already built?—I think the estimated garrison was to be at least 5,000 men, after the fortifications were complete.

3221. You mentioned just now that a certain number of small vessels would be quite as effective as this?—Perhaps not so effective as 5,000 men, but more effective than the present garrison, which is only 1,188.

3222. Now, you have had some experience, no doubt, in moving military forces by sea; there is some difficulty in getting them on board, and so on; there is more difficulty than in moving marines, is there not?—There is a divided responsibility, and the military and naval commanders must agree between themselves upon that point.

3223. The governor of each Colony has the command of the military force?—Yes.

3224. But not of the naval force at all?—No.

3225. Then, supposing you had to defend the West Indies, it would be desirable to take troops from one part to another, where an attack was supposed to be meditated?—Yes.

3226. In that case, if there were military to be moved, the governor of the island from which you wished to take them might refuse to allow them to go?—Certainly.

3227. But if they were marines they would be taken at once?—Certainly.

3228. I need not ask you whether that is not a great advantage with regard to the defence of the West Indies?—Certainly.

3229. Now, do you think that a frigate, with 250 men, could enter the harbour of Sydney, if there were 500 soldiers defending it?—With steam, I think, she certainly might, though she might not pass up to the town.

3230. But supposing you were there with another frigate, with 250 men?—

3231. Marines, I suppose, are very good artillerymen?—They are trained to it.

3232. Have you any means of ascertaining what sort of artillerymen the soldiers of the line are?—I believe they are all trained now to batteries.

3233. Should you think they were as efficient as marines?—No, I should think not, because the marines' drill is constant.

3234. Do you know the number of troops that are now at Sydney?—Nine hundred, I think.

3235. Do you think they would be sufficient to prevent a frigate from entering the heads, or from landing men at Botany Bay?—From landing men at Botany Bay, certainly not; with new batteries they might prevent a frigate from coming up to the town.

3236. But they could not prevent a frigate from landing men at Botany Bay?—Certainly not; it would be impossible.

3237. But a frigate with 25 guns could?—Certainly, it could prevent another frigate coming in.

3238. There are other places on the coast of Australia likely to be attacked, such as Newcastle, to which the military at Sydney would afford no defence?—No, there would be no defence without a naval force.

3239. A naval defence would be most complete?—Yes.

3240. Whereas the military in New South Wales can only defend one point the same amount of money expended upon naval defences would defend the whole coast?—I think so; at this moment the force in Victoria is reduced from 1,800 men to a few men, a regiment having been removed to New Zealand, so that Victoria is denuded of troops altogether, and has not the means of defending any portion of her coast.

3241. Supposing that the Colony of Australia, with its present trade of something like 40 millions a year, were in the hands of a foreign power, do you think then that a naval defence of our commerce with Australia would be required in a still greater degree than it is now?—It would be necessary to keep up a greater force, because we must calculate upon the foreign naval force.

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3242. Do you think it would be desirable under these circumstances to have fortresses, with marines or soldiers at certain points, and dockyards also, as we have at Hong Kong?—That has been our experience.

3243. Do you know what it costs to protect our commerce with South America?—I do not remember what the squadron in the Pacific is; but it is a much larger squadron than that in Australia, whilst the amount of our trade I should think with South America, is not one-half.

3244. Do you consider that the military stationed in our Colonies adds at all to the real strength of the nation?—In such Colonies as I have been speaking of, so far as I know, the military forces are employed purely for police purposes.

3245. But supposing the same amount of money, or even two-thirds of the amount of money, were expended upon the naval defence of the Colony, would not that add considerably to our power as a nation?—To our naval power, decidedly.

3246. Mr. *Adderley.*] You mean in case of hostilities with any foreign power? —Yes.

3247. In time of peace no such convoys of merchandise are required?—We always require to keep up a squadron in South America, because there are so many powers constantly in a state of revolution that it is necessary to have a force there to prevent any improper interference with our trade. The same thing would happen if Australia were in the hands of another nation.

3248. We are at a certain expense in defending Canada; but supposing Canada were incorporated into the United States, would our expenses be increased or diminished in time of war?—Your expenses must increase, because you must have your territory protected in the event of the Americans committing any aggression upon your trade, which now there is no apprehension of.

3249. If Canada were incorporated into the United States, the only difference in time of peace would be, that we should no longer have to garrison it?—I may give as an instance, that we have a dispute with Spain now, I believe, for detaining two of our vessels at Gibraltar, nearly under the guns of the fortress; and the result has been, that we have had two frigates sent out there to protect our trade.

3250. When we are at war with any state, I presume that we are at greater expense than during a time of peace. The question is, whether a Colony would be more expensive in time of peace if it were independent?—The example I have just given is in point. We are at peace with Spain, but our trade is liable to interference upon points of dispute as to smuggling, and we have considered it necessary to protect our trade by two vessels, mounting 76 guns, and manned by 950 men.

3251. Supposing Bermuda to be made impregnable, at whatever cost, do you consider it important to English interests to maintain Halifax also?—That is a question connected with Canada and the United States, which is a different thing.

3252. In what sense would Halifax be important to England, supposing Bermuda to be made impregnable?—To defend the whole of our North American coast, I presume, The distance between Bermuda and Halifax is 700 miles; and Bermuda is valuable merely because Halifax very frequently used to be closed in the winter time by ice.

3253. In what sense would Halifax enable us to defend the American coast? —It possesses an excellent harbour.

3254. Supposing Bermuda were made impregnable, and were of sufficient size to shelter a naval force in winter, should we not have as good a harbour in Bermuda as in Halifax?—My plan would not include the fortifying of either place. So long as we maintain naval supremacy, we can hold them both.

3255. Do you consider that the garrison of 1,200 men at Bermuda, and the garrison of 1,200 at Halifax, are useless?—Not entirely useless. I do not know Halifax so well as I do Bermuda; but 1,200 would make a poor defence at Bermuda, if we had no naval force to assist it.

3256. You consider that a fortress imperfectly manned is worse than no fortress at all?—I think so, because it is liable to be taken by surprise, and then it becomes a weapon in the hands of the enemy, and the stores fall into the hands of the enemy.

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3257. Supposing that considerable expense must be incurred in making Bermuda and Halifax safe, do you think it necessary for Imperial interests that both should be maintained?—Yes; Bermuda will hold but a small fleet.

3258. You think that in the case of danger of an American war, it is necessary for us to have both harbours so as to maintain a sufficient number of ships in case of war?—Yes.

3259. Putting out of the question Colonial interests altogether?—Yes.

3260. What would be the use of 2,000 Marines, as you have suggested, in the West Indies?—I was merely asked whether they were necessary for police purposes.

3261. What sort of service do you contemplate for those Marines?—Police service.

3262. You do not look upon them in the light of a garrison, necessary for a fortress in the West Indies, but as a police force in case of internal disturbances?—They would be of course also available for manning such batteries as it might be thought desirable to man, to prevent slight cases of insult and aggression; but certainly not for conquest.

3263. If you treated them as garrisons, and supposing the fortresses to be taken by an insulting enemy, do you think it would be difficult for us to retake them?—Not so long as we have the command of the sea.

3264. So long as England has command of the sea, fortresses in the West Indies are useless?—Generally speaking they are.

3265. If taken by an enemy the enemy probably would find themselves prisoners of war?—As soon as we had recovered the supremacy which we had temporarily lost.

3266. I presume you would add, as an advantage to a naval force over a military defence, that men on board ship are in better health than those on land?—I think the mortality is least amongst sailors, especially since the West Indian and North American stations have been united, because ships are now occasionally sent for health to the colder part of the station.

3267. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you consider that the presence of a squadron supersedes the necessity for troops in the defence of a depôt?—Not if it is fortified.

3268. But you would rather have a squadron of small vessels than a land force?—Yes.

3269. All I understand you to mean thereby is, that if you had a small squadron, a land force would not be required?—I have compared the small squadron at Bermuda with the small garrisons there at present, and I say that one half of the expense would furnish a more efficient defence afloat than the military force does on shore.

3270. That is why one is to supersede the other?—Yes, supposing there are no fortifications.

3271. I think you said just now that you did not think it worth while to maintain a land force unless you could fully garrison a fortification?—I think that the small garrison of Bermuda makes it a source of danger rather than a protection.

3272. Does not the presence of a small force act as a nucleus around which the inhabitants of the Colony may rally?—The inhabitants of Bermuda number only about 8,000, and I suppose out of them very few hundreds would be available for the defence of the Colony. It must be considered as a mere garrison.

3273. Your answer referred simply to Bermuda, and not to Colonies in general?—Not to large Colonies, but to all the Colonies in the West Indies.

3274. If, from the presence of a hostile naval force in those waters, a squadron was drawn away to a distance, and there was no land force on the spot, would not the Colony be liable to attack?—Certainly; but it would be recoverable again as soon as possible.

3275. The loss of the Colony in the meantime would be greater from not being able to stand an attack for a short period?—Yes; if it could stand an attack long enough to enable us to reinforce it, it would be useful.

3276. Where there are fortifications, you would not wish to remove the land force, because there is a squadron in those seas?—On the contrary, unfortunately, when you have fortresses it is necessary to garrison them.

3277. It

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3277. It is to the advantage of the Colony that there should be strong fortresses for the purpose of making a temporary defence in case of the removal of the squadron?—Very extended garrisons are difficult of defence. Supposing the Government had agreed to the immense increase of fortifications at Bermuda as proposed in 1857, and to be completed in 1858, I think we may assume that from 1858 up to 1861, the garrison would still have been 1,188 men only, and I think that Bermuda would then have been weaker, and would have been a much greater prize to an enemy than it is at present.

3278. Your system of defending a Colony in the absence of large fortifications, which you regard as an extravagant mode of protection, would result in a fleet only which would be liable to removal?—Certainly.

3279. You would, therefore, contemplate the possibility of the Colony suffering capture and recapture in consequence of the absence of the squadron?—Supposing a Colony to be attacked, it is quite certain that the attacking force would not go to the stronger part of the Colony to effect a landing; for instance, in Jamaica the attacking force would never come to Port Royal. I think that the 1,700 men in Jamaica afford no protection to the Colony.

3280. Do you not lay some stress upon the loss of prestige, which would attach to a country which altogether lost a Colony?—I think we should equally lose the Colony if the garrison were insufficient.

3281. But we should not lose the possession of the Colony in the same sense if there was some place holding out till it was relieved?—Certainly not, but I think there is not a place in Jamaica capable of standing a siege.

3282. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do I understand greater economy or greater efficiency to be the object of your plan?—Both.

3283. But you think it would lead to greater economy?—I think it would.

3284. Do you mean that, although the cost of naval defence is considerably greater than that of a military defence, the smaller number of men in the squadron would reduce the cost per man?—I think so, in such Colonies as I have mentioned, the West Indies and Australia. The cost of soldiers in Australia is nearly one-third greater. In Victoria the cost per man is 157*l.*, whereas for a seaman it is only 106*l.* The average cost per soldier is 84*l.* or 85*l.*, and that of a sailor 106*l.* In Australia we are expending 5,110,000*l.*; and, supposing it were possible to substitute a naval force, that would provide 500 guns and 5,000 men, which would be a most preponderating naval force.

3285. Do you mean that the increase of the naval force to that amount, in substitution for troops, would bring up the cost to the present amount?—That is what I mean.

3286. You propose, at Bermuda, Halifax, and Australia, to substitute an increased naval force for the troops now in those Colonies?—Not at Halifax.

3287. You except no other place?—No. At Bermuda and in Australia I think it is perfectly possible to substitute a strong naval force.

3288. Bermuda, I believe, contains an important dockyard?—Yes.

3289. And large naval stores?—Yes.

3290. Do you propose to leave them without a garrison?—If you wish to defend it effectually, you must have a very large garrision. There is no difficulty in making Bermuda nearly impregnable, but the difficulty is that there is never a sufficient garrison.

3291. You propose to withdraw troops from Bermuda, and to substitute for them five ships; would you keep those ships always in the harbour?—No, there is not the least occasion to do so.

3292. During the occasional absence in time of war of those ships, and in the absence of soldiers, would not the dockyard and naval stores of Bermuda be at the mercy of a single enemy's cruiser?—I never proposed to defend Bermuda with only five ships; I say it would be a more efficient defence than 1,188 men in the garrison.

3293. Do you propose that the ships should always be in the harbour of Bermuda, or off the harbour?—A certain force should remain at Bermuda if it is to defend Bermuda.

3294. Do you think that practically possible?—Perfectly, or by cruizing so near as to be available in the event of an enemy appearing.

3295. In time of war is it not absolutely certain that men of war would be moving about, from one point to another; would it not be impossible to

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rely upon their remaining permanently in the harbour?—It would depend upon the commanding officer at the station.

3296. You think it would be possible, in time of war, to keep a sufficient naval force at Bermuda to defend the harbour and dockyard?—Quite possible.

3297. Would it be probable?—Yes, or the ships might be cruizing about, because the method in which you defend any colony, by naval means, is by looking carefully out and ascertaining whether any enemy is approaching you. Several of those vessels would be adding to our strength by giving us notice beforehand.

3298. *Chairman.*] At the time of the war with Russia, was not the closing of the Baltic a better defence to this country than if we had dotted sergeant's guards along the eastern coast of England?—Of course it was.

3299. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is not the plan you have proposed directly the reverse of the plan just described; I understood you propose to scatter a naval force in small squadrons over different points, and that at each point the naval force would remain stationary, and would not therefore be available for the general purposes of the war?—My plan is not to scatter a naval force. You send out small ships to bring you intelligence, but I should keep a force concentrated at Bermuda, supposing that the defence of Bermuda was the principal object.

3300. I understand you to say that you wish to maintain the defence of Bermuda, or Sydney, or Melbourne, or Jamaica, against the chances of insult or damage, even from a single enemy's cruizer, in the entire absence of troops, by means of the constant presence of men of war, which must be stationed at different points?—I think they ought to be concentrated at certain points, but a naval force is moveable, whereas a military force is not.

3301. The ships being concentrated at one point, you would leave all other points to the risk of injury and destruction from even the smallest force which an enemy might bring against them?—That is unavoidable, as it is at present; no enemy would attempt to land at one of the small Windward Islands, where there is but a single company; in many of the islands there is only one company of two or three artillerymen.

3302. Would you say that a very moderate amount of force, and a very moderate amount of fortifications, would be sufficient to protect such places as Sydney and Melbourne and Bermuda against attack; I do not say from a powerful expedition, but from a single enemy's cruiser?—Yes, a very little amount of force would be sufficient to do that.

3303. Your plan would not provide against such a contingency?—Mine is a general plan. I do not say that at certain points there might not be a small force employed to prevent an enemy's cruiser entering (for instance, the harbour at Sydney), but no troops that you would keep at Sydney would prevent an enemy landing at Botany Bay; the outer line of defence would depend upon the navy.

3304. Your opinion is against fortifying and garrisoning these Colonies to such an extent as would protect them against military expeditions; would you not fortify them even with small garrisons and moderate fortifications, which, during the inevitable absence of the men-of-war, would protect them from insult and injury from small hostile forces?—I think there would be no objection, if the Colony chose to pay for them. Perhaps you will allow me to refer to a letter I have received from an officer just arrived from Australia, to show the danger of such fortifications being left without adequate garrisons. He says there was a great discussion between the naval officers as to the proper position of the battery, and adds: "The question will be, wherever they may be erected, how to man them. The military force being contributed to by the Colony, the desire is to keep it at the lowest possible strength. They failed in their militia artillery, and are now getting up the popular force of volunteers." It appears to me, from that letter, that Sydney is not a bit stronger than it was before they put up the new batteries of 45 guns.

3305. Would you advise the people of Sydney to erect no batteries whatever, but to rest upon Her Majesty's ships?—No; I should advise them to pay for a large military force, if they choose. But the question put to me was with reference to the comparative value and expense of naval and military defences, and I say that I believe that the naval is more efficient and less expensive than the military force.

3306. You

3306. You think it would be equally to the safety of the Colony that it should have no military defence whatever?—No, certainly not; I have dwelt upon the danger of fortifications with insufficient garrisons. At this moment an enemy could attack Sydney in spite of the new fortifications as easily as before, and would of course be so much the stronger, and would be in possession of great military stores.

3307. That is upon the present plan?—I am assuming that the forts are built upon the best possible plan, but are not garrisoned.

3308. Is it not possible to erect such moderate forts at Sydney as to protect the harbour from destruction by an enemy, during the occasional absence of an English fleet?—Certainly.

3309. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you think that fortifications at Bermuda imperfectly manned are a source of peril to the Colony?—I think so.

3310. In the event of war, would not the best thing be to destroy them altogether?—That is a difficult question to answer, but I think we should have been much wiser never to have begun them.

3311. If there were no fortifications, is it likely that any enemy would visit Bermuda for hostile purposes?—I do not think that Bermuda would be of great advantage, except to a country that has the dominion of the sea.

3312. So long as we have fortifications there incapable of resisting a proper force, they would hold out a strong temptation to any power to possess itself of those fortifications?—Yes, I think so.

3313. Would the same remark apply, in your opinion, to places similarly situated?—I think so.

3314. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Would it not be a matter of great importance to an enemy to destroy the dock-yards and naval stores at Bermuda?—No doubt.

3315. Would it not be almost done as a matter of course if opportunity offered?—So long as we are supreme at sea, it could not occur.

3316. Do you think it possible during war that we should be supreme at sea every day, and at every point?—Yes, if you make the points necessary to guard few; there is no reason why we should not be always superior at Bermuda, to any force likely to be brought against us.

3317. Mr. *Baxter.*] How many ships would, in your opinion, form a sufficient defence to the dock-yards at Bermuda?—Three or four line of battle ships is more than the whole United States of America could bring against us.

3318. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Would it not make those men of war of comparatively little use to keep them stationed near Bermuda, and not capable of being moved about freely?—Yes, but it is a more economical defence than the other, and therefore you would save so much money.

3319. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you think that the garrison of 1,300 men at Bermuda is an adequate defence for the dock-yards?—No, I think not, and that was the opinion of the commission which sat in 1857.

3320. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you mean that the forts at Bermuda are no sufficient defence against an enemy's cruiser coming in to shell the dockyards?—I can hardly imagine it possible that a single enemy's cruiser would attempt to shell the dockyard, so long as the floating battery is there.

3321. You are assuming the entire absence of any garrison?—I think we should have saved an immense deal of money, and been quite as strong at Bermuda, if we had never fortified it at all; it is only available as a naval depôt; and you can defend it much more economically by a naval power than by military means.

3322. *Chairman.*] Lord Grey, who has given evidence before this Committee, said, in answer to Question 2565: "The experience we have had of the past seems to me to lead to the conclusion that almost the whole of the money we have spent upon colonial fortifications has been so much absolutely wasted; and that with respect to many of those fortifications erected at great expense, the wisest thing we could now do would be to blow them up again." Do you agree in that opinion?—Yes; I think that many of our colonial fortifications might be destroyed with great advantage.

3323. Mr. *Fortescue.*] In giving that opinion, are you speaking of the overgrown fortifications beyond the amount of the garrison which can be spared for them, or do you speak of all fortifications?—Of overgrown fortifications, not sufficiently garrisoned.

3324. Sir *George Grey.*] Your opinion is that fortifications that are so extensive

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sive that probably this country would not be likely to spare a sufficient garrison for them in time of war would be a source of danger rather than of strength?—Yes.

3325. Mr. *Marsh.*] Is the cost of marines as much as 106*l.* per man?—Assuming that there is an increase in the number of marines, I think not.

3326. £. 106 includes able-bodied seamen, who get higher wages than marines?—Yes.

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3327. Mr. *Adderley.*] I THINK you are at present Vice President of the Committee of Council on Education?—Yes.

3328. And you were for some time connected with the Government at Sydney?—I am afraid I was more connected with the opposition than the Government.

3329. During what years?—I was a Member of the Legislative Council from 1843 to the end of 1849.

3330. Will you give us your general opinion as to the fitness of such a Colony as New South Wales to undertake its own defence, first as against internal riot, and secondly against foreign attack?—Confining myself to the peculiar circumstances of New South Wales, and leaving out of the question anything that is common to it with the rest of the Colonies, I do not think it desirable to retain any troops at all there. The Government of New South Wales, which has been established about five years, is responsible to an Assembly elected by universal suffrage. There has been a general election every year since responsible Government was introduced, and the existence of each successive Ministry has been exceedingly short; and the measures taken by those Ministries, particularly by the one now in office, have been such as to shake the confidence of the residents in the Colony in the stability of property. A considerable debt has been accumulated, and the Government has introduced a measure with regard to the occupants of Crown land, which is in the highest degree reprehensible. I do not think that a Government of this kind is fit to be entrusted with the disposition of Her Majesty's troops for any purpose whatever. As an illustration, I may mention that there have been lately at a place called Lambing Flat, disturbances beween the gold diggers and the Chinese. The gold diggers wanted to drive away the Chinese, and troops were sent down to repress the disturbance. So far the Colonial Government did its duty, but the Prime Minister went down to Lambing Flat himself, and in order to appease the diggers, made to them certain promises, which promises I am informed were never intended to be fulfilled, and indeed cannot be fulfilled. Suppose that the men, finding themselves deceived by the non-fulfilment of those promises, break out into a new riot, I do not think it desirable that Her Majesty's troops should be employed in putting down such a riot occasioned by the bad faith of the Colonial Government. The Government of New South Wales is placed on a far more democratic basis than the Government of the States of the American Union. In America the democracy is settled on the land, and has an interest in the preservation and prosperity of the country. In New South Wales a great proportion of the voters are not settled on the land, but are in the receipt of wages, and they have no interest or feeling identical with the prosperity of the country whose destinies are virtually entrusted to them. The consequence is, that there is a state of downward progress; that each Government falls below its predecessor in respectability, and that there is a kind of ostracism of men of property and intelligence.

3331. Putting out of the question the democratic nature of the Government of Australia, do you not see some objection to any community that is self-governed being protected by another power?—When a Colony has received self-government, that is, when it has a ministry responsible to a freely elected assembly, the Colony though nominally a dependency of the Crown, and subject to the legislation of the British Parliament, has really for most purposes become a foreign power, and as such should in the first instance be charged with the duty of its own protection and its internal police. The governing power resides in the Prime Minister of the day, and he must dispose of the military force; a limited monarch, in the case of a democratic form of Government, where there is no aristocracy interposed between him and the people, has

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has a tendency to become either a cipher or an autocrat. In the case of New South Wales, the Governor has become a cipher, and would have little real power as to the disposition and employment of the troops, or as to anything else. It seems to me that the people of this country ought not to be taxed for maintaining the external defence or internal police of such a Colony in time of peace.

3332. Do you think that the relations of such a Colony as New South Wales with England impose upon England in the first instance, the task of defending that Colony, with some repayment from the Colony, or do you think that New South Wales should in the first instance bear its own expenses, making claim of repayment upon England, as its mother country, in certain cases?—Speak-with regard to the Australian Colonies which are situate in a temperate latitude, inhabited by Englishmen and Irishmen, in a climate in which they can labour out of door without injury, and under institutions in which they can govern themselves, I do not see that any duty is imposed on the mother country to defend such a Colony in time of peace from interval riot, or from such insults from foreign nations as no country can be wholly secure from; as regards receiving payment from the Colonies for military assistance, it appears to me to be unworthy of the dignity of this country to take money from some Colonies, because they are willing to pay it, and not from others, because they are unwilling to pay it. Thus New South Wales and Victoria pay largely, while Canada does not pay at all; I think it is indispensable that the Imperial Government should mete out equal justice to all its dependencies. But, I object to payment altogether; it is puting our troops more in the position of mercenaries, than if I were a soldier myself I should like. They are virtually serving a foreign Government which hires them from the Government which they are bound to serve. If the Colonies pay for those troops, they will consider, and very properly, that they have a right to use them; and they may and will be used upon occasions which we should think objectionable, but the money would stop our mouths, and we should have no right to complain.

3333. Do you see the necessity of England keeping a small body of troops in Australia either in the way of guards of honour to the Governors, or for the purpose of maintaining the Imperial prestige?—I think that for every purpose, for that of prestige as well as for that of defence in time of peace, the Imperial troops are better away. I cannot help looking forward to a period which may arrive when some of those Colonies may wish to separate from the mother country. The presence of troops and garrisons in those Colonies would form on such an occasion a formidable obstacle in the way of an amicable separation. I hope if ever any one of our Colonies deliberately expresses a wish to separate from the mother country, it will be met in a very different spirit from that in which the separation movement has been met in America. If an insult were offered so the English flag, or a small detachment of our troops were cut-off in such a Colony, such a feeling might be raised among the people of England as might render an amicable separation next to impossible. Thus, in America the Southern States were permitted to declare themselves independent, to organize a government, to pass laws, to adopt a flag, and the people of the north took little account of it; but the attack upon Fort Sumter lit up a blaze which has involved the whole union in one conflagration, and has I fear rendered civil war inevitable.

3334. From what you have said, I presume you would not recommend that troops should be kept in Colonies by England by way of retaining the dependance of any Colonies who might wish to separate from us?—I offer no opinion as to the policy of retaining the whole or any part of our Colonial empire. If a Colony can only be retained by the presence of troops, if their withdrawal would involve a dissolution of the existing state of society, or the destruction of the white race, to withdraw those troops is of course the same as giving up the Colony, and giving it up to destruction; on that I offer no opinion. But I can imagine nothing more impolitic than for England to act over again her American errors of the last century; colonies are no longer desired for the monopoly of their trade. Instead of taxing them as our forefathers claimed to do we, in the matter of this military expenditure, permit them in a great degree to tax us; I hope we are above the vulgar notion that the mere extent of territory over which our flag waves is any increase to our strength. It therefore seems to me that a Colony which is ill-disposed to this country, is not

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not worth retaining; of course if the Colony succeeded in the struggle it would it would have been better never to have attempted to coerce it; but even if the Colony failed, I should think that a country reconquered, wasted by fire and sword, with its old hostility against us embittered, would be one of the most worthless possessions which any nation could have.

3335. Do you think that the Australian tax-payers being called upon to take their share in the defence of their Colony, as English tax-payers take their share of the defence of this country, would incline Australians to assume a position of independence towards us?—This is not so much an Imperial question as a question between inhabitants of different parts of the same empire. The Empire of England of course consists of the United Kingdom and of its dependencies. The question is whether the people of the United Kingdom should be taxed for the benefit of the people of its dependencies. It is exactly the reverse of the question of the last century, which was whether the people of the dependencies should be taxed for the benefit of the United Kingdom. I am against taxing the Colonies for the benefit of the mother country, or the mother country for the benefit of the Colonies. Looking at the case of New South Wales with the eye of a former Colonist, I do not think that any measure so obviously just would lead to permanent discontent. When I lived at Sydney there was no income tax; there were no assessed taxes; there was no excise, except on spirits, which probably was rather a benefit than a burthen. Profits were large; wages were very high; the mildness of the climate renders fuel almost unnecessary, except for cooking, and enables people to do with very little clothing. And it does appear to me that to tax the labourers of Leicestershire and Dorsetshire, for instance, to relieve such a community from a taxation required for its own defence, would be a crying injustice to those who had to pay it. I believe the good sense of the Colonists would acquiesce in this view. Of course they would complain, and would endeavour to retain the subsidy out of the Imperial funds which they now have, but when they found that their complaints were in vain, I think they would acquiesce. By their connection with the mother country the Colonists lose the power of making war and peace, and they run the risk of being involved in war, in consequence of some quarrel in this part of the world, with which they have nothing to do. Those are the disadvantages to the Colony of its connexion with Great Britain; but those evils are much lightened by the remote situation of our Colonies, and by the fact that the mother country is the greatest naval power in the world. On the other hand, the advantages they gain by being part of the British Empire are enormous; they are relieved from the necessity of keeping up a large force at any time on land; they are absolutely relieved from the expense of keeping up a navy. There are no people who enjoy more security in time of war. England is better defended, but she is more exposed; she lies nearer the enemy. In case of war between England and France, the difference between her risk and that of Australia may be expressed by the difference between 21 miles, the distance from Dover to Calais, and 15,000 miles, the distance from England to Australia. I apprehend that the Colonists would consider these things, and would recollect that by the guarantee, as I may call it, of this country in time of war, they are enabled to apply their revenues entirely to their own local purposes and the satisfaction of the requirements of a new country. If England were merely a foreign power to them, it might deal with them in a very different manner from that in which she has dealt with them hitherto. They have now the weight of England on their side; they might know what it was to feel the weight of England against them.

3336. Is there in your mind any other reason, except that of our Colonies being subjected to our foreign policy, why we should assist them at all?—The French are said to have 5,000 men in New Caledonia, at this moment; we have but few troops in New South Wales, and we have a territory there of 1,000 miles of sea coast. It is ridiculous to suppose that the troops we can spare in time of peace would be a defence to such a territory, and it is more ridiculous to suppose that the troops we can spare in time of war would be sufficient; because in time of war the present conditions of warfare are such that we must recall our troops to defend ourselves at home. The changes introduced into warfare render this island more liable to invasion than it was before. Our troops can do little to defend the Australian Colonies, but the Colonies rely upon their presence almost as much as if they were a sufficient guard; and it has hitherto,

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hithorto, at least till within the last two or three years, prevented them from drilling their own men, and from enrolling sufficient militia or volunteers. Any one who spreads out a map of the world, and looks at the dominions of England, will consider it very strange that we should send people from England to defend the Antipodes, while we leave the young men of Australia to grow up without the knowledge of arms.

3337. It has been laid down as an abstract proposition by a high authority that the relation between the mother country and the Colony is, obedience on the one side, and protection on the other; do you think that that relation exists between England and her Colonies, or that there is as little of real protection on the one side as there is of obedience on the other?—I think that so long as England is the greatest naval power in the world she will be a great protection to her Colonies. Were she unable to protect them by her fleet, I do not think the wish to be united to England would long survive. When the Colonies get no advantage from the union with England, they will be inclined to separate. But what I submit to the Committee is, that the motives which induce our Colonists to remain united to the mother country are sufficiently overwhelming without our furnishing a force for their external defence and internal police, which they are perfectly able to pay for themselves.

3338. *Chairman.*] You think that these motives are sufficiently strong to induce the Colonists to retain their allegiance whether the troops are there or not?—I do think so; I am not presumptuous, I believe, in saying that if I had remained in Australia I might have looked forward to filling the post of Premier there, and I am sure that that is the advice I should have given the Colonists.

3339. The circumstance of the Colonies being subject to our foreign policy, does not, in your opinion, give them any claim to call upon us to undertake their internal defence?—I do not think that the Colonies have any claim of any kind. "Claim" is a judicial word. The whole matter seems to me to be one of expediency, to be settled by negotiation. We are not, as I think, bound in any way. If we are to pay, what the Colonies are to be paid should be settled, as nearly as possible, in the same way as if we were treating with a foreign country. The position of those Colonies which have self-government seems to me very much to resemble the position of Hanover, from the accession of the House of Brunswick in England, until the male line succeeded on the accession of Her Majesty.

3340. I understood you, just now, to say that the Colonies have not the right to make war and peace; and that the circumstance of their being subjected to our foreign policy, gave them some claim upon the mother country?—I think that being subject to our foreign policy gives the Colonies fair ground to ask for assistance in time of war. The negotiation with the Colony ought, in my opinion, to be like that with a foreign country, only that the *ultima ratio* with a foreign country would be war, and with a Colony would be separation. The question is, how much we are willing to sacrifice to avert separation, and how much they will submit to do for themselves without separation.

3341. To what extent does the fact of any Colony being involved in our foreign policy give it any claim?—I think I have already answered that question. I do not recognise that there is any claim. Claim implies some distinct right *ex debito justitiæ*. With regard to those Colonies which have responsible Governments, I do not think that there is any *debitum justitiæ*.

3342. In answer to any claim on their part, can it not be said that they have involved us in colonial wars?—I do not think that it would be any good ground, in negotiating with New South Wales, on announcing the withdrawal of troops, to say that we had been engaged in war in reference to Colonies, we will say, in North America. Australia has not been attacked; and I believe that, except in the riots of Ballarat some years ago, no shot has been fired in anger on the Australian Continent.

3343-4. Do you think it material to consider, in undertaking the native war of New Zealand, whether it was caused by English or colonial policy?—Whoever created the New Zealand difficulty, we having troops in the Colony, and having undertaken its defence, without reference to the ground upon which the quarrel arose, are bound to do that for which we placed the troops there. That is one evil of placing troops in a Colony under a responsible Government. You are placing the troops at the disposal of the Minister of the day; that is a thunder-bolt in the hand of a child. A large military expenditure is a popular

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thing in a Colony. Even a war in a remote part of the Colony will be popular in parts where it is not carried on, on account of the money which is made out of it. The country may suffer, but the towns often get a great advantage. I think it is a great want of prudence on the part of the Imperial Government to place the power of commencing wars, in which it will be obliged to take a part, in the hands of persons over whom it not only has no control, but who are often directly interested in getting up a war. And I would also say, that the small Colonies struggling into existence ought not to expect to be able to take things with so high a hand, and to resent every injury as boldly and rapidly as a country like England. If the New Zealand settlers have a quarrel with the natives, in which the natives are doing anything which they ought not to do, it may be a perfect *casus belli*; but I think it much better that war should not necessarily ensue; much better that these young communities should learn that there are many things which they must endure, and that it is better to put up with a great deal of injury than rush immediately to arms. If the Colony had to bear the weight of those conflicts it would learn to endure, to procrastinate, to intrigue, to sow differences among the native chiefs, and practise all the arts which the weak must exercise when they deal with the strong; but so long as the wars they commence must be fought out at the expense of the mother country, there will always be war when there is a pretext which will hold water. It is neither wise nor natural that young communities should be armed with the strength and power of old ones; the tendency is to make them reckless and overbearing.

3345. Do you think that the presence of Imperial troops in a Colony tends to promote or to prevent war?—I have no experience on the point. It is easy to see that, so far as the presence of troops intimidates the tribes, it has a tendency to prevent war; but so far as it relieves the colonists from the responsibility of war, it tends to promote it.

3346. Mr. *Adderley*.] Has not England great difficulty in maintaining a proper check upon military expenditure in the Colonies?—I have no practical experience on that point; I have seen what expenditure on fortification is in New South Wales, where, after an enormous waste of money, Sydney was left utterly defenceless.

3347. Do the views you have expressed apply equally to New Zealand, the Cape of Good Hope, and British North America?—I have not official knowledge to answer the question; I have rather laid down what I consider the abstract theory, but it must receive many modifications. In New Zealand, where there is war, we must fight it out, but having done so, we ought to give the colonists to understand that we are not going to be responsible for another war. I believe that the absence of our troops would do more than anything to prevent war. I have no peculiar knowledge with reference to the Cape, where the Governor is Prime Minister; but there is a harbour there which may be wanted for Imperial purposes, and which ought, perhaps, to be defended by Imperial troops. So long as we choose to have an Algiers in the south of Africa, as France has in the north, I presume we must occupy and defend it in the same way.

3348. Lord *Stanley*.] Are you aware that the seat of war between the natives and the colonists of South Africa is beyond the limits of Cape Colony altogether?—Quite so. As regards the American Colonies, there is the question of Halifax, which may be considered a garrison; but with that exception, I think the Colonies would be better without troops. I look upon the garrison of Quebec as likely, some day or other, to become analogous to the garrison of Fort Sumter. The citadel of Quebec is not a fortification that would bear the attacks of modern warfare.

3349. Mr. *Adderley*.] Do you think our undertaking the garrisoning of Quebec may be quoted against us, as Canada extends, as a reason why we should equally undertake to garrison the future fortresses of the extended Colony?—We do not seem to care much about precedents, as we make some Colonies pay, and some not.

3350. You say that the relation of the Colonies to England should be something like that which existed with Hanover?—I said I thought it was so practicall .

3351. Is not that very much the relation of the early American Colonies to England, and was not that relation very different to that which have lately

lately assumed?—If we go back to the reign of Charles the Second, I think we should find that relation. There was then no question of taxation or military occupation as there was in the reign of George the Third. I remember reading in Evelyn's Diary that the Committee of Trade and Plantations was established very much for fear that the North American Colonies should declare themselves independent.

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3352. There was not till the latter part of last century, any transmission of troops to those Colonies, I believe?—General Braddock's expedition, I think was the first.

3353. Do you know that General Braddock's expedition was provisioned by the Colony?—I was not aware of that.

3354. Supposing the Colonies were called upon to depend upon their own internal recources as you suggest, could they take any part in the naval defence of the empire?—I do not think that England could ask the Colonies for any naval assistance; the contribution would be very small, and I think they would very much repine at it. If England did not supply the naval force, I do not think the Colonies would fit out ships for themselves.

3355. With reference to the fortifications of Sydney, when you suggest that New South Wales should be called upon to bear the cost of making them, do you include block ships and such floating batteries as may be necessary parts of such fortifications?—I think that it should be a Colonial force entirely, excepting in the case of an Imperial garrison, such as Halifax, which is supposed to be valuable as a harbour. If Sydney Cove were considered a valuable station for Imperial purposes, it might not be reasonable to throw its defence wholly on the Colony.

3356. *Chairman.*] Politically speaking, should you say that where a Colony had, from its general resources, the means of bearing a considerable proportion of the expense, it would be an advantage, or a disadvantage, to that dependency to have its defence provided from external sources?—There is a pecuniary advantage, but many countervailing evils. I look at the Colonies as young nations educating themselves, and it is very much to be regretted that they should be educated in a one-sided manner. If we go on in the present system there is risk of reducing the Colonies to the same position to which the Britons were reduced by the Romans, when they left them to the mercy of the Picts and Scots.

3357. Do you not think that the resources of the Australian Colonies would enable them to defend themselves?—I think that a certain amount of money could be got out of a colonial community, but beyond that the people will not pay. A certain sum of money may be obtained from the Australian Colonies, and the sort of Government they now have will get it; and the question is, whether some of that should be employed in their defence, or whether it should be expended in matters which I am afraid would not always bear investigation.

3358. Some evidence has been given before the Committee as to apprehensions entertained, or supposed to be entertained in the Australian Colonies, of an attack from France at New Caledonia, and it has been stated that it was our duty to protect them from such possible aggression; do you think that that was real apprehension in New South Wales?—I think it was perfectly real and genuine.

3359. Would you say that the risk, whatever it may have been, of such an attack was greater or less than the risk which our North American Colonies might be supposed to experience, of an attack by the United States?—An attack on the American Colonies has been tried twice. During the century that Canada has belonged to us, the Americans have had no reason to rejoice that they ever put their feet on Canadian soil. In Australia this has not been tried. The colonists are not trained to arms; but they are a pastoral people, and were they trained they would make as fine soldiers as any in the world, and in that case an attack by such a force as France has in the Pacific would be madness.

3360. It has been stated before this Committee that there are 10,000 volunteers in the Australian Colonies. Should you say that we might reasonably infer, from the circumstance of so large a body of volunteers having enrolled themselves that there are materials for the defence of the Colony, supposing it to be necessary?—I have no knowledge of the nature of the volunteers; it would depend upon what kind of people they are. There are bad elements in

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the population of the Australian Colonies as everywhere else. I think the origin of the volunteers in Australia has arisen from the parent movement in England; for I have observed that whenever a movement takes place in England, it finds its echo at the antipodes, and I believe the volunteer movement there to be a response to the volunteer movement in this country.

3361. Do you think that there is reason to suppose that there will be the materials in Australia for the defence of the Colony, if necessary, considering the large number of men who have enrolled themselves as volunteers?—I have no doubt you will find plenty of people to volunteer. There are no people better mounted than the Australians; they make excellent sailors and are full of spirit. The particular industry of Australia is favourable to the development of the volunteer movement. The sheep and cattle can be left in few hands without absolute ruin; whereas the agricultural people find it almost impossible to engage in war at particular seasons of the year.

3362. Admiral Erskine has given it as his opinion that the attack of an enemy would probably be upon the ships laden with gold rather than by a descent upon the shores. Do you agree in that opinion?—Admiral Erskine is so good an authority that I could not presume to offer an opinion either in confirmation or contradiction. I should think that Sydney might be well worth a visit, by an enemy. When I was there it was quite possible to bring a line-of-battle ship within 20 yards of the town.

3363. Do you think that there would be in time the means of defending it?—I believe there would be the means of defending it against any force which was likely to be brought against it. The defence of such a place as Sydney is a question of fortification. I apprehend that the proper thing to do is to fortify the narrow inlet from the Pacific Ocean into the harbour, which I believe is capable of being fortified in such a manner as to make the entrance of a foreign ship into the harbour very difficult.

3364. Sir *George Grey*.] Your opinion is, that for police purposes and for defence against internal disorders, a colony ought to be left to provide its own means of defence?—Certainly.

3365. Do you apply that universally, including, for instance, the West Indies, or Colonies in which there is a mixed population?—I referred to the West India Colonies when I said I did not wish to enter into the question of withdrawing troops, where such withdrawal would occasion the dissolution of society. That really would not be a question of withdrawing troops, but of the separation and destruction of the Colony.

3366. You have assumed the case of a desire on the part of a Colony to separate from this country, and you have stated your apprehensions of the evils which might ensue from the occupation by British troops of a post in that Colony; but take the case of a Colony desirous of maintaining its connexion with the mother country, and asking for assistance against foreign attack; what, in your opinion, would be the duty of the mother country?—In case of actual war it is the duty of this country, if it can, to assist the Colony, as being part of Her Majesty's dominions. It is our pleasure to have an empire on which the sun never sets. We ought as far as possible to be able to meet the necessities that such an empire imposes upon us; but after we have done all we can, we must in case of war dispose our troops on the most valuable and most important points. The duty of defending the Colonies must always be taken with this qualification.

3367. You draw a broad distinction between defence against internal disorder and defence against foreign enemies?—Quite so; I do not think we are called upon to supply the Colonies in time of peace, or perhaps in time of war, with a force sufficient to protect them from insult.

3368. Do you draw any distinction between an isolated Colony and a Colony which has a long boundary bordering on a foreign country?—I do not. I think that a Colony with a long boundary stands especially in need of protection, and that our maintaining troops there acts only as an opiate to put the Colony to sleep, and it prevents them from getting the only adequate protection for themselves.

3369. Lord *Stanley*.] Taking the case of such a Colony as Canada, and supposing that unfortunately differences arose between this country and the United States, do you not think that the population of Canada having nothing to do with the cause of the quarrel, would have a claim upon England for protection in

in a war which they had not brought on, but in which they nevertheless found themselves involved?—I think so; they have twice been involved in such wars, once when General Montgomery went to Quebec, and again in the war of 1812.

3370. Do you consider that such a state of things as I have contemplated as possible would limit the rule you laid down as a general rule, that when a Colony once has responsible Government, it ought to provide its own defence? —War is an exception to all rules. The Colony ought to be defended as part of the Empire so far as the wants and necessities of war will permit. Unless there is some such reason to vary the rule, the rule should be that in time of peace there should be no Imperial troops in the Colony.

3371. Would you apply that to a Colony situated as Canada is, no less than to a Colony circumstanced as the Australian Colonies are?—Much more so; because the frontier of Canada is so extensive, and the defence so difficult, being exposed to attack by a steamer crossing in a few hours from the American coast. It would be deluding the Colony to hold out to them that we could do anything important towards protecting so long a line of frontier as that. If it is to be protected at all, it must be protected by themselves.

3372. Mr. *Marsh.*] You say the connexion of the Colony with the mother country saves the Government the expense of naval protection: does it not also save great expense in diplomatic agents?—Certainly; but I think the Colonial Legislature will not object to pay for diplomatic agents, if they have the posts to give.

3373. Your opinion is that England should allow the colonists of New Zealand to fight it out themselves with the natives?—Not speaking of the present war.

3374. You think that if England did that, they should allow the colonists to do it in their own way?—We cannot claim to control unless we assist.

3375. Mr. *Baxter.*] Would you withdraw the garrisons from Quebec, Kingston, and Halifax, in time of peace?—Halifax stands upon a separate footing: I should see with great pleasure the garrisons of Quebec and Kingston withdrawn.

3376. Would it not be better to keep a moderate force in Canada, as a nucleus of British force, than to send troops out when war broke out?—I think not; I think it would be better to keep the nucleus in England. The general practice now is, when you send troops to the Colonies, to keep the nucleus or depôt in England, to feed them.

3377. If Australia wished it, would you send out a force to man the garrisons?—It would depend upon the form that the war assumed. If France in a war with England struck at the heart of the empire, England, I should hope that the Government of the day would be inclined to keep every man in England, and even to recall the troops from the Colonies. We should think that we could afford to lose a place like Sydney, but London we could not afford to lose in an Imperial point of view.

3378. In your opinion the maintenance of troops in the Colonies has had the effect of preventing the colonists trusting to their own resources?—In Australia, until the late volunteer movement, it had. Canada has raised a militia which has often behaved gallantly, but that, I think, arose from the nearness of danger, and the obvious inadequacy of our forces for their protection.

3379. Is not the militia of Canada comparatively insignificant?—It was very considerable in the war of 1812, and did great things.

3380. The militia of Canada has not been enrolled for many years?—That is true.

3381. In the other provinces, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, they had no defensive force of their own?—Still I could not say that Canada did nothing for her own defence, because she acted most creditably in time of war.

3382. You think that Canada would have provided the force if no British troops had been kept in the garrisons?—I think so.

3383. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Have you any reason to think that Canada, in case of actual danger, would not now make the same gallant efforts as she made before?—I have no doubt she would come forward gallantly, as she has always done.

3384. Do you think that that remark applies also to the Australian Colonies? —I have nothing to fall back upon; there has been no bloodshed in Australia, except that shed by the soldiers at the row at the diggings.

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3385. Do you think that the large sums voted for military purposes in New South Wales, and during the active volunteer movement which has been going on there, afford no evidence of a spirit of self-defence?—I have no doubt there is a spirit of self-defence in the people of Australia, and that when they understand that they must rely upon themselves, they will defend themselves. There are no braver people in the world.

3386. It has been alleged by them that the presence of a small force of Imperial troops in the Colony is a great assistance and encouragement to the organization of a local force, and they ask that on that account, totally irrespective of the party upon whom the cost is to fall, such a force should be maintained there. Do you think that that opinion is well founded?—I am not a good judge of such matters; but I have no doubt the Colonists will allege everything they can to keep the troops. The argument used to be the convict population, and in some places the native tribes.

3387. We have been told that there is a small party in New South Wales which is in favour of separation from the mother country, and is anxious to get rid of the presence of the Imperial troops?—There is a gentleman who was always for separation when I was in Australia, and before I went there, namely, Dr. Lang. I do not know what particular tactics he now pursues; but as far as I was aware, there was no party for separation when I was in Australia. I correspond with very intelligent persons in the Colony, and I never heard a suggestion of such a feeling.

3388. Do you think that the entire withdrawal of the troops from the Colony would not encourage the tendency to separation?—I think not. At first, there would be an outburst of discontent, and a repining; but I think the colonists would sit down and calculate what they gained and what they lost by connexion with Great Britain, and make up their minds that, although diminished in value, the thing was still worth retaining.

3389. I understood that a considerable portion of your reason for wishing to see the troops removed from the Colonies was an anticipation of the desire of separation. Do you think that that is a near or practical consideration?—It is impossible for me to say. In some Colonies it is a very near and practical consideration. In Australia things are in such a state, and the existing Government is so violent, that I should not be surprised at anything that happened in the next few years.

3390. Has that had a tendency to produce disloyalty towards the Crown?—Not at present, but it has produced the greatest possible disloyalty towards the Queen's Government in New South Wales, and if that Government is armed with the Queen's forces, paid for out of the Imperial funds, or out of the funds of the Colony, so that the strength of the Empire is really exerted in favour of the Government of the day, the Imperial Government must participate in the unpopularity of the local Government, and the step may not be very long from that state of things to separation.

3391. You mean that British troops should not be used to put down internal movements against the Government?—Yes. For instance, there is the greatest discontent in the interior of New South Wales with regard to laws which are now being passed as to the occupancy of Crown lands; and should those laws pass, I do not doubt they will encounter a certain amount of at least passive resistance, which the remoteness of situation, and the reckless character of a portion of the population employed in the interior parts, may render very formidable.

3392. The greater part of your evidence, I understand, has reference to Colonies to which responsible government has been granted?—Yes.

3393. Would you have given anything like the evidence you have, with respect to the presence or absence of Imperial troops, if no responsible government had been granted?—When I was in New South Wales we were in the highest state of discontent for many reasons. We wanted to govern ourselves, although, perhaps, we were as well governed from home. We were very warm upon the question of the renewal of transportation; and if troops had not been there, there might have been very serious riots. So long as a Colony is governed from home, and the will of the Colonial Minister is substituted for their own will, the Government must be armed with force, for the people will not submit willingly to an absentee Government.

3394. Has the introduction of responsible government into Australia made any

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any change in the control which the Australian Colonies has over their foreign policy?—Not legally and technically.

3395. As regards foreign policy, are not the relations between those Colonies and the mother country exactly upon the same footing as they were before the introduction of responsible government?—My view is, that being governed almost entirely by themselves they have really become a foreign power, and that their position has become that of an independent Government.

3396. Have they any greater control over their foreign policy than they had before?—They have no control; it is under the control of Her Majesty.

3397. Whatever the military relations between the Colonies and the mother country were before the introduction of responsible government, do they continue the same now, so far as protection against external enemies is concerned?—It would have been much better to have left the Colonies to defend themselves long ago; but you cannot use troops for the purposes of internal coercion, as it was necessary to do before the establishment of responsible Government without employing those troops for external defence.

3398. It is the case, is it not, that the Australian Colonies have no farther power to involve the mother country in war with an external enemy than they had before?—I think they have further power, for the Governorship has become almost a sinecure, and the Prime Minister may take measures which may compromise us with a foreign government, for instance, with the Government of France in New Caledonia. That person is not removable at Her Majesty's pleasure, but only at the pleasure of the local Parliament.

3399. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You think it probable that no British statesman would offer opposition to the secession of the Colonies?—Not armed opposition.

3400. I presume that it would be thought by most British statesmen undesirable that the secession of an important Colony should take place?—I cannot say; there is a difference of opinion upon the subject.

3401. It is not, as a matter of course, thought desirable?—No.

3402. Assuming that it is thought right to maintain the relations with the mother country, do you not think that an amicable feeling would be improved by the presence of a small body of troops?—I do not think so. If there is the least disposition to separate, a small number of troops, instead of being able to restrain the movement, would offer to demagogues a ready means of committing the Colony by an insult on that sign and symbol of Imperial pre-eminence and protection. The real inducement to the Colonies to remain united to the mother country is not the few troops which they see, but the vast power which they they do not see, but which is behind; I had rather see the Governor's guard composed of colonial soldiers.

3403. Supposing the matured will of the Colony to be in favour of secession, would it not be perfectly easy to remove the troops before any movement took place?—In Boston much blood was shed before independence was declared, and I think it undesirable that the feelings of the colonists should be embittered by the recollection that blood has been shed. I think the troops would be but a target.

3404. In your view of the probable policy of this country as regards secession, the case of Fort Sumter is hardly a parallel case, is it, because there the Federal Government was resolved to prevent secession. In your view, the Home Government of this country would not be desirous of preventing it?—The Federal Government would have no power to prevent secession, unless it was backed by the feeling of the people of America. The feeling of America slumbered until insult was offered to the Stars and Stripes at Fort Sumter, and then it was not in the power of the Federal Government, had they desired it, to restrain the people.

3405. Your objection to the presence of troops applies more to the presence of a sufficient number to protect the Colony, than to the presence of a small force as a nucleus?—My opinion is, that the presence of a small force does not give the protection required, but that it deadens the spirit of the colonists to which alone they can look for real protection; probably every soldier there prevents 100 colonists from taking up arms and drilling.

3406. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Considering that we have every reason to believe that the present feeling of the North American Colonies is one of warm loyalty, should you not think that we should have sufficient notice of such an entire revolution of feeling, as you contemplate, to give us ample time to change our policy?—I cannot tell; perhaps not.

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3407. Assuming that our object is to maintain and encourage the connexion existing between the Colonies and the mother country, do you give it as your opinion that the presence of Imperial troops has no tendency to prolong that connexion?—I think it has rather a tendency to shorten that connexion; it seems to me that the only way to maintain the connexion is to leave it to the good sense, and to the interests of the Colonists, and that any attempt to substitute for that, the appearance of a protection which is unreal, only tends to create disappointment; besides there is the danger which may at any time arise of insult being offered to the flag.

3408. Your opinion is the same even in the case where Imperial troops are kept in the Colony at the earnest desire of the Colony itself, the withdrawal of which troops would at all events produce at the time a great feeling of dissatisfaction?—There are two parties in every Colony, and it is very difficult for them both to be long desirous of the same thing.

3409. You have no reason to think that British soldiers are now maintained in any Colony against the wishes of the Colony?—On the contrary, they would be glad to see 10 times as many.

3410. *Chairman.*] Is that in consequence of an increase in the commissariat expenditure?—Yes, and the upper classes think that it makes society more agreeable; the young ladies are frantic upon the subject, and people who keep public-houses are always glad to see our soldiers.

3411. Sir *George Grey.*] Are you aware that Victoria has undertaken to pay all its military expenses above a fixed amount?—That is so; they require a very vigorous police in Victoria; they have strange people collected together, who require a strong hand, and with the high rate of wages in Australia, they find it a great expense to collect a police. I dare say our army is the best and cheapest support that society can receive under the present conditions of New South Wales and Victoria; but I do not think that is the proper destination for British troops.

Sir *Charles Clifford*, called in; and Examined.

Sir *C. Clifford.*

3412. *Chairman.*] YOU have held the office, I believe, of Speaker of the House of Representatives in New Zealand?—Yes.

3413. From when?—From the time of its being first called together until last November.

3414. How long has that been?—Six years.

3415. Previous to that time, I believe you held other offices?—I have been a settler in New Zealand for 18 years, was Member and Speaker of Wellington Provincial Council, and in 1844 I was a Member of Governor FitzRoy's Council.

3416. Which of the provinces are you specially acquainted with?—Wellington, Nelson, and Canterbury; I have been a good deal in Auckland.

3417. What is the present revenue of New Zealand?—It is divided between the ordinary and territorial; the ordinary revenue is about 220,000*l.*, and the territorial revenue about 240,000*l.*, making a total of 460,000*l.*

3418. Can you state, without going into minute details, what are the principal items of expenditure?—The expenses of the general Government, and all relating to law, police, and customs. Most of the other items of Government expenditure are defrayed by the provinces. There are two separate Governments in New Zealand, the general and provincial governments.

3419. The principal items of expenditure with the Federal Government are with respect to the administration of justice and police?—Yes, and Customs.

3420. The total Imperial military expenditure for New Zealand, given in the Return, voted here, ending 31st March 1859, is 112,358*l.*, and the Colony at that time, it appears, contributed nothing. I believe some arrangement has been in progress for some time, embodying a proposal for a contribution upon the part of the Colony towards its military defences; will you tell us the nature of that?—I believe that has resolved itself into a vote for 5,000*l.*; I believe it was considered that the rate of payment alluded to for the troops, 5*l.* per man, would amount to about 5,000*l.*, and that the Government intended to devote this sum to lessening the cost to the British Government of the barrack accommodation and in the erection of new barracks.

3421. What proportion of payment per man does that bear?—It was calculated, I think, at 5*l.* per man for the number of troops at that time in New Zealand, before the war broke out.

3422. Since

3422. Since the war has broken out, do I understand that those arrangements have been cancelled?—I do not think that they have been cancelled, but they have been rendered impracticable by the enormous expense which it would have entailed upon the Colony, and which it could not afford.

3423. Do you know what the amount would be, calculating the present strength of the Imperial troops in New Zealand?—I do not; but I have made a calculation upon the colonial assets and liabilities, which would not leave anything like a sum sufficient to pay the troops now in New Zealand.

3424. The troops in New Zealand, according to the last return, are given at 5,354?—Yes; I may perhaps be allowed to say, in reference to a former question, that in the last session of the Assembly, although the question was not broached in that particular form of 5 *l.* per man, still being willing to do their utmost, they took upon themselves a debt, towards payment of military expenses, which amounts to more than the 5,000 *l.*; they are raising a loan of 150,000 *l.* in this country, the whole of which will be swallowed up by the expenses consequent upon the war.

3425. Can you state any of the important items in which the money will be expended if it is so raised?—In defraying the cost of arms for militia and volunteers, 30,000 *l.*; the relief of the inhabitants of the province of Tarranaki, from the distress occasioned by the war, 25,000 *l.*; in defraying the expenditure arising out of the native insurrection generally, 45,000 *l.*; repairs of barracks, and new barrack accommodation, 5,000 *l.*; expenses incurred by volunteers called out for actual service, including a bonus to officers and men in Her Majesty's ships, on service in the Colony, 29,000 *l.*; purchase of ammunition for the militia and volunteers, 2,000 *l.*; leaving a small balance of about 12,000 *l.*

3426. Was that calculated upon what would be the cost for 12 months?—Those are items that were then necessary to be expended.

3427. Items which you consider now already due?—Already due.

3428. Is the loan raised upon the revenue of the Federal Government?—Yes.

3429. Has any arrangement been made between the Federal Government and the provinces, as regards the apportionment of the loan?—Of course it ranges over the general revenue of the Colony, and takes precedence over every provincial loan.

3430. The result then will be, that that cost, or that proportion of the cost of the war, which is represented by that loan, will be borne equally by the middle and northern islands?—Clearly.

3431. And that the provinces of Nelson and Canterbury will bear the same proportion as Wellington and New Plymouth?—In proportion to their customs revenue.

3432. Will you state whether, supposing this war to be terminated, you think it probable that the Colony of New Zealand has resources and strength enough to contribute any considerable proportion towards its defences in time of peace?—I think it depends very much upon the assistance given to it under the present circumstances. Now it has resources which are quite capable of being developed, so as to enable it to support itself and all its internal police, putting aside external aggression; but at present those resources are not developed for want of population. If the natives were allowed to gain any head, and if the war is not concluded within a short time, the population of the North Island will decrease instead of increasing; and therefore, at the end of the war, the Colony would not be so capable of providing for its own defence as it was before the war commenced.

3433. You think that a considerable Imperial expenditure is necessary, in order to enable the Colony to hold its ground, so that it may, at some future time, bear a proportion of its own cost?—Yes.

3434. The commissariat expenditure, I suppose, is principally in the province of Auckland?—In Auckland and New Plymouth.

3435. There are no troops at all I think in the Middle Island?—No.

3436. And never have been?—There never have been any stationed there.

3437. From your long experience of New Zealand, is it your opinion, supposing the war to be shortly concluded, that for a period of time it will be necessary to maintain a considerable force in New Zealand?—Any statement of mine would be a mere matter of opinion; but, from what I believe to be the general character of the natives, I think that this war originated, and is now being carried on from a firm belief in the native mind that they are superior in arms and are superior soldiers altogether, to the British. They acknowledge our

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intellectual but not our physical superiority; and as soon as they are convinced of the physical superiority of the British, I think they will at once acknowledge their rule, and be perfectly content, especially when they see that they are to be treated as justly after the war as they were before. Under these circumstances, it will require a very small force indeed to keep the whole Colony in a state of peace and quietude.

3438. You look to the favourable conclusion of the war by a process short of the extermination of the Maori race?—Very much short of it.

3439. You think that the interest of the settler and the natives may be so harmonised as to admit of their continuing to live side by side in peace?—I am sure of it.

3440. Have you formed any opinion as to the mode by which the military expenditure in respect of the war might be diminished, supposing the view which you have just expressed to be the correct one?—There can be no diminution until a favourable conclusion of the war.

3441. You think that we must be prepared for a continuance of the same strength in New Zealand, supposing it to be now between 5,000 and 6,000 men?—I think that, at any rate not less than two regiments would be required for some limited period after the conclusion of the war.

3442. Do you look forward to the time when New Zealand will be able to defend itself against the possibility of disturbance with the native troops?—Yes, I look forward to the natives becoming in perfect accord with the Europeans.

3443. From your knowledge of New Zealand, for the last 18 years, do you think that we can look forward to the time when the presence of an Imperial force will no longer be necessary?—A few garrisons probably may be required.

3444. In answer to Question 2634, Lord Grey said, "I do not think it wise or right, on the part of this country, to undertake to bear the enormous expense and burthen of the New Zealand war, and to leave to the Colony uncontrolled, the power of governing that country in such a manner as to produce constant collision with the natives, and I am sorry to learn that in consequence of that war no change has been made." Do you agree in that opinion of Lord Grey's?—No, I do not; I think that in consequence of the government of the natives being entirely reserved by the Home Government, the Home Government is liable to all the expenses of the war, and that they ought to leave the Colony in a state of peace, before they expect the colonists to take upon themselves the onus of paying the expenses of any future war. I think the chance of future wars would be lessened if more responsibility was thrown on the colonists, whose interest it is to live in harmony with the natives.

3445. Do you think that the reservation in the New Zealand Constitution places the Imperial Government in a position of responsibility, in regard to any collision that might arise with the natives?—Certainly. The British Government having reserved the management of native questions, and having previous to the war withdrawn a regiment, against the remonstrances of the Colonists, should be held responsible.

3446. The Parliament of New Zealand has self-government in every sense of the word?—So far as Europeans are concerned.

3447. As a matter of fact, have the natives votes in respect to the members of the Federal Legislature?—On the same footing as Europeans; any native may have a vote if he can show that he possesses a house worth 5*l.* in the country or 10*l.* in town, or freehold held under grant from the Crown.

3448. There are natives who vote?—Yes.

3449. In those provinces which you know, what is the total number of natives who vote?—I do not know; there are some, but not many.

3450. Do you know whether they are numbered by tens or hundreds?—I think there are only one or two districts in which there are natives to any extent on the electoral roll; I do not think that they are in sufficient numbers at present to affect an election.

3451. Should you say that, as far as you know, there are 20?—More.

3452. One hundred?—I should say there might be, but I cannot tell with any exactitude.

3453. I suppose it may be taken that the natives generally do not vote?—They do not, to affect an election.

3454. Beyond the items of expenditure that you have given us, are there any other large returns of annual expenditure?—The expenditure on the natives comes outof the ordinary revenue.

3455. In

3455. In what way is that money spent upon the natives?—It is generally spent through the Native Department.

3456. What is the amount of it?—There is the Civil List. There is a minimum sum in the Constitution Act, which the Colony is obliged to vote for the natives, and that is 7,000*l.* Besides that, there are voted for schools for the natives and for education, 7,000*l.*; there are salaries to the native chiefs for good behaviour, 1,000*l.*; for a native conference, or a kind of native Parliament, 2,500*l.*; the expense of the Native Department and the salaries of its officers is nearly 2,000*l.*; the vote for medical purposes, vaccination, and other matters, 2,000*l.*; the assessors, a kind of native magistrates, who sit on the Bench with the police magistrates, receive 2,000*l.*

3457. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are those additional items of expenditure?—No; the two latter sums are included in the 7,000*l.* of the civil list. The votes for native expenditure amount to 21,830*l.*

3458. *Chairman.*] I will read to you an answer given by Lord Grey to Question 2635. He is asked "Do you think that it is practically possible to withdraw the subject of native policy from the control of the Colonial Parliament, and the responsible minister, and Lord Grey says, "I think not, and I think that the measure proposed last year in Parliament for creating a sort of native Council, would have led to still greater confusion than now exists." What is your opinion in regard to that?—I do not consider myself competent to give an answer upon that question of the native Council. It is a very moot question. Its use would depend greatly on the hostile tribes being represented equally with the friendly ones.

3459. Then Lord Grey says, "The whole subject of the natives is so indissolubly intertwined with the joint administration of the Colony, and the interest of the two races meet in so many points, that the whole Government must be arranged with a view to an impartial management of affairs with reference to both races, and the mistake in my opinion was not that there was not sufficient responsibility, but that in a state of society in which a greater amount of authority was required on the part of the Home Government, that system of responsible Government was allowed to be established, which deprived the Government at home of the authority which it ought to have exercised." From your knowledge of the by the system of responsible Government, do you think that the Government at home has been unduly deprived of the authority it ought to have exercised over the natives?—No, I do not.

3460. Do you think that the reservations of authority on the part of the Imperial Government are sufficient to enable them to control events so as to guard adequately against native wars, or do you think that under the present system it rests with the Colony to deal with the matter, so that it may bring about these wars?—I think if it were left entirely in the hands of the Colony itself, the Governor exercising the ordinary control which he is enabled to do on other questions, there would be less chance of war than there is at present.

3461. You think that if there were more responsibility, and the local Government were, in the strongest sense of the word, a responsible Government, the chances of war would be less than they are now?—I think they would.

3462. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Will you explain how the proportion of the revenue between the Federal Government and the Provincial Government is arranged?—The general Government has the whole of the ordinary revenue, with the guarantee of giving back to the provinces, I think, three-eighths; and the whole of the territorial revenue is taken by the provinces, for the purposes of Government, and for reproductive works, such as roads, emigration, &c.

3463. Then the whole of the revenue derived from the sale of waste lands is distributed amongst the provincial Governments?—Yes, according to the amount raised in each province.

3464. Is it not the case that the surplus of the ordinary revenue, after the wants of the civil Government have been supplied, are distributed in the same way?—Yes, by the Constitution Act.

3465. In what part of the island is the territorial revenue raised?—By far the greater portion of it in the Middle Island, which is not affected by the native question. I think that the entire land revenue for the last year, in the Northern Island, was only about 50,000*l.* or 60,000*l.*, and the residue of the 240,000*l.* was raised in the Middle Island.

3466. Those portions of the Colony in which the native difficulties, and consequent

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sequent expense, are greatest, supply the smallest proportion of revenue from the sale of their lands?—Very much the smallest proportion.

3467. Have you stated the expenditure incurred during the last year for volunteers and militia?—A sum of 6,317 *l.* was voted.

3468. Independent of the loan?—Independent of the loan.

3469. Would you be inclined to say that if any change of system, at the conclusion of the war, should result in the management of native affairs being handed over in a greater degree to the responsible minister, it would be necessary, for the purpose of introducing something like government into the native districts, that funds for that purpose voted by the Colonial Parliament should be considerably increased?—I think decidedly so; and the view taken by the Parliament of New Zealand during the last session, shows that if they are not too much crippled by the expenses of this war, they will gladly increase the vote in reference to natives, if they could see any well-defined policy for their government.

3470. The interior districts of New Zealand have been, I believe, to a great extent in an independent state, and there has been hardly anything like government?—Because the law cannot be extended to them in any appreciable extent.

3471. The introduction of the machinery of government would entail a considerable expense, which must be provided for by the Parliament of New Zealand?—Yes.

3472. You are of opinion that Parliament would be prepared to vote the necessary funds for the purpose?—I am; provided always, that the Colony is not crippled by the expense of the war being thrown upon them.

3473. Mr. *Adderley.*] Have you formed any opinion as to the probable duration of the war?—No; I think it depends much upon circumstances that one can hardly foresee.

3474. I have received letters from some of the public men in the Colony, both in the Government and in the opposition, which show that they have very little sympathy with the war; is that your opinion?—No, it is not; I think there is great sympathy with the war through the whole of New Zealand.

3475. Do any of the provinces, except those in which the war is raging, take any interest?—A very great interest.

3476. What interest, and how do they show it?—I can say that in all the provinces they have been very anxious to subscribe for the benefit of those who have suffered by it. They have raised corps of volunteers, and each separate Settlement has done all that it can to prevent the necessity of troops being brought away from the seat of war. In the Middle Island, previous to the war breaking out, a political question was mooted very strongly amongst those who took the lead in politics for the separation of the two islands; but the instant the war broke out they with one accord ceased to entertain that question, and it was entirely given up as a political question, and agreed to be laid aside until the war was successfully concluded.

3477. Have those in the Southern Island contributed towards the war?—I do not think that they have been called upon to do so, beyond the share they have in the votes of the Assembly.

3478. Is there a feeling in the Colony that England has involved them in war, and that if they had been left to themselves they would have avoided it?—Many people hold that opinion.

3479. They think that England has undertaken larger responsibilities towards the natives than they would have done?—That is the opinion of many.

3480. If England concludes the war, and then alters the Constitution Act, so as to give to them the government of the natives, they would willingly undertake their own defence, would they not?—Upon the successful conclusion of the war, and the settlement of questions that have arisen, and which will arise out of the war, New Zealand being put into a state of peaceable relations with the natives, I think it will be quite possible for the Colony to volunteer to take care of its internal peace altogether.

3481. Do you think that they contemplate remaining at peace with the natives under these circumstances?—I think they have never had any other intention; they feel it to be their interest.

3482. Do they feel that they would be able to keep peace?—That question is difficult to answer; for this reason, that it is impossible to say in what way the war may end; if the war ends in a perfectly peaceable solution of the question, and the natives, as I believe they will, become perfectly content to remain under British

British laws, and they are convinced that they will be justly treated, and that there is no use in appealing to arms, then I think there will be very little risk of any future war. Sir *C. Clifford.* 27 May 1861.

3483. What sort of force would the Colony, in your opinion, organise for the purpose?—Under the present circumstances of the Colony, it would be very difficult to organise a force for any other purpose than for the defence of particular places. It would be difficult to organise a moveable force. The European population is comparatively much dispersed, and the natives, having great facilities for rapid movement, could almost, without preparation, attack any settlement.

3484. *Chairman.*] Would they be purely provincial forces that would be raised?—Provincial forces for the defence of their own settlements, but under control of general Government.

3485. Mr. *Adderley.*] Do you not think that they would soon adopt a system of concentrating those forces upon any point attacked?—It would be almost impossible, from the fact that you can seldom tell where the attack will be made; the points to be defended are so far apart as to prevent much co-operation, and the settlers are so scattered, that if you take them from their agricultural pursuits to attend to militia duties for any length of time, you cause great detriment to the resources of the Colony.

3486. Are volunteers bound to serve away from home?—Within a certain limited distance.

3487. What is that distance?—I think not more than 30 miles from home. Similar to the militia.

3488. *Chairman.*] Some evidence has been given upon the subject of volunteer corps in the Middle Island; do you know whether they have been entirely the result of spontaneous effort on the part of the settlers, paid for by themselves, or whether there has been any vote from the provincial funds?—Entirely spontaneous, with the exception of the cost of arms; the Federal Government has found arms.

3489. With reference to the degree of interest felt in the war, do you think that that is measured by the fact of whether there was or was not commissariat expenditure going on in the provinces?—I do not think that that had anything to do with it; any feeling of that kind, if it existed at all, is confined to so small a class as not to affect the question in the least.

3490. The Commissariat expenditure, I understand you to say, would be almost entirely confined to Auckland and New Plymouth?—Yes.

3491. Mr. *Adderley.*] Which kind of force is most efficient for native warfare, a volunteer local force or troops from England?—It is difficult to say. It would depend on the service they were employed on.

3492. Which proved most efficient in the last war?—They have been so mixed up together, that one has seldom acted without the other.

3493. Sir *James Fergusson.*] The Colonists place reliance, do they not, on the presence of regular troops?—Yes, certainly.

3494. *Chairman.*] Do you know of any instance of Colonists in the Middle Island desiring the presence of regular troops?—I have heard wishes expressed that troops should be stationed in some of the provinces, but by no great number of the population.

3495. Do you think that, on the part of some of the population, there would be a positive aversion to the presence of troops?—I do not.

3496. Sir *George Grey.*] What would have been the effect of the Colony being left, from its first commencement, to its own resources, without the presence of any British troops?—That is a theoretical question that is very difficult to answer; I think that in any case troops would have had to be forwarded from England.

3497. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you think that the settlers could have maintained themselves without the presence of troops?—I think not.

3498. If the settlers had been left to fight it out with the natives, do you think that New Zealand would have reached anything like its present point of progress?—I think, to a great extent, it would, from the fact that the native question is confined to one-third of the Colony; the settlement in the Middle Island, from which the largest exports are derived, has succeeded without any troops at all.

Jovis, 30° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. A. Mills.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Adderley.	Mr. C. Fortescue.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Sir George Grey.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Marsh.
Lord Robert Cecil.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Childers.	

ARTHUR MILLS, ESQ., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable Lord *Herbert*, of Lea (attending by permission of the House of Lords); Examined.

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3499. *Chairman.*] YOU are Secretary of State for War?—Yes.

3500. It appears from a return received from the Adjutant General's Office that the number of troops in the British dependencies borne on the strength of the Imperial army, between 1851 and 1861, has fluctuated; would those fluctuations be accounted for by the circumstance that the Imperial force in India, China, or elsewhere, has been from time to time increased by the withdrawal of troops from other Colonies?—Just so.

3501. Is it your opinion that the proportion of British troops stationed at any time at any particular point has been governed by measures of Colonial or Imperial necessity?—That is a wide question. When there is an Imperial necessity to concentrate a mass of troops upon any given point, the rest of the Colonies are starved, without reference to their wants at the time, as was the case at the time of the Russian war, when we denuded the Colonies almost entirely of troops.

3502. During the time of the Indian mutiny and the Crimean war those fluctuations took place, and I was led from that to suppose that the changes might have been considerably influenced by the circumstance that the troops were wanted elsewhere?—Just so.

3503. I suppose that would equally apply to the state of things in the year 1860 and the current year, in regard to Hong Kong; for the year 1860, I observe that the number of troops for Hong Kong is given at 10,818, and in 1861, 7,999, but that the average of the five years preceding has been something over 1,000?—Yes.

3504. From that same return, received from the Adjutant General's Office, and dated 14th May, it appears that the strength of the Imperial troops in Canada is 2,220, and the same number was given by the Duke of Newcastle, in reply to a question put by the Committee on the 16th of this month; on the following day, Mr. Baring, in answer to a question put to him in the House of Commons, said that the Commander in Chief in Canada had some time since represented that the military force in Canada was below the amount at which it stood some years since, and that it was intended to send one battalion, which would restore the military strength to what it has been; presuming the answer to have been accurately reported, would that have been a correct reply?—The force in Canada had been reduced by the Duke of Newcastle, when he last came to the Colonial Office, to one battalion of the line and the Canadian Rifles; but, upon a representation made the other day in a private letter from the General commanding in Canada, the Government thought it advisable to send an additional battalion, and it is now under orders to go; the apprehension being, that in consequence of the war in the United States, a large population would turn its attention to the use of arms, and upon the termination of hostilities between the two contending powers, there would be a large mass of military power not very well in hand probably, and therefore that it is well to have some larger force in Canada to prevent filibustering incursions, not on the part of the United States Government, but on the part of the population itself.

3505. Can

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3505. Can you tell us when that letter from Sir Fenwick Williams was received?—I do not recollect the exact day, but it was at the last Cabinet we held before Whitsuntide.

3506. In Canada the same state of things appears for the last four years to have existed in respect of the fluctuations from time to time as have existed in other Colonies. Should you say that the principal object of our maintaining troops in Canada at all is for the purpose of defending the Colony against the contingencies of external hostile aggression from without, or for the maintenance of order within?—Canada is one of the few Colonies which is coterminous with a very powerful State, and there is, therefore, a necessity for maintaining some kind of nucleus of a force in case of hostile aggression.

3507. It has been stated by the Duke of Newcastle in his evidence, that he would consider the present number of troops in Canada entirely as a peace establishment, and that in the event of war it would be necessary to pour in a much larger number of troops?—Certainly.

3508. Has your attention been called to the circumstance that, during six or seven months in the year, we have no means of communication with the heart of Canada by railway, whilst, through the State of Maine by way of Portland, there are means of throwing troops into Canada in the event of a war with the United States?—Yes.

3509. Do you not think that, in the contingency of hostilities from that quarter, there would be considerable difficulty in reinforcing our peace garrisons in Canada, so as to protect the inhabitants against foreign aggression under such a state of things?—Certainly.

3510. Would it not, for instance, be rather a difficult thing to carry out our policy of protecting the Colony, supposing dangers to arise with the United States?—I understand you to mean that we ought, therefore, to have always in Canada a force sufficient for the purpose of defence, without trusting to reinforcements when the emergency arises.

3511. My question is rather whether there is not some inconsistency, in your opinion, in our policy in maintaining at considerable cost a peace establishment there, which would practically be of no use for the defence of a long frontier of 3,000 miles, without considerable reinforcements, which we should have a difficulty in supplying?—We have one or two strong places to maintain, and they form a nucleus for recruiting the militia, and for volunteer corps. You have now a considerable force of volunteers there.

3512. We have it in evidence, that there are of militia nearly 5,000 in Canada; and the Duke of Newcastle, from his official knowledge, and from his recent experience in Canada, has told us that, in his opinion, there are the materials for a much larger force of militia in the Colony. You think that in that state of things, we have good grounds for believing that the Colony has within itself a considerable element of *personnel* for its own defence?—A very considerable element.

3513. Would you look forward to the time when the necessity for sending troops to that Colony may cease, or at all events be greatly diminished, by reason of the increase of the local power?—I think you might, although of course I have no means of speaking of their contributions towards the defences. I do not think we have had a garrison lately, which we could still further reduce. One battalion of the line, and the Canadian Rifles, is as small a force as you can maintain there.

3514. But still you think that the fact of there being so considerable a spirit of volunteering there, and so large a number of men ready to enrol themselves as militiamen, would furnish a ground for thinking that the colony has a very large means of self-defence, as far as men are concerned?—Yes.

3515. With regard to the Canadian Rifles, we had some evidence from the Duke of Newcastle, and he expressed an opinion very much in favour of the constitution of that corps for the purposes of the colony, with reference to the circumstance that they were less likely to desert, and upon other grounds. Do you concur with him in that opinion, that if possible, it is desirable that that local force should be increased, or substituted if possible for regiments of the line?—If it were not for the difficulty of merging regiments of the line into local regiments of that kind, I think it would be a good thing to do.

3516. Is the cost of a corps, organized as the Canadian Rifles are, more than

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that of a regiment of the line of the same strength?—It is rather more, because there are more married men; with that exception there is no difference.

3517. I apprehend that one great reason for preferring a corps constituted as the Canadian Rifles are is, that they have not the inducement to desert?—No, they are within reach of an annuity for life; the young soldiers, when they go out there, are in reach of large wages.

3518. We have heard that there is a very large per-centage of deserters in the North American Colonies, and I think also at the Cape, and in some of the Australian Colonies. Do you know of any means by which our system could be altered so as to obviate that state of things?—You will find that it is diminishing. I think that the public are rather misled by the returns of desertion which are laid before the House of Commons; the number of instances given do not prove that so many men have deserted. There are men who desert over and over again.

3519. Lord *Stanley.*] You put a soldier down as deserting if he is absent for more than a day or two?—Just so; and if he deserts 10 times in the year he appears in the list as 10 deserters.

3520. *Chairman.*] I think, in answer to some question, it was stated that the average number in Canada for five years was 130 or 140. Do you think that number would represent those who had not been recovered, or would it be a *bonâ fide* numerical return of desertions?—Yes, I think so; there are immense facilities for deserting. We are upon the frontier, and there is an immense demand for labour, and very high wages are given. I may illustrate it by saying, that in the United States the army, I believe, deserts in the proportion of the whole in three years.

3521. Some evidence has been given as to the arrangement made for sending troops to British Columbia in 1857. Have you any official knowledge of those arrangements?—There was a demand upon us, and we sent some Sappers.

3522. Do you know whether any arrangement was made as to the mode in which they should be paid for. Were the expenses to be borne upon the Imperial funds?—My impression is, that the expenses were to be borne upon the Imperial funds.

3523. Do you know why they were sent?—It was thought that in a young Colony they would be available in assisting in the construction of roads and buildings.

3524. Has any report been received as to what they have done?—I believe the Colonial Office have received some report, and that upon the whole they doubt the policy of having sent them out.

3525. I think it has been stated that the troops in the North American Colonies are now at Halifax, Quebec, Kingston, and Montreal?—Yes.

3526. Are there any other posts at which troops are now stationed in British North America?—A detachment of Canadian Rifles went up the Red River, but they are coming back again.

3527. I suppose there are some at St. John's, New Brunswick?—Yes, a small number.

3528. Evidence has generally been given with regard to the organization of these local corps in the Colony; speaking of the Canadian Rifles, and the Cape Rifles, and the Newfoundland Fencibles, is it your opinion that where there is the material in the Colony for the formation of such corps it is desirable, as far as possible, to increase them and to substitute them for regiments of the line?—It depends a great deal upon the climate. The reasons which exist against local corps in India do not apply in temperate climates, but then there are some disadvantages; the discipline is more relaxed, and men have not the same ties with home, and are apt to get discontented and internally disorganized occasionally.

3529. The total cost of transport to and from the dependencies, including what is called intercolonial transport, amounts, in round numbers, for the year ending March 1859, to about 200,000*l.* Financially speaking it would, I presume, be a great advantage if, as far as possible, we could save that expense by forming local corps?—Yes.

3530. Can you name any Colonies in which that could be largely extended?—In most Colonies labour is extremely dear, and wages very high, and I have no doubt it is very difficult to raise men.

3531. In a Minute from Sir William Denison on the organization of the military

military force required by the Australian Colonies, and dated, I think, in 1860, he suggests the formation of a regiment of rifles, and gives an estimate of the cost; have you had your attention called to that?—I recollect reading it.

3532. Can you form any opinion as to whether that appears practicable or otherwise?—They raised a certain number of men in Australia for the augmentation of a certain regiment, but they did not raise as many as they expected, and it has ended in those men being absorbed in the regiment and going away with it.

3533. As far as it has been tried, you think it has not succeeded?—I think it is the impression in the Colony that it has not succeeded.

3534. Some evidence has been given before this Committee in regard to the mode in which the Cape Rifles are recruited as distinguished from the mode in which they used to be recruited; have you formed any opinion upon the subject as to whether the Cape Rifles have deteriorated in their constitution?—It is stated that they have to a certain extent, because they have a smaller number of men recruited on the spot, and acquainted with the country; they are now recruited almost exclusively from England. Sir George Grey has made proposals for reducing the number of Cape Rifles, and substituting a certain number of police for them.

3535. What is your opinion in regard to that police force, which I believe is called Currie's Mounted Police?—I hear that they are extremely effective; that each man provides his own horse, and forages for him. and has his own commissariat; but the objection to that is, that being police and not soldiers, and therefore not under the Mutiny Act, they resign if exposed to service which they do not like; for instance, if they get shot at as soldiers would be.

3536. From what you have heard, and from your official knowledge, should you say that there is generally in our South African Colonies the material for a considerably larger local force than we have now, so as to permit a reduction of the Imperial army there?—As far as the evidence, the Cape Mounted Rifles were rather a popular corps; but having failed in their recruiting, I think it shows that the recruiting field is a very limited one.

3537. You think they have gone so far in that direction that they have no unexplored field for recruiting to which they can go?—Apparently not; there are great difficulties in the way of raising levies amongst some of the African races; for example, the Ceylon corps was formed exclusively of Malays, but when that system was no longer adopted, it was proposed to send to Africa for Kaffirs; but in Caffraria, where the ox is a wild animal, the consumption of animal food by the natives is so great, that it was found impossible within reasonable limits to keep them as soldiers; a pound of meat per diem, which was the amount allowed to each soldier, would not satisfy a Kaffir, who generally eats two or three pounds, and it was found that the expense would be so great in feeding them, that they could not be maintained as soldiers. That would apply just as much in South Africa itself.

3538. Mr. Owen, who was sent out as Commissioner with Sir George Clerk, and who also commanded Hottentot levies, has given evidence to the effect that irregular forces are in some respects, for frontier warfare, to be preferred to regular troops?—I should think so.

3539. We have some evidence with regard to the West Indian regiments, as to the mode in which they are now recruited, as compared with the system upon which they were formerly recruited, when the men were brought from the coast of Guinea; what would be your opinion as to the comparative efficiency and satisfactory character of those regiments now as compared with former years?—There certainly is not in the West Indies the same dependence placed in them as when they were unconnected with the population which they were meant to keep in order, that I think there is a great deal of exaggeration upon that subject, and generally speaking, that so long as in the West Indies they can by disparaging the black troops, have white ones substituted, they will disparage black troops, but if they find that they are no longer to have white troops, they will be contented with black troops.

3540. What, in your opinion, is the particular function of troops in the West Indies?—They are more for police purposes, I apprehend, than for anything else.

3541. You do not look upon them as a defence against foreign aggression?—No. I think that the complaints against the black troops originated just after the time of the Indian mutiny, when a great deal of blame was cast upon the authorities

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in India for not having known that the fidelity of the sepoys was not to be depended upon. The result of that was, that commanding officers wrote and said their troops were not to be depended upon. Each appeared to think that if they turned out faithless, it was as well to show he was aware of it, and had given the Government due warning. If nothing happened, it did not matter.

3542. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] How many Governors did that?—I do not recollect.

3543. Mr. *Childers.*] Did the Governors or the principal military officers make those reports?—Some of both.

3544. *Chairman.*] Do you think that we could now at all safely, supposing that the black regiments were not to be depended upon, attempt continuously to garrison the West Indies with white troops, considering the high per-centage of mortality there?—Certainly not.

3545. The Departmental Report which was presented to Parliament has been the subject of examination before this Committee. I wish to ask whether you generally agree in the principles laid down by your predecessor in the War Department in the letter which led to the appointment of that Committee, that principle being, that the Colonies ought to assist as much as possible in their defences?—I believe that all Secretaries of State for War hold that opinion, more or less.

3546. I think that the authors of that report, and Sir William Denison also, in the despatches which he has written, recommend that a Colony should be left to bear the primary responsibility of its own defence, and that the mother country should only assist by a contribution. Do you think that plan in principle a good one?—Yes; habit and custom go for so much that it is impossible to lay down a rule which you can carry into effect immediately.

3547. Without saying that a rigid uniform rule is to be at once applied to all the Colonies, or that all the Colonies are to be put upon the same footing precisely, or are to be dealt with as if they were all in similar circumstances, do you say that the principle therein enunciated is a principle to be aimed at?—Certainly.

3548. The total amount of our Imperial military expenditure in respect of the dependencies administered through the Colonial Department for the year ending March 1859, as given by the return put in before the Committee, is 2,852,264 *l.*, including in that a portion of departmental expenses, recruiting expenses, and non-effective services. In the current year I presume that the New Zealand war will cause a considerable addition to the Imperial expenditure?—Yes.

3549. It appears from a further return we have before us there are now nearly 7,000 more troops in our dependencies than there were in the year to which that return refers. Looking at those facts and figures do you think it would be an extravagant estimate to say that during the current year our Colonial military expenditure will be at least 1,000,000 *l.* more than it was in the year to which that return relates, including the New Zealand war, where the force is again quintupled, but excluding the China occupation?—That depends upon the estimate we may form of the cost of the New Zealand war; that is an exceptional circumstance.

3550. The number of troops given for New Zealand is 5,354; calculating that, exclusive of transport, the troops will cost 100 *l.* per man, that will give half a million additional expenditure.

3551. Mr. *Childers.*] As I understand, some of the troops now in New Zealand are drafted from other Colonies?—Yes.

3552. *Chairman.*] Would not the circumstance of the China war, and the employment of nearly 8,000 troops in that service, so far balance the excess occasioned by the New Zealand war as to render the current year a fair one upon which to base our calculations?—No, I do not think so; the garrison we have in China ought to be in England, and when I disembodied the militia I reckoned upon having it at home; the force in New Zealand ought also to be in England. I think that the necessity for the distribution of our forces in the last few years is much altered. I should accumulate all the forces that it is possible to accumulate at home, and keep as few men as possible in the Colonies.

3553. That would be a very great alteration of our policy as compared with the last 10 years, would it not?—To a great degree.

3554. If I correctly apprehend your view, it would be this, that instead of keeping the troops, as we have done, for the last 10 years, scattered about our dependencies, you would concentrate them at home?—Certainly.

3555. Mr.

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3555. Mr. *Fortescue.*] The China force, I believe, was not formed by drawing troops from the Colonies, but by sending troops from England?—By intercepting troops which were on their way home from India.

3556. It does not affect the comparison of the troops in the Colony one way or the other?—Not at all.

3557. *Chairman.*] The last return for the strength in 1861 exclusive of Hong Kong is 44,481. That return is rather above the average of the last 10 years. Should you say that you see your way in future years to a further reduction of that number?—One hopes that this state of things in New Zealand will not continue, and when you come to an addition of 4,000 men in one Colony, it is a large addition. The force at the Cape has been a great deal reduced, and I think may be further reduced. We are abolishing 11 posts which we now hold, and that will make some reduction in the cost. Sir George Grey, whom I consulted upon the subject last year when he was in this country, has been applying himself to the question of a reduction in the cost of maintenance of the force at the Cape of Good Hope, and I have no doubt he will succeed in effecting a further reduction.

3558. It has been stated in evidence by Sir John Burgoyne, Admiral Erskine, Admiral Elliot, and others, that notwithstanding the great cost of our Colonial garrisons, none of them, except the Mediterranean fortresses, are in a state of tolerable defence, but are dependent upon our command of the sea. Two systems of defence have been recommended, one, that of keeping permanent small stations, and the other, the withdrawing of the garrison in time of peace, but occupying those stations in time of war?—The great fortresses, such as the two Mediterranean fortresses, Malta and Gibraltar, and one or two others, I should garrison to the utmost. I think that the difference between peace and war in many of the Colonies would be, that instead of maintaining a force in them in time of war, we should withdraw it. I see no use in maintaining isolated battalions; either we have the supremacy of the sea, in which case they are useless; or we lose the supremacy of the sea, in which case they are caught in a trap.

3559. It has been stated by some witnesses that in the Bahamas we have spent since the general peace two millions of money, and that we have never kept up a force there sufficient to resist the crews of two frigates; do you approve of that expenditure of money?—All I can say is, that if I were asked to do it I should not do it.

3560. Have you seen the report of the evidence given before the Committee by Sir John Burgoyne?—I have not.

3561. As matters stand at present, should you say that the Colonies—for instance, the British North American Colonies, and the West Indies, contribute as large a proportion, either in men or money, towards their defence, as, considering their revenue and their resources, and their power generally, they may fairly be expected to contribute?—North America, I should say, does not; the West Indies are under peculiar circumstances; we have interfered with their domestic laws.

3562. You think that the circumstance of our having interfered with their relations upon the question of slavery renders theirs a peculiar case?—Yes.

3563. The Colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, we hear practically, do nothing in the shape of contributions towards Imperial expenditure; do you not think it reasonable that we should take some steps towards making those Colonies contribute?—Yes; but the only rational way of proceeding is to say, "You shall have very small garrisons."

3564. You think we should say that they shall have no troops, or a certain maximum of troops?—Yes.

3565. And you think that that would be better than entering into bargains with them?—Yes; I think that we should get the worst of the bargain by passive resistance.

3566. Do you think that there is any advantage in placing the Mediterranean garrisons and other dependencies, which are treated purely as military stations, under the War Department?—Gibraltar is so already, but not Malta.

3567. Nor Hong Kong?—No.

3568. Nor St. Helena?—No; Malta is very nearly so, because at this moment the same officer is Governor and Commander of the Forces.

3569. What do you say of the Ionian Islands?—I think there would be an advantage in having the same arrangement as regards identity of command, but

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I have no anxiety to have the government of the Ionian Islands at the War Office.

3570. Do you think that difficulties arise with regard to that class of dependencies different from those which might arise with regard to others, from the circumstance of their being administered by the Colonial department?—I think not.

3571. Some evidence has been given as to the system of Colonial allowances; are we right in supposing that those Colonial allowances originated in rich and liberal Colonies giving extra payment to the troops, and that then the Imperial Government was compelled, in other cases to follow the example, in order to avoid discontent amongst the troops?—I do not know of any case of Colonial allowance given by the Imperial Government except at the Cape. The cost of transportation is so great, and the cost of provisions increased so much in the interior, that complaints were made that the health of the troops was suffering in consequence, and we were obliged to give them some extra allowance, trusting to the Legislature to reimburse us.

3572. Lord *Robert Cecil*.] Has that trust been fulfilled?—We do not know yet.

3573. *Chairman*.] In consequence of our supplying Armstrong guns to the Mediterranean garrisons, will there be any large increase in the cost of stores for those garrisons?—No; it will be merely the substitution of one kind of ammunition for another. They are well supplied with stores in the Mediterranean garrisons. I ought to say that the Armstrong ammunition is more costly than the other.

3574. A return has been given showing the expenditure incurred for the year ending March 1859, distinguishing the different items of pay, allowances, provisions, arms, stores, barracks, and fortifications. Do you think that there would be any difficulty in appending such a return to the annual Estimates, showing the amount of Imperial expenditure in the Colonies?—I should think it might be done, but I cannot say positively without making inquiry.

3575. Do you think that there are any Colonies in regard to which the principle upon which Lord Grey acted in 1851, in regard to the Australian Colonies, might be advantageously applied; it has been stated that in consequence of the residuum of convict population in Tasmania that Colony is exempted from contribution?—That exemption must cease in course of time.

3576. I think it is now about seven years ago since transportation was discontinued, and during that time there has been a large commissariat expenditure in Tasmania?—I cannot speak to the interior of Tasmania. I have no means of judging of the effect of the residuum of the convict population still left there, but in the course of time Tasmania must be put upon the same footing as the other Colonies.

3577. Looking at the prosperous condition of some of our Colonies, do you not think that it would be wise, politically speaking, if they were taught to rely rather more upon their own defence?—Yes. If all our Colonies could have been founded upon the Indian principle, it would have been of great advantage.

3578. Even now, do you think that, so far as we can do so, we should be conferring a boon upon some of our Colonies by throwing upon them the burden of defending themselves?—As far as that can be done.

3579. Lord *Stanley*.] Do you consider it a good principle that has been acted upon of late, in Australia, to obtain certain contributions from Colonial Legislatures in aid of the maintenance of Imperial troops; does it not give the Colonial authorities the right to control the movement of the troops?—It does to a certain extent; but I do not think that is of any serious disadvantage. In the case of the navy, great disadvantage would result from limiting the operations of a ship to the Colony, but a battalion that is sent to the Colony must remain there, and so long as the troops remain, the Colony pays; when they are withdrawn, the Colony ceases to pay for them.

3580. Which do you think is preferable, to say to a Colony which is willing to pay a certain amount towards its own defences, that it should contribute in the shape of part payment for Imperial troops, or that it should raise a Colonial force of its own to serve as a part of its garrison?—I think one is possible, namely, the payment; but I doubt the practicability of the other; they have not the material for troops. Then there is an advantage in troops passing through a Colony, not only to the army, but to the Colony.

3581. What is the advantage to the army?—You get a change of station, and it

it is of great importance to have healthy Colonies to which troops can be sent after serving in unhealthy Colonies.

3582. I suppose that the cost of a Colonial force is much greater than that of maintaining Imperial troops, on account of labour being so highly paid?—It is not a question of cost, but a question of levying the men at all; the Colony will not pay more than the mother country does, and the only question is, whether they can succeed in raising the men. In point of fact, our troops receive much larger pay than is generally supposed.

3583. In the case of the West Indies, I think the force maintained there upon the average of some years past, has been about 4,500?—I think something of that kind.

3584. You have stated that a large proportion of that force must be considered as maintained there for purposes of police?—Yes.

3585. Do you think that it is the duty of the Imperial Government to provide for the police of the West India Colonies?—No; but it is a very mixed employment, and it is difficult to draw a very distinct line between military and police employment; in point of fact, in time of peace, there is no military employment; it is merely precaution against possible war.

3586. Do you not think that a considerable reduction of troops might take place in the West Indies, and that then the Colonies would exert themselves to provide police at their own expense?—I would rather not give an opinion upon that point, because I have no knowledge of the internal state of the Colony to lead me to form a sound opinion upon it.

3587. In reference to the proposed increase of force in Canada, I understood you to state that the reason assigned was, the danger of disturbance from the population of the United States?—Yes; and that whenever the war ceases, a large population which has trained itself to arms, will be diverted from its ordinary pursuits, and ready for anything.

3588. So long as the war continues, there is rather less danger of such disturbances?—Yes.

3589. And therefore the provision is made for the end of a war which is beginning?—No one can state when it will begin, or when it will end.

3590. Can you tell us what number of men would be required for the effective defence of the three Imperial positions in British North America; Kingston, Halifax, and Quebec?—I could tell you that by reference, but I could not say off-hand.

3591. Sir *George Grey*.] According to the return laid before the Committee from the Adjutant General's Office, it appears that there are now about 4,000 men in the West Indies. Do you know what proportion of that force consists of white troops, and what proportion of black troops?—We have three black regiments, of which a portion is on the coast of Africa; there is a very small white force. In Jamaica there are six companies of the 14th Foot; the Windward and Leeward Islands have a certain number of companies of the 14th Foot divided between them, and a battalion of the 21st Foot.

3592. Does the whole white force in the West Indies consist of only two regiments?—Two regiments.

3593. *Chairman*.] All the black and white troops are borne upon the strength of the Imperial army?—Yes.

3594. Sir *George Grey*.] With reference to that same return, you were asked a question as to the apparent increase of military force in the British Dependencies; is it not the case that after deducting the Mediterranean garrisons, and the additional force in New Zealand, on account of the war, there is a smaller force in the British Colonies at the present time, than in any year since the conclusion of the Russian war?—Yes.

3594. Has your attention been called to a return signed by Sir John Burgoyne, and which purposes to be a rough estimate of the cost of completing works in progress, and of new works necessary to place the undermentioned foreign possessions in a reasonable state of defence, in addition to the sums in the estimates for 1861–62, exclusive of armaments and ordinary barracks, and of such occasional improvements as art and science may from time to time render necessary?—I have not seen it.

3596. He says that the sum necessary for the Mauritius is 250,000*l*. Has any decision been arrived at by the Government to lay out any such sum as that?—None; I wrote to the Mauritius some time ago, and asked the Governor and

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the commanding engineer, the commanding officer, and the admiral, to meet and draw up a plan for the defence of the Mauritius, but putting this restriction upon them, that they were to bear in mind that there would be no augmentation of the garrison, which consists, I think, of about 2,000 men. They have sent home a plan in which the only dispute between them is, whether it requires 4,000 or 5,000 men. That is utterly useless for our purpose.

3597. Are the Committee to understand that this is merely a return of what is necessary according to Sir John Burgoyne's private views, and is not a return upon which the Government proposes to act?—Certainly.

3598. That return has not been sent to the Committee with your authority?—It has not; I think there are 11 places in the Mauritius at which an enemy could land; there are two great ports, and they propose to fortify those, and to erect batteries at each of the 11 landing-places; the island is about 100 miles round, and it is quite clear that any expedition which could land at all, would be sure to run into the batteries, and then you would have your means of defence converted into means of attack in the hands of the enemy.

3599. Do you agree with several witnesses who have been examined, that it is unwise to erect fortifications which cannot be sufficiently garrisoned?—Certainly; the tendency since the peace has been to build fortifications abroad, and to neglect them at home, thus leaving the vital parts undefended, and defending, at great cost, the extremities. I believe that that policy has been entirely wrong. I should spend as little as possible upon fortifications abroad, and strengthen our fortifications at home, where there is a very small extent of sea between us and a possible enemy.

3600. Are we to understand that that return in no degree expresses the decision of the Government as to erecting fortifications?—Certainly; Trincomalee is a place which it has been said it would be very desirable to defend, but it is always accessible to an Indian force.

3601. Mr. *Marsh.*] I think you have stated that our Colonial possessions are more easily defended by a fleet than by garrisons; that is the case at home, is it not?—Yes, but our own shores are accessible when a distant Colony is not.

3602. With reference to the mounted police at the Cape, you say that inconvenience arises from their not being under the Mutiny Act?—I am told so.

3603. Would there be any difficulty in putting them under the Mutiny Act?—Yes; you would have a difficulty; for instance, in putting the London Police under the Mutiny Act.

3604. Do you not think that they would enlist if they were under the Mutiny Act?—That I do not know; it ties a man down, and imposes upon him severe conditions which he would rather be without.

3605. The coast guard, I believe, has been put under the Mutiny Act?—Yes, I think so; but they were accustomed to it before.

3605. I suppose you cannot give us the extra cost of the ammunition for the Armstrong guns?—Yes, I can give it to you if you wish it; it depends upon the calibre of the guns; it is much greater than the other.

3607. So far as that is concerned, the expenditure in the Colonies will be rather more than it used to be?—Yes.

3608. With reference to the cost of Colonial corps, is there not a Colonial corps in Canada?—Yes; the Canadian Rifles are a Colonial corps.

3609. Do you know whether they are paid more than other troops?—No; the difference is that there are more married men, and therefore they cost rather more.

3610. Mr. *Childers.*] Are you satisfied with the sufficiency of the black regiments?—I have heard very different reports for and against them; but I understand from the Colonial Office that they have received some very strong opinions from persons upon whom they can rely in favour of the black regiments.

3611. As a question of money, do you think we get fair consideration for the amount which these regiments cost us?—Yes, I should say so; we get no value for white troops; the mortality and suffering are so great that we ought not to continue to send them.

3612. Lord *Stanley.*] Has not the mortality greatly diminished of late years?—Yes, with care.

3613. Since the system was adopted of quartering white soldiers on the hills?—Yes, it has made a great difference.

3614. Mr. *Childers.*] You say you are, on the whole, satisfied with the present arrangements

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arrangements under which some of the Colonies grant contributions in aid?—Victoria, for example.

3615. You think that the principle upon which these grants are made is satisfactory?—I think so.

3616. Do you think that these Colonies have been fairly treated in the manner in which credit has been given them for their contributions?—I know what you mean by that. There is a difficulty about the matter, in this way: we estimate for troops abroad, and when the troops are in India we mention in the list the amount of force necessary, and the sum of money to be paid, but in the column for cost we leave a blank, because India pays the whole. We have no certainty with regard to any other Colonial contribution that we shall get it every year. India pays the cost of the transport of the troops to India, the cost of the troops while in India, and the expense of their transport back. If we did not apply for money for the troops in other Colonies, and a change of view, or change of government took place in those Colonies, we might find ourselves short of that amount of money. If we had any permanent arrangement with the Colonies it would be much better.

3617. My question was whether Colonies which have largely contributed have ever had fair credit for it in the proceedings of the War Office. For instance, at a time when the Colonies came forward very liberally and offered to pay the whole amount of the Colonial and Imperial expenditure, it may be within your knowledge that the only answer was a request that they would pay something more, and that led to a withdrawal of what they did pay?—I was not aware of that.

3618. Do you think that the arrangement is satisfactory under which, in the Army Estimates, no mention is made of the very large contributions in aid from the Colonies?—That is a Treasury question which the House of Commons has imposed upon the Government, but I think that the system of payment into the Exchequer is wrong in principle. The Colonies, instead of paying for what is really a part of the military expenditure, make a contribution to the general revenues of this country, which may be spent upon the improvement of London, or anything else. I think the estimate is what the public judges by, no one looks into an account, every one wants to know what is to be spent in the following year. The Army Estimates are much larger than the real cost of the army.

3619. If the Colonies did not pay very large sums in aid of the Imperial expenditure that expenditure would be greater than it now is?—The Colonies do not pay very large sums.

3620. Those contributions from the Colonies do not appear in the Estimates, nor in the payments to the Exchequer?—There has been an error in that respect, and I hope that it will be set right.

3621. With reference to the present state of affairs in New Zealand, have you erected a separate command?—Yes.

3622. Is that to continue only during the war?—No limit has been fixed at present, but I should think it would be only for the war.

3623. You have at present an Australian command, and a New Zealand command?—Yes.

3624. But you have no troops in Australia?—Yes; General Pratt is going out, and more troops will be there whenever the war in New Zealand ends.

3625. Are you sending back the General in command before he has any troops to command?—There are 1,109 troops there.

3626. Is that a sufficient force for a separate command?—We should not send out an officer expressly to command 1,109 soldiers, but it is a very exceptional state of things, and we hope things will return to their original state, and in that case there will be no separate command in New Zealand.

3627. Has not the sending out a General been an unnecessary expenditure?—I think not; we have a very able man there.

3628. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you consider it wise expenditure to keep a certain portion of troops in a Colony where there are not any important military posts to represent the Imperial authority, as well as to serve as a nucleus for defending local authorities in case of danger?—Yes, to a certain extent.

3629. You think it proper that a certain number of troops should be kept in the Colony to represent the Imperial authority?—Yes, it is said you should have the English flag flying and the red coat with it.

3630. Mr. *Adderley.*] On what principle would you have a small body of

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troops, in the sense of representing Imperial power?—I do not attach much importance to it, it is a sentimental view.

3631. Is not the sentiment likely to be more dangerous in inducing the Colony to look upon it as a pledge on the part of England to exempt it from the task of self-defence?—Not if the force is small enough.

3632. What amount of force would you keep there?—It must be different in each Colony; but the Colonies which are neither fortresses nor have native tribes, nor are conterminous with any powerful state, will require a very small force, if any.

3633. I am led to understand that troops are under orders for Canada, in consequence of a request from the Commander in Chief in Canada; some time since that, the military force in Canada should be restored to its former strength; may I ask whether I understood you just now to say, that that request from the Commander in Chief arrived in England just before the Whitsuntide holidays?—The request to restore the garrison to what it formerly had been, is of old date, but was always refused; just before Whitsuntide, His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge put into my hand a private letter from General Williams, in which he spoke of the disordered state of the population on the frontier, and said he thought it of importance that we should have some additional strength to prevent incursions.

3634. Do I understand that it is not the intention of the Government to restore the garrison to its former strength, but that the additional troops now about to be sent out, are sent for temporary reasons?—For temporary reasons.

3635. We find it stated in the "Times" of this morning, that reinforcements are to be despatched immediately to the Cape, to augment the British force now serving at that station, namely, 860 men of all ranks, the names of the regiments being given, together with the proportion of officers for each regiment; may I ask whether that is the case?—Not that I know of; there may be a relief going out, but no augmentation.

3636. On the contrary, I understand from your evidence already given, that the force at the Cape is about to be reduced?—The expenditure at the Cape will be a great deal reduced.

3637. You said just now that Canada being conterminous with a powerful state, is a Colony in which we should retain a nucleus of force in case of hostile operations. Mr. Lowe, in his recent evidence, in answer to Question 3371, gave it as his opinion that the greater the exposure of a Colony to such danger, the greater was the necessity for making the Colony self-reliant?—I think that is an extreme view of the question.

3638. In answer to Question 3405, he gave it as his opinion that for every soldier we sent out to such a Colony as Canada, we prevented 100 colonists from taking up arms; do you take the same view?—It is impossible for me to say upon what data that opinion is formed.

3639. Do you think that the troops we send prevent the colonists from developing their own resources?—If you maintain a large garrison, you give them an excellent excuse for not raising any militia of their own. Since the garrison has been reduced, there have been embodiments of militia.

3640. We understood you to say that this country could not safely reduce the garrison below one regiment of the line and the regiment of Canadian Rifles?—I think it is full low.

3641. Do I understand from your answer, that you do not consider that so small a garrison as that would have a mischievous effect in preventing Colonies from developing their resources?—No; I think a small force like that would be a nucleus, around which they would rally, and which would assist them in their military organization.

3642. Are you not afraid that a small force would be withdrawn in case of war?—It depends upon the power with whom we are at war.

3643. Supposing we were at war with a European power, do you not think it very likely that England might be obliged to withdraw the garrison from Canada?—I doubt whether we should withdraw so small a garrison as that.

3644. Mr. Lowe stated that the principles he would act upon in time of peace would be to have no Imperial troops in any Colony, but only in case of war?—My opinion is rather the reverse of that.

3645. What would you do in time of peace?—In the case of a Colony which had no native tribes to contend with, and which was not adjacent to powerful neighbours,

neighbours, I would not keep any garrison beyond that which would be necessary upon the flag and red coat principle.

3646. Do you think that Her Majesty's subjects in the Colonies cannot hoist her flag and wear red coats as well as those in England?—I do not think they can; they cannot get the men.

3647. Do you think that they could not hire them?—Not to the same extent.

3648. You think that our sending them troops has inflicted upon us the necessity of hiring mercenaries in time of war?—No.

3649. During the Russian war, when we raised a German Legion, and nearly quarrelled with America upon the question of enlisting; do you not think that we should have been less in danger of that if our garrisons had been kept at home?—Certainly.

3650. Mr. *Fortescue.*] That is upon the assumption that there are Colonial garrisons to be called home?—Yes.

3651. Mr. *Adderley.*] Have you sufficient knowledge of the condition of the Canadian Militia and Volunteers, to say whether they are generally speaking a well-organized force?—I have not.

3652. Although, in your opinion, a rigid principle cannot be laid down with reference to Colonial contributions for the use of Imperial troops, yet you would not think it right to receive contributions from Colonies which are willing to contribute, whilst you receive none from other Colonies?—I should be glad to receive assistance from wherever I can get it.

3653. Do you not think it an objectionable system to receive contributions from Colonies which are willing to pay, and to exempt from contributions Colonies which are unwilling, although evidently able to pay?—Yes.

3654. You say that the process of developing Colonial resources for self-defence, cannot be carried into effect immediately. The gradual introduction of such a system would not, I presume, be open to objection?—No.

3655. Do you see any objection to the use of the regular force of the British army in Colonies such as Australia, for purposes of local Government, such as putting down local riots?—They can make no claim upon us to use the troops in such a manner as that.

3656. Do you consider that a proper service for British troops to be engaged in?—All service is good for British troops; they do it all exceedingly well, and it makes a variety for them.

3657. Do you see no danger to the discipline of the British army in its employment for the suppression of local riots by a Government which has the complete command of its own policy unconnected with this country?—If British troops were used for political purposes in a Colony it would, no doubt, be very objectionable.

3658. You were asked just now whether you generally concurred in the principle laid down by your predecessor in office, which led to the Departmental Report. May I ask whether you agree especially in the distinction there drawn that England should assist in the defence of Colonies against the aggression of foreign nations, but that the military expenditure for internal police should be defrayed wholly from local funds?—If you can draw the line.

3659. As regards that distinction, what is your view with reference to native tribes, such as the Kaffirs and Maories; do you regard them as foreign nations, or do you consider wars with them in the light of internal wars, the expense of which the Colony ought to take upon itself?—I think they partake of both characters; it is impossible to put them sharply into one category or the other.

3660. Do you think that the distinction which has been drawn justifies the Cape of Good Hope in throwing the entire cost of Kaffir wars upon England?—I do not; but you must recollect, that if you adopt the contrary system, you cannot let your people have their throats cut, when a battalion of troops, if sent out, would prevent it.

3661. Not if you had good reason to believe that they would not allow their throats to be cut?—I am presuming that the time came when they are cut.

3662. What is your general opinion as to the expenditure upon such fortifications as are necessary in Colonies; is that a charge properly falling upon the British Treasury?—I am against them altogether. You allude to such as the Bahamas.

3663. I exclude simply Imperial fortresses, and refer to such fortifications as

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are necessary in harbours, or at seats of Government of Colonies, properly so called?—I should say that the expense is not properly chargeable upon the Imperial Exchequer.

3664. Do you generally think that our expenditure in defending the Colonies is diminishing, and may be looked upon as in course of progressive reduction?—I think it is.

3665. Supposing our Colonies to increase either in number or in territory, as we may suppose that Canada and South Africa very likely may, would you still expect our expenses upon the present system to diminish?—I think that the tendency is not to extend our Colonies; the Colonial Office is always on its guard against accessions of territory, and in South Africa we have given up territory.

3666. Supposing Canada to increase towards the Pacific, do you think that our undertaking the garrisoning of Halifax, Quebec, and Kingston would entail upon us the necessity of garrisoning any other fortresses along that frontier?—I cannot speak of that.

3667. Sir John Burgoyne, in answer to Question 1432, states broadly that most of the Colonies are in an unprovided state, and require new projects altogether. Is that your impression as to the state of our Colonial defences?—No. I do not agree with Sir John Burgoyne that each Colony is to be defended separately, upon the assumption that an overwhelming force will attack it, as I understand he assumes in his evidence.

3668. Even the fortifications which we have in some of the Colonies we can hardly afford to garrison?—Just so.

3669. Do you not consider that there is great danger in fortifications which are inefficiently garrisoned?—Very great.

3670. Do you think that we could undertake to put those in an efficient state and garrison them sufficiently with the forces we have at home?—Certainly not.

3671. I understand you to lay down the principle that you would accumulate troops at home instead of dispersing them in the Colonies?—Yes.

3672. Supposing the expenditure in the New Zealand war to amount to half a million in this year, will not that be in excess of the military expenditure, as compared with what it would be if the Colony bore the expense of its own defence?—Yes; if you could get a Colony to bear the expense of so large a force as there is in New Zealand.

3673. In answer to Question 2237, Mr. Merivale said, "If all Canada were against us, we should not want the troops; if, as probably would be the case, there was a great division of sentiment amongst the population, a division of troops would be an encouragement to the legal side." I wish to ask you whether the employment of British troops in Canada for the purpose of turning the scale in favour of British connexion is a proper ground for retaining our forces there?—It would depend very much upon the relative proportions of the two parties. If Canada is bent upon leaving us, leave us she will.

3674. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] Do the Colonial Estimates bear any proportion of the civil expenditure of the Mediterranean garrisons?—Of Malta and the Ionian Islands.

3675. Do the War Estimates bear any of the civil expenditure?—None.

3676. Not of St. Helena?—No.

3677. You have given it as your opinion that the public look a great deal more to estimates than to accounts; do you not consider that an erroneous idea of the cost of the Colonies is given by including in the Colonial Estimates that which is strictly military expenditure?—To some extent. You can hardly put the civil government of Malta upon the Army Estimates.

3678. Has it any other but a military object?—The principal object no doubt is military. At home, part of your government is for military purposes.

3679. Have you received suggestions for manning the garrisons in any part of the world with marines?—In some places the garrisons have been composed of marines; but a marine force is more costly than troops of the line.

3680. It is less liable to injury, is it not?—Yes, I apprehend it is. It has the advantage of sea service and land service.

3681. Still you think that, on the whole, it would be costly?—It would be costly on that account; a marine costs more than a soldier; he has free rations on board, and in other respects is more costly.

3682. You do not yourself order deductions to be made, but you order the Governors to examine into the expenditure, I presume?—In concert with the Colonial Office.

3683. And

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3683. And in concert with the Colonial authorities?—Yes.

3684. The details of the deduction are furnished by them?—No; I think if that were the case we should have none at all.

3685. Is there not a difficulty in checking the only person who knows anything about the real state of a Colony?—Yes, but they act very fairly upon the whole; a certain amount of pressure is put upon them.

3686. You think it perfectly impossible for any authorities to lay down any general rule as to the expense of those two Colonies in which there are native tribes, New Zealand and the Cape?—I think so; Colonies could not bear the expense of a war in which half a million of money is spent in a year.

3687. Is it your opinion that wars are favourably regarded in the Colonies on account of the increase of trade occasioned by them?—I think it was the case at one time at the Cape; I do not think that it was the case in New Zealand, because the Colonists have suffered terribly by the war.

3688. Are not all these wars much more the result of passion than of interest?—Yes; but very often passion assumes the form of interest.

3689. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Admitting the truth of the principle that Imperial troops should not be used for police purposes, do you not think that there is a considerable difference between purely English communities and dependencies, such as the West Indies, the Mauritius, and others, which have been in some cases conquered from a foreign power, and which are inhabited to a great degree by foreign and mixed populations?—Yes, that is the case in the Mauritius.

3690. You think that the duty of preserving order in such populations is not exactly local, but is more Imperial than in the case of purely English communities?—Yes, the elements of disturbance are more Imperial.

3691. A plan has been proposed according to which every Colony should defend itself by means of a local corps, raised for its own purposes, confined to that particular Colony, and to which the Imperial Government should contribute by way of a rate in aid; do you consider that that would be a good bargain for the Imperial Government?—No; I think that that is going the wrong way to work. The Colonies cannot give men, and may give money.

3692. Do you think that, in that case, England would be contributing towards the maintenance of an inferior force, and of which she would be able to make much less use in time of need?—Yes.

3693. Mr. *Baxter.*] Am I right in assuming that you think that both the numbers and the cost of Imperial troops in the Colonies ought to be diminished?—I think they could be; but when you look into each individual case, you find that the field over which you can diminish is smaller than you might expect; the principal force is in the garrisons; there are 13,000 men at Gibraltar and Malta alone, and that is a force which you cannot diminish at all; in time of war you would increase it.

3694. In Colonies, properly so called, you think it possible and desirable that both the number and cost of troops should be reduced?—Yes; I would keep them at the lowest possible level.

3695. Do you look to the probability of a reduction at the Cape?—Yes, I think it is still capable of a reduction.

3696. You think that the circumstances of the Cape Colony are such that it ought at all events to contribute a certain proportion of the cost of its military defence?—Yes.

3697. *Chairman.*] You say that the rough estimate put in by Sir John Burgoyne must be taken as representing his individual opinion?—Yes.

3698. When Sir John Burgoyne was examined before this Committee he was asked this question: "Can you give the Committee any idea of what should be the additional expenditure in order to complete those works at Mauritius in the mode which you think desirable?" and his answer was, "I could not tell you off-hand." I wish to ask you whether, in order to supplement Sir John Burgoyne's evidence, he was the proper functionary for me to apply to?—He was the proper functionary as to works now in existence, or new works in progress.

3699. Taking that estimate of his in the sense in which it was intended by him as a supplement on his evidence, and taken as his individual opinion, I apprehend that as Chairman of this Committee, I adopted the proper course in asking his opinion?—Yes.

3700. Mr. *Baxter.*] Do you say that in the event of a war the garrisons of such fortifications as Bermuda and Mauritius, and other places of a similar

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character, ought to be withdrawn?—I would not say that the garrison should be withdrawn from the Mauritius; the Mauritius is very valuable to us, and it is a very difficult Colony to keep in order. At the time it was in the hands of the French we lost enormously by the ships which issued from it. I do not think that you ought to desert it, nor do I think that you ought to expend 250,000 *l.* upon it. It should be defended by a fleet.

3701. Generally speaking, you think that we should concentrate our forces at home?—Certainly.

3702. Lord *Robert Cecil.*] I suppose it would be easy to reconquer a Colony?—In the former war we could have taken every Colony.

3703. Mr. *Fortescue.*] After you had retaken a Colony you would probably find your fortifications and arsenals destroyed?—Yes.

Sir *Charles Clifford* called in; and further Examined.

Sir *C. Clifford.*

3704. *Chairman.*] YOU wish to add something to your evidence, I think?—When the Committee adjourned upon the last occasion, there appeared to be an idea that the tendency of my evidence was to show that the Middle Island had not contributed, according to its funds, to the expenses of the war. I stated that the largest portion of the land revenue was at present derivable from the Middle Island, which is the case; but I look upon it that that land revenue cannot in any way be applied towards payment of the expenses of the war, or any expenses of that nature. In the first place, the revenue derived from the sale of waste lands may be looked upon as capital, which, if not reinvested in productive works, such as emigration, or surveys, roads, and other means for facilitating communication with different parts of the Colony, would soon cease to exist; emigration would fall off, and land sales would diminish. Originally, by the Constitution Act, the whole of the land revenue of both islands was liable to the charge for extinguishing native titles. The native claims in the Middle Island having all been purchased, the inhabitants felt jealous of having their money taken to purchase land in the North Island. An arrangement was therefore made and ratified by the Assembly, that the New Zealand Company's debt of 260,000 *l.*, which had been imposed upon New Zealand by the British Government, should be taken entirely by the Middle Island, and that the North Island should borrow a somewhat similar amount to purchase its own lands, thus freeing the Middle Island from that charge. For these reasons it would be very unjust to consider those funds at all available to meet the expenditure occasioned by the war. The only other fund that New Zealand possesses is its ordinary revenue, amounting to 219,600 *l.*, from which is to be deducted the expenditure on account of the general Government, of upwards of 163,000 *l.*, leaving only about 56,000 *l.* to be divided, according to the Constitution Act, amongst the various provinces for defraying the expense of their municipal government. The Government of New Zealand, feeling it impossible to apply the funds at their disposal for the purpose of defraying any extra expenses consequent upon the war, and feeling also that they were called upon to do their utmost in the way of contributing to those expenses, have incurred a further debt of 150,000 *l.*, and beyond that I think it is evident that the Colony has not the means to contribute

3705. Mr. *Fortescue.*] It is the case, is it not, that the expenditure to which you referred upon the last occasion, as appearing upon the estimates for the present year for native purposes, and for the war, will be derived from the general revenue to which the Middle Island contributes its share?—Yes.

3706. The Middle Island also bears the burden of the 150,000 *l.* loan in common with the rest of the Colony?—Certainly; the Middle Island bears its fair share of the burdens of the Colony.

Jovis, 6° die Junii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. A. Mills.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Ellice.
Sir George Grey.	Mr. Marsh.
Sir James Fergusson.	Mr. C. Fortescue.
Mr. Roebuck.	Mr. Adderley.

ARTHUR MILLS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. *William George Anderson*, re-called; and further Examined.

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3707. *Chairman.*] YOU told us, on the former occasion, that you are Principal Clerk in the Treasury?—I am.

3708. In reply to this question, which I asked you when you were last under examination, "Will you procure by a future day and produce before the Committee some clear explanation of the system which now exists, and the recommendations of your department, as to how it should be conducted in future?" you stated you would be in a position, shortly, to produce such information; can you now produce it?—We are not quite ready with the information necessary to arrive at a proper decision upon the question; the War Office have been preparing various detailed statements, and until we receive those it is impossible to lay any plan before the Committee. It will be necessary also to consult the authorities of the Treasury on the subject before any official plan can be submitted for the approval of the Committee.

3709. I understood you to say, upon the last occasion, that as far back as July last the question had been referred by your department to the War Department, and that no action had been taken upon that?—The War Office authorities have not yet finally answered the question put to them as far back as July; it has been necessary to refer to the Colonies for information, and I believe that they will be prepared very shortly to give an answer to the Treasury question.

3710. Can you carry the matter any further now than when you were last before us?—I am afraid not; I can only state, shortly, my own opinion, which is, that all those contributions should be paid into the Exchequer, and that the full charges should be voted upon estimate. At present the Army in some of the Colonies may be considered to be in the pay of two masters; the troops receive a certain portion of their pay from the Colonies, and another portion from the Imperial Exchequer. I think it would be clearer, as a matter of account, and perhaps better as a matter of principle, that the soldiers should have to deal simply with one paymaster.

3711. Are we to understand you to say that there is a difference of opinion between the departments as to the mode in which the Treasury Minute of 1848 should be acted upon?—The principle laid down in that Treasury Minute was quite clear, and is in accordance with the opinion I have just expressed. I do not know that there is anything on record showing that there is a difference of opinion between the departments. We know, privately, that certain persons entertain different opinions upon the subject.

3712. Looking at the time which has elapsed since the matter was referred to the War Department, I presume there is some difficulty in coming to a conclusion?—I believe that has arisen from the necessity of referring to the Colonies for information, and not from any delay on the part of the War Office in dealing with the question.

3713. Mr. *Baring.*] Has it not arisen from the case having reference to Victoria, and also that the war with New Zealand has made great changes in respect of troops in the Australian Colonies?—I believe so. So far as I have been able to learn the cause, that is it.

3714. *Chairman.*] Referring to the answer to which I called your attention just now, in your former examination, can you say whether you will be able, shortly, to produce before the Committee any memorandum which may be

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printed in the Appendix, as the result of the determination of the authorities? —I believe that the War Office authorities have nearly completed, perhaps by this time have quite completed, the information which would enable us to prepare a memorandum; but it must, of course, be brought under the consideration of the authorities of the Treasury before any public Minute can be made upon the subject. Until it shall have been rendered to the Treasury, we shall not be in a position to deal with the question officially.

3715. Have you any further information to give, or suggestion to make, upon the subject?—Nothing; I adhere to the opinion I expressed before, that these sums should be voted in full upon the Estimates, and the full contribution from the Colony paid into the Exchequer. Mr. Whiffin, the Assistant Accountant General, has prepared a great deal of information, which he will lay before the Committee.

3716. Mr. *Baring.*] You propose that a statement should appear upon the face of the Estimates, giving the sums which are, nominally as it may be said, annually voted in the Army Estimates?—Yes. I should propose that the Estimates should contain the full charge, whether payable ultimately out of the Imperial revenue or out of Colonial revenues; and that a statement should appear on the face of the Estimates, for the information of Parliament, showing the amount which reverts to the Imperial Exchequer, in the shape of contributions from the Colonies. That would give Parliament all the information it could require, and would very much simplify the public accounts.

3717. Would you give the estimated receipts from the Colony, or the receipts for the last year?—I should give the estimated receipts from the Colony; these could be stated with accuracy, as they depend upon numbers.

3718. Does your opinion extend to the repairs and construction of barracks, and charges of that sort, being borne by the Colony, without appearing upon the Estimates?—If it is a money transaction between the two departments, it should appear in the Estimates; but the barracks, I believe, belong to the Colonies, and are therefore repaired by the Colonies. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the details to state how that is.

3719. You would have no objection to an arrangement by which the Colonies should pay for the construction and repair of barracks, without passing the sum through the ordinary accounts?—I should have no objection to that; I only object to the arrangement with regard to the troops; if they receive pay from the Colonies, and also from the Government, out of Imperial funds, the gross expense should be laid before Parliament in one account. At present there is no public account in which those expenses are combined.

Mr. *Henry William Sharp Whiffin*, recalled; and further Examined.

Mr. *H. W. S. Whiffin.*

3720. *Chairman.*] WHEN you were last under examination, you were asked to procure for the Committee a return of the actual payments during the period of 10 years, which have found their way into the Imperial Exchequer from the Colonies, towards Colonial defence. Have you such a return that you can now put in?—From the year 1853 down to the present time, I have, so far as relates to the Australian Colonies. (*The same was handed in.*)

Vide Appendix.

3721. Has any decision been arrived at by the War Department as to the mode of acting on the communication received last July from the Treasury, with reference to Colonial payments?—Not that I am aware of.

3722. Have you any information to give to the Committee upon that subject?—No communication has been made to the Treasury in answer to that letter.

3723. Do you know why there has been a delay in the settlement of that question; some explanation has been given of the cause of the delay?—I believe that the delay was occasioned in consequence of the withdrawal of the head-quarter staff and the troops from Victoria for service in New Zealand, consequent upon the recent outbreak, thereby rendering an immediate decision on the question raised inexpedient.

3724. Has the question of how some scheme may be drawn up been before you?—It has recently.

3725. Mr. *Baring.*] I believe that when that letter was received by the Treasury, you were not in your present position?—I was not.

3726. *Chairman.*] Is the subject now being considered by the department?—Certainly.

3727. But

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3727. But nothing has been matured?—Nothing has been matured.

3728. Mr. *Baring.*] There would be ample time to make any arrangements previous to the Estimates for next year?—Yes; this is the best time to do anything which may be necessary.

3729. No arrangement could be made until the Estimates for next year are submitted?—No.

3730. With respect to the return which you have just handed in, showing what contributions have been paid into the Imperial Treasury by Victoria and New South Wales, have you any general observations to make; have any portions of the receipts from Victoria been credited to New South Wales?—There has been a confusion between New South Wales and Victoria; sums paid by Victoria have appeared in the Estimates and annual accounts of Army Expenditure as a contribution from New South Wales.

3731. What is the reason of that?—New South Wales and Victoria have been looked upon as one Colony, being in the same military command.

3732. Have you made any comparison between the sums either voted or expended by the Government of New South Wales and Victoria with these results?—Yes. I have a statement showing the amount voted for the pay and allowance of the troops by the Colonies of Victoria and New South Wales from the year 1853 down to the year 1860, and showing also the amount expended for Imperial purposes. In the year 1853 Victoria voted 90,000*l.*, 10,000*l.* of which only was paid over for Imperial purposes, the rest having been spent in the Colony.

3733. When you use the expression, "Paid over for Imperial purposes," you mean paid to the credit of the Imperial Exchequer?—Yes; only 10,000*l.* has been paid over to the Imperial Exchequer, and so on year by year down to the 31st December 1857.

3734. With reference to the excess of money voted by the Colony, as compared with the sums credited to the Imperial Exchequer, how do you suppose that that sum has been expended?—It has been paid direct to the officers, and there is a very large amount also for passage-money and other services paid for by the Colony on the spot.

3735. I suppose there is no doubt that a great deal more money has been paid by the Colony than that for which credit is given to the Colony in those years?—Yes; Victoria voted 490,000*l.* from 1853 to 1860, and only 100,000*l.* of that has actually been paid over for Imperial purposes.

3736. That is paid into the Imperial Exchequer, and appearing in the accounts as so paid?—Paid over to the Imperial Exchequer.

3737. For the pay and allowances, and other charges in respect of Imperial troops?—Yes.

3738. Was not a new arrangement made in 1858 with the Colony of Victoria?—From the 1st April 1858, Victoria was to pay for all troops above four companies.

3739. Has that been done by the Colony?—Not yet; statements are being prepared showing the amount due by the Colony, and it appears that up to the 31st March 1860 there is a sum of 16,000*l.* due by the Colony, irrespective of clothing and provisions.

3740. Is that for the payment of troops above four companies during that period?—For the payment of troops above four companies, from the 1st April 1858.

3741. What payments have been received during that time from Victoria?—The whole of the money paid by the Colony has been paid to the officer commanding at Melbourne.

3742. For what?—For Colonial allowances to the troops and officers. The Colonies have not voted anything for Imperial purposes since 1857.

3743. You mean that Victoria has voted nothing for the pay of the troops?—They have only voted the Colonial allowances.

3744. Whereas under the arrangements they should have paid for all troops above four companies?—Yes; so far as I can ascertain, they have made no provision in their estimates for that payment.

3745. That is a claim which it is proposed to refer to the Colony?—We are now preparing an account showing the amount due from the Colony.

3746. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Under that arrangement the Colony will pay the Colonial allowances of the four companies?—They will pay the Colonial

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allowances for all the troops, and the Imperial pay for all above four companies.

3747. Have you looked into the question whether at any time the House of Commons has voted money for the payment of troops, whereas in the Colonies the Colonies have actually paid for those troops directly, and have not paid the amount of the allowances to the Exchequer; and therefore money has been voted by Parliament which was unnecessary for the payment of those troops?—That is the case in New South Wales; the Colony provides the Imperial pay of a battery of artillery, and we include the whole expense upon the Army Estimates, and deduct the amount for the pay and allowances as a portion of the sum deducted for "men wanting to complete."

3748. Although the total sum for the pay and allowances of those troops appears in the detailed statement comprising Vote 2, yet a sum equal to the pay and allowances is deducted from the total of Vote 2?—Yes.

3749. So that in reality the sum is not voted?—The sum is really not voted, because we make a deduction as wanting to complete. That remark refers also to the sappers and miners in Southern Australia.

3750. For what reason is that course pursued?—The principal reason is to enable the House of Commons to vote the number of men, so as to bring the entire number under the Mutiny Act.

3751. That course, I believe, is pursued with respect to troops expected home from India?—Yes, in the same way; otherwise those troops would not be included in the Mutiny Act.

3752. Have you prepared a return showing the expenditure for the year 1859–60?—Yes. (*The same was handed in.*)

3753. *Chairman.*] What is the total strength in Hong Kong by that return?—China has been omitted in this return, as also in the return for 1858–9, because it is in an abnormal condition.

3754. Would that return for 1859–60 considerably vary from the return of the previous year, in consequence of the circumstances of the China war?—China has been altogether excluded from this return, and from the return for the year 1858–59.

3755. Do you know whether the expenditure of Hong Kong is not very much more in 1859–60 than it was in 1858–59?—It is considerably more, as the state of war has brought into the China command an immense number of troops which are not generally there.

3756. Mr. *Baring.*] It has been suggested that a return should be prepared and laid upon the table of the House of Commons, with the Estimates, showing the estimated expenditure for military purposes in the different Colonies. Do you anticipate there will be any difficulty in preparing such a return?—None whatever; and it would be of great assistance.

3757. *Chairman.*] You mean a return prepared on the same basis as that laid before the Committee, distinguishing the cost of barracks, their pay and allowances?—Such a return could be prepared without difficulty, with the exception of that portion of this return which gives the amount of departmental expenses and non-effective charges.

3758. Mr. *Baring.*] It would be difficult, I presume, to give any satisfactory return as to stores?—The stores estimated for are for general service, and it would be impossible to state on the Estimates what portion would be applied to the use of any particular Colony. In this return we give merely the value of stores issued by our storekeepers at the various stations.

3759. *Chairman.*] You believe that you could not give, from year to year, a correct statement of the stores in each dependency?—That might be furnished by the storekeeper to each Colony at the end of the year. If he gave a statement of the stores issued by him for Colonial purposes, a value might be put upon those stores and added in the next year's Statement or Estimate.

3760. Mr. *Baring.*] Have you a statement of the different rates of Colonial allowances given at the different stations?—I have. (*The same was handed in.*) *Vide* Appendix.

3761. *Chairman.*] That is a return of what is paid by the Colonies; have you any return for the five Colonies in which allowances are paid out of the Imperial funds?—There is a fixed allowance of 5 *s.* a day in the Australian Colonies; 3 *s.* a day at St. Helena and at the Cape.

3762. Since giving me the answer, which you did just now, have you referred to the return of the strength at Hong Kong for the year ending March 1859–60?

1859–60?—Yes; I find that on the 31st March 1859 it was 1,400, and in 1860, 10,818.

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3763. Hong Kong being excluded from the return of 1860, will be in effect excluded from both, and there will be a considerable difference in the aggregate amount for the two years?—China is excluded from both returns.

The Right Honourable *W. E. Gladstone*, M.P.; Examined.

Right Hon. *W. E. Gladstone*, M.P.

3764. *Chairman.*] YOU are Chancellor of the Exchequer?—I am.

3765. You have also held the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies?—I have been both Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, and also Secretary of State for the Colonies, but each for a short period, and at remote dates.

3766. Some evidence has been given as to a Report on Colonial Military Expenditure prepared by a Departmental Committee, in which the Treasury, the War Department, and the Colonial Office were represented. In consequence of the bearing of the question referred to that Committee, on the revenue and expenditure of the country, I presume that the concurrence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be necessary for its appointment?—Yes; I think that the presence of a Treasury officer on that Committee is conclusive evidence of what, in point of fact, is reasonable and obvious, that the Treasury should have a share in any such measure.

3767. Was your attention called to the existence of that Departmental Committee on your accession to office?—It was; in fact, the report was then in preparation, and was, I think, presented at no long period after my accession to office.

3768. Without asking for any expression of opinion on your part as to the report or memorandum appended to it, I may ask whether, in your opinion, it was a proper subject to be referred to that Departmental Committee?—Yes; I am glad to see it placed under the examination of competent persons with a view to its being brought more fully under the notice of the public, because I think that one of the greatest difficulties, and perhaps the greatest difficulty of all attaching to the subject, is the uninformed and immature, and generally indifferent state of public opinion upon it in this country. Until there is a great power of public opinion in this country brought to bear upon it, I doubt very much whether justice can be fully done.

3769. Some evidence has been given by Mr. Anderson of the Treasury, and also by Mr. Whiffin of the Accountant General's Office, with reference to the payments made by the Colonies towards their own military expenditure. Has your attention been called to the irregularity and paucity of those payments on account of military expenditure?—Yes, but I should distinguish between the smallness of the payments and their irregularity. I do not think that, on the ground of irregularity considered simply and alone, we have any ground to complain, so far at least as I am informed; but in point of fact the amount of the payments made by the Colonies which go directly in relief of the British Exchequer, and with respect to which there is a clear understanding, is very small. If I may refer to a paper which has recently been presented to Parliament, I should state that that paper, although I have not the slightest reason to doubt its accuracy, is yet a paper which I think unless largely developed by explanation would lead to very false conclusions. The paper is No. 290, and is a paper moved for by the Chairman, and is entitled, "A Return showing the forces stationed in the British Dependencies, and the expenditure incurred in their defence by the Imperial and Colonial Governments respectiveiy, during the year ending the 31st March 1859." I have not the least doubt that the return corresponds with the precise terms of the title, but I think that those who look to the return, and see the total of 324,000 *l.* at the foot of the column of Colonial Expenditure would naturally, but without doubt very erroneously, infer that the whole or the great bulk of that sum was paid in relief of the British Exchequer, which I take to be very far indeed from being the case.

3770. Can you call our attention to any particular items in that return which you think would lead to that opinion?—I would respectfully suggest to the Committee, as the question is one of great importance, their obtaining from the departments minute information upon each of the heads, with a view to the explanation of the subject, and enabling the Committee to distinguish accurately between what is paid in relief of the British Exchequer and what is not. My meaning is this:

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that a considerable portion of the sum paid is not paid at all in relief of the British Exchequer, but simply by way of addition to the regular pay and allowances of the forces, which continue to be discharged in full, or nearly so, but I believe in full by the British Exchequer. I take the two important Colonies of New South Wales and Victoria. Against the Colony of New South Wales I find the sum for Colonial expenditure, 29,000*l.*, and against the Colony of Victoria I find 40,000 *l.* The great bulk, I take it, of both those amounts, at any rate a considerable share of both of them, consists of monies that are paid by way of allowances to the troops, in which the British Exchequer may be said to have no concern whatever, because they are an addition to the regular charge borne by the British Exchequer.

3771. Mr. *Ellice.*] That is, they are Colonial allowances, not payments directed by any of the warrants of the War Office?—They are Colonial allowances as correctly described in the question, and have not the effect of relieving the British Exchequer of anything which, if those allowances did not exist, it would be liable to pay.

3772. *Chairman.*] Do you think that those payments which have been known by the name of Colonial Allowances somewhat resemble the extra pay given to troops serving in India?—Yes, I apprehend there is an analogy in principle between them, and they are attended with some obvious, and I should suppose serious inconveniences, although it is not my business to speak particularly of those inconveniences. I apprehend the removal of troops from a Colony where they receive these extra allowances to another not materially different in their view, in climate or circumstances, or conditions of living, is a very sharp trial to the fidelity of the soldiers, and is open to objection on that score.

3773. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Is not the origin of that addition of pay that they are called upon to perform police services as well as military services?—If they are called upon to perform police services in these particular Colonies, in a sense in which they are not liable to perform them in other Colonies, that is a circumstance not within my knowledge. I apprehend that what may be called police services are incident, in a considerable degree, to the whole of our present system of Colonial military defence.

3774. Mr. *Ellice.*] Are you not of opinion that the greatest possible inconvenience arises from those different allowances being made to our troops in different Colonies. For instance, whilst no Colonial allowances are made in Canada, they are made in Australia and in other Colonies where the climate and circumstances are nearly similar?—I do not consider myself entitled to give an official opinion in answer to that question; but, undoubtedly, I entirely agree with the sentiment expressed in the question; and I believe, if I am correctly informed, it might be illustrated yet more vividly by the circumstance that it is not merely between Colonies remote from one another, such as Victoria and Canada, that the discrepancy prevails, but also between Colonies which, although geographically distant, yet, in the British eye are, for the present purpose, almost one and the same, namely, Victoria and Western Australia.

3775. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Is not the difference between Western Australia the existence of gold fields in the one, which imposes upon the Government the duty of maintaining peace, and it is not for the purpose of maintaining peace that the soldiers are stationed there?—That may be a consideration of some weight, but I do not know that it is one that the soldier could be expected to recognise; he might say, that in passing from Victoria to New South Wales, his duty in Western Australia would be less irksome to him than his duty in New South Wales or Victoria, and that he would rather be employed in keeping order amongst the gold diggers than amongst the convicts. I have not yet stated, but I believe it to be the case, that an allowance is now made to the troops in Western Australia; that it is made at the cost of the British Exchequer; and, if I am correctly informed, it was made upon that very ground that great discontent existed upon the removal of troops from New South Wales or Victoria to Western Australia; so that, in point of fact, in that particular case, the local allowance made by the Colony of New South Wales to troops when serving within their limits, instead of being a relief to the British Exchequer, seems rather to have been a burden upon the British Exchequer, because it has compelled us to do something beyond that which we had previously undertaken.

3776. Mr. *Ellice.*] I believe there is no similar allowance made in the Colonies

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Colonies where the climate is much worse than in either of them, namely, in the West Indies?—I am not aware of it.

3777. *Chairman.*] It has been stated in evidence, I think, that there are five Colonies in which allowances are given from the Imperial Exchequer; and, if I understand your view aright, it is this, that we have been possibly, even probably, compelled to pay those allowances out of the Imperial Exchequer in order to avoid the discontent which might arise among our soldiers there, finding that in one Colony they received allowances and in another they did not?—That is what I have understood to be the case; at the same time I hope the Committee will seek further and more correct information upon the subject from the proper department.

3778. Mr. *Ellice.*] It is very similar, is it not, to the extra allowances which we have been obliged to pay to the whole of the troops in China, in consequence of the Indian forces having been employed there?—Very much so.

3779. *Chairman.*] In estimating your ways and means for the year, have you any data to go upon with respect to any probable contributions from the Colonies?—I am sorry to say that the amount in question when compared with the total charge to this country is so small that it has no very sensible influence upon the result; but I hope it will be understood that I am not here to make complaint of the Colonies with regard to the fulfilment of their engagements; I believe that such as they enter into are fulfilled in the most exemplary manner; but there are various questions pending; and I believe, with respect to a portion of the charge to be borne by the Colonies of New South Wales and Victoria, that from some circumstances, of the nature of which I am not perfectly aware, there is a Colonial liability at present unfulfilled. I believe that those Colonies are under arrangements to bear the charge of troops of the line, above four companies for each, and that, not owing, so far as I know, to any fault on their part, but owing to the matter having been overlooked, or from some other cause, that payment has not actually been made, but has recently been claimed. So far as any payment of that kind is concerned, or the payments made by New South Wales, for one battery of artillery, that is in relief, of course, of the British Exchequer. But I only mention these things as illustrations of my remark, that it would be material, as to the number of Imperial troops, to verify in detail the account presented to Parliament, and to distinguish between those Colonial payments which go in relief of the British Exchequer and those which do not.

3780. It has been stated in evidence that the Colonial military expenditure is something between three and four millions a year, about nine-tenths of which is borne by British taxpayers, and one-tenth is provided for by Colonial contribution. With a view to reduce this expenditure, it has been suggested that the primary responsibility of self-defence should be thrown upon the Colonies, and that the mother country should only contribute within certain limits. Do you think that the adoption of any such plan with regard to the British Colonies, would have a beneficial effect upon the revenue of Great Britain, and advantageous in other respects?—I think that to arrive at a system under which the primary responsibility of self-defence by land should be thrown upon the Colonists themselves, speaking, of course of those Colonies which are, so to say, normally constituted, would be not only an immense advantage to the British Exchequer, but would have, I think, many still more important and higher recommendations independently of the question of cost.

3781. You think that any such arrangement, by which the primary responsibility should be thrown upon the Colonies, would be advantageous to communities circumstanced as the British Colonies are?—I would almost venture to say, without speaking of cases in which the circumstances are altogether peculiar, that no community which is not primarily charged with the ordinary business of its own defence is really, or can be, in the full sense of the word, a free community. The privileges of freedom and the burdens of freedom are absolutely associated together; to bear the burdens is as necessary as to enjoy the privilege, in order to form that character which is the great ornament of all freedom itself.

3782. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Does not the relation of the mother country to a Colony impose upon the mother country the obligation of defending the Colony from external attack?—I should rather look back in order to answer that question. I should say that the obligation of the mother country cannot be overlooked, and I do not say that she is not bound to defend her Colonies under whatever system,

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if they do not defend themselves; but what I venture to say is, that the system under which a Colonial community itself is primarily charged with the duty of her own defence is by far the best, both for the mother country and for the Colony itself. I am aware that we are at present far from the system, and if we are to arrive at it, it must be by patient effort, and, perhaps, after a long course of time. I do not mean to point at anything which is impossible in its character, because I mean such a system as, under different circumstances, did exist for a great length of time in the case of the old American Colonies.

3783. Were they not, in fact, independent States, and did we not take possession of them by a strong hand, and impose our power upon them?—I do not think that the old American Colonies, previous to the war of the Revolution, were independent States, any further or in any other sense than in a sense in which it is extremely desirable that all our principal Colonies should be independent States.

3784. *Chairman.*] Is it not the case that, in respect of our early North American Colonies, the parent State retained the arbitrament of peace and war, the retention of which is the main ground upon which the claim for defence of the Colonies by the mother country is rested?—It is so; and it is more than true, if I may say so, because the power of making peace or war was retained by the mother country, and the primary responsibility of self-defence borne by these Colonies at a period and under circumstances when they were almost certain to be drawn into entirely English quarrels, and to be made directly the subject of contest amongst European powers; a state of things to which, with the present ideas that prevail in the world in regard to Colonial dependencies, we can hardly have a parallel.

3785. Mr. *Ellice.*] Were those Colonies at any time in a greater state of independence than our North American Colonies and Australia are now?—I would say they were in a state of much less dependence, because undoubtedly it would not have been permitted to those Colonies to exercise any power to legislate adversely to the mother country, whereas we have observed that even that power may be exercised with a view of raising up a protected interest against the commerce of the mother country, and no such case could have existed in the North American Colonies.

3786. I need not ask you whether you consider the old system much better than the new one?—I think the new system much better than the old one so far as regards the general freedom now established in the commercial relations between the mother country and the Colony; but as regards the relation with respect to the responsibility for defence, I cannot express what I think of the difference in point of advantage in the old system over the new, not merely upon financial grounds, but with a view to the real strength and tone of feeling in the Colonial community. I am satisfied that they never can be altogether what they ought to be until they learn, and desire, to bear a principal part of the burden of their own defence.

3787. Mr. *Roebuck.*] When a State is allowed to do what it likes with its internal regulations, and to protect itself against external aggression, what is the difference between that and independence?—My opinion is that the difference between that and independence would still be a very important one; because, for a variety of causes it would still, I have no doubt, remain the case, that a large part of the work of military defence would have to be borne, and gladly, I should say proudly borne by this country, and therefore a very important portion even of the military charge of the defence would remain with us, and that would at all times be a strong political tie; but the really valuable tie with a Colony in my view is the moral and social tie, and I do not think that that is stronger now than it was in the case of the old American Colonies, even if it be as strong.

3788. You think that the moral and social tie overbalances the cost we incur by protecting them?—I am reluctant to endeavour to measure the one against the other; the subject matter is entirely different.

3789. When our manufactures are shut out of a Colony as they are out of Canada, what possible benefit would accrue to England from the existence of a tie between her and the Colony?—I do not wish to be responsible for the assertion that the manufactures of England are shut out of Canada. I only remark upon the recent legislation of Canada as being a very singular illustration of the operation of the present system, and I say that, if it really be true, as is implied in the question, that there would be no benefit to England resulting from the connexion with Canada, unless we have the cost of defending her, then there is no

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benefit now: I cannot view any portion of the benefit as consisting in the cost of defence.

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3790. Part of the loss would accrue from the fact of her putting exclusive duties upon our goods?—I look upon that case of commercial legislation as one which is exceptional, and one which I should hope is not likely to be permanent. I think it is so adverse in point of feeling and propriety to the relations between the mother country and the Colony, that I earnestly trust as a matter of propriety, of decency almost, it will in some manner disappear.

3791. *Chairman.*] I understand your view to be, that the fact of the defence of the Colonies being undertaken by the parent state, has rather an enervating effect upon those Colonies, and therefore a mischievous one?—That is my strong opinion. I think that, whether it be in the case of Ireland, or in the case of Colonies, the principle of conjoining burden and benefit is a sound principle, and is equally advantageous to those upon whom the burden is imposed, within just limits, and to those from whose shoulders the burden is removed.

3792. As an illustration of your view, not only with reference to Colonies, but generally; do you consider that if from any cause the defence of Great Britain could be undertaken by any power from without, it would be a calamity to Great Britain?—The case being an impossible one, is put of course by way of illustration and argument, but, so regarding it, I do not hesitate to answer it in the affirmative.

3793. Sir *James Fergusson.*] If you cast upon the Colonies the responsibility of their own defence, could you deny them the right to hold aloof from the consequences of any war in which the Home Government of this country might engage?—I do not propose to throw upon the Colonies the responsibility of their own defence by way of any sudden steps; I only venture to say that the old state of things, the old Colonial relation between England and her dependencies, was sound in principle; the present one I think unsound in principle; but I am fully sensible of all the difficulties of the transition, and I do not presume for one moment, especially as it has not been in my power for many years to follow minutely the state and the course of Colonial affairs, to determine either the rate or the mode in which we are to aim at effecting that transition. I think it is important to keep that in view, and to prosecute it with great steadiness as opportunities shall offer, and in the meantime to endeavour to bring it before the public mind in this country, in order that it may take, in the public mind, a place in some degree adequate to its importance.

3794. You mention as somewhat similar cases the position of Ireland and Canada; but is there not this important difference, that Ireland, through her representatives in Parliament, exercises a direct influence over the foreign policy of this country, which Canada does not?—There is that difference, no doubt; and I mentioned the case of Ireland only in the single view of its having enjoyed to a large extent till recently, and to its still enjoying to an extent comparatively small, the privilege as it is termed of exceptional exemption from taxation.

3795. In the event of this country being brought into collision with the United States of America in the present crisis, and Canada being involved in the consequences of such a quarrel, would not the responsibility thrown upon her make it necessary for her to separate herself from the mother country?—No, I think not; I think that the interest and the feelings of Canada would form an important element in the proceedings of the mother country. I think that Canada would retain her own rights and powers; and I have not the slightest doubt that if she thought herself unjustly involved in the consequences of a British war, she would separate. If she found that war inconvenient she would separate, whether we undertook the defence or not; nor do I think that our undertaking the cost of defending her would make the difference. If her feelings are with us, she will go along with us; but if her feelings are not with us, I do not think that she will remain with us because we charge ourselves with the burden of her defence. At the same time, I have not the least doubt that if Canada were involved in the consequences of a war between us and the Untted States, we should have to bear a large portion of the cost. I am not thinking of the mere proportions of the cost, but of the seat of responsibility.

3796. From the general principle which you lay down, extraordinary cases, such as the possibility of an outbreak with the United States, must be excepted?—No, I do not think it makes an exception, properly so called, but it introduces a great

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a great number of important limiting considerations as to the time and mode of proceeding to the establishment of general principles.

3797. Mr. *Adderley.*] So far from self-depending Colonies holding aloof from contribution, is it not the fact that self-depending Colonies are the only Colonies which have ever contributed to Imperial wars?—I have not followed the question minutely for a long time, but I believe that is so. I have not the smallest doubt that in the proportion that responsibilities are accepted by communities they will be more disposed to go beyond the bare idea of self-defence, and to render loyal and effective assistance in the struggles of the empire.

3798. *Chairman.*] We hear from Sir John Burgoyne, Admiral Erskine, and Admiral Elliot, that notwithstanding the great cost of defence in the Colonies, a large number of them are not defensible. Sir John Burgoyne went on to say that a million sterling, over and above the sum already voted, would be required, in order to put those various fortifications in a proper state. Do you think that that state of things may be said to result from the circumstance that we have undertaken a task which we have not the means of fulfilling, and have thereby discouraged local efforts?—I should like to divide my answer by distinguishing between the Mediterranean Colonies and Colonies generally. As regards the Colonies generally, I agree with the evidence given, I think, by Lord Herbert before this Committee, that the whole question is a question of supremacy at sea, and that the maintenance of our supremacy at sea is absolutely vital to our existence, I mean to our present place in the world. England would no longer be England the moment she lost it. If she has supremacy at sea, her Colonial empire is virtually safe, and the fortifications and the Colonial garrisons in the West Indies, and many others, are little if at all required. If, on the other hand, she has not the supremacy at sea, it is impossible to make effective defence, and you are only making victims of those garrisons, with great disparagement to the national honour. Then as to the Mediterranean Colonies, I must again distinguish between Malta and Gibraltar, which I hold as excluded from my answers I have given, and the Ionian Islands. Of course those two garrisons must be considered as garrisons rather than as Colonies, and their political importance, I presume, is hardly a matter of discussion before this Committee. With regard to the Ionian Islands, which I had an opportunity not long ago of visiting, I should question very much the sense in which they could be said to be defensible, even at the present very heavy charge at which we hold the military occupation of them.

3799. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Do you consider them Colonies?—Not in any sense of the term, except that they are involved in our Colonial administration, and may, I presume, be considered to come within the scope of the inquiry of this Committee.

3800. Lord *Stanley.*] Is there not a stipulation of treaty that the Ionian Islands shall contribute a certain sum only towards their own defence?—I believe there is.

3801. The amount, I think, is 25,000 *l.* a year?—I think they did contribute 35,000 *l.*, but it is now 25,000 *l.*, the extra 10,000 *l.* having been remitted by this country. That contribution of 25,000 *l.* is a good deal complained of by the people of the Ionian Islands, or rather by their politicians, whom I should a good deal distinguish from the people, but I think without any reason whatever. It is a very limited sum, and does not exceed one-tenth part of our own charges, and I do not think it possible to conceive that in any political condition they would be subject to a lower charge than 25,000 *l.* for their defences.

3802. There are extensive fortifications, are there not?—The case of the Ionian Islands is a very peculiar one, and I would begin with the smallest of them; namely, Paxo, Ithaca, and Cerigo. In those there are a very small number of men, I think merely a handful kept for honorary purposes, and not for police purposes, because there is a good police in the islands. As to the principle of keeping a small handful of men apart from the regiment to which they belong, sometimes not even under a commissioned officer, for honorary purposes and purposes of compliment and ceremony, I doubt whether it is wise. Then passing on to two of the more considerable islands, Zante and Cephalonia, I can hardly consider anything more difficult to justify than our military system with regard to those islands. When I visited them, there was a considerable force in Cephalonia, I think between 600 and 800 men, and in Zante about half that number; the men in Cephalonia are kept in open barracks; they have no means of defence; there is

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an old fort a few miles from Argostoli, the capital of the island, but I believe it is perfectly worthless. In Zante there is a sort of fort close to the town, but that I believe is not considered defensible, nor was it proposed to be made so.

3803. Upon what principle are those forces kept up?—I do not know; I do not think that they are, in the smallest degree necessary to maintain order; I think it is more likely that disorder would arise from their presence; generally speaking nothing can be better than the relations of the Ionian population of those islands with the British soldier, but at the same time there was lately an uproar in Zante, probably the consequence of some drunken broil. Excepting casualties of that kind, likely to arise from the presence of the soldiers more than from their absence, I cannot see any reason for maintaining those forces. With regard to the question of Corfu, there, and there alone, we have extensive fortifications, of a class that are termed defensible; but although they are termed defensible I am extremely sceptical as to the question whether they can be defended. A very large outlay has been incurred in Corfu, and a very considerable garrison is ordinarily kept there. In the first place, I am bound to say that I do not think anything can be more creditable to both parties than the state of feeling which prevails between the garrison and the population; there is a most agreeable illustration of it which meets the eye of every visitor, for frequently throughout the winter in Corfu there is or was an open game of foot-ball in the open space between the citadel and the town, carried on promiscuously by the British officers, British soldiers, and the population of the town. Now it is impossible, I think, to conceive any more distinct proof of the good feeling which prevails between them than this, because the game of foot-ball is essentially of a nature which, if good feeling did not prevail, would give opportunities for showing the absence of it. With respect to the fortifications of Corfu, I confess it appears to me, without presuming to give an authoritative opinion, that there must be the greatest difficulties arising out of the possession of these fortifications, in the event of a war. We may look at our connexion with the Ionian Islands in the light of an obligation or duty which we have to fulfil, and we should also consider the difficulties which might arise in disposing of the fortifications of Corfu, if we were to quit them. But setting aside these considerations, I conceive that the perfectly distinct and separate idea that Corfu is of military value to us is entirely without ground, and is a superstition founded partly upon the ideas of the great Napoleon, who had other views and other purposes than ours, and partly founded upon the circumstances of a period when we were entirely dependent upon sailing vessels; and I think that Corfu and the Ionian Islands generally, in the event of a war, instead of being a military advantage to us, would be a military burden of such a nature as we might perhaps find almost intolerable.

3804. Mr. *Ellice.*] Do you recollect what sum has been expended in the fortifications of Corfu?—I should not like to state it in figures, but as far as I can remember, a good many hundred thousand pounds.

3805. Do you recollect what was the expense of fortifying the Island of Vido?—That, I believe, was the larger share of the entire expenses; and I imagine those fortifications to be entirely insufficient for the purpose of protecting the citadel, or for the purpose of preventing the landing of an enemy.

3806. But did not the erection of those fortifications necessarily entail upon us the expense of a garrison to man them?—No doubt, and a considerable force.

3807. So that we not only threw away all the money which has been expended upon the fortifications, but have entailed upon ourselves the consequent expense of maintaining a considerable garrison in the fortifications?—Yes; that is a consequence of the erection of fortifications, which, of course, should be always kept in view.

3808. I see that there is, this year, 5,000 *l.* still to be paid, for improving the fortifications of Corfu?—I am assured by the Secretary of State for War that that is intended for necessary reparations in detail; that expense, small as it is, I view with the greatest jealousy. At the same time I know the views of Lord Herbert with respect to these Colonial fortifications; and I should have the utmost disposition to acquiesce in any small charge of this kind of which he had satisfied himself, because I think, in principle, nothing can be more correct than his views of such subjects.

3809. This additional charge which we are called upon now to incur is in consequence of our original folly?—It is one of those consequences of the original

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folly which it is difficult altogether to shake off; but I confess that any plan whatever for the extension of the fortifications of Corfu, or for their general improvement, I should look upon with the greatest aversion, because, in the first place, I believe it is extremely doubtful whether, with modern artillery, from its situation, it is possible to make Corfu defensible by any outlay whatever; and in the second place, the amount of force that must be required to hold Corfu would be an intolerable burden; I am not speaking of money, but with regard to the resources of this country in men, in time of any war of an extensive character; and in the third place, we must take into view the great difficulty of defending Corfu against an enemy in consequence of the sacrifices which would have to be imposed upon the town, which would be most serious. It would be impossible to expect that 20,000 or 25,000 people inhabiting that town should be prepared to suffer all the extremities which they must undergo from the fact of their lying between the citadel and the attacking force, and that not for the sake of their own government, but for the sake of a foreign government, which has a military occupation of their country.

3810. *Chairman.*] I think I understood you to say, that apart from the question of cost, you think that the drain of men required for the fortifications would probably be a serious consideration. I wish to ask you this question, whether you do not think, considering the very large number of men now required or supposed to be required for the defence of our dependencies generally, including the portion of the Imperial force now in India, about 110,000 men, that that is a very serious drain upon our population for the purpose of the military defences of our Colonies?—I should think it a very serious drain; while of course it must be estimated with reference to the importance of the object in view. But what I have in my eye is this: the defence of Corfu would require a force variously estimated, I think, at between 6,000 and 10,000 men, which must be, of course, considered with reference also to the reserve at home necessary for keeping it up; and the idea of bestowing such a force in the case of a great struggle in the Mediterranean for a purpose which does nothing whatever, when it is accomplished, to secure or extend the real strength of England, is an idea which I contemplate with the greatest apprehension and alarm. I may say, that even with regard to the ideas of Napoleon, although it would seem very hazardous indeed to question any opinion of his upon a military subject, yet this stands upon record, that Napoleon kept for a great many years a large force in the Ionian Islands, I do not know whether exclusively in Corfu, but mainly in Corfu, of about 8,000 men, if it was not more, and that force was completely neutralised by two English sailing vessels, when in the hour of his extremest need he wanted its assistance. He abdicated in 1814, and that force went back immediately to France. France having thus lost the Ionian Islands, that force was ready to join Napoleon when he left the Island of Elba; and I always understood that it constituted a very large portion of the nucleus of his army in the Hundred days.

3811. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Is it not the case, that any expense which may now be proposed or incurred for fortifications in Corfu, would be in consequence of our having a few years ago pulled down a great portion of those fortifications, also at a large expense?—One difficulty in which we get involved from the nature of our policy is, that it fluctuates exceedingly. Different Commissioners and different military authorities have held very different views indeed, both as to the mode and as to the practicability of defending Corfu. With respect to the fortifications which were pulled down a short time ago, I should not have supposed that this charge of 5,000 *l.*, which is now upon the Estimates, could have had anything to do with the general restoration of those fortifications. I should have supposed, that in order to remove the consequences of that destruction a larger sum would be required; and I believe that there are plans in the pigeon-holes of the War Department of a much more extended description. I have seen such plans myself in the hands of the engineer officers in Corfu, which may, in point of fact, be expanded to almost any extent that you please. But it so happens that the town of Corfu is commanded by a series of eminences rising one after another into the country, and I should imagine that we might, if so disposed, extend our plans of defence in Corfu to any amount we liked.

3812. Mr. *Roebuck.*] I suppose your mind has been and is now directed to the conclusion that is to be drawn from all that you have said about the Ionian Islands, namely, that the sooner we give them up the better?—Both here and elsewhere

elsewhere I have always treated our relations with the Ionian Islands as a case in which we have undertaken, in the face of Europe, an important obligation, I think when a good opportunity arises of divesting ourselves of that obligation, or surrendering it, it would be very desirable, but I do not see any present likelihood of such an opportunity.

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3813. Mr. *Ellice.*] To proceed to the next item connected with this subject of fortifications in the Army Estimates, I find a large sum of money voted for the fortifications and improvement in the defences of the Mauritius. Do you think it is of such essential importance, looking to the present state of steam navigation, and the difficulty which any enemy would have in approaching the Mauritius, that it is expedient to incur more expenses in the fortifications of the Mauritius?—I confess I should be very averse to any measure of that kind; but of course I give that answer with the reservation that, as Minister of Finance, I do not feel myself entitled to give a conclusive opinion, as I might feel it my duty to yield to authority; as far as I can at present form an opinion, I should say it is not.

3814. We have evidence before us from Sir John Burgoyne, the chief authority among engineers, that even the money we have already expended upon the Mauritius would be by no means sufficient to complete the defences of the island, but a much larger sum is, in his opinion, necessary. Would you be of opinion that it would be wise to continue this system of fortifying a possession like the island of Mauritius, at a great expense to the taxpayers of this country?—No, I should say the proper mode of defending the Mauritius is by our fleet, and that the mere fortifying it to prevent the landing of an enemy, if that be the idea referred to, is an idea that ought not to be entertained.

3815. I believe there is a committee of engineers, called a committee on defences, which has been making the circuit of our Colonies to ascertain where defences would be expedient; and that it is in consequence of some report from that committee that the expenses have been so far incurred in the Mauritius. Are you aware of that report?—Yes, I presumed it had been from professional authority of that kind; at the same time, if there be blame, the blame rests not with the professional authorities so much as it does with those who set them about the work; because, of course, if they are desired to say what is necessary for the defence of an island, they would give a purely professional answer.

3816. A great change has taken place in this respect since the application of steam to navigation. No sudden attack could be made upon any of these Colonies, by a foreign force making its appearance without notice, in any of these seas?—I think the change is enormous, and that, in point of fact, our present system is one founded upon a state of things and a condition of this empire relatively to other powers which has entirely passed away. In former times, our communications with our Colonies were rare, slow, and uncertain, and it would have been very dangerous indeed to trust to the principle of supporting them from the centre; but now, on the contrary, the communications with the world in general are constant, rapid, and certain, and England is the very centre of those communications. We have enormous advantages for supporting them upon the principle of keeping our great mass of force at home, and supplying them as they may require.

3817. Then, seeing that in these Army Estimates it is likely that a further demand is to be made upon us for the fortifications of the Mauritius of 64,000*l.*, would you be of opinion that it would be desirable to review that policy before the country is called upon to make further advances?—Always speaking with reserve and the respect that I should be bound to pay to the opinion of persons more immediately responsible, that is the disposition with which I should approach the question.

3818. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] Have you examined the plans of the mode in which the money is proposed to be laid out in the Mauritius?—No, I have not seen the plans.

3819. Sir *George Grey.*] You are probably aware that the estimate for the future expenditure in Colonial fortifications, given to the Committee by Sir John Burgoyne, has been stated by Lord Herbert to have been made without his authority, and is merely the expression of Sir John Burgoyne's private opinion, and has received no sanction from the Government?—That is so; and I may say, I concur generally in Lord Herbert's views.

3820. Mr. *Ellice.*] It has received the sanction of the Government so far as the sum of 2,200*l.*, the amount inserted in the War Estimates, is concerned?—

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I have not the figures before me, but no doubt it has received the sanction of the Government so far as the sums now asked for are concerned.

3821. Sir *George Grey.*] Is the principle which you recommend as generally applicable to Colonial defences, limited to land defences, exclusive of naval defences?—Yes, I think it is; at least, if it be not, the case would be wholly exceptional.

3822. Mr. *Marsh.*] You were asked about the extra allowances to the troops in Australia, and you were asked what was the cause of it; was not the cause of it the expense of living with reference to the gold discoveries?—I presume that has had something to do with it, but I am not able to say whether that is to be considered as mainly, or in what degree, the cause.

3823. Are you not aware that the salaries of all the Government officers and of the police were also raised at the same time?—Yes; but as the expense of living is mainly the charge of the British Government, and borne by them with a certain fixed deduction, I do not know that that enters very greatly into the question.

3824. Now with reference to the cost of the defence of the Colonies, supposing that we had the same commerce which we have now with our Colonies, and that they were wholly independent, would not the defence of that commerce probably be more costly than the defence of the Colonies under existing circumstances?—No, I think not. The defence of the commerce would be by naval means; I do not think that our Colonial military expenditure is of any considerable avail for the defence of our commerce.

3825. You were asked about the advantage which the mother country gained by having a Colony; now is not the trade of a Colony much greater in proportion to its means, and its population than if that Colony were a foreign country; take, for instance, the case of Australia and California?—I think that is true; I think that when one political community has been founded from a particular country, the relations of trade are very close, and also very extended, and moreover those relations continue to be close and extended, even after the separation of a Colony from its mother country, in a degree somewhat beyond perhaps what the principles of supply and demand would alone produce. I believe, for example, that between Brazil and Portugal there are, from the effects of taste and habit and old association, more extended relations of trade, or at least there were a very short time ago, than would ever have sprung up between them, if it had not been for the previous political relations.

3826. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Then the existence of the relation does not increase the trade between the two countries; but, supposing one country has been made by another, does the trade at all diminish in consequence of that country becoming free?—In the case of the United States, I have no doubt it did diminish to a considerable extent in consequence of the violence of the separation; but if we can suppose such a case as a perfectly amicable separation, I confess my own opinion is, that the commercial relations would continue much as they were before.

3827. Then that relation of mother country and colony is not requisite to the maintenance of the commercial relation?—It is not in my opinion absolutely requisite, if we are to presume a case of amicable separation.

3828. *Chairman.*] Some evidence has been given before us by Mr. Lowe as to the possible, and, in his opinion, probable, effect of the presence of troops in certain Colonies, upon the amicable or other quality of the character of separation. He expressed an opinion that some risk was involved in the presence of troops in Colonies, where there might be some dispute about the allegiance, and some insult might be offered to the British flag, which would be resented by this country, and so cause considerable difficulty when the time for separation might arise. Do you think there would be any such risk occasioned by the presence of troops?—Yes; I am cognisant of that evidence given before the Committee, and I confess I think there is great force in it. Also I think that the presence of British troops might very seriously entangle and embroil the beginning of the controversy, and might in that way have a determining influence upon the question, whether the separation was to be peacefully or violently effected. At the same time, I am bound to say that my belief is, that what may be called the old principles of our Colonial system do not of themselves tend to separation, but are powerfully conducive to perpetually keeping up the connexion between the mother country and the Colonies.

3829. I think

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3829. I think the drift of Mr. Lowe's evidence was, that the allegiance and loyal feeling of those Colonies with which he was connected did not depend in any material degree upon the presence or absence of Imperial troops?—I am afraid that we by our own practice have somewhat, but I hope not extensively, perverted the feeling of the Colonial population in that respect. We have now so long maintained the system of providing for the ordinary purposes of defence, and even in a considerable degree of police, by means of a British force, and at the cost of the British Exchequer, that when we take into consideration the fact that all political modes of thought are very much connected with habit and tradition, I am not sanguine enough to believe that a sound state of opinion could be established in a day; I think it must be brought about by long discussion and much reflection in a considerable tract of time. And I still say that I do not think that a Colonial Minister can do a great deal unless he is supported by the popular feeling of this country much more strongly than any Colonial Minister has ever yet been. As long as the people of England are contented to pay quiescently that portion of their taxation which arises out of the present system of Colonial expenditure, we must not be too exacting upon the Colonial Secretary of State.

3830. Do you think that the principles of Colonial defence are clearer than the mode of applying them; we may see our way to a sound principle, although we may not be at once able to apply it?—I think it would be very presumptuous in me, not having been for a long time conversant with the details of Colonial affairs, to say in what degree they might be applied. But I am quite safe, I think, in saying that the main hope of their extensive and vigorous application must depend upon the awakening of the public mind of England. When a Colonial Minister finds himself in conflict with the popular sentiment in the Colonies, and not supported by the popular sentiment from hence, he is very weak; but a Colonial Minister supported by the popular sentiment from hence, and that popular sentiment founded upon justice and upon the ultimate and true interest of the Colonists themselves, would, I think, make a Colonial Minister very strong, and in that case I should be very sanguine of a speedy improvement.

3831. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Speaking of the extra allowances that are given to troops in certain Colonies, on account of the high price of living there, had the Colonies not been willing to pay those extra allowances, they must have fallen upon the mother country?—If you assume them to be necessary by way of compensation to the troops.

3832. If we recognise the increased cost of living in those Colonies?—I can hardly give an opinion how far they are the direct consequences of that increased cost.

3833. Referring to the opinion which you expressed, as to the policy which should be pursued in expecting each Colony to be responsible for its own defence, would you contemplate each Colony maintaining the same force which is at present thought necessary for its defence, by troops locally raised?—No, my opinion is, that the Colonists would take very different views, and probably on the whole, from the advantage of their position, much sounder views as to their real necessities than it is possible for us to take.

3834. Supposing it is possible for troops to be raised in the Colonies, sufficient for their defence, according to the matured judgment of the Colonists as to their requirements, would you contemplate, where it was necessary, a contribution from this country towards the maintenance of the troops?—I do not look with so much anxiety to the question of the amount of contribution as I do to the transfer of responsibility; that is what I really desire. I think that if the Colonists and the Colonial Government, so far as it is really Colonial, had the primary responsibility resting upon them, no difficulty would occur between the Colonies and this country upon a mere question of amount. What makes me anxious is, our being invested with a responsibility which I do not think belongs to us, or to the natural order of things, a responsibility which I think we have unduly assumed, and which we are not, I think, competent to discharge half so well as the Colonists would discharge it themselves. I should like to see the state of feeling restored to the Colonies, which induced the first American Colonists, when they revolted, to make it one of their grievances that British troops were kept in their borders without their consent. I do not speak of the arrangement itself, but of the feeling which dictated it.

3835. As some questions were asked upon matters of history with regard to

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the American Colonies, I think I am right in believing that at that period the Home Government required the American Colonies to maintain a considerable force of militia for their defence?—I should not like to answer that without having had an opportunity of refreshing my memory; but certainly my impression is, that that was not a demand forced by the Home Government upon the Colonists, but rather the free action of the Colonists themselves.

3836. But at that time, when the Colonies were left to find their own defences, and did find them, undoubtedly a much greater control was exercised by the Home Government, over their proceedings, and the manner of conducting their government, than is attempted now?—I am very doubtful about that; I am certainly speaking from rather remote recollection, but I should be disposed to question that proposition; my belief is, that they were subject to very little interference as a general rule; I am speaking now of the American Colonies.

3837. Mr. *Roebuck.*] You have very often made use of the term "primarily responsible for their own defence;" now what ideas do you attach to that?—The idea attached to the phrase is really best exemplified by the state of opinion and feeling which prevailed in the old American Colonies.

3838. At what time?—During the last century. I think they were, and they felt themselves to be, primarily responsible for their own defence; they thought it their duty to consider in the first instance what was to be done when they were attacked, and they looked for the aid of the mother country to be given to them; whereas, now the mother country either does the whole, or looks for their aid.

3839. Would you say that that was true, when Washington served under a British General in the defence of Virginia, that they felt themselves called upon primarily to defend Virginia against France?—I do not say primarily to defend Virginia against France. I mean that when danger arose, it was their duty in the first instance to consider it, and exert themselves to meet it, irrespective of the British Government; but certainly if the danger was of great magnitude, beyond their strength to cope with, I do not at all doubt that in such a case the bulk of the burden must pass into the hands of the British Government.

3840. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Do you propose practically the entire absence of British troops?—No, I am not prepared to say absolutely that the establishment of the principle would go so far as that, but, at the same time, I think in many cases it might come even to that.

3841. Do you think that, practically, there is much difference between the condition and spirit of Canada to-day and those North American Colonies of the last century, beyond the presence in Canada of a regiment or two of troops?—Yes, very considerable. I think that the old system of American defence was much more favourable to that very high tone of spirit and feeling, than the system we have pursued since the separation of the American Colonies, and that not by the fault of the Canadians themselves, but by the fault of what we have done for them.

3842. Is there any reason to think that Canada is wanting in a military spirit of defence in case of need?—I think it would be unjust to say it is wanting, because all these questions must be judged with reference to circumstances; and I do not know that Canada has done or omitted to do anything otherwise than might fairly have been expected under the circumstances; but, as I have said, I think the circumstances of the old American Colonies were calculated to produce and did produce a much higher tone of feeling, and a much greater sense of responsibility for defence, than has been produced and does exist in our present Colonies.

3843. Mr. *Roebuck.*] Did not the importing from across the Atlantic the passions and prejudices of hate and feeling which existed between England and France also tend to affect the Colonists?—I am not able to form a judgment whether the Colonists did or did not partake, in the last century, more largely of the feelings which prevailed at home than they do now; but, nevertheless, I do not regard that as an indication of evil. I should be very glad to see them partake, as far as possible, of the feelings which prevailed at home, always hoping that those feelings are to be in consonance with right and justice.

3844. There is not that passion and hatred between America and England that there was between France and England?—Certainly not.

3845. Therefore you cannot expect that a Canadian population should have that high tone of feeling, namely, exasperation against America, that the Americans had

had against Canada?—No; I do not wish them to have any exasperation whatever.

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3846. Mr. *Adderley*.] You said that the Colonial contributions towards Imperial expenditure or the defence of the Colonies only, did not introduce an element of uncertainty into your calculation of ways and means for the year, owing to their insignificance in amount?—I also stated that they were paid with exemplary regularity as far as they were defined, and well understood, and regularly claimed by this country.

3847. If the system of defence in the Colonies which you recommend were fully carried out, instead of Colonial contributions towards our expenses in their defence, would not the system be English contributions towards their expenses in their own defence, just the reverse?—That is certainly what I should like to see; and although it is quite true that labour is scarce and dear in the Colonies, yet I doubt very much whether there has ever existed any country where labour was too dear for self-defence, if only the community had right ideas upon the subject, and had not somebody else ready to do it for them.

3848. Do not Colonial wars, such as the present war in New Zealand, and the past Kaffir wars, depending very much upon local Colonial policy, disturb calculations as to the military expenditure of those Colonies in any year?—Certainly; the financial inconvenience of Colonial wars, such as those in Kaffraria and New Zealand, is considerable.

3849. And they depend very much upon Colonial politics, over which the Imperial Government have very little control?—In some cases they must do so; even although we may secure to a Governor of our own choice, by legislative enactment, the question of the determination of Colonial policy, he yet lives in the atmosphere of a Colony possessed of a representative system, and I think it will be Colonial opinion, and not British opinion, that really determines the policy that brings about war.

3850. Can the Imperial Government maintain the same minute control over the expenditure incurred in such wars in Colonies, as they can over wars undertaken by themselves?—With regard to control over expenditure in war, I hardly know what that means.

3851. I am alluding to such war as is now going on in New Zealand, and the great Kaffir wars during the last 10 years. Do you think that the Imperial Government had a conditional control over the expenditure at the time, or has ever had its own expenditure audited, or in any way satisfactorily investigated since?—I am not able to draw a distinction to the disadvantage of Colonial wars between Colonial wars and other wars, as regards control over expenditure. Whether "control over expenditure" in a Colonial war may have some meaning, depends in some degree upon the character of the local Colonial agents; one man may have a more lively sense of responsibility than another, or may be a better man of business than another; but as regards central control, I think the day the war begins it is absolutely ended. As far as the functions of the Treasury in a state of war go, I think it is an entire mistake to suppose that any control whatever exists. I do not speak now of the War Department, because what or how far the War Department can control war expenditure I cannot tell; but I speak of the central control of the Treasury. It is an essential and vital element in the control of the expenditure of the country, that there should be ample and abundant time for the discussion of every question; in war that wholly disappears; everything that is required to be done is of necessity required to be done without delay, which would be interposed by the scruples and objections of the Treasury; in point of fact, so far as I know, control is not only weakened, but disappears in time of war.

3852. *Chairman*.] Do you think in the case of Colonial wars that a new element of difficulty arises with respect to any Imperial control over the expenditure from the circumstances of the war arising in Colonies possessing the powers of self-government?—There is one new element of difficulty in the case of Colonial wars, which is this,—that unfortunately all wars in the conditions of modern times, are exceedingly profitable to some portion or class of the community. In England, when a great war breaks out, it is attended with immense profit to some classes of the community; but still their sense of interest as a class is traversed in some measure by the motives which belong to them as members of the community, and they likewise share the burdens. In the case of

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Colonial wars the profit of the class exists, but the restraining influences do not exist, because the community does not bear the burden.

3853. Sir *George Grey.*] As a matter of fact, have the wars that have been conducted in a Colony been more expensive than those conducted elsewhere?—I am not able to form any such opinion.

3854. Mr. *Adderley.*] You proposed that we should not harshly or roughly, but very gradually recall our Colonies to the old system of their undertaking the primary responsibility of defending themselves, did you not?—That is what I should desire as far as practicable.

3855. Do you think that as long as their doing so is made to depend upon their own willingness to do so, it is likely we shall arrive at that conclusion?—I think it would be too much to expect that after the manner in which they have been treated by us, they should of themselves return at once to a more sound state of opinion; but no doubt if public opinion is enlightened upon the subject in this country, it will follow in the Colonies.

3856. Do you think if it was put as a question to them whether they are willing to pay themselves that which we are paying for them, that they would be likely ever to say that they are so willing?—I never heard that any community would answer such questions as that in the affirmative; I do not believe that we should in their circumstances.

3857. Even if the Colonies were to undertake their own defence, and we were therefore to call the troops home, and it were possible that we should not think it wise to diminish the amount of the Imperial army, would you nevertheless contemplate much reduction in our military expenditure, from the fact of calling upon the Colonies to defend themselves?—My impression is, that there would be some not inconsiderable reduction; I think it would be very considerable, even though it might not seem very large in reference to the total of our military charge.

3858. Do you consider that an empire which extends over the whole world, would be much more safely defended upon such a system?—That is my opinion.

3859. Do you consider that our undertaking to pay for the defence of such Colonies as the Cape, New Zealand, and Canada, seems inconsistent with their possessing self-government?—I have already stated, that I do not think self-government entire and genuine in any case, where it is not connected with very large responsibility for self-defence; at the same time, the cases of the Cape and New Zealand are very much complicated by peculiar circumstances, and therefore I hope that all due reserve will be made in applying my opinion to them. The case of the Cape was a peculiar case, because this country, by the most direct interference, did destroy the system, which was a system of Colonial self-defence.

3860. With regard to what you have just said about the Cape, is it not the fact of the presence of warlike tribes upon the frontier, with the fact of our having broken down our own systems of defence against those tribes, which you think constitutes a claim against the people of England to defend the Colony?—I think so; but I by no means recognise the mere fact of the presence of warlike aboriginal tribes, as a reason for departing from the principle that the colony should be charged with its own defence; on the contrary, I think that is a case where the application of the principle, where it is not barred by antecedent circumstances, is right.

3861. Is it not historically true that our North American Colonists defended themselves against still more warlike Indian tribes, than any in our present Colonies?—It is certainly a fact that they defended themselves against very warlike Indian tribes; nor, as far as I know, do I think that the interests of humanity were worse cared for when the business of defence was in the hands of the Colony than when it is in the hands of the mother country. If the more scrupulous humanity of the mother country, by reason of our being calm and distant spectators, is in favour of the aboriginal tribes, yet on the other hand, if our system tended to produce more frequent wars, that may be more than a compensation.

3862. Do you think that our gift of self-government to Colonies recently, has increased the fair claim on the part of the country upon those Colonies for assuming their defence?—Certainly; I do not see how that claim could have been made without the gift.

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3863. Do you not think that the possession by Colonies such as our Australian Colonies of complete self-government and responsible government increases the danger of such government, having the use of Imperial troops to maintain their own local policy, or to put down the internal disturbance caused by their own local policy?—Yes, I am cognizant of the evidence given by Mr. Lowe upon that subject, and I concur in his opinion on the point.

3864. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Would you say that the acquisition of the right of self-government by certain of our Colonies has made any change whatever in their relation to foreign powers, or in any way increased their control over the policy which may involve them in collision with foreign powers?—No, certainly not; but in what I have said bearing upon the relations with foreign powers, I have had this a great deal in view; the cases, in my opinion, in which the Colonies would now be involved in the consequences of Imperial wars, are exceptional cases; I think there is a great change since the last century in that respect. Each of the Colonies were then supposed to be separate and exclusive resources of wealth for the mother country, in consequence of the supposed value of exclusive trade; that has now disappeared, and I think now the whole application of the consequences of war to transmarine possessions is greatly changed. I think that the cases in which the Colonies would be exposed to the direct consequences of war are now exceptional cases.

3865. But do you think that the claims of our dependencies upon the mother country for assistance in case of war with foreign powers, in which they have been involved by the policy of the mother country, has been at all affected by giving them a responsible government?—No; I do not think it has; my answer was rather the converse of that; that without the gift of a responsible government, we could not have made any claim. I might say with regard to a question from the same source, a short time ago, as to whether the result of my recommendation would be the total withdrawal of the British troops; upon which I said that might frequently happen; that certainly is one of the ulterior developments of this question into which I do not feel myself well qualified to enter. I think the general result would be this; that where sound principles are acted upon, the particular form of the arrangement which they are to take would be worked out gradually by the aid of experience; I cannot anticipate what the precise form would be in each case.

3866. Mr. *Adderley.*] It would carry out your views, would it not, that even though Imperial troops remain in these Colonies, the Colonies should pay them?—It is not absolutely incompatible with them, but I think it is one of those questions which would be best determined by practice, much better than we can now foresee.

3867. I ask you, generally, whether any reason whatever occurs to your mind why the English Colonists of the present day should do less for their own defence than the English Colonists of the last century?—There may be reasons, but they do not occur to my mind. The only reasons that have occurred to my mind are, that in the other sense the Colonists of former times were not allowed an independent existence as regards the full exercise of their own industry; but we now grant absolute freedom, and that, of course, is a consideration, which, as far as it goes, would greatly increase the strength of the argument for their assuming, with the benefits of freedom, the burdens of freedom.

3868. Were not the enemies, to whom these Colonists in the last century were exposed, the French army in Canada, the Spanish army in Florida, and large hordes of Indian troops, officered and drilled by officers of the regular army, as formidable as any that can come in contact with any Colony at the present day?—No doubt.

3869. You were asked if any of the Colonies defended themselves there would be any difference in their relations with England as regards their independence; do you consider, generally, that it would be worth while for us to incur all the disadvantages of the present system, in order to keep up what remains of dependence?—I should be loath to make merchandise of the connexion, and say I would give it up because it is too expensive; that is not a point of view in which I have considered the question; it appears to me, that all the motives by which we ought to be governed in this case really run in the same direction, and that course which is financially the best is the one which likewise is morally and politically the best.

3870. Do you see no advantage in our defence which weighs against the moral

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moral disadvantage of our undertaking the responsibility which usually falls upon all free communities?—Certainly not.

3871. Do you think that the mere fact of calling upon the Colonies to undertake that usual liability of all free communities would incline them at all to separate themselves from us, and assume a position of independence of England, or do you think that they would still feel that their interest lay in the direction of connexion with this country?—I should think they would see that their interest lay in connexion with this country; at the same time I should be apprehensive of abrupt and harsh calls upon them to do even what is right, especially if they were thought to be in consequence of the self-will, or the particular theories of a minister.

3872. Do you think that if it were done gradually in the way that you now recommend, there would be now any such danger of breaking the connexion up, or that the feeling of self-interest would incline them to continue the connexion with this country?—I think that self-interest and feeling would alike lead them to do so.

3873. Do you think that the fact of the American Colonies governing themselves was at all the cause of the ultimate separation of those Colonies from this country?—No, on the contrary, it was an impediment to it. It required a course of great harshness and great obstinacy in us to effect that separation, but we contrived to do it at last.

3874. Do you think that if the present system were continued, and we were to attempt to carry out the old scheme of putting the Colonies in a perfect state of defence at the expense of this country, that any Chancellor of the Exchequer would have the slightest chance of inducing the House of Commons to consent to such an enormous burden?—What I should be afraid of would be our going on insidiously with minute demands upon the House of Commons. If we were boldly to present to the House of Commons any comprehensive scheme for the defence of the Colonies, it might generate a strong re-action, and probably would do so. You might entice the House of Commons by degrees into it, no doubt, though I hope no Government would pursue that course.

3875. *Chairman.*] Looking at the present distribution of power, and responsibility and charge, do you know anything analogous in the history of the world to our relation with our Colonies, as regards their defence?—No, I believe it to be a novel invention, of which up to the present time we are the patentees, and no one has shown a disposition to invade our patent.

3876. Sir *James Fergusson.*] I do not know whether you can give us a more definite account of that early military system of the American Colonies which has been so much talked of. Are you aware whether it was a system at all, or whether it consisted of anything more than the presence in time of peace of Imperial troops?—I do not think I have made use of the phrase "military system;" I have made use of the phrase "Colonial system;" but I cannot think that I stated that there was a military system in regard to the defence of those Colonies. I mean that that is not the view in which it presents itself to me.

3877. Mr. *Fortescue.*] Are you aware that the profits which the Dutch Government derives from her Colonies is not from Colonial revenues, but from the possession of a vast commercial monopoly in the hands of the Government?—If your question refers to Java, my recollection of it is that, practically, it comes to very much the same thing, and that the Colonial monopoly has the effect of a direct contribution.

3878. Mr. *Marsh.*] Does not Spain receive a considerable sum from Cuba?—I believe so.

3879. As direct contribution?—It was so. I have not adverted to it lately, but I believe it is so still.

Mr. *Philip Wodehouse*, called in; and Examined.

Mr. *P. Wodehouse.*

3880. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are Governor of Guiana?—I was; I have just returned.

3881. Some evidence has been given before this Committee, as to the Imperial military expenditure of Guiana, and with respect to the expenditure on what they call sea defences?—Yes.

3882. Will you state what the nature of that expenditure has been?—The principal

principal port and the town of Georgetown, in Demerara, at which all the principal military buildings are, is dependent for protection from the sea upon sea defences, the maintenance of which, as well as of the military buildings and barracks, was paid for by the Home Government, out of Imperial funds; but in 1854, the Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary of State, wrote to the Colony, to say that the Home Government would no longer continue to pay anything for the maintenance of those defences, and that if the Colony would not undertake it itself, the troops must be withdrawn; and from that date, 1854, up to this time, the Colony has maintained those defences.

3883. They are now maintained at the cost of the Colony?—Entirely; and immediately the Duke of Newcastle gave those orders, or very shortly afterwards, the sea broke in, and a large amount of money has been found necessary since.

3884. Sir *George Grey.*] Do you mean that they maintain the works, or the garrison to man the works?—They maintain the sea defences, without which the sea would break in upon them.

3885. They do not pay for the garrison that mans it?—Only in a very small degree.

3886. *Chairman.*] When you left Guiana, what troops were stationed there?—Two companies of white troops, and three companies of a West Indian regiment.

3887. Some evidence has been given as to the value of the black regiments, particularly with reference to the present mode of recruiting and organizing them. Have you a high opinion of those troops, under the present system of discipline and recruiting?—There are opinions of mine upon record in the Colonial Office, to the effect that I should be very sorry to see the Colony left entirely to the protection of the black troops. I have gone so far as to say that if it were necessary to remove the white troops, I would rather see the withdrawal of the white troops preceded by the withdrawal of the black troops.

3888. Sir *George Grey.*] The troops are stationed there for the purpose of maintaining internal order, are they not?—It is not for me to say how far they are kept there exclusively for that purpose; but troops are very essential, I think, in a Colony consisting of such a population as that.

3889. Mr. *Adderley.*] Of what otherwise can they be?—We are very close to the French settlement of Cayenne, and we might be called upon, in case of war between this country and France, to make some sort of defence.

3890. Are the defences sufficient for the purpose?—We have been trying our utmost; we have a militia of 500 men in the Colony, and the military would assist us. The force that the French keep there is of such a nature that we might perhaps make some resistance until assistance was sent us.

3891. Mr. *Fortescue.*] You think you would make a respectable defence against a moderate force?—Against a small force.

3892. *Chairman.*] Do you think that in Guiana there is any particular apprehension of disturbance, supposing the troops were withdrawn?—I look upon the interest and the feelings of the white population, and of the mass of the people, as very different. I have no belief in the possibility of the existence of a cordial feeling between the two.

3893. Looking at the present mode in which the black regiments are recruited, would you rather see the Colony left without them altogether than depending upon them?—Yes; and one reason is this, that so long as the Queen's troops are there in the shape of those regiments, of course the whole of the arms, and the whole of the ammunition and everything of that nature must be in their custody, and if they joined the population they would form an organized body in addition to the mob. If you take them away you would know what you had upon your hands, and the white people could for a time take care of themselves.

3894. Mr. *Marsh.*] Do you think that they would be of any use against foreign enemies?—For a short time; the place is not able to withstand an organized French attack; but supposing sudden hostilities to break out between France and England and one or two small ships to come from Cayenne, we might give an account of them.

3895. Sir *George Grey.*] As against the black population, if the black troops were called upon to suppress internal disorder, you doubt whether they could be depended upon?—Yes.

3896. As soldiers in the field might they be depended upon as against a

Mr. *P. Wodehouse.*

6 June 1861.

foreign enemy?—I think so. They depend very much upon the character of the officers by whom they are commanded; they are too intimately connected with the class of people amongst whom they are, to render it desirable to place implicit reliance upon them.

3897. *Chairman.*] Your principal objection, as I understand, is the source from which they are recruited?—Yes; they were probably better troops when they were recruited from pure Africans.

3898. Do you think British Guiana is able to do more towards its own defences than it does now?—I should state, in justice to British Guiana, that before that could be expected there are others with whom you must begin; I believe there is no other Colony in the West Indies which has a permanent militia; it is a great drain upon the time and leisure of the people; but since 1857 the militia has been steadily maintained.

3899. Sir *George Grey.*] What is the amount of the white population?—The pure white population is very small in numbers, I should think.

3900. Mr. *Marsh.*] Is it principally of English, or of Dutch origin?—There are scarcely any Dutch; the white population is almost entirely English and Scotch.

3901. Sir *George Grey.*] What has been done by the Colony, with a view to maintaining internal order by the establishment of police?—There is a very efficient police, the composition of which is of a mixed character; it is a large establishment for the Colony, and costs from 25,000 *l.* to 30,000 *l.* a-year.

3902. Are the troops used for police purposes, or only to give confidence to the white population?—That is all; the troops perform no kind of civil duty, beyond furnishing a small guard at the Government House; all the rest is garrison duty.

3903. *Chairman.*] Have you any knowledge of any other of the West India Islands?—I have visited Jamaica, and I have been Superintendent of Honduras.

3904. So far as you know, in the other West India Islands, have the troops been employed for police purposes?—I should think not, under ordinary circumstances.

3905. Mr. *Adderley.*] What is the revenue of Demerara?—About 300,000 *l.* a-year.

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Appendix, No. 1.

RETURN showing the FORCES in the BRITISH DEPENDENCIES, borne on the Strength of the Imperial Army, on the 31st March in each Year, from 1851 to 1861.*

COLONIES.	1851.	1852.	1853.	1854.	1855.	1856.	1857.	1858.	1859.	1860.	1861.
NORTH AMERICA:											
Canada	6,106	4,960	4,725	3,435	1,887	1,602	3,287	2,424	3,035	2,234	2,220
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.	2,697	2,026	1,967	1,831	1,086	1,003	2,787	1,902	1,874	1,799	1,819
Newfoundland	427	430	326	345	311	228	230	233	197	235	229
AUSTRALIA:											
New South Wales	651	476	861	1,090	1,207	562	897	917	578	718	444
Victoria	52	79	486	451	1,126	1,093	940	883	625	633	59
Tasmania	901	929	959	699	358	1,068	547	423	290	354	188
South Australia	63	85	67	60	84	85	168	178	98	88	78
West Australia	116	210	202	193	186	198	177	199	176	165	140
New Zealand	1,630	1,306	1,484	1,498	1,577	1,614	1,911	1,618	1,195	1,368	5,354
Cape of Good Hope	5,050	9,096	8,688	5,773	6,035	6,225	10,295	6,082	5,390	4,946	4,788
Bermuda	1,335	1,348	1,354	1,098	1,018	935	1,229	1,203	1,157	1,108	1,071
Bahamas	300	295	267	344	325	294	292	444	415	397	474
St. Helena	517	516	524	520	515	462	570	534	506	487	756
Falkland Islands	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	37	37	36	35
WEST INDIES:											
Jamaica	1,926	1,842	1,858	1,873	1,932	1,826	1,636	1,890	1,489	1,439	1,422
Honduras	239	227	172	195	212	234	203	254	345	355	330
Windward and Leeward Colonies.	3,854	3,851	3,720	3,221	2,518	2,534	2,297	2,550	2,439	2,506	2,388
EASTERN COLONIES:											
Ceylon	3,553	3,559	3,447	3,483	2,763	2,734	2,650	2,318	2,393	2,371	2,266
Mauritius	1,941	1,197	1,837	1,849	1,847	1,944	2,153	590	1,003	1,954	1,990
Labuan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
WEST COAST OF AFRICA:											
Sierra Leone	308	244	276	95	340	429	335	348	355	358	259
Gambia	293	269	311	446	265	315	364	345	340	331	395
Gold Coast	99	238	391	353	345	334	327	301	290	327	326
MEDITERRANEAN:											
Gibraltar	3,618	3,672	4,299	3,378	3,776	5,356	6,397	4,506	4,763	5,956	6,001
Malta	3,331	3,294	4,077	4,442	6,291	9,811	6,718	5,199	5,650	6,131	7,116
Ionian Islands	3,491	3,529	3,550	3,570	3,633	4,261	4,128	3,123	3,243	4,270	4,233
TOTAL	42,498	43,678	45,848	40,242	39,637	45,147	50,547	38,501	37,883	40,566	44,481

* This is exclusive of the Returns for Hong Kong, which are given in a separate Paper.

Adjutant General's Office,
14 May 1861.

A. Horsford,
Deputy Adjutant General.

Appendix, No. 2.

RETURN showing the STRENGTH of the TROOPS in *Hong Kong*, &c., on the 31st March in each Year, from 1851 to 1861.

	1851.	1852.	1853.	1854.	1855.	1856.	1857.	1858.	1859.	1860.	1861.
Hong Kong, &c.	1,052	1,068	1,068	745	546	589	731	1,484	1,400	10,818	7,979

Adjutant General's Office,
15 May 1861.

A. Horsford,
D. A. G.

Appendix, No. 3.

RETURN showing the FORCES Quartered in the BRITISH DEPENDENCIES during

COLONIES.	For the Year ending 31st March 1860.				
	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	TOTAL.
North America:					
Canada	1,039	1,137	248	8	2,432
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	1,612	- -	177	92	1,881
Newfoundland	- -	237	1	1	239
Australia:					
New South Wales	507	- -	106	32	645
Victoria	618	- -	- -	6	624
Tasmania	324	- -	- -	2	326
South Australia	93	- -	- -	7	100
West Australia	88	- -	- -	86	174
New Zealand	1,166	- -	45	41	1,252
Cape of Good Hope	3,409	1,042	176	239	4,866
Bermuda	878	- -	159	91	1,128
Bahamas	- -	386	11	1	398
St. Helena	- -	418	77	2	497
Falkland Islands	- -	37	- -	- -	37
West Indies:					
Jamaica	534	802	94	3	1,433
Honduras	- -	329	24	2	355
Windward and Leeward Colonies	1,145	1,104	136	7	2,392
Eastern Colonies:					
Ceylon	846	1,356	135	7	2,344
Mauritius	1,449	- -	133	48	1,630
Labuan	—	—	—	—	—
West Coast of Africa:					
Sierra Leone	- -	356	- -	- -	356
Gambia	- -	334	- -	- -	334
Gold Coast	- -	306	- -	- -	306
Mediterranean:					
Gibraltar	4,537	- -	1,079	309	5,925
Malta	5,008	637	779	304	6,728
Ionian Islands	3,601	- -	487	206	4,294
TOTAL	26,854	8,481	3,867	1,494	40,696

Adjutant General's Office,
3 May 1861.

Appendix, No. 3.

the Years ending 31st March 1860 and 1861, and according to the Latest Returns.

For the Year ending 3d May 1861.					According to the Latest Returns.				
Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Total.	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Total.
874	1,143	236	7	2,260	855	1,132	227	6	2,220
1,518	- -	229	95	1,842	1,500	- -	229	90	1,819
- -	225	1	1	227	- -	227	1	1	229
455	- -	66	28	549	359	- -	53	32	444
259	- -	- -	21	280	232	- -	- -	27	259
197	- -	- -	2	199	186	- -	- -	2	188
77	- -	- -	3	80	76	- -	- -	2	78
78	- -	- -	64	142	77	- -	- -	63	140
3,368	- -	183	75	3,626	4,975	- -	305	74	5,354
3,387	1,060	159	234	4,840	3,323	1,074	157	234	4,788
875	- -	129	98	1,102	853	- -	123	95	1,071
- -	413	11	- -	424	- -	464	10	- -	474
- -	543	94	39	676	- -	538	114	104	756
- -	35	- -	- -	35	- -	35	- -	- -	35
553	807	102	3	1,465	570	762	87	3	1,422
- -	307	22	2	331	- -	308	22	- -	330
1,208	1,093	123	5	2,429	1,224	1,038	120	6	2,388
869	1,315	122	7	2,313	881	1,259	120	6	2,266
1,709	- -	123	210	2,042	1,671	- -	126	193	1,990
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
- -	338	- -	- -	338	- -	259	- -	- -	259
- -	332	- -	- -	332	- -	395	- -	- -	395
- -	331	- -	- -	331	- -	326	- -	- -	326
4,468	- -	1,117	328	5,913	4,396	- -	1,303	302	6,001
5,416	633	775	288	7,112	5,415	636	782	283	7,116
3,600	- -	457	199	4,256	3,585	- -	452	196	4,233
28,911	8,575	3,949	1,709	43,144	30,178	8,453	4,231	1,619	44,581

J. Yorke Scarlett,
Adjutant General.

Appendix, No. 4.

PAPER delivered in by *T. F. Elliot*, Esq.

Appendix, No. 4. TOTAL NUMBER of VOLUNTEERS or other LOCAL FORCES in the undermentioned Colonies, at the date of the latest Returns.

	Description of Force.	Numbers.	Date of Despatch or Return.
NORTH AMERICA:			
Canada	Militia and Volunteers	4,456	31 December 1859.
Nova Scotia	ditto	2,350	19 April 1860.
New Brunswick	ditto	1,850	18 March 1861.
Newfoundland	Volunteers	350	3 April 1860.
Prince Edward Island	ditto	1,000	14 May 1860.
		10,006	
AUSTRALIA:			
New South Wales	Volunteers	1,696	14 February 1861.
Victoria	ditto	4,750	21 November 1860.
South Australia	ditto	1,538	22 February 1861.
Queensland	ditto	No return.	
Western Australia	Nil	Nil.	
Tasmania	Volunteers	1,500	22 December 1860.
		9,484	
NEW ZEALAND	Militia, Auckland	1,515	21 May 1860.
	Volunteers, Taranaki	Numbers not reported.	
	Other Settlements	No return.	
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE	Mounted Police	475	Blue Book, 1859.
	Volunteers	1,219	14 November 1859.
		1,694	

Colonial Office,
22 April 1861.

Appendix, No. 5.

PAPER delivered in by Mr. *H. S. F. Whiffen.*

A RETURN showing the FORCE stationed in the BRITISH DEPENDENCIES, and the EXPENDITURE incurred for their DEFENCE, during the Year ended 31st March 1860.

STATION.	Description of Force.	Strength. Numbers.	Strength. Totals.	Pay and Allowances.	Provisions, Clothing, Forage, &c.	Stores.	Transport. Land and Water Transport in the Colonies.	Transport. To and from the Colonies and Inter-colonial.	Barracks.	Fortifications.	Proportion of Recruiting Expenses.	Proportion of Non-Effective Services.	Proportion of Departmental Expenses.	Total of Imperial Expenditure.	Total of Colonial Expenditure.	GROSS TOTALS.	STATION.
NORTH AMERICA:				£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	
Canada	Infantry	2,176															
	Artillery	248															
	Engineers	8	2,507	85,706	32,498	4,935	4,138	5,954	5,943	1,595	2,232	23,440	2,005	168,446	13,393	219,657	Canada.
	General, Civil and Medical																
	Staff	75		37,818										37,818			
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	Infantry	1,612															
	Artillery	177															
	Engineers	92	1,929	38,286	16,684	10,754	2,899	5,348	13,896	1,612	1,712	18,936	1,493	130,720	198	149,693	Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
	General, Civil and Medical																
	Staff	48		18,775										18,775			
Newfoundland	Infantry	237															
	Artillery	1															
	Engineers	1	249	7,693	3,620	1,260	332	590	2,255	234	216	2,238	199	18,727		20,807	Newfoundland.
	General, Civil and Medical																
	Staff	10		2,080										2,080			
AUSTRALIA:																	
New South Wales	Infantry	507															
	Artillery	106															
	Engineers	32	653	15,491	7,013	506	92	8,208	2		592	6,196	523	38,533	33,806	76,845	New South Wales.
	General, Civil and Medical																
	Staff	8		4,506										4,506			
Victoria	Infantry	618															
	Artillery																
	Engineers	6	631	14,987	7,481		113	2,585	2		560	5,900	506	32,234	72,110	108,667	Victoria.
	General, Civil and Medical																
	Staff	7		4,323										4,323			
Tasmania	Infantry	324															
	Artillery																
	Engineers	2	347	9,691	9,733	232	161	1,290	787	22	288	3,244	277	25,725		35,113	Tasmania.
	General, Civil and Medical																
	Staff	21		9,388										9,388			
South Australia	Infantry	93															
	Artillery																
	Engineers	7	102	2,733	1,444		15	401			88	854	82	5,737	7,172	14,008	South Australia.
	General, Civil and Medical																
	Staff	2		1,099										1,099			
West Australia	Infantry	88															
	Artillery																
	Engineers	86	183	6,063	7,410	120	273	2,815	125		160	1,711	146	18,828		25,946	West Australia.
	General, Civil and Medical																
	Staff	9		7,118										7,118			
NEW ZEALAND	Infantry	1,166															
	Artillery	45															
	Engineers	41	1,279	38,902	32,491	161	506	9,532			1,152	11,959	1,023	95,726		104,852	New Zealand.
	General, Civil and Medical																
	Staff	27		9,126										9,126			
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE	Infantry	4,451															
	Artillery	176															
	Engineers	229	4,981	139,814	110,527	4,698	24,784	32,814	11,032	135	4,448	45,572	3,985	398,829	56,176	512,834	Cape of Good Hope.
	General, Civil and Medical																
	Staff	115		57,829										57,829			
	Carried forward	12,861	12,861	551,453	228,901	22,666	33,313	69,637	34,042	3,618	11,448	129,250	10,239	1,085,567	182,855	1,268,422	

A RETURN showing the Force stationed in the British Dependencies, and the Expenditure incurred for their Defence, during the Year ended 31 March 1860—*continued*.

STATION.	Description of Force.	Strength. Numbers.	Strength. Totals.	Pay and Allowances.	Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	Stores.	Transport. Land and Water Transport in the Colonies.	Transport. To and from the Colonies and Inter-colonial.	Barracks.	Fortifications.	Proportion of Recruiting Expenses.	Proportion of Non-Effective Services.	Proportion of Departmental Expenses.	Total of Imperial Expenditure.	Total of Colonial Expenditure.	GROSS TOTALS.	STATION.
Brought forward		12,861	12,861	£. 551,453	£. 228,901	£. 22,666	£. 33,313	£. 69,637	£. 34,042	£. 3,618	£. 11,448	£. 120,250	£. 10,239	£. 1,085,567	£. 182,855	£. 1,268,422	
Islands in North and South Atlantic:																	
Bermuda	Infantry	678															
	Artillery	159	- -	35,507	15,257	1,197	1,098	9,629	1,995	95	1,024	10,790	924	77,516		87,587	Bermuda.
	Engineers	91	1,154														
	General, Civil, and Medical Staff	26	- -	10,071	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	10,071			
Bahamas	Infantry	386															
	Artillery	11	- -	12,644	7,174	1,111	120	1,655	1,108	147	352	3,754	327	28,392		32,280	Bahamas.
	Engineers	1	409														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	11	- -	3,888	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	3,888			
St. Helena	Infantry	418															
	Artillery	77	- -	16,709	7,645	651	349	1,853	1,683	96	456	4,759	406	34,607		38,836	St. Helena.
	Engineers	2	509												482		
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	12	- -	3,747	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	3,747			
Falklands	Infantry	37	37	1,213	435	- -	- -	63	- -	- -	32	345	29	2,117		2,117	Falklands.
West Indies:																	
Jamaica	Infantry	1,336															
	Artillery	94	- -	46,988	25,038	3,571	2,758	3,567	3,842	- -	1,364	13,793	1,179	102,040		119,922	Jamaica.
	Engineers	3	1,473												1,637		
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	40	- -	16,245	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	16,245			
Honduras	Infantry	329															
	Artillery	24	- -	12,785	6,135	540	240	2,058	626	196	328	3,422	292	26,822		30,621	Honduras.
	Engineers	2	366														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	11	- -	3,799	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	3,799			
Windward and Leeward Islands	Infantry	2,249															
	Artillery	136	- -	80,865	49,848	5,646	1,728	8,126	13,560	- -	2,176	23,113	1,978	186,980		243,072	Windward and Leeward Islands.
	Engineers	7	2,472												29,279		
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	80	- -	26,813	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	26,813			
Eastern Colonies:																	
Ceylon	Infantry	2,202															
	Artillery	135	- -	62,788	9,354	1,425	145	6,779	795	- -	2,120	22,159	1,896	107,461		207,466	Ceylon.
	Engineers	7	2,370												97,198		
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	26	- -	2,807	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2,807			
Mauritius	Infantry	1,449															
	Artillery	133	- -	50,637	10,702	3,236	2,398	28,330	5,969	14,804	1,488	15,464	2,073	135,221		171,012	Mauritius.
	Engineers	48	1,654												25,354		
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	24	- -	10,437	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	10,437			
Labuan		- -	- -	7,329	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	7,329		7,329	Labuan.
West Coast of Africa:																	
Sierra Leone	Infantry	356															
	Artillery	- -	- -	12,460	4,560	- -	147	1,118	542	98	320	3,469	297	23,011		27,864	Sierra Leone.
	Engineers	- -	371												562		
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	15	- -	4,291	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	4,291			
Gambia	Infantry	334															
	Artillery	- -	- -	10,423	4,494	1,513	272	913	1,234	- -	304	3,272	281	22,706		28,333	Gambia.
	Engineers	- -	350												423		
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	16	- -	5,204	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	5,204			
Gold Coast	Infantry	306															
	Artillery	- -	- -	7,697	3,009	923	276	917	525	- -	288	2,870	245	16,750		20,015	Gold Coast.
	Engineers	- -	319												234		
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	13	- -	3,031	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	3,031			
Mediterranean:																	
Gibraltar	Infantry	4,537															
	Artillery	1,079	- -	175,683	87,506	19,195	6,549	16,517	11,906	12,917	5,409	55,866	4,780	396,319		420,695	Gibraltar.
	Engineers	309	5,975														
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	50	- -	24,376	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	24,376			
Malta	Infantry	5,645															
	Artillery	779	- -	196,194	111,684	22,445	6,517	19,328	13,521	17,157	6,144	63,439	5,428	461,857		489,373	Malta.
	Engineers	304	6,785												6,200		
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	57	- -	21,316	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	21,316			
Ionian Islands	Infantry	3,601															
	Artillery	487	- -	124,509	50,731	8,283	3,185	19,070	5,487	1,662	3,912	40,700	3,482	261,021		305,061	Ionian Islands.
	Engineers	206	4,353												25,000		
	General, Civil and Medical Staff	59	- -	19,040	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	19,040			
	Totals	41,458	41,458	1,560,909	622,473	92,502	59,095	189,560	97,035	50,790	37,096	387,465	33,856	3,130,781	369,224	3,500,005	Totals.

Appendix, No. 6.

RETURN of the Cost of Transport, for Military Purposes, to, from, and between each Colony, during the Year 1859-60. Appendix, No. 6.

COLONY.	To and from Great Britain and the Colonies.				Intercolonial Sea Conveyance to each Colony.			TOTAL.
	Passage of Officers in Contract Packets, and otherwise, without Troops.	Conveyance of Troops without Officers.	Freight of Stores.	Amount.	Conveyance of Officers and Troops.	Freight of Stores.	Amount.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Canada	1,904	3,394	628	5,926	14	14	28	5,954
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	1,473	1,817	1,330	4,620	698	30	728	5,348
Newfoundland	141	- -	392	533	57	- -	57	590
New South Wales	1,181	6,144	75	7,400	805	3	808	8,208
Victoria	769	594	213	1,576	1,056	53	1,109	2,685
Tasmania	225	- -	522	747	523	20	543	1,290
South Australia	201	- -	20	221	171	9	180	401
West Australia	470	1,993	345	2,808	- -	7	7	2,815
New Zealand	216	5,184	394	5,794	3,323	415	3,738	9,532
Cape of Good Hope	2,638	22,008	2,632	27,278	4,013	1,523	5,536	32,814
Bermuda	16	4,630	1,786	6,432	3,147	50	3,197	9,629
Bahamas	872	76	310	1,258	334	63	397	1,655
St. Helena	529	293	921	1,743	23	87	110	1,853
Falklands	- -	- -	63	63	- -	- -	- -	63
Jamaica	2,007	- -	597	2,604	825	138	963	3,567
Honduras	99	- -	912	1,011	1,015	32	1,047	2,058
Windward and Leeward Islands	1,481	2,897	1,058	5,436	2,374	316	2,690	8,126
Ceylon	1,542	3,518	1,709	6,769	- -	10	10	6,779
Mauritius	1,060	26,274	835	28,169	95	66	161	28,330
Labuan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sierra Leone	398	- -	441	839	279	- -	279	1,118
Gambia	679	- -	94	773	132	8	140	913
Gold Coast	529	- -	331	860	53	4	57	917
Gibraltar	513	1,788	14,201	16,502	15	- -	15	16,517
Malta	871	9,009	9,400	19,280	45	3	48	19,328
Ionian Islands	776	14,174	2,864	17,814	1,016	240	1,256	19,070
Total £.	20,590	103,793	42,073	166,456	20,013	3,091	23,104	189,560

Note.—The foregoing amounts are inclusive of the estimated cost of mess, victualling, bedding, &c. for the officers, men, women, and children conveyed in Her Majesty's ships, and of the coals consumed on the voyage.

Admiralty, Somerset House,
5 June 1861.

Chas. Richards,
Comptroller of Transport Services.

Appendix, No. 7.

ROUGH ESTIMATE of the Cost of Completing Works in Progress and of New Works necessary to place the undermentioned Foreign Possessions in a reasonable State of Defence, in addition to the Sums in the Estimates for 1861-62, exclusive of Armaments and ordinary Barracks, and of such occasional Improvements as Art and Science may from time to time render necessary. Appendix, No. 7.

	£.
Gibraltar	25,000
Malta	75,000
Corfu	75,000
Mauritius	250,000
Bermuda	150,000
Halifax	75,000
St. Helena	25,000
Cape of Good Hope	25,000
Trincomalee	36,000
Hong Kong, Bahamas, Falkland Isles, Jamaica, Antigua, Kingston and Quebec, &c.	264,000
£.	1,000,000

J. F. Burgoyne, I. G. F.

Appendix, No. 8.

Appendix, No. 8. STATEMENT of STORES issued to various COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS, showing the CONDITIONS on which the SUPPLIES were made, whether on Payment or otherwise.

	NORTH AMERICA:	
	CANADA:	
	Some arms, accoutrements, and ammunition were furnished to the Provincial Government on a guarantee of repayment.	To be paid for.
	In 1856 field batteries were lent, and were to be paid for, if not returned.	On loan.
	A number of percussion muskets and ammunition were supplied, and payment claimed by Lord Panmure's desire, but resisted by local authorities.	To be paid for.
January - 1860	Gun ammunition, artillery - - - - - -	- ditto.
16 May - „	Ditto - - - ditto - - - - - -	- ditto.
28 May - „	Ditto - - - ditto - - - - - -	- ditto.
	Rockets, &c. - - - - - - - - -	- ditto.
July & August „	Gun ammunition for volunteer artillery in several districts.	- ditto.
	NOVA SCOTIA:	
1 September 1859	3,000 rifled muskets, pattern 1853, and sets of accoutrements.	A gift.
3 May - 1860	Gun ammunition - - - - - - - -	To be paid of.
3 May - „	Six 3-pounder guns, with carriages, limbers, &c. (condemned).	On loan.
June - „	Small-arm and gun ammunition - - - -	To be paid for.
16 June - „	Staff sword, belt, &c. - - - - - -	- ditto.
July - „	Gun and small-arm ammunition - - - -	- ditto.
July - „	Small-arm ammunition - - - - -	- ditto.
September „	Ditto - ditto - - - - - -	- ditto.
27 September „	Gun ammunition, artillery - - - - -	- ditto.
October - „	Small-arm ammunition - - - - -	- ditto.
November „	Ditto - ditto - - - - - -	- ditto.
November „	Gun and small-arm ammunition - - - -	- ditto.
December „	Small-arm ammunition, &c. - - - - -	- ditto.
January - 1861	Ditto - - - ditto - - - - -	- ditto.
January - „	Accoutrements and sundry stores - - - -	- ditto.
	NEW BRUNSWICK:	
15 November 1859	1,500 riflees, pattern 1853, and sets of accoutrements.	A gift.
June - 1860	Two 6-pounder guns, with limbers, stores, &c. -	On loan.
August - „	Accoutrements, gun ammunition, artillery stores, &c.	To be paid for.
	NEWFOUNDLAND:	
21 October - 1859	1,500 rifled muskets, pattern 1853, and sets of accoutrements.	A gift.
October - 1860	Small-arm ammunition - - - - - -	To be paid for.
	PRINCE EDWARD'S ISLAND:	
July - 1860	50 cavalry swords and sets of accoutrements - -	A gift.
July - „	Small arm ammunition - - - - -	To be paid for.
September „	Bugles - - - - - - - - -	- ditto.

STATEMENT of Stores issued to various Colonial Governments—*continued.* Appendix, No. 8.

	AUSTRALIA:	
	NEW SOUTH WALES:	
24 May - 1854	Three 32-pounder guns, with ammunition and stores complete.	To be paid for.
14 August - 1855	50 guns, with powder, shot, and stores complete, for armaments.	- ditto.
December 1859	2,000 rifles, pattern 1853, with accoutrements and ammunition.	- ditto.
	VICTORIA:	
6 June - 1854	20 32-pounder guns, with powder, shot, and stores complete.	To be paid for.
3 December 1859	Armament of colonial steamer and other stores -	- ditto.
21 May - 1860	Ditto - - - ditto - - - ditto - -	- ditto.
9 July - „	1,000 rifles - - - - - - - -	On loan.
19 July - „	600 Lancaster carbines - - - - - -	To be paid for.
19 July - „	350,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition - -	- ditto.
21 September „	300 Lancaster carbiues - - - - - -	- ditto.
21 September „	500,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition - -	- ditto.
21 January - 1861	500 rifles, sea service, with accoutrements, and 800 barrels of powder.	- ditto.
	TASMANIA:	
6 November 1858	1,000 rifles, pattern 1853, second class; 500,000 rounds of ammunition.	To be paid for.
4 September 1854	10 8-inch guns, with powder, shot, and stores complete.	A gift.
May - 1860	Gun ammunition - - - - - - - -	To be paid for.
May - „	Ditto - - - - - - - - -	- ditto.
August - „	Swords, bugles, &c. - - - - - - -	- ditto.
	SOUTH AUSTRALIA:	
5 June - 1854	2,000 rifles, 1,000 swords, and 800,000 rounds of ammunition.	A gift.
6 June - „	Eight field-guns, with powder, shot, and stores complete.	- ditto.
August - 1860	30 percussion muskets, pattern 1851 - - -	On loan.
	Small-arm ammunition - - - - -	To be paid for.
September „	Ditto - ditto - - - - - -	- ditto.
16 May - „	Gun ammunition and shot - - - - -	- ditto.
16 August - „	400 rifles - - - - - - - - -	A gift; to replace issues made to New Zealand.
10 December „	Ammunition, 500,000 rounds - - - -	- - ditto.
21 August - „	Gun and small-arm ammunition, and articles for repair of muskets.	To be paid for.
26 September „	600 rifles - - - - - - - - -	- ditto.
	NEW ZEALAND:	
April - 1860	300 muskets, pattern 1842; 300 rifles, pattern 1853; 417 sets of accoutrements, and small-arm ammunition.	To be paid for.
May - „	300 rifles, pattern 1853; 200 muskets, pattern 1842; 117 sets of accoutrements, and small-arm ammunition.	- ditto.
July - „	Small-arm ammunition - - - - - -	- ditto.
July - „	292 rifles, pattern 1853; 210 muskets, pattern 1842; small-arm ammunition, &c.	- ditto.
July - „	Small-arm ammunition, &c. - - - - -	- ditto.
26 July - 1860	250,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition for rifles, provided by Messrs. Hebbert and Co.	- ditto.
24 September „	550,000 ditto - - - ditto - - - ditto -	- ditto.

Appendix, No, 8.

STATEMENT of Stores issued to various Colonial Governments—*continued.*

	CAPE OF GOOD HOPE:	
	ORANGE FREE STATES:	
27 October - 1856	Two field-pieces complete, with ammunition and stores.	To be paid for.
	CAPE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT:	
29 September 1858	Arms - - - - - - - - - -	To be paid for.
20 *April* - *1859*	*Field*-guns, equipment, and carbines - - -	A gift.
6 September „	Percussion muskets, accoutrements and harness -	- ditto.
12 October - „	Arms and accoutrements - - - - -	- ditto.
2 February - 1860	70 muskets, pattern 1851, and sets of accoutrements	On loan.
7 February - „	Small-arm ammunition - - - - - -	To be paid for.
5 March - „	583 rifles, pattern 1851 - - - - -	On loan.
8 March - „	Small-arm ammunition - - - - -	To be paid for.
28 March - „	Ditto - ditto - - - - - -	- ditto.
22 May - „	Ditto - ditto - - - - - -	- ditto.
9 August - „	240 rifles, pattern 1853 - - - - -	On loan.
30 July - „	40 ditto - ditto - - - - - -	ditto.
	40 sets of accoutrements - - - - -	To be paid for.
30 July - „	Small-arm ammunition and camp equipage - -	- ditto.
10 August - „	20 muskets, pattern 1851, &c. - - - -	- ditto.
16 October - „	Gun ammunition for volunteer artillery - - -	- ditto.
15 December „	A bugle, &c. - - - - - - - -	- ditto.
July - „	50 muskets, pattern 1851, and 50 sets of accoutrements; artillery harness.	- ditto.
July - „	Ordnance carriage and limbers, artillery equipment, ammunition, and accoutrements.	- ditto.
October - „	Small-arm ammunition, &c. - - - - -	- ditto.
	ST. HELENA:	
August - 1860	600 rifles, pattern 1842 - - - - -	On loan.
	Small-arm ammunition - - - - -	To be paid for.
November „	109 rifles, pattern 1856, and appurtenances - -	- ditto.
	WEST INDIES:	
	ANTIGUA:	
4 September 1858	Arms, accoutrements, and ammunition - - -	A gift.
14 July - „	Guns, ammunition, and side-arms - - - -	- ditto.
22 August - 1859	Arms, ammunition, accoutrements, brass guns, ammunition, and side arms.	- ditto.
	BRITISH GUIANA:	
18 February - 1859	Five 8-inch guns, with powder, shot, and shells -	A gift.
13 September „	Shot, shell, cartridges, side-arms, and stores - -	- ditto.
June - 1860	Small-arm ammunition - - - - -	To be paid for.
July & Sept. „	Artillery stores and ammunition - - - -	- ditto.
21 February - „	Gun ammunition, gunpowder, and stores - -	- ditto.
	DOMINICA:	
26 October - 1857	50 rifles, pattern 1853; ammunition, and accoutrements.	A gift.
3 November 1859	Limbers, light 6-pounder gun, ammunition, 50 rifles, pattern 1853, and accoutrements.	- ditto.
12 January - 1860	50 rifles, pattern 1853 - - - - - -	On loan.

STATEMENT of Stores issued to various Colonial Governments—*continued.* Appendix, No. 8.

	WEST INDIES—*continued.*	
	GRENADA:	
22 August - 1859	Brass guns, ammunition, and stores - - - -	To be paid for.
	ST. KITTS:	
27 October - 1858	Arms, ammunition, and accoutrements - - -	A gift.
12 May - 1859		
22 August - „	Ditto - - - - ditto - - - - -	ditto.
30 September „	Ditto - - - - for police - - - -	To be paid for.
	TURK'S ISLAND:	
19 November 1855	140 rifles, pattern 1853, with accoutrements and ammunition.	A gift.
	VIRGIN ISLANDS:	
22 August - 1859	Arms, accoutrements, and ammunition - - -	A gift.
	WEST COAST OF AFRICA:	
	SIERRA LEONE:	
26 January - 1858	800 rifled muskets, pattern 1842, and ammunition -	A gift.
	GAMBIA:	
August - 1860	100 old pattern cavalry swords - - - -	A gift.
	100 sword-belts, &c. - - - - -	To be paid for.
21 February - „	Armaments of colonial steamer - - - -	ditto.

J. Craufurd Caffin,
Director of Stores.

Appendix, No. 9.

RETURN of the AUGMENTATIONS and DIMINUTIONS in the STAFF of the

STATION.	Year ended 31 March 1857.		Year ended 31 March 1858.	
	Increase.	Decrease.	Increase.	Decrease.
North America:				
Canada	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Inspector general. 1 staff surgeon, 1st class.	1 Inspector general. 2 staff surgeons, 1st class. 1 staff surgeon, 2d class. 5 staff assistant surgeons.	1 Deputy inspector general.
Nova Scotia	-	-	-	1 Staff assistant surgeon.
Australia:				
New South Wales	-	-	1 Dispenser	-
Tasmania and Western Australia	-	-	1 Staff assistant surgeon.	-
New Zealand	-	-	-	-
Cape of Good Hope	1 Inspector general. 1 Dispenser.	1 Deputy inspector general. 1 Staff assistant surgeon.	1 Deputy inspector general. 1 Staff assistant surgeon. 1 Apothecary.	1 Staff surgeon, 1st class. 1 Dispenser.
West Indies:				
Jamaica, Bahamas, and Honduras	-	-	1 Staff surgeon, 1st class. 1 Dispenser of medicines.	—
Windward and Leeward Islands	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Inspector general. 1 Staff surgeon, 1st class.	1 Dispenser	1 Staff surgeon, 2d class. 2 Staff assistant surgeons.
Eastern Colonies:				
Ceylon	1 Inspector general.	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Dispenser	-
Mauritius	-	-	1 Dispenser	-
Hong Kong	-	1 Staff assistant surgeon.	1 Dispenser	-
West Coast of Africa	-	1 Surgeon	-	-
Mediterranean:				
Gibraltar	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Inspector general.	1 Staff assistant surgeon. 1 Dispenser of medicines.	—
Malta	1 Inspector general. 1 Deputy inspector general. 2 Staff surgeons, 1st class. 6 staff surgeons, 2d class. 6 Staff assistant surgeons. 1 Dispenser.	-	-	1 Deputy inspector general. 2 staff surgeons, 1st class. 6 staff surgeons, 2d class. 9 Staff assistant surgeons. 1 Dispenser.
Ionian Islands	-	-	-	1 Staff surgeon, 2d class.

Appendix, No. 9.

ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT in the COLONIES, in each of the last Five Years.

Year ended 31 March 1859.		Year ended 31 March 1860.		Year ended 31 March 1861.	
Increase.	Decrease.	Increase.	Decrease.	Increase.	Decrease.
- - -	1 Staff surgeon, 2d class. 4 Staff assistant surgeons.	1 Staff assistant surgeon.	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Inspector general.
—					
- - -	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Staff surgeon, 1st class.	—	
- - -	- - -	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.	—	
- - -	- - -	- - -	1 Staff surgeon, 2d class.	—	
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.
—					
- - -	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Inspector general.	—	
- - -	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Staff surgeon, 1st class.	—	
2 Staff surgeons, 2d class. 2 Staff assistant surgeons.	- - -	1 Deputy inspector general.	1 Staff surgeon, 1st class. 1 Staff surgeon, 2d class.	—	
1 Staff surgeon, 2d class. 1 Staff assistant surgeon.	- - -	2 Staff assistant surgeons.	—		
—					
- - -	- - -	1 Staff surgeon, 2d class. 1 Staff assistant surgeon.	—		

Appendix, No. 10.

RETURN of the COMMISSARIAT STAFF provided in the ESTIMATES for the Years from 1856-57 to 1860-61, for Duty in the COLONIES.

COLONIES.	1856-57. Number of Officers.	1857-58. Number of Officers.	1858-59. Number of Officers.	1859-60. Number of Officers.	1860-61. Number of Officers.	REMARKS.
North America:						
Canada	8	12	13	13	11	
Nova Scotia	7	7	9	9	8	
Newfoundland	2	2	2	2	2	
Australia:						
New South Wales and Victoria	6	6	6	5	5	
Tasmania	5	8	8	9	6	Since reduced to four, one, and six respectively.
South Australia	2	2	2	2	2	
Western Australia	7	7	11	11	9	
New Zealand	5	7	7	8	7	*Note.*—This is exclusive of the number temporarily employed during the war.
Cape of Good Hope	22	31	31	37	34	
Bermuda	7	8	8	8	7	
Bahamas	2	2	2	2	2	
St. Helena	2	2	2	2	2	
West Indies	13	15	15	16	14	
Jamaica	4	6	6	7	6	
Honduras	2	2	2	2	2	
Eastern Colonies:						
Mauritius	4	4		5	5	
Hong Kong	5	5	6	6	7	*Note.*—This is exclusive of the number temporarily employed in China during the war.
West Coast of Africa:						
Sierra Leone	4	4	4	4	4	
Gambia	2	2	2	2	2	
Gold Coast	2	2	2	2	2	
Mediterranean:						
Gibraltar	5	5	7	7	7	
Malta	8	8	8	8	8	
Ionian Islands	5	5	7	7	7	
TOTALS	129	152	165	174	159	

Memorandum.—The difference between the Commissariat Staff for 1857-58 and 1856-57 is attributable to the Colonies having been drained in the latter year to meet the exigencies of the Crimean war, the numbers employed in 1857-58 being nearly the same as before the war.

The increase in 1858-59 is caused by the employment of an additional number of Commissariat clerks, who were appointed during the war, in the place of temporary clerks.

In 1859-60 the Royal Warrant of October 1858 was in operation, and it became necessary to replace upon full pay and employ several officers who had been placed temporarily upon half-pay on reduction upon the termination of the war, these officers taking the place of temporary employés.

The numbers taken for 1860-61 represent what will probably be required for the future (except in Australia, *see* Remarks), the Commissariat Staff in the Colonies having been reduced as low as practicable, to provide for the wants at home.

W. H. Maturin, Dep. for C. G. in Chief.

Appendix, No. 11.

PAPERS delivered in by Mr. *William Henry Sharpe Whiffen*, 6 June 1861.

Colonial Contributions, as per Parliamentary Accounts.

		New South Wales. £. s. d.	Victoria. £. s. d.
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot	Mar. qr. 1853	- - -	3,326 18 4
Repayment by New South Wales in aid of Expenditure, 40th Foot		1,244 13 6	
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot	30 June 1853	- - -	1,667 6 1
Ditto	30 Sept. 1853	- - -	2,526 12 7
Ditto	31 Dec. 1853	- - -	2,620 5 5
		£.	6,814 4 1
Ditto	31 Mar. 1854	- - -	2,491 7 -
Ditto	30 June 1854	- - -	2,443 14 6
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer to Commissariat Chest, on account, 40th Foot		1,111 19 5	
Ditto	ditto	198 13 4	
Ditto	ditto	1,158 15 4	
Ditto	ditto	1,355 12 11	
Credited in P. List, 12th Foot, to	31 Dec. 1854	- - -	2,777 19 9
Ditto	Mar. qr. 1856	- - -	3,475 8 8
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot	Sept. qr. 1854	- - -	4,299 2 4
Ditto	Dec. qr. 1854	- - -	4,050 18 11
	£.	3,825 1 -	19,538 11 2
		£. 23,363 12 2	
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer to Commissariat Chest, on account, 40th Foot		936 12 6	
Ditto	ditto	1,689 11 10	
Ditto	ditto	1,274 14 6	
	£.	3,900 18 10	
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer to Commissariat Chest, on account, 40th Foot		1,178 - -	
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer to Commissariat Chest, on account, 11th Foot		1,257 9 9	
Ditto	ditto	1,336 2 4	
Ditto	ditto	1,225 4 -	
Ditto	ditto	1,319 1 7	
Credited in P. List, 12th Foot	30 June 1855	- - -	3,203 16 5
Ditto	30 Sept. 1855	- - -	3,479 18 2
Ditto	31 Dec. 1855	- - -	1,949 6 9
Ditto	31 Mar. 1856	- - -	9 2 6
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot	31 Mar. 1855	- - -	3,618 - 7
Ditto	30 June 1855	- - -	3,817 14 3
Ditto	30 Sept. 1855	- - -	3,560 - 7
Ditto	31 Dec. 1855	- - -	5,545 11 3
Ditto	31 Mar. 1856	- - -	6,449 - 9
	£.	6,315 17 8	31,632 11 3
		£. 37,948 8 11	

	New South Wales. £. s. d.	Victoria. £. s. d.
(Exchequer.)		
Parliamentary Account, 1853-54, gives	- - -	3,776 18 4
Less transferred in 1855-56	- - -	450 - -
	£.	3,326 18 4
Per Parliamentary Account, 1854-55, p. 8 (Exchequer.)	1,244 13 6	
Per Parliamentary Account, 1854-55, p. 8 (Exchequer.)	- - -	6,814 4 1
Parliamentary Account, 1853-54, p. 4, (appropriations in aid), Australian Colonies	- - -	Australian Colonies. £. s. d. 25,219 14 10
Less applicable to Tasmania	- - -	1,856 2 8
	£.	23,363 12 2
Parliamentary Account, 1855-56, p. 12 (Exchequer.)	4,628 18 10	
Less transferred in 1856-57	1,178 - -	
See Parliamentary Account, p. 9	3,450 18 10	
Add debit on account, Victoria	450 - -	
See above, 1853-54 £.	3,900 18 10	Victoria. £. s. d. 3,618 - 7
Parliamentary Account, 1855-56, p. 12 (Exchequer Credit.) Neutralized in Parliamentary Account, 1856-57, p. 9.	- - -	
Parliamentary Account, 1855-56, p. 6 (appropriations in aid), Australian Colonies	- - -	Australian Colonies. £. s. d. 37,948 8 11
		Victoria. £. s. d. 3,618 - 7
Parliamentary Account, 1856-57, p. 9 (Exchequer Debit.) To neutralize an erroneous credit. *See* Parliamentary Account, 1855-56, p. 12.	- - -	
Parliamentary Account, 1856-57, p. 9 (Exchequer Debit.) To neutralize an erroneous credit. *See* Parliamentary Account, 1855-56, p. 12.	1,178 -	

Colonial Contributions, as per Parliamentary Accounts—*continued.*

		New South Wales.	Victoria.
		£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot	30 June 1856	- - -	6,267 3 4
Ditto	30 Sept. 1856	- - -	6,202 2 9
Ditto	31 Dec. 1856	- - -	7,063 13 10
Ditto	31 Mar. 1857	- - -	6,642 9 1
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer to Commissariat Chest, 11th Foot		1,225 15 7	
Ditto	ditto	1,193 19 10	
Ditto	ditto	1,267 - 3	
Ditto	ditto	1,319 7 6	Headed in Parliamentary account as "Old Stores."
	£.	5,006 3 2	26,175 9 -
		£. 31,181. 12. 2.	

		New South Wales.	Victoria.
		£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot	30 June 1857	- - -	2,566 4 -
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer to Commissariat Chest, on account of the 40th Foot, to Dec. 1857		- - -	14,328 5 10
Repayment by ditto of an advance to Captain Ross, Royal Engineers, on his return to England		- - -	120 15 -
		£.	17,015 4 10
Less,—Amount over-credited to the Exchequer and to the Colony, in the sum of 6,642 *l.* 9 *s.* 1 *d.*, part of 26,175 *l.* 9 *s.* per Parliamentary Account 1857–58		- - -	4,104 9 1
		£.	12,910 15 9
Credited in P. List, 11th Foot, 1 to 23 Oct. 1857		339 11 5	
Ditto 77th Foot, 24 Oct. to 31 Dec. 1857		996 15 1	
Ditto	ditto 31 Mar. 1858	1,233 12 3*	
Repayment by Colonial Treasurer of expenditure incurred by the Commissariat Chest, to 31 Mar. 1857, for Provisions, Coals, Forage, &c., for Royal Artillery		401 9 7	
Repayment by ditto of amount advanced by Commissariat Chest, to 31 Mar. 1857, on account of 11th Foot		1,314 11 5	
Ditto	ditto	326 11 7	
Ditto	ditto	117 15 7	
Ditto	ditto for Postage and Stationery, 31 Dec. 1857	61 6 6	
	£.	4,791 13 5	12,910 15 9
		£. 17,702. 9. 2.	

		New South Wales.	Victoria.
		£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Credited in P. List, 40th Foot	30 Sep. 1857	- - -	2,495 17 4
Ditto	ditto	- - -	2,069 13 6
		£.	4,565 10 10
Less,—Repaid to the Colonial Treasurer by Paymaster, 40th Foot		- - -	2,494 2 6
		£.	2,071 8 4
Repaid by Colonial Treasurer, Apr. 1858		- - -	80 7 3
		£.	2,151 15 7
Credited in P. List, 11th Foot	30 June 1857	448 17 6	
Ditto	ditto	463 16 9	
Ditto	ditto	465 6 -	
Ditto	30 Sep. 1857	452 12 -	
Ditto	ditto	450 10 8	
Ditto	ditto	463 6 -	
	£.	2,744 8 11	- nil.

	New South Wales.	Victoria.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
4,104 *l.* 9 *s.* 1 *d.* over-credited in this account, *see* 1858–59, but remitted by the Colony in 14,328 *l.* 5 *s.* 10 *d.*, *see* 1858–59.		
Parliamentary Account, 1857–58, p. 8	3,686 15 8	26,175 9 -
Add,—Amount credited to Old Stores, instead of the Colony, in Parliamentary Account	1,319 7 6	
£.	5,006 3 2	26,175 9 -
	£. 31,181. 12. 2.	

*253 *l.* 4 *s.* 3 *d.* was also advanced by the Colony of New South Wales for Imperial pay of two Companies, 77th Foot, 1 to 19 April, when they embarked for India; this amount was erroneously credited to Vote for Provisions.

	New South Wales.	Victoria.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Parliamentary Account, 1858–59 (Exchequer.)	15,210 6 -	2,566 4 -
Amount erroneously returned as applicable to New South Wales instead of Victoria	10,344 11 9	10,344 11 9
£.	4,865 14 3	12,910 15 9
Amount erroneously returned as applicable to New South Wales instead of Ceylon	74 - 10	—
£.	4,791 13 5	12,910 15 9
	£. 17,702. 9. 2.	

	New South Wales.	Victoria.
	£. s. d.	
Parliamentary Account, 1859–60 (Exchequer.)	2,151 15 7	- nil.

Returned as New South Wales instead of Victoria.

This will be returned in Parliamentary Account, 1860–61, as an Exchequer Credit.

NEW SOUTH WALES.

Amounts Voted for Military Purposes.				Amounts received from the Colonial Treasurer on account of Military Expenditure.	
	£. s. d.		£. s. d.		£. s. d.
1853:					
Imperial Pay, 2 Companies, 40th Foot (additional):					
	s. d.				
1 Major	16 –	per diem.	– 16 –		
2 Captains	11 7	„	1 3 2		
2 Lieutenants	6 6	„	– 13 –		
2 Ensigns	3 3	„	– 10 6		
1 Assistant Surgeon	7 6	„	– 7 6		
Daily Pay Officers			3 10 2		
	s. d.				
2 Colour Serjeants	2 4	per diem.	– 4 8		
6 Serjeants	1 10	„	– 11 –		
8 Corporals	1 4	„	– 10 8		
3 Drummers	1 1½	„	– 3 5		
178 Privates	1 –	„	8 18 –		
Additional and good conduct pay			– 11 6		
Daily Pay Officers and Men		£.	14 9 5	Per annum. 5,281 17 1	1853 5,145 12 4
Colonial Allowances for the above Officers 5 *s.*, and Men 3½ *d.* *per diem*				1,794 11 8	
Colonial Allowances to Officers serving in the Colony, at 5 *s.*				2,781 10 –	
Ditto Non-commissioned Officers and Men, 430 at 3½ *d.*				2,288 17 1	
Ditto Barrack Serjeants, &c.				82 2 6	
Lodging Allowance:	£. s. d.				
General Staff	600 – –				
Commissariat	400 – –				
Medical	200 – –				
				1,200 – –	
		£.		13,428 18 4	
1854:					
Imperial Pay, 2 Companies, 40th Foot				5,507 17 –	1854 4,904 17 10
Colonial and Military Allowances, ditto				2,308 1 11	
Contingencies				790 4 10	
Colonial Military Allowances for General Service				6,424 4 8	
Lodging Allowance to Staff				2,400 – –	
		£.		17,430 8 5	
1855:					
Imperial Pay, 2 Companies				5,215 17 –	1855 5,235 19 10
Colonial Allowances to the whole Force				12,788 4 5	
Contingencies				3,220 4 6	
		£.		21,224 5 11	
					1856 5,004 3 2
1857:					
Amounts Voted for Military purposes:					
Two Companies, Line				10,103 – 6	1857 5,395 6 10
General Service				9,008 11 3	
Royal Artillery				7,871 14 2	
		£.		26,983 5 11	
Military, Supplementary				2,253 12 4	
		£.		29,236 18 3	
1858:					
Military Establishment and Services				10,432 16 4	1858 (Mar. qr.) 1,233 12 3
Royal Artillery				8,224 17 –	
		£.		18,657 13 4	

NEW SOUTH WALES—*continued.*

Amounts Voted for Military Purposes.	£. s. d.	Amounts received from the Colonial Treasurer on account of Military Expenditure.
1859:		
Military Allowance	8,179 – –	
Royal Artillery	7,398 – –	
£.	15,577 – –	
Military (supplementary)	1,289 13 10	
£.	16,866 13 10	
1860:		
Military Allowance	8,818 6 –	
Royal Artillery	7,308 – –	
£.	16,126 6 –	

RECAPITULATION.

Voted by Colony for Military Purposes.	£. s. d.	Paid over to Imperial Government for Military Expenditure.	£. s. d.
1853	13,428 18 4	1853	5,145 12 4
1854	17,430 8 5	1854	4,904 17 10
1855	21,224 5 11	1855	5,235 19 10
Supposed 1856	21,224 5 11	1856	5,004 3 2
1857	29,236 18 3	1857	5,395 6 10
1858	18,657 13 4	1858 (1st quarter)	1,233 12 3
1859	16,866 13 10	1859	nil.
1860	16,126 6 –	1860	nil.
£.	154,195 10 –	£.	26,919 12 3

VICTORIA.

Amounts Voted for Military Purposes.	£. s. d.	Amounts received from the Colonial Treasurer on account of Military Expenditure.	£. s. d.
1853:			
Imperial Pay	12,952 18 9		
Colonial Allowances	12,084 10 10		
Contingencies, including Provisions, Fuel and Light, Forage, Bedding, Clothing, &c.	19,000 – –		
Contingent Allowances to Non-commissioned Officers and Men	600 – –		
Hospital and Incidentals	1,500 – –		
Additional Pay to 3 Regimental and 1 Commissariat Officer, at 7*s.* 6*d.* per day	547 10 –		
Extra Pay and Allowances to the Non-commisioned Officers and Men of 1 Company	1,400 – –		
Colonial Barrack Masters	1,766 10 –		
£.	49,851 9 7		
Additional Vote, 1853:			
Colonial Allowances, &c.	15,600 – –		
Passage of Head Quarters from Van Diemen's Land, 99th Foot	5,000 – –		
Pay and Allowances, ditto	20,000 – –		
£.	90,451 9 7	1853	10,141 2 3
1854:			
Imperial and Colonial Pay and Allowances, &c., Line	55,522 2 11		
Engineers and Sappers	14,133 18 5		
Guard and Commissariat	2,832 12 11		
£.	71,988 14 3	1854	15,763 2 6

VICTORIA—*continued.*

Amounts Voted for Military Purposes.				Amounts received from the Colonial Treasurer on account of Military Expenditure.		
1855:	£. s. d.					
Colonial Pay, Head Quarter Staff	3,913 10 5					
Staff and Regimental Contingencies	3,870 – –					
Imperial and Colonial Pay (Line)	63,345 13 5					
£.	71,129 3 10					
Royal Engineers:						
1st Captain (3 months) Imperial, 30 *s.*, Colonial, 12 *s.* 6 *d.* per diem	191 5 –					
Sappers and Miners:						
1 Clerk of Works, Imperial, £. 372 15 – Colonial, *s.* 12 *d.* 6	600 17 6					
1 Corporal „ – 2 3½ „ 2 3½	83 12 10					
1 Ditto „ – 1 11¾ „ 1 11¾	72 4 8					
1 Private „ – 1 2½ „ 1 2½	44 2 –					
Allowance to Paymaster for Agency	2 10 –					
Allowance to Non-commissioned Officers and Men for Clothing, at 2 *d.* per diem each	9 2 6					
Provisions, Fuel, Light, &c.	217 – –					
£.	72,349 18 4			1855		27,163 4 10
1856:						
Military Expenditure, per Balance Sheet	74,943 13 4			1856		25,532 – 8
1857:						
Head Quarter Staff	4,167 3 4					
Imperial Pay	£. *s.* *d.*					
	10,495 12 6					
	16,510 12 1					
	27,006 4 7					
Colonial	10,897 2 6					
	17,177 6 3					
	28,074 8 9					
Field and Marching Allowance, Officers and Men	500 – –					
Lodging Allowance to Officers	2,000 – –					
Provisions	14,000 – –					
Hospital Clothing, Forage, Bedding, Washing, Medicines, Funerals, &c.	2,810 – –					
Fuel and Light	3,200 – –					
Stores and Stationery	224 – –					
Transport of Troops	7,424 – –					
Allowances to Deputy and Deputy Assistant Commissary General	700 – –					
£.	90,105 16 8			1857		23,829 19 9
1858:						
(Colonial Allowances.)						
Head Quarter Staff:	£. *s.* *d.*					
Major General Commanding	700 – –					
Deputy Adjutant General	350 – –					
Major of Brigade	250 – –					
Assistant Military Secretary	250 – –					
Aide-de-Camp	250 – –					
Principal Medical Officer	250 – –					
Staff Surgeon	250 – –					
Deputy Commissary General	250 – –					
Purveyor	150 – –					
Medical Storekeeper	150 – –					
Clerk	150 – –					
	3,000 – –					

VICTORIA—*continued.*

Amounts Voted for Military Purposes.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	Amounts received from the Colonial Treasurer on account of Military Expenditure.
1858—*continued.*			
(Colonial Allowances.)			
Her Majesty's Troops:			
Lieutenant Colonel	150 – –		
Command Money	100 – –		
2 Majors, at 150 *l.*	300 – –		
1 Adjutant	150 – –		
Quartermaster	150 – –		
Surgeon	150 – –		
2 Assistant Surgeons, at 150 *l.*	300 – –		
Paymaster	150 – –		
8 Captains, at 150 *l.*	1,200 – –		
16 Subalterns, at 150 *l.*	2,400 – –		
5 Senior Staff Serjeants, at 45 *l.* 12 *s.* 6 *d.*	228 2 6		
8 Staff Serjeants at 36 *l.* 10 *s.* 0 *d.*	292 – –		
40 Serjeants at 33 *l.* 9 *s.* 2 *d.*	1,338 6 8		
40 Corporals at 24 *l.* 6 *s.* 8 *d.*	973 6 8		
781 Drummers and (1 *s.* 1 *d.*) Privates at 19 *l.* 15 *s.* 5 *d.*	15,441 – 5		
		23,322 16 3	
Barrack Master	200 – –		
„ Serjeant	45 12 6		
„ Labourer	18 5 –		
„ Serjeant at Geelong	146 – –		
		409 17 6	
Contingencies:			
Lodging Allowance to Officers	2,000 – –		
Bedding, Hospital Clothing, Stores and Incidentals, &c.	6,000 – –		
		8,000 – –	
	£.	34,732 13 9	
Additional Colonial Allowance of 2½ *d.* per diem to the above Non-commissioned Officers and Men		3,343 – 5	
	£.	38,075 14 2	To be paid over, &c. &c. as 1859 and 1860: *see* below.
1859:			
(Colonial Allowance.)			To be paid over by four quarterly instalments to the Officer commanding Her Majesty's Troops, to be distributed by him as to Her Majesty shall seem fit.
Head Quarter Staff		7,947 9 –	
Her Majesty's Troops (4 Companies)		14,016 – –	
Contingencies		4,934 – –	
	£.	26,897 9 –	
1860:			
Colonial Allowances, as above	£.	26,897 9 –	Ditto ditto.

RECAPITULATION.

Voted by Colony for Military Purposes.	£. s. d.	Paid over to Imperial Government for Military Expenditure.	£. s. d.
1853	90,451 9 7	1853	10,141 2 3
1854	71,988 14 3	1854	15,763 2 6
1855	72,849 18 4	1855	27,163 4 10
1856	74,943 13 4	1856	25,532 – 8
1857	90,105 16 8	1857	23,829 19 9
1858	38,075 14 2	1858	– nil.
1859	26,897 9 –	1859	– nil.
1860	26,897 9 –	1860	– nil.
£.	491,710 4 4	£.	102,429 10 –

STATEMENT showing the RATES of COLONIAL ALLOWANCES paid to Officers of the MILITARY and CIVIL DEPARTMENTS per Month by the under-mentioned Colonies.

	Relative Rank.	MAURITIUS. Including all Allowances.	CEYLON. Including all Allowances.	VICTORIA. In addition to Provisions, Forage, Fuel and Light.		NEW SOUTH WALES. In addition to Provisions, Forage, Fuel and Light.	INDIA. Inclusive of all Allowances.
STAFF:		£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	Lodging. £. s. d.	£. s. d.	
Major General Comthanding		80 – –	100 – –	58 6 8	62 10 –		
Assistant Military Secretary	Captain	26 4 8	28 10 –	20 16 8	18 13 7	10 10 –	
Aide-de-Camp	Captain	26 4 8	28 10 –	20 16 8	18 13 7	10 10 –	
Deputy Quartermaster General	Lieut. Colonel	39 17 10	60 – –	29 3 4	28 19 4	10 10 –	
Deputy Commissary General	Lieut. Colonel	36 17 10		29 3 4	28 19 4		
Assistant Commissary General	Captain	23 4 8	None at this station.	12 10 –	18 13 7	10 10 –	Varies according to circumstances.
Deputy Assistant Commissary General.	Lieutenant	18 11 7				8 10 –	
Commissariat and other Clerks	Ensigns	18 11 7				8 10 –	
Staff Surgeons, 1st Class	Major	32 12 10	30 – –	20 16 8	23 5 1		
Staff Surgeons, 2d Class	Captain	23 4 8	19 – –				
Clerks of Works	Ensigns	18 16 7	none.				
Ordnance Storekeeper	Major	23 17 10	30 – –				
Barrackmaster	Major	23 17 10	none	16 13 4	18 13 7		
		Inclusive of lodging money, as these officers are not provided with public quarters – –					
		In quarters – –					
REGIMENTAL:				£. s. d.			£. s. d.
Colonel Commanding		30 8 3	45 – –	20 16 –			101 3 1, together with off-reckonings.
Lieutenant Colonel Commanding		23 17 10	40 – –	20 16 8			83 10 4, with 40 *l.* 16 *s.* 8 *d.* per month if in Command.
Major		20 17 10	30 – –	12 10 –		10 10 –	61 18 5
Captain		13 4 8	19 – –	12 10 –		8 10 –	29 19 6 with 3 *l.* 13 *s.* per month if commanding a Company.
Lieutenant		8 11 7	12 10 –	12 10 –		7 10 –	19 19 8
Ensign		8 11 7	10 – –	12 10 –		7 10 –	15 13 –
Paymaster		13 4 8	22 – –	12 10 –		8 10 –	Varies according to length of service and other circumstances.
Adjutant		13 16 7	15 10 –	12 10 –		7 10 –	
Quartermaster		13 16 7	15 10 –	12 10 –		7 10 –	
Surgeon		16 4 8	30 – –	12 10 –		8 10 –	
Assistant Surgeon		8 11 7	12 10 –	12 10 –		7 10 –	
		Exclusive of lodging money, these officers being provided with public quarters –					

Agreeable to Regulations of – – – 1857 – – – 1859 – – – 1858 – – – 1858.

Appendix, No. 12.

PAPER delivered in by Rear Admiral *Erskine*, and referred to in his Evidence of 27 May 1861.

Appendix, No. 12.

THE estimate of the cost per head of troops has been arrived at by dividing the "gross total" of the expenditure for each Colony (according to a Return for March 1858) by the number of men in each; the items include:—

1. Pay and allowances, provisions, clothing, arms, &c.
2. Stores.
3. Proportion of recruiting expenses.
4. Barracks and fortifications.
5. Proportion of non-effective services.
6. Proportion of departmental expenses at home.
7. Transport and freight.
8. Colonial expenditure for military purposes in addition.

The cost of seamen is calculated as under, per head, per annum:—

	£.
1. Wages	35
2. Provisions, including freight	21
3. Wear and tear of ship and engines	20
This amounts to about 10 per cent. per annum on the ship's value, the dockyards calculating them at 8 or 9 per cent.	
4. Stores, including masts, &c.	6
5. Ordnance	2
6. Coals	5
7. Departmental expenses at home and abroad	1
8. Proportion of non-effective service	12
9. Miscellaneous	4
	£. 106

1 June 1861.

John Erskine.

Appendix, No. 13.

PAPERS delivered in by *T. F. Elliott*, Esq.

CLASSIFIED STATEMENT of MILITARY EXPENDITURE in the COLONIES, 1858.

NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES.

	Canada.	Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.	Newfoundland.	Total North American Provinces.	
Total Strength	3,118	2,196	209	5,523	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Pay and Allowances	93,144	56,571	7,213	156,928	
Military, Civil and Medical Staff	35,922	18,039	2,102	56,063	
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	29,060	14,677	3,003	46,740	
Stores	4,935	10,754	1,260	16,949	
Total Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	163,061	100,041	13,578	276,680	276,680
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following Heads:					
Recruiting	2,760	1,944	184	4,888	
Pensions, &c.	32,193	22,681	2,157	57,031	
Civil and Military Departments at Home	2,650	1,867	178	4,695	
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	37,603	26,492	2,519	66,614	66,614
Transport — Within the Colonies	5,833	3,773	257	9,863	
Transport — To and from the Colonies	19,281	4,336	298	23,915	33,778
Barracks	5,360	10,661	1,430	17,451	17,451
Fortifications	2,427	2,111	108	4,646	4,646
TOTAL (Imperial Funds) £.	233,565	147,414	18,190	399,169	399,169
TOTAL (Colonial Funds) £.	35,176	92	Nil	35,268	35,268
TOTAL £.	268,741	147,506	18,190	434,437	434,437

AUSTRALIA.

	New South Wales.	Victoria.	South Australia.	Tasmania.	Western Australia.	Total Australia.	
Total Strength	379	841	119	279	183	1,801	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	
Pay and Allowances	8,434	21,746	3,111	11,751	5,614	50,656	
Military, Civil, and Medical Staff	1,852	3,925	735	9,410	7,317	23,239	
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	4,531	10,299	2,751	9,753	8,596	35,930	
Stores	506			232	120	858	
Total Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	15,323	35,970	6,597	31,146	21,647	110,683	110,683
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following heads:—							
Recruiting	336	760	104	240	152	1,592	
Pensions, &c.	3,913	8,683	1,229	2,881	1,889	18,595	
Civil and Military Departments at Home	322	715	101	237	156	1,531	
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	4,571	10,158	1,434	3,358	2,197	21,718	21,718
Transport — Within the Colonies	227	177		356	61	821	
Transport — To and from the Colonies	1,911	3,619	23	1,668	392	7,613	8,434
Barracks	Nil	Nil	Nil	2,114	264	2,378	2,378
Fortifications	Nil	Nil	Nil	139	Nil	139	139
TOTAL (Imperial Funds) £.	22,032	49,924	8,054	38,781	24,561	143,352	143,352
TOTAL (Colonial Funds) £.	29,887	40,400	5,172	Nil	Nil	75,459	75,459
TOTAL £.	51,919	90,324	13,226	38,781	24,561	218,811	218,811

NEW ZEALAND.

Total Strength	1,897		
Pay and Allowances		£. 39,522	£.
Military, Civil and Medical Staff		10,195	
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.		34,989	
Stores		161	
TOTAL Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony			84,867
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army, under the following Heads:			
Recruiting		£. 1,248	
Pensions, &c.		14,424	
Civil and Military Departments at Home		1,187	
TOTAL of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army			16,859
Transport — Within the Colonies		£. 1,219	
Transport — To and from the Colonies		8,281	
			9,500
Barracks		93	93
Fortifications		20	20
TOTAL		£.	111,339

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

Total Strength	6,351		
Pay and Allowances		£. 201,112	£.
Military, Civil and Medical Staff		49,983	
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.		126,448	
Stores		4,698	
TOTAL Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony			382,241
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army, under the following Heads:			
Recruiting		£. 4,704	
Pensions, &c.		55,773	
Civil and Military Departments at Home		4,503	
TOTAL of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army			64,980
Transport — Within the Colonies		£. 21,527	
Transport — To and from the Colonies		61,003	
			82,530*
Barracks		8,412	8,412
Fortifications		209	209
TOTAL (Imperial Funds)		£.	538,372
TOTAL (Colonial Funds)		£.	40,467
TOTAL		£.	578,839

* *N.B.*—This is exclusive of 887 officers and men, and 83 of their families, conveyed to the Cape in the Himalaya; the cost at 12 *l.* a head, would be about 11,640 *l.*

ISLANDS IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH ATLANTIC.

	Bermuda.	Bahamas.	St. Helena.	Falklands.	Total Islands in the North and South Atlantic.
Total Strength	1,201	449	522	37	2,209
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Pay and Allowances	33,753	12,863	16,116	1,163	63,895
Military, Civil and Medical Staff	9,607	3,584	3,699	- - -	16,890
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	18,234	8,017	6,378	102	32,731
Stores	1,197	1,111	651	- - -	2,959
Total direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	62,791	25,575	26,844	1,265	116,475
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following Heads:					
Recruiting	1,064	392	464	32	1,952
Pensions, &c.	12,400	4,635	5,390	381	22,806
Civil and Military Departments at Home	1,021	382	444	31	1,878
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	14,485	5,409	6,298	444	26,636
Transport — Within the Colonies	549	117	499	- - -	1,165
Transport — To and from the Colonies	1,402	1,450	1,163	- - -	4,015
Barracks	1,217	1,575	1,310	- - -	4,102
Fortifications	106	67	137	- - -	310
TOTAL (Imperial Funds) £.	80,550	34,193	36,251	1,709	152,703
TOTAL (Colonial Funds) £.	- Nil -	96	453	- Nil -	549
TOTAL £.	80,550	34,289	36,704	1,709	153,252

WEST INDIES.

	Jamaica.	Honduras.	Windward and Leeward Islands.	Total West Indies.
Total Strength	1,568	413	2,591	4,572
	£.	£.	£.	£.
Pay and Allowances	48,179	12,456	79,212	139,847
Military, Civil, and Medical Staff	13,512	2,720	24,364	40,596
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	21,073	6,522	42,047	69,642
Stores	3,571	540	5,646	9,757
Total Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	86,335	22,238	151,269	259,842
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following Heads:				
Recruiting	1,392	360	2,304	4,056
Pensions, &c.	16,189	4,264	26,752	47,205
Civil and Military Departments at Home	1,333	351	2,202	3,886
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	18,914	4,975	31,258	55,147
Transport — Within the Colonies	2,274	1,269	1,435	4,978
Transport — To and from the Colonies	4,417	861	7,203	12,481
Barracks	5,562	857	10,746	17,165
Fortifications	- - -	31	24	55
TOTAL (Imperial Funds £.	117,502	30,231	201,935	349,668
TOTAL (Colonial Funds) £.	182	- Nil -	32,481	32,663
TOTAL £.	117,684	30,231	234,416	382,331

EASTERN COLONIES.

	Ceylon.	Mauritius.	Hong Kong.	Labuan.	Total Eastern Colonies (exclusive of Hong Kong).
Total Strength	2,470	959	- - -	140 (Sepoys)	3,569*
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Pay and Allowances	67,650	28,499	—	—	—
Military, Civil and Medical Staff	7,747	7,641	—	—	—
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	10,365	4,374	—	—	—
Stores	1,425	3,336	—	—	—
Total Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	87,187	43,850	- - -	6,897	137,934
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following Heads:					
Recruiting	2,232	848	- - -	- - -	3,080
Pensions, &c.	25,503	9,902	- - -	- - -	35,405
Civil and Military Departments at Home	2,100	815	- - -	- - -	2,915
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	29,835	11,565	- - -	- - -	41,400
Transport — Within the Colonies	19	2,632	- - -	- - -	2,651
Transport — To and from the Colonies	11,730	11,440	- - -	- - -	23,170
Barracks	736	6,422	- - -	- - -	7,158
Fortifications	- - -	9,211	- - -	- - -	9,211
Total (Imperial Funds) £.	129,507	85,120	- - -	6,897	221,524
TOTAL (Colonial Funds) £.	85,851	22,634	- Nil -	- Nil -	108,485
TOTAL £.	215,358	107,754	- - -	6,897	330,009

* Including 140 Sepoys paid from Imperial Funds.

WESTERN COAST OF AFRICA.

	Sierra Leone.	Gambia.	Gold Coast.	Total Western Coast of Africa.
Total Strength	372	360	298	1,030
	£.	£.	£.	£.
Pay and Allowances	11,215	10,595	6,444	28,254
Military, Civil and Medical Staff	4,693	4,325	2,194	11,212
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	4,482	3,792	2,335	10,609
Stores	- - -	1,513	923	2,436
Total Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	20,390	20,225	11,896	52,511
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following Heads:				
Recruiting	320	312	264	896
Pensions, &c.	3,841	3,717	3,078	10,636
Civil and Military Departments at Home	316	306	253	875
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	4,477	4,335	3,595	12,407
Transport — Within the Colonies	83	216	262	561
Transport — To and from the Colonies	657	667	544	1,868
Barracks	1,078	1,803	452	3,333
Fortifications	- - -	- - -	14	14
TOTAL (Imperial Funds) £.	26,685	27,246	16,763	70,694
TOTAL (Colonial Funds) £.	385	161	330	876
TOTAL £.	27,070	27,407	17,093	71,570

MEDITERRANEAN.

	Gibraltar.	Malta.	Ionian Islands.	Total Mediterranean.
Total Strength	4,952	5,275	3,159	13,386
	£.	£.	£.	£.
Pay and Allowances	139,232	137,419	99,470	376,121
Military, Civil and Medical Staff	23,218	26,791	16,544	66,553
Provisions, Clothing, Arms, &c.	52,434	52,843	22,712	127,989
Stores	19,195	22,445	8,283	49,923
Total Direct Expenditure on the Pay and Supplies of the Troops present in the Colony £.	234,079	239,498	147,009	620,586
Proportion of General Expenditure of the Army under the following Heads:				
Recruiting	4,488	4,776	2,832	12,096
Pensions, &c.	51,129	54,464	32,616	138,209
Civil and Military Departments at Home	4,209	4,484	2,686	11,379
Total of Indirect Expenditure computed by a proportionate rate to that of the Army £.	59,826	63,724	38,134	161,684
Transport — Within the Colonies	3,523	3,688	2,236	9,447
Transport — To and from the Colonies	13,752	12,708	4,193	30,653
Barracks	5,862	6,445	5,368	17,675
Fortifications	4,972	15,457	4,969	25,398
TOTAL (Imperial Funds) £.	322,014	341,520	201,909	865,443
TOTAL (Colonial Funds) £.	Nil	6,200	25,000	31,200
TOTAL £.	322,014	347,720	226,909	896,643

SUMMARY.

	Total Force.	Imperial Military Expenditure.	Colonial Military Expenditure.	TOTAL.
		£.	£.	£.
North America	5,523	399,169	35,268	434,437
Australia	1,801	143,352	75,459	218,811
New Zealand	1,397	111,339	Nil	111,339
Cape of Good Hope	6,351	538,372	40,467	578,839
Islands in North and South Atlantic	2,209	152,703	549	153,252
West Indies	4,572	349,668	32,663	382,331
Eastern Colonies (exclusive of Hong Kong)	3,569	221,524	108,485	330,009
West Coast of Africa	1,080	70,694	876	71,570
Mediterranean	13,386	865,443	31,200	896,643
TOTAL	39,838	2,852,264	324,967	3,177,231

N.B.—Of the total of Imperial Expenditure, 467,445 *l.* consists of the items distinguished in this Return by the name of "Indirect Charges." The amount of remaining Imperial Charges is 2,384,819 *l.*, making up the total Imperial Expenditure of 2,852,264 *l.*

Appendix, No. 14.

Appendix, No. 14.

STATEMENT showing the Number and Description of LOCAL FORCES in the COLONIES; and also the TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE from COLONIAL FUNDS, for the Year 1858.

	Description of Force.	Numbers.	Expenditure on British Troops.	Expenditure on Local Forces.	Forts and Barracks.	TOTAL.
North America:			£.	£.	£.	£.
Canada	Militia	* 5,584	nil	35,176	nil	35,176
Nova Scotia	ditto	Not embodied.	nil	92	nil	92
New Brunswick	ditto	ditto	nil	nil	nil	nil.
Newfoundland	ditto	ditto	nil	nil	nil	nil.
Australia:						
New South Wales		nil	23,493	nil	6,894	29,887
Victoria	Volunteers	375	35,323	3,727	1,350	40,400
Tasmania		nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
South Australia		nil	2,760	137	2,275	5,172
New Zealand		nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
Cape of Good Hope	Mounted and armed Police.	433	nil	40,467	nil	40,467
Natal	Volunteers	156	nil	nil	nil	nil.
TOTALS		6,548	61,576	79,599	10,019	151,194

* These are the numbers in Canada that were embodied in this year; in the other provinces none are known to have been embodied; but in Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward's Island, every male below the age of 60 (with a few exceptions) is enrolled as a militiaman, although without being embodied or trained.

App. No.

STATEMENT showing the Number and Description of LOCAL FORCES in the COLONIES; and also the TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE from COLONIAL FUNDS, for the Year 1858.

	Description of Force.	Numbers.	Expenditure on British Troops.	Expenditure on Local Forces.	Forts and Barracks.	TOTAL.
			£.	£.	£.	£.
Bermuda	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
Bahamas	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
St. Helena	Militia	322	nil	453	nil	453
Falklands	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
WEST INDIES:						
Jamaica	nil	nil	nil	*182	nil	182
Turks Island	Militia and Volunteers.	240	nil	11	85	96
Honduras	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
Windward and Leeward Islands.	Militia and Volunteers.	-	nil	409	2,812	3,221
British Guiana	Militia and Volunteers.	530	808	2,221	26,231	29,260
EASTERN COLONIES:						
Ceylon	nil	nil	75,032	nil	10,819	85,851
Mauritius	nil	nil	12,634	nil	10,000	22,634
Labuan	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
WEST COAST OF AFRICA:						
Sierra Leone	Militia	nil	nil	385	nil	385
Gambia	ditto	380	nil	161	nil	161
Gold Coast	ditto	17	nil	330	nil	330
West Australia	Volunteers	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
	TOTALS	1,489	88,474	4,152	49,947	142,573

* For custody of arms and stores.

Appendix, No. 15.

PAPER delivered in by *Thomas Frederick Elliot*, Esq.

ESTIMATES of the EXPENSE of a LOCAL REGIMENT in *New South Wales*, referred to in a Minute by Sir *William Denison*, without date, printed at page 7 of a recent Parliamentary Paper, No. 171, of 17 April 1861.

ESTIMATE for the PAY, &c. of the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Drummers, and Privates, for a Regiment consisting of Eight Companies, for One Year.

Numbers.	RANKS, &c.	Rate per Diem.		Daily Rate.		Annual Rate.		Forage.	Command Money.	Non-Effective Allowance.	Contingent to Companies.	Clothing.	Deduct		Difference in Cost of Rations to Public, above that Paid by each Individual.	Lodging Allowance.
		Imperial.	Colonial.	Imperial.	Colonial.	Imperial.	Colonial.						Rations.	Income Duty.		
		£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
1	Lieutenant Colonel	– 17 –	– 11 3	– 17 –	– 11 3	310 5 –	205 6 3	127 15 –	54 15 –	20 – –	– – –	– – –	2 5 7½	6 17 7	6 16 10½	– – –
1	Major	– 16 –	– 7 –	– 16 –	– 7 –	292 – –	127 15 –	63 17 6	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 5 7½	6 1 8	6 16 10½	– – –
8	Captains	– 11 7	– 5 8	4 12 8	2 5 4	1,691 3 4	827 6 8	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	18 5 –	35 4 7	54 15 –	– – –
8	Lieutenants	– 6 6	– 5 –	2 12 –	2 – –	949 – –	730 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	18 5 –	29 15 5	54 15 –	– – –
8	Ensigns	– 5 3	– 5 –	2 2 –	2 – –	766 10 –	730 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	18 5 –	15 19 4	54 15 –	– – –
	Allowance to Officer Instructor	– 2 6	– 2 6	– – –	– – –	45 12 6	– – –	63 17 6	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– 19 –	– – –	– – –
1	Paymaster	– 12 6	– 5 8	– 12 6	– 5 8	228 2 6	103 8 4	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 5 7½	4 15 –	6 16 10½	– – –
1	Adjutant	– 10 –	– 5 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	182 10 –	91 5 –	63 17 6	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 5 7½	3 16 –	6 16 10½	– – –
1	Quartermaster	– 6 6	– 5 –	– 6 6	– 5 –	118 12 6	91 5 –	63 17 6	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 5 7½	2 9 5	6 16 10½	– – –
1	Surgeon	1 2 –	– 8 –	1 2 –	– 8 –	401 10 –	146 – –	63 17 6	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 5 7½	8 7 3	6 16 10½	– – –
1	Assistant Surgeon	– 10 –	– 7 –	– 10 –	– 7 –	182 10 –	127 15 –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 5 7½	3 16 –	6 16 10½	– – –
1	Sergeant Major	– 3 2	– 2 6	– 3 2	– 2 6	57 15 10	45 12 6	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– – –	3 16 –	– 1 –
1	Quartermaster Sergeant	– 2 8	– 2 6	– 2 8	– 2 6	48 13 4	45 12 6	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– – –	3 16 –	– 1 –
1	Schoolmaster	– 4 –	– 2 6	– 4 –	– 2 6	73 – –	45 12 6	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– – –	3 16 –	– 1 –
1	Paymaster Sergeant	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2 6	– 2 6	45 12 6	45 12 6	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– – –	3 16 –	– 1 –
1	Orderly-room Clerk	– 2 6	– 1 –	– 2 6	– 1 –	45 12 6	18 5 –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– – –	3 16 –	– 1 –
1	Hospital Sergeant	– 2 8	– 1 –	– 2 8	– 1 –	48 13 4	18 5 –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– – –	3 16 –	– 1 –
1	Armourer Sergeant	– 2 –	– 1 –	– 2 –	– 1 –	36 10 –	18 5 –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– – –	3 16 –	– 1 –
1	Sergeant Instructor	– 2 2	– 2 6	– 2 2	– 2 6	39 10 10	45 12 6	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– – –	3 16 –	– 1 –
1	Drum Major	– 2 –	– 1 –	– 2 –	– 1 –	36 10 –	18 5 –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– – –	3 16 –	– 1 –
8	Colour Sergeants	– 2 6	– 1 –	1 – –	– 8 –	365 – –	146 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	2 14 –	5 6 5½	– – –	3 16 –	– 1 –
24	Sergeants	– 2 –	– 1 –	2 8 –	1 4 –	876 – –	438 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	21 12 –	42 11 8	– – –	30 8 4	– – –
32	Corporals	– 1 4	– 1 –	2 2 8	1 12 –	778 13 4	584 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	64 16 –	127 15 –	– – –	92 5 –	– – –
16	Drummers	– 1 1	– – 6	– 17 4	– 8 –	316 6 8	146 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	60 6 –	170 6 8	– – –	121 13 4	– – –
608	Privates	– 1 –	– – 6	30 8 –	15 4 –	11,096 – –	5,548 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	38 8 –	85 3 4	– – –	60 16 8	– – –
	Good Conduct Pay	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	392 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	1,155 4 –	3,236 6 8	– – –	2,311 13 4	– – –
	Rewards for good Shooting	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	126 4 7	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –
	Provost Sergeant	– 1 –	– – –	– 1 –	– – –	18 5 –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –
	Allowance to Schoolmistress	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	18 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –
	Allowance to Assistant ditto	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	4 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –
	Officiating Clergyman	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	91 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –
	Allowance for apprehension of Deserters	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	10 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	1 17 11	– – –	– – –
	Excess of Provost Expenditure	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	1.0 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –
	Allowance for Stationery, Orderly-room	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	32 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –
	Ditto – – – ditto – Paymaster	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	16 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –
	Contingent Allowance to 8 Companies	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	292 – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –
73	Women, ½	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –
50	Children, ½ } 95 Daily Rations	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	866 17 6	– – –
150	Children, ¼	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –
	Lodging Allowance	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	1,400 – –
	TOTAL £.	– – –	– – –	52 3 10	28 6 9	19,899 3 9	10,363 3 9	447 2 6	54 15 –	20 – –	292 – –	1,356 12 –	3,780 15 10	119 19 2	3,730 1 8	1,400 – –

Appendix, N

RECAPITULATION.

	Pay and Allowances.	
	Imperial.	Colonial.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Annual pay, &c. - - - - - -	19,899 3 9	10,343 3 9
Forage allowances - - - - - -	447 2 6	
Command money - - - - - -	54 15 –	
Non-effective allowance - - - - -	20 – –	
Contingent to companies - - - - -	292 – –	
Clothing - - - - - - - - -	1,356 12 –	
Rations - - - - - - - - -	3,780 15 10	
Rations in excess paid for - - - - -	3,730 1 8	
Lodging allowance - - - - - -	1,400 – –	
Total - - - £.	30,980 10 9	10,343 3 9
Deduct rations paid for by officers and men -	3,780 15 10	
	27,199 14 11	10,343 3 9
£.	– – 37,542 18 8	
Fuel - - - - - - £. 1,003 18 –		
Light - - - - - - 264 18 8	– – 1,268 16 8	
Total - - - £.	38,811 15 4	

Number.	RANK, &c.	PEACE. Rate, per Day.	WAR. Rate, per Day.	PEACE. Amount, per Annum.	WAR. Amount, per Annum.	Clothing.	Rations.	Forage Allowance.	Fuel and Light.
		£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
1	Lieutenant Colonel -	1 10 –	1 10 –	547 10 –	547 10 –	– – –	720 Rations, exclusive of women and children, at 1 s. per diem, £. 13,140.	127 15 –	–
1	Major - - -	1 – –	1 – –	365 – –	365 – –	– – –		63 17 6	–
8	Captains - - -	– 15 –	– 15 –	2,190 – –	2,190 – –	– – –		–	–
8	Lieutenants - -	– 10 –	– 10 –	1,460 – –	1,460 – –	– – –		–	–
8	Ensigns - - -	– 7 6	– 7 6	1,095 – –	1,095 – –	– – –		–	–
	Allowance to Adjutant - - -	– 5 –	– 5 –	91 5 –	91 5 –	– – –		63 17 6	–
1	Paymaster - -	– 15 –	– 15 –	273 15 –	273 15 –	– – –		–	–
1	Quartermaster - -	– 10 –	– 10 –	182 10 –	182 10 –	– – –		63 17 6	–
1	Surgeon - - -	– 15 –	– 15 –	273 15 –	273 15 –	– – –		63 17 6	–
1	Sergeant Major - -	– 5 –	– 6 6	91 5 –	118 12 6	3 – –		–	–
1	Quartermaster Sergeant - - -	– 3 6	– 5 –	63 17 6	91 5 –	3 – –		–	–
8	Colour Sergeants -	– 3 6	– 5 –	511 – –	730 – –	24 – –		–	–
24	Sergeants - - -	– 3 –	– 4 6	1,314 – –	1,971 – –	72 – –		–	–
32	Corporals - - -	– 2 6	– 3 6	1,470 – –	2,044 – –	88 – –		–	–
16	Drummers - - -	– 1 6	– 3 –	438 – –	976 – –	44 – –		–	–
608	Privates - - -	– 1 –	– 3 –	11,096 – –	22,192 – –	1,520 – –		–	–
	Good conduct pay, and prizes and allowances, stationery, and contingencies -	– –	– –	500 – –	500 – –	–	–	–	–
	Pensions, &c. - -	– –	– –	– – –	500 – –	–	–	–	–
	Barracks, or lodging allowances for officers - - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	For men - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	TOTAL - - £.	– –	– –	21,462 17 6	35,601 12 6	1,754 – –	13,140 – –	383 5 –	1,268 16 8

	PEACE.		WAR.
	£. s. d.		£. s. d.
Annual pay -	21,462 17 6		35,601 12 6
Clothing - -	1,754 – –		3,508 – –
Rations - -	– – –		13,140 – –
Forage - -	383 – –		–
Fuel and light -	– – –		1,268 16 8
£.	23,599 17 6		53,518 9 2

To this must be added the interest of money expended in providing barrack accommodation and lodging money for officers. This is included in the estimate for the regiment—at least a sum of 1,400 *l.* is taken for lodging allowance. In the estimate the officers' pay is put at lower rate than they are now receiving; it would, probably, have to be increased to the extent of 2,000 *l.* per annum.

Appendix, No. 1(

PAPER delivered in by *T. F. Elliot*, Esq.

EXTRACT of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to the Earl of *Elgin* and *Kincardine*, dated 14th March 1851, containing Instructions on the future Military Arrangements in Canada: and, Copies of further Despatches from the Secretary of State for the Colonial Department, on the same subject, in the Years 1854, 1855, and 1856. Appendix, No. 16.

"CANADA (in common with the other British provinces in North America) now possesses in the most ample and complete manner in which it is possible that she should enjoy it, the advantage of self-government in all that relates to her internal affairs. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that this advantage ought to carry with it corresponding responsibilities, and that the time is now come when the people of Canada must be called upon to take upon themselves a larger share than they have hitherto done, of expenses which are incurred on this account, and for their advantage. Of these expenses by far the heaviest charge which falls upon this country is that incurred for the military protection of the Province. Regarding Canada as a most important and valuable part of the empire, and believing the maintenance of the connexion between the mother country and the Colony to be of the highest advantage to both, it is far from being the view of Her Majesty's Government that the general military power of the empire is not to be used in the protection of this part of Her Majesty's dominions. But, looking to the rapid progress which Canada is now making in wealth and population, and to the prosperity which she at this moment enjoys, it is the conviction of Her Majesty's Government, that it is only due to the people of this country that they should now be relieved from a large proportion of the charge which has hitherto been imposed upon them for the protection of a Colony now well able to do much towards protecting itself.

In adopting this principle, I need hardly observe to you that Her Majesty's Government would merely be reverting to the former colonial policy of this country. You are well aware that up to the period of the war of the American Revolution, the then British Colonies which now form the United States, as well as the West Indian Colonies, were required to take upon themselves the principal share of the burthen of their own protection, and even to contribute to the military operations undertaken to extend the Colonial possessions of the British Crown. The North American Colonies defended themselves almost entirely from the fierce Indian tribes by which these infant communities were frequently imperilled, and furnished no inconsiderable proportion of the force by which the contest of British power with that of France was maintained on the continent of America; and the West Indian Colonies did not, in proportion to their means, make less exertions.

Her Majesty's Government would have thought it right at an earlier period to revert to this former policy of the empire, and to extend to Canada measures of the same description with those which have already been adopted as respects the Australian Colonies, had it not been that till lately there were circumstances connected with the commercial and general condition of Canada which seemed to render the time unfavourable for effecting so important a change. The difficulties under which commerce and industry laboured were of a very aggravated description, and produced their usual consequences of political excitement and discontent; nor ought it to be concealed that much of the prevailing distress was attributable to the changes which had taken place in British legislation. The combined effect of the stimulus given by the Act of 1843 to the investment of capital in preparations for supplying this country with flour from Canada, and of the subsequent general repeal of all restrictions on the importation of corn and flour into the United Kingdom, had undoubtedly been to cause very heavy losses in Canada, and till these had been recovered, it would have been inexpedient to add to the burthens of the Province.

But the season of commercial depression in Canada has now passed away: the repeal of the Navigation Laws, and the opening of the St. Lawrence Canals, which the Province has been enabled to construct by a loan raised on highly favourable terms on the credit of the British Treasury, has given a great impulse to its trade, and the remarkable increase of the Customs revenue which you have lately reported to me, affords a clear and striking proof of the return of prosperity. Under these circumstances, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that no more favourable opportunity could be found for placing the fiscal relations of the mother country and the Colony on a permanent and equitable footing. They are the more induced to adopt this view of the subject, because they are prepared to recommend to Parliament that assistance of the same kind with that which has proved so eminently useful to Canada in the construction of the St. Lawrence Canals, should be extended to her

Appendix, No. 16.

in respect of another public work, calculated to be hardly less beneficial to her than these canals. In another Despatch I will explain to your Lordship the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the means by which it is hoped that the construction of the Quebec and Halifax Railway may be accomplished. I only advert to this subject at present for the purpose of observing that, while the credit of this country is exerted to enable Canada to extend her public works and to develop her resources, I feel confident that the Parliament of Canada will readily co-operate with Her Majesty's Government in adopting measures for diminishing the charge on the British Treasury for the defence of the Province.

Having thus explained to your Lordship the principles of the policy which Her Majesty's Government propose to adopt, I will now proceed to state more particularly the measures by which it is contemplated that this policy should be carried into effect. In the first place, it is intended that, in future, with the exception of a certain number of enrolled pensioners, for whose location in the Province arrangements are in progress, the troops maintained in Canada should be confined to the garrisons of two or three fortified posts of importance, probably only Quebec and Kingston. The terms of amity upon which this country now is with the United States, and the fortunate termination of all the questions in dispute between the two nations, removes, as I trust, all risk of any attack upon Canada from the only power from which there could be any danger; and it appears to Her Majesty's Government, that if the provincial militia is maintained upon a proper footing, so long as peace continues, enough would be done to provide for the security of the Province, by maintaining garrisons of regular troops in the two important posts I have mentioned. In the unfortunate, and, I trust, improbable, contingency of a war with the United States, it is obvious that both the Colony and the mother country would be called upon to submit to great sacrifices, and to make great exertions for their defence, but I have no doubt that these would be cheerfully made by both, if the exigency should unhappily arise.

Upon the reduction of the British force in Canada to the garrisons of these fortified positions, it would become necessary that the warlike stores which are kept in the Colony should be reduced, and that the barracks and other buildings which are no longer required should be disposed of; but if the Parliament of Canada should be willing to undertake to keep up these barracks and buildings, in case of their being hereafter required, there would be no objection on the part of Her Majesty's Government to make them over to the provincial authorities; and if the maintenance of a British force at any of the posts now occupied should be desired for the preservation of internal security, such a force would be readily supplied by Her Majesty's Government, if the actual cost thus incurred were provided for by the Province.

Another charge, which Her Majesty's Government would also expect that the Province should take upon itself as part of the above arrangement, is that of maintaining the canals now in charge of the Ordnance Department. You are aware that these canals were executed at the sole expense of this country, and at a very heavy cost, chiefly with a view to the military defence of the Province. Her Majesty's Government conceive that the charge of maintaining them ought now to be undertaken by the Province, and I trust that no difficulty will arise on that head. With regard to the Indian Department, as by the arrangement lately made, the extinction of the charge (except so far as regards some payments for their lives to individuals) is provided for within five years, no further steps are required to be taken.

In conclusion I have now only to assure you, that while Her Majesty's Government consider that justice to the people of this country requires that Canada, which is now so well able to support whatever establishments are necessary for her own defence and for her own advantage, should cease to occasion so heavy a charge as formerly to the British Treasury, and that it is a fitting opportunity for introducing the change when, in consequence of proceedings which have taken place in the Province, it becomes expedient to call upon Parliament to provide for the salary of the Governor General, it must not for a moment be supposed that these measures are contemplated under any idea that the connexion between the mother country and the Colony could be dissolved without great injury to both, or that there is any probability that it will be so. On the contrary, these measures are regarded as safe, because Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that the great body of the people of Canada are so fully satisfied of the great benefits they enjoy from the system of constitutional Government, now happily established in the Province under the authority of the British Crown, that it may properly be left to themselves to take their share of the burthen of maintaining and defending an order of things from which they reap so much advantage. Under this impression, and in the earnest hope and confident belief that Canada may long continue to form an important member of the British Empire, Her Majesty's Government have adopted the conclusions which I have now explained to you."

Appendix, No. 16.

Copy of DESPATCH from His Grace the Duke of *Newcastle* to Lieutenant General *Rowan*, commanding the Troops.

Sir, Downing-street, April 1854.

IN my Despatch, dated 11th instant, announcing to you the proposed withdrawal of three regiments of infantry and three companies of Royal Artillery from Canada, I promised to communicate with you by the present mail respecting the re-distribution of the troops under your command, rendered necessary by this measure.

I now proceed to instruct you that the single regiment of infantry, which will be increased to 850 rank and file, and the two companies of Royal Artillery, which (exclusive of the Canadian Rifles, will comprise the whole force remaining in Canada after these reductions shall have been carried into effect, will have to be quartered in Quebec.

The Canadian Rifles you will station at Kingston, and two companies of that corps should be detached for service at Montreal.

This distribution of the forces under your command involves the abandonment of the several outposts which have been heretofore maintained within the Province, and you will lose no time in making the necessary preparations for this purpose.

A discretion will, however, rest with you to leave small parties at such of the outposts, Niagara for instance, as you may perhaps think right to maintain until the new arrangement be completed, and detach non-commissioned officers and soldiers in charge of Government buildings and barracks, until these shall be given up to the Colonial Government, or otherwise disposed of.

You are aware that the 16th regiment, at present in Jamaica, is to proceed to Quebec to replace the 26th regiment, which has been ordered to Bermuda.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Newcastle.*

Copy of DESPATCH from the Right Honourable Sir *G. Grey* to Governor Sir *Edmund Head.*

Sir Downing-street, August 1854.

HER Majesty's Government have long had under their consideration the necessity of establishing a clear understanding with the Government of Canada on the subject of the measures mutually to be taken for the military defence of the Province, and the subsidiary arrangements requisite to that end.

2. Although Canada is happily remote from the direct influence of those hostilities in which this country is at present engaged, it becomes now even more necessary than before, that the available military resources of the empire in general, and the purposes to which they are applicable, should be fully ascertained.

3. Relying on the loyalty and patriotism of the inhabitants of Canada, no less than on their rapid advance in all that constitutes the strength of a community, Her Majesty's Government have not scrupled to reduce the military force stationed in the Colony in time of peace much below the amount which in former times had been thought advisable; and the result of the measures thus taken has hitherto fully justified their experience. The course of events of recent years has more and more fully developed the attachment of the Canadian people to the institutions under which they live; the gratifying proofs which have been so lately acknowledged by me, of the deep interest which they take in the success of the arms of Great Britain and her allies in the present contest, have been strongly felt by all classes throughout these kingdoms; and it is with a feeling of deep satisfaction that we are enabled to congratulate ourselves on the union thus cemented between communities so far severed by local position, but joined by the ties of common freedom, and of loyal attachment to one Sovereign.

4. Her Majesty's Government propose to make no change in the principle of the relations now subsisting between this country and the Province as regards its military defence. The Imperial Government will remain charged, as before, with the supply and maintenance of military force, for the defence of Canada, as of every other part of Her Majesty's dominions, in the event of its being menaced by foreign arms. They propose also to continue to maintain the force now existing in Canada, or whatever force may be strictly required for the military occupation of the new posts of first-class importance, so as to form a nucleus for the defence of the Province.

5. For all beyond this, they propose to rely on the loyalty and military spirit of the Province itself. They are fully aware that if the contingency, now happily remote, should ever occur, of an invasion of Canada by foreign arms, the most valuable aid to the reinforcements of troops which could be supplied from this country would be afforded by the courage and numbers of an organized militia, such as her great population might now enable her to supply. And they are equally persuaded that if the tranquillity of the community should be menaced from within, the necessary force for the maintenance of order, both civil and military, if the latter should be required, will be best provided for by the Province herself.

Appendix, No. 16.

6. With respect to the lands now held by the British Government for military purposes, much correspondence has at different times taken place between this department and the Colonial Government; and I was in hopes to have received before this time a report from the Province, which Lord Elgin was requested to furnish, classifying these lands in such a manner as might enable Her Majesty's Government to arrive at some positive decision as to their ultimate disposal. Although this report has not yet been received, I have within the last few days been placed in possession of a printed "Report of the Commissioners appointed to investigate and report upon the best means of reorganizing the Militia of Canada," which goes far towards supplying the deficiency. Having consulted the home authorities in more immediate charge of these lands, I believe that the information in the possession of Her Majesty's Government is already nearly sufficient to settle the details of the plan, when an agreement has been established as to its outlines.

7. These Ordnance lands are by no means all of them Crown reserves; but, as I find noticed in the documents before me, many of them have been purchased at considerable cost to the Imperial treasury.

8. It is not, however, the intention of Her Majesty's Government to make any distinction between reserves and purchased lands; they wish to deal with the entire property solely with a view to the permanent interests of the Province.

9. With this view, it appears to them that the Ordnance lands at Quebec, Montreal, and Kingston should be retained, for purposes of defence, in the hands of the Imperial Government. There may, perhaps, be portions of these lands not required for present or future military use, in which case these may be the subject of future arrangement; but of this I cannot, with the information as yet before me, speak with certainty.

10. There is a second class of lands, not situated at these posts, and which will not be permanently occupied by Her Majesty's troops, but which, in the opinion of military judges, will be of importance for the defence of the Province, in case of invasion. On some of them considerable sums have been expended with this view. Lands of this class it is proposed to make over to the Canadian Government for occupation and present use, but with a stipulation that they shall be kept available for military purposes, together with any buildings really requisite for similar purposes, in case they should be required at any future time for the defence of Canada.

11. There, is lastly, a third class, comprising lands which it is not important to retain for military purposes. These it is proposed to make over at once and unconditionally to the Canadian Government.

12. Should your Government think proper to devote the funds which may arise from their sale or other use to internal defences, as proposed in the Report to which I have referred, Her Majesty's Government would regard such an appropriation of these funds with much satisfaction, but they do not wish to impose it as a condition on the transfer.

13. I have already said that Her Majesty's Government are now in possession of materials which may go a long way towards enabling them to effect this classification; but it would be more satisfactory if they had your assistance in such a manner as you may yourself, with the advice of your Executive Council, suggest towards the settlement of the details.

14. Whenever final instructions on this subject are conveyed, pending questions touching the disposal of military stores may also be arranged.

15. It is necessary to add, that any surrender of these lands by Her Majesty's Government must of course be subject to existing engagements respecting them, such as those entered into, in some few instances, with pensioners for their location.

I have, &c.
(signed) *G. Grey.*

Copy of DESPATCH from the Right Honourable *H. Labouchere*, M.P., to Governor Sir *Edmund Head.*

Sir, Downing-street, 2 May 1856.

You are aware that the Treaty of Peace provides for the prompt evacuation by Her Majesty's forces of the foreign territories at present held by them, and that among other arrangements for the distribution of the army on its return from active service, orders have been given that five regiments shall be selected to be stationed in British North America, of which three are allotted to Canada.

2. Such an amount of force is not of a character to afford much room for misconception as to the purpose of Her Majesty's Government; but still I think it better to address to you a few remarks in explanation of that purpose.

3 Earl Grey's Despatch to Lord Elgin of the 14th March 1851 laid down the principles which were then adopted by Her Majesty's Government in regard to their colonial policy, considered in a military point of view; and in reserving to the mother country

country the duty of maintaining garrisons for fortresses of chief importance, such as Quebec, invited the co-operation of the Province for the auxiliary measures of defence. The vigour with which at this moment a militia force is being organized, justifies our continuing to place, as we do place, the fullest reliance on this policy.

4. It is not of course to be expected that the force of the garrisons alluded to should be at all times of an unvarying strength. It may vary occasionally from military or political reasons. During the war just ended, when the chief military strength of the empire had to be concentrated for the operations in the East, regiments stationed in Canada were withdrawn; and, as my predecessor, Sir George Grey, explained in a Despatch dated 11th August 1854, increased responsibility was thrown upon the Province.

That emergency has now happily passed away; but although the regular soldiers in Canada may be more or fewer at any particular time, the policy of Her Majesty's Government continues the same, and they desire to place their main dependence on the well-proved loyalty and courage of Her Majesty's Canadian subjects to repel any hostile aggression, should the occasion ever unfortunately occur, although in that event Her Majesty's Government would not fail to give to the Province the full support of the whole power of the British Empire.

5. You will take care that no misapprehension on this subject shall exist in Canada which might produce any relaxation of the honourable exertions which the Province is now making to establish a suitable military organization. I have had the greatest satisfaction in submitting to Her Majesty the accounts which you have transmitted to me of the spirit and energy with which all classes of Her Canadian subjects have come forward to carry into effect the provisions of the new Militia Act, and I trust that the result will be that this local force will speedily be placed on a footing of permanent efficiency.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Labouchere.*

Appendix, No. 17.

PAPERS delivered in by *T. F. Elliot*, Esq.

Appendix, No. 17. DESPATCHES from the Right Honourable Earl *Grey*, Secretary of State, to the Governor of New South Wales, on future Military Arrangements.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to Governor Sir *C. A. FitzRoy*.

Sir, Downing-street, 24 November 1846.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that in consequence of the information recently received from New Zealand, Her Majesty's servants have determined that an increase of the military force now in the Colony should be effected with the least possible delay. With that view, I have to instruct you to make immediate arrangements, in concert with the officer commanding the troops in New South Wales, for sending the whole of the disposable force now serving there to Wellington, with the utmost practicable despatch. It will, I calculate, be in your power, without danger, to send at least 900 men for this service, still retaining a small force at Sydney, which, under the present circumstances of New South Wales, is all that I consider indispensable. New South Wales may be regarded as being perfectly safe, for the present at least, from any attack from a foreign enemy; there are no native tribes capable of engaging in serious hostilities with the colonists; and the convict establishment is now reduced so low, while so great an increase has taken place in the numbers of the free population, that there is no longer the necessity which some years ago existed for maintaining a considerable military force to guard against the risk of an attempt to rise on the part of the convicts. Under these circumstances there is no part of Her Majesty's dominions in which there is less occasion for a large body of troops. Accordingly, I find that, with the exception of those at Sydney, the troops now serving in New South Wales are broken up into small detachments, and obviously performing duties more analogous to those of a police corps than of a part of Her Majesty's regular army. But these are duties which the heavy demands upon the services of the British army do not admit that it should be called upon any longer to undertake. Her Majesty's confidential servants will consider it their duty to take care that the naval and military forces shall afford efficient protection from the attacks of any foreign enemy to so important a part of Her dominions as New South Wales; but for the maintenance of internal order and tranquillity it is only reasonable that the colonists should themselves be called upon to provide, by the formation of an adequate force of police; or, if necessary, of militia. You will bring this subject under the immediate consideration of the Legislative Council; and under no circumstances will you consider yourself authorized to delay sending to New Zealand the force I have already named.

I do not propose that for the present there should be any alteration in the amount of force in Van Diemen's Land, including Norfolk Island, or in Southern or Western Australia; nor is the arrangement for sending the 96th regiment to India to be disturbed.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Grey*.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to Governor Sir *C. A. FitzRoy*.

Sir, Downing-street, 19 October 1847.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch, No. 100, of the 30th April last, with its enclosures, reporting the steps proposed to be taken by the Lieutenant General commanding Her Majesty's troops in the Australian settlements, in obedience to my instructions to yourself of the 24th November last, for increasing the force in New Zealand, and by the reduction of that in New South Wales, and also pointing out the difficulty which exists in organizing an efficient police corps for the last-named Colony.

Although the force which you propose to retain in New South Wales is somewhat larger in amount than I have directed you to keep there, it is not my intention to withhold my approval from this arrangement as one of a temporary nature. Viewed in this light, I see no sufficient reason for objecting to the arrangement, because the force which it provided for New Zealand will be raised nearly to the amount that was intended, while the restoration of tranquillity in that Colony has greatly diminished the want of troops which seemed to exist there when I addressed to you my despatch above referred to. At the time the arrangements which you now report were adopted, there was a further reason for departing in some degree from those which had been directed, in consequence of the

the demands which still continued on the services of the troops in New South Wales to keep the convicts in subjection. This demand will, however, now cease, as orders have been given for breaking up the convict establishment in that Colony. Hence, and taking also into consideration the fact that this Colony is peculiarly exempt from the danger of being attacked by a foreign enemy, I am of opinion that the amount to which I last year directed that the garrison of New South Wales should be reduced will ultimately be amply sufficient; and I cannot, accordingly, hold out to you the expectation that so considerable a force as that to which you refer will long continue to be kept there, merely for the purpose of supporting the police in the maintenance of order, this being a service for which the Colony must provide. You will do well, therefore, to bring under the consideration of the Legislative Council of your Government the propriety of taking early measures to increase the police, so as to be prepared for the further reduction in the number of regular troops maintained in the Colony, which will probably be effected at a very early period. In taking any measures for this purpose, you will suggest to the Legislative Council that it deserves to be considered whether the difficulty which is described to exist in obtaining the services of an adequate number of effective policemen might not be met by causing men to be engaged for this purpose in England. I have no doubt that men well fitted for the duty might easily be engaged here under a stipulation to serve for seven or ten years, for reasonable wages; and in order to secure their performance of the agreement, some bonus should be held out to them on the completion of their term of service, while, on the other hand, in the event of their either leaving the service voluntarily or being dismissed for misconduct before the expiration of the stipulated period, they should be made subject to a penalty equal to the probable cost of their conveyance to the Colony, for the recovery of which stringent and summary powers should be given to the Governor by the Act authorizing the measure.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Grey.*

Copy of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to Governor Sir C. *A. Fitz Roy.*

Sir, Downing-street, 4 March 1848.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch, No. 166, of the 20th August last, with the copy therein enclosed of a report from the Commanding Royal Engineer in New South Wales, relating to the defences of Port Jackson.

I cannot coincide in the opinion which you inform me exists in New South Wales, that the circumstance that Halifax and Quebec have been fortified at the cost of this country, affords a precedent for an application being made to Parliament for a vote for the protection of Sydney. The situation of those places, by which they are so much more exposed to attack than any of the Australian cities, affords a sufficient reason for the expense incurred for their defence. You will inform the Legislative Council that, while the right of the Australian Colonies to look for their fair share of that protection which it is the object of Her Majesty's naval and military forces to extend to all parts of the British Empire is fully recognised by Her Majesty's servants, they are of opinion that these Colonies have now made so much progress in wealth and population, that their inhabitants may reasonably be expected to bear also a part of the heavy charges which, with a view to that protection, are imposed upon their fellow-subjects residing in the United Kingdom; and that the smallest contribution towards these charges which ought now to be required from the colonists is that of providing any additional means of local defence which may be required. I can, therefore, hold out no expectation whatever to the Legislative Council of New South Wales, that Her Majesty's Government will be able to render any assistance towards the erection of the works which have been suggested at Sydney, unless they think proper to vote the requisite funds for their construction, and, on that condition, Her Majesty's Government will be happy to direct the Board of Ordnance to appoint officers to plan and execute the works.

With regard to the want of an artillery force in New South Wales, adverted to by the Commanding Royal Engineer, I have to observe that as a force of this description would only be required in the very improbable event of an attempted invasion, this danger might be met at a very moderate expense by forming in Sydney a volunteer artillery corps. If some of the principal gentlemen would exert themselves in forming such a corps, I should approve of your granting them commissions. It has been found in this country that without interfering materially with their ordinary avocations, the workmen employed in our dockyards can, by devoting to this object a few hours in the week, be trained so as to form a very effective force, both of artillery and of infantry. Similar corps might be formed at Sydney and Melbourne, composed of the labouring population of these towns, and officered by the inhabitants of higher station. The only expense for which the Legislative Council would be called upon to provide would be that of uniforms for the men, and pay during the hours of training. I send you herewith, in order to assist you in the consideration of the question whether a measure of the nature above adverted to might not be adopted with advantage, a copy of the regulations respecting the dockyard battalions.

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I cannot conclude this Despatch without expressing my confidence that the inhabitants of New South Wales have too much of the spirit which has always distinguished the British nation, to be slow in coming forward to answer this invitation to organize themselves for their own defence.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Grey.*

Extract of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to Sir *C. A. FitzRoy*; dated Downing-street, 1 June 1848.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch, No. 247, of the 18th December, with the copies therein enclosed, of a report, with its annexures, of a Select Committee of the Legislative Council of New South Wales, relative to the question as to the expediency of making some addition to the police force, in consequence of the reduction in the numbers of the troops stationed in that Colony.

My Despatch, No. 11, Military, of the 4th March last, will have apprised you of the views which Her Majesty's Government entertain on the subject of the military defence of the Colony under your government. I cannot, however, assent to the remarks which have been made by the committee, that Her Majesty's Government have afforded protection to New Zealand by depriving New South Wales of the amount of protection to which it is fairly entitled. The force which was withdrawn from New South Wales was sent to New Zealand only to meet a pressing emergency, and Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate the permanent maintenance of a large regular force in the latter any more than in the former colony.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to Governor Sir *C. A. FitzRoy.*

Sir, Downing-street, 21 November 1849.

IN my Despatch of the 24th of November 1846, No. 2, Military, I instructed you to make immediate arrangements in concert with the officer commanding the troops in New South Wales, for sending the whole of the disposable force now serving there to Wellington, with the utmost practicable despatch. I calculated that it would be in your power, without danger, to send at least 900 men for this service, still retaining a small force at Sydney, which, under the circumstances of New South Wales at that time, was all that I considered indispensable. I was of opinion that New South Wales might be regarded as being perfectly safe from any attack from a foreign enemy, there being no native tribes capable of engaging in serious hostilities with the colonists, and the convict establishment having been reduced so low, while so great an increase has taken place in the numbers of the free population, that there was no longer the necessity which some years ago existed for maintaining a considerable military force to guard against the risk of an attempt to rise on the part of the convicts; and that, under these circumstances, there was no part of Her Majesty's dominions in which there was less occasion for a large body of troops. I found that, with the exception of those at Sydney, the troops serving in New South Wales were broken up into small detachments, and were obviously performing duties more analogous to those of a police corps than of a part of Her Majesty's regular army. I considered that these were duties which the heavy demands upon the services of the British army did not admit that it should be called upon any longer to undertake. I informed you that Her Majesty's confidential servants would consider it their duty to take care that Her naval and military forces should afford efficient protection from the attack of any foreign enemy to so important a part of Her dominions as New South Wales, but that for the maintenance of internal order and tranquillity, it was only reasonable that the colonists should themselves be called upon to provide, by the formation of an adequate force of police, or, if necessary, of militia. I instructed you to bring this subject under the immediate consideration of the Legislative Council, and under no circumstances to consider yourself authorised to delay sending to New Zealand the force I had named.

In my Despatch of the 4th March 1848, No. 11, Military, I instructed you to inform the Legislative Council of New South Wales, that while the right of the Australian Colonies to look for their fair share of that protection which it is the object of Her Majesty's naval and military forces to extend to all parts of the British empire was fully recognised by Her Majesty's servants, they were of opinion that these Colonies have made so much progress in wealth and population, that their inhabitants might reasonably be expected to bear also a part of the heavy charges which, with a view to that protection, are imposed upon their fellow-subjects residing in the United Kingdom, and that the smallest contribution towards these charges, which ought now to be required from the colonists, was that of providing any additional means of local defence which might be required; and I suggested to you the propriety of inviting the principal gentlemen of the Colony to exert themselves in forming a volunteer artillery force.

In

In my Despatch of the 1st of June following, No. 16, Military, after noticing the Report of the Committee of the Legislative Council of New South Wales, on the question how far it might be expedient to make some addition to the police, in consequence of the withdrawal of a portion of the troops, I explained that the force so withdrawn was sent to New Zealand to meet a pressing emergency; and I stated that Her Majesty's Government did not contemplate the permanent maintenance of a large regular force in that Colony, any more than in New South Wales. Appendix, No. 17.

These communications will have fully prepared you for the reduction which Her Majesty's Government find it absolutely necessary to make of the military expenditure of the Australian Colonies, and I have accordingly to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government propose to transfer to the Colony of New South Wales the barracks and all military buildings and lands not immediately required for the preservation of stores, and that the charge of providing, maintaining, and repairing quarters for Her Majesty's troops in New South Wales, must in future be undertaken by the Colony, and that the force to be retained there, will be reduced to a guard in the capital of the Colony, and in the town of Melbourne, which will be the capital of the proposed province of Victoria. If a greater amount of force is required, the Local Legislature must either make provision for raising a more considerable body of police than is now maintained, or some other description of local force, or else provide for the pay and allowances of an additional number of Her Majesty's regular army, in which case there would no objection to allow additional regiments to serve there.

In adopting the policy which I am thus called upon to prescribe to you for your future guidance, Her Majesty's Government are swayed by the consideration that New South Wales already possesses representative institutions, and these will, it cannot be doubted, very speedily be extended to the other Australian Colonies, and that all the restrictions heretofore imposed on colonial trade by Imperial legislation have now been removed.

It is my duty to apprise you, that if the Colonial Legislature should not think proper to make adequate provision for the maintenance of the necessary barracks in a manner in which the health and comfort of the troops will be as well secured as at present, it will be incumbent on Her Majesty's Government to remove them altogether.

I have only further to acquaint you, that in giving to the Colony the barracks and other buildings which are to be transferred to it under the present instructions, it must be distinctly understood that Her Majesty's Government reserve to themselves the right of resuming possession, if at any future time it should in their judgment become necessary to do so; some nominal rent must therefore be reserved as a recognition of the title of the Crown to the property.

You will take an early opportunity of reporting to me the arrangements which you shall make in pursuance of the present instruction.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Grey.*

Copy of a DESPATCH from Earl *Grey* to Governor Sir *C. A. Fitz Roy.*

Sir, Downing-street, 21 June 1850.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch, Military, No. 227, of the 7th of November last, with the Minute therein enclosed, of the deliberations of the Executive Council of New South Wales, on the defenceless state of Port Jackson.

Having attentively considered that Minute, I am compelled to state, that so far from finding any reason for altering my previous view of the subject, I conceive that the facts which are set out in it are calculated to confirm that view. I have no doubt that prudence does prescribe the erection of works sufficient to protect the city of Sydney from a predatory attack: but the great value of the property it contains, and the wealth and prosperity evinced by the very large sums of money stated to be in the banks, afford proof no less of the ability of the Colony to meet the expense of providing such protection, than of the necessity of doing so.

On this subject I have to remind you, that many of the great commercial cities of this country are even now not less open than Sydney to predatory attacks, while some even of our arsenals and important military stations are as yet but very imperfectly protected; and it is altogether unreasonable to suppose that Parliament could be asked to vote money from the revenue of the United Kingdom for the defence of Sydney, while there is still a want of similar works at home, more especially as it must be borne in mind how much more lightly the inhabitants of New South Wales are taxed than those of Her Majesty's subjects who remain in this country.

Her Majesty's servants are prepared to take measures for affording to the inhabitants of the Colonies their fair share of protection as a portion of the British empire. Any attack made upon New South Wales, or any injury to any inhabitant of the Colony, would be resented in the same manner as an attack upon any other part of Her Majesty's dominions, or an injury to any other of Her Majesty's subjects. But while we admit this as the rule

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to be observed, we consider that Her Majesty's subjects inhabiting the Colonies must take their fair share with their fellow-subjects at home in bearing the common burthen of providing for the safety of the empire as a whole, and that the smallest contribution which they can be expected to make towards this object is that of undertaking the local expenses which are required.

It appears to have escaped the notice of yourself and of the Executive Council, that in the earlier days of British colonization the colonists were left to depend in a far greater degree than at present on their exertions. The inhabitants of what are now the United States of America were left, up to the time of the separation, with exceedingly little assistance from the mother country to defend themselves from the numerous and warlike tribes of Indians by whom they were surrounded; nay, even during war with France, a large part of the burthen of maintaining the arduous contest with that powerful monarchy with its Indian allies, fell upon the British American provinces, and not upon the mother country. At the present time the Legislature of Jamaica has the entire charge of the fortifications of the island.

New South Wales has now advanced so far in wealth and population, that without further aid from the mother country than you will have learned from my recent Despatches it is intended to afford, the Colony is well able to do what is necessary in order to provide for its own defence.

At the same time Her Majesty's Government will be glad to afford such assistance as can be given with justice to the rest of Her Majesty's subjects in carrying into effect such measures as the Colonial Legislature may consider expedient with a view to its defence. It is not possible to comply with the request that the troops lately sent to New Zealand should be brought back, because measures have already been taken for the reduction of the force in that Colony; but if it should be considered desirable to execute any fortifications by military labour, Her Majesty's Government would willingly take steps for stationing an additional regiment in New South Wales, and also a detachment of sappers and miners, provided the Legislative Council would vote the amount required for their pay, including both their ordinary pay and the working pay to which they would be entitled. No charge would be made upon the Colony for the conveyance of the troops there, nor on account of the claims to pensions which the soldiers would acquire during their stay in the Colony; and further, whenever it became necessary to relieve a regiment so stationed in New South Wales, encouragement would be given to the soldiers belonging to it to take their discharge, thus effecting, without cost to the Colony, a useful addition, not only to its population, but to its means of defence, as men so discharged could, under the existing regulations, be called upon to serve against an enemy in case of need. Her Majesty's Government would also willingly take measures for increasing the number of enrolled pensioners in the Colony, if the Local Legislature would provide for the cost of conveying them there, and settling them in the situations where they might be most useful.

You will take an early opportunity of communicating these observations to the Executive Council; and you will concert with that body the course which it may be expedient to pursue with the view of bringing the subject under the consideration of the Legislative Council.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Grey*.

Appendix, No. 18.

PAPER delivered in by *T. F. Elliot*, Esq.

LETTER from the Colonial Department to the Treasury, on the German Legion at the *Cape of Good Hope.* Appendix, No. 18.

Sir, Downing-street, 4 February 1859.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Bulwer Lytton to request that you will bring under the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury the following statement relative to the employment and pay of the German Legion at the Cape of Good Hope.

At the close of the war the foreign legions which had entered into the service of Great Britain were entitled, by the terms of their enlistment, to receive a certain gratuity, and to be sent to their respective countries at the public expense. This in itself required some outlay, besides which, it was found that some of the men might not meet with a favourable reception at their own homes, and that there would be difficulty in procuring the requisite authority for their transit through intermediate countries. In this position of affairs, it was suggested, so far as regarded the German Legion, that it might be advantageous to themselves, and useful to that Colony, if they were established as military settlers at the Cape of Good Hope. The Governor, Sir George Grey, was consulted, and expressed his concurrence in the scheme, which was thereupon put into course of execution.

The plan was, that such officers and men of the German Legion as would volunteer for the purpose should be settled upon land in suitable stations along the frontier of Kaffraria, upon condition of preserving their military training, and of rendering military service when required. They were, during a term of seven years, to assemble every year for a stated period of exercise, and were to receive during the first three years a commuted pay equal to about half pay, but if called out for actual service, either in support of the civil power or in defence of the country, their receipts were to be increased to full pay, the expense being defrayed in the former instance by the Colony, and in the latter by the Imperial Government.

Only a moderate part of the German Legion, amounting to 2,300 of all ranks, accepted these terms, and proceeded to the Cape. At first it was thought probable by those who sent them out that a large proportion of them would be accompanied by their families, or would marry before proceeding to the Cape; and every facility for these purposes was afforded to them by Her Majesty's Government, not merely by giving a free passage to all the women and children, but by permitting marriages of the soldiers up to the date of embarkation, and even affording a conveyance after the legion to any of their country-women betrothed to men of the corps, according to the customs of Germany. The result, however, was, that whilst the men of all ranks amounted, as above stated, to 2,300, the females of all ages did not exceed 330.

The force behaved very well on the voyage, and arrived in good health and order. Great disappointment, however, was expressed by Governor Sir George Grey in his Despatch of the 25th of March 1857, No. 38, at the scarcity of women, and he describes this as so unfavourable to the prospect that the men would become good settlers, and attended, in his opinion, with such risks of lawless and violent conduct, that he had thought it necessary to keep them under arms. Page 10 of P. P.

When it was pointed out to the Governor, however, by Mr. Labouchere's Despatch of 14th September 1857, No. 239, that this consideration could not, consistently with the terms of the scheme under which the Legion had been sent out, supply a valid reason for retaining them on full pay, be supplied in different Despatches, noted in the margin, explanations which placed the matter in a very different light. He produced evidence to show that at the moment when the Legion arrived, the whole Kaffir race were in a state of great excitement; that serious apprehension of imminent danger to the Colony was entertained not merely by the colonists, but by the officer in command of the troops on the frontier, and that the opportune arrival and display of the new comers as an available military force had therefore been of great importance to the security of the country and the preservation of peace. Page 40 of P. P.

No. 154, 30 Oct. 1857.
" 155, 31 Oct. 1857.
" 173, 26 Nov. 1857.
" 27, 22 Mar. 1858.
(Pages 29, 32, 34, and 37, of P. P.)

Not long afterwards the outbreak of the great Indian mutiny again created a new and unexpected demand for troops. Acting in accordance with urgent exhortations from the Government at home, Sir G. Grey despatched large bodies of British troops to India, but in so doing, he was expressly reminded in one Despatch from the Secretary of State, dated 26th August 1857, that he would still have by him a force in which the German Legion was enumerated as one of the constituents; and in a subsequent Despatch, dated 5th January 1858, No. 286, he was told that, if his retaining the Germans under arms had enabled him (Page 10, P. P., of December 1857).

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Page 41, of P. P.

to increase his succours to India, the result would have been fortunate. These instructions and statements received by Sir G. Grey from the Secretary of State certainly afford Sir G. Grey fair reasons for arguing that he had authority for reckoning on the support of Her Majesty's Government and of Parliament in continuing to keep the Legion embodied, notwithstanding prior objections, until the call and pressure occasioned by the mutiny were over. Accordingly his retention of the Legion on full pay was eventually sanctioned by

Page 43, P. P.

Despatch, dated 5th February 1858, No. 305, up to the close of the financial year ending on the 31st March 1858; after that date it was to cease.

On receiving this intimation, however, Sir George Grey represented, in a Despatch, dated the 17th July last, that the circumstances of the Colony had changed since these instructions to him were written. The powerful Chief, Moshesh, head of the Basutos, had gained great advantages over the Orange Free State, thus threatening the security of the European races generally, and the frontier was placed in so critical a condition, that the British territory must be deemed to be threatened by hostile aggression until these disputes with the Free State could be adjusted, for which purpose Sir George Grey was about to visit the interior. As Governor of the Colony, answerable for its security, he reported his decided opinion that the breaking up of the German Legion would probably bring an enemy into the field, and he stated that for this reason he had felt himself bound to continue to keep the corps embodied for military duty, adding an assurance that it would not be kept under arms a day longer than necessary. In the month of September peace was concluded under Sir George Grey's auspices between the Orange Free State and the Basuto nation; but in the very same month urgent demands reached him from the Governments both of Calcutta and of Bombay for further reinforcements. He immediately despatched 2,500 men, including 1,000 of the German Legion, being as many of that corps as would volunteer for the purpose.

Such having been the course of events up to the date of the latest advices from the Cape, I am desired to express Sir E. Lytton's opinion that there are sufficient reasons to justify an application to Parliament to provide up to the present time, or end of the now current financial year, for the expense occasioned by keeping the German Legion on full pay. Sir E. Lytton thinks it is to be regretted that imperfect information was at first given by Sir George Grey as to his reasons for the measure, and hence that it seemed to rest upon a ground to which Her Majesty's Government justly objected. But it must be admitted that the explanations subsequently afforded by Sir George Grey establish that military necessity which is the proper justification of his conduct in keeping the corps embodied. He has shown that at the time when they arrived the peace of the Colony was in serious danger, and that in the subsequent exigencies of the Indian mutiny the presence of this corps, as an available military force, enabled him to despatch the most material succours to India, and that during the whole period of their sojourn in the Colony there has been no time at which one or the other of these demands for their services has not existed. Nor must it be forgotten that in so largely diminishing the garrison at the Cape as has been done to meet the exigencies of the service in India, a military saving must have been effected at the Cape far greater than the cost of keeping the German Legion as a substitute for part of the withdrawn troops.

On these grounds Sir E. Lytton feels himself warranted in recommending, and he does so most earnestly, and after the most careful investigation of the circumstances, for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury that an estimate should be submitted to Parliament to provide for the difference between the half and the full pay of the German Legion for the period above stated. The exact amount required for the purpose could best be calculated by the War Department, to which office Sir E. Lytton would beg to refer their Lordships for the necessary information on this head.

I am, &c.
(signed) *H. Merivale.*

G. A. Hamilton, Esq.,
&c. &c. &c.

Appendix, No. 19.

REMARKS on Mr. *Elliot's* Memorandum appended to the Report of the Committee on the Military Defence of the Colonies.

THE leading feature of Mr. Elliot's Memorandum is, that while it exposes and condemns the results of the present system, it proposes no practical alteration in that system; consequently, the anomalies and abuses which General Peel points out, and for which he wishes that a remedy be provided, will continue in full force if Mr. Elliot's views be adopted. The Committee was appointed to "prepare a scheme" for the application of certain principles to each Colony; but this task Mr. Elliot, as I contend, does not perform. It is true that he expresses an abstract opinion against scattering our troops in small garrisons, and it is true also that "he prefers the plan by which Her Majesty's Government determines the amount of force which it deems reasonable to allot to different Colonies, as being required by the duties of the Sovereign State, whilst the Colonies themselves must pay for any additional number of troops which they may ask for and obtain." But practically this is nothing else than the present system put into words, inasmuch as Her Majesty's Government now "allots the amount of force which it thinks reasonable," &c.; and if it does not, it can, whenever it pleases, increase or diminish that force.

I do not deny that it would be consistent with the literal terms of Mr. Elliot's definition to throw as much of the responsibility and burden of self-defence on the Colonies as the report recommends, or even more, for the Imperial Government might say that "the duties of the Sovereign State" do not "require any force to be allotted" to any Colony, with or without the exception of the half-dozen military posts enumerated in the Report; but that is not the way in which the plan ever has been worked or will be worked; nor is it the way in which Mr. Elliot conceives its working. That I am right in supposing him not to advocate a change of system is shown by his selection of the North American Colonies as an example of the plan which he prefers. "There," he says, "it is already in operation," and consequently, "a general and intelligible principle is established." Now, it so happens that there is no group of Colonies with which the War Office has been engaged in more constant and irritating correspondence, or about which we have more inconsistent decisions, or which exhibits more marked inequality as regards the plans of defence adopted, the contributions of the various Colonies, and the assistance we have given them, than those of North America. Indeed, it is to this group that I should most naturally recur for illustrations of the present system, involving, as it does (what General Peel calls) "the absence of any fixed and recognized principle in determining questions of military expenditure." Moreover, the practical result, as exemplified in British America, of the system which Mr. Elliot desires to see in general operation is, that in Canada alone has any attempt been made at self-defence (and there it is a feeble and inadequate one); in the other Colonies, comprising, as they do, some of the oldest, most numerous, most prosperous, and most energetic of our Colonial communities, not one farthing is expended or one man raised and trained for the defence of their own lives and properties against foreign enemies. I can hardly conceive that he considers this to be a desirable state of things, or one which ought not only to continue indefinitely in British America, but to be extended over the whole empire.

Nor can I agree with Mr. Elliot that any distinction can be drawn between the system pursued in British America and that pursued at the Cape. In both his principle prevails, for (to use his own words) "the Government determines the amount of force which it deems reasonable to allot to the Colonies respectively, as being required by the duties of the Sovereign State." At the Cape, as we all know, the practical result of this has been what Mr. Elliot calls the "grave fact," and what the Report calls the "gigantic anomaly," of an expenditure in one year of 830,000*l.*

These and similar facts lead to the conclusion that no permanent reduction of expense to this country, and no effective stimulus to Colonial exertions, will be the result of merely recommending, as Mr. Elliot has done, to Government the desirableness of reconsidering the distribution of the army in the Colonies. This has been done over and over again, and nothing has come of it. We have, with trifling exceptions, the same extravagance on our side, the same helplessness on theirs; the same confusion, inconsistency, and disputation which has prevailed more or less for the last century in our military policy towards our Colonies.

I will now proceed to consider Mr. Elliot's principal objections to the report.

His first objection is to a uniform rate of joint contribution. It will be remembered that the two main principles of the plan proposed in the report are—(1.) Colonial responsibility and management. (2.) Joint contribution at a uniform rate. Of these, the former is infinitely the more important; and, if it be admitted, the precise mode in which the mother country should assist the Colony is comparatively immaterial. It must necessarily be by a contribution of some kind either in men or money, and I feel assured that a uniform rate for such contribution will be found both more fair and more likely to answer practically than any other arrangement. If it be objected to, we must adopt a rate varying according to some other intelligible and definite principle; and I can conceive no other than one varying according either to the capacity of the different Colonies, or according

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to their exposure to danger. Now, the application of either of these tests would lead to a result far more anomalous and unsatisfactory than the adoption of a uniform rate. It is absolutely impossible to gauge, even approximately, the comparative capacities or resources of different countries; you cannot do it according to revenue, because that depends on willingness quite as much as on ability to support taxation (for example, Austria has a larger revenue than the United States, but no one supposes she has greater means of raising one); nor can you do it according to population, because the producing power of different races, or of the same races in different circumstances, varies indefinitely; but even if you could, I see no justice in dealing with your Colonies as if they were paupers, and giving them money, or money's worth, on account of or in proportion to their poverty; nor do I think that small Colonies have any claim to get their public services performed more cheaply than large ones at other people's expense. The ground of their claim upon us is the fact of their dependence, and that applies equally to the large and the small. It is a matter of justice, not of charity; and Mr. Elliot, in favouring the eleemosynary principle, puts the matter, as I conceive, on a wrong basis altogether. The apportionment of contribution according to exposure to attack would be, if possible, even more impracticable, for the danger of attack which a country lies under depends on such numerous and perpetually varying circumstances, geographical, political, and military, that it may at once be discarded as a basis for any permanent arrangement. If, however, a better way of working out a scheme of joint contribution than that of a uniform rate can be devised, I, for one, should be perfectly ready to consider it; the only principle on which I desire to insist as essential, being that of a common defence under colonial management, as distinguished from that (now in force) of separation and independence, both of action and contribution, the mother country having the primary responsibility.

According to the former, which is the course recommended in the report, the whole system of defence, including the amount of force, would be decided on by the Colony, as the most competent and most interested party, and to the expense of that system the mother country would contribute. According to the latter, which is the course recommended by Mr. Elliot, neither party would have the power or the obligation to provide for the whole defence of a colony; but the mother country would provide for Imperial interests, and the Colony would either provide for colonial interests, or leave them unprovided for.

Of the latter system, the fruits are before us, in the fact that we incur an enormous outlay for what Mr. Elliot admits to be, in a military point of view, a most imperfect and inadequate result; while the Colonies do virtually nothing. Of the former system we have also had experience; and I will now endeavour to show how it worked as regards military efficiency, not insisting for the present on its more obvious recommendations of justice and economy.

For 150 years after we had colonized North America, the principle of Colonial self-defence prevailed there almost exclusively. The British colonists found themselves in contact with native nations, more numerous, more warlike, and better organized than any which modern colonists have had to deal with. They were also surrounded by and intermingled with the Colonies of several European nations, each of which separately was in the habit of meeting England in war on equal terms, both by sea and land, viz., the French, the Spaniards, and the Dutch. In all our Colonies there were "Imperial interests" to be protected, that is, there were points of great strategical and commercial importance, such as Boston, New York, Charlestown, and many others. Yet in those days it was not considered by the mother country that it was her interest to garrison her colonies, nor did it ever occur to the colonists that when for their own objects they sought, by emigrating, an asylum of freedom, or a new field of enterprise and profit, they were entitled thereby to claim immunity from the responsibility of self-defence, which devolves on the members of every other organized community in the world. On the contrary, they were content to know that with the greater advantages of a new country, they must meet greater hardships and dangers. They never thought that they were to take the former, and to be protected at other people's expense from the latter.

Until the year 1754 I can only find two instances when regular soldiers were sent to British America. One was in 1664, in the case of the army which took New York; and the other in 1695, when a body of troops was sent to reinforce the colonists who were carrying on war against the French. In 1754, a change of policy occurred in this respect for the first time. Braddock was sent to America with a considerable force, the English Mutiny Act was extended for the first time to the Colonies, and they were never again without British troops till we recognized their independence.

Let us see how this system (the idea of applying which, in a modified form, and under circumstances beyond comparison more favourable, appears now so rash and ruinous) actually worked. In the first place, the British Colonies not only successfully established themselves and resisted all attacks on them, but they attacked and conquered foreign possessions, and handed them over to the British Crown; secondly, they attained great prosperity; their increase, as regards commerce and population, from the commencement of the 18th century to the declaration of independence, being as great as any recorded in history, except that of Australia and California, since the discovery of gold; thirdly, they produced and trained a race of statesmen and soldiers, who proved themselves at least equal to the greatest of their European contemporaries. What I have said is illustrated by almost every page of early Colonial history; and I know of no history more fruitful in the record of heroic deeds. For example, in 1710, the American Colonists conquered Nova Scotia

Scotia from the French without any help from England. In 1745, three New England States, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut, of which the whole population at that time was only about 300,000, organized and equipped a naval and military expedition against Louisburg, a fortress described by a contemporary historian as "of prodigious strength," garrisoned by 600 regulars and 1,300 militia, and took it after a regular siege, with 49 days of open trenches, its fall involving the surrender of the whole of Cape Breton. The expense, amounting to 200,000*l.*, was defrayed in the first place by the colonists, and only repaid to them by England after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, by which Louisburg was restored to France.

It would have seemed strange to the men who executed such military operations as these to be told (as Mr. Elliot says of the people of Nova Scotia) that they "could not be expected" to provide for the defence of their own capitals. Yet the population of the three Colonies which conquered Cape Breton was not so large, collectively, as that of Nova Scotia alone, nor was their commerce so great, nor were they, like her, within eight days steaming of the aid of the mother country. If there had been a British garrison in those days at Boston, a place as "important to the general power of the empire" as Halifax is now, the people of New England would soon have found out that they too "could not be expected" even to contribute towards defending it.

I next come to the consideration of Mr. Elliot's opinion, that the dependence of the Colonies is not the only ground for our undertaking to defend them, and his argument that the interest we have in their defence constitutes alone a sufficient ground for such undertaking. This view may be perhaps best tested by considering a case where we have "interest" without "dependence." We have a strong interest in the defence of Belgium, if for no other reason, because we are bound by treaty to protect it; indeed, I think it will hardly be denied that there is no British Colony of which the security against foreign conquest is more important to us, and certainly there is not one half as much danger of being conquered. Yet it would seem very strange if Belgium proposed that we should undertake the expense of fortifying Antwerp and the maintenance of its garrison. We should of course reply that though we had an interest in the security of Belgium, that of the Belgians was so much more powerful and direct, that it was for them and not for us to provide for it. We should probably add the expression of our opinion, that the business would be better done if they managed it by themselves and in their own way than if we interfered; and this is precisely what we ought to say to the Colonies, except that, as was said in the Report, their dependence on us imposes on us an obligation to give them material assistance. I therefore propose to deal with them as we should with Belgium, only so far as is consistent with a reasonable discharge of the obligation.

Although I consider that this is a sufficient answer to the whole argument about "interest," I cannot pass by without remark the illustrations by which Mr. Elliot endeavours to show the importance to England of the political connexion with the Colonies. I do so the more willingly because the fallacy (as I conceive it to be) which he employs is one very generally received.

Mr. Elliot argues that the fact of Australia taking our exports, to the amount of "nearly 12*l.*" a head of her population, while the United States take them only at the rate of "less than 1*l.*," "shows how much larger in proportion is the commerce with countries which remain part of the empire." I might with equal justice and greater plausibility (the cases being far more analogous) argue that because the United States take, in proportion to population, a greater amount of our exports than Canada, that fact "shows how much larger is the commerce with countries which do not remain part of the empire."*

The truth is, that in neither the one case nor the other have the political conditions of the respective countries anything to do with the matter. It is governed to a certain extent, perhaps, at first, by origin, but mainly and permanently by economical conditions, *i. e.*, on the one hand by the purchasing power, and on the other by the varying productions and wants of their people respectively. In the first place, Australia, having, like all young countries, a very imperfect division of labour, produces very few kinds of articles, and, of course, imports almost everything that she consumes; while the United States, with a vast population, and a territory embracing every variety of climate, are, to a great extent, self-supplying. In the second place, Australia producing nothing analogous to British manufactures, has no temptation to enact a protective tariff, while the converse is the case with the United States, which have a powerful manufacturing interest, and therefore seek to protect it. If the Australians thought a protective tariff conducive to their interests, they would immediately enact one. This is not a mere theory: it is proved by facts, as nearly as possible to demonstration. Instead of comparing two countries so entirely dissimilar as Australia and the United States, I will adopt the more opposite course of comparing—

1. Two countries, one a colony and the other independent, of which the economical conditions are tolerably similar; and—

2. Two different periods of the same country's existence, involving different sets of political conditions.

1. The

* The population of the United States may be estimated at 28,000,000 for the year 1859, in which they imported from Great Britain to the value of 22,611,283*l.*, or about 16*s.* per head. The population of Canada was estimated by its Finance Minister at "nearly 3,000,000" in the same year, and its imports from Great Britain were 1,854,821*l.*, or somewhat more than 12*s.* per head.

Appendix, No. 19.

1. The difference between the tariff of the United States and that of Canada (as regards the present question) is just this, that in the former British manufactures are charged with a duty of 24 per cent., and in the latter of 20 per cent., with the exception of leather and clothes, which, on account of some special interest, are charged at 25 per cent. Such is the exact amount of the difference in the obstacles which our trade meets with in our own dependency and the neighbouring foreign State respectively, the result being, as I have shown, that we export more to the foreigner than to the colonist.

And it is further to be observed, that the present American tariff is less, the Canadian tariff more, protective than the last; showing that while the Canadians are following the old path, and protecting in proportion as the interests which demand protection grow powerful, the Americans are beginning to see the folly of restrictive tariffs, and show a tendency at least towards greater freedom of trade.

2. I have compared the statistics of our trade with the United States, before and after their independence, with the following results:* From 1760 to 1770, the last decade of their colonial dependence, the average annual exports from this country to British North America were 1,763,409 *l.* (official value). From 1783 to 1790, the first seven years after our recognition of their independence, the average annual exports, similarly calculated, were 2,349,040 *l.* From 1805 to 1808, the average annual exports were 6,479,277 *l.* These figures show that the dissolution of the connexion with England caused no appreciable injury to the commercial intercourse of the two countries, although the period to which they relate embraces a transition from a system under which the mother country had a strict monopoly of the trade with her colonies, to one under which the latter enjoyed, of course, unlimited access to all the markets of the world.

It is true, as Mr. Elliot says, that "the habit of resorting to a particular market" has a considerable effect upon commerce, but he has not explained what that has to do with the political connexion, which is the only relevant question; and I have shown, on the contrary, that in the case of the only available precedent, the habit of resorting to a particular market survived the change from dependence to independence, nor is there any ground whatever for supposing that it could cease to operate on the Australians, merely because their political connexion with England was dissolved.

Mr. Elliot concludes his memorandum by making a division of the colonies into groups; not, however, with the view of proposing specific arrangements with respect to military expenditure to suit the circumstances of each group, but merely, as I understand, in order to show the dissimilarity of the colonies *inter se*, and the consequent injustice of applying a uniform rule, as regards military expenditure, to all. "Surely," he says, "it is quite as unjust to apply a uniform rule to different cases as to apply a varying rule to cases which are alike." He supports this view by describing the local peculiarities of the various colonies, and follows up his description by saying, "It will be seen at a glance that it would be difficult to frame a general rule which shall be equally applicable to all of such dissimilar societies." Now, it is essential to bear in mind that the only point on which "uniformity of rule" is sought to be applied to these dissimilar societies is the support of the charges made necessary for their own defence. Attention to this point will, I think, lead at once to a discovery of the fallacy of Mr. Elliot's argument. It is not only British Colonies that differ from each other in almost every conceivable way. France and Java, India and Denmark, Cuba and Madagascar, differ from each other, as regards their wealth and their poverty, their dependence and their independence, their security and their insecurity, even more widely than any British colonies; yet to all of them this "uniform rule" properly and justly applies, that they provide the means, either in men or money, of defending themselves against internal anarchy and foreign aggression. What Mr. Elliot had to show for the purposes of his argument was, not that the British colonies are *unlike* each other materially and socially, but that they are *like* each other, while differing from all the rest of the world, in their exceptional right to make other people pay for protecting them. It is strange how completely in this discussion the fact is ignored that we are not proposing to apply a new and untried principle to British colonies, but merely suggesting an approach, in a gradual and modified form, to a "uniformity of rule," which has always prevailed, under infinitely varying circumstances, everywhere else, and to which they form the sole and monstrous exception.

The only group on which Mr. Elliot's observations appear to call for special remark from me is that of the West Indies. Here he deserts the ground of defence against foreign aggression, and lays down broadly our obligations to keep troops there for the purpose of preserving "the existence of society," intimating that without such a force they would be in danger of "falling into helpless and perhaps sanguinary anarchy;" and again, "that without troops these Colonies could not exist." If such were really the case, I think it would be difficult to justify our maintaining indefinitely, by the pressure of external force, a society so rotten as to be utterly incapable of holding together alone. But I entirely dissent from this gloomy view. If the negroes were slaves, or if they were, though nominally free, a down-trodden and oppressed race, there might be a danger of Jacobinical insurrection; but the converse of this is the case. The complaint is that the engroes have, under the existing arrangements of society, entirely their own way; and if so, there appears to be no temptation to alter them by violence.

At any rate, the principle laid down by the Secretary of State for War, in the letter on which the appointment of the Committee was founded (and concurred in by the Lords of

* The statistics in the text are taken from the Tables in Pitkin's "History of the Commerce of the United States."

of the Treasury and the Secretary of State for the Colonies), was, that "military expenditure for purposes of internal police should be defrayed by local funds"—a principle which would go even farther than that suggested in the Report, inasmuch as it would deprive the West Indies of any claim even for Imperial contribution towards a force kept for the purposes of preventing internal disturbance.

I must add, that it is difficult to understand why, upon any view of the subject, we keep black troops in the West Indies; as, in the case of a Negro insurrection (the only alleged danger to "society"), they would not only be untrustworthy, but formidable; and no one, I suppose, believes that they would be capable of meeting French or American troops in the field.

In conclusion, I wish emphatically to repeat, that the real question is not whether the arrangements which we make for the defence of our Colonies are capable or not of being improved, by re-distribution of force here or reduction of force there, but whether they are not radically wrong, *i. e.*, based on a theory fundamentally erroneous. The view which I believe to be the right one is, that when a part of the people of an old country voluntarily "swarms" to a new one, there is neither justice nor policy in permitting the emigrants to throw on those whom they leave behind the responsibility and charge of keeping the new society together, and defending it against the dangers to which its own act has exposed it. And I must again point out that, speaking generally, no colonizing country except England, and England only in comparatively modern days, has ever done so. The Colonies of all other nations, ancient and modern, and English Colonies till we quarrelled with America, have either defended themselves or paid their full share of the expenses of the common defence. Between a Greek metropolis and her Colonies there was a bond of amity, amounting virtually, though not in express terms, to an offensive and defensive alliance; but the obligation was strictly reciprocal: if Athens considered herself bound to assist the Ionian cities against the Persian king; on the other hand, the Syracusan triremes fought in a Peloponnesian quarrel, as part of the Corinthian contingent, at Ægos-Potamos. We cannot deal in this way with our Colonies, because they were formed with the understanding that they were to remain "part of the empire," and have a right, so long as they choose to assert it, to the fulfilment of this virtual compact. But it is desirable, both for our sakes and theirs, to reduce to the minimum the incidents of their dependence; for ours, because we have a right to discharge ourselves, so far as justice and honour permit, of the material burdens caused by a relation which does not bring us any corresponding material advantages; for theirs, because, in proportion as they learn to provide for their own wants, and to assert their own rights, instead of leaning on others, their national character will be elevated and strengthened, and they will be prepared for the day when their independence shall become inevitable. It is on this view that the plan of military defence suggested in the report is based, inasmuch as, by throwing on the Colonies the primary responsibility of their own defence, and confining the assistance of the mother country to a contribution or a contingent, it involves the smallest possible amount, consistently with the circumtances of the case, of interference with their freedom and independence of action.

(signed) *John Robert Godley.*

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The contributions by Canada or the other North American Colonies to the military expenditure therein do not pass through the War Office, and witness knows nothing about the application of these sums, *Whiffen* 747-750——With regard to certain items of Colonial expenditure at the Cape of Good Hope and other Colonies, these do not pass through the army accounts, and are not credited to the Imperial Exchequer, *ib.* 752-456——Colonial and not Imperial expenditure represented by the sums which are not brought to account in this country, *ib.* 765.

Explanation as to the extent to which the War Office is cognizant of the several contributions by the Colonies towards the military expenditure, *Whiffen* 813-830. 933-935. 962-971. 975-980——Means of the War Office for knowing the sums paid over from the Colonies to the Treasury; these are not at all applied to the military service, *ib.* 893-909——Proper duty of the War Office to see that the payments for which the Colonies are liable have been duly made; difficulty hereon through the possibility of Colonial payments reaching the Exchequer without the cognizance of the War Office, *ib.* 944-963——Control by the Treasury in regard to the expenditure out of the Treasury chest abroad, *ib.* 967-971.

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C.

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3. *Difficulty as regards a Colonial Military Contribution.*
4. *Imperial Cost in the event of an American War.*
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1. *Particulars of the Military Expenditure in different Periods.*
2. *Arrangement for a Colonial Contribution: Question of Increasing the Charge.*
3. *Colonial Expenditure of* 150,000 *l. through the War.*
4. *Question of leaving to the Colonists the entire Responsibility of Dealing with the Natives.*
5. *Prospect of the continuance of Peace, without Imperial Aid, when the present War is over.*
6. *Number of Imperial Troops at different Periods.*
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2. *Precedent in the case of the early Colonies in North America.*
3. *Amount of the Imperial Force.*
4. *Militia amd Volunteers.*
5. *Project of a Railway for Imperial Purposes.*
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7. *Imperial and Colonial Expenditure respectively.*

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Responsibility of this country for the colonial feeling in regard to self-defence, *Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone* 3829. 3841, 3842——Witness looks less to the reduction of cost to the mother country than to a transfer of the responsibility, *ib.* 3833, 3834——Greater safety by the adoption of the principle of self-defence, *ib.* 3858——There seems no reason why colonists of the present day should do less for their own defence than colonists of the last century, *ib.* 3867, 3868.

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